Goodwill indemnity in Spain: limits of a waiver

15 November 2026

  • Spain
  • Distribution
  • Litigation

In Spain, a waiver of goodwill indemnity in a distribution agreement does not always protect the manufacturer. The Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal ordered a manufacturer to pay its distributor more than EUR 100,000 in goodwill indemnity and damages for insufficient notice, despite the written waiver, because it held that the agreement had expired and that good faith limited the waiver’s effect. To avoid the same risk, the manufacturer should renew the agreement in writing before it expires or expressly provide that waivers remain effective, specify which customer base the waiver covers and give notice proportionate to the duration of the relationship.

Summary

  • The distributor’s case and the manufacturer’s liability
  • What the Court of Appeal decided on the waiver
  • Why the waiver was not applied
  • A valid waiver with limits: distribution and agency
  • Whether the waiver should have fallen away with the agreement
  • What manufacturers distributing in Spain should do

Goodwill indemnity in Spain: the distributor’s case

For more than twenty years, the manufacturer and distributor worked together without a written agreement. In 2018, they signed a two-year contract. The distributor agreed to waive both goodwill indemnity and damages arising from termination.

The agreement expired in December 2020. Neither party renewed it, but they continued doing business together.

Months later, the manufacturer decided to end the relationship. It gave less than two months’ notice and alleged breaches by the distributor that it was unable to prove.

Waiver of goodwill indemnity: what the Court of Appeal decided

In a distribution relationship, the distributor can waive goodwill indemnity. In an agency relationship, an advance waiver is not permitted. In this case, however, the Court of Appeal held that the waiver no longer applied because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The court also considered that good faith could limit the waiver’s effect, given the length of the relationship and its termination without good cause.

The argument based on expiry is debatable: a clause intended to govern the end of an agreement should not lose its effect simply because that agreement ends. To avoid this uncertainty, parties that continue trading after expiry should renew the agreement in writing or expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

Why was the goodwill indemnity waiver not applied?

The Court of Appeal relied on two grounds.

The first was the expiry of the agreement. Since the parties had continued trading without signing a new document, the court held that the waiver was no longer effective when the manufacturer ended the relationship.

The second was good faith. Even if the waiver still applied, the court considered that it could not take full effect in those circumstances: more than twenty-five years of collaboration, a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause.

Goodwill indemnity waiver: valid, but with limits

The judgment is surprising because a distributor can, in principle, waive this indemnity. To understand why, it helps to distinguish distribution from agency.

In agency relationships, the law protects the agent against an advance waiver. This follows from Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992, read together with the goodwill indemnity provisions in Article 28.

In distribution relationships, the Spanish Supreme Court applies Article 28 by analogy where its requirements are met (judgment 944/2023 of 13 June). But this does not prevent a manufacturer and distributor from agreeing to exclude all compensation if either party terminates the agreement on notice. The Supreme Court confirmed this in its judgments of 4 December 2007, 15 January 2008, sitting in plenary session, and 25 April 2011.

The distinction lies in how the relationship ends. That case law concerns ordinary termination, whether on notice or on expiry of the agreed term. A waiver offers less certainty where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice, as happened here.

Should the waiver have fallen away with the agreement?

Of the Court of Appeal’s two grounds, the first is the more debatable: that the waiver ceased to apply because the agreement had expired.

The Spanish Supreme Court has enforced exclusion clauses precisely after an agreement has expired. It did so in its judgment of 23 December 2008. In that case, a dealer’s agreement ended when its extension expired. The court refused goodwill compensation because the agreement itself excluded any claim arising from its termination.

The point is straightforward: if a clause is agreed to govern what happens when an agreement ends, it is difficult to argue that it loses its effect merely because the agreement ends.

There is a difference here: the parties continued trading after expiry and, according to the Court of Appeal, did so on the terms that had traditionally governed their relationship. But continuing to trade does not, by itself, show that they intended to set aside a waiver relating to the customer base developed up to that point.

There is an agency case that might appear to point the other way. The Supreme Court has prevented parties from dividing the indemnity into separate periods through successive declarations that there was “nothing further to claim” (judgment of 27 June 2013). Its reason, however, was the mandatory protection afforded by Article 28 of the Spanish Commercial Agency Act, which the parties cannot exclude. That restriction does not apply to distribution.

Even if the waiver remained effective, there would still be the question of notice. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss. They compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business and would therefore not necessarily be covered by that waiver.

What should manufacturers distributing in Spain do?

Businesses may continue trading as usual and overlook the fact that their agreement has expired. This judgment illustrates the risk: when the time comes to end the relationship, the manufacturer may discover that the protections it relied on are no longer effective.

The agreement should be renewed in writing before it expires. If the parties have already continued trading without renewal, they should document which terms still apply and expressly provide that waivers remain effective both after expiry and while the relationship continues without a new document.

It is also important to specify which customer base the waiver covers. If it is intended to include the customer base already built up, this should be stated expressly, with a reference date, a defined territory and confirmation that the waiver is final.

Finally, goodwill indemnity, damages for insufficient notice and other damages should be addressed separately. When ending the relationship, the manufacturer should give notice proportionate to its duration.

Frequently asked questions on goodwill indemnity in Spain

Is a waiver of goodwill indemnity valid in a distribution agreement in Spain?

In principle, yes: in distribution the distributor can waive the indemnity, whereas in agency the law protects the agent against an advance waiver (Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992). A waiver offers less certainty, however, where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice.

What happens to the waiver if the agreement expires and the parties keep trading?

The risk is that it will not be applied. In the case decided by the Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal, the waiver was held to be no longer effective because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The argument is debatable, but to avoid uncertainty the agreement should be renewed in writing or should expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

Can good faith limit a waiver of goodwill indemnity?

According to the court, in that case it could: after more than twenty-five years of collaboration, with a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause, the waiver could not take full effect.

Does the waiver also cover damages for insufficient notice?

Not necessarily. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss, because they compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business.

How should the waiver be worded to cover the customer base already built up?

It must say so expressly: the waiver should state a reference date, a defined territory and that the waiver is final.

How much notice must the manufacturer give?

The article does not give a number of days: it says that notice must be proportionate to the duration of the relationship. In the case examined, the manufacturer gave less than two months’ notice after more than twenty-five years of collaboration.

Abstract: In February 2022, this previous article examined the adoption of Legislative Decree No. 198 of November 8, 2021 (the “Decree”), through which Italy transposed Directive (EU) 2019/633 (the “Directive”) on unfair commercial practices in business-to-business relationships within the agri-food supply chain.

Four years later, the regulatory framework has evolved and the landscape has changed in part: the Italian legislature has made several amendments to the Decree, the designated enforcement authority has significantly stepped up its activities, and the first court decisions regarding the application of the Decree have been issued.

This article aims to provide an updated overview.

The Regulatory Framework: Original Structure and Subsequent Amendments

The implementation of the Directive provided the Italian legislature with an opportunity to overhaul the pre-existing national regulations governing the agri-food supply chain—in particular those set forth in Article 62 of Decree-Law No. 1/2012. The result is a unified and systematic regulatory framework on the subject, contained in the Decree that entered into force on December 15, 2021.

For an analysis of the structure and key provisions of the Decree, please refer to the previous article. The fundamental structural choices described in that article remain in effect: the Decree establishes mandatory contractual requirements for operators in the agricultural and food sector, identifies unfair practices that are always prohibited (the so-called “blacklist”) and those prohibited unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties (the so-called “gray list”), regulates below-cost sales (not covered by the Directive), provides for a comprehensive system of penalties to punish any violations, and designates the Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention (ICQRF) as the authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the Decree’s provisions.

What is of interest here are the legislative amendments that have modified and supplemented the original text of the Decree. As will be seen, these amendments have tightened regulations that were already stricter than European standards at the time of the Decree’s adoption.

The first amendment was introduced by Decree-Law No. 21/2022, which expanded the definition of perishable products to include meat-based products with specific physicochemical characteristics, and extended the applicability of the 30-day payment terms to the following agricultural and food products:

“a) prepackaged products bearing an expiration date or a minimum shelf life not exceeding sixty days;

  1. b) bulk products, even if placed in protective packaging or refrigerated, that have not undergone treatments designed to extend their shelf life beyond sixty days;
    c) meat products exhibiting one of the following physicochemical characteristics: awgreater than 0.95 and pH greater than 5.2, or awgreater than 0.91, or pH equal to or greater than 4.5;
  2. d) all types of milk.”

 

Subsequently, Decree-Law No. 69/2023 expanded the scope of the Decree to include “suppliers established in other Member States or in third countries when the buyer is established in Italy.” Therefore, today, the Decree applies to all business-to-business (B2B) sales contracts in which the supplier and/or the buyer is established in Italy, regardless of the parties’ turnover and the law applicable to the contract. This is an extremely broad scope of application, capable of effectively encompassing any commercial relationship in which at least one of the parties is Italian. This deliberate departure from the differentiated turnover thresholds provided for by the Directive—justified, according to the legislature, by the extraordinary fragmentation of the Italian agri-food supply chain—continues to define the broader scope of the Italian regime compared to the minimum level of harmonization established by the EU.

Decree-Law No. 69/2023 also amended the minimum notice period for the buyer’s cancellation of orders for perishable products, prohibiting any “notice period so short as to reasonably lead one to believe that the supplier cannot find alternative outlets for its products” and delegating to a subsequent implementing regulation (not yet issued) to establish specific rules governing this matter. Finally, the provision extended to foreign suppliers the right to file complaints with the national enforcement authority (ICQRF).

The most recent amendment to the Decree was introduced by Decree-Law No. 63/2024, which

  • added the provision that the supply price must take into account the cost of production
  • specified that wholesale markets also fall within the scope of the Decree
  • included, among the documents that the ICQRF may obtain, accounting documents relating to sales activities and related services, and
  • introduced the possibility of paying any penalties imposed under the Decree at a reduced rate, provided the contractor demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to mitigate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

 

The cumulative effect of the amendments outlined above is the establishment of regulations that are even stricter than those that took effect in December 2021 (which were already significantly more restrictive than the Directive).

Mandatory Contractual Requirements: Persistent Compliance Challenges

Article 3 of the Decree imposes several mandatory requirements for contracts for the sale of agricultural and food products: written form, a minimum term of 12 months, specification of the product’s quantity and characteristics, a fixed or determinable price that reflects production costs, and definition of the terms of delivery and payment.

However, the legislature’s intention to establish a system that safeguards the contractual rights of the parties has clashed with the reality of commercial transactions in this sector. In fact, experience has shown that these contractual requirements remain the primary source of difficulty for operators in complying with the Decree. It is therefore not surprising that many of the objections raised by the ICQRF over the years have concerned precisely this aspect.

The written form requirement is particularly critical: a significant percentage of operators, especially in sectors characterized by long-standing informal commercial relationships (the prime example being the wine sector), continue to conclude transactions without an adequate written framework agreement, relying instead on commercial customs and verbal agreements that the Decree does not recognize as sufficient. It is no coincidence that the reports issued by the ICQRF in recent years list the failure to enter into written contracts prior to the delivery of the products sold   among the most frequent violations found.

Another aspect that is frequently penalized is the unilateral modification of prices: in several cases, buyers have attempted to adjust agreed-upon prices without the supplier’s written consent—a practice that the Decree expressly prohibits and that has been the subject of the first judicial decisions issued on the matter (which will be discussed in paragraph 6).

Italian Specifics: Additional Prohibited Practices and Below-Cost Sales

In addition to the “black list” and “gray list” of unfair practices prohibited by the Directive, Article 5 of the Decree identifies and prohibits 16 additional unfair practices, which stem from the pre-existing Italian regulatory framework. These include, for example, the purchase of agricultural and food products through double-reduction electronic tenders and auctions, the application of objectively different conditions for equivalent services, and the obtaining of undue unilateral benefits not justified by the nature or content of the commercial relationship.

An interesting feature of the Italian list is its explicitly bilateral nature: unlike the Directive, which was designed to protect suppliers from potential abuses by larger and more powerful buyers, Article 5 of the Decree prohibits various unfair practices that also apply to suppliers, including the imposition of an unduly short expiration date, the forced maintenance of a specific product range, and the requirement to reserve a privileged shelf position for certain products. The Decree, therefore, also protects—in certain cases—buyers.

Another distinctive feature of Italian law (and that of a few other countries in the European Union—Spain, Croatia, and Hungary) is the regulation of below-cost sales, which is not covered by the Directive.

Under Article 7 of the Decree, sales below production cost are permitted only in two circumstances:

  • when perishable products are at risk of spoilage, or
  • if the commercial transaction has been planned and agreed upon in writing with the supplier. In all other cases, the price of the product sold below cost is automatically adjusted.

It should be noted that the replacement criteria specified by the legislature (purchase invoices, average production costs, average product price) are unclear and have been subject to various interpretations.

The penalties for violating the ban on below-cost sales are severe: administrative fines ranging from 1 to 6 million euros and suspension of business operations for up to 20 days in cases of repeat offenses or particularly serious violations.

In any case, selling below cost is not merely a national issue; in fact, in its report dated December 1, 2025, on the evaluation of the Directive, the Commission indicated that it will propose a revision of the Directive to establish the principle that farmers should not be forced to systematically sell their products below production costs. We can therefore expect changes to the European regulations governing this issue.

The Penalty System

The Decree contains a comprehensive system of penalties, calibrated according to the nature and severity of the violation.

Failure to comply with the provisions of the Decree results, depending on the case, in three types of consequences, which may apply cumulatively:

  1. Invalidity of the offending contractual clause, which is automatically replaced where the Decree so provides: for example, a term of less than 12 months is extended to that minimum period; a price below the cost of production is adjusted upward.
  2. Monetary penalties: fines ranging from a fixed minimum of between 1,000 and 30,000 euros, depending on the obligation violated, to a maximum varying from 3% to 5% of the annual revenue of the party responsible for the violation, which may be increased up to two or three times in the event of repeated violations, with an overall maximum limit of 10% of revenue. With specific regard to unfair practices, Article 10 of the Decree provides that those included on the “blacklist” are subject to administrative penalties ranging from 30,000 euros to 5% of the previous year’s revenue; those included on the “gray list” are subject to fines ranging from 15,000 euros to 3% of revenue; other practices prohibited under Article 5 are subject to penalties ranging from 5,000 euros to 4% of revenue.
  3. Compensation for Damages: Injured parties and their representative organizations may, in any case, file claims for compensation for damages (all of which must be proven).

 

As previously mentioned, starting in 2024, an operator subject to a monetary penalty may, within a strict deadline of thirty days from the notification of the injunction order, pay the penalty at a 50% reduction if the operator demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to eliminate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

Enforcement of the Regulations: The Expanding Role of the ICQRF

Four years after its designation as the competent supervisory authority in Italy pursuant to the Decree, the ICQRF (Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention) has become one of the most active supervisory bodies in the European Union in this sector. Working in coordination with the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Agri-Food Products, it conducts inspections both in response to reports and on its own initiative.

The gradual intensification of this agency’s activities is remarkable. In 2022, the ICQRF conducted 139 inspections. By 2025, that number had risen to 3,536. Inspections resulting from complaints are—in fact—extremely rare, while the majority of inspections are carried out on the agency’s own initiative. Operators’ reluctance to file complaints—a phenomenon common across all EU member states and largely attributable to fears of commercial retaliation by stronger business partners—has made proactive enforcement the primary mechanism in practice.

The most recent ICQRF reports confirm a significant upward trend in the volume of inspections, the number of operators investigated (76 in 2022 versus 1,430 in 2025), and the number of violations detected (15 in 2022, 562 in 2025). The sectors subject to the most frequent inspections are dairy products and fruits and vegetables, both characterized by large, structurally powerful buyers and a highly fragmented supplier base.

The most commonly found violations include unilateral changes to contractual terms by the buyer, failure to comply with mandatory payment terms, and the absence of written sales contracts.

Case Law on Unfair Practices in the Agri-Food Supply Chain

The intensification of inspections and the issuance of injunctions against operators has, as was to be expected, led to the first disputes and, consequently, to the first court decisions regarding the Decree.

Following appeals filed by certain operators in the dairy sector against administrative sanctions imposed for unilaterally modifying the agreed-upon price of milk, several trial courts (specifically the Court of Brescia and the Milan Court of Appeals) have confirmed that any price modification requires the written consent of all contracting parties. This is consistent with the text of the Decree, which prohibits unilateral changes to agreed-upon contractual terms and requires that agreements between the parties be in writing.

In Judgment No. 1225 of April 29, 2025, published on June 12, 2025, the Milan Court of Appeals ruled that a letter revising the criteria for calculating the price—sent by the buyer to the supplier, not preceded by negotiations between the parties, and not signed by the supplier to indicate acceptance—constitutes a unilateral modification of the contractual terms relating to the price, which is punishable under Article 4(d) of the Decree. In fact, it cannot be considered a written agreement (since it is signed by only one party). It is true that Article 3 of the Decree provides for the possibility of fulfilling the written form requirement through “equivalent forms,” but this is conditional on the fundamental contractual elements (including the price) having been previously agreed upon between the buyer and the supplier through a framework agreement.

Therefore, it is irrelevant that, in the present case, the supplier, by continuing to make deliveries, behaved in a manner that could be construed as tacit acceptance of the amendment, given that price agreements cannot be established through “equivalent forms.”

The body of case law remains limited, so it is premature to draw definitive conclusions about the direction of case law in this area.

However, there is no doubt that the operational boundaries of the penalty regime are gradually being defined and the interpretive limits of the Decree’s provisions are being clarified.

Conclusion

The Italian regulatory framework governing unfair commercial practices in the agricultural and food supply chain has, in the more than four years since its entry into force, moved from theory to practical application.

The basic framework described in the previous article has been supplemented by subsequent legislative amendments, and enforcement of the regulations is overseen by a regulatory authority that has demonstrated both the will and the capacity to act. The proactive approach of the ICQRF, which is increasingly active in its role as an enforcement authority, leaves no doubt that compliance with the Decree is a practical imperative, not merely a theoretical one.

For operators active in the Italian agri-food supply chain—whether they are suppliers, buyers, or intermediaries—the priorities are clear:

  • contracts must be in writing and comply with the mandatory requirements set forth in the Decree
  • business practices must be reviewed to verify their compliance with the law and ensure they do not fall under the list of prohibited practices, and
  • Business processes must ensure that each operator adheres to good commercial practices in its dealings with its partners and other operators in the supply chain.

France regulates unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain more strictly than Directive (EU) 2019/633 requires. Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 30 June 2021 transposed the Directive into a framework already built by the Egalim laws, and France chose not to apply the turnover thresholds set out in the Directive: the rules therefore cover all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, whatever the size or nationality of the parties. Written annual agreements signed before 1 March, automatic price revision clauses, capped payment terms and administrative fines reaching €2 million, doubled for repeat infringements, are the core of the regime, enforced by the DGCCRF.

Summary

  1. Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when
  2. Products covered by the French rules
  3. Scope of the French rules compared with the Directive
  4. Suppliers and buyers covered, regardless of size and nationality
  5. Applicable law and jurisdiction in international supply contracts
  6. Where French law goes further than the Directive
  7. Mandatory content of an agri-food supply agreement
  8. Penalties for breaching the contractual requirements
  9. Unfair practices prohibited beyond the Directive
  10. Penalties for unfair commercial practices
  11. The DGCCRF and its enforcement powers
  12. Findings of the latest DGCCRF report

Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when?

Directive (EU) 2019/633 was transposed into French law by Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 2021, June 30th, whose provisions entered into force on July 1, 2021 and apply to contracts concluded as from November 1, 2021. Contracts concluded before that date were granted a 12-month period, starting on July 1, 2021, to comply with these provisions.

This transposition forms part of an already well-established legislative framework shaped by « Egalim I » Law No. 2018-938 of October 30, 2018; « Egalim II » Law No. 2021-1357 of October 18, 2021 and « Egalim III » Law No. 2023-1041 of November 17, 2023, which strengthen contractual relations and the protection of agricultural producers. Even prior to the transposition of the Directive, French law had already refocused the rules on restrictive business practices around the following unlawful practices:

  • A significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
  • the granting of an advantage without consideration; and
  • The sudden termination of established business relationships.

 

The Ordinance of June 30, 2021 transposed those provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/633 that did not fall within this existing framework, specifically introducing three new restrictive practices applicable to agricultural and food products into the French Commercial Code  (Com.C):

  • The cancellation of an order for perishable products at short notice (Article L. 443-5 of the Com.C);
  • The unlawful obtaining, use, or disclosure of the supplier’s trade secrets (Article L. 443-6 of the Com.C);
  • The refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a supply agreement where the supplier has requested such confirmation (Article L. 443-7 of the Com.C).

 

This framework has been strengthened by Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026 on emergency measures for agricultural protection and sovereignty (the “2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law”), most of whose relevant provisions entered into force on 20 August 2026. The 2026 law notably amends agricultural contracting rules, food-sector price revision mechanisms and certain restrictive trade practices.

Which agri-food products are covered by the French rules?

Directive 2019/633 applies to the sale of “agricultural and food products”, defined in Article 2 as “the products listed in Annex I to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as products not listed in that Annex but processed for use as food for human consumption by using products listed in that Annex”, subject to the annual turnover thresholds of suppliers and buyers set out in Article 1§2.

Is the scope of the French rules broader than the Directive?

In France, the scope of the provisions transposing the Directive is the same as that of EU law, as they apply to agricultural and food products.

However, certain French provisions in this area have a broader scope of application. Many provisions of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code apply to commercial relationships relating to “production, distribution or service activities” (in particular restrictive practices – Article L. 442-1 Com.C). Some of these provisions apply to fast-moving consumer goods, defined in Article L. 441-4 of the French Commercial Code as “non-durable products with a high frequency and recurrence of consumption”, the list of which is set by decree, as well as to food products.

Which suppliers and buyers are covered, and does their size matter?

France chose not to introduce the supplier and buyer turnover thresholds provided for in Directive 2019/633. As a result, the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers.

Which law applies to an international agri-food supply contract?

French law does not provide for specific conflict-of-law rules applicable to supply contracts in the agri-food sector. At first glance, international contracts for the supply of agri-food products are therefore governed by the general conflict-of-law rules applicable in France.

Choice of law under Rome I and the 1955 Hague Convention

These general rules are laid down by Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, known as the Rome I Regulation. Rome I establishes as a general principle that the parties are free to choose the law applicable to an international contract, either expressly or implicitly. In the absence of an express choice, the applicable law depends on the legal characterization of the supply contract.

A distinction must therefore be made depending on the nature of the supply contract. If the French court characterizes the contract as a contract for the sale of goods, it may apply either the Rome I Regulation or, more likely, the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international sales of tangible movable goods. In both cases, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the seller is established. If the supply contract is characterized as a processing or bespoke supply contract, particularly where it is based on detailed specifications, the French court would apply the Rome I Regulation and may consider such a contract to constitute a service contract rather than a sale contract. In that case, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the service provider is established.

Article L. 444-1.A and the limits of overriding mandatory rules

In addition, it its worthwhile looking at Article L. 444-1.A of the French Commercial Code which states

“The provisions of Chapters I, II and III of this Title apply to any agreement between a supplier and a buyer relating to products or services marketed on French territory. These provisions are matters of public policy. Any dispute relating to their application falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts, subject to compliance with European Union law and international treaties ratified or approved by France and without prejudice to recourse to arbitration.”

At first glance, this provision pretends to bring all commercial contracts within the scope of French law where the products or services are marketed in France, like an overriding mandatory rule (OMR). However, this approach appears ambiguous, unjustified and at the end ineffective.

First, restrictive trade practices (RTP) do not constitute OMR within the meaning of the Rome I Regulation. Article L. 444-1.A does not expressly refer to the terms overriding mandatory rules and just merely recalls the domestic public policy nature of the relevant provisions.

Second, French case law has repeatedly refused to qualify RTP as OMR, with the exception of enforcement actions brought by the French Ministry of Economy and Finance against third party imposing to their counterpart blatant imbalance clauses.

Third, the general characterization of the provisions of Title IV of the French Commercial Code as OMR does not satisfy the test of sufficient connection and imperative necessity as defined by the ECJ in its ruling of 5 September 2024 (Huk-Coburg-Allgemeine Versicherung, Case C-86/23).

Exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts and its exceptions

With respect to jurisdiction, Article L. 444-1.A wants to create an exclusive jurisdiction of French courts for commercial matters such as RTP. However, it provides clear and wide exceptions based on compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction matters and with arbitration rules.

In practice, any jurisdiction clause (subject to the exception here after) or arbitration clause stipulated in an international contract must be upheld by French courts, which must therefore decline jurisdiction. Only in very limited circumstances may French courts assert this exclusive jurisdiction rule, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has not entered into any relevant multilateral or bilateral convention with France (such as Lugano Convention, The Hague conventions…).

Are the French rules stricter than Directive (EU) 2019/633?

French commercial law is stricter than the rules laid down by Directive 2019/633, for several reasons:

  • A broader scope of application:
  • No thresholds limit the application of these provisions; as a result, all economic operators are covered, regardless of their size or turnover;
  • While certain provisions are specific to food products, there is also a common framework applicable to all products without distinction, as well as a specific regulatory regime for fast-moving consumer goods (see Question 3).
  • Prior to the transposition of the Directive, France already had a legislative framework in place in this area (the Egalim laws), which it continued to develop after the entry into force of the ordinance transposing the European Directive; this is why the ordinance transposed only four new restrictive trade practices, rather than the entire list set out in the Directive.
  • French law provides for strict regulation governing commercial negotiations, particularly in the large-scale retail sector. The 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law further strengthens this framework by introducing tighter rules on agricultural contract negotiations, reference production-cost indicators, automatic price revision mechanisms in the food sector, repeated tendering procedures and substantial reductions in order volumes during negotiations.

What must a valid agri-food supply agreement contain in France?

Chapter I of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code, entitled “Transparency in commercial relationships”, imposes numerous requirements governing the negotiation and performance of commercial agreements:

The seller’s terms and conditions of sale

The seller’s pricing policy: the seller must provide any buyer who so requests with its terms and conditions of sale, which must include, at a minimum, the conditions of sale, payment terms, the price list, and the schedule of price reductions (discounts, immediate rebates, deferred rebates, and “free” products) (Article L. 441-1 of the Com.C).

These terms and conditions may be general (applicable to all customers), category-based (applicable to a category of customers, such as wholesalers, provided that the classification is based on objective identification criteria), or specific and individually negotiated (supplementing or derogating from the general or category-based terms and conditions of sale).

In this respect, specific provisions apply to food products and products intended for pet food (Article L. 441-1-1 of the French Commercial Code), as well as to wholesalers (Article L. 441-1-2 of the French Commercial Code).

Since 20 August 2026, Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C. also allows the supplier’s terms and conditions of sale for food products and pet food to include an automatic formula revising the unit-price list in line with upward or downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials used in the product.

The buyer’s commercial cooperation services

La politique de coopération commerciale de l’acheteur: L’acheteur, quant à lui, propose et négocie avec le fournisseur des services rendus par lui et qui bénéficient, directement ou indirectement, au fournisseur (Art. L. 441-3 C.com.):

  • Commercial cooperation services: these are services provided in connection with the resale of products or services to consumers, or with a view to their resale to professionals, which are intended to promote the marketing of the supplier’s products and are separable from the act of sale.
  • Other services: “other obligations intended to promote the commercial relationship between the supplier and the distributor or service provider” (L. 441-3, III. 3° Com. C).
  • Promotional benefits: Direct allocation of discounts («remise») to consumers by the distributor acting under a mandate from the supplier for fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

The written annual agreement and the 31 January or 1 March deadlines

Formalisation of the negotiation: a written agreement must be entered into, before 1 March of each year, between the supplier and the distributor or service provider, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements.

As an experimental rule until 31 December 2029, where the supplier is a legal entity with worldwide annual turnover (excluding tax) below €350 million in the last closed financial year, the statutory 1st of March date referred to in Articles L. 441-3, L. 441-4, L. 441-6 and L. 443-8 Com. C. is replaced by 31th of January. In the same situations, the three-month periods referred to in Article L. 441-4 VI and Article L. 443-8 V(B) Com. C. are reduced to two months.

Law No. 2026-796 introduces also two experiments: Until 15 April 2029 for agreements governed by Article L. 443-8 Com. C., and until 15 April 2028 for agreements governed by Article L. 441-4 Com. C., where the annual agreement has not been concluded by 1st of March (or within two months from the beginning of a special marketing cycle), the supplier may, if no new contract has been formed, terminate the commercial relationship without the distributor being able to rely on the rules on sudden termination under Article L. 442-1 II Com.C., or request application of a notice period compliant with that provision.

Negotiation timetable for producer/first-buyer of agro-food contracts: under Article L. 631-24II bis of the French Rural and Maritime Fishing code (“CRPM”), the written contract or framework agreement must be concluded within four months after the prospective buyer receives the producer’s written proposal (this period may be extended by an extended interprofessional agreement, up to six months). If no agreement is reached, one of the parties must refer the matter to the Agricultural Commercial Relations Mediator within 15 days. If mediation fails and both parties still intend to establish or continue the relationship, the Agricultural Commercial Disputes Settlement Committee must be seized within a further 15 days; where applicable, the contract must then be concluded within two months after the parties receive the Committee’s decision

It must set out (Art. L. 441-3 Com.C.):

  • The terms and conditions of the sale of products or the provision of services (including price reductions) and, where applicable, the types of situations in which and the modalities according to which general sales conditions (GSCs) may apply.
  • Commercial cooperation services
  • Other obligations
  • Any service or obligation arising from an agreement entered into with a legal entity located outside French territory with which the distributor is directly or indirectly affiliated

 

It being specified that the mandatory contents of the written agreement vary depending on its scope of application, namely whether the agreement is entered into with wholesalers, relates to fast-moving consumer goods, or concerns agricultural products (Art. L. 441-7 and L. 441-8 Com.C).

Stricter rules for agricultural products: duration, price revision, renegotiation

More specifically, with respect to agricultural products, French law is all the more protective as regards the formalisation of negotiations and provides for even stricter obligations:

  • Clause relating to the duration of the contract: under Article L. 631-24 VI CRPM, the minimum duration of a contract between a producer and a first buyer is three years, except for products subject to excise duties and for grapes, must and the wines produced from them. Unless otherwise agreed, contracts are renewable by tacit renewal for an equivalent period; where the buyer gives notice of non-renewal, the notice period may not be less than three months. The producer may expressly waive the statutory minimum durations in writing, in accordance with Articles 148 and 168 of Regulation (EU) No. 1308/2013. A contract or framework agreement lasting less than three years may omit an automatic upward/downward revision clause for a fixed price.
  • Clauses relating to price determination mechanismsi and revision: Article L. 631-24 III CRPM requires the contract or framework agreement to contain the price and its automatic upward/downward revision mechanism, or the criteria and methods used to determine the price, including the weighting of the relevant indicators. The producer’s proposal must take account of one or more indicators relating to relevant agricultural production costs and their evolution. The parties must refer in the final contract or framework agreement to the reference indicators published by the competent interprofessional organisation (or, failing publication, by the relevant agricultural technical institutes), unless they expressly choose other agricultural production-cost indicators and state the reasons for that choice. Clauses whose purpose or effect is automatically to renegotiate or change the price so as to align it with a more favourable price practised by a competing buyer, producer, producer organisation or association of producer organisations are deemed unwritten.

 

For food products and pet food subject to Article L. 443-8 Com.C., the annual written agreement must contain an automatic formula revising the unit-price list according to upward and downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials. If the supplier’s terms and conditions contain the formula permitted by Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C., the annual agreement must reproduce that formula and it is not negotiable. Price changes resulting from its application must be implemented no later than one month after activation. A distributor may object only where objective economic data show that the link drawn by the supplier between raw-material cost changes and the impact on its price list is manifestly erroneous.

Lastly, specific provisions apply to contracts entered into between a supplier and a distributor “relating to the design and production of food products in accordance with specifications meeting the buyer’s specific needs and marketed under a private label”, as set out in Article L. 441-7 of the French Commercial Code.

Invoicing and payment terms for food products and beverages

Invoicing and payment terms: any purchase and sale transaction must give rise to an invoice, issued upon completion of the transaction and containing a number of mandatory particulars. In addition, the Commercial Code provides for a default payment period of 30 days, with a maximum payment period of 60 days or 45 days end of month, and sets out late payment penalties and a fixed recovery fee in the event of late payment (Art. L. 441-9 and L. 441-10 Com.C)

In addition, the legislator has introduced specific payment deadlines for food products and beverages (Art. L. 441-11 Com.C):

  • Perishable agricultural products, perishable food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals: 30 days from delivery. In the case of periodic billing:30 days after the end of the ten-day period;
  • For seasonal fruits and vegetables: 30 days from the end of the month of delivery;
  • Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption: 20 days from the date of delivery;
  • Alcoholic beverages subject to excise duty (e.g., Armagnac, Cognac, brandy, gin, rum, vodka): 30 days from the end of the month of delivery. For wine and other non-sparkling fermented beverages covered by Article L. 665-3 CRPM, the first buyer must, in principle, pay the seller (or its subrogee) an advance of at least 15% of the order amount within ten clear days after conclusion of the sale contract. Since 20 August 2026, interprofessional bodies may provide a derogation from this advance-payment obligation only in the context of multiannual contracts.
  • Non-perishable agricultural and food products: If the invoice is issued by the supplier: 60 days from the date of issue of the invoice; and If the invoice is issued by the buyer: 60 days from the date of preparation of the invoice.

 

Logistics penalties

Logistics penalites: lastly, the French Commercial Code strictly regulates specific contractual sanctions known as “logistics penalties”, relating to the supplier’s failure to comply with its delivery, conformity, or timing obligations (Art. L. 441-17 Com.C).

What are the penalties for breaching the contractual requirements?

In the event of a breach of contractual requirements, several sanctions may apply:

  • Seller’s pricing policy: an administrative fine not exceeding €15,000 for a natural person and €75,000 for a legal entity ( L. 441-1 Com.C).

For food products and products intended for pet food, the administrative fine may not exceed €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, and the maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 443-8 Com.C). The new information requirements attached to an optional automatic price-revision formula in the supplier’s terms and conditions (Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C.) are also backed by the administrative sanction provided in Article L. 443-8 Com.C. More generally, any breach of Article L. 443-8 I to VI is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum doubled for a repeated infringement within two years.

  • Buyer’s commercial cooperation policy and formalisation of negotiations: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-6 Com.C).

Failure to comply with the March 1st deadline provided for in Article L. 441-3(IV) is punishable by an administrative fine not exceeding €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity. In the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final, the maximum fine is increased to €400,000 for a natural person and €2,000,000 for a legal entity. For suppliers falling within the temporary €350 million turnover experiment introduced by the 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law, references to the 1 March deadline must be read as 31 January for the duration of the experiment (until 31 December 2029).

  • Absence of a price revision clause in the agricultural sector: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-7 C)
  • Absence of a renegotiation clause: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-8 Com.C)).
  • Failure to comply with payment deadlines, absence of mandatory information required under the terms of payment, setting of non-compliant rates or conditions for late payment penalties, and failure to comply with the terms of calculation of payment deadlines agreed between the parties: administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €2 million for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €4 million for a legal entity in the event of a repeat offense within two years of the date on which the first penalty decision became final ( L. 441-16 Com.C).

 

Which unfair practices does French law prohibit beyond the Directive?

In addition to the contractual obligations described above, aimed at preventing abuses and unfair commercial practices between businesses, Articles L. 442-1 to L. 442-12 of the French Commercial Code set out a list of «unfair commercial practices between undertakings» (« pratiques commerciales déloyales entre entreprises »), including:

  • Obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage without consideration or manifestly disproportionate to the consideration provided (Art. L. 442-1(I) Com.C);
  • Subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations creating a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
  • Subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or operating conditions are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.);
  • imposing logistics penalties in breach of Article 441-17 (Art. L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
  • Applying or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, or sales or purchase conditions not justified by real consideration set out in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
  • Failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, leading to the failure to conclude a contract within the deadline set out in Article L. 441-3 ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
  • Abruptly terminating, even partially, an established commercial relationship without sufficient written notice, taking into account the duration of the relationship and industry practices or interprofessional agreements ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
  • Implementing, during contract negotiations, a substantial reduction in the volume of orders placed with an established commercial partner, even temporarily, where the scale, unusual nature or circumstances of the reduction are such as to jeopardise the balance of the established commercial relationship ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
  • For operators providing online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations laid down therein, other clauses and practices remaining governed by Title IV of Book IV ( L. 442-1, III Com.C.);
  • Directly or indirectly participating in a breach of the prohibition on out-of-network resale imposed on a distributor bound by an exempt selective or exclusive distribution agreement ( L. 442-2 Com. C);
  • Clauses deemed null and void, including retroactive rebates, discounts or commercial cooperation benefits, automatic granting of more favourable terms granted to competing undertakings, or prohibitions on assigning receivables ( L. 442-3 Com.C);
  • Resale at a loss or announcement of resale at a loss ( L. 442-5 Com.C.);
  • Imposing a minimum resale price on a distributor ( L. 442-6 Com.C.);
  • For buyers of agricultural or food products, imposing an abnormally low purchase price on suppliers ( L. 442-7 Com.C);
  • Regulation of remote reverse auctions ( L. 442-8 Com.C.);
  • Artificially increasing or decreasing prices, particularly in remote auctions, through false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or any other fraudulent means ( L. 442-9 Com.C);
  • Associations or cooperatives offering products for sale or providing services not provided for in their bylaws( L. 442-10 Com.C.);
  • Use of public property belonging to the State, local authorities or public bodies to sell products or provide services under irregular conditions ( L. 442-11 Com.C);
  • For cloud computing service providers, granting unlimited cloud credits or making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the conclusion of such an agreement ( L. 442-12 Com.C.).

 

What are the penalties for unfair commercial practices in France?

General sanctions regime under Article L. 442-4

The unfair commercial practices listed below are subject to the same sanction’s regime, as provided for in Article L. 442-4 of the French Commercial Code. The practices concerned are the following:

  • L. 442-1, I, 1° Com.C: obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage that does not correspond to any consideration or is clearly disproportionate to the consideration given;
  • L. 442-1, I, 2° Com.C: subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations that create a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
  • L. 442-1, I, 3° Com.C: imposing logistical penalties in violation of Article L. 441-17;
  • L. 442-1, I, 4° Com.C: practicing or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, conditions, or terms of sale or purchase that are not justified by actual considerations provided for in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage;
  • L. 442-1, I, 5° Com.C: failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, resulting in the contract not being concluded within the deadline specified in Article L. 441-3;
  • L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.: subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or modalities are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations;
  • L. 442-1, II Com.C.: implementing a substantial reduction in order volumes during contract negotiations, including temporarily, where its scale, unusual nature or the circumstances are liable to jeopardise the balance of an established commercial relationship;
  • L. 442-1, III Com.C: for operators offering online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations set out in this text; other clauses or practices remain governed by Title IV of Book IV;
  • Art L. 442-2 C: participating directly or indirectly in the violation of the prohibition on resale outside the network imposed on distributors bound by a selective or exclusive distribution agreement exempted under competition law;
  • Art L. 442-3 C: using clauses or contracts allowing the producer to benefit from retroactive benefit of discounts (“remises”), rebates (“rabais”), or commercial cooperation; the automatic granting of more favorable terms to competing companies; prohibition on assigning claims against the other party to third parties;
  • L. 442-7 Com.C: for a buyer of agricultural products or foodstuffs, imposing an abusively low selling price on its supplier;
  • Article L. 442-8 C: regulation of remote reverse auctions.

For all these practices:

  • the victim of such practices may have the illegal clauses or contracts declared null and void and request the restitution of undue benefits;

the French Minister for the Economy or the Public Prosecutor may request the court to:

  • order the cessation of the practices;
  • declare illegal clauses or contracts null and void and obtain restitution of undue benefits;

request the imposition of a civil fine, the amount of which may not exceed:

  • five million euros;
  • three times the amount of the benefits unduly received or obtained;
  • or 5% of the turnover excluding tax generated in France by the perpetrator of the practices during the last financial year ended preceding the financial year in which the practices were implemented.

The court shall systematically order the publication, dissemination, or posting of its decision or an extract thereof, in accordance with the terms and conditions it specifies.

Practices subject to specific sanctions

  • L. 442-5 Com.C: resale at a loss or the announcement of resale at a loss is punishable by a fine not exceeding 0.4% of the annual turnover excluding VAT generated in France during the last closed financial year (Art. L. 442-5, I Com.C);
  • L. 442-6 Com.C: imposition of a minimum resale price on the distributor is punishable by a maximum fine of €75,000 for legal entities;
  • L. 442-9 Com.C: causing an artificial increase or decrease in prices, in particular in remote auctions, by disseminating false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or by any other fraudulent means, is punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €225,000 for food products. Additional penalties may also apply;
  • L. 442-11 Com.C: using public property belonging to the State, local authorities or their public bodies to offer products for sale or to provide services under irregular condition is punishable by seizure on the premises, for a period not exceeding one month, of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services. It may also give rise to the confiscation of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services, and to an order to pay the Public Treasury an amount corresponding to the value of the seized products;
  • L. 442-12 Com.C: for a cloud computing service provider, granting unlimited cloud computing credits credits to a person engaged in production, distribution or service activities and making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the simultaneous conclusion of such an agreement constitutes an unfair commercial practice punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €1,500,000 (Article L. 132-2 of the French Consumer Code: sanctions for misleading commercial practices – « sanction despratiques commerciales trompeuses»).

 

Which authority enforces the rules, and what powers does it have?

The national authority responsible for enforcement is the administrative authority in charge of competition and consumer affairs: the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF). The DGCCRF has investigative powers (Article L. 450-1 of the French Commercial Code), may issue injunctions (Article L. 470-1 of the French Commercial Code), and imposes administrative fines and sanctions for breaches of Title IV of Book IV and for non-compliance with injunctions (Article L. 470-2 of the French Commercial Code).

What did the DGCCRF’s latest enforcement report find?

According to the last DGCCRF’s 2024 report, DGCCRF «inspected 186 establishments in the dairy, cattle, pork, poultry and egg sectors in order to verify compliance with the mandatory written contractualisation between producers and their first buyers. ». The report further states that «the regulation of commercial relations and negotiations is likely to give rise to a new Egalim law, following the publication of several parliamentary reports. »In this respect, a parliamentary report on the application of the so-called «Egalim 38» law was submitted on 13 March 2024. The legislative development anticipated in that report has since materialised in Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026, which substantially amended agricultural contractualisation and food-sector commercial negotiation rules with effect, for most of the relevant provisions, from 20 August 2026.

***

Frequently asked questions on unfair trading practices in France

Does French law apply if my company is not established in France?

Yes, as regards the substantive rules. France did not adopt the turnover thresholds of Directive 2019/633, so the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers. Whether a French court will hear a dispute is a separate question.

Can we choose a law other than French law in an agri-food supply contract?

In principle yes. French law contains no specific conflict-of-law rules for agri-food supply contracts, so the choice is governed by the Rome I Regulation, under which the parties are free to choose the applicable law. Article L. 444-1.A of the Commercial Code appears to claim French law for products marketed in France, but French case law has repeatedly refused to treat restrictive trade practices as overriding mandatory rules.

Will a jurisdiction or arbitration clause be upheld by the French courts?

In practice yes. Article L. 444-1.A expressly reserves compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction and with arbitration. French courts may assert the exclusive jurisdiction rule only in very limited circumstances, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has entered into no relevant convention with France.

What is the payment deadline for perishable food products in France?

Thirty days from delivery for perishable agricultural and food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals. Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption must be paid within 20 days of delivery, seasonal fruit and vegetables within 30 days of the end of the month of delivery, and non-perishable agricultural and food products within 60 days (Article L. 441-11 of the Commercial Code).

By what date must the annual agreement with a distributor be signed?

Before 1 March or 31 January (when supplier’s turnover is less than €350 million) of each year, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements. Missing that deadline is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity, doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years.

Must a contract with an agricultural producer include a price revision clause?

Yes. The contract between a producer and its first buyer must provide for automatic upward and downward price revision mechanisms, based in particular on indicators relating to agricultural production costs and to changes in those costs. The absence of such a clause is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity.

How long must a supply contract with an agricultural producer last?

At least three years, and the contract must include a clause to that effect. The term may be extended up to a maximum of five years where an interprofessional agreement so provides (Article L. 631-24, III, 5° of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code).

After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

Why wine matters in this agreement

The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

  1. tariff liberalisation;
  2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
  3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
  4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

  1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
  2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
  3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) and “Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

Geographical indications: protection and tension

One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

  1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
  2. transition periods for local operators;
  3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

Services, distribution, and market structure

Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

  1. logistics providers
  2. distribution networks
  3. commercial representation
  4. marketing and advertising agencies

For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

Legal advisors will need to consider:

  1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
  2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
  3. compliance with competition rules

The implementation gap: where risk lies

Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

  1. managing client expectations
  2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
  3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

What should lawyers be doing now?

Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

  1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
  2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
  3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
  4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

Final sip

The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

At major events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, some companies attempt to “wildly” associate their brand or image with the event through a practice known as “ambush marketing” , defined by French courts as “an advertising strategy implemented by a company in order to associate its commercial image with that of an event and thereby benefit from the media impact of that event without paying the relevant fees and without having obtained the prior authorisation of the event organiser” (Paris Court of Appeal, 2nd chamber, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912). A risky and unlawful practice, but one that is sometimes conceivable.

Key points

  • Ambush marketing is a practice that may give rise to sanctions but is not prohibited as such.
  • In return for their investments in the competition, FIFA’s official sponsors and partners enjoy very strong legal protection, through various general instruments (infringement, free-riding/parasitism, intellectual property) and more specific ones (sports law), against all forms of ambush marketing.
  • The FIFA World Cup benefits from enhanced protection based on an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide and on FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines, in the absence of specific French legislation comparable to that enacted for the Olympic Games.
  • However, these rights are not absolute, and there remain narrow opportunities for a (clever) form of ambush marketing.

Protection of official World Cup sponsors and partners against ambush marketing

Reaching nearly 5 billion people across all platforms during its last edition in Qatar in 2022, including more than 1.5 billion viewers for the final alone, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is the most-watched sporting event on the planet. Hosted for the first time by three countries (Canada, Mexico and the United States), it brings together 48 teams and more than 1,200 players for 104 matches across 16 stadiums. Its organisation is largely financed by various official partners, sponsors and rights holders, who in return receive the exclusive right to use FIFA’s official trademarks and intellectual property so as to associate their own image and distinctive signs with the competition.

Ambush marketing is not sanctioned as such under French law, but a range of statutory provisions allow for broad protection of sponsors and partners of world-class sporting events against ambush marketing. They are indeed entitled to peacefully enjoy the rights offered to them in exchange for the significant investments they make in connection with events such as, for example, the football or rugby World Cups, or the Olympic Games.

The following legal instruments may in particular be invoked by official sponsors and by the organisers of such events:

  • the “classic” protections offered by intellectual property law (trademark law and copyright) by way of an infringement action under the French Intellectual Property Code,
  • civil liability law (parasitism/free-riding and unfair competition based on article 1240 of the French Civil Code),
  • consumer law (misleading commercial practices),
  • but also more specific provisions, such as the protection of the exploitation rights of sports federations and organisers of sporting events under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, which grants organisers of sporting events a monopoly over the exploitation of those events.

On these grounds, the following ambush marketing practices have notably been sanctioned:

The exploitation of a tennis competition and the use, during the sporting event, of the brand associated with it: An online betting operator organised bets on Roland Garros matches using the protected sign and Roland Garros trademark to identify the matches on which bets were offered. The unlawful exploitation of the sporting competition was sanctioned at EUR 400,000 under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, the French Tennis Federation being the sole owner of the right to exploit Roland Garros. The use of the trademark was also sanctioned for infringement (EUR 300,000) and free-riding/parasitism (EUR 500,000) (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 Oct. 2009, No. 08/19179; Paris Judicial Court, 8 Aug. 2024, No 08/19179).

An advertising campaign carried out during a film festival reproducing the event’s registered trademark: During the Cannes Film Festival, a cosmetics brand published videos on its social media showing its brand ambassadors being styled, with the official Cannes Film Festival poster visible in certain shots, one of which reproduced the registered Palme d’Or trademark. Sanctioned on the grounds of copyright infringement and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Judicial Court, 11 Dec. 2020, No. 19/08543).

An advertising campaign falsely claiming the status of official event partner: During the Cannes Film Festival, the use of the slogan “official hairdresser of women” alongside the expressions “Cannes” and “Festival de Cannes”, and other publications that falsely led the public to believe the company was an official festival partner, to the detriment of the sole official festival hairdresser. Sanctioned on the grounds of unfair competition and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Court of Appeal, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912).

These financial sanctions may be combined with injunctions to cease the practices and/or orders for press publication, subject to periodic penalty payments.

FIFA’s specific trademark protection

Unlike the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, which benefited from specific French legislation as a host country (Law No. 2018-202 of 26 March 2018 on the organisation of the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games) reserving in particular advertising spaces in the vicinity of competition venues exclusively for official partners, the 2026 FIFA World Cup does not take place on French territory, and therefore no equivalent French legal framework applies. The protection of official partners and sponsors thus relies on general law , but is nonetheless robust.

FIFA has built an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide, protected in France by the provisions of the French Intellectual Property Code. These trademarks include in particular the verbal and figurative trademark FIFA®, the marks FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, as well as the official competition emblem (combining the trophy with the figure 26), the official slogan “We Are 26™” / “Nous Sommes 26™”, the logos of the sixteen host cities, and the official typeface “FWC 26”, protected by copyright. Only FIFA’s rights holders, namely the FIFA Partners (led by Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways and Visa), the Plus Sponsors, the Official Sponsors and Regional Supporters, are authorised to use this official intellectual property for commercial purposes.

FIFA has published Intellectual Property Guidelines (version 2.0, June 2024) detailing the authorised and prohibited uses of the trademarks and logos associated with the 2026 World Cup. According to these guidelines, the following are prohibited without authorisation: any use of official trademarks in commercial advertising; the incorporation of official intellectual property into a trade name or domain name; the organisation of competitions, games or prize draws creating an association with the competition; the use of official trademarks to decorate a retail store; and the use of official hashtags by a corporate account for commercial purposes. The guidelines further specify that protection extends not only to identical reproduction of official trademarks but also to confusingly similar variants. This protection, recalled in the guidelines, is consistent with the enhanced protection afforded to well-known trademarks under French law by article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code.

Lessons from the Paris 2024 Olympic Games: what risks do brands face?

The Paris 2024 Olympic Games gave rise to significant litigation that clearly illustrates the risks faced by companies tempted by ambush marketing at a major sporting event. Although these decisions were rendered in the specific context of the Olympic Games, which benefited from specific, reinforced legal protections, they nevertheless constitute a direct warning for brands that might consider similar strategies during the World Cup, on the basis of general law.

The use of official symbols on travelling physical media: During the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, a Chinese dairy company had buses displaying the Olympic rings alongside its own brands circulating throughout Paris, while presenting itself as “the only Chinese dairy company present in Paris 2024”. The Paris Court of Appeal upheld both free-riding/parasitism and trademark infringement, and ordered the companies concerned, in summary proceedings, to pay EUR 20,000 per defendant, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 20,000 per day per proven infringement, aimed at stopping the diffusion of the advertising (Paris Court of Appeal, pole 5, chamber 2, 21 Nov. 2025, No. 24/15283; Paris Court, interim order of 8 Aug. 2024, No. 24/55463). This judgment illustrates the vigilance of French courts with regard to strategies of visual association with an event, even without an explicit claim of official partnership, and confirms the possibility of combining infringement and parasitism claims for substantial awards.

The unauthorised broadcast of competitions: The Paris Court, sitting in summary proceedings during the Olympic Games, ordered the immediate cessation of the broadcast of Olympic competitions by a streaming platform that did not hold the corresponding media rights, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 1,500 per identified infringement, EUR 3,000 per day for ongoing distributions and EUR 5,000 per day for failure to withdraw the content (Paris Court, summary proceedings, 18 Sept. 2024, No. 24/53019). Thus, any platform broadcasting World Cup matches without holding the rights licensed by FIFA faces immediate emergency measures under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code.

The enhanced protection of well-known trademarks: The French Court of Cassation confirmed that protection of Olympic trademarks extends beyond strict reproduction: it is sufficient for the trademark to be evoked or suggested, without the need to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public. This solution, based on article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, was applied to a bar that had used the Olympic rings on its coasters to promote its broadcast evenings (Court of Cassation, Criminal chamber, 17 Jan. 2017, No. 15-86.363). FIFA’s trademarks being equally well-known worldwide, the same protective regime applies to them: a mere evocation of official trademarks, even without literal reproduction, may constitute an actionable infringement.

Certain marketing operations may escape sanction

Analysis of case law and promotional practices nonetheless reveals the contours of certain advertising practices that could be permitted (not sanctioned by the provisions described above), provided they are carefully prepared and presented. Here are some examples.

Creative or humorous communication

  • A tongue-in-cheek, even humorous approach may allow companies to avoid the sanctions described above. For example, Intersnack’s Vico crisps brand launched a promotional campaign in 2016 around the slogan “Vico, partner of supporters at home”.
  • Irish bookmaker Paddy Power sponsored an egg-and-spoon race in “London”, a village in Burgundy, France, in order to display the following slogan in London during the 2012 Olympic Games: “Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is)”. The Olympic organising committee failed to stop this campaign. British humour …
  • Meanwhile, Heineken, a rival of official Euro 2016 sponsor Carlsberg, marketed a range of beer bottles in the colours of the flags of 21 countries that had “marked its history”, the majority of which were participating in the tournament.

Using factual information as advertising

It was held lawful to use the results of a rugby match and the announcement of an upcoming match in a newspaper to promote a car brand, with the advertisement reading: “France 13 England 24 , the Fiat 500 congratulates England on its victory and looks forward to seeing the French team on 9 March for France-Italy”. The judges considered that this publication “merely reproduces a current sporting result, obtained and made public on the front page of the sports newspaper, and refers to a future fixture also known to have been announced in the newspaper’s editorial content” (Court of Cassation, Commercial chamber, 20 May 2014, No. 13-12.102).

Sponsoring players participating in the World Cup

Any company may enter into partnerships with players participating in the FIFA World Cup, for example by supplying them with equipment or clothing bearing its logo. FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines expressly state that they “contain no affirmations regarding rights held by third parties such as players, clubs, member associations [or] confederations”. FIFA’s guidelines also explicitly confirm that generic images related to football, national teams or national flags do not fall within the official intellectual property. Caution is nonetheless warranted: the partnership must not create the impression of a commercial association with FIFA or the competition, nor use FIFA’s official trademarks.

A combined legal and marketing approach in designing and preparing the message of any such communication campaign is essential to avoid legal proceedings, particularly on the grounds of free-riding/parasitism. Certain advertising campaigns can therefore legitimately be considered, particularly when they are clever.

Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

What the EU decision does (and does not) do

The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

How different payment types are affected in practice

Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

Country notes (alphabetical)

Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

 

Practical next steps for EU companies

  1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
  2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
  3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
  4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
  5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
  6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
  7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
  8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
  9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

Under French Law, franchisors and distributors are subject to two kinds of pre-contractual information obligations: each party must spontaneously inform their future partner of any information they know is decisive to their consent. In addition, for certain contracts – i.e a franchise agreement – there is a duty to disclose a limited amount of information in a document. These pre-contractual obligations are mandatory rules of public policy. Thus, these two obligations apply simultaneously to the franchisor, distributor or dealer when negotiating a contract with a partner.

Takeaways

  • The information required by the DIP must be fully completed and updated ;
  • The information not required by the DIP but provided by the franchisor must be carefully selected and sincere;
  • Franchisee must be given the opportunity to request additional information from the franchisor;
  • Franchisee’s experience in the economic sector enables the franchisor to considerably limit its exposure to the risk of contract cancellation due to a defect in the franchisee’s consent;
  • Franchisor must keep the proof of the actual disclosure of pre-contractual information (whether mandatory or not).
  • The general information obligation under common law (Article 1112-1 of the French Civil Code) may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation provided for under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code.

General duty of disclosure for all contractors

What is the scope of this pre-contractual information?

This obligation is imposed on all counterparties, for any kind of contract. Indeed, article 1112-1 of the Civil Code states that:

(§. 1) The party who knows information of decisive importance for the consent of the other party must inform the other party if the latter legitimately ignores this information or trusts its counterparty.

(§. 3) Of decisive importance is the information that is directly and necessarily related to the content of the contract or the quality of the parties. »

This obligation applies to all contracting parties for any type of contract.

French courts have ruled that this general information obligation may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code (see below), answering the question in the affirmative (Paris Court of Appeal, 27 March 2024, no. 22/12665). The scope of the latter has however, been defined by the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») : only information bearing a direct and necessary link with the subject matter of the contract or the qualities of the parties is subject to the disclosure obligation (Cass. com., 14 May 2025, no. 23-17.948).

Who bears the burden of proof?

The burden of proof rests on the person who claims that the information was due to him. He must then prove (i) that the other party owed him the information but (ii) did not provide it (Article 1112-1 (§. 4) of the Civil Code)

Special duty of disclosure for franchise and distribution agreements

Which contracts are subject to this special rule?

French law requires (art. L.330-3 French Commercial Code) the provision of a pre-contractual information document (in French “DIP”) and the draft contract, by any person:

  • which grants another person the right to use a trade mark, trade name or sign,
  • while requiring an exclusive or quasi-exclusive commitment for the exercise of its activity (e.g. exclusive purchase obligation). The quasi-exclusive nature of the commitment is assessed on a case-by-case basis by French courts, independently of the 80% purchase threshold provided for under EU Regulation 2022/720, which is treated merely as an indicative reference.

Concretely, DIP must be provided, for example, to the franchisee, distributor, dealer or licensee of a brand, by its franchisor, supplier or licensor as soon as the two above conditions are met. French courts have moreover recently had occasion to confirm that the scope of the DIP obligation is not limited to franchise agreements but extends, in particular, to dealership agreements, provided the above-mentioned conditions are met (Paris Court of Appeal, 22 May 2024, no. 22/08672).

When the DIP must be provided?

DIP and draft contract must be provided at least 20 days before signing the contract, and, where applicable, before the payment of the sum required to be paid prior to the signature of the contract (for a reservation).

What information must be disclosed in the DIP?

Article R. 330-1 of the French Commercial Code requires that DIP mentions the following information (non-detailed list) concerning:

  • Franchisor (identity and experience of the managers, career path, etc.);
  • Franchisor’s business (in particular creation date, head office, bank accounts, history of the development of the business, annual accounts, etc.);
  • Operating network (members list with indication of signing date of contracts, establishments list offering the same products/services in the area of the planned activity, number of members having ceased to be part of the network during the year preceding the issue of the DIP with indication of the reasons for leaving, etc.);
  • Trademark licensed (date of registration, ownership and use);
  • General state of the market (about products or services covered by the contract) and local state of the market (about the planned area) and information relating to factors of competition and development perspective. With respect to the local market, the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») has held that the franchisor is not required to conduct a market study, but that if one is provided, it must be accurate and verifiable (Cass. com., 18 Oct. 2023, no. 22-19.329).;
  • Essential element of the draft contract and at least: its duration, contract renewal conditions, termination and assignment conditions and scope of exclusivities;
  • Financial obligations weighing in on contracting party: nature and amount of the expenses and investments that will have to be incurred before starting operations (up-front entry fee, installation costs, etc.).

Beyond the exhaustiveness of the information required under the aforementioned provision, the DIP is subject to a qualitative standard. All information provided — including information provided spontaneously — must be accurate and truthful to ensure that the prospective network member’s consent is fully informed and free from any defect.

How to prove the disclosure of information?

The burden of proof for the delivery of the DIP rests on the debtor of this obligation: the franchisor (Cass. Com., 7 July 2004, n°02-15.950). The ideal for the franchisor is to have the franchisee sign and date his DIP on the day it is delivered and to keep the proof thereof.

The clause of contract indicating that the franchisee acknowledges having received a complete DIP does not provide proof of the delivery of a complete DIP (Cass. com, 10 January 2018, n° 15-25.287).

The franchisor is subject to a duty to update the DIP until the contract is signed

In a ruling dated 26 June 2024 (no. 23-14.085 PB), the French Supreme Court held that formal compliance of the DIP at the time of its delivery is not sufficient to exonerate the franchisor from all pre-contractual liability. This position was confirmed by a subsequent ruling of 4 December 2024 (no. 23-16.684).

These two decisions appear to establish a duty of ongoing updates incumbent upon the network head throughout the entire period between the delivery of the DIP and the execution of the contract. Where significant events occur during that interval — insolvency proceedings affecting network members, major litigation, or structural changes to the network — the network head is required to proactively inform the prospective member. The court then examines whether the failure to disclose such information was liable to distort the candidate’s assessment of the network and, consequently, to vitiate his consent (Cass. com., 26 June 2024, op. cit.).

A franchisor may therefore not shelter behind the initial regularity of the DIP to discharge its disclosure duty where the network’s situation has materially changed prior to the signing of the contract.

Sanction for breach of pre-contractual information duties

Criminal sanction

Failing to comply with the obligations relating to the DIP, franchisor or supplier can be sentenced to a criminal fine of up to 1,500 euros and up to 3,000 euros in the event of a repeat offence, the fine being multiplied by five for legal entities (article R.330-2 French commercial Code).

Cancellation of the contract for deceit

The contract may be declared null and void in case of breach of either article 1112-1 of the French Code civil or article L. 330-3 of the French Code de commerce. In both cases, failure to comply with the obligation to provide information is sanctioned if the applicant demonstrates that his or her consent has been vitiated by error, deceit or violence. In this respect, courts conduct a concrete, case-by-case assessment, taking into account in particular the professional experience and personal due diligence of the distributor: a sophisticated candidate will face greater difficulty in establishing deceit, and his experience in the relevant sector may be sufficient to exonerate the franchisor (Paris Court of Appeal, div. 5 – ch. 11, 26 Apr. 2024, no. 21/13205), even where the information provided was incomplete or inaccurate (Paris Court of Appeal, 20 Jan. 2021, no. 19/03382).

The path is therefore narrow for the franchisee: he cannot invoke error concerning profitability when it is he who draws up his plan, and even when this plan is drawn up by the franchisor or based on information drawn up and transmitted by the franchisor, the experience of the franchisee who knew the local market may exonerate the franchisor.

Regarding deceit, Courts strictly assess its two conditions which are:

  • (a material element) the existence of a lie or deceptive reticence (article 1137 French Civil Code), and
  • (an intentional element) the intention to deceive his counterparty (article 1130 French Civil Code).

Where applicable, the parties must return to the state they were in before the contract.

Damages

Although the claims for contract cancellation are subject to very strict conditions, it remains that franchisees/distributors may alternatively obtain damages on the basis of tort liability for non-compliance with the pre-contractual information obligation, subject to proof of fault (incomplete or incorrect information), damage (loss of opportunity of not contracting or contracting on more advantageous terms) and the causal link between the two.

Angel Iglesias Molero

Practice areas

  • Corporate
  • Artificial intelligence
  • Contracts
  • Investments
  • Start-up

Contact Angel





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    Unfair Commercial Practices in the Italian Agri-Food Supply Chain: Five Years On, What Has Changed?

    23 October 2026

    • Italy
    • Distribution

    In Spain, a waiver of goodwill indemnity in a distribution agreement does not always protect the manufacturer. The Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal ordered a manufacturer to pay its distributor more than EUR 100,000 in goodwill indemnity and damages for insufficient notice, despite the written waiver, because it held that the agreement had expired and that good faith limited the waiver’s effect. To avoid the same risk, the manufacturer should renew the agreement in writing before it expires or expressly provide that waivers remain effective, specify which customer base the waiver covers and give notice proportionate to the duration of the relationship.

    Summary

    • The distributor’s case and the manufacturer’s liability
    • What the Court of Appeal decided on the waiver
    • Why the waiver was not applied
    • A valid waiver with limits: distribution and agency
    • Whether the waiver should have fallen away with the agreement
    • What manufacturers distributing in Spain should do

    Goodwill indemnity in Spain: the distributor’s case

    For more than twenty years, the manufacturer and distributor worked together without a written agreement. In 2018, they signed a two-year contract. The distributor agreed to waive both goodwill indemnity and damages arising from termination.

    The agreement expired in December 2020. Neither party renewed it, but they continued doing business together.

    Months later, the manufacturer decided to end the relationship. It gave less than two months’ notice and alleged breaches by the distributor that it was unable to prove.

    Waiver of goodwill indemnity: what the Court of Appeal decided

    In a distribution relationship, the distributor can waive goodwill indemnity. In an agency relationship, an advance waiver is not permitted. In this case, however, the Court of Appeal held that the waiver no longer applied because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The court also considered that good faith could limit the waiver’s effect, given the length of the relationship and its termination without good cause.

    The argument based on expiry is debatable: a clause intended to govern the end of an agreement should not lose its effect simply because that agreement ends. To avoid this uncertainty, parties that continue trading after expiry should renew the agreement in writing or expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

    Why was the goodwill indemnity waiver not applied?

    The Court of Appeal relied on two grounds.

    The first was the expiry of the agreement. Since the parties had continued trading without signing a new document, the court held that the waiver was no longer effective when the manufacturer ended the relationship.

    The second was good faith. Even if the waiver still applied, the court considered that it could not take full effect in those circumstances: more than twenty-five years of collaboration, a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause.

    Goodwill indemnity waiver: valid, but with limits

    The judgment is surprising because a distributor can, in principle, waive this indemnity. To understand why, it helps to distinguish distribution from agency.

    In agency relationships, the law protects the agent against an advance waiver. This follows from Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992, read together with the goodwill indemnity provisions in Article 28.

    In distribution relationships, the Spanish Supreme Court applies Article 28 by analogy where its requirements are met (judgment 944/2023 of 13 June). But this does not prevent a manufacturer and distributor from agreeing to exclude all compensation if either party terminates the agreement on notice. The Supreme Court confirmed this in its judgments of 4 December 2007, 15 January 2008, sitting in plenary session, and 25 April 2011.

    The distinction lies in how the relationship ends. That case law concerns ordinary termination, whether on notice or on expiry of the agreed term. A waiver offers less certainty where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice, as happened here.

    Should the waiver have fallen away with the agreement?

    Of the Court of Appeal’s two grounds, the first is the more debatable: that the waiver ceased to apply because the agreement had expired.

    The Spanish Supreme Court has enforced exclusion clauses precisely after an agreement has expired. It did so in its judgment of 23 December 2008. In that case, a dealer’s agreement ended when its extension expired. The court refused goodwill compensation because the agreement itself excluded any claim arising from its termination.

    The point is straightforward: if a clause is agreed to govern what happens when an agreement ends, it is difficult to argue that it loses its effect merely because the agreement ends.

    There is a difference here: the parties continued trading after expiry and, according to the Court of Appeal, did so on the terms that had traditionally governed their relationship. But continuing to trade does not, by itself, show that they intended to set aside a waiver relating to the customer base developed up to that point.

    There is an agency case that might appear to point the other way. The Supreme Court has prevented parties from dividing the indemnity into separate periods through successive declarations that there was “nothing further to claim” (judgment of 27 June 2013). Its reason, however, was the mandatory protection afforded by Article 28 of the Spanish Commercial Agency Act, which the parties cannot exclude. That restriction does not apply to distribution.

    Even if the waiver remained effective, there would still be the question of notice. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss. They compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business and would therefore not necessarily be covered by that waiver.

    What should manufacturers distributing in Spain do?

    Businesses may continue trading as usual and overlook the fact that their agreement has expired. This judgment illustrates the risk: when the time comes to end the relationship, the manufacturer may discover that the protections it relied on are no longer effective.

    The agreement should be renewed in writing before it expires. If the parties have already continued trading without renewal, they should document which terms still apply and expressly provide that waivers remain effective both after expiry and while the relationship continues without a new document.

    It is also important to specify which customer base the waiver covers. If it is intended to include the customer base already built up, this should be stated expressly, with a reference date, a defined territory and confirmation that the waiver is final.

    Finally, goodwill indemnity, damages for insufficient notice and other damages should be addressed separately. When ending the relationship, the manufacturer should give notice proportionate to its duration.

    Frequently asked questions on goodwill indemnity in Spain

    Is a waiver of goodwill indemnity valid in a distribution agreement in Spain?

    In principle, yes: in distribution the distributor can waive the indemnity, whereas in agency the law protects the agent against an advance waiver (Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992). A waiver offers less certainty, however, where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice.

    What happens to the waiver if the agreement expires and the parties keep trading?

    The risk is that it will not be applied. In the case decided by the Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal, the waiver was held to be no longer effective because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The argument is debatable, but to avoid uncertainty the agreement should be renewed in writing or should expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

    Can good faith limit a waiver of goodwill indemnity?

    According to the court, in that case it could: after more than twenty-five years of collaboration, with a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause, the waiver could not take full effect.

    Does the waiver also cover damages for insufficient notice?

    Not necessarily. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss, because they compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business.

    How should the waiver be worded to cover the customer base already built up?

    It must say so expressly: the waiver should state a reference date, a defined territory and that the waiver is final.

    How much notice must the manufacturer give?

    The article does not give a number of days: it says that notice must be proportionate to the duration of the relationship. In the case examined, the manufacturer gave less than two months’ notice after more than twenty-five years of collaboration.

    Abstract: In February 2022, this previous article examined the adoption of Legislative Decree No. 198 of November 8, 2021 (the “Decree”), through which Italy transposed Directive (EU) 2019/633 (the “Directive”) on unfair commercial practices in business-to-business relationships within the agri-food supply chain.

    Four years later, the regulatory framework has evolved and the landscape has changed in part: the Italian legislature has made several amendments to the Decree, the designated enforcement authority has significantly stepped up its activities, and the first court decisions regarding the application of the Decree have been issued.

    This article aims to provide an updated overview.

    The Regulatory Framework: Original Structure and Subsequent Amendments

    The implementation of the Directive provided the Italian legislature with an opportunity to overhaul the pre-existing national regulations governing the agri-food supply chain—in particular those set forth in Article 62 of Decree-Law No. 1/2012. The result is a unified and systematic regulatory framework on the subject, contained in the Decree that entered into force on December 15, 2021.

    For an analysis of the structure and key provisions of the Decree, please refer to the previous article. The fundamental structural choices described in that article remain in effect: the Decree establishes mandatory contractual requirements for operators in the agricultural and food sector, identifies unfair practices that are always prohibited (the so-called “blacklist”) and those prohibited unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties (the so-called “gray list”), regulates below-cost sales (not covered by the Directive), provides for a comprehensive system of penalties to punish any violations, and designates the Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention (ICQRF) as the authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the Decree’s provisions.

    What is of interest here are the legislative amendments that have modified and supplemented the original text of the Decree. As will be seen, these amendments have tightened regulations that were already stricter than European standards at the time of the Decree’s adoption.

    The first amendment was introduced by Decree-Law No. 21/2022, which expanded the definition of perishable products to include meat-based products with specific physicochemical characteristics, and extended the applicability of the 30-day payment terms to the following agricultural and food products:

    “a) prepackaged products bearing an expiration date or a minimum shelf life not exceeding sixty days;

    1. b) bulk products, even if placed in protective packaging or refrigerated, that have not undergone treatments designed to extend their shelf life beyond sixty days;
      c) meat products exhibiting one of the following physicochemical characteristics: awgreater than 0.95 and pH greater than 5.2, or awgreater than 0.91, or pH equal to or greater than 4.5;
    2. d) all types of milk.”

     

    Subsequently, Decree-Law No. 69/2023 expanded the scope of the Decree to include “suppliers established in other Member States or in third countries when the buyer is established in Italy.” Therefore, today, the Decree applies to all business-to-business (B2B) sales contracts in which the supplier and/or the buyer is established in Italy, regardless of the parties’ turnover and the law applicable to the contract. This is an extremely broad scope of application, capable of effectively encompassing any commercial relationship in which at least one of the parties is Italian. This deliberate departure from the differentiated turnover thresholds provided for by the Directive—justified, according to the legislature, by the extraordinary fragmentation of the Italian agri-food supply chain—continues to define the broader scope of the Italian regime compared to the minimum level of harmonization established by the EU.

    Decree-Law No. 69/2023 also amended the minimum notice period for the buyer’s cancellation of orders for perishable products, prohibiting any “notice period so short as to reasonably lead one to believe that the supplier cannot find alternative outlets for its products” and delegating to a subsequent implementing regulation (not yet issued) to establish specific rules governing this matter. Finally, the provision extended to foreign suppliers the right to file complaints with the national enforcement authority (ICQRF).

