After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

Why wine matters in this agreement

The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

1. tariff liberalisation;
2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the « Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures » (SPS) and « Technical Barriers to Trade » (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

Geographical indications: protection and tension

One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
2. transition periods for local operators;
3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

Services, distribution, and market structure

Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

1. logistics providers
2. distribution networks
3. commercial representation
4. marketing and advertising agencies

For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

Legal advisors will need to consider:

1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
3. compliance with competition rules

The implementation gap: where risk lies

Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

1. managing client expectations
2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

What should lawyers be doing now?

Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

Final sip

The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

Lors d’évènements de grande ampleur, tels que la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026, certaines entreprises tentent d’associer « sauvagement » leur marque ou image à l’évènement par une pratique d’« ambush marketing » (marketing d’embuscade) définie par la jurisprudence comme une « stratégie publicitaire mise en place par une entreprise afin d’associer son image commerciale à celle d’un événement et donc de profiter de l’impact médiatique dudit événement sans s’acquitter des droits qui y sont relatifs et sans avoir obtenu au préalable l’autorisation de l’organisateur de l’événement » (CA Paris, 2e chambre, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912). Une pratique risquée et sanctionnée, mais parfois envisageable.

Points clés à retenir

• L’ambush marketing est une pratique sanctionnée mais qui n’est pas interdite en soi.
• En contrepartie de leurs investissements dans la compétition, les sponsors et partenaires officiels de la FIFA bénéficient d’une protection juridique très importante, par l’intermédiaire de divers textes généraux (contrefaçon, parasitisme, propriété intellectuelle) ou plus particuliers (droit du sport), contre toutes formes d’ambush marketing.
• La Coupe du Monde de la FIFA fait l’objet d’une protection renforcée fondée sur un portefeuille étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier et sur les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, en l’absence de législation française spécifique comparable à celle instituée pour les Jeux Olympiques.
• Ces droits ne sont pas absolus et il reste néanmoins de minces opportunités permettant une pratique, astucieuse, du marketing d’embuscade.

La protection des sponsors et partenaires officiels de la Coupe du Monde contre l’ambush marketing

Fort d’une audience mondiale de près de 5 milliards de personnes sur l’ensemble des plateformes lors de sa dernière édition au Qatar en 2022 – dont plus de 1,5 milliard pour la seule finale – la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 est l’évènement sportif le plus suivi de la planète. Accueilli pour la première fois par trois pays (Canada, Mexique et États-Unis), il réunit 48 équipes et plus de 1 200 joueurs pour 104 matchs dans 16 stades. Son organisation est financée dans une large mesure par les différents partenaires, sponsors et détenteurs de droits officiels, qui bénéficient en contrepartie d’un droit exclusif d’utilisation des marques et propriétés intellectuelles officielles de la FIFA afin d’y associer leur propre image et signes distinctifs.

La pratique d’ambush marketing n’est pas sanctionnée en tant que telle par le droit français, mais de nombreux textes épars permettent de protéger largement les sponsors et partenaires de manifestations sportives de dimension mondiale contre l’ambush marketing. Ils sont en effet légitimes à pouvoir jouir paisiblement des droits qui leur sont offerts en contrepartie de leurs larges investissements réalisés dans le cadre d’évènements tels que, par exemple, les coupes du monde de football ou de rugby, ou les Jeux Olympiques.

Peuvent notamment être invoqués par les sponsors officiels et par les organisateurs de telles manifestations :

• les protections « classiques » offertes par le droit de la propriété intellectuelle (droit des marques et droit d’auteur) au titre de l’action en contrefaçon fondée sur le Code de la propriété intellectuelle,
• le droit de la responsabilité civile (parasitisme et concurrence déloyale fondés sur l’article 1240 du Code civil),
• le droit de la consommation (pratiques commerciales trompeuses),
• mais aussi des textes plus spécifiques tels que la protection des droits d’exploitation des fédérations sportives et des organisateurs de manifestations sportives prévue par l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, qui confère aux organisateurs de manifestations sportives un monopole d’exploitation.

Sur ces fondements, ont par exemple été sanctionnées les pratiques d’ambush marketing suivantes :

• L’exploitation d’une compétition de tennis et l’utilisation, pendant l’évènement sportif, de la marque associée à celui-ci : L’organisation de paris en ligne portant sur le tournoi de Roland Garros, utilisant le signe protégé et la marque Roland Garros pour viser les matchs sur lesquels les paris étaient organisés. L’exploitation illicite de la compétition sportive est sanctionnée à hauteur de 400 000 euros sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, la Fédération française de tennis étant seule propriétaire du droit d’exploitation de Roland Garros. L’utilisation de la marque est également sanctionnée au titre de la contrefaçon (à hauteur de 300 000 euros) et du parasitisme (à hauteur de 500 000 euros) (CA Paris, 14 oct. 2009, n° 08/19179).
• Une campagne publicitaire réalisée pendant un festival de cinéma reproduisant la marque déposée de l’évènement : L’organisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, d’une opération de communication digitale par une marque de cosmétique à travers la publication de vidéos sur ses réseaux sociaux, sur certains plans desquelles était visible l’affiche officielle du festival de Cannes, l’une d’elles reproduisant la marque déposée de la palme d’or. Sanctionnée sur les fondements de la contrefaçon de droits d’auteur et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (TJ Paris, 11 déc. 2020, n° 19/08543).
• Une campagne publicitaire visant à se voir attribuer à tort la qualité de partenaire officiel d’un évènement : L’utilisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, du slogan « coiffeur officiel des femmes » associé aux expressions « Cannes » et « Festival de Cannes », laissant faussement croire au public que l’entreprise était partenaire officiel du festival. Sanctionnée sur le fondement de la concurrence déloyale et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (CA Paris, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912).

Ces sanctions pécuniaires peuvent se cumuler avec des injonctions de cessation des pratiques et/ou des mesures de publication dans la presse, sous astreinte.

La protection spécifique des marques de la FIFA

À la différence des Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024, qui bénéficiaient d’une loi française spécifique en tant que pays hôte (loi n° 2018-202 du 26 mars 2018 relative à l’organisation des Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024) et réservant notamment les espaces publicitaires à proximité des sites de compétition aux seuls partenaires officiels, la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 ne se tenant pas sur le territoire français, aucun dispositif légal français équivalent n’est applicable. La protection des partenaires et sponsors officiels repose donc sur le droit commun, mais elle n’en est pas moins solide.

La FIFA a constitué un portefeuille très étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier, protégées en France par les dispositions du Code de la propriété intellectuelle. Ces marques comprennent notamment la marque verbale et figurative FIFA®, les marques FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, ainsi que l’emblème officiel de la compétition (combinant le trophée et le chiffre 26), le slogan officiel « We Are 26™ » / « Nous Sommes 26™ », les logos des seize villes hôtes, et la police typographique officielle « FWC 26 », protégée par le droit d’auteur. Seuls les détenteurs de droits de la FIFA, c’est-à-dire les Partenaires FIFA (au premier rang desquels figurent Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways et Visa), les Sponsors Plus, les Sponsors officiels et les Supporters régionaux, sont autorisés à utiliser à des fins commerciales cette propriété intellectuelle officielle.

La FIFA a publié des directives relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, qui précisent en détail les usages autorisés et interdits des marques et logos liés à la Coupe du Monde 2026. Selon ces directives, sont notamment prohibés, sans autorisation, toute utilisation des marques officielles dans une publicité commerciale ; l’intégration de la propriété intellectuelle officielle dans un nom commercial ou un nom de domaine ; l’organisation de concours ou jeux-concours créant une association avec la compétition ; l’utilisation des marques officielles pour décorer un magasin ; et l’usage par un compte professionnel de hashtags officiels dans un but commercial. Ces directives précisent en outre que la protection s’étend non seulement à la reproduction à l’identique des marques officielles, mais également à leurs variantes dont la similitude peut prêter à confusion. Cette protection rappelée par les lignes directrices est en cohérence avec la protection élargie accordée aux marques notoires en droit français par l’article L.713-5 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle.

Les leçons des JO de Paris 2024 : quels risques pour les marques ?

Les Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024 ont donné lieu à un contentieux abondant qui éclaire concrètement les risques auxquels s’exposent les entreprises tentées par l’ambush marketing lors d’un évènement sportif majeur. Si ces décisions ont été rendues dans le contexte spécifique des JO, pendant lesquels protections légales spécifiques renforcées s’appliquaient, elles constituent néanmoins un avertissement direct pour les marques qui envisageraient des stratégies similaires lors de la Coupe du Monde, sur le fondement du droit commun.

• L’utilisation de symboles officiels sur des supports physiques itinérants : Pendant les JO de Paris 2024, une société chinoise du secteur laitier avait fait circuler dans Paris des bus arborant les anneaux olympiques associés à ses propres marques, tout en se présentant comme « la seule société laitière chinoise présente à Paris 2024 ». La Cour d’appel de Paris a confirmé tant le parasitisme que la contrefaçon de marque, et condamné les sociétés concernées, en référé, au paiement d’une provision de 20 000 euros, assortie d’une astreinte de 20 000 euros par jour et par infraction constatée, visant à faire cesser la diffusion des publicités (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 2, 21 nov. 2025, n° 24/15283 ; TJ Paris, ordonnance de référé du 8 août 2024, 24/55463).
• La retransmission non autorisée de compétitions : Le tribunal judiciaire de Paris a ordonné en référé, pendant les JO, la cessation immédiate de la diffusion de compétitions olympiques par une plateforme de streaming ne disposant pas des droits médias correspondants, sous astreinte de 1 500 euros par infraction constatée, 3 000 euros par jour pour les distributions continues et 5 000 euros par jour pour défaut de retrait (TJ Paris, réf., 18 sept. 2024, n° 24/53019). Ainsi, toute plateforme retransmettant des matchs de la Coupe du Monde sans détenir les droits cédés par la FIFA s’expose à des mesures d’urgence immédiates, sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport.
• La protection élargie de la marque notoire : La Cour de cassation a confirmé que la protection des marques olympiques s’étendait au-delà de la reproduction stricto sensu : il suffit que la marque soit évoquée ou suggérée, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de démontrer un risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public. Cette solution, fondée sur l’article L.713-5 du code de la propriété intellectuelle, s’est appliquée à un bar ayant utilisé les anneaux olympiques sur ses sous-bocks pour promouvoir ses soirées de retransmission (Cass. crim., 17 janv. 2017, n° 15-86.363). Les marques de la FIFA étant tout aussi notoires sur le plan mondial, le même régime protecteur leur est applicable : une simple évocation des marques officielles, même sans reproduction littérale, pourra caractériser une atteinte sanctionnable.

Certaines opérations marketing peuvent échapper à toute sanction

L’analyse de la jurisprudence et des pratiques promotionnelles permet néanmoins de comprendre les contours de certaines pratiques publicitaires qui pourraient être autorisées (non sanctionnées par les textes susmentionnés), sous réserve qu’elles soient préparées et présentées avec habileté. En voici quelques exemples.

Communication sur un ton décalé ou humoristique : Une approche décalée, voire humoristique, peut permettre d’échapper aux sanctions susvisées.

• Ainsi, la marque de chips Vico du groupe Intersnack avait lancé en 2016 une campagne promotionnelle autour du slogan « Vico, partenaire des supporters à domicile ».
• La société irlandaise Paddy Power avait pour sa part parrainé une course de l’œuf dans la cuiller à « London », village de Bourgogne, pour afficher à Londres pendant les JO de 2012 le slogan : « Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year ! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is) ». Le comité d’organisation des JO avait échoué à faire cesser cette campagne. Humour anglais …
• Le groupe Heineken avait quant à lui commercialisé pendant l’Euro 2016, dont Carlsberg était le sponsor officiel, une gamme de bouteilles aux couleurs des drapeaux de 21 pays ayant « marqué son histoire », parmi lesquels une majorité de participants à la compétition.

Communication d’une donnée informative à titre publicitaire : A été jugé licite l’utilisation de résultats d’un match de rugby et l’annonce d’un prochain match dans un journal pour la promotion d’un véhicule automobile, la publicité indiquant : « France 13 Angleterre 24 – la Fiat 500 félicite l’Angleterre pour sa victoire et donne rendez-vous à l’équipe de France le 9 mars pour France-Italie ». Les juges ont considéré que cette publication « se borne à reproduire un résultat sportif d’actualité, acquis et rendu public en première page du journal d’information sportive, et à faire état d’une rencontre future également connue comme déjà annoncée par le journal dans un article d’information » (Cass. com., 20 mai 2014, n° 13-12.102).

Sponsoring de joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde : Toute société peut conclure des partenariats avec des joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA, par exemple en leur fournissant des équipements ou des vêtements portant son logo. Les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle précisent expressément qu’elles « ne contiennent aucune affirmation relative à des droits détenus par des tierces parties telles que les joueurs, clubs, associations membres [ou] confédérations ». Les directives de la FIFA confirment par ailleurs explicitement que les images génériques liées au football, aux équipes nationales ou aux drapeaux de pays n’entrent pas dans la propriété intellectuelle officielle. La prudence s’impose néanmoins : le partenariat ne doit pas créer l’impression d’une association commerciale avec la FIFA ou la compétition, ni utiliser les marques officielles de la FIFA.

L’approche combinée juridique et marketing dans la conception et la préparation du message d’une telle opération de communication est essentielle pour éviter des poursuites judiciaires, notamment sur le fondement du parasitisme. Certaines campagnes publicitaires peuvent donc légitimement être envisagées, notamment quand elles sont astucieuses.

Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

What the EU decision does (and does not) do

The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

How different payment types are affected in practice

Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

Country notes (alphabetical)

Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

Practical next steps for EU companies

1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

En droit français, les franchiseurs et les distributeurs sont soumis à deux types d’obligations précontractuelles d’information : chaque partie doit spontanément informer son futur partenaire de toute information qu’elle sait déterminante pour son consentement. De plus, pour certains contrats — notamment le contrat de franchise — il existe une obligation de communiquer un nombre limité d’informations dans un document dédié. Ces obligations précontractuelles sont d’ordre public. Ainsi, ces deux obligations s’appliquent simultanément au franchiseur, au distributeur ou au concessionnaire lors de la négociation d’un contrat avec un partenaire.

Points clés à retenir

• Les informations requises par le DIP doivent être intégralement renseignées et actualisées ;
• Les informations non exigées par le DIP mais communiquées par le franchiseur doivent être soigneusement sélectionnées et sincères ;
• Le franchisé doit avoir la possibilité de solliciter des informations complémentaires auprès du franchiseur ;
• L’expérience du franchisé dans le secteur économique concerné permet au franchiseur de limiter considérablement son exposition au risque de nullité du contrat pour vice du consentement ;
• Le franchiseur doit conserver la preuve de la remise effective des informations précontractuelles, qu’elles soient obligatoires ou non.
• L’obligation générale d’information de droit commun (article 1112-1 du Code civil) peut s’appliquer concurremment avec l’obligation spéciale prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce.

Obligation générale d’information applicable à tous les contractants

Quelle est l’étendue de cette obligation précontractuelle d’information ?

Cette obligation s’impose à tous les cocontractants, pour tout type de contrat. En effet, l’article 1112-1 du Code civil dispose que :

(§. 1) Celle des parties qui connaît une information dont l’importance est déterminante pour le consentement de l’autre doit l’en informer dès lors que, légitimement, cette dernière ignore cette information ou fait confiance à son cocontractant.

(§. 3) Ont une importance déterminante les informations qui ont un lien direct et nécessaire avec le contenu du contrat ou la qualité des parties.

Cette obligation s’applique à toutes les parties contractantes, pour tout type de contrat.

La jurisprudence s’est prononcée sur la question du cumul de cette obligation de droit commun, avec l’obligation spéciale d’information prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce (cf infra), en répondant par la positive (CA Paris, 27 mars 2024, n° 22/12665). Le périmètre de cette dernière a toutefois été circonscrit par la Cour de cassation : seules les informations présentant un lien direct et nécessaire avec l’objet du contrat ou la qualité des parties sont soumises à obligation de communication (Cass. com., 14 mai 2025, n° 23-17.948).

À qui incombe la charge de la preuve?

La charge de la preuve repose sur celui qui soutient que l’information lui était due. Il doit alors démontrer (i) que l’autre partie lui devait cette information, mais (ii) ne la lui a pas fournie (article 1112-1 (§. 4) du Code civil).

Obligation spéciale d’information applicable aux contrats de franchise et de distribution

Quels contrats sont soumis à cette règle particulière?

Le droit français impose (art. L. 330-3 du Code de commerce) la communication d’un document d’information précontractuelle (« DIP ») ainsi que du projet de contrat, par toute personne :

• qui accorde à une autre personne le droit d’utiliser une marque, une enseigne ou un nom commercial,
• tout en exigeant un engagement exclusif ou quasi-exclusif pour l’exercice de son activité (par exemple, une obligation d’achat exclusif). Le caractère quasi-exclusif fait l’objet d’une appréciation casuistique par les juges français, indépendamment du seuil de 80% des achats prévu par le règlement UE 2022/720, qui n’est utilisé que comme un repère indicatif.

Concrètement, le DIP doit être remis, par exemple, au franchisé, au distributeur, au concessionnaire ou au licencié de marque, par son franchiseur, fournisseur ou concédant, dès lors que les deux conditions précitées sont réunies. Récemment la jurisprudence française a d’ailleurs eu l’occasion de rappeler que le champ d’application du DIP ne se limitait pas à la franchise, mais également et notamment, au contrat de concession, dès lors que les conditions précitées sont réunies (CA Paris, 22 mai 2024, n° 22/08672).

À quel moment le DIP doit-il être remis?

Le DIP et le projet de contrat doivent être communiqués au moins 20 jours avant la signature du contrat, et, le cas échéant, avant le paiement de toute somme exigée préalablement à la signature (notamment en cas de réservation).

Quelles informations doivent figurer dans le DIP?

L’article R. 330-1 du Code de commerce impose que le DIP mentionne les informations suivantes (liste non exhaustive) relatives :

• Au franchiseur (identité et expérience des dirigeants, parcours professionnel, etc.) ;
• À l’activité du franchiseur (notamment la date de création, le siège social, les références bancaires, l’historique du développement de l’enseigne, les comptes annuels, etc.) ;
• Au réseau (liste des membres avec indication de la date de signature des contrats, liste des établissements proposant les mêmes produits ou services dans la zone d’activité envisagée, nombre de membres ayant quitté le réseau au cours de l’année précédant la remise du DIP avec indication des motifs de départ, etc.) ;
• À la marque concédée (date d’enregistrement, titularité et conditions d’exploitation) ;
• À l’état général du marché (relatif aux produits ou services visés par le contrat) et à l’état local du marché (relatif à la zone d’activité envisagée), ainsi qu’aux facteurs de concurrence et aux perspectives de développement. La Cour de cassation a jugé, s’agissant du marché local, que le franchiseur n’était pas tenu de réaliser une étude de marché, mais que s’il en fournit une, celle-ci doit être exacte et vérifiable (Cass. com., 18 oct. 2023, n° 22-19.329).
• Aux éléments essentiels du projet de contrat, et notamment : sa durée, les conditions de renouvellement, de résiliation et de cession, ainsi que l’étendue des exclusivités accordées ;
• Aux obligations financières pesant sur le cocontractant : nature et montant des dépenses et investissements à engager avant le démarrage de l’activité (droit d’entrée, frais d’installation, etc.).

Au-delà de comporter l’ensemble des informations mentionnées par l’article précité, le DIP doit répondre à une exigence qualitative. En effet toutes les informations communiquées, y compris celles transmises spontanément, doivent être exactes et sincères, afin de garantir un consentement éclairé et exempt de tout vice de la part du candidat à l’entrée dans le réseau.

Comment prouver la remise des informations?

La charge de la preuve de la remise du DIP incombe au débiteur de cette obligation : le franchiseur (Cass. com., 7 juillet 2004, n° 02-15.950). L’idéal pour le franchiseur est de faire signer et dater le DIP par le franchisé le jour de sa remise et d’en conserver la preuve.

La clause contractuelle par laquelle le franchisé reconnaît avoir reçu un DIP complet ne constitue pas une preuve suffisante de la remise effective d’un DIP complet (Cass. com., 10 janvier 2018, n° 15-25.287).

Le franchiseur est-il tenu d’une obligation d’actualisation du DIP jusqu’à la signature du contrat

Dans un arrêt du 26 juin 2024 (n°23-1 14.085 PB) la Cour de cassation retient que la conformité formelle du DIP à la date de sa remise ne suffit pas à exonérer le franchiseur de toute responsabilité précontractuelle. Cette solution est confirmée par un arrêt du 4 décembre 2024 (n° 23-16.684).

Ces deux décisions semblent consacrer une obligation d’actualisation du DIP pesant sur la tête de réseau durant toute la période séparant la remise du document de la conclusion du contrat. Lorsque des événements significatifs surviennent dans cet intervalle (procédure collective affectant des membres du réseau, contentieux majeur, modification structurelle du réseau) la tête de réseau est tenue d’en informer spontanément le candidat. Le juge examine alors si le manquement à cette obligation était susceptible d’altérer l’appréciation que le candidat pouvait avoir du réseau et, partant, de vicier son consentement (Cass. com., 26 juin 2024, op. cit.). Le franchiseur ne saurait donc se retrancher derrière la régularité initiale du DIP pour s’affranchir de son devoir d’information dès lors que la situation du réseau a évolué de manière significative avant la signature du contrat.

Sanctions en cas de manquement aux obligations précontractuelles d’information

Sanction pénale

Le non-respect des obligations relatives au DIP peut exposer le franchiseur ou le fournisseur à une amende pénale pouvant aller jusqu’à 1 500 euros, portée à 3 000 euros en cas de récidive, le montant étant multiplié par cinq pour les personnes morales (article R. 330-2 du Code de commerce).

Nullité du contrat pour dol

Le contrat peut être annulé en cas de manquement à l’article 1112-1 ou à l’article L. 330-3. Dans les deux cas, le non-respect de l’obligation d’information n’est sanctionné que si le demandeur démontre que son consentement a été vicié par l’erreur, le dol ou la violence. Le juge procède à une appréciation in concreto, tenant compte notamment de l’expérience professionnelle et des diligences personnelles du distributeur : un candidat averti aura plus de difficultés à caractériser un dol, et son expérience dans le secteur concerné peut suffire à exonérer le franchiseur (CA Paris, pôle 5 – ch. 11, 26 avr. 2024, n° 21/13205), quand bien même les informations communiquées lacunaires ou inexactes (CA Paris, 20 janv. 2021, n° 19/03382).

Le cas échéant, les parties doivent être remises dans l’état antérieur à la conclusion du contrat.

S’agissant des éléments constitutifs du dol, les tribunaux en apprécient strictement les deux conditions:

• (Un élément matériel) l’existence d’un mensonge ou d’une réticence dolosive (article 1137 du Code civil) ;
• Et (un élément intentionnel) l’intention de tromper son cocontractant (article 1130 du Code civil).

Dommages et intérêts

Bien que les demandes en nullité soient soumises à des conditions très strictes, les franchisés et distributeurs peuvent alternativement obtenir des dommages et intérêts sur le fondement de la responsabilité délictuelle pour manquement à l’obligation précontractuelle d’information, sous réserve de démontrer une faute (information incomplète ou erronée), un préjudice indemnisable (celui-ci se limite à la perte de chance de ne pas contracter ou de contracter à des conditions plus avantageuses – voir en ce sens : Cass. com., 15 mars 2017, n° 15-16.406) et le lien de causalité entre les deux.

From Reporting to Governance and Risk Allocation

Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) considerations are playing an increasingly influential role in how businesses operate, invest, and manage risk, especially within the European Union, where corporate sustainability and responsibility regulation have been on the agenda in recent years.

With the adoption of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), many companies anticipated a significant shift in compliance. Since then, the EU has introduced simplification measures to streamline reporting and due diligence obligations, reduce the administrative burden, and improve proportionality, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while maintaining the core sustainability objectives.

While opinions may differ regarding the evolution of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) in EU regulation and the subsequent postponements of reporting obligations, regulatory developments appear to have, in practice, supported a shift in perspective. Sustainability is no longer viewed solely as a reporting requirement, but increasingly as a matter of governance, strategy, and risk allocation. This development is welcome, as the regulatory framework’s underlying objective is to advance the green transition, which in turn requires a change in how companies integrate sustainability into their decision-making and operations.

This focus on sustainability influences businesses of all sizes, including SMEs. Even companies not directly subject to the CSRD or CSDDD anticipate that ESG requirements will be passed down through the supply chain. Many non-reporting SMEs are already embedding sustainability practices, and this trend is likely to continue. In other words, sustainability policies are already affecting companies well before any formal reporting obligations kick in.

Environmental, Social, and Governance in Contract Architecture

One of the key means of implementing environmental, social, and governance obligations and objectives in day-to-day business operations is through commercial contracts and the requirements and commitments embedded in them.

Even where a company itself is not directly subject to extensive reporting or due diligence obligations, corporate sustainability and responsibility expectations flow through the market via contractual relationships. Larger undertakings within the scope of CSRD and, in due course, the CSDDD require contractual assurances, information rights, and cooperation from their business partners, including SMEs operating within their supply chains. As a result, corporate sustainability and responsibility become a question of contractual architecture. Companies must consider not only price mechanisms, liability caps and termination triggers, but also how environmental, social and governance risks and obligations are addressed and allocated between the parties through legally enforceable contractual terms.

Translating Policies into Binding Obligations

A typical starting point is the incorporation of a code of conduct or sustainability policies into commercial contracts, often by reference and through an express obligation on the contracting party to comply with them. From a legal standpoint, this raises important drafting questions. Many codes are drafted as high-level public statements. When such policies are converted into contractual commitments, their wording, scope, and hierarchy relative to the main agreement require careful consideration. The obligations must be sufficiently clear to define the parties’ expectations, coherent with other contractual provisions, and proportionate to the commercial relationship. The obligations must also be capable of practical implementation and effective monitoring in the context of the agreement.

In practical terms, this may mean requiring the supplier to comply with specific labour standards, maintain documented environmental management procedures, report on emissions data, ensure traceability of key raw materials, or allow reasonable access for audits. Clearly defining what is expected, how compliance is demonstrated, and what consequences follow from non-compliance is essential for the clause to function effectively. Otherwise, clauses that appear comprehensive in theory and ambitious in scope may offer limited enforceability in practice, and their impact may remain marginal if compliance cannot be effectively monitored and verified. If policies are not properly translated into binding and operational obligations, the company risks a mismatch between what it promises publicly and what is actually required under its contracts. This may undermine consistency, weaken risk management, and expose the company to reputational and governance risks if its own stated principles cannot be enforced within its supply or distribution chain.