    The most recent amendment to the Decree was introduced by Decree-Law No. 63/2024, which

    • added the provision that the supply price must take into account the cost of production
    • specified that wholesale markets also fall within the scope of the Decree
    • included, among the documents that the ICQRF may obtain, accounting documents relating to sales activities and related services, and
    • introduced the possibility of paying any penalties imposed under the Decree at a reduced rate, provided the contractor demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to mitigate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

     

    The cumulative effect of the amendments outlined above is the establishment of regulations that are even stricter than those that took effect in December 2021 (which were already significantly more restrictive than the Directive).

    Mandatory Contractual Requirements: Persistent Compliance Challenges

    Article 3 of the Decree imposes several mandatory requirements for contracts for the sale of agricultural and food products: written form, a minimum term of 12 months, specification of the product’s quantity and characteristics, a fixed or determinable price that reflects production costs, and definition of the terms of delivery and payment.

    However, the legislature’s intention to establish a system that safeguards the contractual rights of the parties has clashed with the reality of commercial transactions in this sector. In fact, experience has shown that these contractual requirements remain the primary source of difficulty for operators in complying with the Decree. It is therefore not surprising that many of the objections raised by the ICQRF over the years have concerned precisely this aspect.

    The written form requirement is particularly critical: a significant percentage of operators, especially in sectors characterized by long-standing informal commercial relationships (the prime example being the wine sector), continue to conclude transactions without an adequate written framework agreement, relying instead on commercial customs and verbal agreements that the Decree does not recognize as sufficient. It is no coincidence that the reports issued by the ICQRF in recent years list the failure to enter into written contracts prior to the delivery of the products sold   among the most frequent violations found.

    Another aspect that is frequently penalized is the unilateral modification of prices: in several cases, buyers have attempted to adjust agreed-upon prices without the supplier’s written consent—a practice that the Decree expressly prohibits and that has been the subject of the first judicial decisions issued on the matter (which will be discussed in paragraph 6).

    Italian Specifics: Additional Prohibited Practices and Below-Cost Sales

    In addition to the “black list” and “gray list” of unfair practices prohibited by the Directive, Article 5 of the Decree identifies and prohibits 16 additional unfair practices, which stem from the pre-existing Italian regulatory framework. These include, for example, the purchase of agricultural and food products through double-reduction electronic tenders and auctions, the application of objectively different conditions for equivalent services, and the obtaining of undue unilateral benefits not justified by the nature or content of the commercial relationship.

    An interesting feature of the Italian list is its explicitly bilateral nature: unlike the Directive, which was designed to protect suppliers from potential abuses by larger and more powerful buyers, Article 5 of the Decree prohibits various unfair practices that also apply to suppliers, including the imposition of an unduly short expiration date, the forced maintenance of a specific product range, and the requirement to reserve a privileged shelf position for certain products. The Decree, therefore, also protects—in certain cases—buyers.

    Another distinctive feature of Italian law (and that of a few other countries in the European Union—Spain, Croatia, and Hungary) is the regulation of below-cost sales, which is not covered by the Directive.

    Under Article 7 of the Decree, sales below production cost are permitted only in two circumstances:

    • when perishable products are at risk of spoilage, or
    • if the commercial transaction has been planned and agreed upon in writing with the supplier. In all other cases, the price of the product sold below cost is automatically adjusted.

    It should be noted that the replacement criteria specified by the legislature (purchase invoices, average production costs, average product price) are unclear and have been subject to various interpretations.

    The penalties for violating the ban on below-cost sales are severe: administrative fines ranging from 1 to 6 million euros and suspension of business operations for up to 20 days in cases of repeat offenses or particularly serious violations.

    In any case, selling below cost is not merely a national issue; in fact, in its report dated December 1, 2025, on the evaluation of the Directive, the Commission indicated that it will propose a revision of the Directive to establish the principle that farmers should not be forced to systematically sell their products below production costs. We can therefore expect changes to the European regulations governing this issue.

    The Penalty System

    The Decree contains a comprehensive system of penalties, calibrated according to the nature and severity of the violation.

    Failure to comply with the provisions of the Decree results, depending on the case, in three types of consequences, which may apply cumulatively:

    1. Invalidity of the offending contractual clause, which is automatically replaced where the Decree so provides: for example, a term of less than 12 months is extended to that minimum period; a price below the cost of production is adjusted upward.
    2. Monetary penalties: fines ranging from a fixed minimum of between 1,000 and 30,000 euros, depending on the obligation violated, to a maximum varying from 3% to 5% of the annual revenue of the party responsible for the violation, which may be increased up to two or three times in the event of repeated violations, with an overall maximum limit of 10% of revenue. With specific regard to unfair practices, Article 10 of the Decree provides that those included on the “blacklist” are subject to administrative penalties ranging from 30,000 euros to 5% of the previous year’s revenue; those included on the “gray list” are subject to fines ranging from 15,000 euros to 3% of revenue; other practices prohibited under Article 5 are subject to penalties ranging from 5,000 euros to 4% of revenue.
    3. Compensation for Damages: Injured parties and their representative organizations may, in any case, file claims for compensation for damages (all of which must be proven).

     

    As previously mentioned, starting in 2024, an operator subject to a monetary penalty may, within a strict deadline of thirty days from the notification of the injunction order, pay the penalty at a 50% reduction if the operator demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to eliminate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

    Enforcement of the Regulations: The Expanding Role of the ICQRF

    Four years after its designation as the competent supervisory authority in Italy pursuant to the Decree, the ICQRF (Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention) has become one of the most active supervisory bodies in the European Union in this sector. Working in coordination with the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Agri-Food Products, it conducts inspections both in response to reports and on its own initiative.

    The gradual intensification of this agency’s activities is remarkable. In 2022, the ICQRF conducted 139 inspections. By 2025, that number had risen to 3,536. Inspections resulting from complaints are—in fact—extremely rare, while the majority of inspections are carried out on the agency’s own initiative. Operators’ reluctance to file complaints—a phenomenon common across all EU member states and largely attributable to fears of commercial retaliation by stronger business partners—has made proactive enforcement the primary mechanism in practice.

    The most recent ICQRF reports confirm a significant upward trend in the volume of inspections, the number of operators investigated (76 in 2022 versus 1,430 in 2025), and the number of violations detected (15 in 2022, 562 in 2025). The sectors subject to the most frequent inspections are dairy products and fruits and vegetables, both characterized by large, structurally powerful buyers and a highly fragmented supplier base.

    The most commonly found violations include unilateral changes to contractual terms by the buyer, failure to comply with mandatory payment terms, and the absence of written sales contracts.

    Case Law on Unfair Practices in the Agri-Food Supply Chain

    The intensification of inspections and the issuance of injunctions against operators has, as was to be expected, led to the first disputes and, consequently, to the first court decisions regarding the Decree.

    Following appeals filed by certain operators in the dairy sector against administrative sanctions imposed for unilaterally modifying the agreed-upon price of milk, several trial courts (specifically the Court of Brescia and the Milan Court of Appeals) have confirmed that any price modification requires the written consent of all contracting parties. This is consistent with the text of the Decree, which prohibits unilateral changes to agreed-upon contractual terms and requires that agreements between the parties be in writing.

    In Judgment No. 1225 of April 29, 2025, published on June 12, 2025, the Milan Court of Appeals ruled that a letter revising the criteria for calculating the price—sent by the buyer to the supplier, not preceded by negotiations between the parties, and not signed by the supplier to indicate acceptance—constitutes a unilateral modification of the contractual terms relating to the price, which is punishable under Article 4(d) of the Decree. In fact, it cannot be considered a written agreement (since it is signed by only one party). It is true that Article 3 of the Decree provides for the possibility of fulfilling the written form requirement through “equivalent forms,” but this is conditional on the fundamental contractual elements (including the price) having been previously agreed upon between the buyer and the supplier through a framework agreement.

    Therefore, it is irrelevant that, in the present case, the supplier, by continuing to make deliveries, behaved in a manner that could be construed as tacit acceptance of the amendment, given that price agreements cannot be established through “equivalent forms.”

    The body of case law remains limited, so it is premature to draw definitive conclusions about the direction of case law in this area.

    However, there is no doubt that the operational boundaries of the penalty regime are gradually being defined and the interpretive limits of the Decree’s provisions are being clarified.

    Conclusion

    The Italian regulatory framework governing unfair commercial practices in the agricultural and food supply chain has, in the more than four years since its entry into force, moved from theory to practical application.

    The basic framework described in the previous article has been supplemented by subsequent legislative amendments, and enforcement of the regulations is overseen by a regulatory authority that has demonstrated both the will and the capacity to act. The proactive approach of the ICQRF, which is increasingly active in its role as an enforcement authority, leaves no doubt that compliance with the Decree is a practical imperative, not merely a theoretical one.

    For operators active in the Italian agri-food supply chain—whether they are suppliers, buyers, or intermediaries—the priorities are clear:

    • contracts must be in writing and comply with the mandatory requirements set forth in the Decree
    • business practices must be reviewed to verify their compliance with the law and ensure they do not fall under the list of prohibited practices, and
    • Business processes must ensure that each operator adheres to good commercial practices in its dealings with its partners and other operators in the supply chain.

    France regulates unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain more strictly than Directive (EU) 2019/633 requires. Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 30 June 2021 transposed the Directive into a framework already built by the Egalim laws, and France chose not to apply the turnover thresholds set out in the Directive: the rules therefore cover all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, whatever the size or nationality of the parties. Written annual agreements signed before 1 March, automatic price revision clauses, capped payment terms and administrative fines reaching €2 million, doubled for repeat infringements, are the core of the regime, enforced by the DGCCRF.

    Summary

    1. Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when
    2. Products covered by the French rules
    3. Scope of the French rules compared with the Directive
    4. Suppliers and buyers covered, regardless of size and nationality
    5. Applicable law and jurisdiction in international supply contracts
    6. Where French law goes further than the Directive
    7. Mandatory content of an agri-food supply agreement
    8. Penalties for breaching the contractual requirements
    9. Unfair practices prohibited beyond the Directive
    10. Penalties for unfair commercial practices
    11. The DGCCRF and its enforcement powers
    12. Findings of the latest DGCCRF report

    Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when?

    Directive (EU) 2019/633 was transposed into French law by Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 2021, June 30th, whose provisions entered into force on July 1, 2021 and apply to contracts concluded as from November 1, 2021. Contracts concluded before that date were granted a 12-month period, starting on July 1, 2021, to comply with these provisions.

    This transposition forms part of an already well-established legislative framework shaped by « Egalim I » Law No. 2018-938 of October 30, 2018; « Egalim II » Law No. 2021-1357 of October 18, 2021 and « Egalim III » Law No. 2023-1041 of November 17, 2023, which strengthen contractual relations and the protection of agricultural producers. Even prior to the transposition of the Directive, French law had already refocused the rules on restrictive business practices around the following unlawful practices:

    • A significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
    • the granting of an advantage without consideration; and
    • The sudden termination of established business relationships.

     

    The Ordinance of June 30, 2021 transposed those provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/633 that did not fall within this existing framework, specifically introducing three new restrictive practices applicable to agricultural and food products into the French Commercial Code  (Com.C):

    • The cancellation of an order for perishable products at short notice (Article L. 443-5 of the Com.C);
    • The unlawful obtaining, use, or disclosure of the supplier’s trade secrets (Article L. 443-6 of the Com.C);
    • The refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a supply agreement where the supplier has requested such confirmation (Article L. 443-7 of the Com.C).

     

    This framework has been strengthened by Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026 on emergency measures for agricultural protection and sovereignty (the “2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law”), most of whose relevant provisions entered into force on 20 August 2026. The 2026 law notably amends agricultural contracting rules, food-sector price revision mechanisms and certain restrictive trade practices.

    Which agri-food products are covered by the French rules?

    Directive 2019/633 applies to the sale of “agricultural and food products”, defined in Article 2 as “the products listed in Annex I to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as products not listed in that Annex but processed for use as food for human consumption by using products listed in that Annex”, subject to the annual turnover thresholds of suppliers and buyers set out in Article 1§2.

    Is the scope of the French rules broader than the Directive?

    In France, the scope of the provisions transposing the Directive is the same as that of EU law, as they apply to agricultural and food products.

    However, certain French provisions in this area have a broader scope of application. Many provisions of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code apply to commercial relationships relating to “production, distribution or service activities” (in particular restrictive practices – Article L. 442-1 Com.C). Some of these provisions apply to fast-moving consumer goods, defined in Article L. 441-4 of the French Commercial Code as “non-durable products with a high frequency and recurrence of consumption”, the list of which is set by decree, as well as to food products.

    Which suppliers and buyers are covered, and does their size matter?

    France chose not to introduce the supplier and buyer turnover thresholds provided for in Directive 2019/633. As a result, the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers.

    Which law applies to an international agri-food supply contract?

    French law does not provide for specific conflict-of-law rules applicable to supply contracts in the agri-food sector. At first glance, international contracts for the supply of agri-food products are therefore governed by the general conflict-of-law rules applicable in France.

    Choice of law under Rome I and the 1955 Hague Convention

    These general rules are laid down by Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, known as the Rome I Regulation. Rome I establishes as a general principle that the parties are free to choose the law applicable to an international contract, either expressly or implicitly. In the absence of an express choice, the applicable law depends on the legal characterization of the supply contract.

    A distinction must therefore be made depending on the nature of the supply contract. If the French court characterizes the contract as a contract for the sale of goods, it may apply either the Rome I Regulation or, more likely, the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international sales of tangible movable goods. In both cases, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the seller is established. If the supply contract is characterized as a processing or bespoke supply contract, particularly where it is based on detailed specifications, the French court would apply the Rome I Regulation and may consider such a contract to constitute a service contract rather than a sale contract. In that case, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the service provider is established.

    Article L. 444-1.A and the limits of overriding mandatory rules

    In addition, it its worthwhile looking at Article L. 444-1.A of the French Commercial Code which states

    “The provisions of Chapters I, II and III of this Title apply to any agreement between a supplier and a buyer relating to products or services marketed on French territory. These provisions are matters of public policy. Any dispute relating to their application falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts, subject to compliance with European Union law and international treaties ratified or approved by France and without prejudice to recourse to arbitration.”

    At first glance, this provision pretends to bring all commercial contracts within the scope of French law where the products or services are marketed in France, like an overriding mandatory rule (OMR). However, this approach appears ambiguous, unjustified and at the end ineffective.

    First, restrictive trade practices (RTP) do not constitute OMR within the meaning of the Rome I Regulation. Article L. 444-1.A does not expressly refer to the terms overriding mandatory rules and just merely recalls the domestic public policy nature of the relevant provisions.

    Second, French case law has repeatedly refused to qualify RTP as OMR, with the exception of enforcement actions brought by the French Ministry of Economy and Finance against third party imposing to their counterpart blatant imbalance clauses.

    Third, the general characterization of the provisions of Title IV of the French Commercial Code as OMR does not satisfy the test of sufficient connection and imperative necessity as defined by the ECJ in its ruling of 5 September 2024 (Huk-Coburg-Allgemeine Versicherung, Case C-86/23).

    Exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts and its exceptions

    With respect to jurisdiction, Article L. 444-1.A wants to create an exclusive jurisdiction of French courts for commercial matters such as RTP. However, it provides clear and wide exceptions based on compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction matters and with arbitration rules.

    In practice, any jurisdiction clause (subject to the exception here after) or arbitration clause stipulated in an international contract must be upheld by French courts, which must therefore decline jurisdiction. Only in very limited circumstances may French courts assert this exclusive jurisdiction rule, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has not entered into any relevant multilateral or bilateral convention with France (such as Lugano Convention, The Hague conventions…).

    Are the French rules stricter than Directive (EU) 2019/633?

    French commercial law is stricter than the rules laid down by Directive 2019/633, for several reasons:

    • A broader scope of application:
    • No thresholds limit the application of these provisions; as a result, all economic operators are covered, regardless of their size or turnover;
    • While certain provisions are specific to food products, there is also a common framework applicable to all products without distinction, as well as a specific regulatory regime for fast-moving consumer goods (see Question 3).
    • Prior to the transposition of the Directive, France already had a legislative framework in place in this area (the Egalim laws), which it continued to develop after the entry into force of the ordinance transposing the European Directive; this is why the ordinance transposed only four new restrictive trade practices, rather than the entire list set out in the Directive.
    • French law provides for strict regulation governing commercial negotiations, particularly in the large-scale retail sector. The 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law further strengthens this framework by introducing tighter rules on agricultural contract negotiations, reference production-cost indicators, automatic price revision mechanisms in the food sector, repeated tendering procedures and substantial reductions in order volumes during negotiations.

    What must a valid agri-food supply agreement contain in France?

    Chapter I of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code, entitled “Transparency in commercial relationships”, imposes numerous requirements governing the negotiation and performance of commercial agreements:

    The seller’s terms and conditions of sale

    The seller’s pricing policy: the seller must provide any buyer who so requests with its terms and conditions of sale, which must include, at a minimum, the conditions of sale, payment terms, the price list, and the schedule of price reductions (discounts, immediate rebates, deferred rebates, and “free” products) (Article L. 441-1 of the Com.C).

    These terms and conditions may be general (applicable to all customers), category-based (applicable to a category of customers, such as wholesalers, provided that the classification is based on objective identification criteria), or specific and individually negotiated (supplementing or derogating from the general or category-based terms and conditions of sale).

    In this respect, specific provisions apply to food products and products intended for pet food (Article L. 441-1-1 of the French Commercial Code), as well as to wholesalers (Article L. 441-1-2 of the French Commercial Code).

    Since 20 August 2026, Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C. also allows the supplier’s terms and conditions of sale for food products and pet food to include an automatic formula revising the unit-price list in line with upward or downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials used in the product.

    The buyer’s commercial cooperation services

    La politique de coopération commerciale de l’acheteur: L’acheteur, quant à lui, propose et négocie avec le fournisseur des services rendus par lui et qui bénéficient, directement ou indirectement, au fournisseur (Art. L. 441-3 C.com.):

    • Commercial cooperation services: these are services provided in connection with the resale of products or services to consumers, or with a view to their resale to professionals, which are intended to promote the marketing of the supplier’s products and are separable from the act of sale.
    • Other services: “other obligations intended to promote the commercial relationship between the supplier and the distributor or service provider” (L. 441-3, III. 3° Com. C).
    • Promotional benefits: Direct allocation of discounts («remise») to consumers by the distributor acting under a mandate from the supplier for fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

    The written annual agreement and the 31 January or 1 March deadlines

    Formalisation of the negotiation: a written agreement must be entered into, before 1 March of each year, between the supplier and the distributor or service provider, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements.

    As an experimental rule until 31 December 2029, where the supplier is a legal entity with worldwide annual turnover (excluding tax) below €350 million in the last closed financial year, the statutory 1st of March date referred to in Articles L. 441-3, L. 441-4, L. 441-6 and L. 443-8 Com. C. is replaced by 31th of January. In the same situations, the three-month periods referred to in Article L. 441-4 VI and Article L. 443-8 V(B) Com. C. are reduced to two months.

    Law No. 2026-796 introduces also two experiments: Until 15 April 2029 for agreements governed by Article L. 443-8 Com. C., and until 15 April 2028 for agreements governed by Article L. 441-4 Com. C., where the annual agreement has not been concluded by 1st of March (or within two months from the beginning of a special marketing cycle), the supplier may, if no new contract has been formed, terminate the commercial relationship without the distributor being able to rely on the rules on sudden termination under Article L. 442-1 II Com.C., or request application of a notice period compliant with that provision.

    Negotiation timetable for producer/first-buyer of agro-food contracts: under Article L. 631-24II bis of the French Rural and Maritime Fishing code (“CRPM”), the written contract or framework agreement must be concluded within four months after the prospective buyer receives the producer’s written proposal (this period may be extended by an extended interprofessional agreement, up to six months). If no agreement is reached, one of the parties must refer the matter to the Agricultural Commercial Relations Mediator within 15 days. If mediation fails and both parties still intend to establish or continue the relationship, the Agricultural Commercial Disputes Settlement Committee must be seized within a further 15 days; where applicable, the contract must then be concluded within two months after the parties receive the Committee’s decision

    It must set out (Art. L. 441-3 Com.C.):

    • The terms and conditions of the sale of products or the provision of services (including price reductions) and, where applicable, the types of situations in which and the modalities according to which general sales conditions (GSCs) may apply.
    • Commercial cooperation services
    • Other obligations
    • Any service or obligation arising from an agreement entered into with a legal entity located outside French territory with which the distributor is directly or indirectly affiliated

     

    It being specified that the mandatory contents of the written agreement vary depending on its scope of application, namely whether the agreement is entered into with wholesalers, relates to fast-moving consumer goods, or concerns agricultural products (Art. L. 441-7 and L. 441-8 Com.C).

    Stricter rules for agricultural products: duration, price revision, renegotiation

    More specifically, with respect to agricultural products, French law is all the more protective as regards the formalisation of negotiations and provides for even stricter obligations:

    • Clause relating to the duration of the contract: under Article L. 631-24 VI CRPM, the minimum duration of a contract between a producer and a first buyer is three years, except for products subject to excise duties and for grapes, must and the wines produced from them. Unless otherwise agreed, contracts are renewable by tacit renewal for an equivalent period; where the buyer gives notice of non-renewal, the notice period may not be less than three months. The producer may expressly waive the statutory minimum durations in writing, in accordance with Articles 148 and 168 of Regulation (EU) No. 1308/2013. A contract or framework agreement lasting less than three years may omit an automatic upward/downward revision clause for a fixed price.
    • Clauses relating to price determination mechanismsi and revision: Article L. 631-24 III CRPM requires the contract or framework agreement to contain the price and its automatic upward/downward revision mechanism, or the criteria and methods used to determine the price, including the weighting of the relevant indicators. The producer’s proposal must take account of one or more indicators relating to relevant agricultural production costs and their evolution. The parties must refer in the final contract or framework agreement to the reference indicators published by the competent interprofessional organisation (or, failing publication, by the relevant agricultural technical institutes), unless they expressly choose other agricultural production-cost indicators and state the reasons for that choice. Clauses whose purpose or effect is automatically to renegotiate or change the price so as to align it with a more favourable price practised by a competing buyer, producer, producer organisation or association of producer organisations are deemed unwritten.

     

    For food products and pet food subject to Article L. 443-8 Com.C., the annual written agreement must contain an automatic formula revising the unit-price list according to upward and downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials. If the supplier’s terms and conditions contain the formula permitted by Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C., the annual agreement must reproduce that formula and it is not negotiable. Price changes resulting from its application must be implemented no later than one month after activation. A distributor may object only where objective economic data show that the link drawn by the supplier between raw-material cost changes and the impact on its price list is manifestly erroneous.

    Lastly, specific provisions apply to contracts entered into between a supplier and a distributor “relating to the design and production of food products in accordance with specifications meeting the buyer’s specific needs and marketed under a private label”, as set out in Article L. 441-7 of the French Commercial Code.

    Invoicing and payment terms for food products and beverages

    Invoicing and payment terms: any purchase and sale transaction must give rise to an invoice, issued upon completion of the transaction and containing a number of mandatory particulars. In addition, the Commercial Code provides for a default payment period of 30 days, with a maximum payment period of 60 days or 45 days end of month, and sets out late payment penalties and a fixed recovery fee in the event of late payment (Art. L. 441-9 and L. 441-10 Com.C)

    In addition, the legislator has introduced specific payment deadlines for food products and beverages (Art. L. 441-11 Com.C):

    • Perishable agricultural products, perishable food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals: 30 days from delivery. In the case of periodic billing:30 days after the end of the ten-day period;
    • For seasonal fruits and vegetables: 30 days from the end of the month of delivery;
    • Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption: 20 days from the date of delivery;
    • Alcoholic beverages subject to excise duty (e.g., Armagnac, Cognac, brandy, gin, rum, vodka): 30 days from the end of the month of delivery. For wine and other non-sparkling fermented beverages covered by Article L. 665-3 CRPM, the first buyer must, in principle, pay the seller (or its subrogee) an advance of at least 15% of the order amount within ten clear days after conclusion of the sale contract. Since 20 August 2026, interprofessional bodies may provide a derogation from this advance-payment obligation only in the context of multiannual contracts.
    • Non-perishable agricultural and food products: If the invoice is issued by the supplier: 60 days from the date of issue of the invoice; and If the invoice is issued by the buyer: 60 days from the date of preparation of the invoice.

     

    Logistics penalties

    Logistics penalites: lastly, the French Commercial Code strictly regulates specific contractual sanctions known as “logistics penalties”, relating to the supplier’s failure to comply with its delivery, conformity, or timing obligations (Art. L. 441-17 Com.C).

    What are the penalties for breaching the contractual requirements?

    In the event of a breach of contractual requirements, several sanctions may apply:

    • Seller’s pricing policy: an administrative fine not exceeding €15,000 for a natural person and €75,000 for a legal entity ( L. 441-1 Com.C).

    For food products and products intended for pet food, the administrative fine may not exceed €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, and the maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 443-8 Com.C). The new information requirements attached to an optional automatic price-revision formula in the supplier’s terms and conditions (Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C.) are also backed by the administrative sanction provided in Article L. 443-8 Com.C. More generally, any breach of Article L. 443-8 I to VI is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum doubled for a repeated infringement within two years.

    • Buyer’s commercial cooperation policy and formalisation of negotiations: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-6 Com.C).

    Failure to comply with the March 1st deadline provided for in Article L. 441-3(IV) is punishable by an administrative fine not exceeding €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity. In the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final, the maximum fine is increased to €400,000 for a natural person and €2,000,000 for a legal entity. For suppliers falling within the temporary €350 million turnover experiment introduced by the 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law, references to the 1 March deadline must be read as 31 January for the duration of the experiment (until 31 December 2029).

    • Absence of a price revision clause in the agricultural sector: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-7 C)
    • Absence of a renegotiation clause: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-8 Com.C)).
    • Failure to comply with payment deadlines, absence of mandatory information required under the terms of payment, setting of non-compliant rates or conditions for late payment penalties, and failure to comply with the terms of calculation of payment deadlines agreed between the parties: administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €2 million for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €4 million for a legal entity in the event of a repeat offense within two years of the date on which the first penalty decision became final ( L. 441-16 Com.C).

     

    Which unfair practices does French law prohibit beyond the Directive?

    In addition to the contractual obligations described above, aimed at preventing abuses and unfair commercial practices between businesses, Articles L. 442-1 to L. 442-12 of the French Commercial Code set out a list of «unfair commercial practices between undertakings» (« pratiques commerciales déloyales entre entreprises »), including:

    • Obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage without consideration or manifestly disproportionate to the consideration provided (Art. L. 442-1(I) Com.C);
    • Subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations creating a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
    • Subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or operating conditions are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.);
    • imposing logistics penalties in breach of Article 441-17 (Art. L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
    • Applying or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, or sales or purchase conditions not justified by real consideration set out in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
    • Failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, leading to the failure to conclude a contract within the deadline set out in Article L. 441-3 ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
    • Abruptly terminating, even partially, an established commercial relationship without sufficient written notice, taking into account the duration of the relationship and industry practices or interprofessional agreements ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
    • Implementing, during contract negotiations, a substantial reduction in the volume of orders placed with an established commercial partner, even temporarily, where the scale, unusual nature or circumstances of the reduction are such as to jeopardise the balance of the established commercial relationship ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
    • For operators providing online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations laid down therein, other clauses and practices remaining governed by Title IV of Book IV ( L. 442-1, III Com.C.);
    • Directly or indirectly participating in a breach of the prohibition on out-of-network resale imposed on a distributor bound by an exempt selective or exclusive distribution agreement ( L. 442-2 Com. C);
    • Clauses deemed null and void, including retroactive rebates, discounts or commercial cooperation benefits, automatic granting of more favourable terms granted to competing undertakings, or prohibitions on assigning receivables ( L. 442-3 Com.C);
    • Resale at a loss or announcement of resale at a loss ( L. 442-5 Com.C.);
    • Imposing a minimum resale price on a distributor ( L. 442-6 Com.C.);
    • For buyers of agricultural or food products, imposing an abnormally low purchase price on suppliers ( L. 442-7 Com.C);
    • Regulation of remote reverse auctions ( L. 442-8 Com.C.);
    • Artificially increasing or decreasing prices, particularly in remote auctions, through false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or any other fraudulent means ( L. 442-9 Com.C);
    • Associations or cooperatives offering products for sale or providing services not provided for in their bylaws( L. 442-10 Com.C.);
    • Use of public property belonging to the State, local authorities or public bodies to sell products or provide services under irregular conditions ( L. 442-11 Com.C);
    • For cloud computing service providers, granting unlimited cloud credits or making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the conclusion of such an agreement ( L. 442-12 Com.C.).

     

    What are the penalties for unfair commercial practices in France?

    General sanctions regime under Article L. 442-4

    The unfair commercial practices listed below are subject to the same sanction’s regime, as provided for in Article L. 442-4 of the French Commercial Code. The practices concerned are the following:

    • L. 442-1, I, 1° Com.C: obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage that does not correspond to any consideration or is clearly disproportionate to the consideration given;
    • L. 442-1, I, 2° Com.C: subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations that create a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
    • L. 442-1, I, 3° Com.C: imposing logistical penalties in violation of Article L. 441-17;
    • L. 442-1, I, 4° Com.C: practicing or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, conditions, or terms of sale or purchase that are not justified by actual considerations provided for in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage;
    • L. 442-1, I, 5° Com.C: failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, resulting in the contract not being concluded within the deadline specified in Article L. 441-3;
    • L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.: subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or modalities are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations;
    • L. 442-1, II Com.C.: implementing a substantial reduction in order volumes during contract negotiations, including temporarily, where its scale, unusual nature or the circumstances are liable to jeopardise the balance of an established commercial relationship;
    • L. 442-1, III Com.C: for operators offering online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations set out in this text; other clauses or practices remain governed by Title IV of Book IV;
    • Art L. 442-2 C: participating directly or indirectly in the violation of the prohibition on resale outside the network imposed on distributors bound by a selective or exclusive distribution agreement exempted under competition law;
    • Art L. 442-3 C: using clauses or contracts allowing the producer to benefit from retroactive benefit of discounts (“remises”), rebates (“rabais”), or commercial cooperation; the automatic granting of more favorable terms to competing companies; prohibition on assigning claims against the other party to third parties;
    • L. 442-7 Com.C: for a buyer of agricultural products or foodstuffs, imposing an abusively low selling price on its supplier;
    • Article L. 442-8 C: regulation of remote reverse auctions.

    For all these practices:

    • the victim of such practices may have the illegal clauses or contracts declared null and void and request the restitution of undue benefits;

    the French Minister for the Economy or the Public Prosecutor may request the court to:

    • order the cessation of the practices;
    • declare illegal clauses or contracts null and void and obtain restitution of undue benefits;

    request the imposition of a civil fine, the amount of which may not exceed:

    • five million euros;
    • three times the amount of the benefits unduly received or obtained;
    • or 5% of the turnover excluding tax generated in France by the perpetrator of the practices during the last financial year ended preceding the financial year in which the practices were implemented.

    The court shall systematically order the publication, dissemination, or posting of its decision or an extract thereof, in accordance with the terms and conditions it specifies.

    Practices subject to specific sanctions

    • L. 442-5 Com.C: resale at a loss or the announcement of resale at a loss is punishable by a fine not exceeding 0.4% of the annual turnover excluding VAT generated in France during the last closed financial year (Art. L. 442-5, I Com.C);
    • L. 442-6 Com.C: imposition of a minimum resale price on the distributor is punishable by a maximum fine of €75,000 for legal entities;
    • L. 442-9 Com.C: causing an artificial increase or decrease in prices, in particular in remote auctions, by disseminating false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or by any other fraudulent means, is punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €225,000 for food products. Additional penalties may also apply;
    • L. 442-11 Com.C: using public property belonging to the State, local authorities or their public bodies to offer products for sale or to provide services under irregular condition is punishable by seizure on the premises, for a period not exceeding one month, of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services. It may also give rise to the confiscation of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services, and to an order to pay the Public Treasury an amount corresponding to the value of the seized products;
    • L. 442-12 Com.C: for a cloud computing service provider, granting unlimited cloud computing credits credits to a person engaged in production, distribution or service activities and making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the simultaneous conclusion of such an agreement constitutes an unfair commercial practice punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €1,500,000 (Article L. 132-2 of the French Consumer Code: sanctions for misleading commercial practices – « sanction despratiques commerciales trompeuses»).

     

    Which authority enforces the rules, and what powers does it have?

    The national authority responsible for enforcement is the administrative authority in charge of competition and consumer affairs: the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF). The DGCCRF has investigative powers (Article L. 450-1 of the French Commercial Code), may issue injunctions (Article L. 470-1 of the French Commercial Code), and imposes administrative fines and sanctions for breaches of Title IV of Book IV and for non-compliance with injunctions (Article L. 470-2 of the French Commercial Code).

    What did the DGCCRF’s latest enforcement report find?

    According to the last DGCCRF’s 2024 report, DGCCRF «inspected 186 establishments in the dairy, cattle, pork, poultry and egg sectors in order to verify compliance with the mandatory written contractualisation between producers and their first buyers. ». The report further states that «the regulation of commercial relations and negotiations is likely to give rise to a new Egalim law, following the publication of several parliamentary reports. »In this respect, a parliamentary report on the application of the so-called «Egalim 38» law was submitted on 13 March 2024. The legislative development anticipated in that report has since materialised in Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026, which substantially amended agricultural contractualisation and food-sector commercial negotiation rules with effect, for most of the relevant provisions, from 20 August 2026.

    ***

    Frequently asked questions on unfair trading practices in France

    Does French law apply if my company is not established in France?

    Yes, as regards the substantive rules. France did not adopt the turnover thresholds of Directive 2019/633, so the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers. Whether a French court will hear a dispute is a separate question.

    Can we choose a law other than French law in an agri-food supply contract?

    In principle yes. French law contains no specific conflict-of-law rules for agri-food supply contracts, so the choice is governed by the Rome I Regulation, under which the parties are free to choose the applicable law. Article L. 444-1.A of the Commercial Code appears to claim French law for products marketed in France, but French case law has repeatedly refused to treat restrictive trade practices as overriding mandatory rules.

    Will a jurisdiction or arbitration clause be upheld by the French courts?

    In practice yes. Article L. 444-1.A expressly reserves compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction and with arbitration. French courts may assert the exclusive jurisdiction rule only in very limited circumstances, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has entered into no relevant convention with France.

    What is the payment deadline for perishable food products in France?

    Thirty days from delivery for perishable agricultural and food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals. Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption must be paid within 20 days of delivery, seasonal fruit and vegetables within 30 days of the end of the month of delivery, and non-perishable agricultural and food products within 60 days (Article L. 441-11 of the Commercial Code).

    By what date must the annual agreement with a distributor be signed?

    Before 1 March or 31 January (when supplier’s turnover is less than €350 million) of each year, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements. Missing that deadline is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity, doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years.

    Must a contract with an agricultural producer include a price revision clause?

    Yes. The contract between a producer and its first buyer must provide for automatic upward and downward price revision mechanisms, based in particular on indicators relating to agricultural production costs and to changes in those costs. The absence of such a clause is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity.

    How long must a supply contract with an agricultural producer last?

    At least three years, and the contract must include a clause to that effect. The term may be extended up to a maximum of five years where an interprofessional agreement so provides (Article L. 631-24, III, 5° of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code).

    After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

    A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

    The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

    From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

    This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

    Why wine matters in this agreement

    The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

    1. tariff liberalisation;
    2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
    3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
    4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

    This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

    At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

    Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

    Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

    Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

    For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

    1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
    2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
    3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

    The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

    Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

    More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

    Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

    The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) and “Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

    This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

    For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

    Geographical indications: protection and tension

    One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

    The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

    From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

    1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
    2. transition periods for local operators;
    3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

    This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

    Services, distribution, and market structure

    Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

    Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

    The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

    1. logistics providers
    2. distribution networks
    3. commercial representation
    4. marketing and advertising agencies

    For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

    Legal advisors will need to consider:

    1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
    2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
    3. compliance with competition rules

    The implementation gap: where risk lies

    Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

    Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

    This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

    For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

    1. managing client expectations
    2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
    3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

    What should lawyers be doing now?

    Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

    Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

    1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
    2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
    3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
    4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

    In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

    Final sip

    The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

    Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

    At major events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, some companies attempt to “wildly” associate their brand or image with the event through a practice known as “ambush marketing” , defined by French courts as “an advertising strategy implemented by a company in order to associate its commercial image with that of an event and thereby benefit from the media impact of that event without paying the relevant fees and without having obtained the prior authorisation of the event organiser” (Paris Court of Appeal, 2nd chamber, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912). A risky and unlawful practice, but one that is sometimes conceivable.

    Key points

    • Ambush marketing is a practice that may give rise to sanctions but is not prohibited as such.
    • In return for their investments in the competition, FIFA’s official sponsors and partners enjoy very strong legal protection, through various general instruments (infringement, free-riding/parasitism, intellectual property) and more specific ones (sports law), against all forms of ambush marketing.
    • The FIFA World Cup benefits from enhanced protection based on an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide and on FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines, in the absence of specific French legislation comparable to that enacted for the Olympic Games.
    • However, these rights are not absolute, and there remain narrow opportunities for a (clever) form of ambush marketing.

    Protection of official World Cup sponsors and partners against ambush marketing

    Reaching nearly 5 billion people across all platforms during its last edition in Qatar in 2022, including more than 1.5 billion viewers for the final alone, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is the most-watched sporting event on the planet. Hosted for the first time by three countries (Canada, Mexico and the United States), it brings together 48 teams and more than 1,200 players for 104 matches across 16 stadiums. Its organisation is largely financed by various official partners, sponsors and rights holders, who in return receive the exclusive right to use FIFA’s official trademarks and intellectual property so as to associate their own image and distinctive signs with the competition.

    Ambush marketing is not sanctioned as such under French law, but a range of statutory provisions allow for broad protection of sponsors and partners of world-class sporting events against ambush marketing. They are indeed entitled to peacefully enjoy the rights offered to them in exchange for the significant investments they make in connection with events such as, for example, the football or rugby World Cups, or the Olympic Games.

    The following legal instruments may in particular be invoked by official sponsors and by the organisers of such events:

    • the “classic” protections offered by intellectual property law (trademark law and copyright) by way of an infringement action under the French Intellectual Property Code,
    • civil liability law (parasitism/free-riding and unfair competition based on article 1240 of the French Civil Code),
    • consumer law (misleading commercial practices),
    • but also more specific provisions, such as the protection of the exploitation rights of sports federations and organisers of sporting events under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, which grants organisers of sporting events a monopoly over the exploitation of those events.

    On these grounds, the following ambush marketing practices have notably been sanctioned:

    The exploitation of a tennis competition and the use, during the sporting event, of the brand associated with it: An online betting operator organised bets on Roland Garros matches using the protected sign and Roland Garros trademark to identify the matches on which bets were offered. The unlawful exploitation of the sporting competition was sanctioned at EUR 400,000 under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, the French Tennis Federation being the sole owner of the right to exploit Roland Garros. The use of the trademark was also sanctioned for infringement (EUR 300,000) and free-riding/parasitism (EUR 500,000) (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 Oct. 2009, No. 08/19179; Paris Judicial Court, 8 Aug. 2024, No 08/19179).

    An advertising campaign carried out during a film festival reproducing the event’s registered trademark: During the Cannes Film Festival, a cosmetics brand published videos on its social media showing its brand ambassadors being styled, with the official Cannes Film Festival poster visible in certain shots, one of which reproduced the registered Palme d’Or trademark. Sanctioned on the grounds of copyright infringement and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Judicial Court, 11 Dec. 2020, No. 19/08543).

    An advertising campaign falsely claiming the status of official event partner: During the Cannes Film Festival, the use of the slogan “official hairdresser of women” alongside the expressions “Cannes” and “Festival de Cannes”, and other publications that falsely led the public to believe the company was an official festival partner, to the detriment of the sole official festival hairdresser. Sanctioned on the grounds of unfair competition and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Court of Appeal, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912).

    These financial sanctions may be combined with injunctions to cease the practices and/or orders for press publication, subject to periodic penalty payments.

    FIFA’s specific trademark protection

    Unlike the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, which benefited from specific French legislation as a host country (Law No. 2018-202 of 26 March 2018 on the organisation of the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games) reserving in particular advertising spaces in the vicinity of competition venues exclusively for official partners, the 2026 FIFA World Cup does not take place on French territory, and therefore no equivalent French legal framework applies. The protection of official partners and sponsors thus relies on general law , but is nonetheless robust.

    FIFA has built an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide, protected in France by the provisions of the French Intellectual Property Code. These trademarks include in particular the verbal and figurative trademark FIFA®, the marks FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, as well as the official competition emblem (combining the trophy with the figure 26), the official slogan “We Are 26™” / “Nous Sommes 26™”, the logos of the sixteen host cities, and the official typeface “FWC 26”, protected by copyright. Only FIFA’s rights holders, namely the FIFA Partners (led by Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways and Visa), the Plus Sponsors, the Official Sponsors and Regional Supporters, are authorised to use this official intellectual property for commercial purposes.

    FIFA has published Intellectual Property Guidelines (version 2.0, June 2024) detailing the authorised and prohibited uses of the trademarks and logos associated with the 2026 World Cup. According to these guidelines, the following are prohibited without authorisation: any use of official trademarks in commercial advertising; the incorporation of official intellectual property into a trade name or domain name; the organisation of competitions, games or prize draws creating an association with the competition; the use of official trademarks to decorate a retail store; and the use of official hashtags by a corporate account for commercial purposes. The guidelines further specify that protection extends not only to identical reproduction of official trademarks but also to confusingly similar variants. This protection, recalled in the guidelines, is consistent with the enhanced protection afforded to well-known trademarks under French law by article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code.

    Lessons from the Paris 2024 Olympic Games: what risks do brands face?

    The Paris 2024 Olympic Games gave rise to significant litigation that clearly illustrates the risks faced by companies tempted by ambush marketing at a major sporting event. Although these decisions were rendered in the specific context of the Olympic Games, which benefited from specific, reinforced legal protections, they nevertheless constitute a direct warning for brands that might consider similar strategies during the World Cup, on the basis of general law.

    The use of official symbols on travelling physical media: During the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, a Chinese dairy company had buses displaying the Olympic rings alongside its own brands circulating throughout Paris, while presenting itself as “the only Chinese dairy company present in Paris 2024”. The Paris Court of Appeal upheld both free-riding/parasitism and trademark infringement, and ordered the companies concerned, in summary proceedings, to pay EUR 20,000 per defendant, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 20,000 per day per proven infringement, aimed at stopping the diffusion of the advertising (Paris Court of Appeal, pole 5, chamber 2, 21 Nov. 2025, No. 24/15283; Paris Court, interim order of 8 Aug. 2024, No. 24/55463). This judgment illustrates the vigilance of French courts with regard to strategies of visual association with an event, even without an explicit claim of official partnership, and confirms the possibility of combining infringement and parasitism claims for substantial awards.

    The unauthorised broadcast of competitions: The Paris Court, sitting in summary proceedings during the Olympic Games, ordered the immediate cessation of the broadcast of Olympic competitions by a streaming platform that did not hold the corresponding media rights, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 1,500 per identified infringement, EUR 3,000 per day for ongoing distributions and EUR 5,000 per day for failure to withdraw the content (Paris Court, summary proceedings, 18 Sept. 2024, No. 24/53019). Thus, any platform broadcasting World Cup matches without holding the rights licensed by FIFA faces immediate emergency measures under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code.

    The enhanced protection of well-known trademarks: The French Court of Cassation confirmed that protection of Olympic trademarks extends beyond strict reproduction: it is sufficient for the trademark to be evoked or suggested, without the need to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public. This solution, based on article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, was applied to a bar that had used the Olympic rings on its coasters to promote its broadcast evenings (Court of Cassation, Criminal chamber, 17 Jan. 2017, No. 15-86.363). FIFA’s trademarks being equally well-known worldwide, the same protective regime applies to them: a mere evocation of official trademarks, even without literal reproduction, may constitute an actionable infringement.

    Certain marketing operations may escape sanction

    Analysis of case law and promotional practices nonetheless reveals the contours of certain advertising practices that could be permitted (not sanctioned by the provisions described above), provided they are carefully prepared and presented. Here are some examples.

    Creative or humorous communication

    • A tongue-in-cheek, even humorous approach may allow companies to avoid the sanctions described above. For example, Intersnack’s Vico crisps brand launched a promotional campaign in 2016 around the slogan “Vico, partner of supporters at home”.
    • Irish bookmaker Paddy Power sponsored an egg-and-spoon race in “London”, a village in Burgundy, France, in order to display the following slogan in London during the 2012 Olympic Games: “Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is)”. The Olympic organising committee failed to stop this campaign. British humour …
    • Meanwhile, Heineken, a rival of official Euro 2016 sponsor Carlsberg, marketed a range of beer bottles in the colours of the flags of 21 countries that had “marked its history”, the majority of which were participating in the tournament.

    Using factual information as advertising

    It was held lawful to use the results of a rugby match and the announcement of an upcoming match in a newspaper to promote a car brand, with the advertisement reading: “France 13 England 24 , the Fiat 500 congratulates England on its victory and looks forward to seeing the French team on 9 March for France-Italy”. The judges considered that this publication “merely reproduces a current sporting result, obtained and made public on the front page of the sports newspaper, and refers to a future fixture also known to have been announced in the newspaper’s editorial content” (Court of Cassation, Commercial chamber, 20 May 2014, No. 13-12.102).

    Sponsoring players participating in the World Cup

    Any company may enter into partnerships with players participating in the FIFA World Cup, for example by supplying them with equipment or clothing bearing its logo. FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines expressly state that they “contain no affirmations regarding rights held by third parties such as players, clubs, member associations [or] confederations”. FIFA’s guidelines also explicitly confirm that generic images related to football, national teams or national flags do not fall within the official intellectual property. Caution is nonetheless warranted: the partnership must not create the impression of a commercial association with FIFA or the competition, nor use FIFA’s official trademarks.

    A combined legal and marketing approach in designing and preparing the message of any such communication campaign is essential to avoid legal proceedings, particularly on the grounds of free-riding/parasitism. Certain advertising campaigns can therefore legitimately be considered, particularly when they are clever.

    Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

    Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

    In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

    The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

    With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

    In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

    The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

    This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

    However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

    Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

    The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

    In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

    Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

    For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

    What the EU decision does (and does not) do

    The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

    At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

    In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

    The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

    Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

    Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

    Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

    The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

    Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

    Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

    How different payment types are affected in practice

    Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

    The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

    Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

    If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

    Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

    Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

    Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

    Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

    Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

    Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

    How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

    Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

    For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

    A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

    Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

    A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

    This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

    A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

    A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

    Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

    EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

    Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

    Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

    DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

    Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

    Country notes (alphabetical)

    Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

    France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

    Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

    Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

    For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

    Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

    Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

    Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

     

    Practical next steps for EU companies

    1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
    2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
    3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
    4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
    5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
    6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
    7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
    8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
    9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

    Under French Law, franchisors and distributors are subject to two kinds of pre-contractual information obligations: each party must spontaneously inform their future partner of any information they know is decisive to their consent. In addition, for certain contracts – i.e a franchise agreement – there is a duty to disclose a limited amount of information in a document. These pre-contractual obligations are mandatory rules of public policy. Thus, these two obligations apply simultaneously to the franchisor, distributor or dealer when negotiating a contract with a partner.

    Takeaways

    • The information required by the DIP must be fully completed and updated ;
    • The information not required by the DIP but provided by the franchisor must be carefully selected and sincere;
    • Franchisee must be given the opportunity to request additional information from the franchisor;
    • Franchisee’s experience in the economic sector enables the franchisor to considerably limit its exposure to the risk of contract cancellation due to a defect in the franchisee’s consent;
    • Franchisor must keep the proof of the actual disclosure of pre-contractual information (whether mandatory or not).
    • The general information obligation under common law (Article 1112-1 of the French Civil Code) may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation provided for under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code.

    General duty of disclosure for all contractors

    What is the scope of this pre-contractual information?

    This obligation is imposed on all counterparties, for any kind of contract. Indeed, article 1112-1 of the Civil Code states that:

    (§. 1) The party who knows information of decisive importance for the consent of the other party must inform the other party if the latter legitimately ignores this information or trusts its counterparty.

    (§. 3) Of decisive importance is the information that is directly and necessarily related to the content of the contract or the quality of the parties. »

    This obligation applies to all contracting parties for any type of contract.

    French courts have ruled that this general information obligation may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code (see below), answering the question in the affirmative (Paris Court of Appeal, 27 March 2024, no. 22/12665). The scope of the latter has however, been defined by the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») : only information bearing a direct and necessary link with the subject matter of the contract or the qualities of the parties is subject to the disclosure obligation (Cass. com., 14 May 2025, no. 23-17.948).

    Who bears the burden of proof?

    The burden of proof rests on the person who claims that the information was due to him. He must then prove (i) that the other party owed him the information but (ii) did not provide it (Article 1112-1 (§. 4) of the Civil Code)

    Special duty of disclosure for franchise and distribution agreements

    Which contracts are subject to this special rule?

    French law requires (art. L.330-3 French Commercial Code) the provision of a pre-contractual information document (in French “DIP”) and the draft contract, by any person:

    • which grants another person the right to use a trade mark, trade name or sign,
    • while requiring an exclusive or quasi-exclusive commitment for the exercise of its activity (e.g. exclusive purchase obligation). The quasi-exclusive nature of the commitment is assessed on a case-by-case basis by French courts, independently of the 80% purchase threshold provided for under EU Regulation 2022/720, which is treated merely as an indicative reference.

    Concretely, DIP must be provided, for example, to the franchisee, distributor, dealer or licensee of a brand, by its franchisor, supplier or licensor as soon as the two above conditions are met. French courts have moreover recently had occasion to confirm that the scope of the DIP obligation is not limited to franchise agreements but extends, in particular, to dealership agreements, provided the above-mentioned conditions are met (Paris Court of Appeal, 22 May 2024, no. 22/08672).

    When the DIP must be provided?

    DIP and draft contract must be provided at least 20 days before signing the contract, and, where applicable, before the payment of the sum required to be paid prior to the signature of the contract (for a reservation).

    What information must be disclosed in the DIP?

    Article R. 330-1 of the French Commercial Code requires that DIP mentions the following information (non-detailed list) concerning:

    • Franchisor (identity and experience of the managers, career path, etc.);
    • Franchisor’s business (in particular creation date, head office, bank accounts, history of the development of the business, annual accounts, etc.);
    • Operating network (members list with indication of signing date of contracts, establishments list offering the same products/services in the area of the planned activity, number of members having ceased to be part of the network during the year preceding the issue of the DIP with indication of the reasons for leaving, etc.);
    • Trademark licensed (date of registration, ownership and use);
    • General state of the market (about products or services covered by the contract) and local state of the market (about the planned area) and information relating to factors of competition and development perspective. With respect to the local market, the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») has held that the franchisor is not required to conduct a market study, but that if one is provided, it must be accurate and verifiable (Cass. com., 18 Oct. 2023, no. 22-19.329).;
    • Essential element of the draft contract and at least: its duration, contract renewal conditions, termination and assignment conditions and scope of exclusivities;
    • Financial obligations weighing in on contracting party: nature and amount of the expenses and investments that will have to be incurred before starting operations (up-front entry fee, installation costs, etc.).

    Beyond the exhaustiveness of the information required under the aforementioned provision, the DIP is subject to a qualitative standard. All information provided — including information provided spontaneously — must be accurate and truthful to ensure that the prospective network member’s consent is fully informed and free from any defect.

    How to prove the disclosure of information?

    The burden of proof for the delivery of the DIP rests on the debtor of this obligation: the franchisor (Cass. Com., 7 July 2004, n°02-15.950). The ideal for the franchisor is to have the franchisee sign and date his DIP on the day it is delivered and to keep the proof thereof.

    The clause of contract indicating that the franchisee acknowledges having received a complete DIP does not provide proof of the delivery of a complete DIP (Cass. com, 10 January 2018, n° 15-25.287).

    The franchisor is subject to a duty to update the DIP until the contract is signed

    In a ruling dated 26 June 2024 (no. 23-14.085 PB), the French Supreme Court held that formal compliance of the DIP at the time of its delivery is not sufficient to exonerate the franchisor from all pre-contractual liability. This position was confirmed by a subsequent ruling of 4 December 2024 (no. 23-16.684).

    These two decisions appear to establish a duty of ongoing updates incumbent upon the network head throughout the entire period between the delivery of the DIP and the execution of the contract. Where significant events occur during that interval — insolvency proceedings affecting network members, major litigation, or structural changes to the network — the network head is required to proactively inform the prospective member. The court then examines whether the failure to disclose such information was liable to distort the candidate’s assessment of the network and, consequently, to vitiate his consent (Cass. com., 26 June 2024, op. cit.).

    A franchisor may therefore not shelter behind the initial regularity of the DIP to discharge its disclosure duty where the network’s situation has materially changed prior to the signing of the contract.

    Sanction for breach of pre-contractual information duties

    Criminal sanction

    Failing to comply with the obligations relating to the DIP, franchisor or supplier can be sentenced to a criminal fine of up to 1,500 euros and up to 3,000 euros in the event of a repeat offence, the fine being multiplied by five for legal entities (article R.330-2 French commercial Code).

    Cancellation of the contract for deceit

    The contract may be declared null and void in case of breach of either article 1112-1 of the French Code civil or article L. 330-3 of the French Code de commerce. In both cases, failure to comply with the obligation to provide information is sanctioned if the applicant demonstrates that his or her consent has been vitiated by error, deceit or violence. In this respect, courts conduct a concrete, case-by-case assessment, taking into account in particular the professional experience and personal due diligence of the distributor: a sophisticated candidate will face greater difficulty in establishing deceit, and his experience in the relevant sector may be sufficient to exonerate the franchisor (Paris Court of Appeal, div. 5 – ch. 11, 26 Apr. 2024, no. 21/13205), even where the information provided was incomplete or inaccurate (Paris Court of Appeal, 20 Jan. 2021, no. 19/03382).

    The path is therefore narrow for the franchisee: he cannot invoke error concerning profitability when it is he who draws up his plan, and even when this plan is drawn up by the franchisor or based on information drawn up and transmitted by the franchisor, the experience of the franchisee who knew the local market may exonerate the franchisor.

    Regarding deceit, Courts strictly assess its two conditions which are:

    • (a material element) the existence of a lie or deceptive reticence (article 1137 French Civil Code), and
    • (an intentional element) the intention to deceive his counterparty (article 1130 French Civil Code).

    Where applicable, the parties must return to the state they were in before the contract.

    Damages

    Although the claims for contract cancellation are subject to very strict conditions, it remains that franchisees/distributors may alternatively obtain damages on the basis of tort liability for non-compliance with the pre-contractual information obligation, subject to proof of fault (incomplete or incorrect information), damage (loss of opportunity of not contracting or contracting on more advantageous terms) and the causal link between the two.

    Unfair trading practices in agri-food: France – Legalmondo

    19 September 2026

    • France
    • Distribution

    In Spain, a waiver of goodwill indemnity in a distribution agreement does not always protect the manufacturer. The Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal ordered a manufacturer to pay its distributor more than EUR 100,000 in goodwill indemnity and damages for insufficient notice, despite the written waiver, because it held that the agreement had expired and that good faith limited the waiver’s effect. To avoid the same risk, the manufacturer should renew the agreement in writing before it expires or expressly provide that waivers remain effective, specify which customer base the waiver covers and give notice proportionate to the duration of the relationship.

    Summary

    • The distributor’s case and the manufacturer’s liability
    • What the Court of Appeal decided on the waiver
    • Why the waiver was not applied
    • A valid waiver with limits: distribution and agency
    • Whether the waiver should have fallen away with the agreement
    • What manufacturers distributing in Spain should do

    Goodwill indemnity in Spain: the distributor’s case

    For more than twenty years, the manufacturer and distributor worked together without a written agreement. In 2018, they signed a two-year contract. The distributor agreed to waive both goodwill indemnity and damages arising from termination.

    The agreement expired in December 2020. Neither party renewed it, but they continued doing business together.

    Months later, the manufacturer decided to end the relationship. It gave less than two months’ notice and alleged breaches by the distributor that it was unable to prove.

    Waiver of goodwill indemnity: what the Court of Appeal decided

    In a distribution relationship, the distributor can waive goodwill indemnity. In an agency relationship, an advance waiver is not permitted. In this case, however, the Court of Appeal held that the waiver no longer applied because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The court also considered that good faith could limit the waiver’s effect, given the length of the relationship and its termination without good cause.

    The argument based on expiry is debatable: a clause intended to govern the end of an agreement should not lose its effect simply because that agreement ends. To avoid this uncertainty, parties that continue trading after expiry should renew the agreement in writing or expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

    Why was the goodwill indemnity waiver not applied?

    The Court of Appeal relied on two grounds.

    The first was the expiry of the agreement. Since the parties had continued trading without signing a new document, the court held that the waiver was no longer effective when the manufacturer ended the relationship.

    The second was good faith. Even if the waiver still applied, the court considered that it could not take full effect in those circumstances: more than twenty-five years of collaboration, a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause.

    Goodwill indemnity waiver: valid, but with limits

    The judgment is surprising because a distributor can, in principle, waive this indemnity. To understand why, it helps to distinguish distribution from agency.

    In agency relationships, the law protects the agent against an advance waiver. This follows from Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992, read together with the goodwill indemnity provisions in Article 28.

    In distribution relationships, the Spanish Supreme Court applies Article 28 by analogy where its requirements are met (judgment 944/2023 of 13 June). But this does not prevent a manufacturer and distributor from agreeing to exclude all compensation if either party terminates the agreement on notice. The Supreme Court confirmed this in its judgments of 4 December 2007, 15 January 2008, sitting in plenary session, and 25 April 2011.

    The distinction lies in how the relationship ends. That case law concerns ordinary termination, whether on notice or on expiry of the agreed term. A waiver offers less certainty where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice, as happened here.

    Should the waiver have fallen away with the agreement?

    Of the Court of Appeal’s two grounds, the first is the more debatable: that the waiver ceased to apply because the agreement had expired.

    The Spanish Supreme Court has enforced exclusion clauses precisely after an agreement has expired. It did so in its judgment of 23 December 2008. In that case, a dealer’s agreement ended when its extension expired. The court refused goodwill compensation because the agreement itself excluded any claim arising from its termination.

    The point is straightforward: if a clause is agreed to govern what happens when an agreement ends, it is difficult to argue that it loses its effect merely because the agreement ends.

    There is a difference here: the parties continued trading after expiry and, according to the Court of Appeal, did so on the terms that had traditionally governed their relationship. But continuing to trade does not, by itself, show that they intended to set aside a waiver relating to the customer base developed up to that point.

    There is an agency case that might appear to point the other way. The Supreme Court has prevented parties from dividing the indemnity into separate periods through successive declarations that there was “nothing further to claim” (judgment of 27 June 2013). Its reason, however, was the mandatory protection afforded by Article 28 of the Spanish Commercial Agency Act, which the parties cannot exclude. That restriction does not apply to distribution.

    Even if the waiver remained effective, there would still be the question of notice. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss. They compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business and would therefore not necessarily be covered by that waiver.

    What should manufacturers distributing in Spain do?

    Businesses may continue trading as usual and overlook the fact that their agreement has expired. This judgment illustrates the risk: when the time comes to end the relationship, the manufacturer may discover that the protections it relied on are no longer effective.

    The agreement should be renewed in writing before it expires. If the parties have already continued trading without renewal, they should document which terms still apply and expressly provide that waivers remain effective both after expiry and while the relationship continues without a new document.

    It is also important to specify which customer base the waiver covers. If it is intended to include the customer base already built up, this should be stated expressly, with a reference date, a defined territory and confirmation that the waiver is final.

    Finally, goodwill indemnity, damages for insufficient notice and other damages should be addressed separately. When ending the relationship, the manufacturer should give notice proportionate to its duration.

    Frequently asked questions on goodwill indemnity in Spain

    Is a waiver of goodwill indemnity valid in a distribution agreement in Spain?

    In principle, yes: in distribution the distributor can waive the indemnity, whereas in agency the law protects the agent against an advance waiver (Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992). A waiver offers less certainty, however, where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice.

    What happens to the waiver if the agreement expires and the parties keep trading?

    The risk is that it will not be applied. In the case decided by the Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal, the waiver was held to be no longer effective because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The argument is debatable, but to avoid uncertainty the agreement should be renewed in writing or should expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

    Can good faith limit a waiver of goodwill indemnity?

    According to the court, in that case it could: after more than twenty-five years of collaboration, with a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause, the waiver could not take full effect.

    Does the waiver also cover damages for insufficient notice?

    Not necessarily. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss, because they compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business.

    How should the waiver be worded to cover the customer base already built up?

    It must say so expressly: the waiver should state a reference date, a defined territory and that the waiver is final.

    How much notice must the manufacturer give?

    The article does not give a number of days: it says that notice must be proportionate to the duration of the relationship. In the case examined, the manufacturer gave less than two months’ notice after more than twenty-five years of collaboration.

    Abstract: In February 2022, this previous article examined the adoption of Legislative Decree No. 198 of November 8, 2021 (the “Decree”), through which Italy transposed Directive (EU) 2019/633 (the “Directive”) on unfair commercial practices in business-to-business relationships within the agri-food supply chain.

    Four years later, the regulatory framework has evolved and the landscape has changed in part: the Italian legislature has made several amendments to the Decree, the designated enforcement authority has significantly stepped up its activities, and the first court decisions regarding the application of the Decree have been issued.

    This article aims to provide an updated overview.

    The Regulatory Framework: Original Structure and Subsequent Amendments

    The implementation of the Directive provided the Italian legislature with an opportunity to overhaul the pre-existing national regulations governing the agri-food supply chain—in particular those set forth in Article 62 of Decree-Law No. 1/2012. The result is a unified and systematic regulatory framework on the subject, contained in the Decree that entered into force on December 15, 2021.

    For an analysis of the structure and key provisions of the Decree, please refer to the previous article. The fundamental structural choices described in that article remain in effect: the Decree establishes mandatory contractual requirements for operators in the agricultural and food sector, identifies unfair practices that are always prohibited (the so-called “blacklist”) and those prohibited unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties (the so-called “gray list”), regulates below-cost sales (not covered by the Directive), provides for a comprehensive system of penalties to punish any violations, and designates the Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention (ICQRF) as the authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the Decree’s provisions.

    What is of interest here are the legislative amendments that have modified and supplemented the original text of the Decree. As will be seen, these amendments have tightened regulations that were already stricter than European standards at the time of the Decree’s adoption.

    The first amendment was introduced by Decree-Law No. 21/2022, which expanded the definition of perishable products to include meat-based products with specific physicochemical characteristics, and extended the applicability of the 30-day payment terms to the following agricultural and food products:

    “a) prepackaged products bearing an expiration date or a minimum shelf life not exceeding sixty days;

    1. b) bulk products, even if placed in protective packaging or refrigerated, that have not undergone treatments designed to extend their shelf life beyond sixty days;
      c) meat products exhibiting one of the following physicochemical characteristics: awgreater than 0.95 and pH greater than 5.2, or awgreater than 0.91, or pH equal to or greater than 4.5;
    2. d) all types of milk.”

     

    Subsequently, Decree-Law No. 69/2023 expanded the scope of the Decree to include “suppliers established in other Member States or in third countries when the buyer is established in Italy.” Therefore, today, the Decree applies to all business-to-business (B2B) sales contracts in which the supplier and/or the buyer is established in Italy, regardless of the parties’ turnover and the law applicable to the contract. This is an extremely broad scope of application, capable of effectively encompassing any commercial relationship in which at least one of the parties is Italian. This deliberate departure from the differentiated turnover thresholds provided for by the Directive—justified, according to the legislature, by the extraordinary fragmentation of the Italian agri-food supply chain—continues to define the broader scope of the Italian regime compared to the minimum level of harmonization established by the EU.

    Decree-Law No. 69/2023 also amended the minimum notice period for the buyer’s cancellation of orders for perishable products, prohibiting any “notice period so short as to reasonably lead one to believe that the supplier cannot find alternative outlets for its products” and delegating to a subsequent implementing regulation (not yet issued) to establish specific rules governing this matter. Finally, the provision extended to foreign suppliers the right to file complaints with the national enforcement authority (ICQRF).

    The most recent amendment to the Decree was introduced by Decree-Law No. 63/2024, which

    • added the provision that the supply price must take into account the cost of production
    • specified that wholesale markets also fall within the scope of the Decree
    • included, among the documents that the ICQRF may obtain, accounting documents relating to sales activities and related services, and
    • introduced the possibility of paying any penalties imposed under the Decree at a reduced rate, provided the contractor demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to mitigate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

     

    The cumulative effect of the amendments outlined above is the establishment of regulations that are even stricter than those that took effect in December 2021 (which were already significantly more restrictive than the Directive).

    Mandatory Contractual Requirements: Persistent Compliance Challenges

    Article 3 of the Decree imposes several mandatory requirements for contracts for the sale of agricultural and food products: written form, a minimum term of 12 months, specification of the product’s quantity and characteristics, a fixed or determinable price that reflects production costs, and definition of the terms of delivery and payment.

    However, the legislature’s intention to establish a system that safeguards the contractual rights of the parties has clashed with the reality of commercial transactions in this sector. In fact, experience has shown that these contractual requirements remain the primary source of difficulty for operators in complying with the Decree. It is therefore not surprising that many of the objections raised by the ICQRF over the years have concerned precisely this aspect.

    The written form requirement is particularly critical: a significant percentage of operators, especially in sectors characterized by long-standing informal commercial relationships (the prime example being the wine sector), continue to conclude transactions without an adequate written framework agreement, relying instead on commercial customs and verbal agreements that the Decree does not recognize as sufficient. It is no coincidence that the reports issued by the ICQRF in recent years list the failure to enter into written contracts prior to the delivery of the products sold   among the most frequent violations found.

    Another aspect that is frequently penalized is the unilateral modification of prices: in several cases, buyers have attempted to adjust agreed-upon prices without the supplier’s written consent—a practice that the Decree expressly prohibits and that has been the subject of the first judicial decisions issued on the matter (which will be discussed in paragraph 6).

    Italian Specifics: Additional Prohibited Practices and Below-Cost Sales

    In addition to the “black list” and “gray list” of unfair practices prohibited by the Directive, Article 5 of the Decree identifies and prohibits 16 additional unfair practices, which stem from the pre-existing Italian regulatory framework. These include, for example, the purchase of agricultural and food products through double-reduction electronic tenders and auctions, the application of objectively different conditions for equivalent services, and the obtaining of undue unilateral benefits not justified by the nature or content of the commercial relationship.

    An interesting feature of the Italian list is its explicitly bilateral nature: unlike the Directive, which was designed to protect suppliers from potential abuses by larger and more powerful buyers, Article 5 of the Decree prohibits various unfair practices that also apply to suppliers, including the imposition of an unduly short expiration date, the forced maintenance of a specific product range, and the requirement to reserve a privileged shelf position for certain products. The Decree, therefore, also protects—in certain cases—buyers.

    Another distinctive feature of Italian law (and that of a few other countries in the European Union—Spain, Croatia, and Hungary) is the regulation of below-cost sales, which is not covered by the Directive.

    Under Article 7 of the Decree, sales below production cost are permitted only in two circumstances:

    • when perishable products are at risk of spoilage, or
    • if the commercial transaction has been planned and agreed upon in writing with the supplier. In all other cases, the price of the product sold below cost is automatically adjusted.

    It should be noted that the replacement criteria specified by the legislature (purchase invoices, average production costs, average product price) are unclear and have been subject to various interpretations.

    The penalties for violating the ban on below-cost sales are severe: administrative fines ranging from 1 to 6 million euros and suspension of business operations for up to 20 days in cases of repeat offenses or particularly serious violations.

    In any case, selling below cost is not merely a national issue; in fact, in its report dated December 1, 2025, on the evaluation of the Directive, the Commission indicated that it will propose a revision of the Directive to establish the principle that farmers should not be forced to systematically sell their products below production costs. We can therefore expect changes to the European regulations governing this issue.

    The Penalty System

    The Decree contains a comprehensive system of penalties, calibrated according to the nature and severity of the violation.

    Failure to comply with the provisions of the Decree results, depending on the case, in three types of consequences, which may apply cumulatively:

    1. Invalidity of the offending contractual clause, which is automatically replaced where the Decree so provides: for example, a term of less than 12 months is extended to that minimum period; a price below the cost of production is adjusted upward.
    2. Monetary penalties: fines ranging from a fixed minimum of between 1,000 and 30,000 euros, depending on the obligation violated, to a maximum varying from 3% to 5% of the annual revenue of the party responsible for the violation, which may be increased up to two or three times in the event of repeated violations, with an overall maximum limit of 10% of revenue. With specific regard to unfair practices, Article 10 of the Decree provides that those included on the “blacklist” are subject to administrative penalties ranging from 30,000 euros to 5% of the previous year’s revenue; those included on the “gray list” are subject to fines ranging from 15,000 euros to 3% of revenue; other practices prohibited under Article 5 are subject to penalties ranging from 5,000 euros to 4% of revenue.
    3. Compensation for Damages: Injured parties and their representative organizations may, in any case, file claims for compensation for damages (all of which must be proven).

     

    As previously mentioned, starting in 2024, an operator subject to a monetary penalty may, within a strict deadline of thirty days from the notification of the injunction order, pay the penalty at a 50% reduction if the operator demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to eliminate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

    Enforcement of the Regulations: The Expanding Role of the ICQRF

    Four years after its designation as the competent supervisory authority in Italy pursuant to the Decree, the ICQRF (Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention) has become one of the most active supervisory bodies in the European Union in this sector. Working in coordination with the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Agri-Food Products, it conducts inspections both in response to reports and on its own initiative.

    The gradual intensification of this agency’s activities is remarkable. In 2022, the ICQRF conducted 139 inspections. By 2025, that number had risen to 3,536. Inspections resulting from complaints are—in fact—extremely rare, while the majority of inspections are carried out on the agency’s own initiative. Operators’ reluctance to file complaints—a phenomenon common across all EU member states and largely attributable to fears of commercial retaliation by stronger business partners—has made proactive enforcement the primary mechanism in practice.

    The most recent ICQRF reports confirm a significant upward trend in the volume of inspections, the number of operators investigated (76 in 2022 versus 1,430 in 2025), and the number of violations detected (15 in 2022, 562 in 2025). The sectors subject to the most frequent inspections are dairy products and fruits and vegetables, both characterized by large, structurally powerful buyers and a highly fragmented supplier base.

    The most commonly found violations include unilateral changes to contractual terms by the buyer, failure to comply with mandatory payment terms, and the absence of written sales contracts.

    Case Law on Unfair Practices in the Agri-Food Supply Chain

    The intensification of inspections and the issuance of injunctions against operators has, as was to be expected, led to the first disputes and, consequently, to the first court decisions regarding the Decree.

    Following appeals filed by certain operators in the dairy sector against administrative sanctions imposed for unilaterally modifying the agreed-upon price of milk, several trial courts (specifically the Court of Brescia and the Milan Court of Appeals) have confirmed that any price modification requires the written consent of all contracting parties. This is consistent with the text of the Decree, which prohibits unilateral changes to agreed-upon contractual terms and requires that agreements between the parties be in writing.

    In Judgment No. 1225 of April 29, 2025, published on June 12, 2025, the Milan Court of Appeals ruled that a letter revising the criteria for calculating the price—sent by the buyer to the supplier, not preceded by negotiations between the parties, and not signed by the supplier to indicate acceptance—constitutes a unilateral modification of the contractual terms relating to the price, which is punishable under Article 4(d) of the Decree. In fact, it cannot be considered a written agreement (since it is signed by only one party). It is true that Article 3 of the Decree provides for the possibility of fulfilling the written form requirement through “equivalent forms,” but this is conditional on the fundamental contractual elements (including the price) having been previously agreed upon between the buyer and the supplier through a framework agreement.

    Therefore, it is irrelevant that, in the present case, the supplier, by continuing to make deliveries, behaved in a manner that could be construed as tacit acceptance of the amendment, given that price agreements cannot be established through “equivalent forms.”

    The body of case law remains limited, so it is premature to draw definitive conclusions about the direction of case law in this area.

    However, there is no doubt that the operational boundaries of the penalty regime are gradually being defined and the interpretive limits of the Decree’s provisions are being clarified.

    Conclusion

    The Italian regulatory framework governing unfair commercial practices in the agricultural and food supply chain has, in the more than four years since its entry into force, moved from theory to practical application.

    The basic framework described in the previous article has been supplemented by subsequent legislative amendments, and enforcement of the regulations is overseen by a regulatory authority that has demonstrated both the will and the capacity to act. The proactive approach of the ICQRF, which is increasingly active in its role as an enforcement authority, leaves no doubt that compliance with the Decree is a practical imperative, not merely a theoretical one.

    For operators active in the Italian agri-food supply chain—whether they are suppliers, buyers, or intermediaries—the priorities are clear:

    • contracts must be in writing and comply with the mandatory requirements set forth in the Decree
    • business practices must be reviewed to verify their compliance with the law and ensure they do not fall under the list of prohibited practices, and
    • Business processes must ensure that each operator adheres to good commercial practices in its dealings with its partners and other operators in the supply chain.

    France regulates unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain more strictly than Directive (EU) 2019/633 requires. Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 30 June 2021 transposed the Directive into a framework already built by the Egalim laws, and France chose not to apply the turnover thresholds set out in the Directive: the rules therefore cover all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, whatever the size or nationality of the parties. Written annual agreements signed before 1 March, automatic price revision clauses, capped payment terms and administrative fines reaching €2 million, doubled for repeat infringements, are the core of the regime, enforced by the DGCCRF.

    Summary

    1. Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when
    2. Products covered by the French rules
    3. Scope of the French rules compared with the Directive
    4. Suppliers and buyers covered, regardless of size and nationality
    5. Applicable law and jurisdiction in international supply contracts
    6. Where French law goes further than the Directive
    7. Mandatory content of an agri-food supply agreement
    8. Penalties for breaching the contractual requirements
    9. Unfair practices prohibited beyond the Directive
    10. Penalties for unfair commercial practices
    11. The DGCCRF and its enforcement powers
    12. Findings of the latest DGCCRF report

    Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when?

    Directive (EU) 2019/633 was transposed into French law by Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 2021, June 30th, whose provisions entered into force on July 1, 2021 and apply to contracts concluded as from November 1, 2021. Contracts concluded before that date were granted a 12-month period, starting on July 1, 2021, to comply with these provisions.

    This transposition forms part of an already well-established legislative framework shaped by « Egalim I » Law No. 2018-938 of October 30, 2018; « Egalim II » Law No. 2021-1357 of October 18, 2021 and « Egalim III » Law No. 2023-1041 of November 17, 2023, which strengthen contractual relations and the protection of agricultural producers. Even prior to the transposition of the Directive, French law had already refocused the rules on restrictive business practices around the following unlawful practices:

    • A significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
    • the granting of an advantage without consideration; and
    • The sudden termination of established business relationships.

     

    The Ordinance of June 30, 2021 transposed those provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/633 that did not fall within this existing framework, specifically introducing three new restrictive practices applicable to agricultural and food products into the French Commercial Code  (Com.C):

    • The cancellation of an order for perishable products at short notice (Article L. 443-5 of the Com.C);
    • The unlawful obtaining, use, or disclosure of the supplier’s trade secrets (Article L. 443-6 of the Com.C);
    • The refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a supply agreement where the supplier has requested such confirmation (Article L. 443-7 of the Com.C).

     

    This framework has been strengthened by Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026 on emergency measures for agricultural protection and sovereignty (the “2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law”), most of whose relevant provisions entered into force on 20 August 2026. The 2026 law notably amends agricultural contracting rules, food-sector price revision mechanisms and certain restrictive trade practices.

    Which agri-food products are covered by the French rules?

    Directive 2019/633 applies to the sale of “agricultural and food products”, defined in Article 2 as “the products listed in Annex I to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as products not listed in that Annex but processed for use as food for human consumption by using products listed in that Annex”, subject to the annual turnover thresholds of suppliers and buyers set out in Article 1§2.

    Is the scope of the French rules broader than the Directive?

    In France, the scope of the provisions transposing the Directive is the same as that of EU law, as they apply to agricultural and food products.

    However, certain French provisions in this area have a broader scope of application. Many provisions of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code apply to commercial relationships relating to “production, distribution or service activities” (in particular restrictive practices – Article L. 442-1 Com.C). Some of these provisions apply to fast-moving consumer goods, defined in Article L. 441-4 of the French Commercial Code as “non-durable products with a high frequency and recurrence of consumption”, the list of which is set by decree, as well as to food products.

    Which suppliers and buyers are covered, and does their size matter?

    France chose not to introduce the supplier and buyer turnover thresholds provided for in Directive 2019/633. As a result, the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers.

    Which law applies to an international agri-food supply contract?

    French law does not provide for specific conflict-of-law rules applicable to supply contracts in the agri-food sector. At first glance, international contracts for the supply of agri-food products are therefore governed by the general conflict-of-law rules applicable in France.

    Choice of law under Rome I and the 1955 Hague Convention

    These general rules are laid down by Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, known as the Rome I Regulation. Rome I establishes as a general principle that the parties are free to choose the law applicable to an international contract, either expressly or implicitly. In the absence of an express choice, the applicable law depends on the legal characterization of the supply contract.

    A distinction must therefore be made depending on the nature of the supply contract. If the French court characterizes the contract as a contract for the sale of goods, it may apply either the Rome I Regulation or, more likely, the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international sales of tangible movable goods. In both cases, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the seller is established. If the supply contract is characterized as a processing or bespoke supply contract, particularly where it is based on detailed specifications, the French court would apply the Rome I Regulation and may consider such a contract to constitute a service contract rather than a sale contract. In that case, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the service provider is established.

    Article L. 444-1.A and the limits of overriding mandatory rules

    In addition, it its worthwhile looking at Article L. 444-1.A of the French Commercial Code which states

    “The provisions of Chapters I, II and III of this Title apply to any agreement between a supplier and a buyer relating to products or services marketed on French territory. These provisions are matters of public policy. Any dispute relating to their application falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts, subject to compliance with European Union law and international treaties ratified or approved by France and without prejudice to recourse to arbitration.”

    At first glance, this provision pretends to bring all commercial contracts within the scope of French law where the products or services are marketed in France, like an overriding mandatory rule (OMR). However, this approach appears ambiguous, unjustified and at the end ineffective.

    First, restrictive trade practices (RTP) do not constitute OMR within the meaning of the Rome I Regulation. Article L. 444-1.A does not expressly refer to the terms overriding mandatory rules and just merely recalls the domestic public policy nature of the relevant provisions.

    Second, French case law has repeatedly refused to qualify RTP as OMR, with the exception of enforcement actions brought by the French Ministry of Economy and Finance against third party imposing to their counterpart blatant imbalance clauses.

    Third, the general characterization of the provisions of Title IV of the French Commercial Code as OMR does not satisfy the test of sufficient connection and imperative necessity as defined by the ECJ in its ruling of 5 September 2024 (Huk-Coburg-Allgemeine Versicherung, Case C-86/23).

    Exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts and its exceptions

    With respect to jurisdiction, Article L. 444-1.A wants to create an exclusive jurisdiction of French courts for commercial matters such as RTP. However, it provides clear and wide exceptions based on compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction matters and with arbitration rules.

    In practice, any jurisdiction clause (subject to the exception here after) or arbitration clause stipulated in an international contract must be upheld by French courts, which must therefore decline jurisdiction. Only in very limited circumstances may French courts assert this exclusive jurisdiction rule, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has not entered into any relevant multilateral or bilateral convention with France (such as Lugano Convention, The Hague conventions…).

    Are the French rules stricter than Directive (EU) 2019/633?

    French commercial law is stricter than the rules laid down by Directive 2019/633, for several reasons:

    • A broader scope of application:
    • No thresholds limit the application of these provisions; as a result, all economic operators are covered, regardless of their size or turnover;
    • While certain provisions are specific to food products, there is also a common framework applicable to all products without distinction, as well as a specific regulatory regime for fast-moving consumer goods (see Question 3).
    • Prior to the transposition of the Directive, France already had a legislative framework in place in this area (the Egalim laws), which it continued to develop after the entry into force of the ordinance transposing the European Directive; this is why the ordinance transposed only four new restrictive trade practices, rather than the entire list set out in the Directive.
    • French law provides for strict regulation governing commercial negotiations, particularly in the large-scale retail sector. The 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law further strengthens this framework by introducing tighter rules on agricultural contract negotiations, reference production-cost indicators, automatic price revision mechanisms in the food sector, repeated tendering procedures and substantial reductions in order volumes during negotiations.

    What must a valid agri-food supply agreement contain in France?

    Chapter I of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code, entitled “Transparency in commercial relationships”, imposes numerous requirements governing the negotiation and performance of commercial agreements:

    The seller’s terms and conditions of sale

    The seller’s pricing policy: the seller must provide any buyer who so requests with its terms and conditions of sale, which must include, at a minimum, the conditions of sale, payment terms, the price list, and the schedule of price reductions (discounts, immediate rebates, deferred rebates, and “free” products) (Article L. 441-1 of the Com.C).

    These terms and conditions may be general (applicable to all customers), category-based (applicable to a category of customers, such as wholesalers, provided that the classification is based on objective identification criteria), or specific and individually negotiated (supplementing or derogating from the general or category-based terms and conditions of sale).

    In this respect, specific provisions apply to food products and products intended for pet food (Article L. 441-1-1 of the French Commercial Code), as well as to wholesalers (Article L. 441-1-2 of the French Commercial Code).

    Since 20 August 2026, Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C. also allows the supplier’s terms and conditions of sale for food products and pet food to include an automatic formula revising the unit-price list in line with upward or downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials used in the product.

    The buyer’s commercial cooperation services

    La politique de coopération commerciale de l’acheteur: L’acheteur, quant à lui, propose et négocie avec le fournisseur des services rendus par lui et qui bénéficient, directement ou indirectement, au fournisseur (Art. L. 441-3 C.com.):

    • Commercial cooperation services: these are services provided in connection with the resale of products or services to consumers, or with a view to their resale to professionals, which are intended to promote the marketing of the supplier’s products and are separable from the act of sale.
    • Other services: “other obligations intended to promote the commercial relationship between the supplier and the distributor or service provider” (L. 441-3, III. 3° Com. C).
    • Promotional benefits: Direct allocation of discounts («remise») to consumers by the distributor acting under a mandate from the supplier for fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

    The written annual agreement and the 31 January or 1 March deadlines

    Formalisation of the negotiation: a written agreement must be entered into, before 1 March of each year, between the supplier and the distributor or service provider, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements.

    As an experimental rule until 31 December 2029, where the supplier is a legal entity with worldwide annual turnover (excluding tax) below €350 million in the last closed financial year, the statutory 1st of March date referred to in Articles L. 441-3, L. 441-4, L. 441-6 and L. 443-8 Com. C. is replaced by 31th of January. In the same situations, the three-month periods referred to in Article L. 441-4 VI and Article L. 443-8 V(B) Com. C. are reduced to two months.

    Law No. 2026-796 introduces also two experiments: Until 15 April 2029 for agreements governed by Article L. 443-8 Com. C., and until 15 April 2028 for agreements governed by Article L. 441-4 Com. C., where the annual agreement has not been concluded by 1st of March (or within two months from the beginning of a special marketing cycle), the supplier may, if no new contract has been formed, terminate the commercial relationship without the distributor being able to rely on the rules on sudden termination under Article L. 442-1 II Com.C., or request application of a notice period compliant with that provision.

    Negotiation timetable for producer/first-buyer of agro-food contracts: under Article L. 631-24II bis of the French Rural and Maritime Fishing code (“CRPM”), the written contract or framework agreement must be concluded within four months after the prospective buyer receives the producer’s written proposal (this period may be extended by an extended interprofessional agreement, up to six months). If no agreement is reached, one of the parties must refer the matter to the Agricultural Commercial Relations Mediator within 15 days. If mediation fails and both parties still intend to establish or continue the relationship, the Agricultural Commercial Disputes Settlement Committee must be seized within a further 15 days; where applicable, the contract must then be concluded within two months after the parties receive the Committee’s decision

    It must set out (Art. L. 441-3 Com.C.):

    • The terms and conditions of the sale of products or the provision of services (including price reductions) and, where applicable, the types of situations in which and the modalities according to which general sales conditions (GSCs) may apply.
    • Commercial cooperation services
    • Other obligations
    • Any service or obligation arising from an agreement entered into with a legal entity located outside French territory with which the distributor is directly or indirectly affiliated

     

    It being specified that the mandatory contents of the written agreement vary depending on its scope of application, namely whether the agreement is entered into with wholesalers, relates to fast-moving consumer goods, or concerns agricultural products (Art. L. 441-7 and L. 441-8 Com.C).

    Stricter rules for agricultural products: duration, price revision, renegotiation

    More specifically, with respect to agricultural products, French law is all the more protective as regards the formalisation of negotiations and provides for even stricter obligations:

    • Clause relating to the duration of the contract: under Article L. 631-24 VI CRPM, the minimum duration of a contract between a producer and a first buyer is three years, except for products subject to excise duties and for grapes, must and the wines produced from them. Unless otherwise agreed, contracts are renewable by tacit renewal for an equivalent period; where the buyer gives notice of non-renewal, the notice period may not be less than three months. The producer may expressly waive the statutory minimum durations in writing, in accordance with Articles 148 and 168 of Regulation (EU) No. 1308/2013. A contract or framework agreement lasting less than three years may omit an automatic upward/downward revision clause for a fixed price.
    • Clauses relating to price determination mechanismsi and revision: Article L. 631-24 III CRPM requires the contract or framework agreement to contain the price and its automatic upward/downward revision mechanism, or the criteria and methods used to determine the price, including the weighting of the relevant indicators. The producer’s proposal must take account of one or more indicators relating to relevant agricultural production costs and their evolution. The parties must refer in the final contract or framework agreement to the reference indicators published by the competent interprofessional organisation (or, failing publication, by the relevant agricultural technical institutes), unless they expressly choose other agricultural production-cost indicators and state the reasons for that choice. Clauses whose purpose or effect is automatically to renegotiate or change the price so as to align it with a more favourable price practised by a competing buyer, producer, producer organisation or association of producer organisations are deemed unwritten.

     

    For food products and pet food subject to Article L. 443-8 Com.C., the annual written agreement must contain an automatic formula revising the unit-price list according to upward and downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials. If the supplier’s terms and conditions contain the formula permitted by Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C., the annual agreement must reproduce that formula and it is not negotiable. Price changes resulting from its application must be implemented no later than one month after activation. A distributor may object only where objective economic data show that the link drawn by the supplier between raw-material cost changes and the impact on its price list is manifestly erroneous.

    Lastly, specific provisions apply to contracts entered into between a supplier and a distributor “relating to the design and production of food products in accordance with specifications meeting the buyer’s specific needs and marketed under a private label”, as set out in Article L. 441-7 of the French Commercial Code.

    Invoicing and payment terms for food products and beverages

    Invoicing and payment terms: any purchase and sale transaction must give rise to an invoice, issued upon completion of the transaction and containing a number of mandatory particulars. In addition, the Commercial Code provides for a default payment period of 30 days, with a maximum payment period of 60 days or 45 days end of month, and sets out late payment penalties and a fixed recovery fee in the event of late payment (Art. L. 441-9 and L. 441-10 Com.C)

    In addition, the legislator has introduced specific payment deadlines for food products and beverages (Art. L. 441-11 Com.C):

    • Perishable agricultural products, perishable food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals: 30 days from delivery. In the case of periodic billing:30 days after the end of the ten-day period;
    • For seasonal fruits and vegetables: 30 days from the end of the month of delivery;
    • Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption: 20 days from the date of delivery;
    • Alcoholic beverages subject to excise duty (e.g., Armagnac, Cognac, brandy, gin, rum, vodka): 30 days from the end of the month of delivery. For wine and other non-sparkling fermented beverages covered by Article L. 665-3 CRPM, the first buyer must, in principle, pay the seller (or its subrogee) an advance of at least 15% of the order amount within ten clear days after conclusion of the sale contract. Since 20 August 2026, interprofessional bodies may provide a derogation from this advance-payment obligation only in the context of multiannual contracts.
    • Non-perishable agricultural and food products: If the invoice is issued by the supplier: 60 days from the date of issue of the invoice; and If the invoice is issued by the buyer: 60 days from the date of preparation of the invoice.

     

    Logistics penalties

    Logistics penalites: lastly, the French Commercial Code strictly regulates specific contractual sanctions known as “logistics penalties”, relating to the supplier’s failure to comply with its delivery, conformity, or timing obligations (Art. L. 441-17 Com.C).

    What are the penalties for breaching the contractual requirements?

    In the event of a breach of contractual requirements, several sanctions may apply:

    • Seller’s pricing policy: an administrative fine not exceeding €15,000 for a natural person and €75,000 for a legal entity ( L. 441-1 Com.C).

    For food products and products intended for pet food, the administrative fine may not exceed €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, and the maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 443-8 Com.C). The new information requirements attached to an optional automatic price-revision formula in the supplier’s terms and conditions (Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C.) are also backed by the administrative sanction provided in Article L. 443-8 Com.C. More generally, any breach of Article L. 443-8 I to VI is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum doubled for a repeated infringement within two years.

    • Buyer’s commercial cooperation policy and formalisation of negotiations: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-6 Com.C).

    Failure to comply with the March 1st deadline provided for in Article L. 441-3(IV) is punishable by an administrative fine not exceeding €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity. In the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final, the maximum fine is increased to €400,000 for a natural person and €2,000,000 for a legal entity. For suppliers falling within the temporary €350 million turnover experiment introduced by the 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law, references to the 1 March deadline must be read as 31 January for the duration of the experiment (until 31 December 2029).

    • Absence of a price revision clause in the agricultural sector: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-7 C)
    • Absence of a renegotiation clause: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-8 Com.C)).
    • Failure to comply with payment deadlines, absence of mandatory information required under the terms of payment, setting of non-compliant rates or conditions for late payment penalties, and failure to comply with the terms of calculation of payment deadlines agreed between the parties: administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €2 million for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €4 million for a legal entity in the event of a repeat offense within two years of the date on which the first penalty decision became final ( L. 441-16 Com.C).

     

    Which unfair practices does French law prohibit beyond the Directive?

    In addition to the contractual obligations described above, aimed at preventing abuses and unfair commercial practices between businesses, Articles L. 442-1 to L. 442-12 of the French Commercial Code set out a list of «unfair commercial practices between undertakings» (« pratiques commerciales déloyales entre entreprises »), including:

    • Obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage without consideration or manifestly disproportionate to the consideration provided (Art. L. 442-1(I) Com.C);
    • Subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations creating a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
    • Subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or operating conditions are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.);
    • imposing logistics penalties in breach of Article 441-17 (Art. L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
    • Applying or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, or sales or purchase conditions not justified by real consideration set out in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
    • Failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, leading to the failure to conclude a contract within the deadline set out in Article L. 441-3 ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
    • Abruptly terminating, even partially, an established commercial relationship without sufficient written notice, taking into account the duration of the relationship and industry practices or interprofessional agreements ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
    • Implementing, during contract negotiations, a substantial reduction in the volume of orders placed with an established commercial partner, even temporarily, where the scale, unusual nature or circumstances of the reduction are such as to jeopardise the balance of the established commercial relationship ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
    • For operators providing online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations laid down therein, other clauses and practices remaining governed by Title IV of Book IV ( L. 442-1, III Com.C.);
    • Directly or indirectly participating in a breach of the prohibition on out-of-network resale imposed on a distributor bound by an exempt selective or exclusive distribution agreement ( L. 442-2 Com. C);
    • Clauses deemed null and void, including retroactive rebates, discounts or commercial cooperation benefits, automatic granting of more favourable terms granted to competing undertakings, or prohibitions on assigning receivables ( L. 442-3 Com.C);
    • Resale at a loss or announcement of resale at a loss ( L. 442-5 Com.C.);
    • Imposing a minimum resale price on a distributor ( L. 442-6 Com.C.);
    • For buyers of agricultural or food products, imposing an abnormally low purchase price on suppliers ( L. 442-7 Com.C);
    • Regulation of remote reverse auctions ( L. 442-8 Com.C.);
    • Artificially increasing or decreasing prices, particularly in remote auctions, through false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or any other fraudulent means ( L. 442-9 Com.C);
    • Associations or cooperatives offering products for sale or providing services not provided for in their bylaws( L. 442-10 Com.C.);
    • Use of public property belonging to the State, local authorities or public bodies to sell products or provide services under irregular conditions ( L. 442-11 Com.C);
    • For cloud computing service providers, granting unlimited cloud credits or making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the conclusion of such an agreement ( L. 442-12 Com.C.).

     

    What are the penalties for unfair commercial practices in France?

    General sanctions regime under Article L. 442-4

    The unfair commercial practices listed below are subject to the same sanction’s regime, as provided for in Article L. 442-4 of the French Commercial Code. The practices concerned are the following:

    • L. 442-1, I, 1° Com.C: obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage that does not correspond to any consideration or is clearly disproportionate to the consideration given;
    • L. 442-1, I, 2° Com.C: subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations that create a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
    • L. 442-1, I, 3° Com.C: imposing logistical penalties in violation of Article L. 441-17;
    • L. 442-1, I, 4° Com.C: practicing or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, conditions, or terms of sale or purchase that are not justified by actual considerations provided for in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage;
    • L. 442-1, I, 5° Com.C: failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, resulting in the contract not being concluded within the deadline specified in Article L. 441-3;
    • L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.: subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or modalities are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations;
    • L. 442-1, II Com.C.: implementing a substantial reduction in order volumes during contract negotiations, including temporarily, where its scale, unusual nature or the circumstances are liable to jeopardise the balance of an established commercial relationship;
    • L. 442-1, III Com.C: for operators offering online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations set out in this text; other clauses or practices remain governed by Title IV of Book IV;
    • Art L. 442-2 C: participating directly or indirectly in the violation of the prohibition on resale outside the network imposed on distributors bound by a selective or exclusive distribution agreement exempted under competition law;
    • Art L. 442-3 C: using clauses or contracts allowing the producer to benefit from retroactive benefit of discounts (“remises”), rebates (“rabais”), or commercial cooperation; the automatic granting of more favorable terms to competing companies; prohibition on assigning claims against the other party to third parties;
    • L. 442-7 Com.C: for a buyer of agricultural products or foodstuffs, imposing an abusively low selling price on its supplier;
    • Article L. 442-8 C: regulation of remote reverse auctions.

    For all these practices:

    • the victim of such practices may have the illegal clauses or contracts declared null and void and request the restitution of undue benefits;

    the French Minister for the Economy or the Public Prosecutor may request the court to:

    • order the cessation of the practices;
    • declare illegal clauses or contracts null and void and obtain restitution of undue benefits;

    request the imposition of a civil fine, the amount of which may not exceed:

    • five million euros;
    • three times the amount of the benefits unduly received or obtained;
    • or 5% of the turnover excluding tax generated in France by the perpetrator of the practices during the last financial year ended preceding the financial year in which the practices were implemented.

    The court shall systematically order the publication, dissemination, or posting of its decision or an extract thereof, in accordance with the terms and conditions it specifies.

    Practices subject to specific sanctions

    • L. 442-5 Com.C: resale at a loss or the announcement of resale at a loss is punishable by a fine not exceeding 0.4% of the annual turnover excluding VAT generated in France during the last closed financial year (Art. L. 442-5, I Com.C);
    • L. 442-6 Com.C: imposition of a minimum resale price on the distributor is punishable by a maximum fine of €75,000 for legal entities;
    • L. 442-9 Com.C: causing an artificial increase or decrease in prices, in particular in remote auctions, by disseminating false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or by any other fraudulent means, is punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €225,000 for food products. Additional penalties may also apply;
    • L. 442-11 Com.C: using public property belonging to the State, local authorities or their public bodies to offer products for sale or to provide services under irregular condition is punishable by seizure on the premises, for a period not exceeding one month, of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services. It may also give rise to the confiscation of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services, and to an order to pay the Public Treasury an amount corresponding to the value of the seized products;
    • L. 442-12 Com.C: for a cloud computing service provider, granting unlimited cloud computing credits credits to a person engaged in production, distribution or service activities and making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the simultaneous conclusion of such an agreement constitutes an unfair commercial practice punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €1,500,000 (Article L. 132-2 of the French Consumer Code: sanctions for misleading commercial practices – « sanction despratiques commerciales trompeuses»).

     

    Which authority enforces the rules, and what powers does it have?

    The national authority responsible for enforcement is the administrative authority in charge of competition and consumer affairs: the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF). The DGCCRF has investigative powers (Article L. 450-1 of the French Commercial Code), may issue injunctions (Article L. 470-1 of the French Commercial Code), and imposes administrative fines and sanctions for breaches of Title IV of Book IV and for non-compliance with injunctions (Article L. 470-2 of the French Commercial Code).

    What did the DGCCRF’s latest enforcement report find?

    According to the last DGCCRF’s 2024 report, DGCCRF «inspected 186 establishments in the dairy, cattle, pork, poultry and egg sectors in order to verify compliance with the mandatory written contractualisation between producers and their first buyers. ». The report further states that «the regulation of commercial relations and negotiations is likely to give rise to a new Egalim law, following the publication of several parliamentary reports. »In this respect, a parliamentary report on the application of the so-called «Egalim 38» law was submitted on 13 March 2024. The legislative development anticipated in that report has since materialised in Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026, which substantially amended agricultural contractualisation and food-sector commercial negotiation rules with effect, for most of the relevant provisions, from 20 August 2026.

    ***

    Frequently asked questions on unfair trading practices in France

    Does French law apply if my company is not established in France?

    Yes, as regards the substantive rules. France did not adopt the turnover thresholds of Directive 2019/633, so the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers. Whether a French court will hear a dispute is a separate question.

    Can we choose a law other than French law in an agri-food supply contract?

    In principle yes. French law contains no specific conflict-of-law rules for agri-food supply contracts, so the choice is governed by the Rome I Regulation, under which the parties are free to choose the applicable law. Article L. 444-1.A of the Commercial Code appears to claim French law for products marketed in France, but French case law has repeatedly refused to treat restrictive trade practices as overriding mandatory rules.

    Will a jurisdiction or arbitration clause be upheld by the French courts?

    In practice yes. Article L. 444-1.A expressly reserves compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction and with arbitration. French courts may assert the exclusive jurisdiction rule only in very limited circumstances, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has entered into no relevant convention with France.

    What is the payment deadline for perishable food products in France?

    Thirty days from delivery for perishable agricultural and food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals. Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption must be paid within 20 days of delivery, seasonal fruit and vegetables within 30 days of the end of the month of delivery, and non-perishable agricultural and food products within 60 days (Article L. 441-11 of the Commercial Code).

    By what date must the annual agreement with a distributor be signed?

    Before 1 March or 31 January (when supplier’s turnover is less than €350 million) of each year, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements. Missing that deadline is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity, doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years.

    Must a contract with an agricultural producer include a price revision clause?

    Yes. The contract between a producer and its first buyer must provide for automatic upward and downward price revision mechanisms, based in particular on indicators relating to agricultural production costs and to changes in those costs. The absence of such a clause is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity.

    How long must a supply contract with an agricultural producer last?

    At least three years, and the contract must include a clause to that effect. The term may be extended up to a maximum of five years where an interprofessional agreement so provides (Article L. 631-24, III, 5° of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code).

    After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

    A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

    The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

    From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

    This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

    Why wine matters in this agreement

    The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

    1. tariff liberalisation;
    2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
    3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
    4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

    This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

    At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

    Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

    Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

    Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

    For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

    1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
    2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
    3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

    The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

    Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

    More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

    Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

    The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) and “Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

    This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

    For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

    Geographical indications: protection and tension

    One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

    The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

    From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

    1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
    2. transition periods for local operators;
    3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

    This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

    Services, distribution, and market structure

    Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

    Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

    The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

    1. logistics providers
    2. distribution networks
    3. commercial representation
    4. marketing and advertising agencies

    For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

    Legal advisors will need to consider:

    1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
    2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
    3. compliance with competition rules

    The implementation gap: where risk lies

    Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

    Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

    This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

    For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

    1. managing client expectations
    2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
    3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

    What should lawyers be doing now?

    Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

    Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

    1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
    2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
    3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
    4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

    In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

    Final sip

    The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

    Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

    At major events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, some companies attempt to “wildly” associate their brand or image with the event through a practice known as “ambush marketing” , defined by French courts as “an advertising strategy implemented by a company in order to associate its commercial image with that of an event and thereby benefit from the media impact of that event without paying the relevant fees and without having obtained the prior authorisation of the event organiser” (Paris Court of Appeal, 2nd chamber, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912). A risky and unlawful practice, but one that is sometimes conceivable.

    Key points

    • Ambush marketing is a practice that may give rise to sanctions but is not prohibited as such.
    • In return for their investments in the competition, FIFA’s official sponsors and partners enjoy very strong legal protection, through various general instruments (infringement, free-riding/parasitism, intellectual property) and more specific ones (sports law), against all forms of ambush marketing.
    • The FIFA World Cup benefits from enhanced protection based on an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide and on FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines, in the absence of specific French legislation comparable to that enacted for the Olympic Games.
    • However, these rights are not absolute, and there remain narrow opportunities for a (clever) form of ambush marketing.

    Protection of official World Cup sponsors and partners against ambush marketing

    Reaching nearly 5 billion people across all platforms during its last edition in Qatar in 2022, including more than 1.5 billion viewers for the final alone, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is the most-watched sporting event on the planet. Hosted for the first time by three countries (Canada, Mexico and the United States), it brings together 48 teams and more than 1,200 players for 104 matches across 16 stadiums. Its organisation is largely financed by various official partners, sponsors and rights holders, who in return receive the exclusive right to use FIFA’s official trademarks and intellectual property so as to associate their own image and distinctive signs with the competition.

    Ambush marketing is not sanctioned as such under French law, but a range of statutory provisions allow for broad protection of sponsors and partners of world-class sporting events against ambush marketing. They are indeed entitled to peacefully enjoy the rights offered to them in exchange for the significant investments they make in connection with events such as, for example, the football or rugby World Cups, or the Olympic Games.

    The following legal instruments may in particular be invoked by official sponsors and by the organisers of such events:

    • the “classic” protections offered by intellectual property law (trademark law and copyright) by way of an infringement action under the French Intellectual Property Code,
    • civil liability law (parasitism/free-riding and unfair competition based on article 1240 of the French Civil Code),
    • consumer law (misleading commercial practices),
    • but also more specific provisions, such as the protection of the exploitation rights of sports federations and organisers of sporting events under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, which grants organisers of sporting events a monopoly over the exploitation of those events.

    On these grounds, the following ambush marketing practices have notably been sanctioned:

    The exploitation of a tennis competition and the use, during the sporting event, of the brand associated with it: An online betting operator organised bets on Roland Garros matches using the protected sign and Roland Garros trademark to identify the matches on which bets were offered. The unlawful exploitation of the sporting competition was sanctioned at EUR 400,000 under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, the French Tennis Federation being the sole owner of the right to exploit Roland Garros. The use of the trademark was also sanctioned for infringement (EUR 300,000) and free-riding/parasitism (EUR 500,000) (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 Oct. 2009, No. 08/19179; Paris Judicial Court, 8 Aug. 2024, No 08/19179).

    An advertising campaign carried out during a film festival reproducing the event’s registered trademark: During the Cannes Film Festival, a cosmetics brand published videos on its social media showing its brand ambassadors being styled, with the official Cannes Film Festival poster visible in certain shots, one of which reproduced the registered Palme d’Or trademark. Sanctioned on the grounds of copyright infringement and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Judicial Court, 11 Dec. 2020, No. 19/08543).

    An advertising campaign falsely claiming the status of official event partner: During the Cannes Film Festival, the use of the slogan “official hairdresser of women” alongside the expressions “Cannes” and “Festival de Cannes”, and other publications that falsely led the public to believe the company was an official festival partner, to the detriment of the sole official festival hairdresser. Sanctioned on the grounds of unfair competition and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Court of Appeal, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912).

    These financial sanctions may be combined with injunctions to cease the practices and/or orders for press publication, subject to periodic penalty payments.

    FIFA’s specific trademark protection

    Unlike the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, which benefited from specific French legislation as a host country (Law No. 2018-202 of 26 March 2018 on the organisation of the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games) reserving in particular advertising spaces in the vicinity of competition venues exclusively for official partners, the 2026 FIFA World Cup does not take place on French territory, and therefore no equivalent French legal framework applies. The protection of official partners and sponsors thus relies on general law , but is nonetheless robust.

    FIFA has built an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide, protected in France by the provisions of the French Intellectual Property Code. These trademarks include in particular the verbal and figurative trademark FIFA®, the marks FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, as well as the official competition emblem (combining the trophy with the figure 26), the official slogan “We Are 26™” / “Nous Sommes 26™”, the logos of the sixteen host cities, and the official typeface “FWC 26”, protected by copyright. Only FIFA’s rights holders, namely the FIFA Partners (led by Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways and Visa), the Plus Sponsors, the Official Sponsors and Regional Supporters, are authorised to use this official intellectual property for commercial purposes.

    FIFA has published Intellectual Property Guidelines (version 2.0, June 2024) detailing the authorised and prohibited uses of the trademarks and logos associated with the 2026 World Cup. According to these guidelines, the following are prohibited without authorisation: any use of official trademarks in commercial advertising; the incorporation of official intellectual property into a trade name or domain name; the organisation of competitions, games or prize draws creating an association with the competition; the use of official trademarks to decorate a retail store; and the use of official hashtags by a corporate account for commercial purposes. The guidelines further specify that protection extends not only to identical reproduction of official trademarks but also to confusingly similar variants. This protection, recalled in the guidelines, is consistent with the enhanced protection afforded to well-known trademarks under French law by article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code.

    Lessons from the Paris 2024 Olympic Games: what risks do brands face?

    The Paris 2024 Olympic Games gave rise to significant litigation that clearly illustrates the risks faced by companies tempted by ambush marketing at a major sporting event. Although these decisions were rendered in the specific context of the Olympic Games, which benefited from specific, reinforced legal protections, they nevertheless constitute a direct warning for brands that might consider similar strategies during the World Cup, on the basis of general law.

    The use of official symbols on travelling physical media: During the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, a Chinese dairy company had buses displaying the Olympic rings alongside its own brands circulating throughout Paris, while presenting itself as “the only Chinese dairy company present in Paris 2024”. The Paris Court of Appeal upheld both free-riding/parasitism and trademark infringement, and ordered the companies concerned, in summary proceedings, to pay EUR 20,000 per defendant, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 20,000 per day per proven infringement, aimed at stopping the diffusion of the advertising (Paris Court of Appeal, pole 5, chamber 2, 21 Nov. 2025, No. 24/15283; Paris Court, interim order of 8 Aug. 2024, No. 24/55463). This judgment illustrates the vigilance of French courts with regard to strategies of visual association with an event, even without an explicit claim of official partnership, and confirms the possibility of combining infringement and parasitism claims for substantial awards.

    The unauthorised broadcast of competitions: The Paris Court, sitting in summary proceedings during the Olympic Games, ordered the immediate cessation of the broadcast of Olympic competitions by a streaming platform that did not hold the corresponding media rights, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 1,500 per identified infringement, EUR 3,000 per day for ongoing distributions and EUR 5,000 per day for failure to withdraw the content (Paris Court, summary proceedings, 18 Sept. 2024, No. 24/53019). Thus, any platform broadcasting World Cup matches without holding the rights licensed by FIFA faces immediate emergency measures under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code.

    The enhanced protection of well-known trademarks: The French Court of Cassation confirmed that protection of Olympic trademarks extends beyond strict reproduction: it is sufficient for the trademark to be evoked or suggested, without the need to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public. This solution, based on article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, was applied to a bar that had used the Olympic rings on its coasters to promote its broadcast evenings (Court of Cassation, Criminal chamber, 17 Jan. 2017, No. 15-86.363). FIFA’s trademarks being equally well-known worldwide, the same protective regime applies to them: a mere evocation of official trademarks, even without literal reproduction, may constitute an actionable infringement.

    Certain marketing operations may escape sanction

    Analysis of case law and promotional practices nonetheless reveals the contours of certain advertising practices that could be permitted (not sanctioned by the provisions described above), provided they are carefully prepared and presented. Here are some examples.

    Creative or humorous communication

    • A tongue-in-cheek, even humorous approach may allow companies to avoid the sanctions described above. For example, Intersnack’s Vico crisps brand launched a promotional campaign in 2016 around the slogan “Vico, partner of supporters at home”.
    • Irish bookmaker Paddy Power sponsored an egg-and-spoon race in “London”, a village in Burgundy, France, in order to display the following slogan in London during the 2012 Olympic Games: “Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is)”. The Olympic organising committee failed to stop this campaign. British humour …
    • Meanwhile, Heineken, a rival of official Euro 2016 sponsor Carlsberg, marketed a range of beer bottles in the colours of the flags of 21 countries that had “marked its history”, the majority of which were participating in the tournament.

    Using factual information as advertising

    It was held lawful to use the results of a rugby match and the announcement of an upcoming match in a newspaper to promote a car brand, with the advertisement reading: “France 13 England 24 , the Fiat 500 congratulates England on its victory and looks forward to seeing the French team on 9 March for France-Italy”. The judges considered that this publication “merely reproduces a current sporting result, obtained and made public on the front page of the sports newspaper, and refers to a future fixture also known to have been announced in the newspaper’s editorial content” (Court of Cassation, Commercial chamber, 20 May 2014, No. 13-12.102).

    Sponsoring players participating in the World Cup

    Any company may enter into partnerships with players participating in the FIFA World Cup, for example by supplying them with equipment or clothing bearing its logo. FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines expressly state that they “contain no affirmations regarding rights held by third parties such as players, clubs, member associations [or] confederations”. FIFA’s guidelines also explicitly confirm that generic images related to football, national teams or national flags do not fall within the official intellectual property. Caution is nonetheless warranted: the partnership must not create the impression of a commercial association with FIFA or the competition, nor use FIFA’s official trademarks.

    A combined legal and marketing approach in designing and preparing the message of any such communication campaign is essential to avoid legal proceedings, particularly on the grounds of free-riding/parasitism. Certain advertising campaigns can therefore legitimately be considered, particularly when they are clever.

    Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

    Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

    In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

    The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

    With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

    In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

    The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

    This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

    However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

    Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

    The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

    In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

    Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

    For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

    What the EU decision does (and does not) do

    The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

    At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

    In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

    The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

    Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

    Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

    Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

    The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

    Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

    Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

    How different payment types are affected in practice

    Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

    The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

    Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

    If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

    Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

    Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

    Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

    Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

    Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

    Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

    How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

    Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

    For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

    A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

    Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

    A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

    This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

    A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

    A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

    Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

    EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

    Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

    Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

    DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

    Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

    Country notes (alphabetical)

    Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

    France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

    Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

    Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

    For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

    Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

    Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

    Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

     

    Practical next steps for EU companies

    1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
    2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
    3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
    4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
    5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
    6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
    7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
    8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
    9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

    Under French Law, franchisors and distributors are subject to two kinds of pre-contractual information obligations: each party must spontaneously inform their future partner of any information they know is decisive to their consent. In addition, for certain contracts – i.e a franchise agreement – there is a duty to disclose a limited amount of information in a document. These pre-contractual obligations are mandatory rules of public policy. Thus, these two obligations apply simultaneously to the franchisor, distributor or dealer when negotiating a contract with a partner.

    Takeaways

    • The information required by the DIP must be fully completed and updated ;
    • The information not required by the DIP but provided by the franchisor must be carefully selected and sincere;
    • Franchisee must be given the opportunity to request additional information from the franchisor;
    • Franchisee’s experience in the economic sector enables the franchisor to considerably limit its exposure to the risk of contract cancellation due to a defect in the franchisee’s consent;
    • Franchisor must keep the proof of the actual disclosure of pre-contractual information (whether mandatory or not).
    • The general information obligation under common law (Article 1112-1 of the French Civil Code) may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation provided for under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code.

    General duty of disclosure for all contractors

    What is the scope of this pre-contractual information?

    This obligation is imposed on all counterparties, for any kind of contract. Indeed, article 1112-1 of the Civil Code states that:

    (§. 1) The party who knows information of decisive importance for the consent of the other party must inform the other party if the latter legitimately ignores this information or trusts its counterparty.

    (§. 3) Of decisive importance is the information that is directly and necessarily related to the content of the contract or the quality of the parties. »

    This obligation applies to all contracting parties for any type of contract.

    French courts have ruled that this general information obligation may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code (see below), answering the question in the affirmative (Paris Court of Appeal, 27 March 2024, no. 22/12665). The scope of the latter has however, been defined by the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») : only information bearing a direct and necessary link with the subject matter of the contract or the qualities of the parties is subject to the disclosure obligation (Cass. com., 14 May 2025, no. 23-17.948).

    Who bears the burden of proof?

    The burden of proof rests on the person who claims that the information was due to him. He must then prove (i) that the other party owed him the information but (ii) did not provide it (Article 1112-1 (§. 4) of the Civil Code)

    Special duty of disclosure for franchise and distribution agreements

    Which contracts are subject to this special rule?

    French law requires (art. L.330-3 French Commercial Code) the provision of a pre-contractual information document (in French “DIP”) and the draft contract, by any person:

    • which grants another person the right to use a trade mark, trade name or sign,
    • while requiring an exclusive or quasi-exclusive commitment for the exercise of its activity (e.g. exclusive purchase obligation). The quasi-exclusive nature of the commitment is assessed on a case-by-case basis by French courts, independently of the 80% purchase threshold provided for under EU Regulation 2022/720, which is treated merely as an indicative reference.

    Concretely, DIP must be provided, for example, to the franchisee, distributor, dealer or licensee of a brand, by its franchisor, supplier or licensor as soon as the two above conditions are met. French courts have moreover recently had occasion to confirm that the scope of the DIP obligation is not limited to franchise agreements but extends, in particular, to dealership agreements, provided the above-mentioned conditions are met (Paris Court of Appeal, 22 May 2024, no. 22/08672).

    When the DIP must be provided?

    DIP and draft contract must be provided at least 20 days before signing the contract, and, where applicable, before the payment of the sum required to be paid prior to the signature of the contract (for a reservation).

    What information must be disclosed in the DIP?

    Article R. 330-1 of the French Commercial Code requires that DIP mentions the following information (non-detailed list) concerning:

    • Franchisor (identity and experience of the managers, career path, etc.);
    • Franchisor’s business (in particular creation date, head office, bank accounts, history of the development of the business, annual accounts, etc.);
    • Operating network (members list with indication of signing date of contracts, establishments list offering the same products/services in the area of the planned activity, number of members having ceased to be part of the network during the year preceding the issue of the DIP with indication of the reasons for leaving, etc.);
    • Trademark licensed (date of registration, ownership and use);
    • General state of the market (about products or services covered by the contract) and local state of the market (about the planned area) and information relating to factors of competition and development perspective. With respect to the local market, the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») has held that the franchisor is not required to conduct a market study, but that if one is provided, it must be accurate and verifiable (Cass. com., 18 Oct. 2023, no. 22-19.329).;
    • Essential element of the draft contract and at least: its duration, contract renewal conditions, termination and assignment conditions and scope of exclusivities;
    • Financial obligations weighing in on contracting party: nature and amount of the expenses and investments that will have to be incurred before starting operations (up-front entry fee, installation costs, etc.).

    Beyond the exhaustiveness of the information required under the aforementioned provision, the DIP is subject to a qualitative standard. All information provided — including information provided spontaneously — must be accurate and truthful to ensure that the prospective network member’s consent is fully informed and free from any defect.

    How to prove the disclosure of information?

    The burden of proof for the delivery of the DIP rests on the debtor of this obligation: the franchisor (Cass. Com., 7 July 2004, n°02-15.950). The ideal for the franchisor is to have the franchisee sign and date his DIP on the day it is delivered and to keep the proof thereof.

    The clause of contract indicating that the franchisee acknowledges having received a complete DIP does not provide proof of the delivery of a complete DIP (Cass. com, 10 January 2018, n° 15-25.287).

    The franchisor is subject to a duty to update the DIP until the contract is signed

    In a ruling dated 26 June 2024 (no. 23-14.085 PB), the French Supreme Court held that formal compliance of the DIP at the time of its delivery is not sufficient to exonerate the franchisor from all pre-contractual liability. This position was confirmed by a subsequent ruling of 4 December 2024 (no. 23-16.684).

    These two decisions appear to establish a duty of ongoing updates incumbent upon the network head throughout the entire period between the delivery of the DIP and the execution of the contract. Where significant events occur during that interval — insolvency proceedings affecting network members, major litigation, or structural changes to the network — the network head is required to proactively inform the prospective member. The court then examines whether the failure to disclose such information was liable to distort the candidate’s assessment of the network and, consequently, to vitiate his consent (Cass. com., 26 June 2024, op. cit.).

    A franchisor may therefore not shelter behind the initial regularity of the DIP to discharge its disclosure duty where the network’s situation has materially changed prior to the signing of the contract.

    Sanction for breach of pre-contractual information duties

    Criminal sanction

    Failing to comply with the obligations relating to the DIP, franchisor or supplier can be sentenced to a criminal fine of up to 1,500 euros and up to 3,000 euros in the event of a repeat offence, the fine being multiplied by five for legal entities (article R.330-2 French commercial Code).

    Cancellation of the contract for deceit

    The contract may be declared null and void in case of breach of either article 1112-1 of the French Code civil or article L. 330-3 of the French Code de commerce. In both cases, failure to comply with the obligation to provide information is sanctioned if the applicant demonstrates that his or her consent has been vitiated by error, deceit or violence. In this respect, courts conduct a concrete, case-by-case assessment, taking into account in particular the professional experience and personal due diligence of the distributor: a sophisticated candidate will face greater difficulty in establishing deceit, and his experience in the relevant sector may be sufficient to exonerate the franchisor (Paris Court of Appeal, div. 5 – ch. 11, 26 Apr. 2024, no. 21/13205), even where the information provided was incomplete or inaccurate (Paris Court of Appeal, 20 Jan. 2021, no. 19/03382).

    The path is therefore narrow for the franchisee: he cannot invoke error concerning profitability when it is he who draws up his plan, and even when this plan is drawn up by the franchisor or based on information drawn up and transmitted by the franchisor, the experience of the franchisee who knew the local market may exonerate the franchisor.

    Regarding deceit, Courts strictly assess its two conditions which are:

    • (a material element) the existence of a lie or deceptive reticence (article 1137 French Civil Code), and
    • (an intentional element) the intention to deceive his counterparty (article 1130 French Civil Code).

    Where applicable, the parties must return to the state they were in before the contract.

    Damages

    Although the claims for contract cancellation are subject to very strict conditions, it remains that franchisees/distributors may alternatively obtain damages on the basis of tort liability for non-compliance with the pre-contractual information obligation, subject to proof of fault (incomplete or incorrect information), damage (loss of opportunity of not contracting or contracting on more advantageous terms) and the causal link between the two.

    Christophe Hery

    Practice areas

    • Arbitration
    • Agency
    • Antitrust
    • Distribution
    • e-commerce

    Contact Christophe





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      EU – Mercosur and the Wine Trade: What Lawyers Need to Understand Before It Comes into Force

      9 July 2026

      • Brazil
      • Distribution
      • Tax

      In Spain, a waiver of goodwill indemnity in a distribution agreement does not always protect the manufacturer. The Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal ordered a manufacturer to pay its distributor more than EUR 100,000 in goodwill indemnity and damages for insufficient notice, despite the written waiver, because it held that the agreement had expired and that good faith limited the waiver’s effect. To avoid the same risk, the manufacturer should renew the agreement in writing before it expires or expressly provide that waivers remain effective, specify which customer base the waiver covers and give notice proportionate to the duration of the relationship.

      Summary

      • The distributor’s case and the manufacturer’s liability
      • What the Court of Appeal decided on the waiver
      • Why the waiver was not applied
      • A valid waiver with limits: distribution and agency
      • Whether the waiver should have fallen away with the agreement
      • What manufacturers distributing in Spain should do

      Goodwill indemnity in Spain: the distributor’s case

      For more than twenty years, the manufacturer and distributor worked together without a written agreement. In 2018, they signed a two-year contract. The distributor agreed to waive both goodwill indemnity and damages arising from termination.

      The agreement expired in December 2020. Neither party renewed it, but they continued doing business together.

      Months later, the manufacturer decided to end the relationship. It gave less than two months’ notice and alleged breaches by the distributor that it was unable to prove.

      Waiver of goodwill indemnity: what the Court of Appeal decided

      In a distribution relationship, the distributor can waive goodwill indemnity. In an agency relationship, an advance waiver is not permitted. In this case, however, the Court of Appeal held that the waiver no longer applied because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The court also considered that good faith could limit the waiver’s effect, given the length of the relationship and its termination without good cause.

      The argument based on expiry is debatable: a clause intended to govern the end of an agreement should not lose its effect simply because that agreement ends. To avoid this uncertainty, parties that continue trading after expiry should renew the agreement in writing or expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

      Why was the goodwill indemnity waiver not applied?

      The Court of Appeal relied on two grounds.

      The first was the expiry of the agreement. Since the parties had continued trading without signing a new document, the court held that the waiver was no longer effective when the manufacturer ended the relationship.

      The second was good faith. Even if the waiver still applied, the court considered that it could not take full effect in those circumstances: more than twenty-five years of collaboration, a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause.

      Goodwill indemnity waiver: valid, but with limits

      The judgment is surprising because a distributor can, in principle, waive this indemnity. To understand why, it helps to distinguish distribution from agency.

      In agency relationships, the law protects the agent against an advance waiver. This follows from Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992, read together with the goodwill indemnity provisions in Article 28.

      In distribution relationships, the Spanish Supreme Court applies Article 28 by analogy where its requirements are met (judgment 944/2023 of 13 June). But this does not prevent a manufacturer and distributor from agreeing to exclude all compensation if either party terminates the agreement on notice. The Supreme Court confirmed this in its judgments of 4 December 2007, 15 January 2008, sitting in plenary session, and 25 April 2011.

      The distinction lies in how the relationship ends. That case law concerns ordinary termination, whether on notice or on expiry of the agreed term. A waiver offers less certainty where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice, as happened here.

      Should the waiver have fallen away with the agreement?

      Of the Court of Appeal’s two grounds, the first is the more debatable: that the waiver ceased to apply because the agreement had expired.

      The Spanish Supreme Court has enforced exclusion clauses precisely after an agreement has expired. It did so in its judgment of 23 December 2008. In that case, a dealer’s agreement ended when its extension expired. The court refused goodwill compensation because the agreement itself excluded any claim arising from its termination.

      The point is straightforward: if a clause is agreed to govern what happens when an agreement ends, it is difficult to argue that it loses its effect merely because the agreement ends.

      There is a difference here: the parties continued trading after expiry and, according to the Court of Appeal, did so on the terms that had traditionally governed their relationship. But continuing to trade does not, by itself, show that they intended to set aside a waiver relating to the customer base developed up to that point.

      There is an agency case that might appear to point the other way. The Supreme Court has prevented parties from dividing the indemnity into separate periods through successive declarations that there was “nothing further to claim” (judgment of 27 June 2013). Its reason, however, was the mandatory protection afforded by Article 28 of the Spanish Commercial Agency Act, which the parties cannot exclude. That restriction does not apply to distribution.

      Even if the waiver remained effective, there would still be the question of notice. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss. They compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business and would therefore not necessarily be covered by that waiver.

      What should manufacturers distributing in Spain do?

      Businesses may continue trading as usual and overlook the fact that their agreement has expired. This judgment illustrates the risk: when the time comes to end the relationship, the manufacturer may discover that the protections it relied on are no longer effective.

      The agreement should be renewed in writing before it expires. If the parties have already continued trading without renewal, they should document which terms still apply and expressly provide that waivers remain effective both after expiry and while the relationship continues without a new document.

      It is also important to specify which customer base the waiver covers. If it is intended to include the customer base already built up, this should be stated expressly, with a reference date, a defined territory and confirmation that the waiver is final.

      Finally, goodwill indemnity, damages for insufficient notice and other damages should be addressed separately. When ending the relationship, the manufacturer should give notice proportionate to its duration.

      Frequently asked questions on goodwill indemnity in Spain

      Is a waiver of goodwill indemnity valid in a distribution agreement in Spain?

      In principle, yes: in distribution the distributor can waive the indemnity, whereas in agency the law protects the agent against an advance waiver (Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992). A waiver offers less certainty, however, where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice.

      What happens to the waiver if the agreement expires and the parties keep trading?

      The risk is that it will not be applied. In the case decided by the Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal, the waiver was held to be no longer effective because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The argument is debatable, but to avoid uncertainty the agreement should be renewed in writing or should expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

      Can good faith limit a waiver of goodwill indemnity?

      According to the court, in that case it could: after more than twenty-five years of collaboration, with a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause, the waiver could not take full effect.

      Does the waiver also cover damages for insufficient notice?

      Not necessarily. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss, because they compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business.

      How should the waiver be worded to cover the customer base already built up?

      It must say so expressly: the waiver should state a reference date, a defined territory and that the waiver is final.

      How much notice must the manufacturer give?

      The article does not give a number of days: it says that notice must be proportionate to the duration of the relationship. In the case examined, the manufacturer gave less than two months’ notice after more than twenty-five years of collaboration.

      Abstract: In February 2022, this previous article examined the adoption of Legislative Decree No. 198 of November 8, 2021 (the “Decree”), through which Italy transposed Directive (EU) 2019/633 (the “Directive”) on unfair commercial practices in business-to-business relationships within the agri-food supply chain.

      Four years later, the regulatory framework has evolved and the landscape has changed in part: the Italian legislature has made several amendments to the Decree, the designated enforcement authority has significantly stepped up its activities, and the first court decisions regarding the application of the Decree have been issued.

      This article aims to provide an updated overview.

      The Regulatory Framework: Original Structure and Subsequent Amendments

      The implementation of the Directive provided the Italian legislature with an opportunity to overhaul the pre-existing national regulations governing the agri-food supply chain—in particular those set forth in Article 62 of Decree-Law No. 1/2012. The result is a unified and systematic regulatory framework on the subject, contained in the Decree that entered into force on December 15, 2021.

      For an analysis of the structure and key provisions of the Decree, please refer to the previous article. The fundamental structural choices described in that article remain in effect: the Decree establishes mandatory contractual requirements for operators in the agricultural and food sector, identifies unfair practices that are always prohibited (the so-called “blacklist”) and those prohibited unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties (the so-called “gray list”), regulates below-cost sales (not covered by the Directive), provides for a comprehensive system of penalties to punish any violations, and designates the Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention (ICQRF) as the authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the Decree’s provisions.

      What is of interest here are the legislative amendments that have modified and supplemented the original text of the Decree. As will be seen, these amendments have tightened regulations that were already stricter than European standards at the time of the Decree’s adoption.

      The first amendment was introduced by Decree-Law No. 21/2022, which expanded the definition of perishable products to include meat-based products with specific physicochemical characteristics, and extended the applicability of the 30-day payment terms to the following agricultural and food products:

      “a) prepackaged products bearing an expiration date or a minimum shelf life not exceeding sixty days;

      1. b) bulk products, even if placed in protective packaging or refrigerated, that have not undergone treatments designed to extend their shelf life beyond sixty days;
        c) meat products exhibiting one of the following physicochemical characteristics: awgreater than 0.95 and pH greater than 5.2, or awgreater than 0.91, or pH equal to or greater than 4.5;
      2. d) all types of milk.”

       

      Subsequently, Decree-Law No. 69/2023 expanded the scope of the Decree to include “suppliers established in other Member States or in third countries when the buyer is established in Italy.” Therefore, today, the Decree applies to all business-to-business (B2B) sales contracts in which the supplier and/or the buyer is established in Italy, regardless of the parties’ turnover and the law applicable to the contract. This is an extremely broad scope of application, capable of effectively encompassing any commercial relationship in which at least one of the parties is Italian. This deliberate departure from the differentiated turnover thresholds provided for by the Directive—justified, according to the legislature, by the extraordinary fragmentation of the Italian agri-food supply chain—continues to define the broader scope of the Italian regime compared to the minimum level of harmonization established by the EU.

      Decree-Law No. 69/2023 also amended the minimum notice period for the buyer’s cancellation of orders for perishable products, prohibiting any “notice period so short as to reasonably lead one to believe that the supplier cannot find alternative outlets for its products” and delegating to a subsequent implementing regulation (not yet issued) to establish specific rules governing this matter. Finally, the provision extended to foreign suppliers the right to file complaints with the national enforcement authority (ICQRF).

      The most recent amendment to the Decree was introduced by Decree-Law No. 63/2024, which

      • added the provision that the supply price must take into account the cost of production
      • specified that wholesale markets also fall within the scope of the Decree
      • included, among the documents that the ICQRF may obtain, accounting documents relating to sales activities and related services, and
      • introduced the possibility of paying any penalties imposed under the Decree at a reduced rate, provided the contractor demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to mitigate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

       

      The cumulative effect of the amendments outlined above is the establishment of regulations that are even stricter than those that took effect in December 2021 (which were already significantly more restrictive than the Directive).

      Mandatory Contractual Requirements: Persistent Compliance Challenges

      Article 3 of the Decree imposes several mandatory requirements for contracts for the sale of agricultural and food products: written form, a minimum term of 12 months, specification of the product’s quantity and characteristics, a fixed or determinable price that reflects production costs, and definition of the terms of delivery and payment.

      However, the legislature’s intention to establish a system that safeguards the contractual rights of the parties has clashed with the reality of commercial transactions in this sector. In fact, experience has shown that these contractual requirements remain the primary source of difficulty for operators in complying with the Decree. It is therefore not surprising that many of the objections raised by the ICQRF over the years have concerned precisely this aspect.

      The written form requirement is particularly critical: a significant percentage of operators, especially in sectors characterized by long-standing informal commercial relationships (the prime example being the wine sector), continue to conclude transactions without an adequate written framework agreement, relying instead on commercial customs and verbal agreements that the Decree does not recognize as sufficient. It is no coincidence that the reports issued by the ICQRF in recent years list the failure to enter into written contracts prior to the delivery of the products sold   among the most frequent violations found.

      Another aspect that is frequently penalized is the unilateral modification of prices: in several cases, buyers have attempted to adjust agreed-upon prices without the supplier’s written consent—a practice that the Decree expressly prohibits and that has been the subject of the first judicial decisions issued on the matter (which will be discussed in paragraph 6).

      Italian Specifics: Additional Prohibited Practices and Below-Cost Sales

      In addition to the “black list” and “gray list” of unfair practices prohibited by the Directive, Article 5 of the Decree identifies and prohibits 16 additional unfair practices, which stem from the pre-existing Italian regulatory framework. These include, for example, the purchase of agricultural and food products through double-reduction electronic tenders and auctions, the application of objectively different conditions for equivalent services, and the obtaining of undue unilateral benefits not justified by the nature or content of the commercial relationship.

      An interesting feature of the Italian list is its explicitly bilateral nature: unlike the Directive, which was designed to protect suppliers from potential abuses by larger and more powerful buyers, Article 5 of the Decree prohibits various unfair practices that also apply to suppliers, including the imposition of an unduly short expiration date, the forced maintenance of a specific product range, and the requirement to reserve a privileged shelf position for certain products. The Decree, therefore, also protects—in certain cases—buyers.

      Another distinctive feature of Italian law (and that of a few other countries in the European Union—Spain, Croatia, and Hungary) is the regulation of below-cost sales, which is not covered by the Directive.

      Under Article 7 of the Decree, sales below production cost are permitted only in two circumstances:

      • when perishable products are at risk of spoilage, or
      • if the commercial transaction has been planned and agreed upon in writing with the supplier. In all other cases, the price of the product sold below cost is automatically adjusted.

      It should be noted that the replacement criteria specified by the legislature (purchase invoices, average production costs, average product price) are unclear and have been subject to various interpretations.

      The penalties for violating the ban on below-cost sales are severe: administrative fines ranging from 1 to 6 million euros and suspension of business operations for up to 20 days in cases of repeat offenses or particularly serious violations.

      In any case, selling below cost is not merely a national issue; in fact, in its report dated December 1, 2025, on the evaluation of the Directive, the Commission indicated that it will propose a revision of the Directive to establish the principle that farmers should not be forced to systematically sell their products below production costs. We can therefore expect changes to the European regulations governing this issue.

      The Penalty System

      The Decree contains a comprehensive system of penalties, calibrated according to the nature and severity of the violation.

      Failure to comply with the provisions of the Decree results, depending on the case, in three types of consequences, which may apply cumulatively:

      1. Invalidity of the offending contractual clause, which is automatically replaced where the Decree so provides: for example, a term of less than 12 months is extended to that minimum period; a price below the cost of production is adjusted upward.
      2. Monetary penalties: fines ranging from a fixed minimum of between 1,000 and 30,000 euros, depending on the obligation violated, to a maximum varying from 3% to 5% of the annual revenue of the party responsible for the violation, which may be increased up to two or three times in the event of repeated violations, with an overall maximum limit of 10% of revenue. With specific regard to unfair practices, Article 10 of the Decree provides that those included on the “blacklist” are subject to administrative penalties ranging from 30,000 euros to 5% of the previous year’s revenue; those included on the “gray list” are subject to fines ranging from 15,000 euros to 3% of revenue; other practices prohibited under Article 5 are subject to penalties ranging from 5,000 euros to 4% of revenue.
      3. Compensation for Damages: Injured parties and their representative organizations may, in any case, file claims for compensation for damages (all of which must be proven).

       

      As previously mentioned, starting in 2024, an operator subject to a monetary penalty may, within a strict deadline of thirty days from the notification of the injunction order, pay the penalty at a 50% reduction if the operator demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to eliminate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

      Enforcement of the Regulations: The Expanding Role of the ICQRF

      Four years after its designation as the competent supervisory authority in Italy pursuant to the Decree, the ICQRF (Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention) has become one of the most active supervisory bodies in the European Union in this sector. Working in coordination with the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Agri-Food Products, it conducts inspections both in response to reports and on its own initiative.

      The gradual intensification of this agency’s activities is remarkable. In 2022, the ICQRF conducted 139 inspections. By 2025, that number had risen to 3,536. Inspections resulting from complaints are—in fact—extremely rare, while the majority of inspections are carried out on the agency’s own initiative. Operators’ reluctance to file complaints—a phenomenon common across all EU member states and largely attributable to fears of commercial retaliation by stronger business partners—has made proactive enforcement the primary mechanism in practice.

      The most recent ICQRF reports confirm a significant upward trend in the volume of inspections, the number of operators investigated (76 in 2022 versus 1,430 in 2025), and the number of violations detected (15 in 2022, 562 in 2025). The sectors subject to the most frequent inspections are dairy products and fruits and vegetables, both characterized by large, structurally powerful buyers and a highly fragmented supplier base.

      The most commonly found violations include unilateral changes to contractual terms by the buyer, failure to comply with mandatory payment terms, and the absence of written sales contracts.

      Case Law on Unfair Practices in the Agri-Food Supply Chain

      The intensification of inspections and the issuance of injunctions against operators has, as was to be expected, led to the first disputes and, consequently, to the first court decisions regarding the Decree.

      Following appeals filed by certain operators in the dairy sector against administrative sanctions imposed for unilaterally modifying the agreed-upon price of milk, several trial courts (specifically the Court of Brescia and the Milan Court of Appeals) have confirmed that any price modification requires the written consent of all contracting parties. This is consistent with the text of the Decree, which prohibits unilateral changes to agreed-upon contractual terms and requires that agreements between the parties be in writing.

      In Judgment No. 1225 of April 29, 2025, published on June 12, 2025, the Milan Court of Appeals ruled that a letter revising the criteria for calculating the price—sent by the buyer to the supplier, not preceded by negotiations between the parties, and not signed by the supplier to indicate acceptance—constitutes a unilateral modification of the contractual terms relating to the price, which is punishable under Article 4(d) of the Decree. In fact, it cannot be considered a written agreement (since it is signed by only one party). It is true that Article 3 of the Decree provides for the possibility of fulfilling the written form requirement through “equivalent forms,” but this is conditional on the fundamental contractual elements (including the price) having been previously agreed upon between the buyer and the supplier through a framework agreement.

      Therefore, it is irrelevant that, in the present case, the supplier, by continuing to make deliveries, behaved in a manner that could be construed as tacit acceptance of the amendment, given that price agreements cannot be established through “equivalent forms.”

      The body of case law remains limited, so it is premature to draw definitive conclusions about the direction of case law in this area.

      However, there is no doubt that the operational boundaries of the penalty regime are gradually being defined and the interpretive limits of the Decree’s provisions are being clarified.

      Conclusion

      The Italian regulatory framework governing unfair commercial practices in the agricultural and food supply chain has, in the more than four years since its entry into force, moved from theory to practical application.

      The basic framework described in the previous article has been supplemented by subsequent legislative amendments, and enforcement of the regulations is overseen by a regulatory authority that has demonstrated both the will and the capacity to act. The proactive approach of the ICQRF, which is increasingly active in its role as an enforcement authority, leaves no doubt that compliance with the Decree is a practical imperative, not merely a theoretical one.

      For operators active in the Italian agri-food supply chain—whether they are suppliers, buyers, or intermediaries—the priorities are clear:

      • contracts must be in writing and comply with the mandatory requirements set forth in the Decree
      • business practices must be reviewed to verify their compliance with the law and ensure they do not fall under the list of prohibited practices, and
      • Business processes must ensure that each operator adheres to good commercial practices in its dealings with its partners and other operators in the supply chain.

      France regulates unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain more strictly than Directive (EU) 2019/633 requires. Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 30 June 2021 transposed the Directive into a framework already built by the Egalim laws, and France chose not to apply the turnover thresholds set out in the Directive: the rules therefore cover all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, whatever the size or nationality of the parties. Written annual agreements signed before 1 March, automatic price revision clauses, capped payment terms and administrative fines reaching €2 million, doubled for repeat infringements, are the core of the regime, enforced by the DGCCRF.

      Summary

      1. Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when
      2. Products covered by the French rules
      3. Scope of the French rules compared with the Directive
      4. Suppliers and buyers covered, regardless of size and nationality
      5. Applicable law and jurisdiction in international supply contracts
      6. Where French law goes further than the Directive
      7. Mandatory content of an agri-food supply agreement
      8. Penalties for breaching the contractual requirements
      9. Unfair practices prohibited beyond the Directive
      10. Penalties for unfair commercial practices
      11. The DGCCRF and its enforcement powers
      12. Findings of the latest DGCCRF report

      Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when?

      Directive (EU) 2019/633 was transposed into French law by Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 2021, June 30th, whose provisions entered into force on July 1, 2021 and apply to contracts concluded as from November 1, 2021. Contracts concluded before that date were granted a 12-month period, starting on July 1, 2021, to comply with these provisions.

      This transposition forms part of an already well-established legislative framework shaped by « Egalim I » Law No. 2018-938 of October 30, 2018; « Egalim II » Law No. 2021-1357 of October 18, 2021 and « Egalim III » Law No. 2023-1041 of November 17, 2023, which strengthen contractual relations and the protection of agricultural producers. Even prior to the transposition of the Directive, French law had already refocused the rules on restrictive business practices around the following unlawful practices:

      • A significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
      • the granting of an advantage without consideration; and
      • The sudden termination of established business relationships.

       

      The Ordinance of June 30, 2021 transposed those provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/633 that did not fall within this existing framework, specifically introducing three new restrictive practices applicable to agricultural and food products into the French Commercial Code  (Com.C):

      • The cancellation of an order for perishable products at short notice (Article L. 443-5 of the Com.C);
      • The unlawful obtaining, use, or disclosure of the supplier’s trade secrets (Article L. 443-6 of the Com.C);
      • The refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a supply agreement where the supplier has requested such confirmation (Article L. 443-7 of the Com.C).

       

      This framework has been strengthened by Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026 on emergency measures for agricultural protection and sovereignty (the “2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law”), most of whose relevant provisions entered into force on 20 August 2026. The 2026 law notably amends agricultural contracting rules, food-sector price revision mechanisms and certain restrictive trade practices.

      Which agri-food products are covered by the French rules?

      Directive 2019/633 applies to the sale of “agricultural and food products”, defined in Article 2 as “the products listed in Annex I to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as products not listed in that Annex but processed for use as food for human consumption by using products listed in that Annex”, subject to the annual turnover thresholds of suppliers and buyers set out in Article 1§2.

      Is the scope of the French rules broader than the Directive?

      In France, the scope of the provisions transposing the Directive is the same as that of EU law, as they apply to agricultural and food products.

      However, certain French provisions in this area have a broader scope of application. Many provisions of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code apply to commercial relationships relating to “production, distribution or service activities” (in particular restrictive practices – Article L. 442-1 Com.C). Some of these provisions apply to fast-moving consumer goods, defined in Article L. 441-4 of the French Commercial Code as “non-durable products with a high frequency and recurrence of consumption”, the list of which is set by decree, as well as to food products.

      Which suppliers and buyers are covered, and does their size matter?

      France chose not to introduce the supplier and buyer turnover thresholds provided for in Directive 2019/633. As a result, the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers.

      Which law applies to an international agri-food supply contract?

      French law does not provide for specific conflict-of-law rules applicable to supply contracts in the agri-food sector. At first glance, international contracts for the supply of agri-food products are therefore governed by the general conflict-of-law rules applicable in France.

      Choice of law under Rome I and the 1955 Hague Convention

      These general rules are laid down by Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, known as the Rome I Regulation. Rome I establishes as a general principle that the parties are free to choose the law applicable to an international contract, either expressly or implicitly. In the absence of an express choice, the applicable law depends on the legal characterization of the supply contract.

      A distinction must therefore be made depending on the nature of the supply contract. If the French court characterizes the contract as a contract for the sale of goods, it may apply either the Rome I Regulation or, more likely, the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international sales of tangible movable goods. In both cases, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the seller is established. If the supply contract is characterized as a processing or bespoke supply contract, particularly where it is based on detailed specifications, the French court would apply the Rome I Regulation and may consider such a contract to constitute a service contract rather than a sale contract. In that case, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the service provider is established.

      Article L. 444-1.A and the limits of overriding mandatory rules

      In addition, it its worthwhile looking at Article L. 444-1.A of the French Commercial Code which states

      “The provisions of Chapters I, II and III of this Title apply to any agreement between a supplier and a buyer relating to products or services marketed on French territory. These provisions are matters of public policy. Any dispute relating to their application falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts, subject to compliance with European Union law and international treaties ratified or approved by France and without prejudice to recourse to arbitration.”

      At first glance, this provision pretends to bring all commercial contracts within the scope of French law where the products or services are marketed in France, like an overriding mandatory rule (OMR). However, this approach appears ambiguous, unjustified and at the end ineffective.

      First, restrictive trade practices (RTP) do not constitute OMR within the meaning of the Rome I Regulation. Article L. 444-1.A does not expressly refer to the terms overriding mandatory rules and just merely recalls the domestic public policy nature of the relevant provisions.

      Second, French case law has repeatedly refused to qualify RTP as OMR, with the exception of enforcement actions brought by the French Ministry of Economy and Finance against third party imposing to their counterpart blatant imbalance clauses.

      Third, the general characterization of the provisions of Title IV of the French Commercial Code as OMR does not satisfy the test of sufficient connection and imperative necessity as defined by the ECJ in its ruling of 5 September 2024 (Huk-Coburg-Allgemeine Versicherung, Case C-86/23).

      Exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts and its exceptions

      With respect to jurisdiction, Article L. 444-1.A wants to create an exclusive jurisdiction of French courts for commercial matters such as RTP. However, it provides clear and wide exceptions based on compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction matters and with arbitration rules.

      In practice, any jurisdiction clause (subject to the exception here after) or arbitration clause stipulated in an international contract must be upheld by French courts, which must therefore decline jurisdiction. Only in very limited circumstances may French courts assert this exclusive jurisdiction rule, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has not entered into any relevant multilateral or bilateral convention with France (such as Lugano Convention, The Hague conventions…).

      Are the French rules stricter than Directive (EU) 2019/633?

      French commercial law is stricter than the rules laid down by Directive 2019/633, for several reasons:

      • A broader scope of application:
      • No thresholds limit the application of these provisions; as a result, all economic operators are covered, regardless of their size or turnover;
      • While certain provisions are specific to food products, there is also a common framework applicable to all products without distinction, as well as a specific regulatory regime for fast-moving consumer goods (see Question 3).
      • Prior to the transposition of the Directive, France already had a legislative framework in place in this area (the Egalim laws), which it continued to develop after the entry into force of the ordinance transposing the European Directive; this is why the ordinance transposed only four new restrictive trade practices, rather than the entire list set out in the Directive.
      • French law provides for strict regulation governing commercial negotiations, particularly in the large-scale retail sector. The 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law further strengthens this framework by introducing tighter rules on agricultural contract negotiations, reference production-cost indicators, automatic price revision mechanisms in the food sector, repeated tendering procedures and substantial reductions in order volumes during negotiations.

      What must a valid agri-food supply agreement contain in France?

      Chapter I of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code, entitled “Transparency in commercial relationships”, imposes numerous requirements governing the negotiation and performance of commercial agreements:

      The seller’s terms and conditions of sale

      The seller’s pricing policy: the seller must provide any buyer who so requests with its terms and conditions of sale, which must include, at a minimum, the conditions of sale, payment terms, the price list, and the schedule of price reductions (discounts, immediate rebates, deferred rebates, and “free” products) (Article L. 441-1 of the Com.C).