As part of this process, companies must also consider the protection of trade secrets and confidential information. For example, broad audit or data-reporting obligations may raise concerns about sensitive business information. Contractual terms should balance transparency with the need to protect legitimately proprietary data. Clauses such as confidentiality agreements or carve-outs for trade secrets can be used to ensure that sharing ESG-related information does not compromise confidential business information or competitive advantages.

Environmental, Social and Governance Clauses Across Different Contract Types

Besides codes of conduct and sustainability policies, environmental, social and governance-related clauses increasingly take more tailored and transaction-specific forms. In shareholder agreements, sustainability objectives may be reflected in governance structures or even linked to financial outcomes, for example by aligning dividend policies or incentive mechanisms with agreed climate targets. In employment contracts, obligations may extend beyond general compliance and include participation in corporate sustainability training programmes or adherence to internal sustainability guidelines as part of performance expectations.

In supply and manufacturing agreements, environmental, social and governance provisions may address traceability of raw materials, emissions reporting, waste management, energy efficiency standards or the right to replace a supplier if its environmental practices materially conflict with the contracting party’s sustainability commitments. Such contractual mechanisms increasingly affect SMEs operating as suppliers, as ESG expectations pass through the supply chain.

Construction contracts often include detailed requirements regarding material selection, lifecycle impacts, carbon footprint calculations and recycling or waste reduction procedures. For example, in Finland, legislation imposes low-carbon and energy efficiency requirements for new buildings, and a party undertaking a construction project is subject to mandatory reporting obligations relating to construction and demolition waste. These statutory requirements are typically reflected and implemented in the relevant project and construction contracts.

Across these different contract types, the practical significance is consistent. Environmental, social and governance considerations move from the level of general policy into legally enforceable obligations tailored to each specific legal relationship. Contracts function as a mechanism for allocating responsibility, managing compliance risk and aligning commercial incentives with sustainability objectives.

Proportionate Monitoring and Audit Rights

In the contractual implementation and monitoring of environmental, social and governance obligations, audit and information rights play a central role. They are closely linked to effective oversight and form an integral part of a coherent contractual framework. In practice, companies typically seek access to relevant data from their business partners and, where appropriate, establish inspection or audit rights to enable meaningful monitoring and verification, whether conducted directly by the company or, commonly, by an independent expert appointed for that purpose.

However, such arrangements must remain balanced. Overly burdensome provisions may needlessly disrupt day-to-day operations and reduce the willingness to cooperate, particularly for SMEs with limited administrative capacity. By contrast, well-designed mechanisms that balance transparency with confidentiality and operational feasibility are more defensible and more likely to function effectively in practice.

Contractual Remedies

As a general principle, the consequences of a breach are determined by the terms agreed between the parties. In practice, the parties will typically first seek to resolve the matter through discussion and good faith negotiations, allowing the non-compliant party an opportunity to clarify the situation and implement corrective actions within a reasonable timeframe. If negotiations do not lead to a resolution, it may be appropriate to proceed to stronger measures, such as contractual penalties, indemnification obligations, price adjustments, temporary suspension rights or other agreed sanctions, applied in light of the nature and severity of the breach.

The contract should clearly define what constitutes a breach, how it is assessed and what remedies are available in each scenario. Clear and proportionate step-by-step remedy structures enhance legal certainty, reduce the risk of disputes and ensure that material or repeated breaches may trigger more significant consequences, including termination where justified.

Strategic and Voluntary Environmental, Social and Governance Commitments

In the current EU landscape, implementing ESG considerations in commercial contracts is no longer simply a matter of reacting to directives. It is a broader exercise in risk management and corporate governance. Even as the implementation details of the directives may continue to evolve, market expectations, financing conditions and reputational considerations remain key drivers of sustainability integration.

In addition, some companies choose to position themselves as frontrunners in sustainability for strategic and reputational reasons. They may therefore incorporate voluntary environmental, social and governance mechanisms and requirements into their contracts that go beyond, or are not directly derived from, binding directives. By doing so, they signal to investors, customers and other stakeholders that sustainability is treated as a core business priority rather than merely a compliance obligation.

At the same time, it is important to recognise the practical limits of such commitments. Ambitious sustainability requirements may be more challenging for SMEs with limited financial and administrative resources. Meeting extensive reporting, certification or traceability standards can require investments in systems, personnel and external expertise. If contractual expectations are not calibrated to the size and capacity of the counterparty, they may limit the ability of SMEs to participate in certain supply chains. A balanced and proportionate approach helps ensure that sustainability objectives remain achievable and commercially workable across the contractual chain.

Conclusion

For legal practitioners, the central task is not to increase the number of environmental, social and governance clauses as such, but to ensure their quality, coherence and practical relevance. The objective is to design contractual mechanisms that are proportionate, enforceable and aligned with the company’s actual risk profile, industry context and sustainability priorities. Commercial contracts remain one of the most concrete tools for translating sustainability strategy into operational practice. Moreover, every contract lawyer should understand and apply key sustainability principles in their work, ensuring that ESG commitments become integral to legal advice and contract drafting.

The Strait of Hormuz is likely the most strategically important point for the global oil trade. In fact, approximately 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through this narrow passage between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf every day.

Following the outbreak of war in the region, the impact on energy markets was almost immediate: oil prices quickly rose above $100 per barrel, and it is unclear how high they may climb in the coming weeks and months. As a result, transportation, production, and procurement costs are rising across industrial supply chains in many sectors.

For many companies engaged in international trade, this phenomenon creates a very real problem. Contracts signed months (or years) earlier—perhaps at a fixed price—must be fulfilled in a completely different economic context.

A manufacturer that sells goods for delivery in six or twelve months may find itself producing and shipping at much higher energy costs, while the price agreed upon with the customer remains unchanged.

This is a situation that recurs cyclically, for various reasons: from the COVID-19 pandemic to the subsequent raw materials crisis, and on to current geopolitical tensions.

When the increase in costs is so sudden and significant, a question inevitably arises: must the contract still be performed under the original terms, or is it possible to suspend or renegotiate the agreement to adapt it to the new circumstances?

The answer depends on several factors: first and foremost, on what the parties have (or have not) provided for in the contract, but also on the law applicable to the relationship and on the interpretation that judges or arbitrators may give to the rules in the event of a dispute.

Force Majeure and Hardship: Two Different Concepts

When extraordinary events occur—such as a war, an energy crisis, or the disruption of a trade route—many operators immediately invoke force majeure. However, in most cases, these situations fall instead under the category of hardship.

It is therefore essential to distinguish between these two situations.

When an Event Constitutes Force Majeure

Force majeure applies to cases where an extraordinary and unforeseeable event makes it impossible to perform the contract.

The characteristics of the grounds for exemption from liability depend on the law applicable to the commercial relationship, but generally require:

• unpredictability of the event;
• the event being beyond the affected party’s control;
• the impossibility of avoiding or overcoming the event through reasonable efforts.

Typical examples include:

• orders from authorities requiring the suspension of production
• embargoes or export bans
• logistical disruptions caused by war

In these situations, performance is not merely more costly: it becomes objectively impossible. The consequence is that the party unable to perform is generally exempt from liability for the duration of the event.

Hardship

The situation is different when performance of the contract remains possible but becomes economically much more burdensome.

The concept of hardship is generally based on four prerequisites:

1. an event occurring after the conclusion of the contract
2. unpredictability and extraordinary nature of the event
3. a substantial alteration of the economic balance of the contract
4. excessive burden of performance, but not impossibility

A sharp increase in the price of oil, gas, or other raw materials often falls into this category.

Goods can be produced and delivered, but doing so may entail costs far higher than those anticipated when the contract was signed.

The ripple effect along the international supply chain

In global industrial supply chains, the same goods are often the subject of a series of consecutive contracts.

The manufacturer sells to a trader, who sells to a processing company, which resells to an importer in another country, who in turn distributes the product to the end market.

When a hardship event occurs—such as a sharp rise in energy prices—the effect tends to ripple throughout the entire supply chain.

The first party affected by the cost increase will try to pass the increase on to its contractual counterpart, who, in turn, will find themselves in the same situation with the next link in the chain.

The risk is clear: one of the operators in the middle of the chain may face increased upstream costs without being able to pass them on downstream.

This is one of the most common problems in international supply chains.

What happens if there is no clause regarding price fluctuations

In commercial practice, it often happens that parties operate on the basis of orders and order confirmations without a formal written contract, or that a contract exists but contains no provisions regarding price fluctuations or hardship.

In such cases, when costs increase sharply, it is necessary to determine which law applies to individual sales contracts across the supply chain.

This can lead to very different situations:

• one law may allow for price revision or termination of the contract
• another law aplicable to a second contract may not provide for equivalent remedies
• a third contract may contain much more restrictive contractual clauses

The practical result is that an operator in the middle of the chain may face a price increase from their supplier without being able to pass it on to the customer.

A Common Legal Framework: The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG)

Fortunately, many international sales contracts are governed by the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).

The convention has been ratified by 97 countries, including Italy and most major trading partners, such as the U.S., Canada, China, Germany, France, Spain, etc.

The central provision is Article 79, according to which a party is not liable for non-performance if it proves that the non-performance is due to an impediment:

• beyond its control
• unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract
• unavoidable or insurmountable

Traditionally, this provision has been applied to cases of force majeure.

In recent years, there has been debate over whether it can also be applied to cases of hardship, but international case law tends to be very cautious.

International case law on Hardship

Court decisions reflect a rather strict approach.

In some cases, even very significant increases in raw material costs have not been considered sufficient to modify or suspend the contract.

The reasoning is simple: those who operate professionally in international trade must take into account a certain degree of market volatility.

Only when the increase in costs exceeds an exceptional and unforeseeable level such as to radically alter the balance of the contract can hardship be invoked.

One of the most frequently cited cases is the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision in the Scafom case, which recognized the right to renegotiate the contract following a 70% increase in the price of steel.

However, such cases are relatively rare.

Generic clauses that serve no purpose

Many contracts contain hardship clauses copied from standard templates (boilerplate).

The problem is that these clauses often:

• list the effects of hardship
• but do not define when hardship actually occurs

The result is that, when prices rise, the parties may have very different opinions on what constitutes an “exceptional” increase and whether the event in question was “unforeseeable” or not.

The clause, therefore, does not resolve the issue, but defers it to discussion between the parties and, in the event of a failure to reach an agreement, to the courts or arbitrators.

What criteria can define a hardship situation

To make the clause truly effective, it is useful to establish objective parameters.

Among the most commonly used in international contracts:

• an increase or decrease in the price of a raw material beyond a certain threshold (±20% or ±30%)
• an increase in transportation or logistics costs within certain limits;
• significant fluctuations in the exchange rate beyond a specified range;
• the introduction of tariffs or trade restrictions

These parameters, linked to tolerance ranges, allow the parties to quickly and unambiguously identify a hardship event.

Remedies in the Event of Hardship

An effective clause should also address how to handle the situation.

The most common solutions are:

• renegotiation of the contract in good faith
• apply an automatic price adjustment
• appointment of an independent third-party expert to determine the new price
• temporary suspension of the contract
• right of withdrawal if no agreement is reached

These tools allow the parties to manage the crisis without resorting to litigation.

Audit of existing contracts: what to do now

At this point, the practical question becomes: how should we manage the issue in existing business relationships?

The first step is to conduct an audit of existing contracts with suppliers and customers.

1. Introduce comprehensive contracts in new relationships

If the relationships are governed solely by purchase orders and order confirmations, it is advisable to take this opportunity to draft comprehensive international sales contracts that include:

• a hardship clause
• warranty provisions
• remedies for breach
• limitations of liability

2. Update existing contracts

If the relationship is already governed by a contract, you should check whether a hardship clause exists.

If not, it may be useful to propose to the other party:

• a new contract, or
• a contract addendum dedicated to managing price fluctuations.

This helps prevent future conflicts and provides both parties with an effective tool to manage potential price shocks along the supply chain.

Conclusion

Commodity and energy crises demonstrate how exposed international contracts are to sudden changes in economic conditions. When a contract does not clearly address hardship management, the risk does not disappear; it simply shifts along the supply chain until it settles on the weakest link.

For this reason, companies operating within international supply chains should view the hardship clause as a strategic tool for managing contractual risk. A well-drafted contract does not eliminate market volatility, but it allows the parties to address it with clear rules, reducing uncertainty and preventing disputes.

Executive Summary

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) remains one of the most ambitious integration projects in the world. Yet, several years into its operational phase, it has not (yet) delivered the structural shift many expected. A recent analysis underscores the gap between political momentum and economic reality: implementation remains uneven, the agreement is still used by only a portion of participating states, and non-tariff barriers and infrastructure deficits continue to dominate the cost of doing business across borders.  For Egypt, the opportunity is still real — but it depends less on treaty headlines and more on enabling conditions: trade logistics, customs efficiency, regulatory convergence, and competitive industrial capacity. 

Looking Back: The Promise of a Single African Market

When the AfCFTA was launched, expectations were understandably high. A continent-wide trade framework was supposed to reduce tariffs, facilitate trade in goods and services, and strengthen regional value chains — with the broader goal of moving African economies up the value ladder.

In my 2022 article, I asked whether AfCFTA could become a game changer for Egypt, given Egypt’s industrial base, strategic geography, and the potential to diversify export markets beyond traditional partners. (For background, see the earlier article here”).

The Reality Check: Intra-African Trade Remains Structurally Weak

Several years later, the interim assessment is sobering. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) recently put it, AfCFTA is not a “game changer” yet, and only about half of member states currently meet the practical prerequisites to trade under the agreement.

A deeper reason is structural: no other world region trades so little with itself, and while statistics may undercount informal cross-border flows (especially in food), the overall picture remains unchanged.