      These terms and conditions may be general (applicable to all customers), category-based (applicable to a category of customers, such as wholesalers, provided that the classification is based on objective identification criteria), or specific and individually negotiated (supplementing or derogating from the general or category-based terms and conditions of sale).

      In this respect, specific provisions apply to food products and products intended for pet food (Article L. 441-1-1 of the French Commercial Code), as well as to wholesalers (Article L. 441-1-2 of the French Commercial Code).

      Since 20 August 2026, Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C. also allows the supplier’s terms and conditions of sale for food products and pet food to include an automatic formula revising the unit-price list in line with upward or downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials used in the product.

      The buyer’s commercial cooperation services

      La politique de coopération commerciale de l’acheteur: L’acheteur, quant à lui, propose et négocie avec le fournisseur des services rendus par lui et qui bénéficient, directement ou indirectement, au fournisseur (Art. L. 441-3 C.com.):

      • Commercial cooperation services: these are services provided in connection with the resale of products or services to consumers, or with a view to their resale to professionals, which are intended to promote the marketing of the supplier’s products and are separable from the act of sale.
      • Other services: “other obligations intended to promote the commercial relationship between the supplier and the distributor or service provider” (L. 441-3, III. 3° Com. C).
      • Promotional benefits: Direct allocation of discounts («remise») to consumers by the distributor acting under a mandate from the supplier for fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

      The written annual agreement and the 31 January or 1 March deadlines

      Formalisation of the negotiation: a written agreement must be entered into, before 1 March of each year, between the supplier and the distributor or service provider, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements.

      As an experimental rule until 31 December 2029, where the supplier is a legal entity with worldwide annual turnover (excluding tax) below €350 million in the last closed financial year, the statutory 1st of March date referred to in Articles L. 441-3, L. 441-4, L. 441-6 and L. 443-8 Com. C. is replaced by 31th of January. In the same situations, the three-month periods referred to in Article L. 441-4 VI and Article L. 443-8 V(B) Com. C. are reduced to two months.

      Law No. 2026-796 introduces also two experiments: Until 15 April 2029 for agreements governed by Article L. 443-8 Com. C., and until 15 April 2028 for agreements governed by Article L. 441-4 Com. C., where the annual agreement has not been concluded by 1st of March (or within two months from the beginning of a special marketing cycle), the supplier may, if no new contract has been formed, terminate the commercial relationship without the distributor being able to rely on the rules on sudden termination under Article L. 442-1 II Com.C., or request application of a notice period compliant with that provision.

      Negotiation timetable for producer/first-buyer of agro-food contracts: under Article L. 631-24II bis of the French Rural and Maritime Fishing code (“CRPM”), the written contract or framework agreement must be concluded within four months after the prospective buyer receives the producer’s written proposal (this period may be extended by an extended interprofessional agreement, up to six months). If no agreement is reached, one of the parties must refer the matter to the Agricultural Commercial Relations Mediator within 15 days. If mediation fails and both parties still intend to establish or continue the relationship, the Agricultural Commercial Disputes Settlement Committee must be seized within a further 15 days; where applicable, the contract must then be concluded within two months after the parties receive the Committee’s decision

      It must set out (Art. L. 441-3 Com.C.):

      • The terms and conditions of the sale of products or the provision of services (including price reductions) and, where applicable, the types of situations in which and the modalities according to which general sales conditions (GSCs) may apply.
      • Commercial cooperation services
      • Other obligations
      • Any service or obligation arising from an agreement entered into with a legal entity located outside French territory with which the distributor is directly or indirectly affiliated

       

      It being specified that the mandatory contents of the written agreement vary depending on its scope of application, namely whether the agreement is entered into with wholesalers, relates to fast-moving consumer goods, or concerns agricultural products (Art. L. 441-7 and L. 441-8 Com.C).

      Stricter rules for agricultural products: duration, price revision, renegotiation

      More specifically, with respect to agricultural products, French law is all the more protective as regards the formalisation of negotiations and provides for even stricter obligations:

      • Clause relating to the duration of the contract: under Article L. 631-24 VI CRPM, the minimum duration of a contract between a producer and a first buyer is three years, except for products subject to excise duties and for grapes, must and the wines produced from them. Unless otherwise agreed, contracts are renewable by tacit renewal for an equivalent period; where the buyer gives notice of non-renewal, the notice period may not be less than three months. The producer may expressly waive the statutory minimum durations in writing, in accordance with Articles 148 and 168 of Regulation (EU) No. 1308/2013. A contract or framework agreement lasting less than three years may omit an automatic upward/downward revision clause for a fixed price.
      • Clauses relating to price determination mechanismsi and revision: Article L. 631-24 III CRPM requires the contract or framework agreement to contain the price and its automatic upward/downward revision mechanism, or the criteria and methods used to determine the price, including the weighting of the relevant indicators. The producer’s proposal must take account of one or more indicators relating to relevant agricultural production costs and their evolution. The parties must refer in the final contract or framework agreement to the reference indicators published by the competent interprofessional organisation (or, failing publication, by the relevant agricultural technical institutes), unless they expressly choose other agricultural production-cost indicators and state the reasons for that choice. Clauses whose purpose or effect is automatically to renegotiate or change the price so as to align it with a more favourable price practised by a competing buyer, producer, producer organisation or association of producer organisations are deemed unwritten.

       

      For food products and pet food subject to Article L. 443-8 Com.C., the annual written agreement must contain an automatic formula revising the unit-price list according to upward and downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials. If the supplier’s terms and conditions contain the formula permitted by Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C., the annual agreement must reproduce that formula and it is not negotiable. Price changes resulting from its application must be implemented no later than one month after activation. A distributor may object only where objective economic data show that the link drawn by the supplier between raw-material cost changes and the impact on its price list is manifestly erroneous.

      Lastly, specific provisions apply to contracts entered into between a supplier and a distributor “relating to the design and production of food products in accordance with specifications meeting the buyer’s specific needs and marketed under a private label”, as set out in Article L. 441-7 of the French Commercial Code.

      Invoicing and payment terms for food products and beverages

      Invoicing and payment terms: any purchase and sale transaction must give rise to an invoice, issued upon completion of the transaction and containing a number of mandatory particulars. In addition, the Commercial Code provides for a default payment period of 30 days, with a maximum payment period of 60 days or 45 days end of month, and sets out late payment penalties and a fixed recovery fee in the event of late payment (Art. L. 441-9 and L. 441-10 Com.C)

      In addition, the legislator has introduced specific payment deadlines for food products and beverages (Art. L. 441-11 Com.C):

      • Perishable agricultural products, perishable food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals: 30 days from delivery. In the case of periodic billing:30 days after the end of the ten-day period;
      • For seasonal fruits and vegetables: 30 days from the end of the month of delivery;
      • Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption: 20 days from the date of delivery;
      • Alcoholic beverages subject to excise duty (e.g., Armagnac, Cognac, brandy, gin, rum, vodka): 30 days from the end of the month of delivery. For wine and other non-sparkling fermented beverages covered by Article L. 665-3 CRPM, the first buyer must, in principle, pay the seller (or its subrogee) an advance of at least 15% of the order amount within ten clear days after conclusion of the sale contract. Since 20 August 2026, interprofessional bodies may provide a derogation from this advance-payment obligation only in the context of multiannual contracts.
      • Non-perishable agricultural and food products: If the invoice is issued by the supplier: 60 days from the date of issue of the invoice; and If the invoice is issued by the buyer: 60 days from the date of preparation of the invoice.

       

      Logistics penalties

      Logistics penalites: lastly, the French Commercial Code strictly regulates specific contractual sanctions known as “logistics penalties”, relating to the supplier’s failure to comply with its delivery, conformity, or timing obligations (Art. L. 441-17 Com.C).

      What are the penalties for breaching the contractual requirements?

      In the event of a breach of contractual requirements, several sanctions may apply:

      • Seller’s pricing policy: an administrative fine not exceeding €15,000 for a natural person and €75,000 for a legal entity ( L. 441-1 Com.C).

      For food products and products intended for pet food, the administrative fine may not exceed €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, and the maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 443-8 Com.C). The new information requirements attached to an optional automatic price-revision formula in the supplier’s terms and conditions (Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C.) are also backed by the administrative sanction provided in Article L. 443-8 Com.C. More generally, any breach of Article L. 443-8 I to VI is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum doubled for a repeated infringement within two years.

      • Buyer’s commercial cooperation policy and formalisation of negotiations: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-6 Com.C).

      Failure to comply with the March 1st deadline provided for in Article L. 441-3(IV) is punishable by an administrative fine not exceeding €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity. In the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final, the maximum fine is increased to €400,000 for a natural person and €2,000,000 for a legal entity. For suppliers falling within the temporary €350 million turnover experiment introduced by the 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law, references to the 1 March deadline must be read as 31 January for the duration of the experiment (until 31 December 2029).

      • Absence of a price revision clause in the agricultural sector: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-7 C)
      • Absence of a renegotiation clause: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-8 Com.C)).
      • Failure to comply with payment deadlines, absence of mandatory information required under the terms of payment, setting of non-compliant rates or conditions for late payment penalties, and failure to comply with the terms of calculation of payment deadlines agreed between the parties: administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €2 million for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €4 million for a legal entity in the event of a repeat offense within two years of the date on which the first penalty decision became final ( L. 441-16 Com.C).

       

      Which unfair practices does French law prohibit beyond the Directive?

      In addition to the contractual obligations described above, aimed at preventing abuses and unfair commercial practices between businesses, Articles L. 442-1 to L. 442-12 of the French Commercial Code set out a list of «unfair commercial practices between undertakings» (« pratiques commerciales déloyales entre entreprises »), including:

      • Obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage without consideration or manifestly disproportionate to the consideration provided (Art. L. 442-1(I) Com.C);
      • Subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations creating a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
      • Subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or operating conditions are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.);
      • imposing logistics penalties in breach of Article 441-17 (Art. L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
      • Applying or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, or sales or purchase conditions not justified by real consideration set out in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
      • Failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, leading to the failure to conclude a contract within the deadline set out in Article L. 441-3 ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
      • Abruptly terminating, even partially, an established commercial relationship without sufficient written notice, taking into account the duration of the relationship and industry practices or interprofessional agreements ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
      • Implementing, during contract negotiations, a substantial reduction in the volume of orders placed with an established commercial partner, even temporarily, where the scale, unusual nature or circumstances of the reduction are such as to jeopardise the balance of the established commercial relationship ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
      • For operators providing online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations laid down therein, other clauses and practices remaining governed by Title IV of Book IV ( L. 442-1, III Com.C.);
      • Directly or indirectly participating in a breach of the prohibition on out-of-network resale imposed on a distributor bound by an exempt selective or exclusive distribution agreement ( L. 442-2 Com. C);
      • Clauses deemed null and void, including retroactive rebates, discounts or commercial cooperation benefits, automatic granting of more favourable terms granted to competing undertakings, or prohibitions on assigning receivables ( L. 442-3 Com.C);
      • Resale at a loss or announcement of resale at a loss ( L. 442-5 Com.C.);
      • Imposing a minimum resale price on a distributor ( L. 442-6 Com.C.);
      • For buyers of agricultural or food products, imposing an abnormally low purchase price on suppliers ( L. 442-7 Com.C);
      • Regulation of remote reverse auctions ( L. 442-8 Com.C.);
      • Artificially increasing or decreasing prices, particularly in remote auctions, through false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or any other fraudulent means ( L. 442-9 Com.C);
      • Associations or cooperatives offering products for sale or providing services not provided for in their bylaws( L. 442-10 Com.C.);
      • Use of public property belonging to the State, local authorities or public bodies to sell products or provide services under irregular conditions ( L. 442-11 Com.C);
      • For cloud computing service providers, granting unlimited cloud credits or making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the conclusion of such an agreement ( L. 442-12 Com.C.).

       

      What are the penalties for unfair commercial practices in France?

      General sanctions regime under Article L. 442-4

      The unfair commercial practices listed below are subject to the same sanction’s regime, as provided for in Article L. 442-4 of the French Commercial Code. The practices concerned are the following:

      • L. 442-1, I, 1° Com.C: obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage that does not correspond to any consideration or is clearly disproportionate to the consideration given;
      • L. 442-1, I, 2° Com.C: subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations that create a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
      • L. 442-1, I, 3° Com.C: imposing logistical penalties in violation of Article L. 441-17;
      • L. 442-1, I, 4° Com.C: practicing or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, conditions, or terms of sale or purchase that are not justified by actual considerations provided for in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage;
      • L. 442-1, I, 5° Com.C: failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, resulting in the contract not being concluded within the deadline specified in Article L. 441-3;
      • L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.: subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or modalities are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations;
      • L. 442-1, II Com.C.: implementing a substantial reduction in order volumes during contract negotiations, including temporarily, where its scale, unusual nature or the circumstances are liable to jeopardise the balance of an established commercial relationship;
      • L. 442-1, III Com.C: for operators offering online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations set out in this text; other clauses or practices remain governed by Title IV of Book IV;
      • Art L. 442-2 C: participating directly or indirectly in the violation of the prohibition on resale outside the network imposed on distributors bound by a selective or exclusive distribution agreement exempted under competition law;
      • Art L. 442-3 C: using clauses or contracts allowing the producer to benefit from retroactive benefit of discounts (“remises”), rebates (“rabais”), or commercial cooperation; the automatic granting of more favorable terms to competing companies; prohibition on assigning claims against the other party to third parties;
      • L. 442-7 Com.C: for a buyer of agricultural products or foodstuffs, imposing an abusively low selling price on its supplier;
      • Article L. 442-8 C: regulation of remote reverse auctions.

      For all these practices:

      • the victim of such practices may have the illegal clauses or contracts declared null and void and request the restitution of undue benefits;

      the French Minister for the Economy or the Public Prosecutor may request the court to:

      • order the cessation of the practices;
      • declare illegal clauses or contracts null and void and obtain restitution of undue benefits;

      request the imposition of a civil fine, the amount of which may not exceed:

      • five million euros;
      • three times the amount of the benefits unduly received or obtained;
      • or 5% of the turnover excluding tax generated in France by the perpetrator of the practices during the last financial year ended preceding the financial year in which the practices were implemented.

      The court shall systematically order the publication, dissemination, or posting of its decision or an extract thereof, in accordance with the terms and conditions it specifies.

      Practices subject to specific sanctions

      • L. 442-5 Com.C: resale at a loss or the announcement of resale at a loss is punishable by a fine not exceeding 0.4% of the annual turnover excluding VAT generated in France during the last closed financial year (Art. L. 442-5, I Com.C);
      • L. 442-6 Com.C: imposition of a minimum resale price on the distributor is punishable by a maximum fine of €75,000 for legal entities;
      • L. 442-9 Com.C: causing an artificial increase or decrease in prices, in particular in remote auctions, by disseminating false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or by any other fraudulent means, is punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €225,000 for food products. Additional penalties may also apply;
      • L. 442-11 Com.C: using public property belonging to the State, local authorities or their public bodies to offer products for sale or to provide services under irregular condition is punishable by seizure on the premises, for a period not exceeding one month, of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services. It may also give rise to the confiscation of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services, and to an order to pay the Public Treasury an amount corresponding to the value of the seized products;
      • L. 442-12 Com.C: for a cloud computing service provider, granting unlimited cloud computing credits credits to a person engaged in production, distribution or service activities and making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the simultaneous conclusion of such an agreement constitutes an unfair commercial practice punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €1,500,000 (Article L. 132-2 of the French Consumer Code: sanctions for misleading commercial practices – « sanction despratiques commerciales trompeuses»).

       

      Which authority enforces the rules, and what powers does it have?

      The national authority responsible for enforcement is the administrative authority in charge of competition and consumer affairs: the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF). The DGCCRF has investigative powers (Article L. 450-1 of the French Commercial Code), may issue injunctions (Article L. 470-1 of the French Commercial Code), and imposes administrative fines and sanctions for breaches of Title IV of Book IV and for non-compliance with injunctions (Article L. 470-2 of the French Commercial Code).

      What did the DGCCRF’s latest enforcement report find?

      According to the last DGCCRF’s 2024 report, DGCCRF «inspected 186 establishments in the dairy, cattle, pork, poultry and egg sectors in order to verify compliance with the mandatory written contractualisation between producers and their first buyers. ». The report further states that «the regulation of commercial relations and negotiations is likely to give rise to a new Egalim law, following the publication of several parliamentary reports. »In this respect, a parliamentary report on the application of the so-called «Egalim 38» law was submitted on 13 March 2024. The legislative development anticipated in that report has since materialised in Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026, which substantially amended agricultural contractualisation and food-sector commercial negotiation rules with effect, for most of the relevant provisions, from 20 August 2026.

      ***

      Frequently asked questions on unfair trading practices in France

      Does French law apply if my company is not established in France?

      Yes, as regards the substantive rules. France did not adopt the turnover thresholds of Directive 2019/633, so the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers. Whether a French court will hear a dispute is a separate question.

      Can we choose a law other than French law in an agri-food supply contract?

      In principle yes. French law contains no specific conflict-of-law rules for agri-food supply contracts, so the choice is governed by the Rome I Regulation, under which the parties are free to choose the applicable law. Article L. 444-1.A of the Commercial Code appears to claim French law for products marketed in France, but French case law has repeatedly refused to treat restrictive trade practices as overriding mandatory rules.

      Will a jurisdiction or arbitration clause be upheld by the French courts?

      In practice yes. Article L. 444-1.A expressly reserves compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction and with arbitration. French courts may assert the exclusive jurisdiction rule only in very limited circumstances, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has entered into no relevant convention with France.

      What is the payment deadline for perishable food products in France?

      Thirty days from delivery for perishable agricultural and food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals. Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption must be paid within 20 days of delivery, seasonal fruit and vegetables within 30 days of the end of the month of delivery, and non-perishable agricultural and food products within 60 days (Article L. 441-11 of the Commercial Code).

      By what date must the annual agreement with a distributor be signed?

      Before 1 March or 31 January (when supplier’s turnover is less than €350 million) of each year, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements. Missing that deadline is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity, doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years.

      Must a contract with an agricultural producer include a price revision clause?

      Yes. The contract between a producer and its first buyer must provide for automatic upward and downward price revision mechanisms, based in particular on indicators relating to agricultural production costs and to changes in those costs. The absence of such a clause is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity.

      How long must a supply contract with an agricultural producer last?

      At least three years, and the contract must include a clause to that effect. The term may be extended up to a maximum of five years where an interprofessional agreement so provides (Article L. 631-24, III, 5° of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code).

      After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

      A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

      The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

      From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

      This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

      Why wine matters in this agreement

      The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

      1. tariff liberalisation;
      2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
      3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
      4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

      This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

      At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

      Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

      Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

      Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

      For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

      1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
      2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
      3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

      The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

      Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

      More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

      Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

      The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) and “Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

      This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

      For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

      Geographical indications: protection and tension

      One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

      The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

      From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

      1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
      2. transition periods for local operators;
      3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

      This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

      Services, distribution, and market structure

      Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

      Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

      The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

      1. logistics providers
      2. distribution networks
      3. commercial representation
      4. marketing and advertising agencies

      For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

      Legal advisors will need to consider:

      1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
      2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
      3. compliance with competition rules

      The implementation gap: where risk lies

      Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

      Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

      This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

      For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

      1. managing client expectations
      2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
      3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

      What should lawyers be doing now?

      Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

      Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

      1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
      2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
      3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
      4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

      In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

      Final sip

      The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

      Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

      At major events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, some companies attempt to “wildly” associate their brand or image with the event through a practice known as “ambush marketing” , defined by French courts as “an advertising strategy implemented by a company in order to associate its commercial image with that of an event and thereby benefit from the media impact of that event without paying the relevant fees and without having obtained the prior authorisation of the event organiser” (Paris Court of Appeal, 2nd chamber, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912). A risky and unlawful practice, but one that is sometimes conceivable.

      Key points

      • Ambush marketing is a practice that may give rise to sanctions but is not prohibited as such.
      • In return for their investments in the competition, FIFA’s official sponsors and partners enjoy very strong legal protection, through various general instruments (infringement, free-riding/parasitism, intellectual property) and more specific ones (sports law), against all forms of ambush marketing.
      • The FIFA World Cup benefits from enhanced protection based on an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide and on FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines, in the absence of specific French legislation comparable to that enacted for the Olympic Games.
      • However, these rights are not absolute, and there remain narrow opportunities for a (clever) form of ambush marketing.

      Protection of official World Cup sponsors and partners against ambush marketing

      Reaching nearly 5 billion people across all platforms during its last edition in Qatar in 2022, including more than 1.5 billion viewers for the final alone, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is the most-watched sporting event on the planet. Hosted for the first time by three countries (Canada, Mexico and the United States), it brings together 48 teams and more than 1,200 players for 104 matches across 16 stadiums. Its organisation is largely financed by various official partners, sponsors and rights holders, who in return receive the exclusive right to use FIFA’s official trademarks and intellectual property so as to associate their own image and distinctive signs with the competition.

      Ambush marketing is not sanctioned as such under French law, but a range of statutory provisions allow for broad protection of sponsors and partners of world-class sporting events against ambush marketing. They are indeed entitled to peacefully enjoy the rights offered to them in exchange for the significant investments they make in connection with events such as, for example, the football or rugby World Cups, or the Olympic Games.

      The following legal instruments may in particular be invoked by official sponsors and by the organisers of such events:

      • the “classic” protections offered by intellectual property law (trademark law and copyright) by way of an infringement action under the French Intellectual Property Code,
      • civil liability law (parasitism/free-riding and unfair competition based on article 1240 of the French Civil Code),
      • consumer law (misleading commercial practices),
      • but also more specific provisions, such as the protection of the exploitation rights of sports federations and organisers of sporting events under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, which grants organisers of sporting events a monopoly over the exploitation of those events.

      On these grounds, the following ambush marketing practices have notably been sanctioned:

      The exploitation of a tennis competition and the use, during the sporting event, of the brand associated with it: An online betting operator organised bets on Roland Garros matches using the protected sign and Roland Garros trademark to identify the matches on which bets were offered. The unlawful exploitation of the sporting competition was sanctioned at EUR 400,000 under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, the French Tennis Federation being the sole owner of the right to exploit Roland Garros. The use of the trademark was also sanctioned for infringement (EUR 300,000) and free-riding/parasitism (EUR 500,000) (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 Oct. 2009, No. 08/19179; Paris Judicial Court, 8 Aug. 2024, No 08/19179).

      An advertising campaign carried out during a film festival reproducing the event’s registered trademark: During the Cannes Film Festival, a cosmetics brand published videos on its social media showing its brand ambassadors being styled, with the official Cannes Film Festival poster visible in certain shots, one of which reproduced the registered Palme d’Or trademark. Sanctioned on the grounds of copyright infringement and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Judicial Court, 11 Dec. 2020, No. 19/08543).

      An advertising campaign falsely claiming the status of official event partner: During the Cannes Film Festival, the use of the slogan “official hairdresser of women” alongside the expressions “Cannes” and “Festival de Cannes”, and other publications that falsely led the public to believe the company was an official festival partner, to the detriment of the sole official festival hairdresser. Sanctioned on the grounds of unfair competition and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Court of Appeal, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912).

      These financial sanctions may be combined with injunctions to cease the practices and/or orders for press publication, subject to periodic penalty payments.

      FIFA’s specific trademark protection

      Unlike the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, which benefited from specific French legislation as a host country (Law No. 2018-202 of 26 March 2018 on the organisation of the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games) reserving in particular advertising spaces in the vicinity of competition venues exclusively for official partners, the 2026 FIFA World Cup does not take place on French territory, and therefore no equivalent French legal framework applies. The protection of official partners and sponsors thus relies on general law , but is nonetheless robust.

      FIFA has built an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide, protected in France by the provisions of the French Intellectual Property Code. These trademarks include in particular the verbal and figurative trademark FIFA®, the marks FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, as well as the official competition emblem (combining the trophy with the figure 26), the official slogan “We Are 26™” / “Nous Sommes 26™”, the logos of the sixteen host cities, and the official typeface “FWC 26”, protected by copyright. Only FIFA’s rights holders, namely the FIFA Partners (led by Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways and Visa), the Plus Sponsors, the Official Sponsors and Regional Supporters, are authorised to use this official intellectual property for commercial purposes.

      FIFA has published Intellectual Property Guidelines (version 2.0, June 2024) detailing the authorised and prohibited uses of the trademarks and logos associated with the 2026 World Cup. According to these guidelines, the following are prohibited without authorisation: any use of official trademarks in commercial advertising; the incorporation of official intellectual property into a trade name or domain name; the organisation of competitions, games or prize draws creating an association with the competition; the use of official trademarks to decorate a retail store; and the use of official hashtags by a corporate account for commercial purposes. The guidelines further specify that protection extends not only to identical reproduction of official trademarks but also to confusingly similar variants. This protection, recalled in the guidelines, is consistent with the enhanced protection afforded to well-known trademarks under French law by article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code.

      Lessons from the Paris 2024 Olympic Games: what risks do brands face?

      The Paris 2024 Olympic Games gave rise to significant litigation that clearly illustrates the risks faced by companies tempted by ambush marketing at a major sporting event. Although these decisions were rendered in the specific context of the Olympic Games, which benefited from specific, reinforced legal protections, they nevertheless constitute a direct warning for brands that might consider similar strategies during the World Cup, on the basis of general law.

      The use of official symbols on travelling physical media: During the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, a Chinese dairy company had buses displaying the Olympic rings alongside its own brands circulating throughout Paris, while presenting itself as “the only Chinese dairy company present in Paris 2024”. The Paris Court of Appeal upheld both free-riding/parasitism and trademark infringement, and ordered the companies concerned, in summary proceedings, to pay EUR 20,000 per defendant, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 20,000 per day per proven infringement, aimed at stopping the diffusion of the advertising (Paris Court of Appeal, pole 5, chamber 2, 21 Nov. 2025, No. 24/15283; Paris Court, interim order of 8 Aug. 2024, No. 24/55463). This judgment illustrates the vigilance of French courts with regard to strategies of visual association with an event, even without an explicit claim of official partnership, and confirms the possibility of combining infringement and parasitism claims for substantial awards.

      The unauthorised broadcast of competitions: The Paris Court, sitting in summary proceedings during the Olympic Games, ordered the immediate cessation of the broadcast of Olympic competitions by a streaming platform that did not hold the corresponding media rights, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 1,500 per identified infringement, EUR 3,000 per day for ongoing distributions and EUR 5,000 per day for failure to withdraw the content (Paris Court, summary proceedings, 18 Sept. 2024, No. 24/53019). Thus, any platform broadcasting World Cup matches without holding the rights licensed by FIFA faces immediate emergency measures under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code.

      The enhanced protection of well-known trademarks: The French Court of Cassation confirmed that protection of Olympic trademarks extends beyond strict reproduction: it is sufficient for the trademark to be evoked or suggested, without the need to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public. This solution, based on article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, was applied to a bar that had used the Olympic rings on its coasters to promote its broadcast evenings (Court of Cassation, Criminal chamber, 17 Jan. 2017, No. 15-86.363). FIFA’s trademarks being equally well-known worldwide, the same protective regime applies to them: a mere evocation of official trademarks, even without literal reproduction, may constitute an actionable infringement.

      Certain marketing operations may escape sanction

      Analysis of case law and promotional practices nonetheless reveals the contours of certain advertising practices that could be permitted (not sanctioned by the provisions described above), provided they are carefully prepared and presented. Here are some examples.

      Creative or humorous communication

      • A tongue-in-cheek, even humorous approach may allow companies to avoid the sanctions described above. For example, Intersnack’s Vico crisps brand launched a promotional campaign in 2016 around the slogan “Vico, partner of supporters at home”.
      • Irish bookmaker Paddy Power sponsored an egg-and-spoon race in “London”, a village in Burgundy, France, in order to display the following slogan in London during the 2012 Olympic Games: “Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is)”. The Olympic organising committee failed to stop this campaign. British humour …
      • Meanwhile, Heineken, a rival of official Euro 2016 sponsor Carlsberg, marketed a range of beer bottles in the colours of the flags of 21 countries that had “marked its history”, the majority of which were participating in the tournament.

      Using factual information as advertising

      It was held lawful to use the results of a rugby match and the announcement of an upcoming match in a newspaper to promote a car brand, with the advertisement reading: “France 13 England 24 , the Fiat 500 congratulates England on its victory and looks forward to seeing the French team on 9 March for France-Italy”. The judges considered that this publication “merely reproduces a current sporting result, obtained and made public on the front page of the sports newspaper, and refers to a future fixture also known to have been announced in the newspaper’s editorial content” (Court of Cassation, Commercial chamber, 20 May 2014, No. 13-12.102).

      Sponsoring players participating in the World Cup

      Any company may enter into partnerships with players participating in the FIFA World Cup, for example by supplying them with equipment or clothing bearing its logo. FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines expressly state that they “contain no affirmations regarding rights held by third parties such as players, clubs, member associations [or] confederations”. FIFA’s guidelines also explicitly confirm that generic images related to football, national teams or national flags do not fall within the official intellectual property. Caution is nonetheless warranted: the partnership must not create the impression of a commercial association with FIFA or the competition, nor use FIFA’s official trademarks.

      A combined legal and marketing approach in designing and preparing the message of any such communication campaign is essential to avoid legal proceedings, particularly on the grounds of free-riding/parasitism. Certain advertising campaigns can therefore legitimately be considered, particularly when they are clever.

      Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

      Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

      In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

      The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

      With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

      In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

      The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

      This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

      However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

      Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

      The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

      In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

      Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

      For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

      What the EU decision does (and does not) do

      The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

      At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

      In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

      The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

      Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

      Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

      Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

      The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

      Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

      Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

      How different payment types are affected in practice

      Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

      The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

      Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

      If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

      Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

      Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

      Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

      Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

      Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

      Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

      How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

      Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

      For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

      A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

      Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

      A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

      This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

      A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

      A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

      Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

      EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

      Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

      Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

      DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

      Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

      Country notes (alphabetical)

      Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

      France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

      Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

      Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

      For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

      Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

      Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

      Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

       

      Practical next steps for EU companies

      1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
      2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
      3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
      4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
      5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
      6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
      7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
      8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
      9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

      Under French Law, franchisors and distributors are subject to two kinds of pre-contractual information obligations: each party must spontaneously inform their future partner of any information they know is decisive to their consent. In addition, for certain contracts – i.e a franchise agreement – there is a duty to disclose a limited amount of information in a document. These pre-contractual obligations are mandatory rules of public policy. Thus, these two obligations apply simultaneously to the franchisor, distributor or dealer when negotiating a contract with a partner.

      Takeaways

      • The information required by the DIP must be fully completed and updated ;
      • The information not required by the DIP but provided by the franchisor must be carefully selected and sincere;
      • Franchisee must be given the opportunity to request additional information from the franchisor;
      • Franchisee’s experience in the economic sector enables the franchisor to considerably limit its exposure to the risk of contract cancellation due to a defect in the franchisee’s consent;
      • Franchisor must keep the proof of the actual disclosure of pre-contractual information (whether mandatory or not).
      • The general information obligation under common law (Article 1112-1 of the French Civil Code) may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation provided for under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code.

      General duty of disclosure for all contractors

      What is the scope of this pre-contractual information?

      This obligation is imposed on all counterparties, for any kind of contract. Indeed, article 1112-1 of the Civil Code states that:

      (§. 1) The party who knows information of decisive importance for the consent of the other party must inform the other party if the latter legitimately ignores this information or trusts its counterparty.

      (§. 3) Of decisive importance is the information that is directly and necessarily related to the content of the contract or the quality of the parties. »

      This obligation applies to all contracting parties for any type of contract.

      French courts have ruled that this general information obligation may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code (see below), answering the question in the affirmative (Paris Court of Appeal, 27 March 2024, no. 22/12665). The scope of the latter has however, been defined by the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») : only information bearing a direct and necessary link with the subject matter of the contract or the qualities of the parties is subject to the disclosure obligation (Cass. com., 14 May 2025, no. 23-17.948).

      Who bears the burden of proof?

      The burden of proof rests on the person who claims that the information was due to him. He must then prove (i) that the other party owed him the information but (ii) did not provide it (Article 1112-1 (§. 4) of the Civil Code)

      Special duty of disclosure for franchise and distribution agreements

      Which contracts are subject to this special rule?

      French law requires (art. L.330-3 French Commercial Code) the provision of a pre-contractual information document (in French “DIP”) and the draft contract, by any person:

      • which grants another person the right to use a trade mark, trade name or sign,
      • while requiring an exclusive or quasi-exclusive commitment for the exercise of its activity (e.g. exclusive purchase obligation). The quasi-exclusive nature of the commitment is assessed on a case-by-case basis by French courts, independently of the 80% purchase threshold provided for under EU Regulation 2022/720, which is treated merely as an indicative reference.

      Concretely, DIP must be provided, for example, to the franchisee, distributor, dealer or licensee of a brand, by its franchisor, supplier or licensor as soon as the two above conditions are met. French courts have moreover recently had occasion to confirm that the scope of the DIP obligation is not limited to franchise agreements but extends, in particular, to dealership agreements, provided the above-mentioned conditions are met (Paris Court of Appeal, 22 May 2024, no. 22/08672).

      When the DIP must be provided?

      DIP and draft contract must be provided at least 20 days before signing the contract, and, where applicable, before the payment of the sum required to be paid prior to the signature of the contract (for a reservation).

      What information must be disclosed in the DIP?

      Article R. 330-1 of the French Commercial Code requires that DIP mentions the following information (non-detailed list) concerning:

      • Franchisor (identity and experience of the managers, career path, etc.);
      • Franchisor’s business (in particular creation date, head office, bank accounts, history of the development of the business, annual accounts, etc.);
      • Operating network (members list with indication of signing date of contracts, establishments list offering the same products/services in the area of the planned activity, number of members having ceased to be part of the network during the year preceding the issue of the DIP with indication of the reasons for leaving, etc.);
      • Trademark licensed (date of registration, ownership and use);
      • General state of the market (about products or services covered by the contract) and local state of the market (about the planned area) and information relating to factors of competition and development perspective. With respect to the local market, the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») has held that the franchisor is not required to conduct a market study, but that if one is provided, it must be accurate and verifiable (Cass. com., 18 Oct. 2023, no. 22-19.329).;
      • Essential element of the draft contract and at least: its duration, contract renewal conditions, termination and assignment conditions and scope of exclusivities;
      • Financial obligations weighing in on contracting party: nature and amount of the expenses and investments that will have to be incurred before starting operations (up-front entry fee, installation costs, etc.).

      Beyond the exhaustiveness of the information required under the aforementioned provision, the DIP is subject to a qualitative standard. All information provided — including information provided spontaneously — must be accurate and truthful to ensure that the prospective network member’s consent is fully informed and free from any defect.

      How to prove the disclosure of information?

      The burden of proof for the delivery of the DIP rests on the debtor of this obligation: the franchisor (Cass. Com., 7 July 2004, n°02-15.950). The ideal for the franchisor is to have the franchisee sign and date his DIP on the day it is delivered and to keep the proof thereof.

      The clause of contract indicating that the franchisee acknowledges having received a complete DIP does not provide proof of the delivery of a complete DIP (Cass. com, 10 January 2018, n° 15-25.287).

      The franchisor is subject to a duty to update the DIP until the contract is signed

      In a ruling dated 26 June 2024 (no. 23-14.085 PB), the French Supreme Court held that formal compliance of the DIP at the time of its delivery is not sufficient to exonerate the franchisor from all pre-contractual liability. This position was confirmed by a subsequent ruling of 4 December 2024 (no. 23-16.684).

      These two decisions appear to establish a duty of ongoing updates incumbent upon the network head throughout the entire period between the delivery of the DIP and the execution of the contract. Where significant events occur during that interval — insolvency proceedings affecting network members, major litigation, or structural changes to the network — the network head is required to proactively inform the prospective member. The court then examines whether the failure to disclose such information was liable to distort the candidate’s assessment of the network and, consequently, to vitiate his consent (Cass. com., 26 June 2024, op. cit.).

      A franchisor may therefore not shelter behind the initial regularity of the DIP to discharge its disclosure duty where the network’s situation has materially changed prior to the signing of the contract.

      Sanction for breach of pre-contractual information duties

      Criminal sanction

      Failing to comply with the obligations relating to the DIP, franchisor or supplier can be sentenced to a criminal fine of up to 1,500 euros and up to 3,000 euros in the event of a repeat offence, the fine being multiplied by five for legal entities (article R.330-2 French commercial Code).

      Cancellation of the contract for deceit

      The contract may be declared null and void in case of breach of either article 1112-1 of the French Code civil or article L. 330-3 of the French Code de commerce. In both cases, failure to comply with the obligation to provide information is sanctioned if the applicant demonstrates that his or her consent has been vitiated by error, deceit or violence. In this respect, courts conduct a concrete, case-by-case assessment, taking into account in particular the professional experience and personal due diligence of the distributor: a sophisticated candidate will face greater difficulty in establishing deceit, and his experience in the relevant sector may be sufficient to exonerate the franchisor (Paris Court of Appeal, div. 5 – ch. 11, 26 Apr. 2024, no. 21/13205), even where the information provided was incomplete or inaccurate (Paris Court of Appeal, 20 Jan. 2021, no. 19/03382).

      The path is therefore narrow for the franchisee: he cannot invoke error concerning profitability when it is he who draws up his plan, and even when this plan is drawn up by the franchisor or based on information drawn up and transmitted by the franchisor, the experience of the franchisee who knew the local market may exonerate the franchisor.

      Regarding deceit, Courts strictly assess its two conditions which are:

      • (a material element) the existence of a lie or deceptive reticence (article 1137 French Civil Code), and
      • (an intentional element) the intention to deceive his counterparty (article 1130 French Civil Code).

      Where applicable, the parties must return to the state they were in before the contract.

      Damages

      Although the claims for contract cancellation are subject to very strict conditions, it remains that franchisees/distributors may alternatively obtain damages on the basis of tort liability for non-compliance with the pre-contractual information obligation, subject to proof of fault (incomplete or incorrect information), damage (loss of opportunity of not contracting or contracting on more advantageous terms) and the causal link between the two.

      Geraldo Fonseca

      Practice areas

      • Corporate
      • Credit collection
      • Insolvency
      • International trade
      • Litigation

      Contact Geraldo





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        Ambush Marketing and the 2026 FIFA World Cup

        11 June 2026

        • France
        • Contracts
        • Distribution

        In Spain, a waiver of goodwill indemnity in a distribution agreement does not always protect the manufacturer. The Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal ordered a manufacturer to pay its distributor more than EUR 100,000 in goodwill indemnity and damages for insufficient notice, despite the written waiver, because it held that the agreement had expired and that good faith limited the waiver’s effect. To avoid the same risk, the manufacturer should renew the agreement in writing before it expires or expressly provide that waivers remain effective, specify which customer base the waiver covers and give notice proportionate to the duration of the relationship.

        Summary

        • The distributor’s case and the manufacturer’s liability
        • What the Court of Appeal decided on the waiver
        • Why the waiver was not applied
        • A valid waiver with limits: distribution and agency
        • Whether the waiver should have fallen away with the agreement
        • What manufacturers distributing in Spain should do

        Goodwill indemnity in Spain: the distributor’s case

        For more than twenty years, the manufacturer and distributor worked together without a written agreement. In 2018, they signed a two-year contract. The distributor agreed to waive both goodwill indemnity and damages arising from termination.

        The agreement expired in December 2020. Neither party renewed it, but they continued doing business together.

        Months later, the manufacturer decided to end the relationship. It gave less than two months’ notice and alleged breaches by the distributor that it was unable to prove.

        Waiver of goodwill indemnity: what the Court of Appeal decided

        In a distribution relationship, the distributor can waive goodwill indemnity. In an agency relationship, an advance waiver is not permitted. In this case, however, the Court of Appeal held that the waiver no longer applied because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The court also considered that good faith could limit the waiver’s effect, given the length of the relationship and its termination without good cause.

        The argument based on expiry is debatable: a clause intended to govern the end of an agreement should not lose its effect simply because that agreement ends. To avoid this uncertainty, parties that continue trading after expiry should renew the agreement in writing or expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

        Why was the goodwill indemnity waiver not applied?

        The Court of Appeal relied on two grounds.

        The first was the expiry of the agreement. Since the parties had continued trading without signing a new document, the court held that the waiver was no longer effective when the manufacturer ended the relationship.

        The second was good faith. Even if the waiver still applied, the court considered that it could not take full effect in those circumstances: more than twenty-five years of collaboration, a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause.

        Goodwill indemnity waiver: valid, but with limits

        The judgment is surprising because a distributor can, in principle, waive this indemnity. To understand why, it helps to distinguish distribution from agency.

        In agency relationships, the law protects the agent against an advance waiver. This follows from Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992, read together with the goodwill indemnity provisions in Article 28.

        In distribution relationships, the Spanish Supreme Court applies Article 28 by analogy where its requirements are met (judgment 944/2023 of 13 June). But this does not prevent a manufacturer and distributor from agreeing to exclude all compensation if either party terminates the agreement on notice. The Supreme Court confirmed this in its judgments of 4 December 2007, 15 January 2008, sitting in plenary session, and 25 April 2011.

        The distinction lies in how the relationship ends. That case law concerns ordinary termination, whether on notice or on expiry of the agreed term. A waiver offers less certainty where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice, as happened here.

        Should the waiver have fallen away with the agreement?

        Of the Court of Appeal’s two grounds, the first is the more debatable: that the waiver ceased to apply because the agreement had expired.

        The Spanish Supreme Court has enforced exclusion clauses precisely after an agreement has expired. It did so in its judgment of 23 December 2008. In that case, a dealer’s agreement ended when its extension expired. The court refused goodwill compensation because the agreement itself excluded any claim arising from its termination.

        The point is straightforward: if a clause is agreed to govern what happens when an agreement ends, it is difficult to argue that it loses its effect merely because the agreement ends.

        There is a difference here: the parties continued trading after expiry and, according to the Court of Appeal, did so on the terms that had traditionally governed their relationship. But continuing to trade does not, by itself, show that they intended to set aside a waiver relating to the customer base developed up to that point.

        There is an agency case that might appear to point the other way. The Supreme Court has prevented parties from dividing the indemnity into separate periods through successive declarations that there was “nothing further to claim” (judgment of 27 June 2013). Its reason, however, was the mandatory protection afforded by Article 28 of the Spanish Commercial Agency Act, which the parties cannot exclude. That restriction does not apply to distribution.

        Even if the waiver remained effective, there would still be the question of notice. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss. They compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business and would therefore not necessarily be covered by that waiver.

        What should manufacturers distributing in Spain do?

        Businesses may continue trading as usual and overlook the fact that their agreement has expired. This judgment illustrates the risk: when the time comes to end the relationship, the manufacturer may discover that the protections it relied on are no longer effective.

        The agreement should be renewed in writing before it expires. If the parties have already continued trading without renewal, they should document which terms still apply and expressly provide that waivers remain effective both after expiry and while the relationship continues without a new document.

        It is also important to specify which customer base the waiver covers. If it is intended to include the customer base already built up, this should be stated expressly, with a reference date, a defined territory and confirmation that the waiver is final.

        Finally, goodwill indemnity, damages for insufficient notice and other damages should be addressed separately. When ending the relationship, the manufacturer should give notice proportionate to its duration.

        Frequently asked questions on goodwill indemnity in Spain

        Is a waiver of goodwill indemnity valid in a distribution agreement in Spain?

        In principle, yes: in distribution the distributor can waive the indemnity, whereas in agency the law protects the agent against an advance waiver (Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992). A waiver offers less certainty, however, where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice.

        What happens to the waiver if the agreement expires and the parties keep trading?

        The risk is that it will not be applied. In the case decided by the Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal, the waiver was held to be no longer effective because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The argument is debatable, but to avoid uncertainty the agreement should be renewed in writing or should expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

        Can good faith limit a waiver of goodwill indemnity?

        According to the court, in that case it could: after more than twenty-five years of collaboration, with a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause, the waiver could not take full effect.

        Does the waiver also cover damages for insufficient notice?

        Not necessarily. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss, because they compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business.

        How should the waiver be worded to cover the customer base already built up?

        It must say so expressly: the waiver should state a reference date, a defined territory and that the waiver is final.

        How much notice must the manufacturer give?

        The article does not give a number of days: it says that notice must be proportionate to the duration of the relationship. In the case examined, the manufacturer gave less than two months’ notice after more than twenty-five years of collaboration.

        Abstract: In February 2022, this previous article examined the adoption of Legislative Decree No. 198 of November 8, 2021 (the “Decree”), through which Italy transposed Directive (EU) 2019/633 (the “Directive”) on unfair commercial practices in business-to-business relationships within the agri-food supply chain.

        Four years later, the regulatory framework has evolved and the landscape has changed in part: the Italian legislature has made several amendments to the Decree, the designated enforcement authority has significantly stepped up its activities, and the first court decisions regarding the application of the Decree have been issued.

        This article aims to provide an updated overview.

        The Regulatory Framework: Original Structure and Subsequent Amendments

        The implementation of the Directive provided the Italian legislature with an opportunity to overhaul the pre-existing national regulations governing the agri-food supply chain—in particular those set forth in Article 62 of Decree-Law No. 1/2012. The result is a unified and systematic regulatory framework on the subject, contained in the Decree that entered into force on December 15, 2021.

        For an analysis of the structure and key provisions of the Decree, please refer to the previous article. The fundamental structural choices described in that article remain in effect: the Decree establishes mandatory contractual requirements for operators in the agricultural and food sector, identifies unfair practices that are always prohibited (the so-called “blacklist”) and those prohibited unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties (the so-called “gray list”), regulates below-cost sales (not covered by the Directive), provides for a comprehensive system of penalties to punish any violations, and designates the Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention (ICQRF) as the authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the Decree’s provisions.

        What is of interest here are the legislative amendments that have modified and supplemented the original text of the Decree. As will be seen, these amendments have tightened regulations that were already stricter than European standards at the time of the Decree’s adoption.

        The first amendment was introduced by Decree-Law No. 21/2022, which expanded the definition of perishable products to include meat-based products with specific physicochemical characteristics, and extended the applicability of the 30-day payment terms to the following agricultural and food products:

        “a) prepackaged products bearing an expiration date or a minimum shelf life not exceeding sixty days;

        1. b) bulk products, even if placed in protective packaging or refrigerated, that have not undergone treatments designed to extend their shelf life beyond sixty days;
          c) meat products exhibiting one of the following physicochemical characteristics: awgreater than 0.95 and pH greater than 5.2, or awgreater than 0.91, or pH equal to or greater than 4.5;
        2. d) all types of milk.”

         

        Subsequently, Decree-Law No. 69/2023 expanded the scope of the Decree to include “suppliers established in other Member States or in third countries when the buyer is established in Italy.” Therefore, today, the Decree applies to all business-to-business (B2B) sales contracts in which the supplier and/or the buyer is established in Italy, regardless of the parties’ turnover and the law applicable to the contract. This is an extremely broad scope of application, capable of effectively encompassing any commercial relationship in which at least one of the parties is Italian. This deliberate departure from the differentiated turnover thresholds provided for by the Directive—justified, according to the legislature, by the extraordinary fragmentation of the Italian agri-food supply chain—continues to define the broader scope of the Italian regime compared to the minimum level of harmonization established by the EU.

        Decree-Law No. 69/2023 also amended the minimum notice period for the buyer’s cancellation of orders for perishable products, prohibiting any “notice period so short as to reasonably lead one to believe that the supplier cannot find alternative outlets for its products” and delegating to a subsequent implementing regulation (not yet issued) to establish specific rules governing this matter. Finally, the provision extended to foreign suppliers the right to file complaints with the national enforcement authority (ICQRF).

        The most recent amendment to the Decree was introduced by Decree-Law No. 63/2024, which

        • added the provision that the supply price must take into account the cost of production
        • specified that wholesale markets also fall within the scope of the Decree
        • included, among the documents that the ICQRF may obtain, accounting documents relating to sales activities and related services, and
        • introduced the possibility of paying any penalties imposed under the Decree at a reduced rate, provided the contractor demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to mitigate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

         

        The cumulative effect of the amendments outlined above is the establishment of regulations that are even stricter than those that took effect in December 2021 (which were already significantly more restrictive than the Directive).

        Mandatory Contractual Requirements: Persistent Compliance Challenges

        Article 3 of the Decree imposes several mandatory requirements for contracts for the sale of agricultural and food products: written form, a minimum term of 12 months, specification of the product’s quantity and characteristics, a fixed or determinable price that reflects production costs, and definition of the terms of delivery and payment.

        However, the legislature’s intention to establish a system that safeguards the contractual rights of the parties has clashed with the reality of commercial transactions in this sector. In fact, experience has shown that these contractual requirements remain the primary source of difficulty for operators in complying with the Decree. It is therefore not surprising that many of the objections raised by the ICQRF over the years have concerned precisely this aspect.

        The written form requirement is particularly critical: a significant percentage of operators, especially in sectors characterized by long-standing informal commercial relationships (the prime example being the wine sector), continue to conclude transactions without an adequate written framework agreement, relying instead on commercial customs and verbal agreements that the Decree does not recognize as sufficient. It is no coincidence that the reports issued by the ICQRF in recent years list the failure to enter into written contracts prior to the delivery of the products sold   among the most frequent violations found.

        Another aspect that is frequently penalized is the unilateral modification of prices: in several cases, buyers have attempted to adjust agreed-upon prices without the supplier’s written consent—a practice that the Decree expressly prohibits and that has been the subject of the first judicial decisions issued on the matter (which will be discussed in paragraph 6).

        Italian Specifics: Additional Prohibited Practices and Below-Cost Sales

        In addition to the “black list” and “gray list” of unfair practices prohibited by the Directive, Article 5 of the Decree identifies and prohibits 16 additional unfair practices, which stem from the pre-existing Italian regulatory framework. These include, for example, the purchase of agricultural and food products through double-reduction electronic tenders and auctions, the application of objectively different conditions for equivalent services, and the obtaining of undue unilateral benefits not justified by the nature or content of the commercial relationship.

        An interesting feature of the Italian list is its explicitly bilateral nature: unlike the Directive, which was designed to protect suppliers from potential abuses by larger and more powerful buyers, Article 5 of the Decree prohibits various unfair practices that also apply to suppliers, including the imposition of an unduly short expiration date, the forced maintenance of a specific product range, and the requirement to reserve a privileged shelf position for certain products. The Decree, therefore, also protects—in certain cases—buyers.

        Another distinctive feature of Italian law (and that of a few other countries in the European Union—Spain, Croatia, and Hungary) is the regulation of below-cost sales, which is not covered by the Directive.

        Under Article 7 of the Decree, sales below production cost are permitted only in two circumstances:

        • when perishable products are at risk of spoilage, or
        • if the commercial transaction has been planned and agreed upon in writing with the supplier. In all other cases, the price of the product sold below cost is automatically adjusted.

        It should be noted that the replacement criteria specified by the legislature (purchase invoices, average production costs, average product price) are unclear and have been subject to various interpretations.

        The penalties for violating the ban on below-cost sales are severe: administrative fines ranging from 1 to 6 million euros and suspension of business operations for up to 20 days in cases of repeat offenses or particularly serious violations.

        In any case, selling below cost is not merely a national issue; in fact, in its report dated December 1, 2025, on the evaluation of the Directive, the Commission indicated that it will propose a revision of the Directive to establish the principle that farmers should not be forced to systematically sell their products below production costs. We can therefore expect changes to the European regulations governing this issue.

        The Penalty System

        The Decree contains a comprehensive system of penalties, calibrated according to the nature and severity of the violation.

        Failure to comply with the provisions of the Decree results, depending on the case, in three types of consequences, which may apply cumulatively:

        1. Invalidity of the offending contractual clause, which is automatically replaced where the Decree so provides: for example, a term of less than 12 months is extended to that minimum period; a price below the cost of production is adjusted upward.
        2. Monetary penalties: fines ranging from a fixed minimum of between 1,000 and 30,000 euros, depending on the obligation violated, to a maximum varying from 3% to 5% of the annual revenue of the party responsible for the violation, which may be increased up to two or three times in the event of repeated violations, with an overall maximum limit of 10% of revenue. With specific regard to unfair practices, Article 10 of the Decree provides that those included on the “blacklist” are subject to administrative penalties ranging from 30,000 euros to 5% of the previous year’s revenue; those included on the “gray list” are subject to fines ranging from 15,000 euros to 3% of revenue; other practices prohibited under Article 5 are subject to penalties ranging from 5,000 euros to 4% of revenue.
        3. Compensation for Damages: Injured parties and their representative organizations may, in any case, file claims for compensation for damages (all of which must be proven).

         

        As previously mentioned, starting in 2024, an operator subject to a monetary penalty may, within a strict deadline of thirty days from the notification of the injunction order, pay the penalty at a 50% reduction if the operator demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to eliminate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

        Enforcement of the Regulations: The Expanding Role of the ICQRF

        Four years after its designation as the competent supervisory authority in Italy pursuant to the Decree, the ICQRF (Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention) has become one of the most active supervisory bodies in the European Union in this sector. Working in coordination with the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Agri-Food Products, it conducts inspections both in response to reports and on its own initiative.

        The gradual intensification of this agency’s activities is remarkable. In 2022, the ICQRF conducted 139 inspections. By 2025, that number had risen to 3,536. Inspections resulting from complaints are—in fact—extremely rare, while the majority of inspections are carried out on the agency’s own initiative. Operators’ reluctance to file complaints—a phenomenon common across all EU member states and largely attributable to fears of commercial retaliation by stronger business partners—has made proactive enforcement the primary mechanism in practice.

        The most recent ICQRF reports confirm a significant upward trend in the volume of inspections, the number of operators investigated (76 in 2022 versus 1,430 in 2025), and the number of violations detected (15 in 2022, 562 in 2025). The sectors subject to the most frequent inspections are dairy products and fruits and vegetables, both characterized by large, structurally powerful buyers and a highly fragmented supplier base.

        The most commonly found violations include unilateral changes to contractual terms by the buyer, failure to comply with mandatory payment terms, and the absence of written sales contracts.

        Case Law on Unfair Practices in the Agri-Food Supply Chain

        The intensification of inspections and the issuance of injunctions against operators has, as was to be expected, led to the first disputes and, consequently, to the first court decisions regarding the Decree.

        Following appeals filed by certain operators in the dairy sector against administrative sanctions imposed for unilaterally modifying the agreed-upon price of milk, several trial courts (specifically the Court of Brescia and the Milan Court of Appeals) have confirmed that any price modification requires the written consent of all contracting parties. This is consistent with the text of the Decree, which prohibits unilateral changes to agreed-upon contractual terms and requires that agreements between the parties be in writing.

        In Judgment No. 1225 of April 29, 2025, published on June 12, 2025, the Milan Court of Appeals ruled that a letter revising the criteria for calculating the price—sent by the buyer to the supplier, not preceded by negotiations between the parties, and not signed by the supplier to indicate acceptance—constitutes a unilateral modification of the contractual terms relating to the price, which is punishable under Article 4(d) of the Decree. In fact, it cannot be considered a written agreement (since it is signed by only one party). It is true that Article 3 of the Decree provides for the possibility of fulfilling the written form requirement through “equivalent forms,” but this is conditional on the fundamental contractual elements (including the price) having been previously agreed upon between the buyer and the supplier through a framework agreement.

        Therefore, it is irrelevant that, in the present case, the supplier, by continuing to make deliveries, behaved in a manner that could be construed as tacit acceptance of the amendment, given that price agreements cannot be established through “equivalent forms.”

        The body of case law remains limited, so it is premature to draw definitive conclusions about the direction of case law in this area.

        However, there is no doubt that the operational boundaries of the penalty regime are gradually being defined and the interpretive limits of the Decree’s provisions are being clarified.

        Conclusion

        The Italian regulatory framework governing unfair commercial practices in the agricultural and food supply chain has, in the more than four years since its entry into force, moved from theory to practical application.

        The basic framework described in the previous article has been supplemented by subsequent legislative amendments, and enforcement of the regulations is overseen by a regulatory authority that has demonstrated both the will and the capacity to act. The proactive approach of the ICQRF, which is increasingly active in its role as an enforcement authority, leaves no doubt that compliance with the Decree is a practical imperative, not merely a theoretical one.

        For operators active in the Italian agri-food supply chain—whether they are suppliers, buyers, or intermediaries—the priorities are clear:

        • contracts must be in writing and comply with the mandatory requirements set forth in the Decree
        • business practices must be reviewed to verify their compliance with the law and ensure they do not fall under the list of prohibited practices, and
        • Business processes must ensure that each operator adheres to good commercial practices in its dealings with its partners and other operators in the supply chain.

        France regulates unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain more strictly than Directive (EU) 2019/633 requires. Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 30 June 2021 transposed the Directive into a framework already built by the Egalim laws, and France chose not to apply the turnover thresholds set out in the Directive: the rules therefore cover all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, whatever the size or nationality of the parties. Written annual agreements signed before 1 March, automatic price revision clauses, capped payment terms and administrative fines reaching €2 million, doubled for repeat infringements, are the core of the regime, enforced by the DGCCRF.

        Summary

        1. Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when
        2. Products covered by the French rules
        3. Scope of the French rules compared with the Directive
        4. Suppliers and buyers covered, regardless of size and nationality
        5. Applicable law and jurisdiction in international supply contracts
        6. Where French law goes further than the Directive
        7. Mandatory content of an agri-food supply agreement
        8. Penalties for breaching the contractual requirements
        9. Unfair practices prohibited beyond the Directive
        10. Penalties for unfair commercial practices
        11. The DGCCRF and its enforcement powers
        12. Findings of the latest DGCCRF report

        Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when?

        Directive (EU) 2019/633 was transposed into French law by Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 2021, June 30th, whose provisions entered into force on July 1, 2021 and apply to contracts concluded as from November 1, 2021. Contracts concluded before that date were granted a 12-month period, starting on July 1, 2021, to comply with these provisions.

        This transposition forms part of an already well-established legislative framework shaped by « Egalim I » Law No. 2018-938 of October 30, 2018; « Egalim II » Law No. 2021-1357 of October 18, 2021 and « Egalim III » Law No. 2023-1041 of November 17, 2023, which strengthen contractual relations and the protection of agricultural producers. Even prior to the transposition of the Directive, French law had already refocused the rules on restrictive business practices around the following unlawful practices:

        • A significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
        • the granting of an advantage without consideration; and
        • The sudden termination of established business relationships.

         

        The Ordinance of June 30, 2021 transposed those provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/633 that did not fall within this existing framework, specifically introducing three new restrictive practices applicable to agricultural and food products into the French Commercial Code  (Com.C):

        • The cancellation of an order for perishable products at short notice (Article L. 443-5 of the Com.C);
        • The unlawful obtaining, use, or disclosure of the supplier’s trade secrets (Article L. 443-6 of the Com.C);
        • The refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a supply agreement where the supplier has requested such confirmation (Article L. 443-7 of the Com.C).

         

        This framework has been strengthened by Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026 on emergency measures for agricultural protection and sovereignty (the “2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law”), most of whose relevant provisions entered into force on 20 August 2026. The 2026 law notably amends agricultural contracting rules, food-sector price revision mechanisms and certain restrictive trade practices.

        Which agri-food products are covered by the French rules?

        Directive 2019/633 applies to the sale of “agricultural and food products”, defined in Article 2 as “the products listed in Annex I to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as products not listed in that Annex but processed for use as food for human consumption by using products listed in that Annex”, subject to the annual turnover thresholds of suppliers and buyers set out in Article 1§2.

        Is the scope of the French rules broader than the Directive?

        In France, the scope of the provisions transposing the Directive is the same as that of EU law, as they apply to agricultural and food products.

        However, certain French provisions in this area have a broader scope of application. Many provisions of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code apply to commercial relationships relating to “production, distribution or service activities” (in particular restrictive practices – Article L. 442-1 Com.C). Some of these provisions apply to fast-moving consumer goods, defined in Article L. 441-4 of the French Commercial Code as “non-durable products with a high frequency and recurrence of consumption”, the list of which is set by decree, as well as to food products.

        Which suppliers and buyers are covered, and does their size matter?

        France chose not to introduce the supplier and buyer turnover thresholds provided for in Directive 2019/633. As a result, the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers.

        Which law applies to an international agri-food supply contract?

        French law does not provide for specific conflict-of-law rules applicable to supply contracts in the agri-food sector. At first glance, international contracts for the supply of agri-food products are therefore governed by the general conflict-of-law rules applicable in France.

        Choice of law under Rome I and the 1955 Hague Convention

        These general rules are laid down by Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, known as the Rome I Regulation. Rome I establishes as a general principle that the parties are free to choose the law applicable to an international contract, either expressly or implicitly. In the absence of an express choice, the applicable law depends on the legal characterization of the supply contract.

        A distinction must therefore be made depending on the nature of the supply contract. If the French court characterizes the contract as a contract for the sale of goods, it may apply either the Rome I Regulation or, more likely, the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international sales of tangible movable goods. In both cases, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the seller is established. If the supply contract is characterized as a processing or bespoke supply contract, particularly where it is based on detailed specifications, the French court would apply the Rome I Regulation and may consider such a contract to constitute a service contract rather than a sale contract. In that case, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the service provider is established.

        Article L. 444-1.A and the limits of overriding mandatory rules

        In addition, it its worthwhile looking at Article L. 444-1.A of the French Commercial Code which states

        “The provisions of Chapters I, II and III of this Title apply to any agreement between a supplier and a buyer relating to products or services marketed on French territory. These provisions are matters of public policy. Any dispute relating to their application falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts, subject to compliance with European Union law and international treaties ratified or approved by France and without prejudice to recourse to arbitration.”

        At first glance, this provision pretends to bring all commercial contracts within the scope of French law where the products or services are marketed in France, like an overriding mandatory rule (OMR). However, this approach appears ambiguous, unjustified and at the end ineffective.

        First, restrictive trade practices (RTP) do not constitute OMR within the meaning of the Rome I Regulation. Article L. 444-1.A does not expressly refer to the terms overriding mandatory rules and just merely recalls the domestic public policy nature of the relevant provisions.

        Second, French case law has repeatedly refused to qualify RTP as OMR, with the exception of enforcement actions brought by the French Ministry of Economy and Finance against third party imposing to their counterpart blatant imbalance clauses.

        Third, the general characterization of the provisions of Title IV of the French Commercial Code as OMR does not satisfy the test of sufficient connection and imperative necessity as defined by the ECJ in its ruling of 5 September 2024 (Huk-Coburg-Allgemeine Versicherung, Case C-86/23).

        Exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts and its exceptions

        With respect to jurisdiction, Article L. 444-1.A wants to create an exclusive jurisdiction of French courts for commercial matters such as RTP. However, it provides clear and wide exceptions based on compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction matters and with arbitration rules.

        In practice, any jurisdiction clause (subject to the exception here after) or arbitration clause stipulated in an international contract must be upheld by French courts, which must therefore decline jurisdiction. Only in very limited circumstances may French courts assert this exclusive jurisdiction rule, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has not entered into any relevant multilateral or bilateral convention with France (such as Lugano Convention, The Hague conventions…).

        Are the French rules stricter than Directive (EU) 2019/633?

        French commercial law is stricter than the rules laid down by Directive 2019/633, for several reasons:

        • A broader scope of application:
        • No thresholds limit the application of these provisions; as a result, all economic operators are covered, regardless of their size or turnover;
        • While certain provisions are specific to food products, there is also a common framework applicable to all products without distinction, as well as a specific regulatory regime for fast-moving consumer goods (see Question 3).
        • Prior to the transposition of the Directive, France already had a legislative framework in place in this area (the Egalim laws), which it continued to develop after the entry into force of the ordinance transposing the European Directive; this is why the ordinance transposed only four new restrictive trade practices, rather than the entire list set out in the Directive.
        • French law provides for strict regulation governing commercial negotiations, particularly in the large-scale retail sector. The 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law further strengthens this framework by introducing tighter rules on agricultural contract negotiations, reference production-cost indicators, automatic price revision mechanisms in the food sector, repeated tendering procedures and substantial reductions in order volumes during negotiations.

        What must a valid agri-food supply agreement contain in France?

        Chapter I of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code, entitled “Transparency in commercial relationships”, imposes numerous requirements governing the negotiation and performance of commercial agreements:

        The seller’s terms and conditions of sale

        The seller’s pricing policy: the seller must provide any buyer who so requests with its terms and conditions of sale, which must include, at a minimum, the conditions of sale, payment terms, the price list, and the schedule of price reductions (discounts, immediate rebates, deferred rebates, and “free” products) (Article L. 441-1 of the Com.C).

        These terms and conditions may be general (applicable to all customers), category-based (applicable to a category of customers, such as wholesalers, provided that the classification is based on objective identification criteria), or specific and individually negotiated (supplementing or derogating from the general or category-based terms and conditions of sale).

        In this respect, specific provisions apply to food products and products intended for pet food (Article L. 441-1-1 of the French Commercial Code), as well as to wholesalers (Article L. 441-1-2 of the French Commercial Code).

        Since 20 August 2026, Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C. also allows the supplier’s terms and conditions of sale for food products and pet food to include an automatic formula revising the unit-price list in line with upward or downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials used in the product.

        The buyer’s commercial cooperation services

        La politique de coopération commerciale de l’acheteur: L’acheteur, quant à lui, propose et négocie avec le fournisseur des services rendus par lui et qui bénéficient, directement ou indirectement, au fournisseur (Art. L. 441-3 C.com.):

        • Commercial cooperation services: these are services provided in connection with the resale of products or services to consumers, or with a view to their resale to professionals, which are intended to promote the marketing of the supplier’s products and are separable from the act of sale.
        • Other services: “other obligations intended to promote the commercial relationship between the supplier and the distributor or service provider” (L. 441-3, III. 3° Com. C).
        • Promotional benefits: Direct allocation of discounts («remise») to consumers by the distributor acting under a mandate from the supplier for fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

        The written annual agreement and the 31 January or 1 March deadlines

        Formalisation of the negotiation: a written agreement must be entered into, before 1 March of each year, between the supplier and the distributor or service provider, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements.

        As an experimental rule until 31 December 2029, where the supplier is a legal entity with worldwide annual turnover (excluding tax) below €350 million in the last closed financial year, the statutory 1st of March date referred to in Articles L. 441-3, L. 441-4, L. 441-6 and L. 443-8 Com. C. is replaced by 31th of January. In the same situations, the three-month periods referred to in Article L. 441-4 VI and Article L. 443-8 V(B) Com. C. are reduced to two months.

        Law No. 2026-796 introduces also two experiments: Until 15 April 2029 for agreements governed by Article L. 443-8 Com. C., and until 15 April 2028 for agreements governed by Article L. 441-4 Com. C., where the annual agreement has not been concluded by 1st of March (or within two months from the beginning of a special marketing cycle), the supplier may, if no new contract has been formed, terminate the commercial relationship without the distributor being able to rely on the rules on sudden termination under Article L. 442-1 II Com.C., or request application of a notice period compliant with that provision.

        Negotiation timetable for producer/first-buyer of agro-food contracts: under Article L. 631-24II bis of the French Rural and Maritime Fishing code (“CRPM”), the written contract or framework agreement must be concluded within four months after the prospective buyer receives the producer’s written proposal (this period may be extended by an extended interprofessional agreement, up to six months). If no agreement is reached, one of the parties must refer the matter to the Agricultural Commercial Relations Mediator within 15 days. If mediation fails and both parties still intend to establish or continue the relationship, the Agricultural Commercial Disputes Settlement Committee must be seized within a further 15 days; where applicable, the contract must then be concluded within two months after the parties receive the Committee’s decision

        It must set out (Art. L. 441-3 Com.C.):

        • The terms and conditions of the sale of products or the provision of services (including price reductions) and, where applicable, the types of situations in which and the modalities according to which general sales conditions (GSCs) may apply.
        • Commercial cooperation services
        • Other obligations
        • Any service or obligation arising from an agreement entered into with a legal entity located outside French territory with which the distributor is directly or indirectly affiliated

         

        It being specified that the mandatory contents of the written agreement vary depending on its scope of application, namely whether the agreement is entered into with wholesalers, relates to fast-moving consumer goods, or concerns agricultural products (Art. L. 441-7 and L. 441-8 Com.C).

        Stricter rules for agricultural products: duration, price revision, renegotiation

        More specifically, with respect to agricultural products, French law is all the more protective as regards the formalisation of negotiations and provides for even stricter obligations:

        • Clause relating to the duration of the contract: under Article L. 631-24 VI CRPM, the minimum duration of a contract between a producer and a first buyer is three years, except for products subject to excise duties and for grapes, must and the wines produced from them. Unless otherwise agreed, contracts are renewable by tacit renewal for an equivalent period; where the buyer gives notice of non-renewal, the notice period may not be less than three months. The producer may expressly waive the statutory minimum durations in writing, in accordance with Articles 148 and 168 of Regulation (EU) No. 1308/2013. A contract or framework agreement lasting less than three years may omit an automatic upward/downward revision clause for a fixed price.
        • Clauses relating to price determination mechanismsi and revision: Article L. 631-24 III CRPM requires the contract or framework agreement to contain the price and its automatic upward/downward revision mechanism, or the criteria and methods used to determine the price, including the weighting of the relevant indicators. The producer’s proposal must take account of one or more indicators relating to relevant agricultural production costs and their evolution. The parties must refer in the final contract or framework agreement to the reference indicators published by the competent interprofessional organisation (or, failing publication, by the relevant agricultural technical institutes), unless they expressly choose other agricultural production-cost indicators and state the reasons for that choice. Clauses whose purpose or effect is automatically to renegotiate or change the price so as to align it with a more favourable price practised by a competing buyer, producer, producer organisation or association of producer organisations are deemed unwritten.

         

        For food products and pet food subject to Article L. 443-8 Com.C., the annual written agreement must contain an automatic formula revising the unit-price list according to upward and downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials. If the supplier’s terms and conditions contain the formula permitted by Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C., the annual agreement must reproduce that formula and it is not negotiable. Price changes resulting from its application must be implemented no later than one month after activation. A distributor may object only where objective economic data show that the link drawn by the supplier between raw-material cost changes and the impact on its price list is manifestly erroneous.

        Lastly, specific provisions apply to contracts entered into between a supplier and a distributor “relating to the design and production of food products in accordance with specifications meeting the buyer’s specific needs and marketed under a private label”, as set out in Article L. 441-7 of the French Commercial Code.

        Invoicing and payment terms for food products and beverages

        Invoicing and payment terms: any purchase and sale transaction must give rise to an invoice, issued upon completion of the transaction and containing a number of mandatory particulars. In addition, the Commercial Code provides for a default payment period of 30 days, with a maximum payment period of 60 days or 45 days end of month, and sets out late payment penalties and a fixed recovery fee in the event of late payment (Art. L. 441-9 and L. 441-10 Com.C)

        In addition, the legislator has introduced specific payment deadlines for food products and beverages (Art. L. 441-11 Com.C):

        • Perishable agricultural products, perishable food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals: 30 days from delivery. In the case of periodic billing:30 days after the end of the ten-day period;
        • For seasonal fruits and vegetables: 30 days from the end of the month of delivery;
        • Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption: 20 days from the date of delivery;
        • Alcoholic beverages subject to excise duty (e.g., Armagnac, Cognac, brandy, gin, rum, vodka): 30 days from the end of the month of delivery. For wine and other non-sparkling fermented beverages covered by Article L. 665-3 CRPM, the first buyer must, in principle, pay the seller (or its subrogee) an advance of at least 15% of the order amount within ten clear days after conclusion of the sale contract. Since 20 August 2026, interprofessional bodies may provide a derogation from this advance-payment obligation only in the context of multiannual contracts.
        • Non-perishable agricultural and food products: If the invoice is issued by the supplier: 60 days from the date of issue of the invoice; and If the invoice is issued by the buyer: 60 days from the date of preparation of the invoice.

         

        Logistics penalties

        Logistics penalites: lastly, the French Commercial Code strictly regulates specific contractual sanctions known as “logistics penalties”, relating to the supplier’s failure to comply with its delivery, conformity, or timing obligations (Art. L. 441-17 Com.C).

        What are the penalties for breaching the contractual requirements?

        In the event of a breach of contractual requirements, several sanctions may apply:

        • Seller’s pricing policy: an administrative fine not exceeding €15,000 for a natural person and €75,000 for a legal entity ( L. 441-1 Com.C).

        For food products and products intended for pet food, the administrative fine may not exceed €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, and the maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 443-8 Com.C). The new information requirements attached to an optional automatic price-revision formula in the supplier’s terms and conditions (Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C.) are also backed by the administrative sanction provided in Article L. 443-8 Com.C. More generally, any breach of Article L. 443-8 I to VI is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum doubled for a repeated infringement within two years.

        • Buyer’s commercial cooperation policy and formalisation of negotiations: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-6 Com.C).

        Failure to comply with the March 1st deadline provided for in Article L. 441-3(IV) is punishable by an administrative fine not exceeding €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity. In the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final, the maximum fine is increased to €400,000 for a natural person and €2,000,000 for a legal entity. For suppliers falling within the temporary €350 million turnover experiment introduced by the 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law, references to the 1 March deadline must be read as 31 January for the duration of the experiment (until 31 December 2029).

        • Absence of a price revision clause in the agricultural sector: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-7 C)
        • Absence of a renegotiation clause: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-8 Com.C)).
        • Failure to comply with payment deadlines, absence of mandatory information required under the terms of payment, setting of non-compliant rates or conditions for late payment penalties, and failure to comply with the terms of calculation of payment deadlines agreed between the parties: administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €2 million for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €4 million for a legal entity in the event of a repeat offense within two years of the date on which the first penalty decision became final ( L. 441-16 Com.C).

         

        Which unfair practices does French law prohibit beyond the Directive?

        In addition to the contractual obligations described above, aimed at preventing abuses and unfair commercial practices between businesses, Articles L. 442-1 to L. 442-12 of the French Commercial Code set out a list of «unfair commercial practices between undertakings» (« pratiques commerciales déloyales entre entreprises »), including:

        • Obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage without consideration or manifestly disproportionate to the consideration provided (Art. L. 442-1(I) Com.C);
        • Subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations creating a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
        • Subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or operating conditions are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.);
        • imposing logistics penalties in breach of Article 441-17 (Art. L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
        • Applying or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, or sales or purchase conditions not justified by real consideration set out in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
        • Failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, leading to the failure to conclude a contract within the deadline set out in Article L. 441-3 ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
        • Abruptly terminating, even partially, an established commercial relationship without sufficient written notice, taking into account the duration of the relationship and industry practices or interprofessional agreements ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
        • Implementing, during contract negotiations, a substantial reduction in the volume of orders placed with an established commercial partner, even temporarily, where the scale, unusual nature or circumstances of the reduction are such as to jeopardise the balance of the established commercial relationship ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
        • For operators providing online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations laid down therein, other clauses and practices remaining governed by Title IV of Book IV ( L. 442-1, III Com.C.);
        • Directly or indirectly participating in a breach of the prohibition on out-of-network resale imposed on a distributor bound by an exempt selective or exclusive distribution agreement ( L. 442-2 Com. C);
        • Clauses deemed null and void, including retroactive rebates, discounts or commercial cooperation benefits, automatic granting of more favourable terms granted to competing undertakings, or prohibitions on assigning receivables ( L. 442-3 Com.C);
        • Resale at a loss or announcement of resale at a loss ( L. 442-5 Com.C.);
        • Imposing a minimum resale price on a distributor ( L. 442-6 Com.C.);
        • For buyers of agricultural or food products, imposing an abnormally low purchase price on suppliers ( L. 442-7 Com.C);
        • Regulation of remote reverse auctions ( L. 442-8 Com.C.);
        • Artificially increasing or decreasing prices, particularly in remote auctions, through false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or any other fraudulent means ( L. 442-9 Com.C);
        • Associations or cooperatives offering products for sale or providing services not provided for in their bylaws( L. 442-10 Com.C.);
        • Use of public property belonging to the State, local authorities or public bodies to sell products or provide services under irregular conditions ( L. 442-11 Com.C);
        • For cloud computing service providers, granting unlimited cloud credits or making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the conclusion of such an agreement ( L. 442-12 Com.C.).

         

        What are the penalties for unfair commercial practices in France?

        General sanctions regime under Article L. 442-4

        The unfair commercial practices listed below are subject to the same sanction’s regime, as provided for in Article L. 442-4 of the French Commercial Code. The practices concerned are the following:

        • L. 442-1, I, 1° Com.C: obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage that does not correspond to any consideration or is clearly disproportionate to the consideration given;
        • L. 442-1, I, 2° Com.C: subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations that create a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
        • L. 442-1, I, 3° Com.C: imposing logistical penalties in violation of Article L. 441-17;
        • L. 442-1, I, 4° Com.C: practicing or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, conditions, or terms of sale or purchase that are not justified by actual considerations provided for in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage;
        • L. 442-1, I, 5° Com.C: failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, resulting in the contract not being concluded within the deadline specified in Article L. 441-3;
        • L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.: subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or modalities are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations;
        • L. 442-1, II Com.C.: implementing a substantial reduction in order volumes during contract negotiations, including temporarily, where its scale, unusual nature or the circumstances are liable to jeopardise the balance of an established commercial relationship;
        • L. 442-1, III Com.C: for operators offering online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations set out in this text; other clauses or practices remain governed by Title IV of Book IV;
        • Art L. 442-2 C: participating directly or indirectly in the violation of the prohibition on resale outside the network imposed on distributors bound by a selective or exclusive distribution agreement exempted under competition law;
        • Art L. 442-3 C: using clauses or contracts allowing the producer to benefit from retroactive benefit of discounts (“remises”), rebates (“rabais”), or commercial cooperation; the automatic granting of more favorable terms to competing companies; prohibition on assigning claims against the other party to third parties;
        • L. 442-7 Com.C: for a buyer of agricultural products or foodstuffs, imposing an abusively low selling price on its supplier;
        • Article L. 442-8 C: regulation of remote reverse auctions.

        For all these practices:

        • the victim of such practices may have the illegal clauses or contracts declared null and void and request the restitution of undue benefits;

        the French Minister for the Economy or the Public Prosecutor may request the court to:

        • order the cessation of the practices;
        • declare illegal clauses or contracts null and void and obtain restitution of undue benefits;

        request the imposition of a civil fine, the amount of which may not exceed:

        • five million euros;
        • three times the amount of the benefits unduly received or obtained;
        • or 5% of the turnover excluding tax generated in France by the perpetrator of the practices during the last financial year ended preceding the financial year in which the practices were implemented.

        The court shall systematically order the publication, dissemination, or posting of its decision or an extract thereof, in accordance with the terms and conditions it specifies.

        Practices subject to specific sanctions

        • L. 442-5 Com.C: resale at a loss or the announcement of resale at a loss is punishable by a fine not exceeding 0.4% of the annual turnover excluding VAT generated in France during the last closed financial year (Art. L. 442-5, I Com.C);
        • L. 442-6 Com.C: imposition of a minimum resale price on the distributor is punishable by a maximum fine of €75,000 for legal entities;
        • L. 442-9 Com.C: causing an artificial increase or decrease in prices, in particular in remote auctions, by disseminating false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or by any other fraudulent means, is punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €225,000 for food products. Additional penalties may also apply;
        • L. 442-11 Com.C: using public property belonging to the State, local authorities or their public bodies to offer products for sale or to provide services under irregular condition is punishable by seizure on the premises, for a period not exceeding one month, of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services. It may also give rise to the confiscation of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services, and to an order to pay the Public Treasury an amount corresponding to the value of the seized products;
        • L. 442-12 Com.C: for a cloud computing service provider, granting unlimited cloud computing credits credits to a person engaged in production, distribution or service activities and making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the simultaneous conclusion of such an agreement constitutes an unfair commercial practice punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €1,500,000 (Article L. 132-2 of the French Consumer Code: sanctions for misleading commercial practices – « sanction despratiques commerciales trompeuses»).

         

        Which authority enforces the rules, and what powers does it have?

        The national authority responsible for enforcement is the administrative authority in charge of competition and consumer affairs: the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF). The DGCCRF has investigative powers (Article L. 450-1 of the French Commercial Code), may issue injunctions (Article L. 470-1 of the French Commercial Code), and imposes administrative fines and sanctions for breaches of Title IV of Book IV and for non-compliance with injunctions (Article L. 470-2 of the French Commercial Code).

        What did the DGCCRF’s latest enforcement report find?

        According to the last DGCCRF’s 2024 report, DGCCRF «inspected 186 establishments in the dairy, cattle, pork, poultry and egg sectors in order to verify compliance with the mandatory written contractualisation between producers and their first buyers. ». The report further states that «the regulation of commercial relations and negotiations is likely to give rise to a new Egalim law, following the publication of several parliamentary reports. »In this respect, a parliamentary report on the application of the so-called «Egalim 38» law was submitted on 13 March 2024. The legislative development anticipated in that report has since materialised in Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026, which substantially amended agricultural contractualisation and food-sector commercial negotiation rules with effect, for most of the relevant provisions, from 20 August 2026.

        ***

        Frequently asked questions on unfair trading practices in France

        Does French law apply if my company is not established in France?

        Yes, as regards the substantive rules. France did not adopt the turnover thresholds of Directive 2019/633, so the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers. Whether a French court will hear a dispute is a separate question.

        Can we choose a law other than French law in an agri-food supply contract?

        In principle yes. French law contains no specific conflict-of-law rules for agri-food supply contracts, so the choice is governed by the Rome I Regulation, under which the parties are free to choose the applicable law. Article L. 444-1.A of the Commercial Code appears to claim French law for products marketed in France, but French case law has repeatedly refused to treat restrictive trade practices as overriding mandatory rules.

        Will a jurisdiction or arbitration clause be upheld by the French courts?

        In practice yes. Article L. 444-1.A expressly reserves compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction and with arbitration. French courts may assert the exclusive jurisdiction rule only in very limited circumstances, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has entered into no relevant convention with France.

        What is the payment deadline for perishable food products in France?

        Thirty days from delivery for perishable agricultural and food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals. Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption must be paid within 20 days of delivery, seasonal fruit and vegetables within 30 days of the end of the month of delivery, and non-perishable agricultural and food products within 60 days (Article L. 441-11 of the Commercial Code).

        By what date must the annual agreement with a distributor be signed?

        Before 1 March or 31 January (when supplier’s turnover is less than €350 million) of each year, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements. Missing that deadline is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity, doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years.

        Must a contract with an agricultural producer include a price revision clause?

        Yes. The contract between a producer and its first buyer must provide for automatic upward and downward price revision mechanisms, based in particular on indicators relating to agricultural production costs and to changes in those costs. The absence of such a clause is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity.

        How long must a supply contract with an agricultural producer last?

        At least three years, and the contract must include a clause to that effect. The term may be extended up to a maximum of five years where an interprofessional agreement so provides (Article L. 631-24, III, 5° of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code).

        After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

        A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

        The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

        From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

        This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

        Why wine matters in this agreement

        The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

        1. tariff liberalisation;
        2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
        3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
        4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

        This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

        At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

        Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

        Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

        Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

        For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

        1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
        2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
        3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

        The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

        Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

        More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

        Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

        The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) and “Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

        This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

        For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

        Geographical indications: protection and tension

        One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

        The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

        From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

        1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
        2. transition periods for local operators;
        3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

        This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

        Services, distribution, and market structure

        Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

        Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

        The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

        1. logistics providers
        2. distribution networks
        3. commercial representation
        4. marketing and advertising agencies

        For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

        Legal advisors will need to consider:

        1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
        2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
        3. compliance with competition rules

        The implementation gap: where risk lies

        Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

        Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

        This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

        For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

        1. managing client expectations
        2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
        3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

        What should lawyers be doing now?

        Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

        Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

        1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
        2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
        3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
        4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

        In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

        Final sip

        The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

        Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

        At major events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, some companies attempt to “wildly” associate their brand or image with the event through a practice known as “ambush marketing” , defined by French courts as “an advertising strategy implemented by a company in order to associate its commercial image with that of an event and thereby benefit from the media impact of that event without paying the relevant fees and without having obtained the prior authorisation of the event organiser” (Paris Court of Appeal, 2nd chamber, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912). A risky and unlawful practice, but one that is sometimes conceivable.

        Key points

        • Ambush marketing is a practice that may give rise to sanctions but is not prohibited as such.
        • In return for their investments in the competition, FIFA’s official sponsors and partners enjoy very strong legal protection, through various general instruments (infringement, free-riding/parasitism, intellectual property) and more specific ones (sports law), against all forms of ambush marketing.
        • The FIFA World Cup benefits from enhanced protection based on an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide and on FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines, in the absence of specific French legislation comparable to that enacted for the Olympic Games.
        • However, these rights are not absolute, and there remain narrow opportunities for a (clever) form of ambush marketing.

        Protection of official World Cup sponsors and partners against ambush marketing

        Reaching nearly 5 billion people across all platforms during its last edition in Qatar in 2022, including more than 1.5 billion viewers for the final alone, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is the most-watched sporting event on the planet. Hosted for the first time by three countries (Canada, Mexico and the United States), it brings together 48 teams and more than 1,200 players for 104 matches across 16 stadiums. Its organisation is largely financed by various official partners, sponsors and rights holders, who in return receive the exclusive right to use FIFA’s official trademarks and intellectual property so as to associate their own image and distinctive signs with the competition.

        Ambush marketing is not sanctioned as such under French law, but a range of statutory provisions allow for broad protection of sponsors and partners of world-class sporting events against ambush marketing. They are indeed entitled to peacefully enjoy the rights offered to them in exchange for the significant investments they make in connection with events such as, for example, the football or rugby World Cups, or the Olympic Games.

        The following legal instruments may in particular be invoked by official sponsors and by the organisers of such events:

        • the “classic” protections offered by intellectual property law (trademark law and copyright) by way of an infringement action under the French Intellectual Property Code,
        • civil liability law (parasitism/free-riding and unfair competition based on article 1240 of the French Civil Code),
        • consumer law (misleading commercial practices),
        • but also more specific provisions, such as the protection of the exploitation rights of sports federations and organisers of sporting events under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, which grants organisers of sporting events a monopoly over the exploitation of those events.

        On these grounds, the following ambush marketing practices have notably been sanctioned:

        The exploitation of a tennis competition and the use, during the sporting event, of the brand associated with it: An online betting operator organised bets on Roland Garros matches using the protected sign and Roland Garros trademark to identify the matches on which bets were offered. The unlawful exploitation of the sporting competition was sanctioned at EUR 400,000 under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, the French Tennis Federation being the sole owner of the right to exploit Roland Garros. The use of the trademark was also sanctioned for infringement (EUR 300,000) and free-riding/parasitism (EUR 500,000) (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 Oct. 2009, No. 08/19179; Paris Judicial Court, 8 Aug. 2024, No 08/19179).

        An advertising campaign carried out during a film festival reproducing the event’s registered trademark: During the Cannes Film Festival, a cosmetics brand published videos on its social media showing its brand ambassadors being styled, with the official Cannes Film Festival poster visible in certain shots, one of which reproduced the registered Palme d’Or trademark. Sanctioned on the grounds of copyright infringement and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Judicial Court, 11 Dec. 2020, No. 19/08543).

        An advertising campaign falsely claiming the status of official event partner: During the Cannes Film Festival, the use of the slogan “official hairdresser of women” alongside the expressions “Cannes” and “Festival de Cannes”, and other publications that falsely led the public to believe the company was an official festival partner, to the detriment of the sole official festival hairdresser. Sanctioned on the grounds of unfair competition and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Court of Appeal, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912).

        These financial sanctions may be combined with injunctions to cease the practices and/or orders for press publication, subject to periodic penalty payments.

        FIFA’s specific trademark protection

        Unlike the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, which benefited from specific French legislation as a host country (Law No. 2018-202 of 26 March 2018 on the organisation of the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games) reserving in particular advertising spaces in the vicinity of competition venues exclusively for official partners, the 2026 FIFA World Cup does not take place on French territory, and therefore no equivalent French legal framework applies. The protection of official partners and sponsors thus relies on general law , but is nonetheless robust.

        FIFA has built an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide, protected in France by the provisions of the French Intellectual Property Code. These trademarks include in particular the verbal and figurative trademark FIFA®, the marks FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, as well as the official competition emblem (combining the trophy with the figure 26), the official slogan “We Are 26™” / “Nous Sommes 26™”, the logos of the sixteen host cities, and the official typeface “FWC 26”, protected by copyright. Only FIFA’s rights holders, namely the FIFA Partners (led by Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways and Visa), the Plus Sponsors, the Official Sponsors and Regional Supporters, are authorised to use this official intellectual property for commercial purposes.

        FIFA has published Intellectual Property Guidelines (version 2.0, June 2024) detailing the authorised and prohibited uses of the trademarks and logos associated with the 2026 World Cup. According to these guidelines, the following are prohibited without authorisation: any use of official trademarks in commercial advertising; the incorporation of official intellectual property into a trade name or domain name; the organisation of competitions, games or prize draws creating an association with the competition; the use of official trademarks to decorate a retail store; and the use of official hashtags by a corporate account for commercial purposes. The guidelines further specify that protection extends not only to identical reproduction of official trademarks but also to confusingly similar variants. This protection, recalled in the guidelines, is consistent with the enhanced protection afforded to well-known trademarks under French law by article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code.

        Lessons from the Paris 2024 Olympic Games: what risks do brands face?

        The Paris 2024 Olympic Games gave rise to significant litigation that clearly illustrates the risks faced by companies tempted by ambush marketing at a major sporting event. Although these decisions were rendered in the specific context of the Olympic Games, which benefited from specific, reinforced legal protections, they nevertheless constitute a direct warning for brands that might consider similar strategies during the World Cup, on the basis of general law.

        The use of official symbols on travelling physical media: During the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, a Chinese dairy company had buses displaying the Olympic rings alongside its own brands circulating throughout Paris, while presenting itself as “the only Chinese dairy company present in Paris 2024”. The Paris Court of Appeal upheld both free-riding/parasitism and trademark infringement, and ordered the companies concerned, in summary proceedings, to pay EUR 20,000 per defendant, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 20,000 per day per proven infringement, aimed at stopping the diffusion of the advertising (Paris Court of Appeal, pole 5, chamber 2, 21 Nov. 2025, No. 24/15283; Paris Court, interim order of 8 Aug. 2024, No. 24/55463). This judgment illustrates the vigilance of French courts with regard to strategies of visual association with an event, even without an explicit claim of official partnership, and confirms the possibility of combining infringement and parasitism claims for substantial awards.

        The unauthorised broadcast of competitions: The Paris Court, sitting in summary proceedings during the Olympic Games, ordered the immediate cessation of the broadcast of Olympic competitions by a streaming platform that did not hold the corresponding media rights, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 1,500 per identified infringement, EUR 3,000 per day for ongoing distributions and EUR 5,000 per day for failure to withdraw the content (Paris Court, summary proceedings, 18 Sept. 2024, No. 24/53019). Thus, any platform broadcasting World Cup matches without holding the rights licensed by FIFA faces immediate emergency measures under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code.

        The enhanced protection of well-known trademarks: The French Court of Cassation confirmed that protection of Olympic trademarks extends beyond strict reproduction: it is sufficient for the trademark to be evoked or suggested, without the need to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public. This solution, based on article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, was applied to a bar that had used the Olympic rings on its coasters to promote its broadcast evenings (Court of Cassation, Criminal chamber, 17 Jan. 2017, No. 15-86.363). FIFA’s trademarks being equally well-known worldwide, the same protective regime applies to them: a mere evocation of official trademarks, even without literal reproduction, may constitute an actionable infringement.

        Certain marketing operations may escape sanction

        Analysis of case law and promotional practices nonetheless reveals the contours of certain advertising practices that could be permitted (not sanctioned by the provisions described above), provided they are carefully prepared and presented. Here are some examples.

        Creative or humorous communication

        • A tongue-in-cheek, even humorous approach may allow companies to avoid the sanctions described above. For example, Intersnack’s Vico crisps brand launched a promotional campaign in 2016 around the slogan “Vico, partner of supporters at home”.
        • Irish bookmaker Paddy Power sponsored an egg-and-spoon race in “London”, a village in Burgundy, France, in order to display the following slogan in London during the 2012 Olympic Games: “Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is)”. The Olympic organising committee failed to stop this campaign. British humour …
        • Meanwhile, Heineken, a rival of official Euro 2016 sponsor Carlsberg, marketed a range of beer bottles in the colours of the flags of 21 countries that had “marked its history”, the majority of which were participating in the tournament.

        Using factual information as advertising

        It was held lawful to use the results of a rugby match and the announcement of an upcoming match in a newspaper to promote a car brand, with the advertisement reading: “France 13 England 24 , the Fiat 500 congratulates England on its victory and looks forward to seeing the French team on 9 March for France-Italy”. The judges considered that this publication “merely reproduces a current sporting result, obtained and made public on the front page of the sports newspaper, and refers to a future fixture also known to have been announced in the newspaper’s editorial content” (Court of Cassation, Commercial chamber, 20 May 2014, No. 13-12.102).

        Sponsoring players participating in the World Cup

        Any company may enter into partnerships with players participating in the FIFA World Cup, for example by supplying them with equipment or clothing bearing its logo. FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines expressly state that they “contain no affirmations regarding rights held by third parties such as players, clubs, member associations [or] confederations”. FIFA’s guidelines also explicitly confirm that generic images related to football, national teams or national flags do not fall within the official intellectual property. Caution is nonetheless warranted: the partnership must not create the impression of a commercial association with FIFA or the competition, nor use FIFA’s official trademarks.

        A combined legal and marketing approach in designing and preparing the message of any such communication campaign is essential to avoid legal proceedings, particularly on the grounds of free-riding/parasitism. Certain advertising campaigns can therefore legitimately be considered, particularly when they are clever.

        Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

        Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

        In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

        The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

        With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

        In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

        The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

        This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

        However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

        Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

        The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

        In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

        Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

        For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

        What the EU decision does (and does not) do

        The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

        At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

        In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

        The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

        Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

        Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

        Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

        The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

        Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

        Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

        How different payment types are affected in practice

        Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

        The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

        Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

        If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

        Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

        Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

        Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

        Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

        Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

        Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

        How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

        Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

        For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

        A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

        Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

        A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

        This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

        A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

        A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

        Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

        EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

        Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

        Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

        DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

        Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

        Country notes (alphabetical)

        Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

        France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

        Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

        Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

        For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

        Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

        Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

        Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

         

        Practical next steps for EU companies

        1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
        2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
        3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
        4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
        5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
        6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
        7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
        8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
        9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

        Under French Law, franchisors and distributors are subject to two kinds of pre-contractual information obligations: each party must spontaneously inform their future partner of any information they know is decisive to their consent. In addition, for certain contracts – i.e a franchise agreement – there is a duty to disclose a limited amount of information in a document. These pre-contractual obligations are mandatory rules of public policy. Thus, these two obligations apply simultaneously to the franchisor, distributor or dealer when negotiating a contract with a partner.

        Takeaways

        • The information required by the DIP must be fully completed and updated ;
        • The information not required by the DIP but provided by the franchisor must be carefully selected and sincere;
        • Franchisee must be given the opportunity to request additional information from the franchisor;
        • Franchisee’s experience in the economic sector enables the franchisor to considerably limit its exposure to the risk of contract cancellation due to a defect in the franchisee’s consent;
        • Franchisor must keep the proof of the actual disclosure of pre-contractual information (whether mandatory or not).
        • The general information obligation under common law (Article 1112-1 of the French Civil Code) may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation provided for under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code.

        General duty of disclosure for all contractors

        What is the scope of this pre-contractual information?

        This obligation is imposed on all counterparties, for any kind of contract. Indeed, article 1112-1 of the Civil Code states that:

        (§. 1) The party who knows information of decisive importance for the consent of the other party must inform the other party if the latter legitimately ignores this information or trusts its counterparty.

        (§. 3) Of decisive importance is the information that is directly and necessarily related to the content of the contract or the quality of the parties. »

        This obligation applies to all contracting parties for any type of contract.

        French courts have ruled that this general information obligation may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code (see below), answering the question in the affirmative (Paris Court of Appeal, 27 March 2024, no. 22/12665). The scope of the latter has however, been defined by the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») : only information bearing a direct and necessary link with the subject matter of the contract or the qualities of the parties is subject to the disclosure obligation (Cass. com., 14 May 2025, no. 23-17.948).

        Who bears the burden of proof?

        The burden of proof rests on the person who claims that the information was due to him. He must then prove (i) that the other party owed him the information but (ii) did not provide it (Article 1112-1 (§. 4) of the Civil Code)

        Special duty of disclosure for franchise and distribution agreements

        Which contracts are subject to this special rule?

        French law requires (art. L.330-3 French Commercial Code) the provision of a pre-contractual information document (in French “DIP”) and the draft contract, by any person:

        • which grants another person the right to use a trade mark, trade name or sign,
        • while requiring an exclusive or quasi-exclusive commitment for the exercise of its activity (e.g. exclusive purchase obligation). The quasi-exclusive nature of the commitment is assessed on a case-by-case basis by French courts, independently of the 80% purchase threshold provided for under EU Regulation 2022/720, which is treated merely as an indicative reference.

        Concretely, DIP must be provided, for example, to the franchisee, distributor, dealer or licensee of a brand, by its franchisor, supplier or licensor as soon as the two above conditions are met. French courts have moreover recently had occasion to confirm that the scope of the DIP obligation is not limited to franchise agreements but extends, in particular, to dealership agreements, provided the above-mentioned conditions are met (Paris Court of Appeal, 22 May 2024, no. 22/08672).

        When the DIP must be provided?

        DIP and draft contract must be provided at least 20 days before signing the contract, and, where applicable, before the payment of the sum required to be paid prior to the signature of the contract (for a reservation).

        What information must be disclosed in the DIP?

        Article R. 330-1 of the French Commercial Code requires that DIP mentions the following information (non-detailed list) concerning:

        • Franchisor (identity and experience of the managers, career path, etc.);
        • Franchisor’s business (in particular creation date, head office, bank accounts, history of the development of the business, annual accounts, etc.);
        • Operating network (members list with indication of signing date of contracts, establishments list offering the same products/services in the area of the planned activity, number of members having ceased to be part of the network during the year preceding the issue of the DIP with indication of the reasons for leaving, etc.);
        • Trademark licensed (date of registration, ownership and use);
        • General state of the market (about products or services covered by the contract) and local state of the market (about the planned area) and information relating to factors of competition and development perspective. With respect to the local market, the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») has held that the franchisor is not required to conduct a market study, but that if one is provided, it must be accurate and verifiable (Cass. com., 18 Oct. 2023, no. 22-19.329).;
        • Essential element of the draft contract and at least: its duration, contract renewal conditions, termination and assignment conditions and scope of exclusivities;
        • Financial obligations weighing in on contracting party: nature and amount of the expenses and investments that will have to be incurred before starting operations (up-front entry fee, installation costs, etc.).

        Beyond the exhaustiveness of the information required under the aforementioned provision, the DIP is subject to a qualitative standard. All information provided — including information provided spontaneously — must be accurate and truthful to ensure that the prospective network member’s consent is fully informed and free from any defect.

        How to prove the disclosure of information?

        The burden of proof for the delivery of the DIP rests on the debtor of this obligation: the franchisor (Cass. Com., 7 July 2004, n°02-15.950). The ideal for the franchisor is to have the franchisee sign and date his DIP on the day it is delivered and to keep the proof thereof.

        The clause of contract indicating that the franchisee acknowledges having received a complete DIP does not provide proof of the delivery of a complete DIP (Cass. com, 10 January 2018, n° 15-25.287).

        The franchisor is subject to a duty to update the DIP until the contract is signed

        In a ruling dated 26 June 2024 (no. 23-14.085 PB), the French Supreme Court held that formal compliance of the DIP at the time of its delivery is not sufficient to exonerate the franchisor from all pre-contractual liability. This position was confirmed by a subsequent ruling of 4 December 2024 (no. 23-16.684).

        These two decisions appear to establish a duty of ongoing updates incumbent upon the network head throughout the entire period between the delivery of the DIP and the execution of the contract. Where significant events occur during that interval — insolvency proceedings affecting network members, major litigation, or structural changes to the network — the network head is required to proactively inform the prospective member. The court then examines whether the failure to disclose such information was liable to distort the candidate’s assessment of the network and, consequently, to vitiate his consent (Cass. com., 26 June 2024, op. cit.).

        A franchisor may therefore not shelter behind the initial regularity of the DIP to discharge its disclosure duty where the network’s situation has materially changed prior to the signing of the contract.

        Sanction for breach of pre-contractual information duties

        Criminal sanction

        Failing to comply with the obligations relating to the DIP, franchisor or supplier can be sentenced to a criminal fine of up to 1,500 euros and up to 3,000 euros in the event of a repeat offence, the fine being multiplied by five for legal entities (article R.330-2 French commercial Code).

        Cancellation of the contract for deceit

        The contract may be declared null and void in case of breach of either article 1112-1 of the French Code civil or article L. 330-3 of the French Code de commerce. In both cases, failure to comply with the obligation to provide information is sanctioned if the applicant demonstrates that his or her consent has been vitiated by error, deceit or violence. In this respect, courts conduct a concrete, case-by-case assessment, taking into account in particular the professional experience and personal due diligence of the distributor: a sophisticated candidate will face greater difficulty in establishing deceit, and his experience in the relevant sector may be sufficient to exonerate the franchisor (Paris Court of Appeal, div. 5 – ch. 11, 26 Apr. 2024, no. 21/13205), even where the information provided was incomplete or inaccurate (Paris Court of Appeal, 20 Jan. 2021, no. 19/03382).

        The path is therefore narrow for the franchisee: he cannot invoke error concerning profitability when it is he who draws up his plan, and even when this plan is drawn up by the franchisor or based on information drawn up and transmitted by the franchisor, the experience of the franchisee who knew the local market may exonerate the franchisor.

        Regarding deceit, Courts strictly assess its two conditions which are:

        • (a material element) the existence of a lie or deceptive reticence (article 1137 French Civil Code), and
        • (an intentional element) the intention to deceive his counterparty (article 1130 French Civil Code).

        Where applicable, the parties must return to the state they were in before the contract.

        Damages

        Although the claims for contract cancellation are subject to very strict conditions, it remains that franchisees/distributors may alternatively obtain damages on the basis of tort liability for non-compliance with the pre-contractual information obligation, subject to proof of fault (incomplete or incorrect information), damage (loss of opportunity of not contracting or contracting on more advantageous terms) and the causal link between the two.

        Christophe Hery

        Practice areas

        • Arbitration
        • Agency
        • Antitrust
        • Distribution
        • e-commerce

        Contact Christophe





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          Spain | Franchising, Theory Of Risk and Guarantees By Franchisee

          15 May 2026

          • Spain
          • Distribution
          • Litigation

          In Spain, a waiver of goodwill indemnity in a distribution agreement does not always protect the manufacturer. The Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal ordered a manufacturer to pay its distributor more than EUR 100,000 in goodwill indemnity and damages for insufficient notice, despite the written waiver, because it held that the agreement had expired and that good faith limited the waiver’s effect. To avoid the same risk, the manufacturer should renew the agreement in writing before it expires or expressly provide that waivers remain effective, specify which customer base the waiver covers and give notice proportionate to the duration of the relationship.

          Summary

          • The distributor’s case and the manufacturer’s liability
          • What the Court of Appeal decided on the waiver
          • Why the waiver was not applied
          • A valid waiver with limits: distribution and agency
          • Whether the waiver should have fallen away with the agreement
          • What manufacturers distributing in Spain should do

          Goodwill indemnity in Spain: the distributor’s case

          For more than twenty years, the manufacturer and distributor worked together without a written agreement. In 2018, they signed a two-year contract. The distributor agreed to waive both goodwill indemnity and damages arising from termination.

          The agreement expired in December 2020. Neither party renewed it, but they continued doing business together.

          Months later, the manufacturer decided to end the relationship. It gave less than two months’ notice and alleged breaches by the distributor that it was unable to prove.

          Waiver of goodwill indemnity: what the Court of Appeal decided

          In a distribution relationship, the distributor can waive goodwill indemnity. In an agency relationship, an advance waiver is not permitted. In this case, however, the Court of Appeal held that the waiver no longer applied because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The court also considered that good faith could limit the waiver’s effect, given the length of the relationship and its termination without good cause.

          The argument based on expiry is debatable: a clause intended to govern the end of an agreement should not lose its effect simply because that agreement ends. To avoid this uncertainty, parties that continue trading after expiry should renew the agreement in writing or expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

          Why was the goodwill indemnity waiver not applied?

          The Court of Appeal relied on two grounds.

          The first was the expiry of the agreement. Since the parties had continued trading without signing a new document, the court held that the waiver was no longer effective when the manufacturer ended the relationship.

          The second was good faith. Even if the waiver still applied, the court considered that it could not take full effect in those circumstances: more than twenty-five years of collaboration, a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause.

          Goodwill indemnity waiver: valid, but with limits

          The judgment is surprising because a distributor can, in principle, waive this indemnity. To understand why, it helps to distinguish distribution from agency.

          In agency relationships, the law protects the agent against an advance waiver. This follows from Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992, read together with the goodwill indemnity provisions in Article 28.

          In distribution relationships, the Spanish Supreme Court applies Article 28 by analogy where its requirements are met (judgment 944/2023 of 13 June). But this does not prevent a manufacturer and distributor from agreeing to exclude all compensation if either party terminates the agreement on notice. The Supreme Court confirmed this in its judgments of 4 December 2007, 15 January 2008, sitting in plenary session, and 25 April 2011.

          The distinction lies in how the relationship ends. That case law concerns ordinary termination, whether on notice or on expiry of the agreed term. A waiver offers less certainty where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice, as happened here.

          Should the waiver have fallen away with the agreement?

          Of the Court of Appeal’s two grounds, the first is the more debatable: that the waiver ceased to apply because the agreement had expired.

          The Spanish Supreme Court has enforced exclusion clauses precisely after an agreement has expired. It did so in its judgment of 23 December 2008. In that case, a dealer’s agreement ended when its extension expired. The court refused goodwill compensation because the agreement itself excluded any claim arising from its termination.

          The point is straightforward: if a clause is agreed to govern what happens when an agreement ends, it is difficult to argue that it loses its effect merely because the agreement ends.

          There is a difference here: the parties continued trading after expiry and, according to the Court of Appeal, did so on the terms that had traditionally governed their relationship. But continuing to trade does not, by itself, show that they intended to set aside a waiver relating to the customer base developed up to that point.

          There is an agency case that might appear to point the other way. The Supreme Court has prevented parties from dividing the indemnity into separate periods through successive declarations that there was “nothing further to claim” (judgment of 27 June 2013). Its reason, however, was the mandatory protection afforded by Article 28 of the Spanish Commercial Agency Act, which the parties cannot exclude. That restriction does not apply to distribution.

          Even if the waiver remained effective, there would still be the question of notice. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss. They compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business and would therefore not necessarily be covered by that waiver.

          What should manufacturers distributing in Spain do?

          Businesses may continue trading as usual and overlook the fact that their agreement has expired. This judgment illustrates the risk: when the time comes to end the relationship, the manufacturer may discover that the protections it relied on are no longer effective.

          The agreement should be renewed in writing before it expires. If the parties have already continued trading without renewal, they should document which terms still apply and expressly provide that waivers remain effective both after expiry and while the relationship continues without a new document.

          It is also important to specify which customer base the waiver covers. If it is intended to include the customer base already built up, this should be stated expressly, with a reference date, a defined territory and confirmation that the waiver is final.

          Finally, goodwill indemnity, damages for insufficient notice and other damages should be addressed separately. When ending the relationship, the manufacturer should give notice proportionate to its duration.

          Frequently asked questions on goodwill indemnity in Spain

          Is a waiver of goodwill indemnity valid in a distribution agreement in Spain?

          In principle, yes: in distribution the distributor can waive the indemnity, whereas in agency the law protects the agent against an advance waiver (Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992). A waiver offers less certainty, however, where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice.

          What happens to the waiver if the agreement expires and the parties keep trading?

          The risk is that it will not be applied. In the case decided by the Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal, the waiver was held to be no longer effective because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The argument is debatable, but to avoid uncertainty the agreement should be renewed in writing or should expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

          Can good faith limit a waiver of goodwill indemnity?

          According to the court, in that case it could: after more than twenty-five years of collaboration, with a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause, the waiver could not take full effect.

          Does the waiver also cover damages for insufficient notice?

          Not necessarily. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss, because they compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business.

          How should the waiver be worded to cover the customer base already built up?

          It must say so expressly: the waiver should state a reference date, a defined territory and that the waiver is final.

          How much notice must the manufacturer give?

          The article does not give a number of days: it says that notice must be proportionate to the duration of the relationship. In the case examined, the manufacturer gave less than two months’ notice after more than twenty-five years of collaboration.

          Abstract: In February 2022, this previous article examined the adoption of Legislative Decree No. 198 of November 8, 2021 (the “Decree”), through which Italy transposed Directive (EU) 2019/633 (the “Directive”) on unfair commercial practices in business-to-business relationships within the agri-food supply chain.

          Four years later, the regulatory framework has evolved and the landscape has changed in part: the Italian legislature has made several amendments to the Decree, the designated enforcement authority has significantly stepped up its activities, and the first court decisions regarding the application of the Decree have been issued.

          This article aims to provide an updated overview.

          The Regulatory Framework: Original Structure and Subsequent Amendments

          The implementation of the Directive provided the Italian legislature with an opportunity to overhaul the pre-existing national regulations governing the agri-food supply chain—in particular those set forth in Article 62 of Decree-Law No. 1/2012. The result is a unified and systematic regulatory framework on the subject, contained in the Decree that entered into force on December 15, 2021.

          For an analysis of the structure and key provisions of the Decree, please refer to the previous article. The fundamental structural choices described in that article remain in effect: the Decree establishes mandatory contractual requirements for operators in the agricultural and food sector, identifies unfair practices that are always prohibited (the so-called “blacklist”) and those prohibited unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties (the so-called “gray list”), regulates below-cost sales (not covered by the Directive), provides for a comprehensive system of penalties to punish any violations, and designates the Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention (ICQRF) as the authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the Decree’s provisions.

          What is of interest here are the legislative amendments that have modified and supplemented the original text of the Decree. As will be seen, these amendments have tightened regulations that were already stricter than European standards at the time of the Decree’s adoption.

          The first amendment was introduced by Decree-Law No. 21/2022, which expanded the definition of perishable products to include meat-based products with specific physicochemical characteristics, and extended the applicability of the 30-day payment terms to the following agricultural and food products:

          “a) prepackaged products bearing an expiration date or a minimum shelf life not exceeding sixty days;

          1. b) bulk products, even if placed in protective packaging or refrigerated, that have not undergone treatments designed to extend their shelf life beyond sixty days;
            c) meat products exhibiting one of the following physicochemical characteristics: awgreater than 0.95 and pH greater than 5.2, or awgreater than 0.91, or pH equal to or greater than 4.5;
          2. d) all types of milk.”

           

          Subsequently, Decree-Law No. 69/2023 expanded the scope of the Decree to include “suppliers established in other Member States or in third countries when the buyer is established in Italy.” Therefore, today, the Decree applies to all business-to-business (B2B) sales contracts in which the supplier and/or the buyer is established in Italy, regardless of the parties’ turnover and the law applicable to the contract. This is an extremely broad scope of application, capable of effectively encompassing any commercial relationship in which at least one of the parties is Italian. This deliberate departure from the differentiated turnover thresholds provided for by the Directive—justified, according to the legislature, by the extraordinary fragmentation of the Italian agri-food supply chain—continues to define the broader scope of the Italian regime compared to the minimum level of harmonization established by the EU.

          Decree-Law No. 69/2023 also amended the minimum notice period for the buyer’s cancellation of orders for perishable products, prohibiting any “notice period so short as to reasonably lead one to believe that the supplier cannot find alternative outlets for its products” and delegating to a subsequent implementing regulation (not yet issued) to establish specific rules governing this matter. Finally, the provision extended to foreign suppliers the right to file complaints with the national enforcement authority (ICQRF).

          The most recent amendment to the Decree was introduced by Decree-Law No. 63/2024, which

          • added the provision that the supply price must take into account the cost of production
          • specified that wholesale markets also fall within the scope of the Decree
          • included, among the documents that the ICQRF may obtain, accounting documents relating to sales activities and related services, and
          • introduced the possibility of paying any penalties imposed under the Decree at a reduced rate, provided the contractor demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to mitigate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

           

          The cumulative effect of the amendments outlined above is the establishment of regulations that are even stricter than those that took effect in December 2021 (which were already significantly more restrictive than the Directive).

          Mandatory Contractual Requirements: Persistent Compliance Challenges

          Article 3 of the Decree imposes several mandatory requirements for contracts for the sale of agricultural and food products: written form, a minimum term of 12 months, specification of the product’s quantity and characteristics, a fixed or determinable price that reflects production costs, and definition of the terms of delivery and payment.

          However, the legislature’s intention to establish a system that safeguards the contractual rights of the parties has clashed with the reality of commercial transactions in this sector. In fact, experience has shown that these contractual requirements remain the primary source of difficulty for operators in complying with the Decree. It is therefore not surprising that many of the objections raised by the ICQRF over the years have concerned precisely this aspect.

          The written form requirement is particularly critical: a significant percentage of operators, especially in sectors characterized by long-standing informal commercial relationships (the prime example being the wine sector), continue to conclude transactions without an adequate written framework agreement, relying instead on commercial customs and verbal agreements that the Decree does not recognize as sufficient. It is no coincidence that the reports issued by the ICQRF in recent years list the failure to enter into written contracts prior to the delivery of the products sold   among the most frequent violations found.

          Another aspect that is frequently penalized is the unilateral modification of prices: in several cases, buyers have attempted to adjust agreed-upon prices without the supplier’s written consent—a practice that the Decree expressly prohibits and that has been the subject of the first judicial decisions issued on the matter (which will be discussed in paragraph 6).

          Italian Specifics: Additional Prohibited Practices and Below-Cost Sales

          In addition to the “black list” and “gray list” of unfair practices prohibited by the Directive, Article 5 of the Decree identifies and prohibits 16 additional unfair practices, which stem from the pre-existing Italian regulatory framework. These include, for example, the purchase of agricultural and food products through double-reduction electronic tenders and auctions, the application of objectively different conditions for equivalent services, and the obtaining of undue unilateral benefits not justified by the nature or content of the commercial relationship.

          An interesting feature of the Italian list is its explicitly bilateral nature: unlike the Directive, which was designed to protect suppliers from potential abuses by larger and more powerful buyers, Article 5 of the Decree prohibits various unfair practices that also apply to suppliers, including the imposition of an unduly short expiration date, the forced maintenance of a specific product range, and the requirement to reserve a privileged shelf position for certain products. The Decree, therefore, also protects—in certain cases—buyers.

          Another distinctive feature of Italian law (and that of a few other countries in the European Union—Spain, Croatia, and Hungary) is the regulation of below-cost sales, which is not covered by the Directive.

          Under Article 7 of the Decree, sales below production cost are permitted only in two circumstances:

          • when perishable products are at risk of spoilage, or
          • if the commercial transaction has been planned and agreed upon in writing with the supplier. In all other cases, the price of the product sold below cost is automatically adjusted.

          It should be noted that the replacement criteria specified by the legislature (purchase invoices, average production costs, average product price) are unclear and have been subject to various interpretations.

          The penalties for violating the ban on below-cost sales are severe: administrative fines ranging from 1 to 6 million euros and suspension of business operations for up to 20 days in cases of repeat offenses or particularly serious violations.

          In any case, selling below cost is not merely a national issue; in fact, in its report dated December 1, 2025, on the evaluation of the Directive, the Commission indicated that it will propose a revision of the Directive to establish the principle that farmers should not be forced to systematically sell their products below production costs. We can therefore expect changes to the European regulations governing this issue.

          The Penalty System

          The Decree contains a comprehensive system of penalties, calibrated according to the nature and severity of the violation.

          Failure to comply with the provisions of the Decree results, depending on the case, in three types of consequences, which may apply cumulatively:

          1. Invalidity of the offending contractual clause, which is automatically replaced where the Decree so provides: for example, a term of less than 12 months is extended to that minimum period; a price below the cost of production is adjusted upward.
          2. Monetary penalties: fines ranging from a fixed minimum of between 1,000 and 30,000 euros, depending on the obligation violated, to a maximum varying from 3% to 5% of the annual revenue of the party responsible for the violation, which may be increased up to two or three times in the event of repeated violations, with an overall maximum limit of 10% of revenue. With specific regard to unfair practices, Article 10 of the Decree provides that those included on the “blacklist” are subject to administrative penalties ranging from 30,000 euros to 5% of the previous year’s revenue; those included on the “gray list” are subject to fines ranging from 15,000 euros to 3% of revenue; other practices prohibited under Article 5 are subject to penalties ranging from 5,000 euros to 4% of revenue.
          3. Compensation for Damages: Injured parties and their representative organizations may, in any case, file claims for compensation for damages (all of which must be proven).

           

          As previously mentioned, starting in 2024, an operator subject to a monetary penalty may, within a strict deadline of thirty days from the notification of the injunction order, pay the penalty at a 50% reduction if the operator demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to eliminate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

          Enforcement of the Regulations: The Expanding Role of the ICQRF

          Four years after its designation as the competent supervisory authority in Italy pursuant to the Decree, the ICQRF (Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention) has become one of the most active supervisory bodies in the European Union in this sector. Working in coordination with the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Agri-Food Products, it conducts inspections both in response to reports and on its own initiative.

          The gradual intensification of this agency’s activities is remarkable. In 2022, the ICQRF conducted 139 inspections. By 2025, that number had risen to 3,536. Inspections resulting from complaints are—in fact—extremely rare, while the majority of inspections are carried out on the agency’s own initiative. Operators’ reluctance to file complaints—a phenomenon common across all EU member states and largely attributable to fears of commercial retaliation by stronger business partners—has made proactive enforcement the primary mechanism in practice.

          The most recent ICQRF reports confirm a significant upward trend in the volume of inspections, the number of operators investigated (76 in 2022 versus 1,430 in 2025), and the number of violations detected (15 in 2022, 562 in 2025). The sectors subject to the most frequent inspections are dairy products and fruits and vegetables, both characterized by large, structurally powerful buyers and a highly fragmented supplier base.

          The most commonly found violations include unilateral changes to contractual terms by the buyer, failure to comply with mandatory payment terms, and the absence of written sales contracts.

          Case Law on Unfair Practices in the Agri-Food Supply Chain

          The intensification of inspections and the issuance of injunctions against operators has, as was to be expected, led to the first disputes and, consequently, to the first court decisions regarding the Decree.

          Following appeals filed by certain operators in the dairy sector against administrative sanctions imposed for unilaterally modifying the agreed-upon price of milk, several trial courts (specifically the Court of Brescia and the Milan Court of Appeals) have confirmed that any price modification requires the written consent of all contracting parties. This is consistent with the text of the Decree, which prohibits unilateral changes to agreed-upon contractual terms and requires that agreements between the parties be in writing.

          In Judgment No. 1225 of April 29, 2025, published on June 12, 2025, the Milan Court of Appeals ruled that a letter revising the criteria for calculating the price—sent by the buyer to the supplier, not preceded by negotiations between the parties, and not signed by the supplier to indicate acceptance—constitutes a unilateral modification of the contractual terms relating to the price, which is punishable under Article 4(d) of the Decree. In fact, it cannot be considered a written agreement (since it is signed by only one party). It is true that Article 3 of the Decree provides for the possibility of fulfilling the written form requirement through “equivalent forms,” but this is conditional on the fundamental contractual elements (including the price) having been previously agreed upon between the buyer and the supplier through a framework agreement.

          Therefore, it is irrelevant that, in the present case, the supplier, by continuing to make deliveries, behaved in a manner that could be construed as tacit acceptance of the amendment, given that price agreements cannot be established through “equivalent forms.”

          The body of case law remains limited, so it is premature to draw definitive conclusions about the direction of case law in this area.

          However, there is no doubt that the operational boundaries of the penalty regime are gradually being defined and the interpretive limits of the Decree’s provisions are being clarified.

          Conclusion

          The Italian regulatory framework governing unfair commercial practices in the agricultural and food supply chain has, in the more than four years since its entry into force, moved from theory to practical application.

          The basic framework described in the previous article has been supplemented by subsequent legislative amendments, and enforcement of the regulations is overseen by a regulatory authority that has demonstrated both the will and the capacity to act. The proactive approach of the ICQRF, which is increasingly active in its role as an enforcement authority, leaves no doubt that compliance with the Decree is a practical imperative, not merely a theoretical one.

          For operators active in the Italian agri-food supply chain—whether they are suppliers, buyers, or intermediaries—the priorities are clear:

          • contracts must be in writing and comply with the mandatory requirements set forth in the Decree
          • business practices must be reviewed to verify their compliance with the law and ensure they do not fall under the list of prohibited practices, and
          • Business processes must ensure that each operator adheres to good commercial practices in its dealings with its partners and other operators in the supply chain.

          France regulates unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain more strictly than Directive (EU) 2019/633 requires. Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 30 June 2021 transposed the Directive into a framework already built by the Egalim laws, and France chose not to apply the turnover thresholds set out in the Directive: the rules therefore cover all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, whatever the size or nationality of the parties. Written annual agreements signed before 1 March, automatic price revision clauses, capped payment terms and administrative fines reaching €2 million, doubled for repeat infringements, are the core of the regime, enforced by the DGCCRF.

          Summary

          1. Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when
          2. Products covered by the French rules
          3. Scope of the French rules compared with the Directive
          4. Suppliers and buyers covered, regardless of size and nationality
          5. Applicable law and jurisdiction in international supply contracts
          6. Where French law goes further than the Directive
          7. Mandatory content of an agri-food supply agreement
          8. Penalties for breaching the contractual requirements
          9. Unfair practices prohibited beyond the Directive
          10. Penalties for unfair commercial practices
          11. The DGCCRF and its enforcement powers
          12. Findings of the latest DGCCRF report

          Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when?

          Directive (EU) 2019/633 was transposed into French law by Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 2021, June 30th, whose provisions entered into force on July 1, 2021 and apply to contracts concluded as from November 1, 2021. Contracts concluded before that date were granted a 12-month period, starting on July 1, 2021, to comply with these provisions.

          This transposition forms part of an already well-established legislative framework shaped by « Egalim I » Law No. 2018-938 of October 30, 2018; « Egalim II » Law No. 2021-1357 of October 18, 2021 and « Egalim III » Law No. 2023-1041 of November 17, 2023, which strengthen contractual relations and the protection of agricultural producers. Even prior to the transposition of the Directive, French law had already refocused the rules on restrictive business practices around the following unlawful practices:

          • A significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
          • the granting of an advantage without consideration; and
          • The sudden termination of established business relationships.

           

          The Ordinance of June 30, 2021 transposed those provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/633 that did not fall within this existing framework, specifically introducing three new restrictive practices applicable to agricultural and food products into the French Commercial Code  (Com.C):

          • The cancellation of an order for perishable products at short notice (Article L. 443-5 of the Com.C);
          • The unlawful obtaining, use, or disclosure of the supplier’s trade secrets (Article L. 443-6 of the Com.C);
          • The refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a supply agreement where the supplier has requested such confirmation (Article L. 443-7 of the Com.C).

           

          This framework has been strengthened by Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026 on emergency measures for agricultural protection and sovereignty (the “2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law”), most of whose relevant provisions entered into force on 20 August 2026. The 2026 law notably amends agricultural contracting rules, food-sector price revision mechanisms and certain restrictive trade practices.

          Which agri-food products are covered by the French rules?

          Directive 2019/633 applies to the sale of “agricultural and food products”, defined in Article 2 as “the products listed in Annex I to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as products not listed in that Annex but processed for use as food for human consumption by using products listed in that Annex”, subject to the annual turnover thresholds of suppliers and buyers set out in Article 1§2.

          Is the scope of the French rules broader than the Directive?

          In France, the scope of the provisions transposing the Directive is the same as that of EU law, as they apply to agricultural and food products.

          However, certain French provisions in this area have a broader scope of application. Many provisions of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code apply to commercial relationships relating to “production, distribution or service activities” (in particular restrictive practices – Article L. 442-1 Com.C). Some of these provisions apply to fast-moving consumer goods, defined in Article L. 441-4 of the French Commercial Code as “non-durable products with a high frequency and recurrence of consumption”, the list of which is set by decree, as well as to food products.

          Which suppliers and buyers are covered, and does their size matter?

          France chose not to introduce the supplier and buyer turnover thresholds provided for in Directive 2019/633. As a result, the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers.

          Which law applies to an international agri-food supply contract?

          French law does not provide for specific conflict-of-law rules applicable to supply contracts in the agri-food sector. At first glance, international contracts for the supply of agri-food products are therefore governed by the general conflict-of-law rules applicable in France.

          Choice of law under Rome I and the 1955 Hague Convention

          These general rules are laid down by Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, known as the Rome I Regulation. Rome I establishes as a general principle that the parties are free to choose the law applicable to an international contract, either expressly or implicitly. In the absence of an express choice, the applicable law depends on the legal characterization of the supply contract.

          A distinction must therefore be made depending on the nature of the supply contract. If the French court characterizes the contract as a contract for the sale of goods, it may apply either the Rome I Regulation or, more likely, the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international sales of tangible movable goods. In both cases, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the seller is established. If the supply contract is characterized as a processing or bespoke supply contract, particularly where it is based on detailed specifications, the French court would apply the Rome I Regulation and may consider such a contract to constitute a service contract rather than a sale contract. In that case, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the service provider is established.

          Article L. 444-1.A and the limits of overriding mandatory rules

          In addition, it its worthwhile looking at Article L. 444-1.A of the French Commercial Code which states

          “The provisions of Chapters I, II and III of this Title apply to any agreement between a supplier and a buyer relating to products or services marketed on French territory. These provisions are matters of public policy. Any dispute relating to their application falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts, subject to compliance with European Union law and international treaties ratified or approved by France and without prejudice to recourse to arbitration.”

          At first glance, this provision pretends to bring all commercial contracts within the scope of French law where the products or services are marketed in France, like an overriding mandatory rule (OMR). However, this approach appears ambiguous, unjustified and at the end ineffective.

          First, restrictive trade practices (RTP) do not constitute OMR within the meaning of the Rome I Regulation. Article L. 444-1.A does not expressly refer to the terms overriding mandatory rules and just merely recalls the domestic public policy nature of the relevant provisions.

          Second, French case law has repeatedly refused to qualify RTP as OMR, with the exception of enforcement actions brought by the French Ministry of Economy and Finance against third party imposing to their counterpart blatant imbalance clauses.

          Third, the general characterization of the provisions of Title IV of the French Commercial Code as OMR does not satisfy the test of sufficient connection and imperative necessity as defined by the ECJ in its ruling of 5 September 2024 (Huk-Coburg-Allgemeine Versicherung, Case C-86/23).

          Exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts and its exceptions

          With respect to jurisdiction, Article L. 444-1.A wants to create an exclusive jurisdiction of French courts for commercial matters such as RTP. However, it provides clear and wide exceptions based on compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction matters and with arbitration rules.

          In practice, any jurisdiction clause (subject to the exception here after) or arbitration clause stipulated in an international contract must be upheld by French courts, which must therefore decline jurisdiction. Only in very limited circumstances may French courts assert this exclusive jurisdiction rule, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has not entered into any relevant multilateral or bilateral convention with France (such as Lugano Convention, The Hague conventions…).

          Are the French rules stricter than Directive (EU) 2019/633?

          French commercial law is stricter than the rules laid down by Directive 2019/633, for several reasons:

          • A broader scope of application:
          • No thresholds limit the application of these provisions; as a result, all economic operators are covered, regardless of their size or turnover;
          • While certain provisions are specific to food products, there is also a common framework applicable to all products without distinction, as well as a specific regulatory regime for fast-moving consumer goods (see Question 3).
          • Prior to the transposition of the Directive, France already had a legislative framework in place in this area (the Egalim laws), which it continued to develop after the entry into force of the ordinance transposing the European Directive; this is why the ordinance transposed only four new restrictive trade practices, rather than the entire list set out in the Directive.
          • French law provides for strict regulation governing commercial negotiations, particularly in the large-scale retail sector. The 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law further strengthens this framework by introducing tighter rules on agricultural contract negotiations, reference production-cost indicators, automatic price revision mechanisms in the food sector, repeated tendering procedures and substantial reductions in order volumes during negotiations.

          What must a valid agri-food supply agreement contain in France?

          Chapter I of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code, entitled “Transparency in commercial relationships”, imposes numerous requirements governing the negotiation and performance of commercial agreements:

          The seller’s terms and conditions of sale

          The seller’s pricing policy: the seller must provide any buyer who so requests with its terms and conditions of sale, which must include, at a minimum, the conditions of sale, payment terms, the price list, and the schedule of price reductions (discounts, immediate rebates, deferred rebates, and “free” products) (Article L. 441-1 of the Com.C).

          These terms and conditions may be general (applicable to all customers), category-based (applicable to a category of customers, such as wholesalers, provided that the classification is based on objective identification criteria), or specific and individually negotiated (supplementing or derogating from the general or category-based terms and conditions of sale).

          In this respect, specific provisions apply to food products and products intended for pet food (Article L. 441-1-1 of the French Commercial Code), as well as to wholesalers (Article L. 441-1-2 of the French Commercial Code).

          Since 20 August 2026, Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C. also allows the supplier’s terms and conditions of sale for food products and pet food to include an automatic formula revising the unit-price list in line with upward or downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials used in the product.

          The buyer’s commercial cooperation services

          La politique de coopération commerciale de l’acheteur: L’acheteur, quant à lui, propose et négocie avec le fournisseur des services rendus par lui et qui bénéficient, directement ou indirectement, au fournisseur (Art. L. 441-3 C.com.):

          • Commercial cooperation services: these are services provided in connection with the resale of products or services to consumers, or with a view to their resale to professionals, which are intended to promote the marketing of the supplier’s products and are separable from the act of sale.
          • Other services: “other obligations intended to promote the commercial relationship between the supplier and the distributor or service provider” (L. 441-3, III. 3° Com. C).
          • Promotional benefits: Direct allocation of discounts («remise») to consumers by the distributor acting under a mandate from the supplier for fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

          The written annual agreement and the 31 January or 1 March deadlines

          Formalisation of the negotiation: a written agreement must be entered into, before 1 March of each year, between the supplier and the distributor or service provider, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements.

          As an experimental rule until 31 December 2029, where the supplier is a legal entity with worldwide annual turnover (excluding tax) below €350 million in the last closed financial year, the statutory 1st of March date referred to in Articles L. 441-3, L. 441-4, L. 441-6 and L. 443-8 Com. C. is replaced by 31th of January. In the same situations, the three-month periods referred to in Article L. 441-4 VI and Article L. 443-8 V(B) Com. C. are reduced to two months.

          Law No. 2026-796 introduces also two experiments: Until 15 April 2029 for agreements governed by Article L. 443-8 Com. C., and until 15 April 2028 for agreements governed by Article L. 441-4 Com. C., where the annual agreement has not been concluded by 1st of March (or within two months from the beginning of a special marketing cycle), the supplier may, if no new contract has been formed, terminate the commercial relationship without the distributor being able to rely on the rules on sudden termination under Article L. 442-1 II Com.C., or request application of a notice period compliant with that provision.

          Negotiation timetable for producer/first-buyer of agro-food contracts: under Article L. 631-24II bis of the French Rural and Maritime Fishing code (“CRPM”), the written contract or framework agreement must be concluded within four months after the prospective buyer receives the producer’s written proposal (this period may be extended by an extended interprofessional agreement, up to six months). If no agreement is reached, one of the parties must refer the matter to the Agricultural Commercial Relations Mediator within 15 days. If mediation fails and both parties still intend to establish or continue the relationship, the Agricultural Commercial Disputes Settlement Committee must be seized within a further 15 days; where applicable, the contract must then be concluded within two months after the parties receive the Committee’s decision

          It must set out (Art. L. 441-3 Com.C.):

          • The terms and conditions of the sale of products or the provision of services (including price reductions) and, where applicable, the types of situations in which and the modalities according to which general sales conditions (GSCs) may apply.
          • Commercial cooperation services
          • Other obligations
          • Any service or obligation arising from an agreement entered into with a legal entity located outside French territory with which the distributor is directly or indirectly affiliated

           

          It being specified that the mandatory contents of the written agreement vary depending on its scope of application, namely whether the agreement is entered into with wholesalers, relates to fast-moving consumer goods, or concerns agricultural products (Art. L. 441-7 and L. 441-8 Com.C).

          Stricter rules for agricultural products: duration, price revision, renegotiation

          More specifically, with respect to agricultural products, French law is all the more protective as regards the formalisation of negotiations and provides for even stricter obligations:

          • Clause relating to the duration of the contract: under Article L. 631-24 VI CRPM, the minimum duration of a contract between a producer and a first buyer is three years, except for products subject to excise duties and for grapes, must and the wines produced from them. Unless otherwise agreed, contracts are renewable by tacit renewal for an equivalent period; where the buyer gives notice of non-renewal, the notice period may not be less than three months. The producer may expressly waive the statutory minimum durations in writing, in accordance with Articles 148 and 168 of Regulation (EU) No. 1308/2013. A contract or framework agreement lasting less than three years may omit an automatic upward/downward revision clause for a fixed price.
          • Clauses relating to price determination mechanismsi and revision: Article L. 631-24 III CRPM requires the contract or framework agreement to contain the price and its automatic upward/downward revision mechanism, or the criteria and methods used to determine the price, including the weighting of the relevant indicators. The producer’s proposal must take account of one or more indicators relating to relevant agricultural production costs and their evolution. The parties must refer in the final contract or framework agreement to the reference indicators published by the competent interprofessional organisation (or, failing publication, by the relevant agricultural technical institutes), unless they expressly choose other agricultural production-cost indicators and state the reasons for that choice. Clauses whose purpose or effect is automatically to renegotiate or change the price so as to align it with a more favourable price practised by a competing buyer, producer, producer organisation or association of producer organisations are deemed unwritten.

           

          For food products and pet food subject to Article L. 443-8 Com.C., the annual written agreement must contain an automatic formula revising the unit-price list according to upward and downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials. If the supplier’s terms and conditions contain the formula permitted by Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C., the annual agreement must reproduce that formula and it is not negotiable. Price changes resulting from its application must be implemented no later than one month after activation. A distributor may object only where objective economic data show that the link drawn by the supplier between raw-material cost changes and the impact on its price list is manifestly erroneous.

          Lastly, specific provisions apply to contracts entered into between a supplier and a distributor “relating to the design and production of food products in accordance with specifications meeting the buyer’s specific needs and marketed under a private label”, as set out in Article L. 441-7 of the French Commercial Code.

          Invoicing and payment terms for food products and beverages

          Invoicing and payment terms: any purchase and sale transaction must give rise to an invoice, issued upon completion of the transaction and containing a number of mandatory particulars. In addition, the Commercial Code provides for a default payment period of 30 days, with a maximum payment period of 60 days or 45 days end of month, and sets out late payment penalties and a fixed recovery fee in the event of late payment (Art. L. 441-9 and L. 441-10 Com.C)

          In addition, the legislator has introduced specific payment deadlines for food products and beverages (Art. L. 441-11 Com.C):

          • Perishable agricultural products, perishable food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals: 30 days from delivery. In the case of periodic billing:30 days after the end of the ten-day period;
          • For seasonal fruits and vegetables: 30 days from the end of the month of delivery;
          • Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption: 20 days from the date of delivery;
          • Alcoholic beverages subject to excise duty (e.g., Armagnac, Cognac, brandy, gin, rum, vodka): 30 days from the end of the month of delivery. For wine and other non-sparkling fermented beverages covered by Article L. 665-3 CRPM, the first buyer must, in principle, pay the seller (or its subrogee) an advance of at least 15% of the order amount within ten clear days after conclusion of the sale contract. Since 20 August 2026, interprofessional bodies may provide a derogation from this advance-payment obligation only in the context of multiannual contracts.
          • Non-perishable agricultural and food products: If the invoice is issued by the supplier: 60 days from the date of issue of the invoice; and If the invoice is issued by the buyer: 60 days from the date of preparation of the invoice.

           

          Logistics penalties

          Logistics penalites: lastly, the French Commercial Code strictly regulates specific contractual sanctions known as “logistics penalties”, relating to the supplier’s failure to comply with its delivery, conformity, or timing obligations (Art. L. 441-17 Com.C).

          What are the penalties for breaching the contractual requirements?

          In the event of a breach of contractual requirements, several sanctions may apply:

          • Seller’s pricing policy: an administrative fine not exceeding €15,000 for a natural person and €75,000 for a legal entity ( L. 441-1 Com.C).

          For food products and products intended for pet food, the administrative fine may not exceed €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, and the maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 443-8 Com.C). The new information requirements attached to an optional automatic price-revision formula in the supplier’s terms and conditions (Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C.) are also backed by the administrative sanction provided in Article L. 443-8 Com.C. More generally, any breach of Article L. 443-8 I to VI is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum doubled for a repeated infringement within two years.

          • Buyer’s commercial cooperation policy and formalisation of negotiations: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-6 Com.C).

          Failure to comply with the March 1st deadline provided for in Article L. 441-3(IV) is punishable by an administrative fine not exceeding €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity. In the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final, the maximum fine is increased to €400,000 for a natural person and €2,000,000 for a legal entity. For suppliers falling within the temporary €350 million turnover experiment introduced by the 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law, references to the 1 March deadline must be read as 31 January for the duration of the experiment (until 31 December 2029).

          • Absence of a price revision clause in the agricultural sector: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-7 C)
          • Absence of a renegotiation clause: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-8 Com.C)).
          • Failure to comply with payment deadlines, absence of mandatory information required under the terms of payment, setting of non-compliant rates or conditions for late payment penalties, and failure to comply with the terms of calculation of payment deadlines agreed between the parties: administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €2 million for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €4 million for a legal entity in the event of a repeat offense within two years of the date on which the first penalty decision became final ( L. 441-16 Com.C).

           

          Which unfair practices does French law prohibit beyond the Directive?

          In addition to the contractual obligations described above, aimed at preventing abuses and unfair commercial practices between businesses, Articles L. 442-1 to L. 442-12 of the French Commercial Code set out a list of «unfair commercial practices between undertakings» (« pratiques commerciales déloyales entre entreprises »), including:

          • Obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage without consideration or manifestly disproportionate to the consideration provided (Art. L. 442-1(I) Com.C);
          • Subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations creating a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
          • Subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or operating conditions are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.);
          • imposing logistics penalties in breach of Article 441-17 (Art. L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
          • Applying or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, or sales or purchase conditions not justified by real consideration set out in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
          • Failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, leading to the failure to conclude a contract within the deadline set out in Article L. 441-3 ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
          • Abruptly terminating, even partially, an established commercial relationship without sufficient written notice, taking into account the duration of the relationship and industry practices or interprofessional agreements ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
          • Implementing, during contract negotiations, a substantial reduction in the volume of orders placed with an established commercial partner, even temporarily, where the scale, unusual nature or circumstances of the reduction are such as to jeopardise the balance of the established commercial relationship ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
          • For operators providing online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations laid down therein, other clauses and practices remaining governed by Title IV of Book IV ( L. 442-1, III Com.C.);
          • Directly or indirectly participating in a breach of the prohibition on out-of-network resale imposed on a distributor bound by an exempt selective or exclusive distribution agreement ( L. 442-2 Com. C);
          • Clauses deemed null and void, including retroactive rebates, discounts or commercial cooperation benefits, automatic granting of more favourable terms granted to competing undertakings, or prohibitions on assigning receivables ( L. 442-3 Com.C);
          • Resale at a loss or announcement of resale at a loss ( L. 442-5 Com.C.);
          • Imposing a minimum resale price on a distributor ( L. 442-6 Com.C.);
          • For buyers of agricultural or food products, imposing an abnormally low purchase price on suppliers ( L. 442-7 Com.C);
          • Regulation of remote reverse auctions ( L. 442-8 Com.C.);
          • Artificially increasing or decreasing prices, particularly in remote auctions, through false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or any other fraudulent means ( L. 442-9 Com.C);
          • Associations or cooperatives offering products for sale or providing services not provided for in their bylaws( L. 442-10 Com.C.);
          • Use of public property belonging to the State, local authorities or public bodies to sell products or provide services under irregular conditions ( L. 442-11 Com.C);
          • For cloud computing service providers, granting unlimited cloud credits or making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the conclusion of such an agreement ( L. 442-12 Com.C.).

           

          What are the penalties for unfair commercial practices in France?

          General sanctions regime under Article L. 442-4

          The unfair commercial practices listed below are subject to the same sanction’s regime, as provided for in Article L. 442-4 of the French Commercial Code. The practices concerned are the following:

          • L. 442-1, I, 1° Com.C: obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage that does not correspond to any consideration or is clearly disproportionate to the consideration given;
          • L. 442-1, I, 2° Com.C: subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations that create a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
          • L. 442-1, I, 3° Com.C: imposing logistical penalties in violation of Article L. 441-17;
          • L. 442-1, I, 4° Com.C: practicing or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, conditions, or terms of sale or purchase that are not justified by actual considerations provided for in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage;
          • L. 442-1, I, 5° Com.C: failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, resulting in the contract not being concluded within the deadline specified in Article L. 441-3;
          • L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.: subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or modalities are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations;
          • L. 442-1, II Com.C.: implementing a substantial reduction in order volumes during contract negotiations, including temporarily, where its scale, unusual nature or the circumstances are liable to jeopardise the balance of an established commercial relationship;
          • L. 442-1, III Com.C: for operators offering online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations set out in this text; other clauses or practices remain governed by Title IV of Book IV;
          • Art L. 442-2 C: participating directly or indirectly in the violation of the prohibition on resale outside the network imposed on distributors bound by a selective or exclusive distribution agreement exempted under competition law;
          • Art L. 442-3 C: using clauses or contracts allowing the producer to benefit from retroactive benefit of discounts (“remises”), rebates (“rabais”), or commercial cooperation; the automatic granting of more favorable terms to competing companies; prohibition on assigning claims against the other party to third parties;
          • L. 442-7 Com.C: for a buyer of agricultural products or foodstuffs, imposing an abusively low selling price on its supplier;
          • Article L. 442-8 C: regulation of remote reverse auctions.

          For all these practices:

          • the victim of such practices may have the illegal clauses or contracts declared null and void and request the restitution of undue benefits;

          the French Minister for the Economy or the Public Prosecutor may request the court to:

          • order the cessation of the practices;
          • declare illegal clauses or contracts null and void and obtain restitution of undue benefits;

          request the imposition of a civil fine, the amount of which may not exceed:

          • five million euros;
          • three times the amount of the benefits unduly received or obtained;
          • or 5% of the turnover excluding tax generated in France by the perpetrator of the practices during the last financial year ended preceding the financial year in which the practices were implemented.

          The court shall systematically order the publication, dissemination, or posting of its decision or an extract thereof, in accordance with the terms and conditions it specifies.

          Practices subject to specific sanctions

          • L. 442-5 Com.C: resale at a loss or the announcement of resale at a loss is punishable by a fine not exceeding 0.4% of the annual turnover excluding VAT generated in France during the last closed financial year (Art. L. 442-5, I Com.C);
          • L. 442-6 Com.C: imposition of a minimum resale price on the distributor is punishable by a maximum fine of €75,000 for legal entities;
          • L. 442-9 Com.C: causing an artificial increase or decrease in prices, in particular in remote auctions, by disseminating false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or by any other fraudulent means, is punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €225,000 for food products. Additional penalties may also apply;
          • L. 442-11 Com.C: using public property belonging to the State, local authorities or their public bodies to offer products for sale or to provide services under irregular condition is punishable by seizure on the premises, for a period not exceeding one month, of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services. It may also give rise to the confiscation of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services, and to an order to pay the Public Treasury an amount corresponding to the value of the seized products;
          • L. 442-12 Com.C: for a cloud computing service provider, granting unlimited cloud computing credits credits to a person engaged in production, distribution or service activities and making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the simultaneous conclusion of such an agreement constitutes an unfair commercial practice punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €1,500,000 (Article L. 132-2 of the French Consumer Code: sanctions for misleading commercial practices – « sanction despratiques commerciales trompeuses»).

           

          Which authority enforces the rules, and what powers does it have?

          The national authority responsible for enforcement is the administrative authority in charge of competition and consumer affairs: the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF). The DGCCRF has investigative powers (Article L. 450-1 of the French Commercial Code), may issue injunctions (Article L. 470-1 of the French Commercial Code), and imposes administrative fines and sanctions for breaches of Title IV of Book IV and for non-compliance with injunctions (Article L. 470-2 of the French Commercial Code).

          What did the DGCCRF’s latest enforcement report find?

          According to the last DGCCRF’s 2024 report, DGCCRF «inspected 186 establishments in the dairy, cattle, pork, poultry and egg sectors in order to verify compliance with the mandatory written contractualisation between producers and their first buyers. ». The report further states that «the regulation of commercial relations and negotiations is likely to give rise to a new Egalim law, following the publication of several parliamentary reports. »In this respect, a parliamentary report on the application of the so-called «Egalim 38» law was submitted on 13 March 2024. The legislative development anticipated in that report has since materialised in Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026, which substantially amended agricultural contractualisation and food-sector commercial negotiation rules with effect, for most of the relevant provisions, from 20 August 2026.