Trade integration cannot deliver transformative outcomes if production, logistics, and institutions do not support scale.

Implementation Has Been Slow — and Often Symbolic

Operationalisation did not start with full-scale liberalisation. Instead, the AfCFTA began with a pilot approach: the Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) launched in October 2022, initially with eight states, later joined by additional countries, including Nigeria and South Africa by spring 2025.

The GTI created valuable learning effects, but it also underlined a key point: early progress was often presented through symbolic deals, while product coverage and volumes remained limited. FAZ highlights that only selected goods could be traded duty-free and that key sectors remained constrained for a long time due to missing or unresolved technical rules.

A pilot, however, cannot substitute for full operational certainty — the kind businesses need to restructure supply chains and invest.

Tariffs Are Not the Main Barrier — Trade Costs Are

AfCFTA is frequently discussed in terms of tariff liberalisation. Yet, evidence suggests that the largest gains do not come from tariffs but from reducing non-tariff barriers and improving trade infrastructure.

FAZ points to a central reality: tariffs tend to add around 20–30% to intra-African trade costs, whereas non-tariff costs can be far higher — driven by bureaucracy, lack of harmonised standards, inefficient border processes, and transport barriers.

This is the crux: even with reduced tariffs, trade will not expand meaningfully if goods still cannot move cheaply, quickly, and predictably.

Integration Complexity and Distributional Politics

Africa’s integration landscape is shaped by multiple overlapping regional economic communities and trade regimes. This creates legal and administrative complexity — often described as an integration “spaghetti bowl.” FAZ notes the challenge of coordination and the continued fragmentation of rules.

There is also a political economy dimension. Intra-African trade is heavily influenced by a small number of larger economies — and the distribution of benefits matters. FAZ highlights the dominance of major players (notably South Africa) and the concern that tariff liberalisation alone may entrench existing industrial advantages.

Where governments expect asymmetric outcomes, resistance often takes the form of delay, narrow implementation, or persistent non-tariff barriers.

What This Means for Egypt: The Opportunity Is Real — But Conditional

Egypt’s strategic case for AfCFTA participation remains strong: industrial potential, geographic location, and the opportunity to access and shape growing markets. But the experience so far suggests that the treaty text alone does not generate trade flows.

For Egypt’s private sector, the decisive factors are practical:

• predictable and efficient customs clearance and border procedures,
• logistics corridors and port efficiency,
• regulatory convergence (standards, certification, compliance),
• stable access to trade finance and payments,
• competitive energy and production conditions for manufacturing and processing.

AfCFTA can support these developments — but it cannot replace them.

The “Game Changer” Pathway: What Must Happen Next

FAZ concludes that AfCFTA will only become truly impactful if it is paired with the fundamentals: major infrastructure investment, stronger production and processing capacity, and a credible industrial policy.

At the same time, Africa faces a classic chicken-and-egg problem: without development there is limited investment appeal; without investment there is limited development.

For Egypt and its partners, a pragmatic strategy would be to:

1. treat AfCFTA as a platform for real trade-cost reduction, not only tariff debates;
2. focus on a limited number of scalable corridors and sectors where regional value chains can realistically grow;
3. strengthen implementation capacity so that preferences become usable for firms — especially SMEs;
4. enhance legal certainty and dispute resolution reliability for cross-border commerce.

Conclusion

AfCFTA remains a landmark achievement in terms of political commitment. But as of today, it has not yet been the “game changer” many hoped for.

For Egypt, the key question is no longer whether AfCFTA is visionary — it is. The question is whether governments and businesses can translate it into lower real trade costs, higher competitiveness, and bankable cross-border transactions. If those enabling conditions improve, AfCFTA’s promise can still become commercial reality.

After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

Why wine matters in this agreement

The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

1. tariff liberalisation;
2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the « Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures » (SPS) and « Technical Barriers to Trade » (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

Geographical indications: protection and tension

One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
2. transition periods for local operators;
3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

Services, distribution, and market structure

Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

1. logistics providers
2. distribution networks
3. commercial representation
4. marketing and advertising agencies

For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

Legal advisors will need to consider:

1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
3. compliance with competition rules

The implementation gap: where risk lies

Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

1. managing client expectations
2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

What should lawyers be doing now?

Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

Final sip

The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

Lors d’évènements de grande ampleur, tels que la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026, certaines entreprises tentent d’associer « sauvagement » leur marque ou image à l’évènement par une pratique d’« ambush marketing » (marketing d’embuscade) définie par la jurisprudence comme une « stratégie publicitaire mise en place par une entreprise afin d’associer son image commerciale à celle d’un événement et donc de profiter de l’impact médiatique dudit événement sans s’acquitter des droits qui y sont relatifs et sans avoir obtenu au préalable l’autorisation de l’organisateur de l’événement » (CA Paris, 2e chambre, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912). Une pratique risquée et sanctionnée, mais parfois envisageable.

Points clés à retenir

• L’ambush marketing est une pratique sanctionnée mais qui n’est pas interdite en soi.
• En contrepartie de leurs investissements dans la compétition, les sponsors et partenaires officiels de la FIFA bénéficient d’une protection juridique très importante, par l’intermédiaire de divers textes généraux (contrefaçon, parasitisme, propriété intellectuelle) ou plus particuliers (droit du sport), contre toutes formes d’ambush marketing.
• La Coupe du Monde de la FIFA fait l’objet d’une protection renforcée fondée sur un portefeuille étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier et sur les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, en l’absence de législation française spécifique comparable à celle instituée pour les Jeux Olympiques.
• Ces droits ne sont pas absolus et il reste néanmoins de minces opportunités permettant une pratique, astucieuse, du marketing d’embuscade.

La protection des sponsors et partenaires officiels de la Coupe du Monde contre l’ambush marketing

Fort d’une audience mondiale de près de 5 milliards de personnes sur l’ensemble des plateformes lors de sa dernière édition au Qatar en 2022 – dont plus de 1,5 milliard pour la seule finale – la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 est l’évènement sportif le plus suivi de la planète. Accueilli pour la première fois par trois pays (Canada, Mexique et États-Unis), il réunit 48 équipes et plus de 1 200 joueurs pour 104 matchs dans 16 stades. Son organisation est financée dans une large mesure par les différents partenaires, sponsors et détenteurs de droits officiels, qui bénéficient en contrepartie d’un droit exclusif d’utilisation des marques et propriétés intellectuelles officielles de la FIFA afin d’y associer leur propre image et signes distinctifs.

La pratique d’ambush marketing n’est pas sanctionnée en tant que telle par le droit français, mais de nombreux textes épars permettent de protéger largement les sponsors et partenaires de manifestations sportives de dimension mondiale contre l’ambush marketing. Ils sont en effet légitimes à pouvoir jouir paisiblement des droits qui leur sont offerts en contrepartie de leurs larges investissements réalisés dans le cadre d’évènements tels que, par exemple, les coupes du monde de football ou de rugby, ou les Jeux Olympiques.

Peuvent notamment être invoqués par les sponsors officiels et par les organisateurs de telles manifestations :

• les protections « classiques » offertes par le droit de la propriété intellectuelle (droit des marques et droit d’auteur) au titre de l’action en contrefaçon fondée sur le Code de la propriété intellectuelle,
• le droit de la responsabilité civile (parasitisme et concurrence déloyale fondés sur l’article 1240 du Code civil),
• le droit de la consommation (pratiques commerciales trompeuses),
• mais aussi des textes plus spécifiques tels que la protection des droits d’exploitation des fédérations sportives et des organisateurs de manifestations sportives prévue par l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, qui confère aux organisateurs de manifestations sportives un monopole d’exploitation.

Sur ces fondements, ont par exemple été sanctionnées les pratiques d’ambush marketing suivantes :

• L’exploitation d’une compétition de tennis et l’utilisation, pendant l’évènement sportif, de la marque associée à celui-ci : L’organisation de paris en ligne portant sur le tournoi de Roland Garros, utilisant le signe protégé et la marque Roland Garros pour viser les matchs sur lesquels les paris étaient organisés. L’exploitation illicite de la compétition sportive est sanctionnée à hauteur de 400 000 euros sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, la Fédération française de tennis étant seule propriétaire du droit d’exploitation de Roland Garros. L’utilisation de la marque est également sanctionnée au titre de la contrefaçon (à hauteur de 300 000 euros) et du parasitisme (à hauteur de 500 000 euros) (CA Paris, 14 oct. 2009, n° 08/19179).
• Une campagne publicitaire réalisée pendant un festival de cinéma reproduisant la marque déposée de l’évènement : L’organisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, d’une opération de communication digitale par une marque de cosmétique à travers la publication de vidéos sur ses réseaux sociaux, sur certains plans desquelles était visible l’affiche officielle du festival de Cannes, l’une d’elles reproduisant la marque déposée de la palme d’or. Sanctionnée sur les fondements de la contrefaçon de droits d’auteur et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (TJ Paris, 11 déc. 2020, n° 19/08543).
• Une campagne publicitaire visant à se voir attribuer à tort la qualité de partenaire officiel d’un évènement : L’utilisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, du slogan « coiffeur officiel des femmes » associé aux expressions « Cannes » et « Festival de Cannes », laissant faussement croire au public que l’entreprise était partenaire officiel du festival. Sanctionnée sur le fondement de la concurrence déloyale et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (CA Paris, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912).

Ces sanctions pécuniaires peuvent se cumuler avec des injonctions de cessation des pratiques et/ou des mesures de publication dans la presse, sous astreinte.

La protection spécifique des marques de la FIFA

À la différence des Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024, qui bénéficiaient d’une loi française spécifique en tant que pays hôte (loi n° 2018-202 du 26 mars 2018 relative à l’organisation des Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024) et réservant notamment les espaces publicitaires à proximité des sites de compétition aux seuls partenaires officiels, la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 ne se tenant pas sur le territoire français, aucun dispositif légal français équivalent n’est applicable. La protection des partenaires et sponsors officiels repose donc sur le droit commun, mais elle n’en est pas moins solide.

La FIFA a constitué un portefeuille très étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier, protégées en France par les dispositions du Code de la propriété intellectuelle. Ces marques comprennent notamment la marque verbale et figurative FIFA®, les marques FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, ainsi que l’emblème officiel de la compétition (combinant le trophée et le chiffre 26), le slogan officiel « We Are 26™ » / « Nous Sommes 26™ », les logos des seize villes hôtes, et la police typographique officielle « FWC 26 », protégée par le droit d’auteur. Seuls les détenteurs de droits de la FIFA, c’est-à-dire les Partenaires FIFA (au premier rang desquels figurent Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways et Visa), les Sponsors Plus, les Sponsors officiels et les Supporters régionaux, sont autorisés à utiliser à des fins commerciales cette propriété intellectuelle officielle.

La FIFA a publié des directives relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, qui précisent en détail les usages autorisés et interdits des marques et logos liés à la Coupe du Monde 2026. Selon ces directives, sont notamment prohibés, sans autorisation, toute utilisation des marques officielles dans une publicité commerciale ; l’intégration de la propriété intellectuelle officielle dans un nom commercial ou un nom de domaine ; l’organisation de concours ou jeux-concours créant une association avec la compétition ; l’utilisation des marques officielles pour décorer un magasin ; et l’usage par un compte professionnel de hashtags officiels dans un but commercial. Ces directives précisent en outre que la protection s’étend non seulement à la reproduction à l’identique des marques officielles, mais également à leurs variantes dont la similitude peut prêter à confusion. Cette protection rappelée par les lignes directrices est en cohérence avec la protection élargie accordée aux marques notoires en droit français par l’article L.713-5 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle.

Les leçons des JO de Paris 2024 : quels risques pour les marques ?

Les Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024 ont donné lieu à un contentieux abondant qui éclaire concrètement les risques auxquels s’exposent les entreprises tentées par l’ambush marketing lors d’un évènement sportif majeur. Si ces décisions ont été rendues dans le contexte spécifique des JO, pendant lesquels protections légales spécifiques renforcées s’appliquaient, elles constituent néanmoins un avertissement direct pour les marques qui envisageraient des stratégies similaires lors de la Coupe du Monde, sur le fondement du droit commun.

• L’utilisation de symboles officiels sur des supports physiques itinérants : Pendant les JO de Paris 2024, une société chinoise du secteur laitier avait fait circuler dans Paris des bus arborant les anneaux olympiques associés à ses propres marques, tout en se présentant comme « la seule société laitière chinoise présente à Paris 2024 ». La Cour d’appel de Paris a confirmé tant le parasitisme que la contrefaçon de marque, et condamné les sociétés concernées, en référé, au paiement d’une provision de 20 000 euros, assortie d’une astreinte de 20 000 euros par jour et par infraction constatée, visant à faire cesser la diffusion des publicités (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 2, 21 nov. 2025, n° 24/15283 ; TJ Paris, ordonnance de référé du 8 août 2024, 24/55463).
• La retransmission non autorisée de compétitions : Le tribunal judiciaire de Paris a ordonné en référé, pendant les JO, la cessation immédiate de la diffusion de compétitions olympiques par une plateforme de streaming ne disposant pas des droits médias correspondants, sous astreinte de 1 500 euros par infraction constatée, 3 000 euros par jour pour les distributions continues et 5 000 euros par jour pour défaut de retrait (TJ Paris, réf., 18 sept. 2024, n° 24/53019). Ainsi, toute plateforme retransmettant des matchs de la Coupe du Monde sans détenir les droits cédés par la FIFA s’expose à des mesures d’urgence immédiates, sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport.
• La protection élargie de la marque notoire : La Cour de cassation a confirmé que la protection des marques olympiques s’étendait au-delà de la reproduction stricto sensu : il suffit que la marque soit évoquée ou suggérée, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de démontrer un risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public. Cette solution, fondée sur l’article L.713-5 du code de la propriété intellectuelle, s’est appliquée à un bar ayant utilisé les anneaux olympiques sur ses sous-bocks pour promouvoir ses soirées de retransmission (Cass. crim., 17 janv. 2017, n° 15-86.363). Les marques de la FIFA étant tout aussi notoires sur le plan mondial, le même régime protecteur leur est applicable : une simple évocation des marques officielles, même sans reproduction littérale, pourra caractériser une atteinte sanctionnable.