          ***

          Frequently asked questions on unfair trading practices in France

          Does French law apply if my company is not established in France?

          Yes, as regards the substantive rules. France did not adopt the turnover thresholds of Directive 2019/633, so the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers. Whether a French court will hear a dispute is a separate question.

          Can we choose a law other than French law in an agri-food supply contract?

          In principle yes. French law contains no specific conflict-of-law rules for agri-food supply contracts, so the choice is governed by the Rome I Regulation, under which the parties are free to choose the applicable law. Article L. 444-1.A of the Commercial Code appears to claim French law for products marketed in France, but French case law has repeatedly refused to treat restrictive trade practices as overriding mandatory rules.

          Will a jurisdiction or arbitration clause be upheld by the French courts?

          In practice yes. Article L. 444-1.A expressly reserves compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction and with arbitration. French courts may assert the exclusive jurisdiction rule only in very limited circumstances, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has entered into no relevant convention with France.

          What is the payment deadline for perishable food products in France?

          Thirty days from delivery for perishable agricultural and food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals. Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption must be paid within 20 days of delivery, seasonal fruit and vegetables within 30 days of the end of the month of delivery, and non-perishable agricultural and food products within 60 days (Article L. 441-11 of the Commercial Code).

          By what date must the annual agreement with a distributor be signed?

          Before 1 March or 31 January (when supplier’s turnover is less than €350 million) of each year, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements. Missing that deadline is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity, doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years.

          Must a contract with an agricultural producer include a price revision clause?

          Yes. The contract between a producer and its first buyer must provide for automatic upward and downward price revision mechanisms, based in particular on indicators relating to agricultural production costs and to changes in those costs. The absence of such a clause is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity.

          How long must a supply contract with an agricultural producer last?

          At least three years, and the contract must include a clause to that effect. The term may be extended up to a maximum of five years where an interprofessional agreement so provides (Article L. 631-24, III, 5° of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code).

          After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

          A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

          The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

          From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

          This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

          Why wine matters in this agreement

          The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

          1. tariff liberalisation;
          2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
          3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
          4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

          This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

          At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

          Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

          Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

          Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

          For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

          1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
          2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
          3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

          The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

          Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

          More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

          Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

          The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) and “Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

          This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

          For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

          Geographical indications: protection and tension

          One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

          The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

          From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

          1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
          2. transition periods for local operators;
          3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

          This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

          Services, distribution, and market structure

          Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

          Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

          The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

          1. logistics providers
          2. distribution networks
          3. commercial representation
          4. marketing and advertising agencies

          For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

          Legal advisors will need to consider:

          1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
          2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
          3. compliance with competition rules

          The implementation gap: where risk lies

          Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

          Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

          This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

          For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

          1. managing client expectations
          2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
          3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

          What should lawyers be doing now?

          Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

          Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

          1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
          2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
          3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
          4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

          In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

          Final sip

          The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

          Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

          At major events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, some companies attempt to “wildly” associate their brand or image with the event through a practice known as “ambush marketing” , defined by French courts as “an advertising strategy implemented by a company in order to associate its commercial image with that of an event and thereby benefit from the media impact of that event without paying the relevant fees and without having obtained the prior authorisation of the event organiser” (Paris Court of Appeal, 2nd chamber, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912). A risky and unlawful practice, but one that is sometimes conceivable.

          Key points

          • Ambush marketing is a practice that may give rise to sanctions but is not prohibited as such.
          • In return for their investments in the competition, FIFA’s official sponsors and partners enjoy very strong legal protection, through various general instruments (infringement, free-riding/parasitism, intellectual property) and more specific ones (sports law), against all forms of ambush marketing.
          • The FIFA World Cup benefits from enhanced protection based on an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide and on FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines, in the absence of specific French legislation comparable to that enacted for the Olympic Games.
          • However, these rights are not absolute, and there remain narrow opportunities for a (clever) form of ambush marketing.

          Protection of official World Cup sponsors and partners against ambush marketing

          Reaching nearly 5 billion people across all platforms during its last edition in Qatar in 2022, including more than 1.5 billion viewers for the final alone, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is the most-watched sporting event on the planet. Hosted for the first time by three countries (Canada, Mexico and the United States), it brings together 48 teams and more than 1,200 players for 104 matches across 16 stadiums. Its organisation is largely financed by various official partners, sponsors and rights holders, who in return receive the exclusive right to use FIFA’s official trademarks and intellectual property so as to associate their own image and distinctive signs with the competition.

          Ambush marketing is not sanctioned as such under French law, but a range of statutory provisions allow for broad protection of sponsors and partners of world-class sporting events against ambush marketing. They are indeed entitled to peacefully enjoy the rights offered to them in exchange for the significant investments they make in connection with events such as, for example, the football or rugby World Cups, or the Olympic Games.

          The following legal instruments may in particular be invoked by official sponsors and by the organisers of such events:

          • the “classic” protections offered by intellectual property law (trademark law and copyright) by way of an infringement action under the French Intellectual Property Code,
          • civil liability law (parasitism/free-riding and unfair competition based on article 1240 of the French Civil Code),
          • consumer law (misleading commercial practices),
          • but also more specific provisions, such as the protection of the exploitation rights of sports federations and organisers of sporting events under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, which grants organisers of sporting events a monopoly over the exploitation of those events.

          On these grounds, the following ambush marketing practices have notably been sanctioned:

          The exploitation of a tennis competition and the use, during the sporting event, of the brand associated with it: An online betting operator organised bets on Roland Garros matches using the protected sign and Roland Garros trademark to identify the matches on which bets were offered. The unlawful exploitation of the sporting competition was sanctioned at EUR 400,000 under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, the French Tennis Federation being the sole owner of the right to exploit Roland Garros. The use of the trademark was also sanctioned for infringement (EUR 300,000) and free-riding/parasitism (EUR 500,000) (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 Oct. 2009, No. 08/19179; Paris Judicial Court, 8 Aug. 2024, No 08/19179).

          An advertising campaign carried out during a film festival reproducing the event’s registered trademark: During the Cannes Film Festival, a cosmetics brand published videos on its social media showing its brand ambassadors being styled, with the official Cannes Film Festival poster visible in certain shots, one of which reproduced the registered Palme d’Or trademark. Sanctioned on the grounds of copyright infringement and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Judicial Court, 11 Dec. 2020, No. 19/08543).

          An advertising campaign falsely claiming the status of official event partner: During the Cannes Film Festival, the use of the slogan “official hairdresser of women” alongside the expressions “Cannes” and “Festival de Cannes”, and other publications that falsely led the public to believe the company was an official festival partner, to the detriment of the sole official festival hairdresser. Sanctioned on the grounds of unfair competition and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Court of Appeal, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912).

          These financial sanctions may be combined with injunctions to cease the practices and/or orders for press publication, subject to periodic penalty payments.

          FIFA’s specific trademark protection

          Unlike the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, which benefited from specific French legislation as a host country (Law No. 2018-202 of 26 March 2018 on the organisation of the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games) reserving in particular advertising spaces in the vicinity of competition venues exclusively for official partners, the 2026 FIFA World Cup does not take place on French territory, and therefore no equivalent French legal framework applies. The protection of official partners and sponsors thus relies on general law , but is nonetheless robust.

          FIFA has built an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide, protected in France by the provisions of the French Intellectual Property Code. These trademarks include in particular the verbal and figurative trademark FIFA®, the marks FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, as well as the official competition emblem (combining the trophy with the figure 26), the official slogan “We Are 26™” / “Nous Sommes 26™”, the logos of the sixteen host cities, and the official typeface “FWC 26”, protected by copyright. Only FIFA’s rights holders, namely the FIFA Partners (led by Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways and Visa), the Plus Sponsors, the Official Sponsors and Regional Supporters, are authorised to use this official intellectual property for commercial purposes.

          FIFA has published Intellectual Property Guidelines (version 2.0, June 2024) detailing the authorised and prohibited uses of the trademarks and logos associated with the 2026 World Cup. According to these guidelines, the following are prohibited without authorisation: any use of official trademarks in commercial advertising; the incorporation of official intellectual property into a trade name or domain name; the organisation of competitions, games or prize draws creating an association with the competition; the use of official trademarks to decorate a retail store; and the use of official hashtags by a corporate account for commercial purposes. The guidelines further specify that protection extends not only to identical reproduction of official trademarks but also to confusingly similar variants. This protection, recalled in the guidelines, is consistent with the enhanced protection afforded to well-known trademarks under French law by article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code.

          Lessons from the Paris 2024 Olympic Games: what risks do brands face?

          The Paris 2024 Olympic Games gave rise to significant litigation that clearly illustrates the risks faced by companies tempted by ambush marketing at a major sporting event. Although these decisions were rendered in the specific context of the Olympic Games, which benefited from specific, reinforced legal protections, they nevertheless constitute a direct warning for brands that might consider similar strategies during the World Cup, on the basis of general law.

          The use of official symbols on travelling physical media: During the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, a Chinese dairy company had buses displaying the Olympic rings alongside its own brands circulating throughout Paris, while presenting itself as “the only Chinese dairy company present in Paris 2024”. The Paris Court of Appeal upheld both free-riding/parasitism and trademark infringement, and ordered the companies concerned, in summary proceedings, to pay EUR 20,000 per defendant, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 20,000 per day per proven infringement, aimed at stopping the diffusion of the advertising (Paris Court of Appeal, pole 5, chamber 2, 21 Nov. 2025, No. 24/15283; Paris Court, interim order of 8 Aug. 2024, No. 24/55463). This judgment illustrates the vigilance of French courts with regard to strategies of visual association with an event, even without an explicit claim of official partnership, and confirms the possibility of combining infringement and parasitism claims for substantial awards.

          The unauthorised broadcast of competitions: The Paris Court, sitting in summary proceedings during the Olympic Games, ordered the immediate cessation of the broadcast of Olympic competitions by a streaming platform that did not hold the corresponding media rights, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 1,500 per identified infringement, EUR 3,000 per day for ongoing distributions and EUR 5,000 per day for failure to withdraw the content (Paris Court, summary proceedings, 18 Sept. 2024, No. 24/53019). Thus, any platform broadcasting World Cup matches without holding the rights licensed by FIFA faces immediate emergency measures under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code.

          The enhanced protection of well-known trademarks: The French Court of Cassation confirmed that protection of Olympic trademarks extends beyond strict reproduction: it is sufficient for the trademark to be evoked or suggested, without the need to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public. This solution, based on article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, was applied to a bar that had used the Olympic rings on its coasters to promote its broadcast evenings (Court of Cassation, Criminal chamber, 17 Jan. 2017, No. 15-86.363). FIFA’s trademarks being equally well-known worldwide, the same protective regime applies to them: a mere evocation of official trademarks, even without literal reproduction, may constitute an actionable infringement.

          Certain marketing operations may escape sanction

          Analysis of case law and promotional practices nonetheless reveals the contours of certain advertising practices that could be permitted (not sanctioned by the provisions described above), provided they are carefully prepared and presented. Here are some examples.

          Creative or humorous communication

          • A tongue-in-cheek, even humorous approach may allow companies to avoid the sanctions described above. For example, Intersnack’s Vico crisps brand launched a promotional campaign in 2016 around the slogan “Vico, partner of supporters at home”.
          • Irish bookmaker Paddy Power sponsored an egg-and-spoon race in “London”, a village in Burgundy, France, in order to display the following slogan in London during the 2012 Olympic Games: “Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is)”. The Olympic organising committee failed to stop this campaign. British humour …
          • Meanwhile, Heineken, a rival of official Euro 2016 sponsor Carlsberg, marketed a range of beer bottles in the colours of the flags of 21 countries that had “marked its history”, the majority of which were participating in the tournament.

          Using factual information as advertising

          It was held lawful to use the results of a rugby match and the announcement of an upcoming match in a newspaper to promote a car brand, with the advertisement reading: “France 13 England 24 , the Fiat 500 congratulates England on its victory and looks forward to seeing the French team on 9 March for France-Italy”. The judges considered that this publication “merely reproduces a current sporting result, obtained and made public on the front page of the sports newspaper, and refers to a future fixture also known to have been announced in the newspaper’s editorial content” (Court of Cassation, Commercial chamber, 20 May 2014, No. 13-12.102).

          Sponsoring players participating in the World Cup

          Any company may enter into partnerships with players participating in the FIFA World Cup, for example by supplying them with equipment or clothing bearing its logo. FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines expressly state that they “contain no affirmations regarding rights held by third parties such as players, clubs, member associations [or] confederations”. FIFA’s guidelines also explicitly confirm that generic images related to football, national teams or national flags do not fall within the official intellectual property. Caution is nonetheless warranted: the partnership must not create the impression of a commercial association with FIFA or the competition, nor use FIFA’s official trademarks.

          A combined legal and marketing approach in designing and preparing the message of any such communication campaign is essential to avoid legal proceedings, particularly on the grounds of free-riding/parasitism. Certain advertising campaigns can therefore legitimately be considered, particularly when they are clever.

          Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

          Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

          In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

          The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

          With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

          In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

          The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

          This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

          However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

          Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

          The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

          In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

          Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

          For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

          What the EU decision does (and does not) do

          The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

          At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

          In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

          The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

          Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

          Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

          Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

          The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

          Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

          Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

          How different payment types are affected in practice

          Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

          The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

          Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

          If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

          Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

          Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

          Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

          Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

          Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

          Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

          How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

          Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

          For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

          A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

          Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

          A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

          This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

          A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

          A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

          Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

          EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

          Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

          Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

          DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

          Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

          Country notes (alphabetical)

          Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

          France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

          Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

          Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

          For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

          Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

          Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

          Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

           

          Practical next steps for EU companies

          1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
          2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
          3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
          4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
          5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
          6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
          7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
          8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
          9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

          Under French Law, franchisors and distributors are subject to two kinds of pre-contractual information obligations: each party must spontaneously inform their future partner of any information they know is decisive to their consent. In addition, for certain contracts – i.e a franchise agreement – there is a duty to disclose a limited amount of information in a document. These pre-contractual obligations are mandatory rules of public policy. Thus, these two obligations apply simultaneously to the franchisor, distributor or dealer when negotiating a contract with a partner.

          Takeaways

          • The information required by the DIP must be fully completed and updated ;
          • The information not required by the DIP but provided by the franchisor must be carefully selected and sincere;
          • Franchisee must be given the opportunity to request additional information from the franchisor;
          • Franchisee’s experience in the economic sector enables the franchisor to considerably limit its exposure to the risk of contract cancellation due to a defect in the franchisee’s consent;
          • Franchisor must keep the proof of the actual disclosure of pre-contractual information (whether mandatory or not).
          • The general information obligation under common law (Article 1112-1 of the French Civil Code) may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation provided for under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code.

          General duty of disclosure for all contractors

          What is the scope of this pre-contractual information?

          This obligation is imposed on all counterparties, for any kind of contract. Indeed, article 1112-1 of the Civil Code states that:

          (§. 1) The party who knows information of decisive importance for the consent of the other party must inform the other party if the latter legitimately ignores this information or trusts its counterparty.

          (§. 3) Of decisive importance is the information that is directly and necessarily related to the content of the contract or the quality of the parties. »

          This obligation applies to all contracting parties for any type of contract.

          French courts have ruled that this general information obligation may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code (see below), answering the question in the affirmative (Paris Court of Appeal, 27 March 2024, no. 22/12665). The scope of the latter has however, been defined by the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») : only information bearing a direct and necessary link with the subject matter of the contract or the qualities of the parties is subject to the disclosure obligation (Cass. com., 14 May 2025, no. 23-17.948).

          Who bears the burden of proof?

          The burden of proof rests on the person who claims that the information was due to him. He must then prove (i) that the other party owed him the information but (ii) did not provide it (Article 1112-1 (§. 4) of the Civil Code)

          Special duty of disclosure for franchise and distribution agreements

          Which contracts are subject to this special rule?

          French law requires (art. L.330-3 French Commercial Code) the provision of a pre-contractual information document (in French “DIP”) and the draft contract, by any person:

          • which grants another person the right to use a trade mark, trade name or sign,
          • while requiring an exclusive or quasi-exclusive commitment for the exercise of its activity (e.g. exclusive purchase obligation). The quasi-exclusive nature of the commitment is assessed on a case-by-case basis by French courts, independently of the 80% purchase threshold provided for under EU Regulation 2022/720, which is treated merely as an indicative reference.

          Concretely, DIP must be provided, for example, to the franchisee, distributor, dealer or licensee of a brand, by its franchisor, supplier or licensor as soon as the two above conditions are met. French courts have moreover recently had occasion to confirm that the scope of the DIP obligation is not limited to franchise agreements but extends, in particular, to dealership agreements, provided the above-mentioned conditions are met (Paris Court of Appeal, 22 May 2024, no. 22/08672).

          When the DIP must be provided?

          DIP and draft contract must be provided at least 20 days before signing the contract, and, where applicable, before the payment of the sum required to be paid prior to the signature of the contract (for a reservation).

          What information must be disclosed in the DIP?

          Article R. 330-1 of the French Commercial Code requires that DIP mentions the following information (non-detailed list) concerning:

          • Franchisor (identity and experience of the managers, career path, etc.);
          • Franchisor’s business (in particular creation date, head office, bank accounts, history of the development of the business, annual accounts, etc.);
          • Operating network (members list with indication of signing date of contracts, establishments list offering the same products/services in the area of the planned activity, number of members having ceased to be part of the network during the year preceding the issue of the DIP with indication of the reasons for leaving, etc.);
          • Trademark licensed (date of registration, ownership and use);
          • General state of the market (about products or services covered by the contract) and local state of the market (about the planned area) and information relating to factors of competition and development perspective. With respect to the local market, the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») has held that the franchisor is not required to conduct a market study, but that if one is provided, it must be accurate and verifiable (Cass. com., 18 Oct. 2023, no. 22-19.329).;
          • Essential element of the draft contract and at least: its duration, contract renewal conditions, termination and assignment conditions and scope of exclusivities;
          • Financial obligations weighing in on contracting party: nature and amount of the expenses and investments that will have to be incurred before starting operations (up-front entry fee, installation costs, etc.).

          Beyond the exhaustiveness of the information required under the aforementioned provision, the DIP is subject to a qualitative standard. All information provided — including information provided spontaneously — must be accurate and truthful to ensure that the prospective network member’s consent is fully informed and free from any defect.

          How to prove the disclosure of information?

          The burden of proof for the delivery of the DIP rests on the debtor of this obligation: the franchisor (Cass. Com., 7 July 2004, n°02-15.950). The ideal for the franchisor is to have the franchisee sign and date his DIP on the day it is delivered and to keep the proof thereof.

          The clause of contract indicating that the franchisee acknowledges having received a complete DIP does not provide proof of the delivery of a complete DIP (Cass. com, 10 January 2018, n° 15-25.287).

          The franchisor is subject to a duty to update the DIP until the contract is signed

          In a ruling dated 26 June 2024 (no. 23-14.085 PB), the French Supreme Court held that formal compliance of the DIP at the time of its delivery is not sufficient to exonerate the franchisor from all pre-contractual liability. This position was confirmed by a subsequent ruling of 4 December 2024 (no. 23-16.684).

          These two decisions appear to establish a duty of ongoing updates incumbent upon the network head throughout the entire period between the delivery of the DIP and the execution of the contract. Where significant events occur during that interval — insolvency proceedings affecting network members, major litigation, or structural changes to the network — the network head is required to proactively inform the prospective member. The court then examines whether the failure to disclose such information was liable to distort the candidate’s assessment of the network and, consequently, to vitiate his consent (Cass. com., 26 June 2024, op. cit.).

          A franchisor may therefore not shelter behind the initial regularity of the DIP to discharge its disclosure duty where the network’s situation has materially changed prior to the signing of the contract.

          Sanction for breach of pre-contractual information duties

          Criminal sanction

          Failing to comply with the obligations relating to the DIP, franchisor or supplier can be sentenced to a criminal fine of up to 1,500 euros and up to 3,000 euros in the event of a repeat offence, the fine being multiplied by five for legal entities (article R.330-2 French commercial Code).

          Cancellation of the contract for deceit

          The contract may be declared null and void in case of breach of either article 1112-1 of the French Code civil or article L. 330-3 of the French Code de commerce. In both cases, failure to comply with the obligation to provide information is sanctioned if the applicant demonstrates that his or her consent has been vitiated by error, deceit or violence. In this respect, courts conduct a concrete, case-by-case assessment, taking into account in particular the professional experience and personal due diligence of the distributor: a sophisticated candidate will face greater difficulty in establishing deceit, and his experience in the relevant sector may be sufficient to exonerate the franchisor (Paris Court of Appeal, div. 5 – ch. 11, 26 Apr. 2024, no. 21/13205), even where the information provided was incomplete or inaccurate (Paris Court of Appeal, 20 Jan. 2021, no. 19/03382).

          The path is therefore narrow for the franchisee: he cannot invoke error concerning profitability when it is he who draws up his plan, and even when this plan is drawn up by the franchisor or based on information drawn up and transmitted by the franchisor, the experience of the franchisee who knew the local market may exonerate the franchisor.

          Regarding deceit, Courts strictly assess its two conditions which are:

          • (a material element) the existence of a lie or deceptive reticence (article 1137 French Civil Code), and
          • (an intentional element) the intention to deceive his counterparty (article 1130 French Civil Code).

          Where applicable, the parties must return to the state they were in before the contract.

          Damages

          Although the claims for contract cancellation are subject to very strict conditions, it remains that franchisees/distributors may alternatively obtain damages on the basis of tort liability for non-compliance with the pre-contractual information obligation, subject to proof of fault (incomplete or incorrect information), damage (loss of opportunity of not contracting or contracting on more advantageous terms) and the causal link between the two.

          Javier Gaspar

          Practice areas

          • Distribution
          • Arbitration
          • Franchising
          • Litigation
          • Sport

          Contact Javier





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            Vietnam on the EU Tax Blacklist: A Guide for EU Buyers

            12 May 2026

            • Vietnam
            • Corporate
            • Distribution
            • Tax

            In Spain, a waiver of goodwill indemnity in a distribution agreement does not always protect the manufacturer. The Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal ordered a manufacturer to pay its distributor more than EUR 100,000 in goodwill indemnity and damages for insufficient notice, despite the written waiver, because it held that the agreement had expired and that good faith limited the waiver’s effect. To avoid the same risk, the manufacturer should renew the agreement in writing before it expires or expressly provide that waivers remain effective, specify which customer base the waiver covers and give notice proportionate to the duration of the relationship.

            Summary

            • The distributor’s case and the manufacturer’s liability
            • What the Court of Appeal decided on the waiver
            • Why the waiver was not applied
            • A valid waiver with limits: distribution and agency
            • Whether the waiver should have fallen away with the agreement
            • What manufacturers distributing in Spain should do

            Goodwill indemnity in Spain: the distributor’s case

            For more than twenty years, the manufacturer and distributor worked together without a written agreement. In 2018, they signed a two-year contract. The distributor agreed to waive both goodwill indemnity and damages arising from termination.

            The agreement expired in December 2020. Neither party renewed it, but they continued doing business together.

            Months later, the manufacturer decided to end the relationship. It gave less than two months’ notice and alleged breaches by the distributor that it was unable to prove.

            Waiver of goodwill indemnity: what the Court of Appeal decided

            In a distribution relationship, the distributor can waive goodwill indemnity. In an agency relationship, an advance waiver is not permitted. In this case, however, the Court of Appeal held that the waiver no longer applied because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The court also considered that good faith could limit the waiver’s effect, given the length of the relationship and its termination without good cause.

            The argument based on expiry is debatable: a clause intended to govern the end of an agreement should not lose its effect simply because that agreement ends. To avoid this uncertainty, parties that continue trading after expiry should renew the agreement in writing or expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

            Why was the goodwill indemnity waiver not applied?

            The Court of Appeal relied on two grounds.

            The first was the expiry of the agreement. Since the parties had continued trading without signing a new document, the court held that the waiver was no longer effective when the manufacturer ended the relationship.

            The second was good faith. Even if the waiver still applied, the court considered that it could not take full effect in those circumstances: more than twenty-five years of collaboration, a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause.

            Goodwill indemnity waiver: valid, but with limits

            The judgment is surprising because a distributor can, in principle, waive this indemnity. To understand why, it helps to distinguish distribution from agency.

            In agency relationships, the law protects the agent against an advance waiver. This follows from Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992, read together with the goodwill indemnity provisions in Article 28.

            In distribution relationships, the Spanish Supreme Court applies Article 28 by analogy where its requirements are met (judgment 944/2023 of 13 June). But this does not prevent a manufacturer and distributor from agreeing to exclude all compensation if either party terminates the agreement on notice. The Supreme Court confirmed this in its judgments of 4 December 2007, 15 January 2008, sitting in plenary session, and 25 April 2011.

            The distinction lies in how the relationship ends. That case law concerns ordinary termination, whether on notice or on expiry of the agreed term. A waiver offers less certainty where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice, as happened here.

            Should the waiver have fallen away with the agreement?

            Of the Court of Appeal’s two grounds, the first is the more debatable: that the waiver ceased to apply because the agreement had expired.

            The Spanish Supreme Court has enforced exclusion clauses precisely after an agreement has expired. It did so in its judgment of 23 December 2008. In that case, a dealer’s agreement ended when its extension expired. The court refused goodwill compensation because the agreement itself excluded any claim arising from its termination.

            The point is straightforward: if a clause is agreed to govern what happens when an agreement ends, it is difficult to argue that it loses its effect merely because the agreement ends.

            There is a difference here: the parties continued trading after expiry and, according to the Court of Appeal, did so on the terms that had traditionally governed their relationship. But continuing to trade does not, by itself, show that they intended to set aside a waiver relating to the customer base developed up to that point.

            There is an agency case that might appear to point the other way. The Supreme Court has prevented parties from dividing the indemnity into separate periods through successive declarations that there was “nothing further to claim” (judgment of 27 June 2013). Its reason, however, was the mandatory protection afforded by Article 28 of the Spanish Commercial Agency Act, which the parties cannot exclude. That restriction does not apply to distribution.

            Even if the waiver remained effective, there would still be the question of notice. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss. They compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business and would therefore not necessarily be covered by that waiver.

            What should manufacturers distributing in Spain do?

            Businesses may continue trading as usual and overlook the fact that their agreement has expired. This judgment illustrates the risk: when the time comes to end the relationship, the manufacturer may discover that the protections it relied on are no longer effective.

            The agreement should be renewed in writing before it expires. If the parties have already continued trading without renewal, they should document which terms still apply and expressly provide that waivers remain effective both after expiry and while the relationship continues without a new document.

            It is also important to specify which customer base the waiver covers. If it is intended to include the customer base already built up, this should be stated expressly, with a reference date, a defined territory and confirmation that the waiver is final.

            Finally, goodwill indemnity, damages for insufficient notice and other damages should be addressed separately. When ending the relationship, the manufacturer should give notice proportionate to its duration.

            Frequently asked questions on goodwill indemnity in Spain

            Is a waiver of goodwill indemnity valid in a distribution agreement in Spain?

            In principle, yes: in distribution the distributor can waive the indemnity, whereas in agency the law protects the agent against an advance waiver (Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992). A waiver offers less certainty, however, where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice.

            What happens to the waiver if the agreement expires and the parties keep trading?

            The risk is that it will not be applied. In the case decided by the Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal, the waiver was held to be no longer effective because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The argument is debatable, but to avoid uncertainty the agreement should be renewed in writing or should expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

            Can good faith limit a waiver of goodwill indemnity?

            According to the court, in that case it could: after more than twenty-five years of collaboration, with a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause, the waiver could not take full effect.

            Does the waiver also cover damages for insufficient notice?

            Not necessarily. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss, because they compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business.

            How should the waiver be worded to cover the customer base already built up?

            It must say so expressly: the waiver should state a reference date, a defined territory and that the waiver is final.

            How much notice must the manufacturer give?

            The article does not give a number of days: it says that notice must be proportionate to the duration of the relationship. In the case examined, the manufacturer gave less than two months’ notice after more than twenty-five years of collaboration.

            Abstract: In February 2022, this previous article examined the adoption of Legislative Decree No. 198 of November 8, 2021 (the “Decree”), through which Italy transposed Directive (EU) 2019/633 (the “Directive”) on unfair commercial practices in business-to-business relationships within the agri-food supply chain.

            Four years later, the regulatory framework has evolved and the landscape has changed in part: the Italian legislature has made several amendments to the Decree, the designated enforcement authority has significantly stepped up its activities, and the first court decisions regarding the application of the Decree have been issued.

            This article aims to provide an updated overview.

            The Regulatory Framework: Original Structure and Subsequent Amendments

            The implementation of the Directive provided the Italian legislature with an opportunity to overhaul the pre-existing national regulations governing the agri-food supply chain—in particular those set forth in Article 62 of Decree-Law No. 1/2012. The result is a unified and systematic regulatory framework on the subject, contained in the Decree that entered into force on December 15, 2021.

            For an analysis of the structure and key provisions of the Decree, please refer to the previous article. The fundamental structural choices described in that article remain in effect: the Decree establishes mandatory contractual requirements for operators in the agricultural and food sector, identifies unfair practices that are always prohibited (the so-called “blacklist”) and those prohibited unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties (the so-called “gray list”), regulates below-cost sales (not covered by the Directive), provides for a comprehensive system of penalties to punish any violations, and designates the Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention (ICQRF) as the authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the Decree’s provisions.

            What is of interest here are the legislative amendments that have modified and supplemented the original text of the Decree. As will be seen, these amendments have tightened regulations that were already stricter than European standards at the time of the Decree’s adoption.

            The first amendment was introduced by Decree-Law No. 21/2022, which expanded the definition of perishable products to include meat-based products with specific physicochemical characteristics, and extended the applicability of the 30-day payment terms to the following agricultural and food products:

            “a) prepackaged products bearing an expiration date or a minimum shelf life not exceeding sixty days;

            1. b) bulk products, even if placed in protective packaging or refrigerated, that have not undergone treatments designed to extend their shelf life beyond sixty days;
              c) meat products exhibiting one of the following physicochemical characteristics: awgreater than 0.95 and pH greater than 5.2, or awgreater than 0.91, or pH equal to or greater than 4.5;
            2. d) all types of milk.”

             

            Subsequently, Decree-Law No. 69/2023 expanded the scope of the Decree to include “suppliers established in other Member States or in third countries when the buyer is established in Italy.” Therefore, today, the Decree applies to all business-to-business (B2B) sales contracts in which the supplier and/or the buyer is established in Italy, regardless of the parties’ turnover and the law applicable to the contract. This is an extremely broad scope of application, capable of effectively encompassing any commercial relationship in which at least one of the parties is Italian. This deliberate departure from the differentiated turnover thresholds provided for by the Directive—justified, according to the legislature, by the extraordinary fragmentation of the Italian agri-food supply chain—continues to define the broader scope of the Italian regime compared to the minimum level of harmonization established by the EU.

            Decree-Law No. 69/2023 also amended the minimum notice period for the buyer’s cancellation of orders for perishable products, prohibiting any “notice period so short as to reasonably lead one to believe that the supplier cannot find alternative outlets for its products” and delegating to a subsequent implementing regulation (not yet issued) to establish specific rules governing this matter. Finally, the provision extended to foreign suppliers the right to file complaints with the national enforcement authority (ICQRF).

            The most recent amendment to the Decree was introduced by Decree-Law No. 63/2024, which

            • added the provision that the supply price must take into account the cost of production
            • specified that wholesale markets also fall within the scope of the Decree
            • included, among the documents that the ICQRF may obtain, accounting documents relating to sales activities and related services, and
            • introduced the possibility of paying any penalties imposed under the Decree at a reduced rate, provided the contractor demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to mitigate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

             

            The cumulative effect of the amendments outlined above is the establishment of regulations that are even stricter than those that took effect in December 2021 (which were already significantly more restrictive than the Directive).

            Mandatory Contractual Requirements: Persistent Compliance Challenges

            Article 3 of the Decree imposes several mandatory requirements for contracts for the sale of agricultural and food products: written form, a minimum term of 12 months, specification of the product’s quantity and characteristics, a fixed or determinable price that reflects production costs, and definition of the terms of delivery and payment.

            However, the legislature’s intention to establish a system that safeguards the contractual rights of the parties has clashed with the reality of commercial transactions in this sector. In fact, experience has shown that these contractual requirements remain the primary source of difficulty for operators in complying with the Decree. It is therefore not surprising that many of the objections raised by the ICQRF over the years have concerned precisely this aspect.

            The written form requirement is particularly critical: a significant percentage of operators, especially in sectors characterized by long-standing informal commercial relationships (the prime example being the wine sector), continue to conclude transactions without an adequate written framework agreement, relying instead on commercial customs and verbal agreements that the Decree does not recognize as sufficient. It is no coincidence that the reports issued by the ICQRF in recent years list the failure to enter into written contracts prior to the delivery of the products sold   among the most frequent violations found.

            Another aspect that is frequently penalized is the unilateral modification of prices: in several cases, buyers have attempted to adjust agreed-upon prices without the supplier’s written consent—a practice that the Decree expressly prohibits and that has been the subject of the first judicial decisions issued on the matter (which will be discussed in paragraph 6).

            Italian Specifics: Additional Prohibited Practices and Below-Cost Sales

            In addition to the “black list” and “gray list” of unfair practices prohibited by the Directive, Article 5 of the Decree identifies and prohibits 16 additional unfair practices, which stem from the pre-existing Italian regulatory framework. These include, for example, the purchase of agricultural and food products through double-reduction electronic tenders and auctions, the application of objectively different conditions for equivalent services, and the obtaining of undue unilateral benefits not justified by the nature or content of the commercial relationship.

            An interesting feature of the Italian list is its explicitly bilateral nature: unlike the Directive, which was designed to protect suppliers from potential abuses by larger and more powerful buyers, Article 5 of the Decree prohibits various unfair practices that also apply to suppliers, including the imposition of an unduly short expiration date, the forced maintenance of a specific product range, and the requirement to reserve a privileged shelf position for certain products. The Decree, therefore, also protects—in certain cases—buyers.

            Another distinctive feature of Italian law (and that of a few other countries in the European Union—Spain, Croatia, and Hungary) is the regulation of below-cost sales, which is not covered by the Directive.

            Under Article 7 of the Decree, sales below production cost are permitted only in two circumstances:

            • when perishable products are at risk of spoilage, or
            • if the commercial transaction has been planned and agreed upon in writing with the supplier. In all other cases, the price of the product sold below cost is automatically adjusted.

            It should be noted that the replacement criteria specified by the legislature (purchase invoices, average production costs, average product price) are unclear and have been subject to various interpretations.

            The penalties for violating the ban on below-cost sales are severe: administrative fines ranging from 1 to 6 million euros and suspension of business operations for up to 20 days in cases of repeat offenses or particularly serious violations.

            In any case, selling below cost is not merely a national issue; in fact, in its report dated December 1, 2025, on the evaluation of the Directive, the Commission indicated that it will propose a revision of the Directive to establish the principle that farmers should not be forced to systematically sell their products below production costs. We can therefore expect changes to the European regulations governing this issue.

            The Penalty System

            The Decree contains a comprehensive system of penalties, calibrated according to the nature and severity of the violation.

            Failure to comply with the provisions of the Decree results, depending on the case, in three types of consequences, which may apply cumulatively:

            1. Invalidity of the offending contractual clause, which is automatically replaced where the Decree so provides: for example, a term of less than 12 months is extended to that minimum period; a price below the cost of production is adjusted upward.
            2. Monetary penalties: fines ranging from a fixed minimum of between 1,000 and 30,000 euros, depending on the obligation violated, to a maximum varying from 3% to 5% of the annual revenue of the party responsible for the violation, which may be increased up to two or three times in the event of repeated violations, with an overall maximum limit of 10% of revenue. With specific regard to unfair practices, Article 10 of the Decree provides that those included on the “blacklist” are subject to administrative penalties ranging from 30,000 euros to 5% of the previous year’s revenue; those included on the “gray list” are subject to fines ranging from 15,000 euros to 3% of revenue; other practices prohibited under Article 5 are subject to penalties ranging from 5,000 euros to 4% of revenue.
            3. Compensation for Damages: Injured parties and their representative organizations may, in any case, file claims for compensation for damages (all of which must be proven).

             

            As previously mentioned, starting in 2024, an operator subject to a monetary penalty may, within a strict deadline of thirty days from the notification of the injunction order, pay the penalty at a 50% reduction if the operator demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to eliminate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

            Enforcement of the Regulations: The Expanding Role of the ICQRF

            Four years after its designation as the competent supervisory authority in Italy pursuant to the Decree, the ICQRF (Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention) has become one of the most active supervisory bodies in the European Union in this sector. Working in coordination with the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Agri-Food Products, it conducts inspections both in response to reports and on its own initiative.

            The gradual intensification of this agency’s activities is remarkable. In 2022, the ICQRF conducted 139 inspections. By 2025, that number had risen to 3,536. Inspections resulting from complaints are—in fact—extremely rare, while the majority of inspections are carried out on the agency’s own initiative. Operators’ reluctance to file complaints—a phenomenon common across all EU member states and largely attributable to fears of commercial retaliation by stronger business partners—has made proactive enforcement the primary mechanism in practice.

            The most recent ICQRF reports confirm a significant upward trend in the volume of inspections, the number of operators investigated (76 in 2022 versus 1,430 in 2025), and the number of violations detected (15 in 2022, 562 in 2025). The sectors subject to the most frequent inspections are dairy products and fruits and vegetables, both characterized by large, structurally powerful buyers and a highly fragmented supplier base.

            The most commonly found violations include unilateral changes to contractual terms by the buyer, failure to comply with mandatory payment terms, and the absence of written sales contracts.

            Case Law on Unfair Practices in the Agri-Food Supply Chain

            The intensification of inspections and the issuance of injunctions against operators has, as was to be expected, led to the first disputes and, consequently, to the first court decisions regarding the Decree.

            Following appeals filed by certain operators in the dairy sector against administrative sanctions imposed for unilaterally modifying the agreed-upon price of milk, several trial courts (specifically the Court of Brescia and the Milan Court of Appeals) have confirmed that any price modification requires the written consent of all contracting parties. This is consistent with the text of the Decree, which prohibits unilateral changes to agreed-upon contractual terms and requires that agreements between the parties be in writing.

            In Judgment No. 1225 of April 29, 2025, published on June 12, 2025, the Milan Court of Appeals ruled that a letter revising the criteria for calculating the price—sent by the buyer to the supplier, not preceded by negotiations between the parties, and not signed by the supplier to indicate acceptance—constitutes a unilateral modification of the contractual terms relating to the price, which is punishable under Article 4(d) of the Decree. In fact, it cannot be considered a written agreement (since it is signed by only one party). It is true that Article 3 of the Decree provides for the possibility of fulfilling the written form requirement through “equivalent forms,” but this is conditional on the fundamental contractual elements (including the price) having been previously agreed upon between the buyer and the supplier through a framework agreement.

            Therefore, it is irrelevant that, in the present case, the supplier, by continuing to make deliveries, behaved in a manner that could be construed as tacit acceptance of the amendment, given that price agreements cannot be established through “equivalent forms.”

            The body of case law remains limited, so it is premature to draw definitive conclusions about the direction of case law in this area.

            However, there is no doubt that the operational boundaries of the penalty regime are gradually being defined and the interpretive limits of the Decree’s provisions are being clarified.

            Conclusion

            The Italian regulatory framework governing unfair commercial practices in the agricultural and food supply chain has, in the more than four years since its entry into force, moved from theory to practical application.

            The basic framework described in the previous article has been supplemented by subsequent legislative amendments, and enforcement of the regulations is overseen by a regulatory authority that has demonstrated both the will and the capacity to act. The proactive approach of the ICQRF, which is increasingly active in its role as an enforcement authority, leaves no doubt that compliance with the Decree is a practical imperative, not merely a theoretical one.

            For operators active in the Italian agri-food supply chain—whether they are suppliers, buyers, or intermediaries—the priorities are clear:

            • contracts must be in writing and comply with the mandatory requirements set forth in the Decree
            • business practices must be reviewed to verify their compliance with the law and ensure they do not fall under the list of prohibited practices, and
            • Business processes must ensure that each operator adheres to good commercial practices in its dealings with its partners and other operators in the supply chain.

            France regulates unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain more strictly than Directive (EU) 2019/633 requires. Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 30 June 2021 transposed the Directive into a framework already built by the Egalim laws, and France chose not to apply the turnover thresholds set out in the Directive: the rules therefore cover all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, whatever the size or nationality of the parties. Written annual agreements signed before 1 March, automatic price revision clauses, capped payment terms and administrative fines reaching €2 million, doubled for repeat infringements, are the core of the regime, enforced by the DGCCRF.

            Summary

            1. Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when
            2. Products covered by the French rules
            3. Scope of the French rules compared with the Directive
            4. Suppliers and buyers covered, regardless of size and nationality
            5. Applicable law and jurisdiction in international supply contracts
            6. Where French law goes further than the Directive
            7. Mandatory content of an agri-food supply agreement
            8. Penalties for breaching the contractual requirements
            9. Unfair practices prohibited beyond the Directive
            10. Penalties for unfair commercial practices
            11. The DGCCRF and its enforcement powers
            12. Findings of the latest DGCCRF report

            Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when?

            Directive (EU) 2019/633 was transposed into French law by Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 2021, June 30th, whose provisions entered into force on July 1, 2021 and apply to contracts concluded as from November 1, 2021. Contracts concluded before that date were granted a 12-month period, starting on July 1, 2021, to comply with these provisions.

            This transposition forms part of an already well-established legislative framework shaped by « Egalim I » Law No. 2018-938 of October 30, 2018; « Egalim II » Law No. 2021-1357 of October 18, 2021 and « Egalim III » Law No. 2023-1041 of November 17, 2023, which strengthen contractual relations and the protection of agricultural producers. Even prior to the transposition of the Directive, French law had already refocused the rules on restrictive business practices around the following unlawful practices:

            • A significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
            • the granting of an advantage without consideration; and
            • The sudden termination of established business relationships.

             

            The Ordinance of June 30, 2021 transposed those provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/633 that did not fall within this existing framework, specifically introducing three new restrictive practices applicable to agricultural and food products into the French Commercial Code  (Com.C):

            • The cancellation of an order for perishable products at short notice (Article L. 443-5 of the Com.C);
            • The unlawful obtaining, use, or disclosure of the supplier’s trade secrets (Article L. 443-6 of the Com.C);
            • The refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a supply agreement where the supplier has requested such confirmation (Article L. 443-7 of the Com.C).

             

            This framework has been strengthened by Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026 on emergency measures for agricultural protection and sovereignty (the “2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law”), most of whose relevant provisions entered into force on 20 August 2026. The 2026 law notably amends agricultural contracting rules, food-sector price revision mechanisms and certain restrictive trade practices.

            Which agri-food products are covered by the French rules?

            Directive 2019/633 applies to the sale of “agricultural and food products”, defined in Article 2 as “the products listed in Annex I to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as products not listed in that Annex but processed for use as food for human consumption by using products listed in that Annex”, subject to the annual turnover thresholds of suppliers and buyers set out in Article 1§2.

            Is the scope of the French rules broader than the Directive?

            In France, the scope of the provisions transposing the Directive is the same as that of EU law, as they apply to agricultural and food products.

            However, certain French provisions in this area have a broader scope of application. Many provisions of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code apply to commercial relationships relating to “production, distribution or service activities” (in particular restrictive practices – Article L. 442-1 Com.C). Some of these provisions apply to fast-moving consumer goods, defined in Article L. 441-4 of the French Commercial Code as “non-durable products with a high frequency and recurrence of consumption”, the list of which is set by decree, as well as to food products.

            Which suppliers and buyers are covered, and does their size matter?

            France chose not to introduce the supplier and buyer turnover thresholds provided for in Directive 2019/633. As a result, the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers.

            Which law applies to an international agri-food supply contract?

            French law does not provide for specific conflict-of-law rules applicable to supply contracts in the agri-food sector. At first glance, international contracts for the supply of agri-food products are therefore governed by the general conflict-of-law rules applicable in France.

            Choice of law under Rome I and the 1955 Hague Convention

            These general rules are laid down by Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, known as the Rome I Regulation. Rome I establishes as a general principle that the parties are free to choose the law applicable to an international contract, either expressly or implicitly. In the absence of an express choice, the applicable law depends on the legal characterization of the supply contract.

            A distinction must therefore be made depending on the nature of the supply contract. If the French court characterizes the contract as a contract for the sale of goods, it may apply either the Rome I Regulation or, more likely, the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international sales of tangible movable goods. In both cases, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the seller is established. If the supply contract is characterized as a processing or bespoke supply contract, particularly where it is based on detailed specifications, the French court would apply the Rome I Regulation and may consider such a contract to constitute a service contract rather than a sale contract. In that case, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the service provider is established.

            Article L. 444-1.A and the limits of overriding mandatory rules

            In addition, it its worthwhile looking at Article L. 444-1.A of the French Commercial Code which states

            “The provisions of Chapters I, II and III of this Title apply to any agreement between a supplier and a buyer relating to products or services marketed on French territory. These provisions are matters of public policy. Any dispute relating to their application falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts, subject to compliance with European Union law and international treaties ratified or approved by France and without prejudice to recourse to arbitration.”

            At first glance, this provision pretends to bring all commercial contracts within the scope of French law where the products or services are marketed in France, like an overriding mandatory rule (OMR). However, this approach appears ambiguous, unjustified and at the end ineffective.

            First, restrictive trade practices (RTP) do not constitute OMR within the meaning of the Rome I Regulation. Article L. 444-1.A does not expressly refer to the terms overriding mandatory rules and just merely recalls the domestic public policy nature of the relevant provisions.

            Second, French case law has repeatedly refused to qualify RTP as OMR, with the exception of enforcement actions brought by the French Ministry of Economy and Finance against third party imposing to their counterpart blatant imbalance clauses.

            Third, the general characterization of the provisions of Title IV of the French Commercial Code as OMR does not satisfy the test of sufficient connection and imperative necessity as defined by the ECJ in its ruling of 5 September 2024 (Huk-Coburg-Allgemeine Versicherung, Case C-86/23).

            Exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts and its exceptions

            With respect to jurisdiction, Article L. 444-1.A wants to create an exclusive jurisdiction of French courts for commercial matters such as RTP. However, it provides clear and wide exceptions based on compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction matters and with arbitration rules.

            In practice, any jurisdiction clause (subject to the exception here after) or arbitration clause stipulated in an international contract must be upheld by French courts, which must therefore decline jurisdiction. Only in very limited circumstances may French courts assert this exclusive jurisdiction rule, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has not entered into any relevant multilateral or bilateral convention with France (such as Lugano Convention, The Hague conventions…).

            Are the French rules stricter than Directive (EU) 2019/633?

            French commercial law is stricter than the rules laid down by Directive 2019/633, for several reasons:

            • A broader scope of application:
            • No thresholds limit the application of these provisions; as a result, all economic operators are covered, regardless of their size or turnover;
            • While certain provisions are specific to food products, there is also a common framework applicable to all products without distinction, as well as a specific regulatory regime for fast-moving consumer goods (see Question 3).
            • Prior to the transposition of the Directive, France already had a legislative framework in place in this area (the Egalim laws), which it continued to develop after the entry into force of the ordinance transposing the European Directive; this is why the ordinance transposed only four new restrictive trade practices, rather than the entire list set out in the Directive.
            • French law provides for strict regulation governing commercial negotiations, particularly in the large-scale retail sector. The 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law further strengthens this framework by introducing tighter rules on agricultural contract negotiations, reference production-cost indicators, automatic price revision mechanisms in the food sector, repeated tendering procedures and substantial reductions in order volumes during negotiations.

            What must a valid agri-food supply agreement contain in France?

            Chapter I of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code, entitled “Transparency in commercial relationships”, imposes numerous requirements governing the negotiation and performance of commercial agreements:

            The seller’s terms and conditions of sale

            The seller’s pricing policy: the seller must provide any buyer who so requests with its terms and conditions of sale, which must include, at a minimum, the conditions of sale, payment terms, the price list, and the schedule of price reductions (discounts, immediate rebates, deferred rebates, and “free” products) (Article L. 441-1 of the Com.C).

            These terms and conditions may be general (applicable to all customers), category-based (applicable to a category of customers, such as wholesalers, provided that the classification is based on objective identification criteria), or specific and individually negotiated (supplementing or derogating from the general or category-based terms and conditions of sale).

            In this respect, specific provisions apply to food products and products intended for pet food (Article L. 441-1-1 of the French Commercial Code), as well as to wholesalers (Article L. 441-1-2 of the French Commercial Code).

            Since 20 August 2026, Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C. also allows the supplier’s terms and conditions of sale for food products and pet food to include an automatic formula revising the unit-price list in line with upward or downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials used in the product.

            The buyer’s commercial cooperation services

            La politique de coopération commerciale de l’acheteur: L’acheteur, quant à lui, propose et négocie avec le fournisseur des services rendus par lui et qui bénéficient, directement ou indirectement, au fournisseur (Art. L. 441-3 C.com.):

            • Commercial cooperation services: these are services provided in connection with the resale of products or services to consumers, or with a view to their resale to professionals, which are intended to promote the marketing of the supplier’s products and are separable from the act of sale.
            • Other services: “other obligations intended to promote the commercial relationship between the supplier and the distributor or service provider” (L. 441-3, III. 3° Com. C).
            • Promotional benefits: Direct allocation of discounts («remise») to consumers by the distributor acting under a mandate from the supplier for fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

            The written annual agreement and the 31 January or 1 March deadlines

            Formalisation of the negotiation: a written agreement must be entered into, before 1 March of each year, between the supplier and the distributor or service provider, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements.

            As an experimental rule until 31 December 2029, where the supplier is a legal entity with worldwide annual turnover (excluding tax) below €350 million in the last closed financial year, the statutory 1st of March date referred to in Articles L. 441-3, L. 441-4, L. 441-6 and L. 443-8 Com. C. is replaced by 31th of January. In the same situations, the three-month periods referred to in Article L. 441-4 VI and Article L. 443-8 V(B) Com. C. are reduced to two months.

            Law No. 2026-796 introduces also two experiments: Until 15 April 2029 for agreements governed by Article L. 443-8 Com. C., and until 15 April 2028 for agreements governed by Article L. 441-4 Com. C., where the annual agreement has not been concluded by 1st of March (or within two months from the beginning of a special marketing cycle), the supplier may, if no new contract has been formed, terminate the commercial relationship without the distributor being able to rely on the rules on sudden termination under Article L. 442-1 II Com.C., or request application of a notice period compliant with that provision.

            Negotiation timetable for producer/first-buyer of agro-food contracts: under Article L. 631-24II bis of the French Rural and Maritime Fishing code (“CRPM”), the written contract or framework agreement must be concluded within four months after the prospective buyer receives the producer’s written proposal (this period may be extended by an extended interprofessional agreement, up to six months). If no agreement is reached, one of the parties must refer the matter to the Agricultural Commercial Relations Mediator within 15 days. If mediation fails and both parties still intend to establish or continue the relationship, the Agricultural Commercial Disputes Settlement Committee must be seized within a further 15 days; where applicable, the contract must then be concluded within two months after the parties receive the Committee’s decision

            It must set out (Art. L. 441-3 Com.C.):

            • The terms and conditions of the sale of products or the provision of services (including price reductions) and, where applicable, the types of situations in which and the modalities according to which general sales conditions (GSCs) may apply.
            • Commercial cooperation services
            • Other obligations
            • Any service or obligation arising from an agreement entered into with a legal entity located outside French territory with which the distributor is directly or indirectly affiliated

             

            It being specified that the mandatory contents of the written agreement vary depending on its scope of application, namely whether the agreement is entered into with wholesalers, relates to fast-moving consumer goods, or concerns agricultural products (Art. L. 441-7 and L. 441-8 Com.C).

            Stricter rules for agricultural products: duration, price revision, renegotiation

            More specifically, with respect to agricultural products, French law is all the more protective as regards the formalisation of negotiations and provides for even stricter obligations:

            • Clause relating to the duration of the contract: under Article L. 631-24 VI CRPM, the minimum duration of a contract between a producer and a first buyer is three years, except for products subject to excise duties and for grapes, must and the wines produced from them. Unless otherwise agreed, contracts are renewable by tacit renewal for an equivalent period; where the buyer gives notice of non-renewal, the notice period may not be less than three months. The producer may expressly waive the statutory minimum durations in writing, in accordance with Articles 148 and 168 of Regulation (EU) No. 1308/2013. A contract or framework agreement lasting less than three years may omit an automatic upward/downward revision clause for a fixed price.
            • Clauses relating to price determination mechanismsi and revision: Article L. 631-24 III CRPM requires the contract or framework agreement to contain the price and its automatic upward/downward revision mechanism, or the criteria and methods used to determine the price, including the weighting of the relevant indicators. The producer’s proposal must take account of one or more indicators relating to relevant agricultural production costs and their evolution. The parties must refer in the final contract or framework agreement to the reference indicators published by the competent interprofessional organisation (or, failing publication, by the relevant agricultural technical institutes), unless they expressly choose other agricultural production-cost indicators and state the reasons for that choice. Clauses whose purpose or effect is automatically to renegotiate or change the price so as to align it with a more favourable price practised by a competing buyer, producer, producer organisation or association of producer organisations are deemed unwritten.

             

            For food products and pet food subject to Article L. 443-8 Com.C., the annual written agreement must contain an automatic formula revising the unit-price list according to upward and downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials. If the supplier’s terms and conditions contain the formula permitted by Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C., the annual agreement must reproduce that formula and it is not negotiable. Price changes resulting from its application must be implemented no later than one month after activation. A distributor may object only where objective economic data show that the link drawn by the supplier between raw-material cost changes and the impact on its price list is manifestly erroneous.

            Lastly, specific provisions apply to contracts entered into between a supplier and a distributor “relating to the design and production of food products in accordance with specifications meeting the buyer’s specific needs and marketed under a private label”, as set out in Article L. 441-7 of the French Commercial Code.

            Invoicing and payment terms for food products and beverages

            Invoicing and payment terms: any purchase and sale transaction must give rise to an invoice, issued upon completion of the transaction and containing a number of mandatory particulars. In addition, the Commercial Code provides for a default payment period of 30 days, with a maximum payment period of 60 days or 45 days end of month, and sets out late payment penalties and a fixed recovery fee in the event of late payment (Art. L. 441-9 and L. 441-10 Com.C)

            In addition, the legislator has introduced specific payment deadlines for food products and beverages (Art. L. 441-11 Com.C):

            • Perishable agricultural products, perishable food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals: 30 days from delivery. In the case of periodic billing:30 days after the end of the ten-day period;
            • For seasonal fruits and vegetables: 30 days from the end of the month of delivery;
            • Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption: 20 days from the date of delivery;
            • Alcoholic beverages subject to excise duty (e.g., Armagnac, Cognac, brandy, gin, rum, vodka): 30 days from the end of the month of delivery. For wine and other non-sparkling fermented beverages covered by Article L. 665-3 CRPM, the first buyer must, in principle, pay the seller (or its subrogee) an advance of at least 15% of the order amount within ten clear days after conclusion of the sale contract. Since 20 August 2026, interprofessional bodies may provide a derogation from this advance-payment obligation only in the context of multiannual contracts.
            • Non-perishable agricultural and food products: If the invoice is issued by the supplier: 60 days from the date of issue of the invoice; and If the invoice is issued by the buyer: 60 days from the date of preparation of the invoice.

             

            Logistics penalties

            Logistics penalites: lastly, the French Commercial Code strictly regulates specific contractual sanctions known as “logistics penalties”, relating to the supplier’s failure to comply with its delivery, conformity, or timing obligations (Art. L. 441-17 Com.C).

            What are the penalties for breaching the contractual requirements?

            In the event of a breach of contractual requirements, several sanctions may apply:

            • Seller’s pricing policy: an administrative fine not exceeding €15,000 for a natural person and €75,000 for a legal entity ( L. 441-1 Com.C).

            For food products and products intended for pet food, the administrative fine may not exceed €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, and the maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 443-8 Com.C). The new information requirements attached to an optional automatic price-revision formula in the supplier’s terms and conditions (Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C.) are also backed by the administrative sanction provided in Article L. 443-8 Com.C. More generally, any breach of Article L. 443-8 I to VI is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum doubled for a repeated infringement within two years.

            • Buyer’s commercial cooperation policy and formalisation of negotiations: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-6 Com.C).

            Failure to comply with the March 1st deadline provided for in Article L. 441-3(IV) is punishable by an administrative fine not exceeding €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity. In the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final, the maximum fine is increased to €400,000 for a natural person and €2,000,000 for a legal entity. For suppliers falling within the temporary €350 million turnover experiment introduced by the 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law, references to the 1 March deadline must be read as 31 January for the duration of the experiment (until 31 December 2029).

            • Absence of a price revision clause in the agricultural sector: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-7 C)
            • Absence of a renegotiation clause: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-8 Com.C)).
            • Failure to comply with payment deadlines, absence of mandatory information required under the terms of payment, setting of non-compliant rates or conditions for late payment penalties, and failure to comply with the terms of calculation of payment deadlines agreed between the parties: administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €2 million for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €4 million for a legal entity in the event of a repeat offense within two years of the date on which the first penalty decision became final ( L. 441-16 Com.C).

             

            Which unfair practices does French law prohibit beyond the Directive?

            In addition to the contractual obligations described above, aimed at preventing abuses and unfair commercial practices between businesses, Articles L. 442-1 to L. 442-12 of the French Commercial Code set out a list of «unfair commercial practices between undertakings» (« pratiques commerciales déloyales entre entreprises »), including:

            • Obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage without consideration or manifestly disproportionate to the consideration provided (Art. L. 442-1(I) Com.C);
            • Subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations creating a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
            • Subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or operating conditions are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.);
            • imposing logistics penalties in breach of Article 441-17 (Art. L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
            • Applying or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, or sales or purchase conditions not justified by real consideration set out in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
            • Failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, leading to the failure to conclude a contract within the deadline set out in Article L. 441-3 ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
            • Abruptly terminating, even partially, an established commercial relationship without sufficient written notice, taking into account the duration of the relationship and industry practices or interprofessional agreements ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
            • Implementing, during contract negotiations, a substantial reduction in the volume of orders placed with an established commercial partner, even temporarily, where the scale, unusual nature or circumstances of the reduction are such as to jeopardise the balance of the established commercial relationship ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
            • For operators providing online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations laid down therein, other clauses and practices remaining governed by Title IV of Book IV ( L. 442-1, III Com.C.);
            • Directly or indirectly participating in a breach of the prohibition on out-of-network resale imposed on a distributor bound by an exempt selective or exclusive distribution agreement ( L. 442-2 Com. C);
            • Clauses deemed null and void, including retroactive rebates, discounts or commercial cooperation benefits, automatic granting of more favourable terms granted to competing undertakings, or prohibitions on assigning receivables ( L. 442-3 Com.C);
            • Resale at a loss or announcement of resale at a loss ( L. 442-5 Com.C.);
            • Imposing a minimum resale price on a distributor ( L. 442-6 Com.C.);
            • For buyers of agricultural or food products, imposing an abnormally low purchase price on suppliers ( L. 442-7 Com.C);
            • Regulation of remote reverse auctions ( L. 442-8 Com.C.);
            • Artificially increasing or decreasing prices, particularly in remote auctions, through false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or any other fraudulent means ( L. 442-9 Com.C);
            • Associations or cooperatives offering products for sale or providing services not provided for in their bylaws( L. 442-10 Com.C.);
            • Use of public property belonging to the State, local authorities or public bodies to sell products or provide services under irregular conditions ( L. 442-11 Com.C);
            • For cloud computing service providers, granting unlimited cloud credits or making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the conclusion of such an agreement ( L. 442-12 Com.C.).

             

            What are the penalties for unfair commercial practices in France?

            General sanctions regime under Article L. 442-4

            The unfair commercial practices listed below are subject to the same sanction’s regime, as provided for in Article L. 442-4 of the French Commercial Code. The practices concerned are the following:

            • L. 442-1, I, 1° Com.C: obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage that does not correspond to any consideration or is clearly disproportionate to the consideration given;
            • L. 442-1, I, 2° Com.C: subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations that create a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
            • L. 442-1, I, 3° Com.C: imposing logistical penalties in violation of Article L. 441-17;
            • L. 442-1, I, 4° Com.C: practicing or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, conditions, or terms of sale or purchase that are not justified by actual considerations provided for in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage;
            • L. 442-1, I, 5° Com.C: failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, resulting in the contract not being concluded within the deadline specified in Article L. 441-3;
            • L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.: subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or modalities are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations;
            • L. 442-1, II Com.C.: implementing a substantial reduction in order volumes during contract negotiations, including temporarily, where its scale, unusual nature or the circumstances are liable to jeopardise the balance of an established commercial relationship;
            • L. 442-1, III Com.C: for operators offering online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations set out in this text; other clauses or practices remain governed by Title IV of Book IV;
            • Art L. 442-2 C: participating directly or indirectly in the violation of the prohibition on resale outside the network imposed on distributors bound by a selective or exclusive distribution agreement exempted under competition law;
            • Art L. 442-3 C: using clauses or contracts allowing the producer to benefit from retroactive benefit of discounts (“remises”), rebates (“rabais”), or commercial cooperation; the automatic granting of more favorable terms to competing companies; prohibition on assigning claims against the other party to third parties;
            • L. 442-7 Com.C: for a buyer of agricultural products or foodstuffs, imposing an abusively low selling price on its supplier;
            • Article L. 442-8 C: regulation of remote reverse auctions.

            For all these practices:

            • the victim of such practices may have the illegal clauses or contracts declared null and void and request the restitution of undue benefits;

            the French Minister for the Economy or the Public Prosecutor may request the court to:

            • order the cessation of the practices;
            • declare illegal clauses or contracts null and void and obtain restitution of undue benefits;

            request the imposition of a civil fine, the amount of which may not exceed:

            • five million euros;
            • three times the amount of the benefits unduly received or obtained;
            • or 5% of the turnover excluding tax generated in France by the perpetrator of the practices during the last financial year ended preceding the financial year in which the practices were implemented.

            The court shall systematically order the publication, dissemination, or posting of its decision or an extract thereof, in accordance with the terms and conditions it specifies.

            Practices subject to specific sanctions

            • L. 442-5 Com.C: resale at a loss or the announcement of resale at a loss is punishable by a fine not exceeding 0.4% of the annual turnover excluding VAT generated in France during the last closed financial year (Art. L. 442-5, I Com.C);
            • L. 442-6 Com.C: imposition of a minimum resale price on the distributor is punishable by a maximum fine of €75,000 for legal entities;
            • L. 442-9 Com.C: causing an artificial increase or decrease in prices, in particular in remote auctions, by disseminating false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or by any other fraudulent means, is punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €225,000 for food products. Additional penalties may also apply;
            • L. 442-11 Com.C: using public property belonging to the State, local authorities or their public bodies to offer products for sale or to provide services under irregular condition is punishable by seizure on the premises, for a period not exceeding one month, of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services. It may also give rise to the confiscation of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services, and to an order to pay the Public Treasury an amount corresponding to the value of the seized products;
            • L. 442-12 Com.C: for a cloud computing service provider, granting unlimited cloud computing credits credits to a person engaged in production, distribution or service activities and making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the simultaneous conclusion of such an agreement constitutes an unfair commercial practice punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €1,500,000 (Article L. 132-2 of the French Consumer Code: sanctions for misleading commercial practices – « sanction despratiques commerciales trompeuses»).

             

            Which authority enforces the rules, and what powers does it have?

            The national authority responsible for enforcement is the administrative authority in charge of competition and consumer affairs: the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF). The DGCCRF has investigative powers (Article L. 450-1 of the French Commercial Code), may issue injunctions (Article L. 470-1 of the French Commercial Code), and imposes administrative fines and sanctions for breaches of Title IV of Book IV and for non-compliance with injunctions (Article L. 470-2 of the French Commercial Code).

            What did the DGCCRF’s latest enforcement report find?

            According to the last DGCCRF’s 2024 report, DGCCRF «inspected 186 establishments in the dairy, cattle, pork, poultry and egg sectors in order to verify compliance with the mandatory written contractualisation between producers and their first buyers. ». The report further states that «the regulation of commercial relations and negotiations is likely to give rise to a new Egalim law, following the publication of several parliamentary reports. »In this respect, a parliamentary report on the application of the so-called «Egalim 38» law was submitted on 13 March 2024. The legislative development anticipated in that report has since materialised in Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026, which substantially amended agricultural contractualisation and food-sector commercial negotiation rules with effect, for most of the relevant provisions, from 20 August 2026.

            ***

            Frequently asked questions on unfair trading practices in France

            Does French law apply if my company is not established in France?

            Yes, as regards the substantive rules. France did not adopt the turnover thresholds of Directive 2019/633, so the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers. Whether a French court will hear a dispute is a separate question.

            Can we choose a law other than French law in an agri-food supply contract?

            In principle yes. French law contains no specific conflict-of-law rules for agri-food supply contracts, so the choice is governed by the Rome I Regulation, under which the parties are free to choose the applicable law. Article L. 444-1.A of the Commercial Code appears to claim French law for products marketed in France, but French case law has repeatedly refused to treat restrictive trade practices as overriding mandatory rules.

            Will a jurisdiction or arbitration clause be upheld by the French courts?

            In practice yes. Article L. 444-1.A expressly reserves compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction and with arbitration. French courts may assert the exclusive jurisdiction rule only in very limited circumstances, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has entered into no relevant convention with France.

            What is the payment deadline for perishable food products in France?

            Thirty days from delivery for perishable agricultural and food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals. Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption must be paid within 20 days of delivery, seasonal fruit and vegetables within 30 days of the end of the month of delivery, and non-perishable agricultural and food products within 60 days (Article L. 441-11 of the Commercial Code).

            By what date must the annual agreement with a distributor be signed?

            Before 1 March or 31 January (when supplier’s turnover is less than €350 million) of each year, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements. Missing that deadline is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity, doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years.

            Must a contract with an agricultural producer include a price revision clause?

            Yes. The contract between a producer and its first buyer must provide for automatic upward and downward price revision mechanisms, based in particular on indicators relating to agricultural production costs and to changes in those costs. The absence of such a clause is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity.

            How long must a supply contract with an agricultural producer last?

            At least three years, and the contract must include a clause to that effect. The term may be extended up to a maximum of five years where an interprofessional agreement so provides (Article L. 631-24, III, 5° of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code).

            After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

            A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

            The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

            From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

            This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

            Why wine matters in this agreement

            The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

            1. tariff liberalisation;
            2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
            3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
            4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

            This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

            At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

            Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

            Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

            Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

            For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

            1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
            2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
            3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

            The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

            Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

            More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

            Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

            The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) and “Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

            This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

            For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

            Geographical indications: protection and tension

            One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

            The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

            From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

            1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
            2. transition periods for local operators;
            3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

            This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

            Services, distribution, and market structure

            Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

            Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

            The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

            1. logistics providers
            2. distribution networks
            3. commercial representation
            4. marketing and advertising agencies

            For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

            Legal advisors will need to consider:

            1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
            2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
            3. compliance with competition rules

            The implementation gap: where risk lies

            Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

            Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

            This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

            For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

            1. managing client expectations
            2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
            3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

            What should lawyers be doing now?

            Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

            Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

            1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
            2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
            3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
            4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

            In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

            Final sip

            The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

            Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

            At major events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, some companies attempt to “wildly” associate their brand or image with the event through a practice known as “ambush marketing” , defined by French courts as “an advertising strategy implemented by a company in order to associate its commercial image with that of an event and thereby benefit from the media impact of that event without paying the relevant fees and without having obtained the prior authorisation of the event organiser” (Paris Court of Appeal, 2nd chamber, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912). A risky and unlawful practice, but one that is sometimes conceivable.

            Key points

            • Ambush marketing is a practice that may give rise to sanctions but is not prohibited as such.
            • In return for their investments in the competition, FIFA’s official sponsors and partners enjoy very strong legal protection, through various general instruments (infringement, free-riding/parasitism, intellectual property) and more specific ones (sports law), against all forms of ambush marketing.
            • The FIFA World Cup benefits from enhanced protection based on an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide and on FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines, in the absence of specific French legislation comparable to that enacted for the Olympic Games.
            • However, these rights are not absolute, and there remain narrow opportunities for a (clever) form of ambush marketing.

            Protection of official World Cup sponsors and partners against ambush marketing

            Reaching nearly 5 billion people across all platforms during its last edition in Qatar in 2022, including more than 1.5 billion viewers for the final alone, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is the most-watched sporting event on the planet. Hosted for the first time by three countries (Canada, Mexico and the United States), it brings together 48 teams and more than 1,200 players for 104 matches across 16 stadiums. Its organisation is largely financed by various official partners, sponsors and rights holders, who in return receive the exclusive right to use FIFA’s official trademarks and intellectual property so as to associate their own image and distinctive signs with the competition.

            Ambush marketing is not sanctioned as such under French law, but a range of statutory provisions allow for broad protection of sponsors and partners of world-class sporting events against ambush marketing. They are indeed entitled to peacefully enjoy the rights offered to them in exchange for the significant investments they make in connection with events such as, for example, the football or rugby World Cups, or the Olympic Games.

            The following legal instruments may in particular be invoked by official sponsors and by the organisers of such events:

            • the “classic” protections offered by intellectual property law (trademark law and copyright) by way of an infringement action under the French Intellectual Property Code,
            • civil liability law (parasitism/free-riding and unfair competition based on article 1240 of the French Civil Code),
            • consumer law (misleading commercial practices),
            • but also more specific provisions, such as the protection of the exploitation rights of sports federations and organisers of sporting events under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, which grants organisers of sporting events a monopoly over the exploitation of those events.

            On these grounds, the following ambush marketing practices have notably been sanctioned:

            The exploitation of a tennis competition and the use, during the sporting event, of the brand associated with it: An online betting operator organised bets on Roland Garros matches using the protected sign and Roland Garros trademark to identify the matches on which bets were offered. The unlawful exploitation of the sporting competition was sanctioned at EUR 400,000 under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, the French Tennis Federation being the sole owner of the right to exploit Roland Garros. The use of the trademark was also sanctioned for infringement (EUR 300,000) and free-riding/parasitism (EUR 500,000) (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 Oct. 2009, No. 08/19179; Paris Judicial Court, 8 Aug. 2024, No 08/19179).

            An advertising campaign carried out during a film festival reproducing the event’s registered trademark: During the Cannes Film Festival, a cosmetics brand published videos on its social media showing its brand ambassadors being styled, with the official Cannes Film Festival poster visible in certain shots, one of which reproduced the registered Palme d’Or trademark. Sanctioned on the grounds of copyright infringement and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Judicial Court, 11 Dec. 2020, No. 19/08543).

            An advertising campaign falsely claiming the status of official event partner: During the Cannes Film Festival, the use of the slogan “official hairdresser of women” alongside the expressions “Cannes” and “Festival de Cannes”, and other publications that falsely led the public to believe the company was an official festival partner, to the detriment of the sole official festival hairdresser. Sanctioned on the grounds of unfair competition and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Court of Appeal, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912).

            These financial sanctions may be combined with injunctions to cease the practices and/or orders for press publication, subject to periodic penalty payments.

            FIFA’s specific trademark protection

            Unlike the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, which benefited from specific French legislation as a host country (Law No. 2018-202 of 26 March 2018 on the organisation of the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games) reserving in particular advertising spaces in the vicinity of competition venues exclusively for official partners, the 2026 FIFA World Cup does not take place on French territory, and therefore no equivalent French legal framework applies. The protection of official partners and sponsors thus relies on general law , but is nonetheless robust.

            FIFA has built an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide, protected in France by the provisions of the French Intellectual Property Code. These trademarks include in particular the verbal and figurative trademark FIFA®, the marks FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, as well as the official competition emblem (combining the trophy with the figure 26), the official slogan “We Are 26™” / “Nous Sommes 26™”, the logos of the sixteen host cities, and the official typeface “FWC 26”, protected by copyright. Only FIFA’s rights holders, namely the FIFA Partners (led by Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways and Visa), the Plus Sponsors, the Official Sponsors and Regional Supporters, are authorised to use this official intellectual property for commercial purposes.

            FIFA has published Intellectual Property Guidelines (version 2.0, June 2024) detailing the authorised and prohibited uses of the trademarks and logos associated with the 2026 World Cup. According to these guidelines, the following are prohibited without authorisation: any use of official trademarks in commercial advertising; the incorporation of official intellectual property into a trade name or domain name; the organisation of competitions, games or prize draws creating an association with the competition; the use of official trademarks to decorate a retail store; and the use of official hashtags by a corporate account for commercial purposes. The guidelines further specify that protection extends not only to identical reproduction of official trademarks but also to confusingly similar variants. This protection, recalled in the guidelines, is consistent with the enhanced protection afforded to well-known trademarks under French law by article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code.

            Lessons from the Paris 2024 Olympic Games: what risks do brands face?

            The Paris 2024 Olympic Games gave rise to significant litigation that clearly illustrates the risks faced by companies tempted by ambush marketing at a major sporting event. Although these decisions were rendered in the specific context of the Olympic Games, which benefited from specific, reinforced legal protections, they nevertheless constitute a direct warning for brands that might consider similar strategies during the World Cup, on the basis of general law.

            The use of official symbols on travelling physical media: During the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, a Chinese dairy company had buses displaying the Olympic rings alongside its own brands circulating throughout Paris, while presenting itself as “the only Chinese dairy company present in Paris 2024”. The Paris Court of Appeal upheld both free-riding/parasitism and trademark infringement, and ordered the companies concerned, in summary proceedings, to pay EUR 20,000 per defendant, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 20,000 per day per proven infringement, aimed at stopping the diffusion of the advertising (Paris Court of Appeal, pole 5, chamber 2, 21 Nov. 2025, No. 24/15283; Paris Court, interim order of 8 Aug. 2024, No. 24/55463). This judgment illustrates the vigilance of French courts with regard to strategies of visual association with an event, even without an explicit claim of official partnership, and confirms the possibility of combining infringement and parasitism claims for substantial awards.

            The unauthorised broadcast of competitions: The Paris Court, sitting in summary proceedings during the Olympic Games, ordered the immediate cessation of the broadcast of Olympic competitions by a streaming platform that did not hold the corresponding media rights, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 1,500 per identified infringement, EUR 3,000 per day for ongoing distributions and EUR 5,000 per day for failure to withdraw the content (Paris Court, summary proceedings, 18 Sept. 2024, No. 24/53019). Thus, any platform broadcasting World Cup matches without holding the rights licensed by FIFA faces immediate emergency measures under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code.

            The enhanced protection of well-known trademarks: The French Court of Cassation confirmed that protection of Olympic trademarks extends beyond strict reproduction: it is sufficient for the trademark to be evoked or suggested, without the need to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public. This solution, based on article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, was applied to a bar that had used the Olympic rings on its coasters to promote its broadcast evenings (Court of Cassation, Criminal chamber, 17 Jan. 2017, No. 15-86.363). FIFA’s trademarks being equally well-known worldwide, the same protective regime applies to them: a mere evocation of official trademarks, even without literal reproduction, may constitute an actionable infringement.

            Certain marketing operations may escape sanction

            Analysis of case law and promotional practices nonetheless reveals the contours of certain advertising practices that could be permitted (not sanctioned by the provisions described above), provided they are carefully prepared and presented. Here are some examples.

            Creative or humorous communication

            • A tongue-in-cheek, even humorous approach may allow companies to avoid the sanctions described above. For example, Intersnack’s Vico crisps brand launched a promotional campaign in 2016 around the slogan “Vico, partner of supporters at home”.
            • Irish bookmaker Paddy Power sponsored an egg-and-spoon race in “London”, a village in Burgundy, France, in order to display the following slogan in London during the 2012 Olympic Games: “Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is)”. The Olympic organising committee failed to stop this campaign. British humour …
            • Meanwhile, Heineken, a rival of official Euro 2016 sponsor Carlsberg, marketed a range of beer bottles in the colours of the flags of 21 countries that had “marked its history”, the majority of which were participating in the tournament.

            Using factual information as advertising

            It was held lawful to use the results of a rugby match and the announcement of an upcoming match in a newspaper to promote a car brand, with the advertisement reading: “France 13 England 24 , the Fiat 500 congratulates England on its victory and looks forward to seeing the French team on 9 March for France-Italy”. The judges considered that this publication “merely reproduces a current sporting result, obtained and made public on the front page of the sports newspaper, and refers to a future fixture also known to have been announced in the newspaper’s editorial content” (Court of Cassation, Commercial chamber, 20 May 2014, No. 13-12.102).

            Sponsoring players participating in the World Cup

            Any company may enter into partnerships with players participating in the FIFA World Cup, for example by supplying them with equipment or clothing bearing its logo. FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines expressly state that they “contain no affirmations regarding rights held by third parties such as players, clubs, member associations [or] confederations”. FIFA’s guidelines also explicitly confirm that generic images related to football, national teams or national flags do not fall within the official intellectual property. Caution is nonetheless warranted: the partnership must not create the impression of a commercial association with FIFA or the competition, nor use FIFA’s official trademarks.

            A combined legal and marketing approach in designing and preparing the message of any such communication campaign is essential to avoid legal proceedings, particularly on the grounds of free-riding/parasitism. Certain advertising campaigns can therefore legitimately be considered, particularly when they are clever.

            Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

            Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

            In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

            The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

            With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

            In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

            The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

            This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

            However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

            Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

            The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

            In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

            Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

            For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

            What the EU decision does (and does not) do

            The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

            At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

            In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

            The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

            Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

            Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

            Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

            The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

            Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

            Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

            How different payment types are affected in practice

            Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

            The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

            Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

            If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

            Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

            Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

            Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

            Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

            Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

            Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

            How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

            Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

            For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

            A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

            Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

            A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

            This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

            A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

            A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

            Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

            EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

            Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

            Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

            DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

            Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

            Country notes (alphabetical)

            Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

            France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

            Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

            Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

            For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

            Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

            Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

            Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

             

            Practical next steps for EU companies

            1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
            2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
            3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
            4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
            5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
            6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
            7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
            8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
            9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

            Under French Law, franchisors and distributors are subject to two kinds of pre-contractual information obligations: each party must spontaneously inform their future partner of any information they know is decisive to their consent. In addition, for certain contracts – i.e a franchise agreement – there is a duty to disclose a limited amount of information in a document. These pre-contractual obligations are mandatory rules of public policy. Thus, these two obligations apply simultaneously to the franchisor, distributor or dealer when negotiating a contract with a partner.

            Takeaways

            • The information required by the DIP must be fully completed and updated ;
            • The information not required by the DIP but provided by the franchisor must be carefully selected and sincere;
            • Franchisee must be given the opportunity to request additional information from the franchisor;
            • Franchisee’s experience in the economic sector enables the franchisor to considerably limit its exposure to the risk of contract cancellation due to a defect in the franchisee’s consent;
            • Franchisor must keep the proof of the actual disclosure of pre-contractual information (whether mandatory or not).
            • The general information obligation under common law (Article 1112-1 of the French Civil Code) may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation provided for under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code.

            General duty of disclosure for all contractors

            What is the scope of this pre-contractual information?

            This obligation is imposed on all counterparties, for any kind of contract. Indeed, article 1112-1 of the Civil Code states that:

            (§. 1) The party who knows information of decisive importance for the consent of the other party must inform the other party if the latter legitimately ignores this information or trusts its counterparty.

            (§. 3) Of decisive importance is the information that is directly and necessarily related to the content of the contract or the quality of the parties. »

            This obligation applies to all contracting parties for any type of contract.

            French courts have ruled that this general information obligation may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code (see below), answering the question in the affirmative (Paris Court of Appeal, 27 March 2024, no. 22/12665). The scope of the latter has however, been defined by the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») : only information bearing a direct and necessary link with the subject matter of the contract or the qualities of the parties is subject to the disclosure obligation (Cass. com., 14 May 2025, no. 23-17.948).

            Who bears the burden of proof?

            The burden of proof rests on the person who claims that the information was due to him. He must then prove (i) that the other party owed him the information but (ii) did not provide it (Article 1112-1 (§. 4) of the Civil Code)

            Special duty of disclosure for franchise and distribution agreements

            Which contracts are subject to this special rule?

            French law requires (art. L.330-3 French Commercial Code) the provision of a pre-contractual information document (in French “DIP”) and the draft contract, by any person:

            • which grants another person the right to use a trade mark, trade name or sign,
            • while requiring an exclusive or quasi-exclusive commitment for the exercise of its activity (e.g. exclusive purchase obligation). The quasi-exclusive nature of the commitment is assessed on a case-by-case basis by French courts, independently of the 80% purchase threshold provided for under EU Regulation 2022/720, which is treated merely as an indicative reference.

            Concretely, DIP must be provided, for example, to the franchisee, distributor, dealer or licensee of a brand, by its franchisor, supplier or licensor as soon as the two above conditions are met. French courts have moreover recently had occasion to confirm that the scope of the DIP obligation is not limited to franchise agreements but extends, in particular, to dealership agreements, provided the above-mentioned conditions are met (Paris Court of Appeal, 22 May 2024, no. 22/08672).

            When the DIP must be provided?

            DIP and draft contract must be provided at least 20 days before signing the contract, and, where applicable, before the payment of the sum required to be paid prior to the signature of the contract (for a reservation).

            What information must be disclosed in the DIP?

            Article R. 330-1 of the French Commercial Code requires that DIP mentions the following information (non-detailed list) concerning:

            • Franchisor (identity and experience of the managers, career path, etc.);
            • Franchisor’s business (in particular creation date, head office, bank accounts, history of the development of the business, annual accounts, etc.);
            • Operating network (members list with indication of signing date of contracts, establishments list offering the same products/services in the area of the planned activity, number of members having ceased to be part of the network during the year preceding the issue of the DIP with indication of the reasons for leaving, etc.);
            • Trademark licensed (date of registration, ownership and use);
            • General state of the market (about products or services covered by the contract) and local state of the market (about the planned area) and information relating to factors of competition and development perspective. With respect to the local market, the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») has held that the franchisor is not required to conduct a market study, but that if one is provided, it must be accurate and verifiable (Cass. com., 18 Oct. 2023, no. 22-19.329).;
            • Essential element of the draft contract and at least: its duration, contract renewal conditions, termination and assignment conditions and scope of exclusivities;
            • Financial obligations weighing in on contracting party: nature and amount of the expenses and investments that will have to be incurred before starting operations (up-front entry fee, installation costs, etc.).

            Beyond the exhaustiveness of the information required under the aforementioned provision, the DIP is subject to a qualitative standard. All information provided — including information provided spontaneously — must be accurate and truthful to ensure that the prospective network member’s consent is fully informed and free from any defect.

            How to prove the disclosure of information?

            The burden of proof for the delivery of the DIP rests on the debtor of this obligation: the franchisor (Cass. Com., 7 July 2004, n°02-15.950). The ideal for the franchisor is to have the franchisee sign and date his DIP on the day it is delivered and to keep the proof thereof.

            The clause of contract indicating that the franchisee acknowledges having received a complete DIP does not provide proof of the delivery of a complete DIP (Cass. com, 10 January 2018, n° 15-25.287).

            The franchisor is subject to a duty to update the DIP until the contract is signed

            In a ruling dated 26 June 2024 (no. 23-14.085 PB), the French Supreme Court held that formal compliance of the DIP at the time of its delivery is not sufficient to exonerate the franchisor from all pre-contractual liability. This position was confirmed by a subsequent ruling of 4 December 2024 (no. 23-16.684).

            These two decisions appear to establish a duty of ongoing updates incumbent upon the network head throughout the entire period between the delivery of the DIP and the execution of the contract. Where significant events occur during that interval — insolvency proceedings affecting network members, major litigation, or structural changes to the network — the network head is required to proactively inform the prospective member. The court then examines whether the failure to disclose such information was liable to distort the candidate’s assessment of the network and, consequently, to vitiate his consent (Cass. com., 26 June 2024, op. cit.).

            A franchisor may therefore not shelter behind the initial regularity of the DIP to discharge its disclosure duty where the network’s situation has materially changed prior to the signing of the contract.

            Sanction for breach of pre-contractual information duties

            Criminal sanction

            Failing to comply with the obligations relating to the DIP, franchisor or supplier can be sentenced to a criminal fine of up to 1,500 euros and up to 3,000 euros in the event of a repeat offence, the fine being multiplied by five for legal entities (article R.330-2 French commercial Code).

            Cancellation of the contract for deceit

            The contract may be declared null and void in case of breach of either article 1112-1 of the French Code civil or article L. 330-3 of the French Code de commerce. In both cases, failure to comply with the obligation to provide information is sanctioned if the applicant demonstrates that his or her consent has been vitiated by error, deceit or violence. In this respect, courts conduct a concrete, case-by-case assessment, taking into account in particular the professional experience and personal due diligence of the distributor: a sophisticated candidate will face greater difficulty in establishing deceit, and his experience in the relevant sector may be sufficient to exonerate the franchisor (Paris Court of Appeal, div. 5 – ch. 11, 26 Apr. 2024, no. 21/13205), even where the information provided was incomplete or inaccurate (Paris Court of Appeal, 20 Jan. 2021, no. 19/03382).

            The path is therefore narrow for the franchisee: he cannot invoke error concerning profitability when it is he who draws up his plan, and even when this plan is drawn up by the franchisor or based on information drawn up and transmitted by the franchisor, the experience of the franchisee who knew the local market may exonerate the franchisor.

            Regarding deceit, Courts strictly assess its two conditions which are:

            • (a material element) the existence of a lie or deceptive reticence (article 1137 French Civil Code), and
            • (an intentional element) the intention to deceive his counterparty (article 1130 French Civil Code).

            Where applicable, the parties must return to the state they were in before the contract.

            Damages

            Although the claims for contract cancellation are subject to very strict conditions, it remains that franchisees/distributors may alternatively obtain damages on the basis of tort liability for non-compliance with the pre-contractual information obligation, subject to proof of fault (incomplete or incorrect information), damage (loss of opportunity of not contracting or contracting on more advantageous terms) and the causal link between the two.

            Federico Vasoli

            Practice areas

            • Corporate
            • Foreign investments
            • M&A

            Contact Federico





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              France | Pre-contractual disclosure in distribution and franchise agreements

              6 May 2026

              • France
              • Franchising
              • Distribution

              In Spain, a waiver of goodwill indemnity in a distribution agreement does not always protect the manufacturer. The Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal ordered a manufacturer to pay its distributor more than EUR 100,000 in goodwill indemnity and damages for insufficient notice, despite the written waiver, because it held that the agreement had expired and that good faith limited the waiver’s effect. To avoid the same risk, the manufacturer should renew the agreement in writing before it expires or expressly provide that waivers remain effective, specify which customer base the waiver covers and give notice proportionate to the duration of the relationship.

              Summary

              • The distributor’s case and the manufacturer’s liability
              • What the Court of Appeal decided on the waiver
              • Why the waiver was not applied
              • A valid waiver with limits: distribution and agency
              • Whether the waiver should have fallen away with the agreement
              • What manufacturers distributing in Spain should do

              Goodwill indemnity in Spain: the distributor’s case

              For more than twenty years, the manufacturer and distributor worked together without a written agreement. In 2018, they signed a two-year contract. The distributor agreed to waive both goodwill indemnity and damages arising from termination.

              The agreement expired in December 2020. Neither party renewed it, but they continued doing business together.

              Months later, the manufacturer decided to end the relationship. It gave less than two months’ notice and alleged breaches by the distributor that it was unable to prove.

              Waiver of goodwill indemnity: what the Court of Appeal decided

              In a distribution relationship, the distributor can waive goodwill indemnity. In an agency relationship, an advance waiver is not permitted. In this case, however, the Court of Appeal held that the waiver no longer applied because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The court also considered that good faith could limit the waiver’s effect, given the length of the relationship and its termination without good cause.

              The argument based on expiry is debatable: a clause intended to govern the end of an agreement should not lose its effect simply because that agreement ends. To avoid this uncertainty, parties that continue trading after expiry should renew the agreement in writing or expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

              Why was the goodwill indemnity waiver not applied?

              The Court of Appeal relied on two grounds.

              The first was the expiry of the agreement. Since the parties had continued trading without signing a new document, the court held that the waiver was no longer effective when the manufacturer ended the relationship.

              The second was good faith. Even if the waiver still applied, the court considered that it could not take full effect in those circumstances: more than twenty-five years of collaboration, a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause.

              Goodwill indemnity waiver: valid, but with limits

              The judgment is surprising because a distributor can, in principle, waive this indemnity. To understand why, it helps to distinguish distribution from agency.

              In agency relationships, the law protects the agent against an advance waiver. This follows from Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992, read together with the goodwill indemnity provisions in Article 28.

              In distribution relationships, the Spanish Supreme Court applies Article 28 by analogy where its requirements are met (judgment 944/2023 of 13 June). But this does not prevent a manufacturer and distributor from agreeing to exclude all compensation if either party terminates the agreement on notice. The Supreme Court confirmed this in its judgments of 4 December 2007, 15 January 2008, sitting in plenary session, and 25 April 2011.

              The distinction lies in how the relationship ends. That case law concerns ordinary termination, whether on notice or on expiry of the agreed term. A waiver offers less certainty where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice, as happened here.

              Should the waiver have fallen away with the agreement?

              Of the Court of Appeal’s two grounds, the first is the more debatable: that the waiver ceased to apply because the agreement had expired.

              The Spanish Supreme Court has enforced exclusion clauses precisely after an agreement has expired. It did so in its judgment of 23 December 2008. In that case, a dealer’s agreement ended when its extension expired. The court refused goodwill compensation because the agreement itself excluded any claim arising from its termination.

              The point is straightforward: if a clause is agreed to govern what happens when an agreement ends, it is difficult to argue that it loses its effect merely because the agreement ends.

              There is a difference here: the parties continued trading after expiry and, according to the Court of Appeal, did so on the terms that had traditionally governed their relationship. But continuing to trade does not, by itself, show that they intended to set aside a waiver relating to the customer base developed up to that point.

              There is an agency case that might appear to point the other way. The Supreme Court has prevented parties from dividing the indemnity into separate periods through successive declarations that there was “nothing further to claim” (judgment of 27 June 2013). Its reason, however, was the mandatory protection afforded by Article 28 of the Spanish Commercial Agency Act, which the parties cannot exclude. That restriction does not apply to distribution.

              Even if the waiver remained effective, there would still be the question of notice. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss. They compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business and would therefore not necessarily be covered by that waiver.

              What should manufacturers distributing in Spain do?

              Businesses may continue trading as usual and overlook the fact that their agreement has expired. This judgment illustrates the risk: when the time comes to end the relationship, the manufacturer may discover that the protections it relied on are no longer effective.

              The agreement should be renewed in writing before it expires. If the parties have already continued trading without renewal, they should document which terms still apply and expressly provide that waivers remain effective both after expiry and while the relationship continues without a new document.

              It is also important to specify which customer base the waiver covers. If it is intended to include the customer base already built up, this should be stated expressly, with a reference date, a defined territory and confirmation that the waiver is final.

              Finally, goodwill indemnity, damages for insufficient notice and other damages should be addressed separately. When ending the relationship, the manufacturer should give notice proportionate to its duration.

              Frequently asked questions on goodwill indemnity in Spain

              Is a waiver of goodwill indemnity valid in a distribution agreement in Spain?

              In principle, yes: in distribution the distributor can waive the indemnity, whereas in agency the law protects the agent against an advance waiver (Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992). A waiver offers less certainty, however, where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice.

              What happens to the waiver if the agreement expires and the parties keep trading?

              The risk is that it will not be applied. In the case decided by the Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal, the waiver was held to be no longer effective because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The argument is debatable, but to avoid uncertainty the agreement should be renewed in writing or should expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

              Can good faith limit a waiver of goodwill indemnity?

              According to the court, in that case it could: after more than twenty-five years of collaboration, with a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause, the waiver could not take full effect.

              Does the waiver also cover damages for insufficient notice?

              Not necessarily. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss, because they compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business.

              How should the waiver be worded to cover the customer base already built up?

              It must say so expressly: the waiver should state a reference date, a defined territory and that the waiver is final.

              How much notice must the manufacturer give?

              The article does not give a number of days: it says that notice must be proportionate to the duration of the relationship. In the case examined, the manufacturer gave less than two months’ notice after more than twenty-five years of collaboration.

              Abstract: In February 2022, this previous article examined the adoption of Legislative Decree No. 198 of November 8, 2021 (the “Decree”), through which Italy transposed Directive (EU) 2019/633 (the “Directive”) on unfair commercial practices in business-to-business relationships within the agri-food supply chain.

              Four years later, the regulatory framework has evolved and the landscape has changed in part: the Italian legislature has made several amendments to the Decree, the designated enforcement authority has significantly stepped up its activities, and the first court decisions regarding the application of the Decree have been issued.

              This article aims to provide an updated overview.

              The Regulatory Framework: Original Structure and Subsequent Amendments

              The implementation of the Directive provided the Italian legislature with an opportunity to overhaul the pre-existing national regulations governing the agri-food supply chain—in particular those set forth in Article 62 of Decree-Law No. 1/2012. The result is a unified and systematic regulatory framework on the subject, contained in the Decree that entered into force on December 15, 2021.

              For an analysis of the structure and key provisions of the Decree, please refer to the previous article. The fundamental structural choices described in that article remain in effect: the Decree establishes mandatory contractual requirements for operators in the agricultural and food sector, identifies unfair practices that are always prohibited (the so-called “blacklist”) and those prohibited unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties (the so-called “gray list”), regulates below-cost sales (not covered by the Directive), provides for a comprehensive system of penalties to punish any violations, and designates the Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention (ICQRF) as the authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the Decree’s provisions.

              What is of interest here are the legislative amendments that have modified and supplemented the original text of the Decree. As will be seen, these amendments have tightened regulations that were already stricter than European standards at the time of the Decree’s adoption.

              The first amendment was introduced by Decree-Law No. 21/2022, which expanded the definition of perishable products to include meat-based products with specific physicochemical characteristics, and extended the applicability of the 30-day payment terms to the following agricultural and food products:

              “a) prepackaged products bearing an expiration date or a minimum shelf life not exceeding sixty days;

              1. b) bulk products, even if placed in protective packaging or refrigerated, that have not undergone treatments designed to extend their shelf life beyond sixty days;
                c) meat products exhibiting one of the following physicochemical characteristics: awgreater than 0.95 and pH greater than 5.2, or awgreater than 0.91, or pH equal to or greater than 4.5;
              2. d) all types of milk.”

               

              Subsequently, Decree-Law No. 69/2023 expanded the scope of the Decree to include “suppliers established in other Member States or in third countries when the buyer is established in Italy.” Therefore, today, the Decree applies to all business-to-business (B2B) sales contracts in which the supplier and/or the buyer is established in Italy, regardless of the parties’ turnover and the law applicable to the contract. This is an extremely broad scope of application, capable of effectively encompassing any commercial relationship in which at least one of the parties is Italian. This deliberate departure from the differentiated turnover thresholds provided for by the Directive—justified, according to the legislature, by the extraordinary fragmentation of the Italian agri-food supply chain—continues to define the broader scope of the Italian regime compared to the minimum level of harmonization established by the EU.

              Decree-Law No. 69/2023 also amended the minimum notice period for the buyer’s cancellation of orders for perishable products, prohibiting any “notice period so short as to reasonably lead one to believe that the supplier cannot find alternative outlets for its products” and delegating to a subsequent implementing regulation (not yet issued) to establish specific rules governing this matter. Finally, the provision extended to foreign suppliers the right to file complaints with the national enforcement authority (ICQRF).

              The most recent amendment to the Decree was introduced by Decree-Law No. 63/2024, which

              • added the provision that the supply price must take into account the cost of production
              • specified that wholesale markets also fall within the scope of the Decree
              • included, among the documents that the ICQRF may obtain, accounting documents relating to sales activities and related services, and
              • introduced the possibility of paying any penalties imposed under the Decree at a reduced rate, provided the contractor demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to mitigate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

               

              The cumulative effect of the amendments outlined above is the establishment of regulations that are even stricter than those that took effect in December 2021 (which were already significantly more restrictive than the Directive).

              Mandatory Contractual Requirements: Persistent Compliance Challenges

              Article 3 of the Decree imposes several mandatory requirements for contracts for the sale of agricultural and food products: written form, a minimum term of 12 months, specification of the product’s quantity and characteristics, a fixed or determinable price that reflects production costs, and definition of the terms of delivery and payment.

              However, the legislature’s intention to establish a system that safeguards the contractual rights of the parties has clashed with the reality of commercial transactions in this sector. In fact, experience has shown that these contractual requirements remain the primary source of difficulty for operators in complying with the Decree. It is therefore not surprising that many of the objections raised by the ICQRF over the years have concerned precisely this aspect.

              The written form requirement is particularly critical: a significant percentage of operators, especially in sectors characterized by long-standing informal commercial relationships (the prime example being the wine sector), continue to conclude transactions without an adequate written framework agreement, relying instead on commercial customs and verbal agreements that the Decree does not recognize as sufficient. It is no coincidence that the reports issued by the ICQRF in recent years list the failure to enter into written contracts prior to the delivery of the products sold   among the most frequent violations found.

              Another aspect that is frequently penalized is the unilateral modification of prices: in several cases, buyers have attempted to adjust agreed-upon prices without the supplier’s written consent—a practice that the Decree expressly prohibits and that has been the subject of the first judicial decisions issued on the matter (which will be discussed in paragraph 6).

              Italian Specifics: Additional Prohibited Practices and Below-Cost Sales

              In addition to the “black list” and “gray list” of unfair practices prohibited by the Directive, Article 5 of the Decree identifies and prohibits 16 additional unfair practices, which stem from the pre-existing Italian regulatory framework. These include, for example, the purchase of agricultural and food products through double-reduction electronic tenders and auctions, the application of objectively different conditions for equivalent services, and the obtaining of undue unilateral benefits not justified by the nature or content of the commercial relationship.

              An interesting feature of the Italian list is its explicitly bilateral nature: unlike the Directive, which was designed to protect suppliers from potential abuses by larger and more powerful buyers, Article 5 of the Decree prohibits various unfair practices that also apply to suppliers, including the imposition of an unduly short expiration date, the forced maintenance of a specific product range, and the requirement to reserve a privileged shelf position for certain products. The Decree, therefore, also protects—in certain cases—buyers.

              Another distinctive feature of Italian law (and that of a few other countries in the European Union—Spain, Croatia, and Hungary) is the regulation of below-cost sales, which is not covered by the Directive.

              Under Article 7 of the Decree, sales below production cost are permitted only in two circumstances:

              • when perishable products are at risk of spoilage, or
              • if the commercial transaction has been planned and agreed upon in writing with the supplier. In all other cases, the price of the product sold below cost is automatically adjusted.

              It should be noted that the replacement criteria specified by the legislature (purchase invoices, average production costs, average product price) are unclear and have been subject to various interpretations.

              The penalties for violating the ban on below-cost sales are severe: administrative fines ranging from 1 to 6 million euros and suspension of business operations for up to 20 days in cases of repeat offenses or particularly serious violations.

              In any case, selling below cost is not merely a national issue; in fact, in its report dated December 1, 2025, on the evaluation of the Directive, the Commission indicated that it will propose a revision of the Directive to establish the principle that farmers should not be forced to systematically sell their products below production costs. We can therefore expect changes to the European regulations governing this issue.

              The Penalty System

              The Decree contains a comprehensive system of penalties, calibrated according to the nature and severity of the violation.

              Failure to comply with the provisions of the Decree results, depending on the case, in three types of consequences, which may apply cumulatively:

              1. Invalidity of the offending contractual clause, which is automatically replaced where the Decree so provides: for example, a term of less than 12 months is extended to that minimum period; a price below the cost of production is adjusted upward.
              2. Monetary penalties: fines ranging from a fixed minimum of between 1,000 and 30,000 euros, depending on the obligation violated, to a maximum varying from 3% to 5% of the annual revenue of the party responsible for the violation, which may be increased up to two or three times in the event of repeated violations, with an overall maximum limit of 10% of revenue. With specific regard to unfair practices, Article 10 of the Decree provides that those included on the “blacklist” are subject to administrative penalties ranging from 30,000 euros to 5% of the previous year’s revenue; those included on the “gray list” are subject to fines ranging from 15,000 euros to 3% of revenue; other practices prohibited under Article 5 are subject to penalties ranging from 5,000 euros to 4% of revenue.
              3. Compensation for Damages: Injured parties and their representative organizations may, in any case, file claims for compensation for damages (all of which must be proven).

               

              As previously mentioned, starting in 2024, an operator subject to a monetary penalty may, within a strict deadline of thirty days from the notification of the injunction order, pay the penalty at a 50% reduction if the operator demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to eliminate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

              Enforcement of the Regulations: The Expanding Role of the ICQRF

              Four years after its designation as the competent supervisory authority in Italy pursuant to the Decree, the ICQRF (Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention) has become one of the most active supervisory bodies in the European Union in this sector. Working in coordination with the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Agri-Food Products, it conducts inspections both in response to reports and on its own initiative.

              The gradual intensification of this agency’s activities is remarkable. In 2022, the ICQRF conducted 139 inspections. By 2025, that number had risen to 3,536. Inspections resulting from complaints are—in fact—extremely rare, while the majority of inspections are carried out on the agency’s own initiative. Operators’ reluctance to file complaints—a phenomenon common across all EU member states and largely attributable to fears of commercial retaliation by stronger business partners—has made proactive enforcement the primary mechanism in practice.

              The most recent ICQRF reports confirm a significant upward trend in the volume of inspections, the number of operators investigated (76 in 2022 versus 1,430 in 2025), and the number of violations detected (15 in 2022, 562 in 2025). The sectors subject to the most frequent inspections are dairy products and fruits and vegetables, both characterized by large, structurally powerful buyers and a highly fragmented supplier base.

              The most commonly found violations include unilateral changes to contractual terms by the buyer, failure to comply with mandatory payment terms, and the absence of written sales contracts.

              Case Law on Unfair Practices in the Agri-Food Supply Chain

              The intensification of inspections and the issuance of injunctions against operators has, as was to be expected, led to the first disputes and, consequently, to the first court decisions regarding the Decree.

              Following appeals filed by certain operators in the dairy sector against administrative sanctions imposed for unilaterally modifying the agreed-upon price of milk, several trial courts (specifically the Court of Brescia and the Milan Court of Appeals) have confirmed that any price modification requires the written consent of all contracting parties. This is consistent with the text of the Decree, which prohibits unilateral changes to agreed-upon contractual terms and requires that agreements between the parties be in writing.

              In Judgment No. 1225 of April 29, 2025, published on June 12, 2025, the Milan Court of Appeals ruled that a letter revising the criteria for calculating the price—sent by the buyer to the supplier, not preceded by negotiations between the parties, and not signed by the supplier to indicate acceptance—constitutes a unilateral modification of the contractual terms relating to the price, which is punishable under Article 4(d) of the Decree. In fact, it cannot be considered a written agreement (since it is signed by only one party). It is true that Article 3 of the Decree provides for the possibility of fulfilling the written form requirement through “equivalent forms,” but this is conditional on the fundamental contractual elements (including the price) having been previously agreed upon between the buyer and the supplier through a framework agreement.

              Therefore, it is irrelevant that, in the present case, the supplier, by continuing to make deliveries, behaved in a manner that could be construed as tacit acceptance of the amendment, given that price agreements cannot be established through “equivalent forms.”

              The body of case law remains limited, so it is premature to draw definitive conclusions about the direction of case law in this area.

              However, there is no doubt that the operational boundaries of the penalty regime are gradually being defined and the interpretive limits of the Decree’s provisions are being clarified.

              Conclusion

              The Italian regulatory framework governing unfair commercial practices in the agricultural and food supply chain has, in the more than four years since its entry into force, moved from theory to practical application.

              The basic framework described in the previous article has been supplemented by subsequent legislative amendments, and enforcement of the regulations is overseen by a regulatory authority that has demonstrated both the will and the capacity to act. The proactive approach of the ICQRF, which is increasingly active in its role as an enforcement authority, leaves no doubt that compliance with the Decree is a practical imperative, not merely a theoretical one.

              For operators active in the Italian agri-food supply chain—whether they are suppliers, buyers, or intermediaries—the priorities are clear:

              • contracts must be in writing and comply with the mandatory requirements set forth in the Decree
              • business practices must be reviewed to verify their compliance with the law and ensure they do not fall under the list of prohibited practices, and
              • Business processes must ensure that each operator adheres to good commercial practices in its dealings with its partners and other operators in the supply chain.

              France regulates unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain more strictly than Directive (EU) 2019/633 requires. Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 30 June 2021 transposed the Directive into a framework already built by the Egalim laws, and France chose not to apply the turnover thresholds set out in the Directive: the rules therefore cover all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, whatever the size or nationality of the parties. Written annual agreements signed before 1 March, automatic price revision clauses, capped payment terms and administrative fines reaching €2 million, doubled for repeat infringements, are the core of the regime, enforced by the DGCCRF.

              Summary

              1. Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when
              2. Products covered by the French rules
              3. Scope of the French rules compared with the Directive
              4. Suppliers and buyers covered, regardless of size and nationality
              5. Applicable law and jurisdiction in international supply contracts
              6. Where French law goes further than the Directive
              7. Mandatory content of an agri-food supply agreement
              8. Penalties for breaching the contractual requirements
              9. Unfair practices prohibited beyond the Directive
              10. Penalties for unfair commercial practices
              11. The DGCCRF and its enforcement powers
              12. Findings of the latest DGCCRF report

              Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when?

              Directive (EU) 2019/633 was transposed into French law by Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 2021, June 30th, whose provisions entered into force on July 1, 2021 and apply to contracts concluded as from November 1, 2021. Contracts concluded before that date were granted a 12-month period, starting on July 1, 2021, to comply with these provisions.

              This transposition forms part of an already well-established legislative framework shaped by « Egalim I » Law No. 2018-938 of October 30, 2018; « Egalim II » Law No. 2021-1357 of October 18, 2021 and « Egalim III » Law No. 2023-1041 of November 17, 2023, which strengthen contractual relations and the protection of agricultural producers. Even prior to the transposition of the Directive, French law had already refocused the rules on restrictive business practices around the following unlawful practices:

              • A significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
              • the granting of an advantage without consideration; and
              • The sudden termination of established business relationships.

               

              The Ordinance of June 30, 2021 transposed those provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/633 that did not fall within this existing framework, specifically introducing three new restrictive practices applicable to agricultural and food products into the French Commercial Code  (Com.C):

              • The cancellation of an order for perishable products at short notice (Article L. 443-5 of the Com.C);
              • The unlawful obtaining, use, or disclosure of the supplier’s trade secrets (Article L. 443-6 of the Com.C);
              • The refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a supply agreement where the supplier has requested such confirmation (Article L. 443-7 of the Com.C).

               

              This framework has been strengthened by Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026 on emergency measures for agricultural protection and sovereignty (the “2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law”), most of whose relevant provisions entered into force on 20 August 2026. The 2026 law notably amends agricultural contracting rules, food-sector price revision mechanisms and certain restrictive trade practices.

              Which agri-food products are covered by the French rules?

              Directive 2019/633 applies to the sale of “agricultural and food products”, defined in Article 2 as “the products listed in Annex I to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as products not listed in that Annex but processed for use as food for human consumption by using products listed in that Annex”, subject to the annual turnover thresholds of suppliers and buyers set out in Article 1§2.

              Is the scope of the French rules broader than the Directive?

              In France, the scope of the provisions transposing the Directive is the same as that of EU law, as they apply to agricultural and food products.

              However, certain French provisions in this area have a broader scope of application. Many provisions of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code apply to commercial relationships relating to “production, distribution or service activities” (in particular restrictive practices – Article L. 442-1 Com.C). Some of these provisions apply to fast-moving consumer goods, defined in Article L. 441-4 of the French Commercial Code as “non-durable products with a high frequency and recurrence of consumption”, the list of which is set by decree, as well as to food products.

              Which suppliers and buyers are covered, and does their size matter?

              France chose not to introduce the supplier and buyer turnover thresholds provided for in Directive 2019/633. As a result, the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers.

              Which law applies to an international agri-food supply contract?

              French law does not provide for specific conflict-of-law rules applicable to supply contracts in the agri-food sector. At first glance, international contracts for the supply of agri-food products are therefore governed by the general conflict-of-law rules applicable in France.

              Choice of law under Rome I and the 1955 Hague Convention

              These general rules are laid down by Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, known as the Rome I Regulation. Rome I establishes as a general principle that the parties are free to choose the law applicable to an international contract, either expressly or implicitly. In the absence of an express choice, the applicable law depends on the legal characterization of the supply contract.

              A distinction must therefore be made depending on the nature of the supply contract. If the French court characterizes the contract as a contract for the sale of goods, it may apply either the Rome I Regulation or, more likely, the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international sales of tangible movable goods. In both cases, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the seller is established. If the supply contract is characterized as a processing or bespoke supply contract, particularly where it is based on detailed specifications, the French court would apply the Rome I Regulation and may consider such a contract to constitute a service contract rather than a sale contract. In that case, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the service provider is established.

              Article L. 444-1.A and the limits of overriding mandatory rules

              In addition, it its worthwhile looking at Article L. 444-1.A of the French Commercial Code which states

              “The provisions of Chapters I, II and III of this Title apply to any agreement between a supplier and a buyer relating to products or services marketed on French territory. These provisions are matters of public policy. Any dispute relating to their application falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts, subject to compliance with European Union law and international treaties ratified or approved by France and without prejudice to recourse to arbitration.”

              At first glance, this provision pretends to bring all commercial contracts within the scope of French law where the products or services are marketed in France, like an overriding mandatory rule (OMR). However, this approach appears ambiguous, unjustified and at the end ineffective.

              First, restrictive trade practices (RTP) do not constitute OMR within the meaning of the Rome I Regulation. Article L. 444-1.A does not expressly refer to the terms overriding mandatory rules and just merely recalls the domestic public policy nature of the relevant provisions.

              Second, French case law has repeatedly refused to qualify RTP as OMR, with the exception of enforcement actions brought by the French Ministry of Economy and Finance against third party imposing to their counterpart blatant imbalance clauses.

              Third, the general characterization of the provisions of Title IV of the French Commercial Code as OMR does not satisfy the test of sufficient connection and imperative necessity as defined by the ECJ in its ruling of 5 September 2024 (Huk-Coburg-Allgemeine Versicherung, Case C-86/23).

              Exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts and its exceptions

              With respect to jurisdiction, Article L. 444-1.A wants to create an exclusive jurisdiction of French courts for commercial matters such as RTP. However, it provides clear and wide exceptions based on compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction matters and with arbitration rules.

              In practice, any jurisdiction clause (subject to the exception here after) or arbitration clause stipulated in an international contract must be upheld by French courts, which must therefore decline jurisdiction. Only in very limited circumstances may French courts assert this exclusive jurisdiction rule, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has not entered into any relevant multilateral or bilateral convention with France (such as Lugano Convention, The Hague conventions…).

              Are the French rules stricter than Directive (EU) 2019/633?

              French commercial law is stricter than the rules laid down by Directive 2019/633, for several reasons:

              • A broader scope of application:
              • No thresholds limit the application of these provisions; as a result, all economic operators are covered, regardless of their size or turnover;
              • While certain provisions are specific to food products, there is also a common framework applicable to all products without distinction, as well as a specific regulatory regime for fast-moving consumer goods (see Question 3).
              • Prior to the transposition of the Directive, France already had a legislative framework in place in this area (the Egalim laws), which it continued to develop after the entry into force of the ordinance transposing the European Directive; this is why the ordinance transposed only four new restrictive trade practices, rather than the entire list set out in the Directive.
              • French law provides for strict regulation governing commercial negotiations, particularly in the large-scale retail sector. The 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law further strengthens this framework by introducing tighter rules on agricultural contract negotiations, reference production-cost indicators, automatic price revision mechanisms in the food sector, repeated tendering procedures and substantial reductions in order volumes during negotiations.

              What must a valid agri-food supply agreement contain in France?

              Chapter I of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code, entitled “Transparency in commercial relationships”, imposes numerous requirements governing the negotiation and performance of commercial agreements:

              The seller’s terms and conditions of sale

              The seller’s pricing policy: the seller must provide any buyer who so requests with its terms and conditions of sale, which must include, at a minimum, the conditions of sale, payment terms, the price list, and the schedule of price reductions (discounts, immediate rebates, deferred rebates, and “free” products) (Article L. 441-1 of the Com.C).

              These terms and conditions may be general (applicable to all customers), category-based (applicable to a category of customers, such as wholesalers, provided that the classification is based on objective identification criteria), or specific and individually negotiated (supplementing or derogating from the general or category-based terms and conditions of sale).

              In this respect, specific provisions apply to food products and products intended for pet food (Article L. 441-1-1 of the French Commercial Code), as well as to wholesalers (Article L. 441-1-2 of the French Commercial Code).

              Since 20 August 2026, Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C. also allows the supplier’s terms and conditions of sale for food products and pet food to include an automatic formula revising the unit-price list in line with upward or downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials used in the product.

              The buyer’s commercial cooperation services

              La politique de coopération commerciale de l’acheteur: L’acheteur, quant à lui, propose et négocie avec le fournisseur des services rendus par lui et qui bénéficient, directement ou indirectement, au fournisseur (Art. L. 441-3 C.com.):

              • Commercial cooperation services: these are services provided in connection with the resale of products or services to consumers, or with a view to their resale to professionals, which are intended to promote the marketing of the supplier’s products and are separable from the act of sale.
              • Other services: “other obligations intended to promote the commercial relationship between the supplier and the distributor or service provider” (L. 441-3, III. 3° Com. C).
              • Promotional benefits: Direct allocation of discounts («remise») to consumers by the distributor acting under a mandate from the supplier for fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

              The written annual agreement and the 31 January or 1 March deadlines

              Formalisation of the negotiation: a written agreement must be entered into, before 1 March of each year, between the supplier and the distributor or service provider, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements.

              As an experimental rule until 31 December 2029, where the supplier is a legal entity with worldwide annual turnover (excluding tax) below €350 million in the last closed financial year, the statutory 1st of March date referred to in Articles L. 441-3, L. 441-4, L. 441-6 and L. 443-8 Com. C. is replaced by 31th of January. In the same situations, the three-month periods referred to in Article L. 441-4 VI and Article L. 443-8 V(B) Com. C. are reduced to two months.

              Law No. 2026-796 introduces also two experiments: Until 15 April 2029 for agreements governed by Article L. 443-8 Com. C., and until 15 April 2028 for agreements governed by Article L. 441-4 Com. C., where the annual agreement has not been concluded by 1st of March (or within two months from the beginning of a special marketing cycle), the supplier may, if no new contract has been formed, terminate the commercial relationship without the distributor being able to rely on the rules on sudden termination under Article L. 442-1 II Com.C., or request application of a notice period compliant with that provision.

              Negotiation timetable for producer/first-buyer of agro-food contracts: under Article L. 631-24II bis of the French Rural and Maritime Fishing code (“CRPM”), the written contract or framework agreement must be concluded within four months after the prospective buyer receives the producer’s written proposal (this period may be extended by an extended interprofessional agreement, up to six months). If no agreement is reached, one of the parties must refer the matter to the Agricultural Commercial Relations Mediator within 15 days. If mediation fails and both parties still intend to establish or continue the relationship, the Agricultural Commercial Disputes Settlement Committee must be seized within a further 15 days; where applicable, the contract must then be concluded within two months after the parties receive the Committee’s decision

              It must set out (Art. L. 441-3 Com.C.):

              • The terms and conditions of the sale of products or the provision of services (including price reductions) and, where applicable, the types of situations in which and the modalities according to which general sales conditions (GSCs) may apply.
              • Commercial cooperation services
              • Other obligations
              • Any service or obligation arising from an agreement entered into with a legal entity located outside French territory with which the distributor is directly or indirectly affiliated

               

              It being specified that the mandatory contents of the written agreement vary depending on its scope of application, namely whether the agreement is entered into with wholesalers, relates to fast-moving consumer goods, or concerns agricultural products (Art. L. 441-7 and L. 441-8 Com.C).

              Stricter rules for agricultural products: duration, price revision, renegotiation

              More specifically, with respect to agricultural products, French law is all the more protective as regards the formalisation of negotiations and provides for even stricter obligations:

              • Clause relating to the duration of the contract: under Article L. 631-24 VI CRPM, the minimum duration of a contract between a producer and a first buyer is three years, except for products subject to excise duties and for grapes, must and the wines produced from them. Unless otherwise agreed, contracts are renewable by tacit renewal for an equivalent period; where the buyer gives notice of non-renewal, the notice period may not be less than three months. The producer may expressly waive the statutory minimum durations in writing, in accordance with Articles 148 and 168 of Regulation (EU) No. 1308/2013. A contract or framework agreement lasting less than three years may omit an automatic upward/downward revision clause for a fixed price.
              • Clauses relating to price determination mechanismsi and revision: Article L. 631-24 III CRPM requires the contract or framework agreement to contain the price and its automatic upward/downward revision mechanism, or the criteria and methods used to determine the price, including the weighting of the relevant indicators. The producer’s proposal must take account of one or more indicators relating to relevant agricultural production costs and their evolution. The parties must refer in the final contract or framework agreement to the reference indicators published by the competent interprofessional organisation (or, failing publication, by the relevant agricultural technical institutes), unless they expressly choose other agricultural production-cost indicators and state the reasons for that choice. Clauses whose purpose or effect is automatically to renegotiate or change the price so as to align it with a more favourable price practised by a competing buyer, producer, producer organisation or association of producer organisations are deemed unwritten.

               

              For food products and pet food subject to Article L. 443-8 Com.C., the annual written agreement must contain an automatic formula revising the unit-price list according to upward and downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials. If the supplier’s terms and conditions contain the formula permitted by Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C., the annual agreement must reproduce that formula and it is not negotiable. Price changes resulting from its application must be implemented no later than one month after activation. A distributor may object only where objective economic data show that the link drawn by the supplier between raw-material cost changes and the impact on its price list is manifestly erroneous.

              Lastly, specific provisions apply to contracts entered into between a supplier and a distributor “relating to the design and production of food products in accordance with specifications meeting the buyer’s specific needs and marketed under a private label”, as set out in Article L. 441-7 of the French Commercial Code.

              Invoicing and payment terms for food products and beverages

              Invoicing and payment terms: any purchase and sale transaction must give rise to an invoice, issued upon completion of the transaction and containing a number of mandatory particulars. In addition, the Commercial Code provides for a default payment period of 30 days, with a maximum payment period of 60 days or 45 days end of month, and sets out late payment penalties and a fixed recovery fee in the event of late payment (Art. L. 441-9 and L. 441-10 Com.C)

              In addition, the legislator has introduced specific payment deadlines for food products and beverages (Art. L. 441-11 Com.C):

              • Perishable agricultural products, perishable food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals: 30 days from delivery. In the case of periodic billing:30 days after the end of the ten-day period;
              • For seasonal fruits and vegetables: 30 days from the end of the month of delivery;
              • Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption: 20 days from the date of delivery;
              • Alcoholic beverages subject to excise duty (e.g., Armagnac, Cognac, brandy, gin, rum, vodka): 30 days from the end of the month of delivery. For wine and other non-sparkling fermented beverages covered by Article L. 665-3 CRPM, the first buyer must, in principle, pay the seller (or its subrogee) an advance of at least 15% of the order amount within ten clear days after conclusion of the sale contract. Since 20 August 2026, interprofessional bodies may provide a derogation from this advance-payment obligation only in the context of multiannual contracts.
              • Non-perishable agricultural and food products: If the invoice is issued by the supplier: 60 days from the date of issue of the invoice; and If the invoice is issued by the buyer: 60 days from the date of preparation of the invoice.

               

              Logistics penalties

              Logistics penalites: lastly, the French Commercial Code strictly regulates specific contractual sanctions known as “logistics penalties”, relating to the supplier’s failure to comply with its delivery, conformity, or timing obligations (Art. L. 441-17 Com.C).

              What are the penalties for breaching the contractual requirements?

              In the event of a breach of contractual requirements, several sanctions may apply:

              • Seller’s pricing policy: an administrative fine not exceeding €15,000 for a natural person and €75,000 for a legal entity ( L. 441-1 Com.C).

              For food products and products intended for pet food, the administrative fine may not exceed €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, and the maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 443-8 Com.C). The new information requirements attached to an optional automatic price-revision formula in the supplier’s terms and conditions (Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C.) are also backed by the administrative sanction provided in Article L. 443-8 Com.C. More generally, any breach of Article L. 443-8 I to VI is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum doubled for a repeated infringement within two years.

              • Buyer’s commercial cooperation policy and formalisation of negotiations: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-6 Com.C).

              Failure to comply with the March 1st deadline provided for in Article L. 441-3(IV) is punishable by an administrative fine not exceeding €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity. In the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final, the maximum fine is increased to €400,000 for a natural person and €2,000,000 for a legal entity. For suppliers falling within the temporary €350 million turnover experiment introduced by the 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law, references to the 1 March deadline must be read as 31 January for the duration of the experiment (until 31 December 2029).

              • Absence of a price revision clause in the agricultural sector: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-7 C)
              • Absence of a renegotiation clause: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-8 Com.C)).
              • Failure to comply with payment deadlines, absence of mandatory information required under the terms of payment, setting of non-compliant rates or conditions for late payment penalties, and failure to comply with the terms of calculation of payment deadlines agreed between the parties: administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €2 million for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €4 million for a legal entity in the event of a repeat offense within two years of the date on which the first penalty decision became final ( L. 441-16 Com.C).

               

              Which unfair practices does French law prohibit beyond the Directive?

              In addition to the contractual obligations described above, aimed at preventing abuses and unfair commercial practices between businesses, Articles L. 442-1 to L. 442-12 of the French Commercial Code set out a list of «unfair commercial practices between undertakings» (« pratiques commerciales déloyales entre entreprises »), including:

              • Obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage without consideration or manifestly disproportionate to the consideration provided (Art. L. 442-1(I) Com.C);
              • Subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations creating a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
              • Subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or operating conditions are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.);
              • imposing logistics penalties in breach of Article 441-17 (Art. L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
              • Applying or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, or sales or purchase conditions not justified by real consideration set out in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
              • Failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, leading to the failure to conclude a contract within the deadline set out in Article L. 441-3 ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
              • Abruptly terminating, even partially, an established commercial relationship without sufficient written notice, taking into account the duration of the relationship and industry practices or interprofessional agreements ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
              • Implementing, during contract negotiations, a substantial reduction in the volume of orders placed with an established commercial partner, even temporarily, where the scale, unusual nature or circumstances of the reduction are such as to jeopardise the balance of the established commercial relationship ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
              • For operators providing online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations laid down therein, other clauses and practices remaining governed by Title IV of Book IV ( L. 442-1, III Com.C.);
              • Directly or indirectly participating in a breach of the prohibition on out-of-network resale imposed on a distributor bound by an exempt selective or exclusive distribution agreement ( L. 442-2 Com. C);
              • Clauses deemed null and void, including retroactive rebates, discounts or commercial cooperation benefits, automatic granting of more favourable terms granted to competing undertakings, or prohibitions on assigning receivables ( L. 442-3 Com.C);
              • Resale at a loss or announcement of resale at a loss ( L. 442-5 Com.C.);
              • Imposing a minimum resale price on a distributor ( L. 442-6 Com.C.);
              • For buyers of agricultural or food products, imposing an abnormally low purchase price on suppliers ( L. 442-7 Com.C);
              • Regulation of remote reverse auctions ( L. 442-8 Com.C.);
              • Artificially increasing or decreasing prices, particularly in remote auctions, through false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or any other fraudulent means ( L. 442-9 Com.C);
              • Associations or cooperatives offering products for sale or providing services not provided for in their bylaws( L. 442-10 Com.C.);
              • Use of public property belonging to the State, local authorities or public bodies to sell products or provide services under irregular conditions ( L. 442-11 Com.C);
              • For cloud computing service providers, granting unlimited cloud credits or making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the conclusion of such an agreement ( L. 442-12 Com.C.).

               

              What are the penalties for unfair commercial practices in France?

              General sanctions regime under Article L. 442-4

              The unfair commercial practices listed below are subject to the same sanction’s regime, as provided for in Article L. 442-4 of the French Commercial Code. The practices concerned are the following:

              • L. 442-1, I, 1° Com.C: obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage that does not correspond to any consideration or is clearly disproportionate to the consideration given;
              • L. 442-1, I, 2° Com.C: subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations that create a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
              • L. 442-1, I, 3° Com.C: imposing logistical penalties in violation of Article L. 441-17;
              • L. 442-1, I, 4° Com.C: practicing or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, conditions, or terms of sale or purchase that are not justified by actual considerations provided for in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage;
              • L. 442-1, I, 5° Com.C: failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, resulting in the contract not being concluded within the deadline specified in Article L. 441-3;
              • L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.: subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or modalities are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations;
              • L. 442-1, II Com.C.: implementing a substantial reduction in order volumes during contract negotiations, including temporarily, where its scale, unusual nature or the circumstances are liable to jeopardise the balance of an established commercial relationship;
              • L. 442-1, III Com.C: for operators offering online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations set out in this text; other clauses or practices remain governed by Title IV of Book IV;
              • Art L. 442-2 C: participating directly or indirectly in the violation of the prohibition on resale outside the network imposed on distributors bound by a selective or exclusive distribution agreement exempted under competition law;
              • Art L. 442-3 C: using clauses or contracts allowing the producer to benefit from retroactive benefit of discounts (“remises”), rebates (“rabais”), or commercial cooperation; the automatic granting of more favorable terms to competing companies; prohibition on assigning claims against the other party to third parties;
              • L. 442-7 Com.C: for a buyer of agricultural products or foodstuffs, imposing an abusively low selling price on its supplier;
              • Article L. 442-8 C: regulation of remote reverse auctions.

              For all these practices:

              • the victim of such practices may have the illegal clauses or contracts declared null and void and request the restitution of undue benefits;

              the French Minister for the Economy or the Public Prosecutor may request the court to:

              • order the cessation of the practices;
              • declare illegal clauses or contracts null and void and obtain restitution of undue benefits;

              request the imposition of a civil fine, the amount of which may not exceed:

              • five million euros;
              • three times the amount of the benefits unduly received or obtained;
              • or 5% of the turnover excluding tax generated in France by the perpetrator of the practices during the last financial year ended preceding the financial year in which the practices were implemented.

              The court shall systematically order the publication, dissemination, or posting of its decision or an extract thereof, in accordance with the terms and conditions it specifies.

              Practices subject to specific sanctions

              • L. 442-5 Com.C: resale at a loss or the announcement of resale at a loss is punishable by a fine not exceeding 0.4% of the annual turnover excluding VAT generated in France during the last closed financial year (Art. L. 442-5, I Com.C);
              • L. 442-6 Com.C: imposition of a minimum resale price on the distributor is punishable by a maximum fine of €75,000 for legal entities;
              • L. 442-9 Com.C: causing an artificial increase or decrease in prices, in particular in remote auctions, by disseminating false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or by any other fraudulent means, is punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €225,000 for food products. Additional penalties may also apply;
              • L. 442-11 Com.C: using public property belonging to the State, local authorities or their public bodies to offer products for sale or to provide services under irregular condition is punishable by seizure on the premises, for a period not exceeding one month, of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services. It may also give rise to the confiscation of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services, and to an order to pay the Public Treasury an amount corresponding to the value of the seized products;
              • L. 442-12 Com.C: for a cloud computing service provider, granting unlimited cloud computing credits credits to a person engaged in production, distribution or service activities and making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the simultaneous conclusion of such an agreement constitutes an unfair commercial practice punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €1,500,000 (Article L. 132-2 of the French Consumer Code: sanctions for misleading commercial practices – « sanction despratiques commerciales trompeuses»).

               

              Which authority enforces the rules, and what powers does it have?

              The national authority responsible for enforcement is the administrative authority in charge of competition and consumer affairs: the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF). The DGCCRF has investigative powers (Article L. 450-1 of the French Commercial Code), may issue injunctions (Article L. 470-1 of the French Commercial Code), and imposes administrative fines and sanctions for breaches of Title IV of Book IV and for non-compliance with injunctions (Article L. 470-2 of the French Commercial Code).

              What did the DGCCRF’s latest enforcement report find?

              According to the last DGCCRF’s 2024 report, DGCCRF «inspected 186 establishments in the dairy, cattle, pork, poultry and egg sectors in order to verify compliance with the mandatory written contractualisation between producers and their first buyers. ». The report further states that «the regulation of commercial relations and negotiations is likely to give rise to a new Egalim law, following the publication of several parliamentary reports. »In this respect, a parliamentary report on the application of the so-called «Egalim 38» law was submitted on 13 March 2024. The legislative development anticipated in that report has since materialised in Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026, which substantially amended agricultural contractualisation and food-sector commercial negotiation rules with effect, for most of the relevant provisions, from 20 August 2026.

              ***

              Frequently asked questions on unfair trading practices in France

              Does French law apply if my company is not established in France?

              Yes, as regards the substantive rules. France did not adopt the turnover thresholds of Directive 2019/633, so the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers. Whether a French court will hear a dispute is a separate question.

              Can we choose a law other than French law in an agri-food supply contract?

              In principle yes. French law contains no specific conflict-of-law rules for agri-food supply contracts, so the choice is governed by the Rome I Regulation, under which the parties are free to choose the applicable law. Article L. 444-1.A of the Commercial Code appears to claim French law for products marketed in France, but French case law has repeatedly refused to treat restrictive trade practices as overriding mandatory rules.

              Will a jurisdiction or arbitration clause be upheld by the French courts?

              In practice yes. Article L. 444-1.A expressly reserves compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction and with arbitration. French courts may assert the exclusive jurisdiction rule only in very limited circumstances, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has entered into no relevant convention with France.

              What is the payment deadline for perishable food products in France?

              Thirty days from delivery for perishable agricultural and food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals. Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption must be paid within 20 days of delivery, seasonal fruit and vegetables within 30 days of the end of the month of delivery, and non-perishable agricultural and food products within 60 days (Article L. 441-11 of the Commercial Code).

              By what date must the annual agreement with a distributor be signed?

              Before 1 March or 31 January (when supplier’s turnover is less than €350 million) of each year, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements. Missing that deadline is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity, doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years.

              Must a contract with an agricultural producer include a price revision clause?

              Yes. The contract between a producer and its first buyer must provide for automatic upward and downward price revision mechanisms, based in particular on indicators relating to agricultural production costs and to changes in those costs. The absence of such a clause is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity.

              How long must a supply contract with an agricultural producer last?

              At least three years, and the contract must include a clause to that effect. The term may be extended up to a maximum of five years where an interprofessional agreement so provides (Article L. 631-24, III, 5° of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code).

              After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

              A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

              The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

              From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

              This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

              Why wine matters in this agreement

              The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

              1. tariff liberalisation;
              2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
              3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
              4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

              This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

              At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

              Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

              Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

              Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

              For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

              1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
              2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
              3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

              The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

              Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

              More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

              Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

              The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) and “Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

              This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

              For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

              Geographical indications: protection and tension

              One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

              The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

              From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

              1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
              2. transition periods for local operators;
              3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

              This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

              Services, distribution, and market structure

              Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

              Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

              The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

              1. logistics providers
              2. distribution networks
              3. commercial representation
              4. marketing and advertising agencies

              For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

              Legal advisors will need to consider:

              1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
              2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
              3. compliance with competition rules

              The implementation gap: where risk lies

              Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

              Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

              This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

              For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

              1. managing client expectations
              2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
              3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

              What should lawyers be doing now?

              Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

              Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

              1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
              2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
              3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
              4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

              In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

              Final sip

              The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

              Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

              At major events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, some companies attempt to “wildly” associate their brand or image with the event through a practice known as “ambush marketing” , defined by French courts as “an advertising strategy implemented by a company in order to associate its commercial image with that of an event and thereby benefit from the media impact of that event without paying the relevant fees and without having obtained the prior authorisation of the event organiser” (Paris Court of Appeal, 2nd chamber, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912). A risky and unlawful practice, but one that is sometimes conceivable.

              Key points

              • Ambush marketing is a practice that may give rise to sanctions but is not prohibited as such.
              • In return for their investments in the competition, FIFA’s official sponsors and partners enjoy very strong legal protection, through various general instruments (infringement, free-riding/parasitism, intellectual property) and more specific ones (sports law), against all forms of ambush marketing.
              • The FIFA World Cup benefits from enhanced protection based on an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide and on FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines, in the absence of specific French legislation comparable to that enacted for the Olympic Games.
              • However, these rights are not absolute, and there remain narrow opportunities for a (clever) form of ambush marketing.

              Protection of official World Cup sponsors and partners against ambush marketing

              Reaching nearly 5 billion people across all platforms during its last edition in Qatar in 2022, including more than 1.5 billion viewers for the final alone, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is the most-watched sporting event on the planet. Hosted for the first time by three countries (Canada, Mexico and the United States), it brings together 48 teams and more than 1,200 players for 104 matches across 16 stadiums. Its organisation is largely financed by various official partners, sponsors and rights holders, who in return receive the exclusive right to use FIFA’s official trademarks and intellectual property so as to associate their own image and distinctive signs with the competition.

              Ambush marketing is not sanctioned as such under French law, but a range of statutory provisions allow for broad protection of sponsors and partners of world-class sporting events against ambush marketing. They are indeed entitled to peacefully enjoy the rights offered to them in exchange for the significant investments they make in connection with events such as, for example, the football or rugby World Cups, or the Olympic Games.

              The following legal instruments may in particular be invoked by official sponsors and by the organisers of such events:

              • the “classic” protections offered by intellectual property law (trademark law and copyright) by way of an infringement action under the French Intellectual Property Code,
              • civil liability law (parasitism/free-riding and unfair competition based on article 1240 of the French Civil Code),
              • consumer law (misleading commercial practices),
              • but also more specific provisions, such as the protection of the exploitation rights of sports federations and organisers of sporting events under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, which grants organisers of sporting events a monopoly over the exploitation of those events.

              On these grounds, the following ambush marketing practices have notably been sanctioned:

              The exploitation of a tennis competition and the use, during the sporting event, of the brand associated with it: An online betting operator organised bets on Roland Garros matches using the protected sign and Roland Garros trademark to identify the matches on which bets were offered. The unlawful exploitation of the sporting competition was sanctioned at EUR 400,000 under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, the French Tennis Federation being the sole owner of the right to exploit Roland Garros. The use of the trademark was also sanctioned for infringement (EUR 300,000) and free-riding/parasitism (EUR 500,000) (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 Oct. 2009, No. 08/19179; Paris Judicial Court, 8 Aug. 2024, No 08/19179).

              An advertising campaign carried out during a film festival reproducing the event’s registered trademark: During the Cannes Film Festival, a cosmetics brand published videos on its social media showing its brand ambassadors being styled, with the official Cannes Film Festival poster visible in certain shots, one of which reproduced the registered Palme d’Or trademark. Sanctioned on the grounds of copyright infringement and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Judicial Court, 11 Dec. 2020, No. 19/08543).

              An advertising campaign falsely claiming the status of official event partner: During the Cannes Film Festival, the use of the slogan “official hairdresser of women” alongside the expressions “Cannes” and “Festival de Cannes”, and other publications that falsely led the public to believe the company was an official festival partner, to the detriment of the sole official festival hairdresser. Sanctioned on the grounds of unfair competition and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Court of Appeal, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912).

              These financial sanctions may be combined with injunctions to cease the practices and/or orders for press publication, subject to periodic penalty payments.

              FIFA’s specific trademark protection

              Unlike the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, which benefited from specific French legislation as a host country (Law No. 2018-202 of 26 March 2018 on the organisation of the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games) reserving in particular advertising spaces in the vicinity of competition venues exclusively for official partners, the 2026 FIFA World Cup does not take place on French territory, and therefore no equivalent French legal framework applies. The protection of official partners and sponsors thus relies on general law , but is nonetheless robust.

              FIFA has built an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide, protected in France by the provisions of the French Intellectual Property Code. These trademarks include in particular the verbal and figurative trademark FIFA®, the marks FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, as well as the official competition emblem (combining the trophy with the figure 26), the official slogan “We Are 26™” / “Nous Sommes 26™”, the logos of the sixteen host cities, and the official typeface “FWC 26”, protected by copyright. Only FIFA’s rights holders, namely the FIFA Partners (led by Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways and Visa), the Plus Sponsors, the Official Sponsors and Regional Supporters, are authorised to use this official intellectual property for commercial purposes.

              FIFA has published Intellectual Property Guidelines (version 2.0, June 2024) detailing the authorised and prohibited uses of the trademarks and logos associated with the 2026 World Cup. According to these guidelines, the following are prohibited without authorisation: any use of official trademarks in commercial advertising; the incorporation of official intellectual property into a trade name or domain name; the organisation of competitions, games or prize draws creating an association with the competition; the use of official trademarks to decorate a retail store; and the use of official hashtags by a corporate account for commercial purposes. The guidelines further specify that protection extends not only to identical reproduction of official trademarks but also to confusingly similar variants. This protection, recalled in the guidelines, is consistent with the enhanced protection afforded to well-known trademarks under French law by article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code.

              Lessons from the Paris 2024 Olympic Games: what risks do brands face?

              The Paris 2024 Olympic Games gave rise to significant litigation that clearly illustrates the risks faced by companies tempted by ambush marketing at a major sporting event. Although these decisions were rendered in the specific context of the Olympic Games, which benefited from specific, reinforced legal protections, they nevertheless constitute a direct warning for brands that might consider similar strategies during the World Cup, on the basis of general law.

              The use of official symbols on travelling physical media: During the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, a Chinese dairy company had buses displaying the Olympic rings alongside its own brands circulating throughout Paris, while presenting itself as “the only Chinese dairy company present in Paris 2024”. The Paris Court of Appeal upheld both free-riding/parasitism and trademark infringement, and ordered the companies concerned, in summary proceedings, to pay EUR 20,000 per defendant, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 20,000 per day per proven infringement, aimed at stopping the diffusion of the advertising (Paris Court of Appeal, pole 5, chamber 2, 21 Nov. 2025, No. 24/15283; Paris Court, interim order of 8 Aug. 2024, No. 24/55463). This judgment illustrates the vigilance of French courts with regard to strategies of visual association with an event, even without an explicit claim of official partnership, and confirms the possibility of combining infringement and parasitism claims for substantial awards.

              The unauthorised broadcast of competitions: The Paris Court, sitting in summary proceedings during the Olympic Games, ordered the immediate cessation of the broadcast of Olympic competitions by a streaming platform that did not hold the corresponding media rights, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 1,500 per identified infringement, EUR 3,000 per day for ongoing distributions and EUR 5,000 per day for failure to withdraw the content (Paris Court, summary proceedings, 18 Sept. 2024, No. 24/53019). Thus, any platform broadcasting World Cup matches without holding the rights licensed by FIFA faces immediate emergency measures under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code.

              The enhanced protection of well-known trademarks: The French Court of Cassation confirmed that protection of Olympic trademarks extends beyond strict reproduction: it is sufficient for the trademark to be evoked or suggested, without the need to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public. This solution, based on article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, was applied to a bar that had used the Olympic rings on its coasters to promote its broadcast evenings (Court of Cassation, Criminal chamber, 17 Jan. 2017, No. 15-86.363). FIFA’s trademarks being equally well-known worldwide, the same protective regime applies to them: a mere evocation of official trademarks, even without literal reproduction, may constitute an actionable infringement.

              Certain marketing operations may escape sanction

              Analysis of case law and promotional practices nonetheless reveals the contours of certain advertising practices that could be permitted (not sanctioned by the provisions described above), provided they are carefully prepared and presented. Here are some examples.

              Creative or humorous communication

              • A tongue-in-cheek, even humorous approach may allow companies to avoid the sanctions described above. For example, Intersnack’s Vico crisps brand launched a promotional campaign in 2016 around the slogan “Vico, partner of supporters at home”.
              • Irish bookmaker Paddy Power sponsored an egg-and-spoon race in “London”, a village in Burgundy, France, in order to display the following slogan in London during the 2012 Olympic Games: “Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is)”. The Olympic organising committee failed to stop this campaign. British humour …
              • Meanwhile, Heineken, a rival of official Euro 2016 sponsor Carlsberg, marketed a range of beer bottles in the colours of the flags of 21 countries that had “marked its history”, the majority of which were participating in the tournament.

              Using factual information as advertising

              It was held lawful to use the results of a rugby match and the announcement of an upcoming match in a newspaper to promote a car brand, with the advertisement reading: “France 13 England 24 , the Fiat 500 congratulates England on its victory and looks forward to seeing the French team on 9 March for France-Italy”. The judges considered that this publication “merely reproduces a current sporting result, obtained and made public on the front page of the sports newspaper, and refers to a future fixture also known to have been announced in the newspaper’s editorial content” (Court of Cassation, Commercial chamber, 20 May 2014, No. 13-12.102).

              Sponsoring players participating in the World Cup

              Any company may enter into partnerships with players participating in the FIFA World Cup, for example by supplying them with equipment or clothing bearing its logo. FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines expressly state that they “contain no affirmations regarding rights held by third parties such as players, clubs, member associations [or] confederations”. FIFA’s guidelines also explicitly confirm that generic images related to football, national teams or national flags do not fall within the official intellectual property. Caution is nonetheless warranted: the partnership must not create the impression of a commercial association with FIFA or the competition, nor use FIFA’s official trademarks.

              A combined legal and marketing approach in designing and preparing the message of any such communication campaign is essential to avoid legal proceedings, particularly on the grounds of free-riding/parasitism. Certain advertising campaigns can therefore legitimately be considered, particularly when they are clever.

              Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

              Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

              In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

              The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

              With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

              In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

              The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

              This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

              However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

              Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

              The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

              In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

              Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

              For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

              What the EU decision does (and does not) do

              The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

              At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

              In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

              The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

              Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

              Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

              Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

              The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

              Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

              Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

              How different payment types are affected in practice

              Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

              The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

              Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

              If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

              Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

              Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

              Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

              Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

              Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

              Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

              How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

              Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

              For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

              A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

              Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

              A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

              This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

              A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

              A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

              Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

              EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

              Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

              Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

              DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

              Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

              Country notes (alphabetical)

              Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

              France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

              Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

              Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

              For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

              Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

              Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

              Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

               

              Practical next steps for EU companies

              1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
              2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
              3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
              4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
              5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
              6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
              7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
              8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
              9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

              Under French Law, franchisors and distributors are subject to two kinds of pre-contractual information obligations: each party must spontaneously inform their future partner of any information they know is decisive to their consent. In addition, for certain contracts – i.e a franchise agreement – there is a duty to disclose a limited amount of information in a document. These pre-contractual obligations are mandatory rules of public policy. Thus, these two obligations apply simultaneously to the franchisor, distributor or dealer when negotiating a contract with a partner.

              Takeaways

              • The information required by the DIP must be fully completed and updated ;
              • The information not required by the DIP but provided by the franchisor must be carefully selected and sincere;
              • Franchisee must be given the opportunity to request additional information from the franchisor;
              • Franchisee’s experience in the economic sector enables the franchisor to considerably limit its exposure to the risk of contract cancellation due to a defect in the franchisee’s consent;
              • Franchisor must keep the proof of the actual disclosure of pre-contractual information (whether mandatory or not).
              • The general information obligation under common law (Article 1112-1 of the French Civil Code) may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation provided for under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code.

              General duty of disclosure for all contractors

              What is the scope of this pre-contractual information?

              This obligation is imposed on all counterparties, for any kind of contract. Indeed, article 1112-1 of the Civil Code states that:

              (§. 1) The party who knows information of decisive importance for the consent of the other party must inform the other party if the latter legitimately ignores this information or trusts its counterparty.

              (§. 3) Of decisive importance is the information that is directly and necessarily related to the content of the contract or the quality of the parties. »

              This obligation applies to all contracting parties for any type of contract.

              French courts have ruled that this general information obligation may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code (see below), answering the question in the affirmative (Paris Court of Appeal, 27 March 2024, no. 22/12665). The scope of the latter has however, been defined by the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») : only information bearing a direct and necessary link with the subject matter of the contract or the qualities of the parties is subject to the disclosure obligation (Cass. com., 14 May 2025, no. 23-17.948).

              Who bears the burden of proof?

              The burden of proof rests on the person who claims that the information was due to him. He must then prove (i) that the other party owed him the information but (ii) did not provide it (Article 1112-1 (§. 4) of the Civil Code)

              Special duty of disclosure for franchise and distribution agreements

              Which contracts are subject to this special rule?

              French law requires (art. L.330-3 French Commercial Code) the provision of a pre-contractual information document (in French “DIP”) and the draft contract, by any person:

              • which grants another person the right to use a trade mark, trade name or sign,
              • while requiring an exclusive or quasi-exclusive commitment for the exercise of its activity (e.g. exclusive purchase obligation). The quasi-exclusive nature of the commitment is assessed on a case-by-case basis by French courts, independently of the 80% purchase threshold provided for under EU Regulation 2022/720, which is treated merely as an indicative reference.

              Concretely, DIP must be provided, for example, to the franchisee, distributor, dealer or licensee of a brand, by its franchisor, supplier or licensor as soon as the two above conditions are met. French courts have moreover recently had occasion to confirm that the scope of the DIP obligation is not limited to franchise agreements but extends, in particular, to dealership agreements, provided the above-mentioned conditions are met (Paris Court of Appeal, 22 May 2024, no. 22/08672).