Certaines opérations marketing peuvent échapper à toute sanction

L’analyse de la jurisprudence et des pratiques promotionnelles permet néanmoins de comprendre les contours de certaines pratiques publicitaires qui pourraient être autorisées (non sanctionnées par les textes susmentionnés), sous réserve qu’elles soient préparées et présentées avec habileté. En voici quelques exemples.

Communication sur un ton décalé ou humoristique : Une approche décalée, voire humoristique, peut permettre d’échapper aux sanctions susvisées.

• Ainsi, la marque de chips Vico du groupe Intersnack avait lancé en 2016 une campagne promotionnelle autour du slogan « Vico, partenaire des supporters à domicile ».
• La société irlandaise Paddy Power avait pour sa part parrainé une course de l’œuf dans la cuiller à « London », village de Bourgogne, pour afficher à Londres pendant les JO de 2012 le slogan : « Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year ! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is) ». Le comité d’organisation des JO avait échoué à faire cesser cette campagne. Humour anglais …
• Le groupe Heineken avait quant à lui commercialisé pendant l’Euro 2016, dont Carlsberg était le sponsor officiel, une gamme de bouteilles aux couleurs des drapeaux de 21 pays ayant « marqué son histoire », parmi lesquels une majorité de participants à la compétition.

Communication d’une donnée informative à titre publicitaire : A été jugé licite l’utilisation de résultats d’un match de rugby et l’annonce d’un prochain match dans un journal pour la promotion d’un véhicule automobile, la publicité indiquant : « France 13 Angleterre 24 – la Fiat 500 félicite l’Angleterre pour sa victoire et donne rendez-vous à l’équipe de France le 9 mars pour France-Italie ». Les juges ont considéré que cette publication « se borne à reproduire un résultat sportif d’actualité, acquis et rendu public en première page du journal d’information sportive, et à faire état d’une rencontre future également connue comme déjà annoncée par le journal dans un article d’information » (Cass. com., 20 mai 2014, n° 13-12.102).

Sponsoring de joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde : Toute société peut conclure des partenariats avec des joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA, par exemple en leur fournissant des équipements ou des vêtements portant son logo. Les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle précisent expressément qu’elles « ne contiennent aucune affirmation relative à des droits détenus par des tierces parties telles que les joueurs, clubs, associations membres [ou] confédérations ». Les directives de la FIFA confirment par ailleurs explicitement que les images génériques liées au football, aux équipes nationales ou aux drapeaux de pays n’entrent pas dans la propriété intellectuelle officielle. La prudence s’impose néanmoins : le partenariat ne doit pas créer l’impression d’une association commerciale avec la FIFA ou la compétition, ni utiliser les marques officielles de la FIFA.

L’approche combinée juridique et marketing dans la conception et la préparation du message d’une telle opération de communication est essentielle pour éviter des poursuites judiciaires, notamment sur le fondement du parasitisme. Certaines campagnes publicitaires peuvent donc légitimement être envisagées, notamment quand elles sont astucieuses.

Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

What the EU decision does (and does not) do

The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

How different payment types are affected in practice

Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

Country notes (alphabetical)

Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

Practical next steps for EU companies

1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

En droit français, les franchiseurs et les distributeurs sont soumis à deux types d’obligations précontractuelles d’information : chaque partie doit spontanément informer son futur partenaire de toute information qu’elle sait déterminante pour son consentement. De plus, pour certains contrats — notamment le contrat de franchise — il existe une obligation de communiquer un nombre limité d’informations dans un document dédié. Ces obligations précontractuelles sont d’ordre public. Ainsi, ces deux obligations s’appliquent simultanément au franchiseur, au distributeur ou au concessionnaire lors de la négociation d’un contrat avec un partenaire.

Points clés à retenir

• Les informations requises par le DIP doivent être intégralement renseignées et actualisées ;
• Les informations non exigées par le DIP mais communiquées par le franchiseur doivent être soigneusement sélectionnées et sincères ;
• Le franchisé doit avoir la possibilité de solliciter des informations complémentaires auprès du franchiseur ;
• L’expérience du franchisé dans le secteur économique concerné permet au franchiseur de limiter considérablement son exposition au risque de nullité du contrat pour vice du consentement ;
• Le franchiseur doit conserver la preuve de la remise effective des informations précontractuelles, qu’elles soient obligatoires ou non.
• L’obligation générale d’information de droit commun (article 1112-1 du Code civil) peut s’appliquer concurremment avec l’obligation spéciale prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce.

Obligation générale d’information applicable à tous les contractants

Quelle est l’étendue de cette obligation précontractuelle d’information ?

Cette obligation s’impose à tous les cocontractants, pour tout type de contrat. En effet, l’article 1112-1 du Code civil dispose que :

(§. 1) Celle des parties qui connaît une information dont l’importance est déterminante pour le consentement de l’autre doit l’en informer dès lors que, légitimement, cette dernière ignore cette information ou fait confiance à son cocontractant.

(§. 3) Ont une importance déterminante les informations qui ont un lien direct et nécessaire avec le contenu du contrat ou la qualité des parties.

Cette obligation s’applique à toutes les parties contractantes, pour tout type de contrat.

La jurisprudence s’est prononcée sur la question du cumul de cette obligation de droit commun, avec l’obligation spéciale d’information prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce (cf infra), en répondant par la positive (CA Paris, 27 mars 2024, n° 22/12665). Le périmètre de cette dernière a toutefois été circonscrit par la Cour de cassation : seules les informations présentant un lien direct et nécessaire avec l’objet du contrat ou la qualité des parties sont soumises à obligation de communication (Cass. com., 14 mai 2025, n° 23-17.948).

À qui incombe la charge de la preuve?

La charge de la preuve repose sur celui qui soutient que l’information lui était due. Il doit alors démontrer (i) que l’autre partie lui devait cette information, mais (ii) ne la lui a pas fournie (article 1112-1 (§. 4) du Code civil).

Obligation spéciale d’information applicable aux contrats de franchise et de distribution

Quels contrats sont soumis à cette règle particulière?

Le droit français impose (art. L. 330-3 du Code de commerce) la communication d’un document d’information précontractuelle (« DIP ») ainsi que du projet de contrat, par toute personne :

• qui accorde à une autre personne le droit d’utiliser une marque, une enseigne ou un nom commercial,
• tout en exigeant un engagement exclusif ou quasi-exclusif pour l’exercice de son activité (par exemple, une obligation d’achat exclusif). Le caractère quasi-exclusif fait l’objet d’une appréciation casuistique par les juges français, indépendamment du seuil de 80% des achats prévu par le règlement UE 2022/720, qui n’est utilisé que comme un repère indicatif.

Concrètement, le DIP doit être remis, par exemple, au franchisé, au distributeur, au concessionnaire ou au licencié de marque, par son franchiseur, fournisseur ou concédant, dès lors que les deux conditions précitées sont réunies. Récemment la jurisprudence française a d’ailleurs eu l’occasion de rappeler que le champ d’application du DIP ne se limitait pas à la franchise, mais également et notamment, au contrat de concession, dès lors que les conditions précitées sont réunies (CA Paris, 22 mai 2024, n° 22/08672).

À quel moment le DIP doit-il être remis?

Le DIP et le projet de contrat doivent être communiqués au moins 20 jours avant la signature du contrat, et, le cas échéant, avant le paiement de toute somme exigée préalablement à la signature (notamment en cas de réservation).

Quelles informations doivent figurer dans le DIP?

L’article R. 330-1 du Code de commerce impose que le DIP mentionne les informations suivantes (liste non exhaustive) relatives :

• Au franchiseur (identité et expérience des dirigeants, parcours professionnel, etc.) ;
• À l’activité du franchiseur (notamment la date de création, le siège social, les références bancaires, l’historique du développement de l’enseigne, les comptes annuels, etc.) ;
• Au réseau (liste des membres avec indication de la date de signature des contrats, liste des établissements proposant les mêmes produits ou services dans la zone d’activité envisagée, nombre de membres ayant quitté le réseau au cours de l’année précédant la remise du DIP avec indication des motifs de départ, etc.) ;
• À la marque concédée (date d’enregistrement, titularité et conditions d’exploitation) ;
• À l’état général du marché (relatif aux produits ou services visés par le contrat) et à l’état local du marché (relatif à la zone d’activité envisagée), ainsi qu’aux facteurs de concurrence et aux perspectives de développement. La Cour de cassation a jugé, s’agissant du marché local, que le franchiseur n’était pas tenu de réaliser une étude de marché, mais que s’il en fournit une, celle-ci doit être exacte et vérifiable (Cass. com., 18 oct. 2023, n° 22-19.329).
• Aux éléments essentiels du projet de contrat, et notamment : sa durée, les conditions de renouvellement, de résiliation et de cession, ainsi que l’étendue des exclusivités accordées ;
• Aux obligations financières pesant sur le cocontractant : nature et montant des dépenses et investissements à engager avant le démarrage de l’activité (droit d’entrée, frais d’installation, etc.).

Au-delà de comporter l’ensemble des informations mentionnées par l’article précité, le DIP doit répondre à une exigence qualitative. En effet toutes les informations communiquées, y compris celles transmises spontanément, doivent être exactes et sincères, afin de garantir un consentement éclairé et exempt de tout vice de la part du candidat à l’entrée dans le réseau.

Comment prouver la remise des informations?

La charge de la preuve de la remise du DIP incombe au débiteur de cette obligation : le franchiseur (Cass. com., 7 juillet 2004, n° 02-15.950). L’idéal pour le franchiseur est de faire signer et dater le DIP par le franchisé le jour de sa remise et d’en conserver la preuve.

La clause contractuelle par laquelle le franchisé reconnaît avoir reçu un DIP complet ne constitue pas une preuve suffisante de la remise effective d’un DIP complet (Cass. com., 10 janvier 2018, n° 15-25.287).

Le franchiseur est-il tenu d’une obligation d’actualisation du DIP jusqu’à la signature du contrat

Dans un arrêt du 26 juin 2024 (n°23-1 14.085 PB) la Cour de cassation retient que la conformité formelle du DIP à la date de sa remise ne suffit pas à exonérer le franchiseur de toute responsabilité précontractuelle. Cette solution est confirmée par un arrêt du 4 décembre 2024 (n° 23-16.684).

Ces deux décisions semblent consacrer une obligation d’actualisation du DIP pesant sur la tête de réseau durant toute la période séparant la remise du document de la conclusion du contrat. Lorsque des événements significatifs surviennent dans cet intervalle (procédure collective affectant des membres du réseau, contentieux majeur, modification structurelle du réseau) la tête de réseau est tenue d’en informer spontanément le candidat. Le juge examine alors si le manquement à cette obligation était susceptible d’altérer l’appréciation que le candidat pouvait avoir du réseau et, partant, de vicier son consentement (Cass. com., 26 juin 2024, op. cit.). Le franchiseur ne saurait donc se retrancher derrière la régularité initiale du DIP pour s’affranchir de son devoir d’information dès lors que la situation du réseau a évolué de manière significative avant la signature du contrat.

Sanctions en cas de manquement aux obligations précontractuelles d’information

Sanction pénale

Le non-respect des obligations relatives au DIP peut exposer le franchiseur ou le fournisseur à une amende pénale pouvant aller jusqu’à 1 500 euros, portée à 3 000 euros en cas de récidive, le montant étant multiplié par cinq pour les personnes morales (article R. 330-2 du Code de commerce).

Nullité du contrat pour dol

Le contrat peut être annulé en cas de manquement à l’article 1112-1 ou à l’article L. 330-3. Dans les deux cas, le non-respect de l’obligation d’information n’est sanctionné que si le demandeur démontre que son consentement a été vicié par l’erreur, le dol ou la violence. Le juge procède à une appréciation in concreto, tenant compte notamment de l’expérience professionnelle et des diligences personnelles du distributeur : un candidat averti aura plus de difficultés à caractériser un dol, et son expérience dans le secteur concerné peut suffire à exonérer le franchiseur (CA Paris, pôle 5 – ch. 11, 26 avr. 2024, n° 21/13205), quand bien même les informations communiquées lacunaires ou inexactes (CA Paris, 20 janv. 2021, n° 19/03382).

Le cas échéant, les parties doivent être remises dans l’état antérieur à la conclusion du contrat.

S’agissant des éléments constitutifs du dol, les tribunaux en apprécient strictement les deux conditions:

• (Un élément matériel) l’existence d’un mensonge ou d’une réticence dolosive (article 1137 du Code civil) ;
• Et (un élément intentionnel) l’intention de tromper son cocontractant (article 1130 du Code civil).