              When the DIP must be provided?

              DIP and draft contract must be provided at least 20 days before signing the contract, and, where applicable, before the payment of the sum required to be paid prior to the signature of the contract (for a reservation).

              What information must be disclosed in the DIP?

              Article R. 330-1 of the French Commercial Code requires that DIP mentions the following information (non-detailed list) concerning:

              • Franchisor (identity and experience of the managers, career path, etc.);
              • Franchisor’s business (in particular creation date, head office, bank accounts, history of the development of the business, annual accounts, etc.);
              • Operating network (members list with indication of signing date of contracts, establishments list offering the same products/services in the area of the planned activity, number of members having ceased to be part of the network during the year preceding the issue of the DIP with indication of the reasons for leaving, etc.);
              • Trademark licensed (date of registration, ownership and use);
              • General state of the market (about products or services covered by the contract) and local state of the market (about the planned area) and information relating to factors of competition and development perspective. With respect to the local market, the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») has held that the franchisor is not required to conduct a market study, but that if one is provided, it must be accurate and verifiable (Cass. com., 18 Oct. 2023, no. 22-19.329).;
              • Essential element of the draft contract and at least: its duration, contract renewal conditions, termination and assignment conditions and scope of exclusivities;
              • Financial obligations weighing in on contracting party: nature and amount of the expenses and investments that will have to be incurred before starting operations (up-front entry fee, installation costs, etc.).

              Beyond the exhaustiveness of the information required under the aforementioned provision, the DIP is subject to a qualitative standard. All information provided — including information provided spontaneously — must be accurate and truthful to ensure that the prospective network member’s consent is fully informed and free from any defect.

              How to prove the disclosure of information?

              The burden of proof for the delivery of the DIP rests on the debtor of this obligation: the franchisor (Cass. Com., 7 July 2004, n°02-15.950). The ideal for the franchisor is to have the franchisee sign and date his DIP on the day it is delivered and to keep the proof thereof.

              The clause of contract indicating that the franchisee acknowledges having received a complete DIP does not provide proof of the delivery of a complete DIP (Cass. com, 10 January 2018, n° 15-25.287).

              The franchisor is subject to a duty to update the DIP until the contract is signed

              In a ruling dated 26 June 2024 (no. 23-14.085 PB), the French Supreme Court held that formal compliance of the DIP at the time of its delivery is not sufficient to exonerate the franchisor from all pre-contractual liability. This position was confirmed by a subsequent ruling of 4 December 2024 (no. 23-16.684).

              These two decisions appear to establish a duty of ongoing updates incumbent upon the network head throughout the entire period between the delivery of the DIP and the execution of the contract. Where significant events occur during that interval — insolvency proceedings affecting network members, major litigation, or structural changes to the network — the network head is required to proactively inform the prospective member. The court then examines whether the failure to disclose such information was liable to distort the candidate’s assessment of the network and, consequently, to vitiate his consent (Cass. com., 26 June 2024, op. cit.).

              A franchisor may therefore not shelter behind the initial regularity of the DIP to discharge its disclosure duty where the network’s situation has materially changed prior to the signing of the contract.

              Sanction for breach of pre-contractual information duties

              Criminal sanction

              Failing to comply with the obligations relating to the DIP, franchisor or supplier can be sentenced to a criminal fine of up to 1,500 euros and up to 3,000 euros in the event of a repeat offence, the fine being multiplied by five for legal entities (article R.330-2 French commercial Code).

              Cancellation of the contract for deceit

              The contract may be declared null and void in case of breach of either article 1112-1 of the French Code civil or article L. 330-3 of the French Code de commerce. In both cases, failure to comply with the obligation to provide information is sanctioned if the applicant demonstrates that his or her consent has been vitiated by error, deceit or violence. In this respect, courts conduct a concrete, case-by-case assessment, taking into account in particular the professional experience and personal due diligence of the distributor: a sophisticated candidate will face greater difficulty in establishing deceit, and his experience in the relevant sector may be sufficient to exonerate the franchisor (Paris Court of Appeal, div. 5 – ch. 11, 26 Apr. 2024, no. 21/13205), even where the information provided was incomplete or inaccurate (Paris Court of Appeal, 20 Jan. 2021, no. 19/03382).

              The path is therefore narrow for the franchisee: he cannot invoke error concerning profitability when it is he who draws up his plan, and even when this plan is drawn up by the franchisor or based on information drawn up and transmitted by the franchisor, the experience of the franchisee who knew the local market may exonerate the franchisor.

              Regarding deceit, Courts strictly assess its two conditions which are:

              • (a material element) the existence of a lie or deceptive reticence (article 1137 French Civil Code), and
              • (an intentional element) the intention to deceive his counterparty (article 1130 French Civil Code).

              Where applicable, the parties must return to the state they were in before the contract.

              Damages

              Although the claims for contract cancellation are subject to very strict conditions, it remains that franchisees/distributors may alternatively obtain damages on the basis of tort liability for non-compliance with the pre-contractual information obligation, subject to proof of fault (incomplete or incorrect information), damage (loss of opportunity of not contracting or contracting on more advantageous terms) and the causal link between the two.

              Christophe Hery

              Practice areas

              • Arbitration
              • Agency
              • Antitrust
              • Distribution
              • e-commerce

              Contact Christophe





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                International distribution agreements | Key Clauses and Lessons learned from the history of Nike

                30 March 2026

                • Italy
                • Contracts
                • Distribution
                • Intellectual property
                • Trademark and Patents

                In Spain, a waiver of goodwill indemnity in a distribution agreement does not always protect the manufacturer. The Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal ordered a manufacturer to pay its distributor more than EUR 100,000 in goodwill indemnity and damages for insufficient notice, despite the written waiver, because it held that the agreement had expired and that good faith limited the waiver’s effect. To avoid the same risk, the manufacturer should renew the agreement in writing before it expires or expressly provide that waivers remain effective, specify which customer base the waiver covers and give notice proportionate to the duration of the relationship.

                Summary

                • The distributor’s case and the manufacturer’s liability
                • What the Court of Appeal decided on the waiver
                • Why the waiver was not applied
                • A valid waiver with limits: distribution and agency
                • Whether the waiver should have fallen away with the agreement
                • What manufacturers distributing in Spain should do

                Goodwill indemnity in Spain: the distributor’s case

                For more than twenty years, the manufacturer and distributor worked together without a written agreement. In 2018, they signed a two-year contract. The distributor agreed to waive both goodwill indemnity and damages arising from termination.

                The agreement expired in December 2020. Neither party renewed it, but they continued doing business together.

                Months later, the manufacturer decided to end the relationship. It gave less than two months’ notice and alleged breaches by the distributor that it was unable to prove.

                Waiver of goodwill indemnity: what the Court of Appeal decided

                In a distribution relationship, the distributor can waive goodwill indemnity. In an agency relationship, an advance waiver is not permitted. In this case, however, the Court of Appeal held that the waiver no longer applied because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The court also considered that good faith could limit the waiver’s effect, given the length of the relationship and its termination without good cause.

                The argument based on expiry is debatable: a clause intended to govern the end of an agreement should not lose its effect simply because that agreement ends. To avoid this uncertainty, parties that continue trading after expiry should renew the agreement in writing or expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

                Why was the goodwill indemnity waiver not applied?

                The Court of Appeal relied on two grounds.

                The first was the expiry of the agreement. Since the parties had continued trading without signing a new document, the court held that the waiver was no longer effective when the manufacturer ended the relationship.

                The second was good faith. Even if the waiver still applied, the court considered that it could not take full effect in those circumstances: more than twenty-five years of collaboration, a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause.

                Goodwill indemnity waiver: valid, but with limits

                The judgment is surprising because a distributor can, in principle, waive this indemnity. To understand why, it helps to distinguish distribution from agency.

                In agency relationships, the law protects the agent against an advance waiver. This follows from Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992, read together with the goodwill indemnity provisions in Article 28.

                In distribution relationships, the Spanish Supreme Court applies Article 28 by analogy where its requirements are met (judgment 944/2023 of 13 June). But this does not prevent a manufacturer and distributor from agreeing to exclude all compensation if either party terminates the agreement on notice. The Supreme Court confirmed this in its judgments of 4 December 2007, 15 January 2008, sitting in plenary session, and 25 April 2011.

                The distinction lies in how the relationship ends. That case law concerns ordinary termination, whether on notice or on expiry of the agreed term. A waiver offers less certainty where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice, as happened here.

                Should the waiver have fallen away with the agreement?

                Of the Court of Appeal’s two grounds, the first is the more debatable: that the waiver ceased to apply because the agreement had expired.

                The Spanish Supreme Court has enforced exclusion clauses precisely after an agreement has expired. It did so in its judgment of 23 December 2008. In that case, a dealer’s agreement ended when its extension expired. The court refused goodwill compensation because the agreement itself excluded any claim arising from its termination.

                The point is straightforward: if a clause is agreed to govern what happens when an agreement ends, it is difficult to argue that it loses its effect merely because the agreement ends.

                There is a difference here: the parties continued trading after expiry and, according to the Court of Appeal, did so on the terms that had traditionally governed their relationship. But continuing to trade does not, by itself, show that they intended to set aside a waiver relating to the customer base developed up to that point.

                There is an agency case that might appear to point the other way. The Supreme Court has prevented parties from dividing the indemnity into separate periods through successive declarations that there was “nothing further to claim” (judgment of 27 June 2013). Its reason, however, was the mandatory protection afforded by Article 28 of the Spanish Commercial Agency Act, which the parties cannot exclude. That restriction does not apply to distribution.

                Even if the waiver remained effective, there would still be the question of notice. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss. They compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business and would therefore not necessarily be covered by that waiver.

                What should manufacturers distributing in Spain do?

                Businesses may continue trading as usual and overlook the fact that their agreement has expired. This judgment illustrates the risk: when the time comes to end the relationship, the manufacturer may discover that the protections it relied on are no longer effective.

                The agreement should be renewed in writing before it expires. If the parties have already continued trading without renewal, they should document which terms still apply and expressly provide that waivers remain effective both after expiry and while the relationship continues without a new document.

                It is also important to specify which customer base the waiver covers. If it is intended to include the customer base already built up, this should be stated expressly, with a reference date, a defined territory and confirmation that the waiver is final.

                Finally, goodwill indemnity, damages for insufficient notice and other damages should be addressed separately. When ending the relationship, the manufacturer should give notice proportionate to its duration.

                Frequently asked questions on goodwill indemnity in Spain

                Is a waiver of goodwill indemnity valid in a distribution agreement in Spain?

                In principle, yes: in distribution the distributor can waive the indemnity, whereas in agency the law protects the agent against an advance waiver (Article 3 of Spain’s Commercial Agency Act, Law 12/1992). A waiver offers less certainty, however, where the manufacturer ends the relationship without good cause and gives insufficient notice.

                What happens to the waiver if the agreement expires and the parties keep trading?

                The risk is that it will not be applied. In the case decided by the Barcelona Provincial Court of Appeal, the waiver was held to be no longer effective because the agreement had expired and the parties had continued trading without renewing it. The argument is debatable, but to avoid uncertainty the agreement should be renewed in writing or should expressly provide that waivers remain effective.

                Can good faith limit a waiver of goodwill indemnity?

                According to the court, in that case it could: after more than twenty-five years of collaboration, with a customer base developed by the distributor and termination without good cause, the waiver could not take full effect.

                Does the waiver also cover damages for insufficient notice?

                Not necessarily. Damages for failing to give sufficient notice address a different loss, because they compensate the distributor for not having had a reasonable period to reorganise its business.

                How should the waiver be worded to cover the customer base already built up?

                It must say so expressly: the waiver should state a reference date, a defined territory and that the waiver is final.

                How much notice must the manufacturer give?

                The article does not give a number of days: it says that notice must be proportionate to the duration of the relationship. In the case examined, the manufacturer gave less than two months’ notice after more than twenty-five years of collaboration.

                Abstract: In February 2022, this previous article examined the adoption of Legislative Decree No. 198 of November 8, 2021 (the “Decree”), through which Italy transposed Directive (EU) 2019/633 (the “Directive”) on unfair commercial practices in business-to-business relationships within the agri-food supply chain.

                Four years later, the regulatory framework has evolved and the landscape has changed in part: the Italian legislature has made several amendments to the Decree, the designated enforcement authority has significantly stepped up its activities, and the first court decisions regarding the application of the Decree have been issued.

                This article aims to provide an updated overview.

                The Regulatory Framework: Original Structure and Subsequent Amendments

                The implementation of the Directive provided the Italian legislature with an opportunity to overhaul the pre-existing national regulations governing the agri-food supply chain—in particular those set forth in Article 62 of Decree-Law No. 1/2012. The result is a unified and systematic regulatory framework on the subject, contained in the Decree that entered into force on December 15, 2021.

                For an analysis of the structure and key provisions of the Decree, please refer to the previous article. The fundamental structural choices described in that article remain in effect: the Decree establishes mandatory contractual requirements for operators in the agricultural and food sector, identifies unfair practices that are always prohibited (the so-called “blacklist”) and those prohibited unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties (the so-called “gray list”), regulates below-cost sales (not covered by the Directive), provides for a comprehensive system of penalties to punish any violations, and designates the Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention (ICQRF) as the authority responsible for monitoring compliance with the Decree’s provisions.

                What is of interest here are the legislative amendments that have modified and supplemented the original text of the Decree. As will be seen, these amendments have tightened regulations that were already stricter than European standards at the time of the Decree’s adoption.

                The first amendment was introduced by Decree-Law No. 21/2022, which expanded the definition of perishable products to include meat-based products with specific physicochemical characteristics, and extended the applicability of the 30-day payment terms to the following agricultural and food products:

                “a) prepackaged products bearing an expiration date or a minimum shelf life not exceeding sixty days;

                1. b) bulk products, even if placed in protective packaging or refrigerated, that have not undergone treatments designed to extend their shelf life beyond sixty days;
                  c) meat products exhibiting one of the following physicochemical characteristics: awgreater than 0.95 and pH greater than 5.2, or awgreater than 0.91, or pH equal to or greater than 4.5;
                2. d) all types of milk.”

                 

                Subsequently, Decree-Law No. 69/2023 expanded the scope of the Decree to include “suppliers established in other Member States or in third countries when the buyer is established in Italy.” Therefore, today, the Decree applies to all business-to-business (B2B) sales contracts in which the supplier and/or the buyer is established in Italy, regardless of the parties’ turnover and the law applicable to the contract. This is an extremely broad scope of application, capable of effectively encompassing any commercial relationship in which at least one of the parties is Italian. This deliberate departure from the differentiated turnover thresholds provided for by the Directive—justified, according to the legislature, by the extraordinary fragmentation of the Italian agri-food supply chain—continues to define the broader scope of the Italian regime compared to the minimum level of harmonization established by the EU.

                Decree-Law No. 69/2023 also amended the minimum notice period for the buyer’s cancellation of orders for perishable products, prohibiting any “notice period so short as to reasonably lead one to believe that the supplier cannot find alternative outlets for its products” and delegating to a subsequent implementing regulation (not yet issued) to establish specific rules governing this matter. Finally, the provision extended to foreign suppliers the right to file complaints with the national enforcement authority (ICQRF).

                The most recent amendment to the Decree was introduced by Decree-Law No. 63/2024, which

                • added the provision that the supply price must take into account the cost of production
                • specified that wholesale markets also fall within the scope of the Decree
                • included, among the documents that the ICQRF may obtain, accounting documents relating to sales activities and related services, and
                • introduced the possibility of paying any penalties imposed under the Decree at a reduced rate, provided the contractor demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to mitigate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

                 

                The cumulative effect of the amendments outlined above is the establishment of regulations that are even stricter than those that took effect in December 2021 (which were already significantly more restrictive than the Directive).

                Mandatory Contractual Requirements: Persistent Compliance Challenges

                Article 3 of the Decree imposes several mandatory requirements for contracts for the sale of agricultural and food products: written form, a minimum term of 12 months, specification of the product’s quantity and characteristics, a fixed or determinable price that reflects production costs, and definition of the terms of delivery and payment.

                However, the legislature’s intention to establish a system that safeguards the contractual rights of the parties has clashed with the reality of commercial transactions in this sector. In fact, experience has shown that these contractual requirements remain the primary source of difficulty for operators in complying with the Decree. It is therefore not surprising that many of the objections raised by the ICQRF over the years have concerned precisely this aspect.

                The written form requirement is particularly critical: a significant percentage of operators, especially in sectors characterized by long-standing informal commercial relationships (the prime example being the wine sector), continue to conclude transactions without an adequate written framework agreement, relying instead on commercial customs and verbal agreements that the Decree does not recognize as sufficient. It is no coincidence that the reports issued by the ICQRF in recent years list the failure to enter into written contracts prior to the delivery of the products sold   among the most frequent violations found.

                Another aspect that is frequently penalized is the unilateral modification of prices: in several cases, buyers have attempted to adjust agreed-upon prices without the supplier’s written consent—a practice that the Decree expressly prohibits and that has been the subject of the first judicial decisions issued on the matter (which will be discussed in paragraph 6).

                Italian Specifics: Additional Prohibited Practices and Below-Cost Sales

                In addition to the “black list” and “gray list” of unfair practices prohibited by the Directive, Article 5 of the Decree identifies and prohibits 16 additional unfair practices, which stem from the pre-existing Italian regulatory framework. These include, for example, the purchase of agricultural and food products through double-reduction electronic tenders and auctions, the application of objectively different conditions for equivalent services, and the obtaining of undue unilateral benefits not justified by the nature or content of the commercial relationship.

                An interesting feature of the Italian list is its explicitly bilateral nature: unlike the Directive, which was designed to protect suppliers from potential abuses by larger and more powerful buyers, Article 5 of the Decree prohibits various unfair practices that also apply to suppliers, including the imposition of an unduly short expiration date, the forced maintenance of a specific product range, and the requirement to reserve a privileged shelf position for certain products. The Decree, therefore, also protects—in certain cases—buyers.

                Another distinctive feature of Italian law (and that of a few other countries in the European Union—Spain, Croatia, and Hungary) is the regulation of below-cost sales, which is not covered by the Directive.

                Under Article 7 of the Decree, sales below production cost are permitted only in two circumstances:

                • when perishable products are at risk of spoilage, or
                • if the commercial transaction has been planned and agreed upon in writing with the supplier. In all other cases, the price of the product sold below cost is automatically adjusted.

                It should be noted that the replacement criteria specified by the legislature (purchase invoices, average production costs, average product price) are unclear and have been subject to various interpretations.

                The penalties for violating the ban on below-cost sales are severe: administrative fines ranging from 1 to 6 million euros and suspension of business operations for up to 20 days in cases of repeat offenses or particularly serious violations.

                In any case, selling below cost is not merely a national issue; in fact, in its report dated December 1, 2025, on the evaluation of the Directive, the Commission indicated that it will propose a revision of the Directive to establish the principle that farmers should not be forced to systematically sell their products below production costs. We can therefore expect changes to the European regulations governing this issue.

                The Penalty System

                The Decree contains a comprehensive system of penalties, calibrated according to the nature and severity of the violation.

                Failure to comply with the provisions of the Decree results, depending on the case, in three types of consequences, which may apply cumulatively:

                1. Invalidity of the offending contractual clause, which is automatically replaced where the Decree so provides: for example, a term of less than 12 months is extended to that minimum period; a price below the cost of production is adjusted upward.
                2. Monetary penalties: fines ranging from a fixed minimum of between 1,000 and 30,000 euros, depending on the obligation violated, to a maximum varying from 3% to 5% of the annual revenue of the party responsible for the violation, which may be increased up to two or three times in the event of repeated violations, with an overall maximum limit of 10% of revenue. With specific regard to unfair practices, Article 10 of the Decree provides that those included on the “blacklist” are subject to administrative penalties ranging from 30,000 euros to 5% of the previous year’s revenue; those included on the “gray list” are subject to fines ranging from 15,000 euros to 3% of revenue; other practices prohibited under Article 5 are subject to penalties ranging from 5,000 euros to 4% of revenue.
                3. Compensation for Damages: Injured parties and their representative organizations may, in any case, file claims for compensation for damages (all of which must be proven).

                 

                As previously mentioned, starting in 2024, an operator subject to a monetary penalty may, within a strict deadline of thirty days from the notification of the injunction order, pay the penalty at a 50% reduction if the operator demonstrates that it has taken all appropriate measures to eliminate the harmful consequences of the violation alleged by the authority.

                Enforcement of the Regulations: The Expanding Role of the ICQRF

                Four years after its designation as the competent supervisory authority in Italy pursuant to the Decree, the ICQRF (Central Inspectorate for Quality Protection and Fraud Prevention) has become one of the most active supervisory bodies in the European Union in this sector. Working in coordination with the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Agri-Food Products, it conducts inspections both in response to reports and on its own initiative.

                The gradual intensification of this agency’s activities is remarkable. In 2022, the ICQRF conducted 139 inspections. By 2025, that number had risen to 3,536. Inspections resulting from complaints are—in fact—extremely rare, while the majority of inspections are carried out on the agency’s own initiative. Operators’ reluctance to file complaints—a phenomenon common across all EU member states and largely attributable to fears of commercial retaliation by stronger business partners—has made proactive enforcement the primary mechanism in practice.

                The most recent ICQRF reports confirm a significant upward trend in the volume of inspections, the number of operators investigated (76 in 2022 versus 1,430 in 2025), and the number of violations detected (15 in 2022, 562 in 2025). The sectors subject to the most frequent inspections are dairy products and fruits and vegetables, both characterized by large, structurally powerful buyers and a highly fragmented supplier base.

                The most commonly found violations include unilateral changes to contractual terms by the buyer, failure to comply with mandatory payment terms, and the absence of written sales contracts.

                Case Law on Unfair Practices in the Agri-Food Supply Chain

                The intensification of inspections and the issuance of injunctions against operators has, as was to be expected, led to the first disputes and, consequently, to the first court decisions regarding the Decree.

                Following appeals filed by certain operators in the dairy sector against administrative sanctions imposed for unilaterally modifying the agreed-upon price of milk, several trial courts (specifically the Court of Brescia and the Milan Court of Appeals) have confirmed that any price modification requires the written consent of all contracting parties. This is consistent with the text of the Decree, which prohibits unilateral changes to agreed-upon contractual terms and requires that agreements between the parties be in writing.

                In Judgment No. 1225 of April 29, 2025, published on June 12, 2025, the Milan Court of Appeals ruled that a letter revising the criteria for calculating the price—sent by the buyer to the supplier, not preceded by negotiations between the parties, and not signed by the supplier to indicate acceptance—constitutes a unilateral modification of the contractual terms relating to the price, which is punishable under Article 4(d) of the Decree. In fact, it cannot be considered a written agreement (since it is signed by only one party). It is true that Article 3 of the Decree provides for the possibility of fulfilling the written form requirement through “equivalent forms,” but this is conditional on the fundamental contractual elements (including the price) having been previously agreed upon between the buyer and the supplier through a framework agreement.

                Therefore, it is irrelevant that, in the present case, the supplier, by continuing to make deliveries, behaved in a manner that could be construed as tacit acceptance of the amendment, given that price agreements cannot be established through “equivalent forms.”

                The body of case law remains limited, so it is premature to draw definitive conclusions about the direction of case law in this area.

                However, there is no doubt that the operational boundaries of the penalty regime are gradually being defined and the interpretive limits of the Decree’s provisions are being clarified.

                Conclusion

                The Italian regulatory framework governing unfair commercial practices in the agricultural and food supply chain has, in the more than four years since its entry into force, moved from theory to practical application.

                The basic framework described in the previous article has been supplemented by subsequent legislative amendments, and enforcement of the regulations is overseen by a regulatory authority that has demonstrated both the will and the capacity to act. The proactive approach of the ICQRF, which is increasingly active in its role as an enforcement authority, leaves no doubt that compliance with the Decree is a practical imperative, not merely a theoretical one.

                For operators active in the Italian agri-food supply chain—whether they are suppliers, buyers, or intermediaries—the priorities are clear:

                • contracts must be in writing and comply with the mandatory requirements set forth in the Decree
                • business practices must be reviewed to verify their compliance with the law and ensure they do not fall under the list of prohibited practices, and
                • Business processes must ensure that each operator adheres to good commercial practices in its dealings with its partners and other operators in the supply chain.

                France regulates unfair trading practices in the agri-food supply chain more strictly than Directive (EU) 2019/633 requires. Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 30 June 2021 transposed the Directive into a framework already built by the Egalim laws, and France chose not to apply the turnover thresholds set out in the Directive: the rules therefore cover all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, whatever the size or nationality of the parties. Written annual agreements signed before 1 March, automatic price revision clauses, capped payment terms and administrative fines reaching €2 million, doubled for repeat infringements, are the core of the regime, enforced by the DGCCRF.

                Summary

                1. Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when
                2. Products covered by the French rules
                3. Scope of the French rules compared with the Directive
                4. Suppliers and buyers covered, regardless of size and nationality
                5. Applicable law and jurisdiction in international supply contracts
                6. Where French law goes further than the Directive
                7. Mandatory content of an agri-food supply agreement
                8. Penalties for breaching the contractual requirements
                9. Unfair practices prohibited beyond the Directive
                10. Penalties for unfair commercial practices
                11. The DGCCRF and its enforcement powers
                12. Findings of the latest DGCCRF report

                Which French law implements Directive (EU) 2019/633, and since when?

                Directive (EU) 2019/633 was transposed into French law by Ordinance No. 2021-859 of 2021, June 30th, whose provisions entered into force on July 1, 2021 and apply to contracts concluded as from November 1, 2021. Contracts concluded before that date were granted a 12-month period, starting on July 1, 2021, to comply with these provisions.

                This transposition forms part of an already well-established legislative framework shaped by « Egalim I » Law No. 2018-938 of October 30, 2018; « Egalim II » Law No. 2021-1357 of October 18, 2021 and « Egalim III » Law No. 2023-1041 of November 17, 2023, which strengthen contractual relations and the protection of agricultural producers. Even prior to the transposition of the Directive, French law had already refocused the rules on restrictive business practices around the following unlawful practices:

                • A significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
                • the granting of an advantage without consideration; and
                • The sudden termination of established business relationships.

                 

                The Ordinance of June 30, 2021 transposed those provisions of Directive (EU) 2019/633 that did not fall within this existing framework, specifically introducing three new restrictive practices applicable to agricultural and food products into the French Commercial Code  (Com.C):

                • The cancellation of an order for perishable products at short notice (Article L. 443-5 of the Com.C);
                • The unlawful obtaining, use, or disclosure of the supplier’s trade secrets (Article L. 443-6 of the Com.C);
                • The refusal to confirm in writing the terms of a supply agreement where the supplier has requested such confirmation (Article L. 443-7 of the Com.C).

                 

                This framework has been strengthened by Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026 on emergency measures for agricultural protection and sovereignty (the “2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law”), most of whose relevant provisions entered into force on 20 August 2026. The 2026 law notably amends agricultural contracting rules, food-sector price revision mechanisms and certain restrictive trade practices.

                Which agri-food products are covered by the French rules?

                Directive 2019/633 applies to the sale of “agricultural and food products”, defined in Article 2 as “the products listed in Annex I to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, as well as products not listed in that Annex but processed for use as food for human consumption by using products listed in that Annex”, subject to the annual turnover thresholds of suppliers and buyers set out in Article 1§2.

                Is the scope of the French rules broader than the Directive?

                In France, the scope of the provisions transposing the Directive is the same as that of EU law, as they apply to agricultural and food products.

                However, certain French provisions in this area have a broader scope of application. Many provisions of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code apply to commercial relationships relating to “production, distribution or service activities” (in particular restrictive practices – Article L. 442-1 Com.C). Some of these provisions apply to fast-moving consumer goods, defined in Article L. 441-4 of the French Commercial Code as “non-durable products with a high frequency and recurrence of consumption”, the list of which is set by decree, as well as to food products.

                Which suppliers and buyers are covered, and does their size matter?

                France chose not to introduce the supplier and buyer turnover thresholds provided for in Directive 2019/633. As a result, the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers.

                Which law applies to an international agri-food supply contract?

                French law does not provide for specific conflict-of-law rules applicable to supply contracts in the agri-food sector. At first glance, international contracts for the supply of agri-food products are therefore governed by the general conflict-of-law rules applicable in France.

                Choice of law under Rome I and the 1955 Hague Convention

                These general rules are laid down by Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, known as the Rome I Regulation. Rome I establishes as a general principle that the parties are free to choose the law applicable to an international contract, either expressly or implicitly. In the absence of an express choice, the applicable law depends on the legal characterization of the supply contract.

                A distinction must therefore be made depending on the nature of the supply contract. If the French court characterizes the contract as a contract for the sale of goods, it may apply either the Rome I Regulation or, more likely, the Hague Convention of 15 June 1955 on the law applicable to international sales of tangible movable goods. In both cases, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the seller is established. If the supply contract is characterized as a processing or bespoke supply contract, particularly where it is based on detailed specifications, the French court would apply the Rome I Regulation and may consider such a contract to constitute a service contract rather than a sale contract. In that case, the applicable law would be the law of the State in which the service provider is established.

                Article L. 444-1.A and the limits of overriding mandatory rules

                In addition, it its worthwhile looking at Article L. 444-1.A of the French Commercial Code which states

                “The provisions of Chapters I, II and III of this Title apply to any agreement between a supplier and a buyer relating to products or services marketed on French territory. These provisions are matters of public policy. Any dispute relating to their application falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts, subject to compliance with European Union law and international treaties ratified or approved by France and without prejudice to recourse to arbitration.”

                At first glance, this provision pretends to bring all commercial contracts within the scope of French law where the products or services are marketed in France, like an overriding mandatory rule (OMR). However, this approach appears ambiguous, unjustified and at the end ineffective.

                First, restrictive trade practices (RTP) do not constitute OMR within the meaning of the Rome I Regulation. Article L. 444-1.A does not expressly refer to the terms overriding mandatory rules and just merely recalls the domestic public policy nature of the relevant provisions.

                Second, French case law has repeatedly refused to qualify RTP as OMR, with the exception of enforcement actions brought by the French Ministry of Economy and Finance against third party imposing to their counterpart blatant imbalance clauses.

                Third, the general characterization of the provisions of Title IV of the French Commercial Code as OMR does not satisfy the test of sufficient connection and imperative necessity as defined by the ECJ in its ruling of 5 September 2024 (Huk-Coburg-Allgemeine Versicherung, Case C-86/23).

                Exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts and its exceptions

                With respect to jurisdiction, Article L. 444-1.A wants to create an exclusive jurisdiction of French courts for commercial matters such as RTP. However, it provides clear and wide exceptions based on compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction matters and with arbitration rules.

                In practice, any jurisdiction clause (subject to the exception here after) or arbitration clause stipulated in an international contract must be upheld by French courts, which must therefore decline jurisdiction. Only in very limited circumstances may French courts assert this exclusive jurisdiction rule, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has not entered into any relevant multilateral or bilateral convention with France (such as Lugano Convention, The Hague conventions…).

                Are the French rules stricter than Directive (EU) 2019/633?

                French commercial law is stricter than the rules laid down by Directive 2019/633, for several reasons:

                • A broader scope of application:
                • No thresholds limit the application of these provisions; as a result, all economic operators are covered, regardless of their size or turnover;
                • While certain provisions are specific to food products, there is also a common framework applicable to all products without distinction, as well as a specific regulatory regime for fast-moving consumer goods (see Question 3).
                • Prior to the transposition of the Directive, France already had a legislative framework in place in this area (the Egalim laws), which it continued to develop after the entry into force of the ordinance transposing the European Directive; this is why the ordinance transposed only four new restrictive trade practices, rather than the entire list set out in the Directive.
                • French law provides for strict regulation governing commercial negotiations, particularly in the large-scale retail sector. The 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law further strengthens this framework by introducing tighter rules on agricultural contract negotiations, reference production-cost indicators, automatic price revision mechanisms in the food sector, repeated tendering procedures and substantial reductions in order volumes during negotiations.

                What must a valid agri-food supply agreement contain in France?

                Chapter I of Title IV of Book IV of the French Commercial Code, entitled “Transparency in commercial relationships”, imposes numerous requirements governing the negotiation and performance of commercial agreements:

                The seller’s terms and conditions of sale

                The seller’s pricing policy: the seller must provide any buyer who so requests with its terms and conditions of sale, which must include, at a minimum, the conditions of sale, payment terms, the price list, and the schedule of price reductions (discounts, immediate rebates, deferred rebates, and “free” products) (Article L. 441-1 of the Com.C).

                These terms and conditions may be general (applicable to all customers), category-based (applicable to a category of customers, such as wholesalers, provided that the classification is based on objective identification criteria), or specific and individually negotiated (supplementing or derogating from the general or category-based terms and conditions of sale).

                In this respect, specific provisions apply to food products and products intended for pet food (Article L. 441-1-1 of the French Commercial Code), as well as to wholesalers (Article L. 441-1-2 of the French Commercial Code).

                Since 20 August 2026, Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C. also allows the supplier’s terms and conditions of sale for food products and pet food to include an automatic formula revising the unit-price list in line with upward or downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials used in the product.

                The buyer’s commercial cooperation services

                La politique de coopération commerciale de l’acheteur: L’acheteur, quant à lui, propose et négocie avec le fournisseur des services rendus par lui et qui bénéficient, directement ou indirectement, au fournisseur (Art. L. 441-3 C.com.):

                • Commercial cooperation services: these are services provided in connection with the resale of products or services to consumers, or with a view to their resale to professionals, which are intended to promote the marketing of the supplier’s products and are separable from the act of sale.
                • Other services: “other obligations intended to promote the commercial relationship between the supplier and the distributor or service provider” (L. 441-3, III. 3° Com. C).
                • Promotional benefits: Direct allocation of discounts («remise») to consumers by the distributor acting under a mandate from the supplier for fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG).

                The written annual agreement and the 31 January or 1 March deadlines

                Formalisation of the negotiation: a written agreement must be entered into, before 1 March of each year, between the supplier and the distributor or service provider, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements.

                As an experimental rule until 31 December 2029, where the supplier is a legal entity with worldwide annual turnover (excluding tax) below €350 million in the last closed financial year, the statutory 1st of March date referred to in Articles L. 441-3, L. 441-4, L. 441-6 and L. 443-8 Com. C. is replaced by 31th of January. In the same situations, the three-month periods referred to in Article L. 441-4 VI and Article L. 443-8 V(B) Com. C. are reduced to two months.

                Law No. 2026-796 introduces also two experiments: Until 15 April 2029 for agreements governed by Article L. 443-8 Com. C., and until 15 April 2028 for agreements governed by Article L. 441-4 Com. C., where the annual agreement has not been concluded by 1st of March (or within two months from the beginning of a special marketing cycle), the supplier may, if no new contract has been formed, terminate the commercial relationship without the distributor being able to rely on the rules on sudden termination under Article L. 442-1 II Com.C., or request application of a notice period compliant with that provision.

                Negotiation timetable for producer/first-buyer of agro-food contracts: under Article L. 631-24II bis of the French Rural and Maritime Fishing code (“CRPM”), the written contract or framework agreement must be concluded within four months after the prospective buyer receives the producer’s written proposal (this period may be extended by an extended interprofessional agreement, up to six months). If no agreement is reached, one of the parties must refer the matter to the Agricultural Commercial Relations Mediator within 15 days. If mediation fails and both parties still intend to establish or continue the relationship, the Agricultural Commercial Disputes Settlement Committee must be seized within a further 15 days; where applicable, the contract must then be concluded within two months after the parties receive the Committee’s decision

                It must set out (Art. L. 441-3 Com.C.):

                • The terms and conditions of the sale of products or the provision of services (including price reductions) and, where applicable, the types of situations in which and the modalities according to which general sales conditions (GSCs) may apply.
                • Commercial cooperation services
                • Other obligations
                • Any service or obligation arising from an agreement entered into with a legal entity located outside French territory with which the distributor is directly or indirectly affiliated

                 

                It being specified that the mandatory contents of the written agreement vary depending on its scope of application, namely whether the agreement is entered into with wholesalers, relates to fast-moving consumer goods, or concerns agricultural products (Art. L. 441-7 and L. 441-8 Com.C).

                Stricter rules for agricultural products: duration, price revision, renegotiation

                More specifically, with respect to agricultural products, French law is all the more protective as regards the formalisation of negotiations and provides for even stricter obligations:

                • Clause relating to the duration of the contract: under Article L. 631-24 VI CRPM, the minimum duration of a contract between a producer and a first buyer is three years, except for products subject to excise duties and for grapes, must and the wines produced from them. Unless otherwise agreed, contracts are renewable by tacit renewal for an equivalent period; where the buyer gives notice of non-renewal, the notice period may not be less than three months. The producer may expressly waive the statutory minimum durations in writing, in accordance with Articles 148 and 168 of Regulation (EU) No. 1308/2013. A contract or framework agreement lasting less than three years may omit an automatic upward/downward revision clause for a fixed price.
                • Clauses relating to price determination mechanismsi and revision: Article L. 631-24 III CRPM requires the contract or framework agreement to contain the price and its automatic upward/downward revision mechanism, or the criteria and methods used to determine the price, including the weighting of the relevant indicators. The producer’s proposal must take account of one or more indicators relating to relevant agricultural production costs and their evolution. The parties must refer in the final contract or framework agreement to the reference indicators published by the competent interprofessional organisation (or, failing publication, by the relevant agricultural technical institutes), unless they expressly choose other agricultural production-cost indicators and state the reasons for that choice. Clauses whose purpose or effect is automatically to renegotiate or change the price so as to align it with a more favourable price practised by a competing buyer, producer, producer organisation or association of producer organisations are deemed unwritten.

                 

                For food products and pet food subject to Article L. 443-8 Com.C., the annual written agreement must contain an automatic formula revising the unit-price list according to upward and downward changes in the cost of agricultural raw materials. If the supplier’s terms and conditions contain the formula permitted by Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C., the annual agreement must reproduce that formula and it is not negotiable. Price changes resulting from its application must be implemented no later than one month after activation. A distributor may object only where objective economic data show that the link drawn by the supplier between raw-material cost changes and the impact on its price list is manifestly erroneous.

                Lastly, specific provisions apply to contracts entered into between a supplier and a distributor “relating to the design and production of food products in accordance with specifications meeting the buyer’s specific needs and marketed under a private label”, as set out in Article L. 441-7 of the French Commercial Code.

                Invoicing and payment terms for food products and beverages

                Invoicing and payment terms: any purchase and sale transaction must give rise to an invoice, issued upon completion of the transaction and containing a number of mandatory particulars. In addition, the Commercial Code provides for a default payment period of 30 days, with a maximum payment period of 60 days or 45 days end of month, and sets out late payment penalties and a fixed recovery fee in the event of late payment (Art. L. 441-9 and L. 441-10 Com.C)

                In addition, the legislator has introduced specific payment deadlines for food products and beverages (Art. L. 441-11 Com.C):

                • Perishable agricultural products, perishable food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals: 30 days from delivery. In the case of periodic billing:30 days after the end of the ten-day period;
                • For seasonal fruits and vegetables: 30 days from the end of the month of delivery;
                • Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption: 20 days from the date of delivery;
                • Alcoholic beverages subject to excise duty (e.g., Armagnac, Cognac, brandy, gin, rum, vodka): 30 days from the end of the month of delivery. For wine and other non-sparkling fermented beverages covered by Article L. 665-3 CRPM, the first buyer must, in principle, pay the seller (or its subrogee) an advance of at least 15% of the order amount within ten clear days after conclusion of the sale contract. Since 20 August 2026, interprofessional bodies may provide a derogation from this advance-payment obligation only in the context of multiannual contracts.
                • Non-perishable agricultural and food products: If the invoice is issued by the supplier: 60 days from the date of issue of the invoice; and If the invoice is issued by the buyer: 60 days from the date of preparation of the invoice.

                 

                Logistics penalties

                Logistics penalites: lastly, the French Commercial Code strictly regulates specific contractual sanctions known as “logistics penalties”, relating to the supplier’s failure to comply with its delivery, conformity, or timing obligations (Art. L. 441-17 Com.C).

                What are the penalties for breaching the contractual requirements?

                In the event of a breach of contractual requirements, several sanctions may apply:

                • Seller’s pricing policy: an administrative fine not exceeding €15,000 for a natural person and €75,000 for a legal entity ( L. 441-1 Com.C).

                For food products and products intended for pet food, the administrative fine may not exceed €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, and the maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 443-8 Com.C). The new information requirements attached to an optional automatic price-revision formula in the supplier’s terms and conditions (Article L. 441-1-1 IV bis Com.C.) are also backed by the administrative sanction provided in Article L. 443-8 Com.C. More generally, any breach of Article L. 443-8 I to VI is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum doubled for a repeated infringement within two years.

                • Buyer’s commercial cooperation policy and formalisation of negotiations: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-6 Com.C).

                Failure to comply with the March 1st deadline provided for in Article L. 441-3(IV) is punishable by an administrative fine not exceeding €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity. In the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final, the maximum fine is increased to €400,000 for a natural person and €2,000,000 for a legal entity. For suppliers falling within the temporary €350 million turnover experiment introduced by the 2026 Agricultural Sovereignty Law, references to the 1 March deadline must be read as 31 January for the duration of the experiment (until 31 December 2029).

                • Absence of a price revision clause in the agricultural sector: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €750,000 for a legal entity in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-7 C)
                • Absence of a renegotiation clause: an administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity. The maximum fine is doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years from the date on which the first sanction decision became final (Art. L. 441-8 Com.C)).
                • Failure to comply with payment deadlines, absence of mandatory information required under the terms of payment, setting of non-compliant rates or conditions for late payment penalties, and failure to comply with the terms of calculation of payment deadlines agreed between the parties: administrative fine not exceeding €75,000 for a natural person and €2 million for a legal entity, with the maximum fine increased to €150,000 for a natural person and €4 million for a legal entity in the event of a repeat offense within two years of the date on which the first penalty decision became final ( L. 441-16 Com.C).

                 

                Which unfair practices does French law prohibit beyond the Directive?

                In addition to the contractual obligations described above, aimed at preventing abuses and unfair commercial practices between businesses, Articles L. 442-1 to L. 442-12 of the French Commercial Code set out a list of «unfair commercial practices between undertakings» (« pratiques commerciales déloyales entre entreprises »), including:

                • Obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage without consideration or manifestly disproportionate to the consideration provided (Art. L. 442-1(I) Com.C);
                • Subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations creating a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
                • Subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or operating conditions are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations ( L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.);
                • imposing logistics penalties in breach of Article 441-17 (Art. L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
                • Applying or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, or sales or purchase conditions not justified by real consideration set out in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
                • Failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, leading to the failure to conclude a contract within the deadline set out in Article L. 441-3 ( L. 442-1, I Com.C.);
                • Abruptly terminating, even partially, an established commercial relationship without sufficient written notice, taking into account the duration of the relationship and industry practices or interprofessional agreements ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
                • Implementing, during contract negotiations, a substantial reduction in the volume of orders placed with an established commercial partner, even temporarily, where the scale, unusual nature or circumstances of the reduction are such as to jeopardise the balance of the established commercial relationship ( L. 442-1, II Com.C.);
                • For operators providing online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations laid down therein, other clauses and practices remaining governed by Title IV of Book IV ( L. 442-1, III Com.C.);
                • Directly or indirectly participating in a breach of the prohibition on out-of-network resale imposed on a distributor bound by an exempt selective or exclusive distribution agreement ( L. 442-2 Com. C);
                • Clauses deemed null and void, including retroactive rebates, discounts or commercial cooperation benefits, automatic granting of more favourable terms granted to competing undertakings, or prohibitions on assigning receivables ( L. 442-3 Com.C);
                • Resale at a loss or announcement of resale at a loss ( L. 442-5 Com.C.);
                • Imposing a minimum resale price on a distributor ( L. 442-6 Com.C.);
                • For buyers of agricultural or food products, imposing an abnormally low purchase price on suppliers ( L. 442-7 Com.C);
                • Regulation of remote reverse auctions ( L. 442-8 Com.C.);
                • Artificially increasing or decreasing prices, particularly in remote auctions, through false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or any other fraudulent means ( L. 442-9 Com.C);
                • Associations or cooperatives offering products for sale or providing services not provided for in their bylaws( L. 442-10 Com.C.);
                • Use of public property belonging to the State, local authorities or public bodies to sell products or provide services under irregular conditions ( L. 442-11 Com.C);
                • For cloud computing service providers, granting unlimited cloud credits or making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the conclusion of such an agreement ( L. 442-12 Com.C.).

                 

                What are the penalties for unfair commercial practices in France?

                General sanctions regime under Article L. 442-4

                The unfair commercial practices listed below are subject to the same sanction’s regime, as provided for in Article L. 442-4 of the French Commercial Code. The practices concerned are the following:

                • L. 442-1, I, 1° Com.C: obtaining or attempting to obtain from the other party an advantage that does not correspond to any consideration or is clearly disproportionate to the consideration given;
                • L. 442-1, I, 2° Com.C: subjecting or attempting to subject the other party to obligations that create a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties;
                • L. 442-1, I, 3° Com.C: imposing logistical penalties in violation of Article L. 441-17;
                • L. 442-1, I, 4° Com.C: practicing or obtaining discriminatory prices, payment terms, conditions, or terms of sale or purchase that are not justified by actual considerations provided for in the annual agreement, creating a competitive advantage or disadvantage;
                • L. 442-1, I, 5° Com.C: failure to conduct commercial negotiations in good faith in accordance with Article L. 441-4, resulting in the contract not being concluded within the deadline specified in Article L. 441-3;
                • L. 442-1, I, 6° Com.C.: subjecting a commercial partner to repeated competitive tendering procedures or calls for tenders whose frequency or modalities are liable to create a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations;
                • L. 442-1, II Com.C.: implementing a substantial reduction in order volumes during contract negotiations, including temporarily, where its scale, unusual nature or the circumstances are liable to jeopardise the balance of an established commercial relationship;
                • L. 442-1, III Com.C: for operators offering online intermediation services within the meaning of Regulation (EU) 2019/1150, failure to comply with the obligations set out in this text; other clauses or practices remain governed by Title IV of Book IV;
                • Art L. 442-2 C: participating directly or indirectly in the violation of the prohibition on resale outside the network imposed on distributors bound by a selective or exclusive distribution agreement exempted under competition law;
                • Art L. 442-3 C: using clauses or contracts allowing the producer to benefit from retroactive benefit of discounts (“remises”), rebates (“rabais”), or commercial cooperation; the automatic granting of more favorable terms to competing companies; prohibition on assigning claims against the other party to third parties;
                • L. 442-7 Com.C: for a buyer of agricultural products or foodstuffs, imposing an abusively low selling price on its supplier;
                • Article L. 442-8 C: regulation of remote reverse auctions.

                For all these practices:

                • the victim of such practices may have the illegal clauses or contracts declared null and void and request the restitution of undue benefits;

                the French Minister for the Economy or the Public Prosecutor may request the court to:

                • order the cessation of the practices;
                • declare illegal clauses or contracts null and void and obtain restitution of undue benefits;

                request the imposition of a civil fine, the amount of which may not exceed:

                • five million euros;
                • three times the amount of the benefits unduly received or obtained;
                • or 5% of the turnover excluding tax generated in France by the perpetrator of the practices during the last financial year ended preceding the financial year in which the practices were implemented.

                The court shall systematically order the publication, dissemination, or posting of its decision or an extract thereof, in accordance with the terms and conditions it specifies.

                Practices subject to specific sanctions

                • L. 442-5 Com.C: resale at a loss or the announcement of resale at a loss is punishable by a fine not exceeding 0.4% of the annual turnover excluding VAT generated in France during the last closed financial year (Art. L. 442-5, I Com.C);
                • L. 442-6 Com.C: imposition of a minimum resale price on the distributor is punishable by a maximum fine of €75,000 for legal entities;
                • L. 442-9 Com.C: causing an artificial increase or decrease in prices, in particular in remote auctions, by disseminating false information, excessive or insufficient offers, or by any other fraudulent means, is punishable by three years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €225,000 for food products. Additional penalties may also apply;
                • L. 442-11 Com.C: using public property belonging to the State, local authorities or their public bodies to offer products for sale or to provide services under irregular condition is punishable by seizure on the premises, for a period not exceeding one month, of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services. It may also give rise to the confiscation of the products offered for sale and of the assets used to enable the sale of the products or the provision of services, and to an order to pay the Public Treasury an amount corresponding to the value of the seized products;
                • L. 442-12 Com.C: for a cloud computing service provider, granting unlimited cloud computing credits credits to a person engaged in production, distribution or service activities and making the sale of a product or service conditional upon the simultaneous conclusion of such an agreement constitutes an unfair commercial practice punishable by two years’ imprisonment and a maximum fine of €1,500,000 (Article L. 132-2 of the French Consumer Code: sanctions for misleading commercial practices – « sanction despratiques commerciales trompeuses»).

                 

                Which authority enforces the rules, and what powers does it have?

                The national authority responsible for enforcement is the administrative authority in charge of competition and consumer affairs: the Directorate General for Competition, Consumer Affairs and Fraud Control (DGCCRF). The DGCCRF has investigative powers (Article L. 450-1 of the French Commercial Code), may issue injunctions (Article L. 470-1 of the French Commercial Code), and imposes administrative fines and sanctions for breaches of Title IV of Book IV and for non-compliance with injunctions (Article L. 470-2 of the French Commercial Code).

                What did the DGCCRF’s latest enforcement report find?

                According to the last DGCCRF’s 2024 report, DGCCRF «inspected 186 establishments in the dairy, cattle, pork, poultry and egg sectors in order to verify compliance with the mandatory written contractualisation between producers and their first buyers. ». The report further states that «the regulation of commercial relations and negotiations is likely to give rise to a new Egalim law, following the publication of several parliamentary reports. »In this respect, a parliamentary report on the application of the so-called «Egalim 38» law was submitted on 13 March 2024. The legislative development anticipated in that report has since materialised in Law No. 2026-796 of 18 August 2026, which substantially amended agricultural contractualisation and food-sector commercial negotiation rules with effect, for most of the relevant provisions, from 20 August 2026.

                ***

                Frequently asked questions on unfair trading practices in France

                Does French law apply if my company is not established in France?

                Yes, as regards the substantive rules. France did not adopt the turnover thresholds of Directive 2019/633, so the national provisions apply to all commercial relationships involving the sale of agricultural and food products, irrespective of the nationality or economic size of the suppliers and buyers. Whether a French court will hear a dispute is a separate question.

                Can we choose a law other than French law in an agri-food supply contract?

                In principle yes. French law contains no specific conflict-of-law rules for agri-food supply contracts, so the choice is governed by the Rome I Regulation, under which the parties are free to choose the applicable law. Article L. 444-1.A of the Commercial Code appears to claim French law for products marketed in France, but French case law has repeatedly refused to treat restrictive trade practices as overriding mandatory rules.

                Will a jurisdiction or arbitration clause be upheld by the French courts?

                In practice yes. Article L. 444-1.A expressly reserves compliance with European Union law, with international conventions on jurisdiction and with arbitration. French courts may assert the exclusive jurisdiction rule only in very limited circumstances, notably where the counterparty is established in a State that has entered into no relevant convention with France.

                What is the payment deadline for perishable food products in France?

                Thirty days from delivery for perishable agricultural and food products, frozen or deep-frozen meat, frozen fish and prepared meals. Live cattle and fresh meat intended for consumption must be paid within 20 days of delivery, seasonal fruit and vegetables within 30 days of the end of the month of delivery, and non-perishable agricultural and food products within 60 days (Article L. 441-11 of the Commercial Code).

                By what date must the annual agreement with a distributor be signed?

                Before 1 March or 31 January (when supplier’s turnover is less than €350 million) of each year, in the form of either a single document or an annual framework agreement supplemented by specific implementation agreements. Missing that deadline is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €200,000 for a natural person and €1,000,000 for a legal entity, doubled in the event of a repeated infringement within two years.

                Must a contract with an agricultural producer include a price revision clause?

                Yes. The contract between a producer and its first buyer must provide for automatic upward and downward price revision mechanisms, based in particular on indicators relating to agricultural production costs and to changes in those costs. The absence of such a clause is punishable by an administrative fine of up to €75,000 for a natural person and €375,000 for a legal entity.

                How long must a supply contract with an agricultural producer last?

                At least three years, and the contract must include a clause to that effect. The term may be extended up to a maximum of five years where an interprofessional agreement so provides (Article L. 631-24, III, 5° of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code).

                After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

                A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

                The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

                From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

                This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

                Why wine matters in this agreement

                The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

                1. tariff liberalisation;
                2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
                3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
                4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

                This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

                At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

                Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

                Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

                Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

                For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

                1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
                2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
                3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

                The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

                Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

                More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

                Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

                The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the “Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” (SPS) and “Technical Barriers to Trade” (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

                This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

                For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

                Geographical indications: protection and tension

                One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

                The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

                From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

                1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
                2. transition periods for local operators;
                3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

                This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

                Services, distribution, and market structure

                Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

                Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

                The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

                1. logistics providers
                2. distribution networks
                3. commercial representation
                4. marketing and advertising agencies

                For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

                Legal advisors will need to consider:

                1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
                2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
                3. compliance with competition rules

                The implementation gap: where risk lies

                Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

                Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

                This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

                For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

                1. managing client expectations
                2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
                3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

                What should lawyers be doing now?

                Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

                Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

                1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
                2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
                3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
                4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

                In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

                Final sip

                The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

                Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

                At major events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, some companies attempt to “wildly” associate their brand or image with the event through a practice known as “ambush marketing” , defined by French courts as “an advertising strategy implemented by a company in order to associate its commercial image with that of an event and thereby benefit from the media impact of that event without paying the relevant fees and without having obtained the prior authorisation of the event organiser” (Paris Court of Appeal, 2nd chamber, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912). A risky and unlawful practice, but one that is sometimes conceivable.

                Key points

                • Ambush marketing is a practice that may give rise to sanctions but is not prohibited as such.
                • In return for their investments in the competition, FIFA’s official sponsors and partners enjoy very strong legal protection, through various general instruments (infringement, free-riding/parasitism, intellectual property) and more specific ones (sports law), against all forms of ambush marketing.
                • The FIFA World Cup benefits from enhanced protection based on an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide and on FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines, in the absence of specific French legislation comparable to that enacted for the Olympic Games.
                • However, these rights are not absolute, and there remain narrow opportunities for a (clever) form of ambush marketing.

                Protection of official World Cup sponsors and partners against ambush marketing

                Reaching nearly 5 billion people across all platforms during its last edition in Qatar in 2022, including more than 1.5 billion viewers for the final alone, the 2026 FIFA World Cup is the most-watched sporting event on the planet. Hosted for the first time by three countries (Canada, Mexico and the United States), it brings together 48 teams and more than 1,200 players for 104 matches across 16 stadiums. Its organisation is largely financed by various official partners, sponsors and rights holders, who in return receive the exclusive right to use FIFA’s official trademarks and intellectual property so as to associate their own image and distinctive signs with the competition.

                Ambush marketing is not sanctioned as such under French law, but a range of statutory provisions allow for broad protection of sponsors and partners of world-class sporting events against ambush marketing. They are indeed entitled to peacefully enjoy the rights offered to them in exchange for the significant investments they make in connection with events such as, for example, the football or rugby World Cups, or the Olympic Games.

                The following legal instruments may in particular be invoked by official sponsors and by the organisers of such events:

                • the “classic” protections offered by intellectual property law (trademark law and copyright) by way of an infringement action under the French Intellectual Property Code,
                • civil liability law (parasitism/free-riding and unfair competition based on article 1240 of the French Civil Code),
                • consumer law (misleading commercial practices),
                • but also more specific provisions, such as the protection of the exploitation rights of sports federations and organisers of sporting events under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, which grants organisers of sporting events a monopoly over the exploitation of those events.

                On these grounds, the following ambush marketing practices have notably been sanctioned:

                The exploitation of a tennis competition and the use, during the sporting event, of the brand associated with it: An online betting operator organised bets on Roland Garros matches using the protected sign and Roland Garros trademark to identify the matches on which bets were offered. The unlawful exploitation of the sporting competition was sanctioned at EUR 400,000 under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code, the French Tennis Federation being the sole owner of the right to exploit Roland Garros. The use of the trademark was also sanctioned for infringement (EUR 300,000) and free-riding/parasitism (EUR 500,000) (Paris Court of Appeal, 14 Oct. 2009, No. 08/19179; Paris Judicial Court, 8 Aug. 2024, No 08/19179).

                An advertising campaign carried out during a film festival reproducing the event’s registered trademark: During the Cannes Film Festival, a cosmetics brand published videos on its social media showing its brand ambassadors being styled, with the official Cannes Film Festival poster visible in certain shots, one of which reproduced the registered Palme d’Or trademark. Sanctioned on the grounds of copyright infringement and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Judicial Court, 11 Dec. 2020, No. 19/08543).

                An advertising campaign falsely claiming the status of official event partner: During the Cannes Film Festival, the use of the slogan “official hairdresser of women” alongside the expressions “Cannes” and “Festival de Cannes”, and other publications that falsely led the public to believe the company was an official festival partner, to the detriment of the sole official festival hairdresser. Sanctioned on the grounds of unfair competition and parasitism at EUR 50,000 (Paris Court of Appeal, 8 June 2018, No. 17/12912).

                These financial sanctions may be combined with injunctions to cease the practices and/or orders for press publication, subject to periodic penalty payments.

                FIFA’s specific trademark protection

                Unlike the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, which benefited from specific French legislation as a host country (Law No. 2018-202 of 26 March 2018 on the organisation of the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games) reserving in particular advertising spaces in the vicinity of competition venues exclusively for official partners, the 2026 FIFA World Cup does not take place on French territory, and therefore no equivalent French legal framework applies. The protection of official partners and sponsors thus relies on general law , but is nonetheless robust.

                FIFA has built an extensive portfolio of trademarks registered worldwide, protected in France by the provisions of the French Intellectual Property Code. These trademarks include in particular the verbal and figurative trademark FIFA®, the marks FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, as well as the official competition emblem (combining the trophy with the figure 26), the official slogan “We Are 26™” / “Nous Sommes 26™”, the logos of the sixteen host cities, and the official typeface “FWC 26”, protected by copyright. Only FIFA’s rights holders, namely the FIFA Partners (led by Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways and Visa), the Plus Sponsors, the Official Sponsors and Regional Supporters, are authorised to use this official intellectual property for commercial purposes.

                FIFA has published Intellectual Property Guidelines (version 2.0, June 2024) detailing the authorised and prohibited uses of the trademarks and logos associated with the 2026 World Cup. According to these guidelines, the following are prohibited without authorisation: any use of official trademarks in commercial advertising; the incorporation of official intellectual property into a trade name or domain name; the organisation of competitions, games or prize draws creating an association with the competition; the use of official trademarks to decorate a retail store; and the use of official hashtags by a corporate account for commercial purposes. The guidelines further specify that protection extends not only to identical reproduction of official trademarks but also to confusingly similar variants. This protection, recalled in the guidelines, is consistent with the enhanced protection afforded to well-known trademarks under French law by article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code.

                Lessons from the Paris 2024 Olympic Games: what risks do brands face?

                The Paris 2024 Olympic Games gave rise to significant litigation that clearly illustrates the risks faced by companies tempted by ambush marketing at a major sporting event. Although these decisions were rendered in the specific context of the Olympic Games, which benefited from specific, reinforced legal protections, they nevertheless constitute a direct warning for brands that might consider similar strategies during the World Cup, on the basis of general law.

                The use of official symbols on travelling physical media: During the Paris 2024 Olympic Games, a Chinese dairy company had buses displaying the Olympic rings alongside its own brands circulating throughout Paris, while presenting itself as “the only Chinese dairy company present in Paris 2024”. The Paris Court of Appeal upheld both free-riding/parasitism and trademark infringement, and ordered the companies concerned, in summary proceedings, to pay EUR 20,000 per defendant, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 20,000 per day per proven infringement, aimed at stopping the diffusion of the advertising (Paris Court of Appeal, pole 5, chamber 2, 21 Nov. 2025, No. 24/15283; Paris Court, interim order of 8 Aug. 2024, No. 24/55463). This judgment illustrates the vigilance of French courts with regard to strategies of visual association with an event, even without an explicit claim of official partnership, and confirms the possibility of combining infringement and parasitism claims for substantial awards.

                The unauthorised broadcast of competitions: The Paris Court, sitting in summary proceedings during the Olympic Games, ordered the immediate cessation of the broadcast of Olympic competitions by a streaming platform that did not hold the corresponding media rights, subject to a periodic penalty of EUR 1,500 per identified infringement, EUR 3,000 per day for ongoing distributions and EUR 5,000 per day for failure to withdraw the content (Paris Court, summary proceedings, 18 Sept. 2024, No. 24/53019). Thus, any platform broadcasting World Cup matches without holding the rights licensed by FIFA faces immediate emergency measures under article L.333-1 of the French Sports Code.

                The enhanced protection of well-known trademarks: The French Court of Cassation confirmed that protection of Olympic trademarks extends beyond strict reproduction: it is sufficient for the trademark to be evoked or suggested, without the need to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion in the mind of the public. This solution, based on article L.713-5 of the French Intellectual Property Code, was applied to a bar that had used the Olympic rings on its coasters to promote its broadcast evenings (Court of Cassation, Criminal chamber, 17 Jan. 2017, No. 15-86.363). FIFA’s trademarks being equally well-known worldwide, the same protective regime applies to them: a mere evocation of official trademarks, even without literal reproduction, may constitute an actionable infringement.

                Certain marketing operations may escape sanction

                Analysis of case law and promotional practices nonetheless reveals the contours of certain advertising practices that could be permitted (not sanctioned by the provisions described above), provided they are carefully prepared and presented. Here are some examples.

                Creative or humorous communication

                • A tongue-in-cheek, even humorous approach may allow companies to avoid the sanctions described above. For example, Intersnack’s Vico crisps brand launched a promotional campaign in 2016 around the slogan “Vico, partner of supporters at home”.
                • Irish bookmaker Paddy Power sponsored an egg-and-spoon race in “London”, a village in Burgundy, France, in order to display the following slogan in London during the 2012 Olympic Games: “Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is)”. The Olympic organising committee failed to stop this campaign. British humour …
                • Meanwhile, Heineken, a rival of official Euro 2016 sponsor Carlsberg, marketed a range of beer bottles in the colours of the flags of 21 countries that had “marked its history”, the majority of which were participating in the tournament.

                Using factual information as advertising

                It was held lawful to use the results of a rugby match and the announcement of an upcoming match in a newspaper to promote a car brand, with the advertisement reading: “France 13 England 24 , the Fiat 500 congratulates England on its victory and looks forward to seeing the French team on 9 March for France-Italy”. The judges considered that this publication “merely reproduces a current sporting result, obtained and made public on the front page of the sports newspaper, and refers to a future fixture also known to have been announced in the newspaper’s editorial content” (Court of Cassation, Commercial chamber, 20 May 2014, No. 13-12.102).

                Sponsoring players participating in the World Cup

                Any company may enter into partnerships with players participating in the FIFA World Cup, for example by supplying them with equipment or clothing bearing its logo. FIFA’s Intellectual Property Guidelines expressly state that they “contain no affirmations regarding rights held by third parties such as players, clubs, member associations [or] confederations”. FIFA’s guidelines also explicitly confirm that generic images related to football, national teams or national flags do not fall within the official intellectual property. Caution is nonetheless warranted: the partnership must not create the impression of a commercial association with FIFA or the competition, nor use FIFA’s official trademarks.

                A combined legal and marketing approach in designing and preparing the message of any such communication campaign is essential to avoid legal proceedings, particularly on the grounds of free-riding/parasitism. Certain advertising campaigns can therefore legitimately be considered, particularly when they are clever.

                Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

                Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

                In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

                The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

                With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

                In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

                The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

                This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

                However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

                Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

                The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

                In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

                Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

                For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

                What the EU decision does (and does not) do

                The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

                At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

                In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

                The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

                Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

                Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

                Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

                The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

                Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

                Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

                How different payment types are affected in practice

                Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

                The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

                Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

                If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

                Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

                Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

                Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

                Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

                Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

                Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

                How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

                Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

                For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

                A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

                Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

                A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

                This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

                A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

                A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

                Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

                EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

                Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

                Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

                DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

                Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

                Country notes (alphabetical)

                Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

                France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

                Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

                Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

                For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

                Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

                Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

                Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

                 

                Practical next steps for EU companies

                1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
                2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
                3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
                4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
                5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
                6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
                7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
                8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
                9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

                Under French Law, franchisors and distributors are subject to two kinds of pre-contractual information obligations: each party must spontaneously inform their future partner of any information they know is decisive to their consent. In addition, for certain contracts – i.e a franchise agreement – there is a duty to disclose a limited amount of information in a document. These pre-contractual obligations are mandatory rules of public policy. Thus, these two obligations apply simultaneously to the franchisor, distributor or dealer when negotiating a contract with a partner.

                Takeaways

                • The information required by the DIP must be fully completed and updated ;
                • The information not required by the DIP but provided by the franchisor must be carefully selected and sincere;
                • Franchisee must be given the opportunity to request additional information from the franchisor;
                • Franchisee’s experience in the economic sector enables the franchisor to considerably limit its exposure to the risk of contract cancellation due to a defect in the franchisee’s consent;
                • Franchisor must keep the proof of the actual disclosure of pre-contractual information (whether mandatory or not).
                • The general information obligation under common law (Article 1112-1 of the French Civil Code) may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation provided for under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code.

                General duty of disclosure for all contractors

                What is the scope of this pre-contractual information?

                This obligation is imposed on all counterparties, for any kind of contract. Indeed, article 1112-1 of the Civil Code states that:

                (§. 1) The party who knows information of decisive importance for the consent of the other party must inform the other party if the latter legitimately ignores this information or trusts its counterparty.

                (§. 3) Of decisive importance is the information that is directly and necessarily related to the content of the contract or the quality of the parties. »

                This obligation applies to all contracting parties for any type of contract.

                French courts have ruled that this general information obligation may apply concurrently with the special disclosure obligation under Article L. 330-3 of the French Commercial Code (see below), answering the question in the affirmative (Paris Court of Appeal, 27 March 2024, no. 22/12665). The scope of the latter has however, been defined by the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») : only information bearing a direct and necessary link with the subject matter of the contract or the qualities of the parties is subject to the disclosure obligation (Cass. com., 14 May 2025, no. 23-17.948).

                Who bears the burden of proof?

                The burden of proof rests on the person who claims that the information was due to him. He must then prove (i) that the other party owed him the information but (ii) did not provide it (Article 1112-1 (§. 4) of the Civil Code)

                Special duty of disclosure for franchise and distribution agreements

                Which contracts are subject to this special rule?

                French law requires (art. L.330-3 French Commercial Code) the provision of a pre-contractual information document (in French “DIP”) and the draft contract, by any person:

                • which grants another person the right to use a trade mark, trade name or sign,
                • while requiring an exclusive or quasi-exclusive commitment for the exercise of its activity (e.g. exclusive purchase obligation). The quasi-exclusive nature of the commitment is assessed on a case-by-case basis by French courts, independently of the 80% purchase threshold provided for under EU Regulation 2022/720, which is treated merely as an indicative reference.

                Concretely, DIP must be provided, for example, to the franchisee, distributor, dealer or licensee of a brand, by its franchisor, supplier or licensor as soon as the two above conditions are met. French courts have moreover recently had occasion to confirm that the scope of the DIP obligation is not limited to franchise agreements but extends, in particular, to dealership agreements, provided the above-mentioned conditions are met (Paris Court of Appeal, 22 May 2024, no. 22/08672).

                When the DIP must be provided?

                DIP and draft contract must be provided at least 20 days before signing the contract, and, where applicable, before the payment of the sum required to be paid prior to the signature of the contract (for a reservation).

                What information must be disclosed in the DIP?

                Article R. 330-1 of the French Commercial Code requires that DIP mentions the following information (non-detailed list) concerning:

                • Franchisor (identity and experience of the managers, career path, etc.);
                • Franchisor’s business (in particular creation date, head office, bank accounts, history of the development of the business, annual accounts, etc.);
                • Operating network (members list with indication of signing date of contracts, establishments list offering the same products/services in the area of the planned activity, number of members having ceased to be part of the network during the year preceding the issue of the DIP with indication of the reasons for leaving, etc.);
                • Trademark licensed (date of registration, ownership and use);
                • General state of the market (about products or services covered by the contract) and local state of the market (about the planned area) and information relating to factors of competition and development perspective. With respect to the local market, the French Supreme Court (« Cour de cassation ») has held that the franchisor is not required to conduct a market study, but that if one is provided, it must be accurate and verifiable (Cass. com., 18 Oct. 2023, no. 22-19.329).;
                • Essential element of the draft contract and at least: its duration, contract renewal conditions, termination and assignment conditions and scope of exclusivities;
                • Financial obligations weighing in on contracting party: nature and amount of the expenses and investments that will have to be incurred before starting operations (up-front entry fee, installation costs, etc.).

                Beyond the exhaustiveness of the information required under the aforementioned provision, the DIP is subject to a qualitative standard. All information provided — including information provided spontaneously — must be accurate and truthful to ensure that the prospective network member’s consent is fully informed and free from any defect.

                How to prove the disclosure of information?

                The burden of proof for the delivery of the DIP rests on the debtor of this obligation: the franchisor (Cass. Com., 7 July 2004, n°02-15.950). The ideal for the franchisor is to have the franchisee sign and date his DIP on the day it is delivered and to keep the proof thereof.

                The clause of contract indicating that the franchisee acknowledges having received a complete DIP does not provide proof of the delivery of a complete DIP (Cass. com, 10 January 2018, n° 15-25.287).

                The franchisor is subject to a duty to update the DIP until the contract is signed

                In a ruling dated 26 June 2024 (no. 23-14.085 PB), the French Supreme Court held that formal compliance of the DIP at the time of its delivery is not sufficient to exonerate the franchisor from all pre-contractual liability. This position was confirmed by a subsequent ruling of 4 December 2024 (no. 23-16.684).

                These two decisions appear to establish a duty of ongoing updates incumbent upon the network head throughout the entire period between the delivery of the DIP and the execution of the contract. Where significant events occur during that interval — insolvency proceedings affecting network members, major litigation, or structural changes to the network — the network head is required to proactively inform the prospective member. The court then examines whether the failure to disclose such information was liable to distort the candidate’s assessment of the network and, consequently, to vitiate his consent (Cass. com., 26 June 2024, op. cit.).

                A franchisor may therefore not shelter behind the initial regularity of the DIP to discharge its disclosure duty where the network’s situation has materially changed prior to the signing of the contract.

                Sanction for breach of pre-contractual information duties

                Criminal sanction

                Failing to comply with the obligations relating to the DIP, franchisor or supplier can be sentenced to a criminal fine of up to 1,500 euros and up to 3,000 euros in the event of a repeat offence, the fine being multiplied by five for legal entities (article R.330-2 French commercial Code).

                Cancellation of the contract for deceit

                The contract may be declared null and void in case of breach of either article 1112-1 of the French Code civil or article L. 330-3 of the French Code de commerce. In both cases, failure to comply with the obligation to provide information is sanctioned if the applicant demonstrates that his or her consent has been vitiated by error, deceit or violence. In this respect, courts conduct a concrete, case-by-case assessment, taking into account in particular the professional experience and personal due diligence of the distributor: a sophisticated candidate will face greater difficulty in establishing deceit, and his experience in the relevant sector may be sufficient to exonerate the franchisor (Paris Court of Appeal, div. 5 – ch. 11, 26 Apr. 2024, no. 21/13205), even where the information provided was incomplete or inaccurate (Paris Court of Appeal, 20 Jan. 2021, no. 19/03382).

                The path is therefore narrow for the franchisee: he cannot invoke error concerning profitability when it is he who draws up his plan, and even when this plan is drawn up by the franchisor or based on information drawn up and transmitted by the franchisor, the experience of the franchisee who knew the local market may exonerate the franchisor.

                Regarding deceit, Courts strictly assess its two conditions which are:

                • (a material element) the existence of a lie or deceptive reticence (article 1137 French Civil Code), and
                • (an intentional element) the intention to deceive his counterparty (article 1130 French Civil Code).

                Where applicable, the parties must return to the state they were in before the contract.

                Damages

                Although the claims for contract cancellation are subject to very strict conditions, it remains that franchisees/distributors may alternatively obtain damages on the basis of tort liability for non-compliance with the pre-contractual information obligation, subject to proof of fault (incomplete or incorrect information), damage (loss of opportunity of not contracting or contracting on more advantageous terms) and the causal link between the two.

                Roberto Luzi Crivellini

                Practice areas

                • Arbitration
                • Distribution
                • International trade
                • Litigation
                • Real estate

                Contact Roberto





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