Dommages et intérêts

Bien que les demandes en nullité soient soumises à des conditions très strictes, les franchisés et distributeurs peuvent alternativement obtenir des dommages et intérêts sur le fondement de la responsabilité délictuelle pour manquement à l’obligation précontractuelle d’information, sous réserve de démontrer une faute (information incomplète ou erronée), un préjudice indemnisable (celui-ci se limite à la perte de chance de ne pas contracter ou de contracter à des conditions plus avantageuses – voir en ce sens : Cass. com., 15 mars 2017, n° 15-16.406) et le lien de causalité entre les deux.

From Reporting to Governance and Risk Allocation

Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) considerations are playing an increasingly influential role in how businesses operate, invest, and manage risk, especially within the European Union, where corporate sustainability and responsibility regulation have been on the agenda in recent years.

With the adoption of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), many companies anticipated a significant shift in compliance. Since then, the EU has introduced simplification measures to streamline reporting and due diligence obligations, reduce the administrative burden, and improve proportionality, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while maintaining the core sustainability objectives.

While opinions may differ regarding the evolution of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) in EU regulation and the subsequent postponements of reporting obligations, regulatory developments appear to have, in practice, supported a shift in perspective. Sustainability is no longer viewed solely as a reporting requirement, but increasingly as a matter of governance, strategy, and risk allocation. This development is welcome, as the regulatory framework’s underlying objective is to advance the green transition, which in turn requires a change in how companies integrate sustainability into their decision-making and operations.

This focus on sustainability influences businesses of all sizes, including SMEs. Even companies not directly subject to the CSRD or CSDDD anticipate that ESG requirements will be passed down through the supply chain. Many non-reporting SMEs are already embedding sustainability practices, and this trend is likely to continue. In other words, sustainability policies are already affecting companies well before any formal reporting obligations kick in.

Environmental, Social, and Governance in Contract Architecture

One of the key means of implementing environmental, social, and governance obligations and objectives in day-to-day business operations is through commercial contracts and the requirements and commitments embedded in them.

Even where a company itself is not directly subject to extensive reporting or due diligence obligations, corporate sustainability and responsibility expectations flow through the market via contractual relationships. Larger undertakings within the scope of CSRD and, in due course, the CSDDD require contractual assurances, information rights, and cooperation from their business partners, including SMEs operating within their supply chains. As a result, corporate sustainability and responsibility become a question of contractual architecture. Companies must consider not only price mechanisms, liability caps and termination triggers, but also how environmental, social and governance risks and obligations are addressed and allocated between the parties through legally enforceable contractual terms.

Translating Policies into Binding Obligations

A typical starting point is the incorporation of a code of conduct or sustainability policies into commercial contracts, often by reference and through an express obligation on the contracting party to comply with them. From a legal standpoint, this raises important drafting questions. Many codes are drafted as high-level public statements. When such policies are converted into contractual commitments, their wording, scope, and hierarchy relative to the main agreement require careful consideration. The obligations must be sufficiently clear to define the parties’ expectations, coherent with other contractual provisions, and proportionate to the commercial relationship. The obligations must also be capable of practical implementation and effective monitoring in the context of the agreement.

In practical terms, this may mean requiring the supplier to comply with specific labour standards, maintain documented environmental management procedures, report on emissions data, ensure traceability of key raw materials, or allow reasonable access for audits. Clearly defining what is expected, how compliance is demonstrated, and what consequences follow from non-compliance is essential for the clause to function effectively. Otherwise, clauses that appear comprehensive in theory and ambitious in scope may offer limited enforceability in practice, and their impact may remain marginal if compliance cannot be effectively monitored and verified. If policies are not properly translated into binding and operational obligations, the company risks a mismatch between what it promises publicly and what is actually required under its contracts. This may undermine consistency, weaken risk management, and expose the company to reputational and governance risks if its own stated principles cannot be enforced within its supply or distribution chain.

As part of this process, companies must also consider the protection of trade secrets and confidential information. For example, broad audit or data-reporting obligations may raise concerns about sensitive business information. Contractual terms should balance transparency with the need to protect legitimately proprietary data. Clauses such as confidentiality agreements or carve-outs for trade secrets can be used to ensure that sharing ESG-related information does not compromise confidential business information or competitive advantages.

Environmental, Social and Governance Clauses Across Different Contract Types

Besides codes of conduct and sustainability policies, environmental, social and governance-related clauses increasingly take more tailored and transaction-specific forms. In shareholder agreements, sustainability objectives may be reflected in governance structures or even linked to financial outcomes, for example by aligning dividend policies or incentive mechanisms with agreed climate targets. In employment contracts, obligations may extend beyond general compliance and include participation in corporate sustainability training programmes or adherence to internal sustainability guidelines as part of performance expectations.

In supply and manufacturing agreements, environmental, social and governance provisions may address traceability of raw materials, emissions reporting, waste management, energy efficiency standards or the right to replace a supplier if its environmental practices materially conflict with the contracting party’s sustainability commitments. Such contractual mechanisms increasingly affect SMEs operating as suppliers, as ESG expectations pass through the supply chain.

Construction contracts often include detailed requirements regarding material selection, lifecycle impacts, carbon footprint calculations and recycling or waste reduction procedures. For example, in Finland, legislation imposes low-carbon and energy efficiency requirements for new buildings, and a party undertaking a construction project is subject to mandatory reporting obligations relating to construction and demolition waste. These statutory requirements are typically reflected and implemented in the relevant project and construction contracts.

Across these different contract types, the practical significance is consistent. Environmental, social and governance considerations move from the level of general policy into legally enforceable obligations tailored to each specific legal relationship. Contracts function as a mechanism for allocating responsibility, managing compliance risk and aligning commercial incentives with sustainability objectives.

Proportionate Monitoring and Audit Rights

In the contractual implementation and monitoring of environmental, social and governance obligations, audit and information rights play a central role. They are closely linked to effective oversight and form an integral part of a coherent contractual framework. In practice, companies typically seek access to relevant data from their business partners and, where appropriate, establish inspection or audit rights to enable meaningful monitoring and verification, whether conducted directly by the company or, commonly, by an independent expert appointed for that purpose.

However, such arrangements must remain balanced. Overly burdensome provisions may needlessly disrupt day-to-day operations and reduce the willingness to cooperate, particularly for SMEs with limited administrative capacity. By contrast, well-designed mechanisms that balance transparency with confidentiality and operational feasibility are more defensible and more likely to function effectively in practice.

Contractual Remedies

As a general principle, the consequences of a breach are determined by the terms agreed between the parties. In practice, the parties will typically first seek to resolve the matter through discussion and good faith negotiations, allowing the non-compliant party an opportunity to clarify the situation and implement corrective actions within a reasonable timeframe. If negotiations do not lead to a resolution, it may be appropriate to proceed to stronger measures, such as contractual penalties, indemnification obligations, price adjustments, temporary suspension rights or other agreed sanctions, applied in light of the nature and severity of the breach.

The contract should clearly define what constitutes a breach, how it is assessed and what remedies are available in each scenario. Clear and proportionate step-by-step remedy structures enhance legal certainty, reduce the risk of disputes and ensure that material or repeated breaches may trigger more significant consequences, including termination where justified.

Strategic and Voluntary Environmental, Social and Governance Commitments

In the current EU landscape, implementing ESG considerations in commercial contracts is no longer simply a matter of reacting to directives. It is a broader exercise in risk management and corporate governance. Even as the implementation details of the directives may continue to evolve, market expectations, financing conditions and reputational considerations remain key drivers of sustainability integration.

In addition, some companies choose to position themselves as frontrunners in sustainability for strategic and reputational reasons. They may therefore incorporate voluntary environmental, social and governance mechanisms and requirements into their contracts that go beyond, or are not directly derived from, binding directives. By doing so, they signal to investors, customers and other stakeholders that sustainability is treated as a core business priority rather than merely a compliance obligation.

At the same time, it is important to recognise the practical limits of such commitments. Ambitious sustainability requirements may be more challenging for SMEs with limited financial and administrative resources. Meeting extensive reporting, certification or traceability standards can require investments in systems, personnel and external expertise. If contractual expectations are not calibrated to the size and capacity of the counterparty, they may limit the ability of SMEs to participate in certain supply chains. A balanced and proportionate approach helps ensure that sustainability objectives remain achievable and commercially workable across the contractual chain.

Conclusion

For legal practitioners, the central task is not to increase the number of environmental, social and governance clauses as such, but to ensure their quality, coherence and practical relevance. The objective is to design contractual mechanisms that are proportionate, enforceable and aligned with the company’s actual risk profile, industry context and sustainability priorities. Commercial contracts remain one of the most concrete tools for translating sustainability strategy into operational practice. Moreover, every contract lawyer should understand and apply key sustainability principles in their work, ensuring that ESG commitments become integral to legal advice and contract drafting.

The Strait of Hormuz is likely the most strategically important point for the global oil trade. In fact, approximately 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through this narrow passage between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf every day.

Following the outbreak of war in the region, the impact on energy markets was almost immediate: oil prices quickly rose above $100 per barrel, and it is unclear how high they may climb in the coming weeks and months. As a result, transportation, production, and procurement costs are rising across industrial supply chains in many sectors.

For many companies engaged in international trade, this phenomenon creates a very real problem. Contracts signed months (or years) earlier—perhaps at a fixed price—must be fulfilled in a completely different economic context.

A manufacturer that sells goods for delivery in six or twelve months may find itself producing and shipping at much higher energy costs, while the price agreed upon with the customer remains unchanged.

This is a situation that recurs cyclically, for various reasons: from the COVID-19 pandemic to the subsequent raw materials crisis, and on to current geopolitical tensions.

When the increase in costs is so sudden and significant, a question inevitably arises: must the contract still be performed under the original terms, or is it possible to suspend or renegotiate the agreement to adapt it to the new circumstances?

The answer depends on several factors: first and foremost, on what the parties have (or have not) provided for in the contract, but also on the law applicable to the relationship and on the interpretation that judges or arbitrators may give to the rules in the event of a dispute.

Force Majeure and Hardship: Two Different Concepts

When extraordinary events occur—such as a war, an energy crisis, or the disruption of a trade route—many operators immediately invoke force majeure. However, in most cases, these situations fall instead under the category of hardship.

It is therefore essential to distinguish between these two situations.

When an Event Constitutes Force Majeure

Force majeure applies to cases where an extraordinary and unforeseeable event makes it impossible to perform the contract.

The characteristics of the grounds for exemption from liability depend on the law applicable to the commercial relationship, but generally require:

• unpredictability of the event;
• the event being beyond the affected party’s control;
• the impossibility of avoiding or overcoming the event through reasonable efforts.

Typical examples include:

• orders from authorities requiring the suspension of production
• embargoes or export bans
• logistical disruptions caused by war

In these situations, performance is not merely more costly: it becomes objectively impossible. The consequence is that the party unable to perform is generally exempt from liability for the duration of the event.

Hardship

The situation is different when performance of the contract remains possible but becomes economically much more burdensome.

The concept of hardship is generally based on four prerequisites:

1. an event occurring after the conclusion of the contract
2. unpredictability and extraordinary nature of the event
3. a substantial alteration of the economic balance of the contract
4. excessive burden of performance, but not impossibility

A sharp increase in the price of oil, gas, or other raw materials often falls into this category.

Goods can be produced and delivered, but doing so may entail costs far higher than those anticipated when the contract was signed.

The ripple effect along the international supply chain

In global industrial supply chains, the same goods are often the subject of a series of consecutive contracts.

The manufacturer sells to a trader, who sells to a processing company, which resells to an importer in another country, who in turn distributes the product to the end market.

When a hardship event occurs—such as a sharp rise in energy prices—the effect tends to ripple throughout the entire supply chain.

The first party affected by the cost increase will try to pass the increase on to its contractual counterpart, who, in turn, will find themselves in the same situation with the next link in the chain.

The risk is clear: one of the operators in the middle of the chain may face increased upstream costs without being able to pass them on downstream.

This is one of the most common problems in international supply chains.

What happens if there is no clause regarding price fluctuations

In commercial practice, it often happens that parties operate on the basis of orders and order confirmations without a formal written contract, or that a contract exists but contains no provisions regarding price fluctuations or hardship.

In such cases, when costs increase sharply, it is necessary to determine which law applies to individual sales contracts across the supply chain.

This can lead to very different situations:

• one law may allow for price revision or termination of the contract
• another law aplicable to a second contract may not provide for equivalent remedies
• a third contract may contain much more restrictive contractual clauses

The practical result is that an operator in the middle of the chain may face a price increase from their supplier without being able to pass it on to the customer.

A Common Legal Framework: The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG)

Fortunately, many international sales contracts are governed by the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).

The convention has been ratified by 97 countries, including Italy and most major trading partners, such as the U.S., Canada, China, Germany, France, Spain, etc.

The central provision is Article 79, according to which a party is not liable for non-performance if it proves that the non-performance is due to an impediment:

• beyond its control
• unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract
• unavoidable or insurmountable

Traditionally, this provision has been applied to cases of force majeure.

In recent years, there has been debate over whether it can also be applied to cases of hardship, but international case law tends to be very cautious.

International case law on Hardship

Court decisions reflect a rather strict approach.

In some cases, even very significant increases in raw material costs have not been considered sufficient to modify or suspend the contract.

The reasoning is simple: those who operate professionally in international trade must take into account a certain degree of market volatility.

Only when the increase in costs exceeds an exceptional and unforeseeable level such as to radically alter the balance of the contract can hardship be invoked.

One of the most frequently cited cases is the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision in the Scafom case, which recognized the right to renegotiate the contract following a 70% increase in the price of steel.

However, such cases are relatively rare.

Generic clauses that serve no purpose

Many contracts contain hardship clauses copied from standard templates (boilerplate).

The problem is that these clauses often:

• list the effects of hardship
• but do not define when hardship actually occurs

The result is that, when prices rise, the parties may have very different opinions on what constitutes an “exceptional” increase and whether the event in question was “unforeseeable” or not.

The clause, therefore, does not resolve the issue, but defers it to discussion between the parties and, in the event of a failure to reach an agreement, to the courts or arbitrators.

What criteria can define a hardship situation

To make the clause truly effective, it is useful to establish objective parameters.

Among the most commonly used in international contracts:

• an increase or decrease in the price of a raw material beyond a certain threshold (±20% or ±30%)
• an increase in transportation or logistics costs within certain limits;
• significant fluctuations in the exchange rate beyond a specified range;
• the introduction of tariffs or trade restrictions

These parameters, linked to tolerance ranges, allow the parties to quickly and unambiguously identify a hardship event.

Remedies in the Event of Hardship

An effective clause should also address how to handle the situation.

The most common solutions are:

• renegotiation of the contract in good faith
• apply an automatic price adjustment
• appointment of an independent third-party expert to determine the new price
• temporary suspension of the contract
• right of withdrawal if no agreement is reached

These tools allow the parties to manage the crisis without resorting to litigation.

Audit of existing contracts: what to do now

At this point, the practical question becomes: how should we manage the issue in existing business relationships?

The first step is to conduct an audit of existing contracts with suppliers and customers.

1. Introduce comprehensive contracts in new relationships

If the relationships are governed solely by purchase orders and order confirmations, it is advisable to take this opportunity to draft comprehensive international sales contracts that include:

• a hardship clause
• warranty provisions
• remedies for breach
• limitations of liability

2. Update existing contracts

If the relationship is already governed by a contract, you should check whether a hardship clause exists.

If not, it may be useful to propose to the other party:

• a new contract, or
• a contract addendum dedicated to managing price fluctuations.

This helps prevent future conflicts and provides both parties with an effective tool to manage potential price shocks along the supply chain.

Conclusion

Commodity and energy crises demonstrate how exposed international contracts are to sudden changes in economic conditions. When a contract does not clearly address hardship management, the risk does not disappear; it simply shifts along the supply chain until it settles on the weakest link.

For this reason, companies operating within international supply chains should view the hardship clause as a strategic tool for managing contractual risk. A well-drafted contract does not eliminate market volatility, but it allows the parties to address it with clear rules, reducing uncertainty and preventing disputes.

Executive Summary

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) remains one of the most ambitious integration projects in the world. Yet, several years into its operational phase, it has not (yet) delivered the structural shift many expected. A recent analysis underscores the gap between political momentum and economic reality: implementation remains uneven, the agreement is still used by only a portion of participating states, and non-tariff barriers and infrastructure deficits continue to dominate the cost of doing business across borders.  For Egypt, the opportunity is still real — but it depends less on treaty headlines and more on enabling conditions: trade logistics, customs efficiency, regulatory convergence, and competitive industrial capacity. 

Looking Back: The Promise of a Single African Market

When the AfCFTA was launched, expectations were understandably high. A continent-wide trade framework was supposed to reduce tariffs, facilitate trade in goods and services, and strengthen regional value chains — with the broader goal of moving African economies up the value ladder.

In my 2022 article, I asked whether AfCFTA could become a game changer for Egypt, given Egypt’s industrial base, strategic geography, and the potential to diversify export markets beyond traditional partners. (For background, see the earlier article here”).

The Reality Check: Intra-African Trade Remains Structurally Weak

Several years later, the interim assessment is sobering. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) recently put it, AfCFTA is not a “game changer” yet, and only about half of member states currently meet the practical prerequisites to trade under the agreement.

A deeper reason is structural: no other world region trades so little with itself, and while statistics may undercount informal cross-border flows (especially in food), the overall picture remains unchanged.

Trade integration cannot deliver transformative outcomes if production, logistics, and institutions do not support scale.

Implementation Has Been Slow — and Often Symbolic

Operationalisation did not start with full-scale liberalisation. Instead, the AfCFTA began with a pilot approach: the Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) launched in October 2022, initially with eight states, later joined by additional countries, including Nigeria and South Africa by spring 2025.

The GTI created valuable learning effects, but it also underlined a key point: early progress was often presented through symbolic deals, while product coverage and volumes remained limited. FAZ highlights that only selected goods could be traded duty-free and that key sectors remained constrained for a long time due to missing or unresolved technical rules.

A pilot, however, cannot substitute for full operational certainty — the kind businesses need to restructure supply chains and invest.

Tariffs Are Not the Main Barrier — Trade Costs Are

AfCFTA is frequently discussed in terms of tariff liberalisation. Yet, evidence suggests that the largest gains do not come from tariffs but from reducing non-tariff barriers and improving trade infrastructure.

FAZ points to a central reality: tariffs tend to add around 20–30% to intra-African trade costs, whereas non-tariff costs can be far higher — driven by bureaucracy, lack of harmonised standards, inefficient border processes, and transport barriers.

This is the crux: even with reduced tariffs, trade will not expand meaningfully if goods still cannot move cheaply, quickly, and predictably.

Integration Complexity and Distributional Politics

Africa’s integration landscape is shaped by multiple overlapping regional economic communities and trade regimes. This creates legal and administrative complexity — often described as an integration “spaghetti bowl.” FAZ notes the challenge of coordination and the continued fragmentation of rules.

There is also a political economy dimension. Intra-African trade is heavily influenced by a small number of larger economies — and the distribution of benefits matters. FAZ highlights the dominance of major players (notably South Africa) and the concern that tariff liberalisation alone may entrench existing industrial advantages.

Where governments expect asymmetric outcomes, resistance often takes the form of delay, narrow implementation, or persistent non-tariff barriers.

What This Means for Egypt: The Opportunity Is Real — But Conditional

Egypt’s strategic case for AfCFTA participation remains strong: industrial potential, geographic location, and the opportunity to access and shape growing markets. But the experience so far suggests that the treaty text alone does not generate trade flows.

For Egypt’s private sector, the decisive factors are practical:

• predictable and efficient customs clearance and border procedures,
• logistics corridors and port efficiency,
• regulatory convergence (standards, certification, compliance),
• stable access to trade finance and payments,
• competitive energy and production conditions for manufacturing and processing.

AfCFTA can support these developments — but it cannot replace them.

The “Game Changer” Pathway: What Must Happen Next

FAZ concludes that AfCFTA will only become truly impactful if it is paired with the fundamentals: major infrastructure investment, stronger production and processing capacity, and a credible industrial policy.

At the same time, Africa faces a classic chicken-and-egg problem: without development there is limited investment appeal; without investment there is limited development.

For Egypt and its partners, a pragmatic strategy would be to:

1. treat AfCFTA as a platform for real trade-cost reduction, not only tariff debates;
2. focus on a limited number of scalable corridors and sectors where regional value chains can realistically grow;
3. strengthen implementation capacity so that preferences become usable for firms — especially SMEs;
4. enhance legal certainty and dispute resolution reliability for cross-border commerce.

Conclusion

AfCFTA remains a landmark achievement in terms of political commitment. But as of today, it has not yet been the “game changer” many hoped for.

For Egypt, the key question is no longer whether AfCFTA is visionary — it is. The question is whether governments and businesses can translate it into lower real trade costs, higher competitiveness, and bankable cross-border transactions. If those enabling conditions improve, AfCFTA’s promise can still become commercial reality.

After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

Why wine matters in this agreement

The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

1. tariff liberalisation;
2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the « Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures » (SPS) and « Technical Barriers to Trade » (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

Geographical indications: protection and tension

One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
2. transition periods for local operators;
3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

Services, distribution, and market structure

Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

1. logistics providers
2. distribution networks
3. commercial representation
4. marketing and advertising agencies

For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

Legal advisors will need to consider:

1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
3. compliance with competition rules

The implementation gap: where risk lies

Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

1. managing client expectations
2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

What should lawyers be doing now?

Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

Final sip

The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

Lors d’évènements de grande ampleur, tels que la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026, certaines entreprises tentent d’associer « sauvagement » leur marque ou image à l’évènement par une pratique d’« ambush marketing » (marketing d’embuscade) définie par la jurisprudence comme une « stratégie publicitaire mise en place par une entreprise afin d’associer son image commerciale à celle d’un événement et donc de profiter de l’impact médiatique dudit événement sans s’acquitter des droits qui y sont relatifs et sans avoir obtenu au préalable l’autorisation de l’organisateur de l’événement » (CA Paris, 2e chambre, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912). Une pratique risquée et sanctionnée, mais parfois envisageable.

Points clés à retenir

• L’ambush marketing est une pratique sanctionnée mais qui n’est pas interdite en soi.
• En contrepartie de leurs investissements dans la compétition, les sponsors et partenaires officiels de la FIFA bénéficient d’une protection juridique très importante, par l’intermédiaire de divers textes généraux (contrefaçon, parasitisme, propriété intellectuelle) ou plus particuliers (droit du sport), contre toutes formes d’ambush marketing.
• La Coupe du Monde de la FIFA fait l’objet d’une protection renforcée fondée sur un portefeuille étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier et sur les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, en l’absence de législation française spécifique comparable à celle instituée pour les Jeux Olympiques.
• Ces droits ne sont pas absolus et il reste néanmoins de minces opportunités permettant une pratique, astucieuse, du marketing d’embuscade.

La protection des sponsors et partenaires officiels de la Coupe du Monde contre l’ambush marketing

Fort d’une audience mondiale de près de 5 milliards de personnes sur l’ensemble des plateformes lors de sa dernière édition au Qatar en 2022 – dont plus de 1,5 milliard pour la seule finale – la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 est l’évènement sportif le plus suivi de la planète. Accueilli pour la première fois par trois pays (Canada, Mexique et États-Unis), il réunit 48 équipes et plus de 1 200 joueurs pour 104 matchs dans 16 stades. Son organisation est financée dans une large mesure par les différents partenaires, sponsors et détenteurs de droits officiels, qui bénéficient en contrepartie d’un droit exclusif d’utilisation des marques et propriétés intellectuelles officielles de la FIFA afin d’y associer leur propre image et signes distinctifs.

La pratique d’ambush marketing n’est pas sanctionnée en tant que telle par le droit français, mais de nombreux textes épars permettent de protéger largement les sponsors et partenaires de manifestations sportives de dimension mondiale contre l’ambush marketing. Ils sont en effet légitimes à pouvoir jouir paisiblement des droits qui leur sont offerts en contrepartie de leurs larges investissements réalisés dans le cadre d’évènements tels que, par exemple, les coupes du monde de football ou de rugby, ou les Jeux Olympiques.

Peuvent notamment être invoqués par les sponsors officiels et par les organisateurs de telles manifestations :

• les protections « classiques » offertes par le droit de la propriété intellectuelle (droit des marques et droit d’auteur) au titre de l’action en contrefaçon fondée sur le Code de la propriété intellectuelle,
• le droit de la responsabilité civile (parasitisme et concurrence déloyale fondés sur l’article 1240 du Code civil),
• le droit de la consommation (pratiques commerciales trompeuses),
• mais aussi des textes plus spécifiques tels que la protection des droits d’exploitation des fédérations sportives et des organisateurs de manifestations sportives prévue par l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, qui confère aux organisateurs de manifestations sportives un monopole d’exploitation.

Sur ces fondements, ont par exemple été sanctionnées les pratiques d’ambush marketing suivantes :

• L’exploitation d’une compétition de tennis et l’utilisation, pendant l’évènement sportif, de la marque associée à celui-ci : L’organisation de paris en ligne portant sur le tournoi de Roland Garros, utilisant le signe protégé et la marque Roland Garros pour viser les matchs sur lesquels les paris étaient organisés. L’exploitation illicite de la compétition sportive est sanctionnée à hauteur de 400 000 euros sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, la Fédération française de tennis étant seule propriétaire du droit d’exploitation de Roland Garros. L’utilisation de la marque est également sanctionnée au titre de la contrefaçon (à hauteur de 300 000 euros) et du parasitisme (à hauteur de 500 000 euros) (CA Paris, 14 oct. 2009, n° 08/19179).
• Une campagne publicitaire réalisée pendant un festival de cinéma reproduisant la marque déposée de l’évènement : L’organisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, d’une opération de communication digitale par une marque de cosmétique à travers la publication de vidéos sur ses réseaux sociaux, sur certains plans desquelles était visible l’affiche officielle du festival de Cannes, l’une d’elles reproduisant la marque déposée de la palme d’or. Sanctionnée sur les fondements de la contrefaçon de droits d’auteur et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (TJ Paris, 11 déc. 2020, n° 19/08543).
• Une campagne publicitaire visant à se voir attribuer à tort la qualité de partenaire officiel d’un évènement : L’utilisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, du slogan « coiffeur officiel des femmes » associé aux expressions « Cannes » et « Festival de Cannes », laissant faussement croire au public que l’entreprise était partenaire officiel du festival. Sanctionnée sur le fondement de la concurrence déloyale et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (CA Paris, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912).

Ces sanctions pécuniaires peuvent se cumuler avec des injonctions de cessation des pratiques et/ou des mesures de publication dans la presse, sous astreinte.

La protection spécifique des marques de la FIFA

À la différence des Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024, qui bénéficiaient d’une loi française spécifique en tant que pays hôte (loi n° 2018-202 du 26 mars 2018 relative à l’organisation des Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024) et réservant notamment les espaces publicitaires à proximité des sites de compétition aux seuls partenaires officiels, la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 ne se tenant pas sur le territoire français, aucun dispositif légal français équivalent n’est applicable. La protection des partenaires et sponsors officiels repose donc sur le droit commun, mais elle n’en est pas moins solide.

La FIFA a constitué un portefeuille très étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier, protégées en France par les dispositions du Code de la propriété intellectuelle. Ces marques comprennent notamment la marque verbale et figurative FIFA®, les marques FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, ainsi que l’emblème officiel de la compétition (combinant le trophée et le chiffre 26), le slogan officiel « We Are 26™ » / « Nous Sommes 26™ », les logos des seize villes hôtes, et la police typographique officielle « FWC 26 », protégée par le droit d’auteur. Seuls les détenteurs de droits de la FIFA, c’est-à-dire les Partenaires FIFA (au premier rang desquels figurent Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways et Visa), les Sponsors Plus, les Sponsors officiels et les Supporters régionaux, sont autorisés à utiliser à des fins commerciales cette propriété intellectuelle officielle.

La FIFA a publié des directives relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, qui précisent en détail les usages autorisés et interdits des marques et logos liés à la Coupe du Monde 2026. Selon ces directives, sont notamment prohibés, sans autorisation, toute utilisation des marques officielles dans une publicité commerciale ; l’intégration de la propriété intellectuelle officielle dans un nom commercial ou un nom de domaine ; l’organisation de concours ou jeux-concours créant une association avec la compétition ; l’utilisation des marques officielles pour décorer un magasin ; et l’usage par un compte professionnel de hashtags officiels dans un but commercial. Ces directives précisent en outre que la protection s’étend non seulement à la reproduction à l’identique des marques officielles, mais également à leurs variantes dont la similitude peut prêter à confusion. Cette protection rappelée par les lignes directrices est en cohérence avec la protection élargie accordée aux marques notoires en droit français par l’article L.713-5 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle.

Les leçons des JO de Paris 2024 : quels risques pour les marques ?

Les Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024 ont donné lieu à un contentieux abondant qui éclaire concrètement les risques auxquels s’exposent les entreprises tentées par l’ambush marketing lors d’un évènement sportif majeur. Si ces décisions ont été rendues dans le contexte spécifique des JO, pendant lesquels protections légales spécifiques renforcées s’appliquaient, elles constituent néanmoins un avertissement direct pour les marques qui envisageraient des stratégies similaires lors de la Coupe du Monde, sur le fondement du droit commun.

• L’utilisation de symboles officiels sur des supports physiques itinérants : Pendant les JO de Paris 2024, une société chinoise du secteur laitier avait fait circuler dans Paris des bus arborant les anneaux olympiques associés à ses propres marques, tout en se présentant comme « la seule société laitière chinoise présente à Paris 2024 ». La Cour d’appel de Paris a confirmé tant le parasitisme que la contrefaçon de marque, et condamné les sociétés concernées, en référé, au paiement d’une provision de 20 000 euros, assortie d’une astreinte de 20 000 euros par jour et par infraction constatée, visant à faire cesser la diffusion des publicités (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 2, 21 nov. 2025, n° 24/15283 ; TJ Paris, ordonnance de référé du 8 août 2024, 24/55463).
• La retransmission non autorisée de compétitions : Le tribunal judiciaire de Paris a ordonné en référé, pendant les JO, la cessation immédiate de la diffusion de compétitions olympiques par une plateforme de streaming ne disposant pas des droits médias correspondants, sous astreinte de 1 500 euros par infraction constatée, 3 000 euros par jour pour les distributions continues et 5 000 euros par jour pour défaut de retrait (TJ Paris, réf., 18 sept. 2024, n° 24/53019). Ainsi, toute plateforme retransmettant des matchs de la Coupe du Monde sans détenir les droits cédés par la FIFA s’expose à des mesures d’urgence immédiates, sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport.
• La protection élargie de la marque notoire : La Cour de cassation a confirmé que la protection des marques olympiques s’étendait au-delà de la reproduction stricto sensu : il suffit que la marque soit évoquée ou suggérée, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de démontrer un risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public. Cette solution, fondée sur l’article L.713-5 du code de la propriété intellectuelle, s’est appliquée à un bar ayant utilisé les anneaux olympiques sur ses sous-bocks pour promouvoir ses soirées de retransmission (Cass. crim., 17 janv. 2017, n° 15-86.363). Les marques de la FIFA étant tout aussi notoires sur le plan mondial, le même régime protecteur leur est applicable : une simple évocation des marques officielles, même sans reproduction littérale, pourra caractériser une atteinte sanctionnable.

Certaines opérations marketing peuvent échapper à toute sanction

L’analyse de la jurisprudence et des pratiques promotionnelles permet néanmoins de comprendre les contours de certaines pratiques publicitaires qui pourraient être autorisées (non sanctionnées par les textes susmentionnés), sous réserve qu’elles soient préparées et présentées avec habileté. En voici quelques exemples.

Communication sur un ton décalé ou humoristique : Une approche décalée, voire humoristique, peut permettre d’échapper aux sanctions susvisées.

• Ainsi, la marque de chips Vico du groupe Intersnack avait lancé en 2016 une campagne promotionnelle autour du slogan « Vico, partenaire des supporters à domicile ».
• La société irlandaise Paddy Power avait pour sa part parrainé une course de l’œuf dans la cuiller à « London », village de Bourgogne, pour afficher à Londres pendant les JO de 2012 le slogan : « Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year ! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is) ». Le comité d’organisation des JO avait échoué à faire cesser cette campagne. Humour anglais …
• Le groupe Heineken avait quant à lui commercialisé pendant l’Euro 2016, dont Carlsberg était le sponsor officiel, une gamme de bouteilles aux couleurs des drapeaux de 21 pays ayant « marqué son histoire », parmi lesquels une majorité de participants à la compétition.

Communication d’une donnée informative à titre publicitaire : A été jugé licite l’utilisation de résultats d’un match de rugby et l’annonce d’un prochain match dans un journal pour la promotion d’un véhicule automobile, la publicité indiquant : « France 13 Angleterre 24 – la Fiat 500 félicite l’Angleterre pour sa victoire et donne rendez-vous à l’équipe de France le 9 mars pour France-Italie ». Les juges ont considéré que cette publication « se borne à reproduire un résultat sportif d’actualité, acquis et rendu public en première page du journal d’information sportive, et à faire état d’une rencontre future également connue comme déjà annoncée par le journal dans un article d’information » (Cass. com., 20 mai 2014, n° 13-12.102).

Sponsoring de joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde : Toute société peut conclure des partenariats avec des joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA, par exemple en leur fournissant des équipements ou des vêtements portant son logo. Les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle précisent expressément qu’elles « ne contiennent aucune affirmation relative à des droits détenus par des tierces parties telles que les joueurs, clubs, associations membres [ou] confédérations ». Les directives de la FIFA confirment par ailleurs explicitement que les images génériques liées au football, aux équipes nationales ou aux drapeaux de pays n’entrent pas dans la propriété intellectuelle officielle. La prudence s’impose néanmoins : le partenariat ne doit pas créer l’impression d’une association commerciale avec la FIFA ou la compétition, ni utiliser les marques officielles de la FIFA.

L’approche combinée juridique et marketing dans la conception et la préparation du message d’une telle opération de communication est essentielle pour éviter des poursuites judiciaires, notamment sur le fondement du parasitisme. Certaines campagnes publicitaires peuvent donc légitimement être envisagées, notamment quand elles sont astucieuses.

Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

What the EU decision does (and does not) do

The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

How different payment types are affected in practice

Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

Country notes (alphabetical)

Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

Practical next steps for EU companies

1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

En droit français, les franchiseurs et les distributeurs sont soumis à deux types d’obligations précontractuelles d’information : chaque partie doit spontanément informer son futur partenaire de toute information qu’elle sait déterminante pour son consentement. De plus, pour certains contrats — notamment le contrat de franchise — il existe une obligation de communiquer un nombre limité d’informations dans un document dédié. Ces obligations précontractuelles sont d’ordre public. Ainsi, ces deux obligations s’appliquent simultanément au franchiseur, au distributeur ou au concessionnaire lors de la négociation d’un contrat avec un partenaire.

Points clés à retenir

• Les informations requises par le DIP doivent être intégralement renseignées et actualisées ;
• Les informations non exigées par le DIP mais communiquées par le franchiseur doivent être soigneusement sélectionnées et sincères ;
• Le franchisé doit avoir la possibilité de solliciter des informations complémentaires auprès du franchiseur ;
• L’expérience du franchisé dans le secteur économique concerné permet au franchiseur de limiter considérablement son exposition au risque de nullité du contrat pour vice du consentement ;
• Le franchiseur doit conserver la preuve de la remise effective des informations précontractuelles, qu’elles soient obligatoires ou non.
• L’obligation générale d’information de droit commun (article 1112-1 du Code civil) peut s’appliquer concurremment avec l’obligation spéciale prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce.

Obligation générale d’information applicable à tous les contractants

Quelle est l’étendue de cette obligation précontractuelle d’information ?

Cette obligation s’impose à tous les cocontractants, pour tout type de contrat. En effet, l’article 1112-1 du Code civil dispose que :

(§. 1) Celle des parties qui connaît une information dont l’importance est déterminante pour le consentement de l’autre doit l’en informer dès lors que, légitimement, cette dernière ignore cette information ou fait confiance à son cocontractant.

(§. 3) Ont une importance déterminante les informations qui ont un lien direct et nécessaire avec le contenu du contrat ou la qualité des parties.

Cette obligation s’applique à toutes les parties contractantes, pour tout type de contrat.

La jurisprudence s’est prononcée sur la question du cumul de cette obligation de droit commun, avec l’obligation spéciale d’information prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce (cf infra), en répondant par la positive (CA Paris, 27 mars 2024, n° 22/12665). Le périmètre de cette dernière a toutefois été circonscrit par la Cour de cassation : seules les informations présentant un lien direct et nécessaire avec l’objet du contrat ou la qualité des parties sont soumises à obligation de communication (Cass. com., 14 mai 2025, n° 23-17.948).

À qui incombe la charge de la preuve?

La charge de la preuve repose sur celui qui soutient que l’information lui était due. Il doit alors démontrer (i) que l’autre partie lui devait cette information, mais (ii) ne la lui a pas fournie (article 1112-1 (§. 4) du Code civil).

Obligation spéciale d’information applicable aux contrats de franchise et de distribution

Quels contrats sont soumis à cette règle particulière?

Le droit français impose (art. L. 330-3 du Code de commerce) la communication d’un document d’information précontractuelle (« DIP ») ainsi que du projet de contrat, par toute personne :

• qui accorde à une autre personne le droit d’utiliser une marque, une enseigne ou un nom commercial,
• tout en exigeant un engagement exclusif ou quasi-exclusif pour l’exercice de son activité (par exemple, une obligation d’achat exclusif). Le caractère quasi-exclusif fait l’objet d’une appréciation casuistique par les juges français, indépendamment du seuil de 80% des achats prévu par le règlement UE 2022/720, qui n’est utilisé que comme un repère indicatif.

Concrètement, le DIP doit être remis, par exemple, au franchisé, au distributeur, au concessionnaire ou au licencié de marque, par son franchiseur, fournisseur ou concédant, dès lors que les deux conditions précitées sont réunies. Récemment la jurisprudence française a d’ailleurs eu l’occasion de rappeler que le champ d’application du DIP ne se limitait pas à la franchise, mais également et notamment, au contrat de concession, dès lors que les conditions précitées sont réunies (CA Paris, 22 mai 2024, n° 22/08672).

À quel moment le DIP doit-il être remis?

Le DIP et le projet de contrat doivent être communiqués au moins 20 jours avant la signature du contrat, et, le cas échéant, avant le paiement de toute somme exigée préalablement à la signature (notamment en cas de réservation).

Quelles informations doivent figurer dans le DIP?

L’article R. 330-1 du Code de commerce impose que le DIP mentionne les informations suivantes (liste non exhaustive) relatives :

• Au franchiseur (identité et expérience des dirigeants, parcours professionnel, etc.) ;
• À l’activité du franchiseur (notamment la date de création, le siège social, les références bancaires, l’historique du développement de l’enseigne, les comptes annuels, etc.) ;
• Au réseau (liste des membres avec indication de la date de signature des contrats, liste des établissements proposant les mêmes produits ou services dans la zone d’activité envisagée, nombre de membres ayant quitté le réseau au cours de l’année précédant la remise du DIP avec indication des motifs de départ, etc.) ;
• À la marque concédée (date d’enregistrement, titularité et conditions d’exploitation) ;
• À l’état général du marché (relatif aux produits ou services visés par le contrat) et à l’état local du marché (relatif à la zone d’activité envisagée), ainsi qu’aux facteurs de concurrence et aux perspectives de développement. La Cour de cassation a jugé, s’agissant du marché local, que le franchiseur n’était pas tenu de réaliser une étude de marché, mais que s’il en fournit une, celle-ci doit être exacte et vérifiable (Cass. com., 18 oct. 2023, n° 22-19.329).
• Aux éléments essentiels du projet de contrat, et notamment : sa durée, les conditions de renouvellement, de résiliation et de cession, ainsi que l’étendue des exclusivités accordées ;
• Aux obligations financières pesant sur le cocontractant : nature et montant des dépenses et investissements à engager avant le démarrage de l’activité (droit d’entrée, frais d’installation, etc.).

Au-delà de comporter l’ensemble des informations mentionnées par l’article précité, le DIP doit répondre à une exigence qualitative. En effet toutes les informations communiquées, y compris celles transmises spontanément, doivent être exactes et sincères, afin de garantir un consentement éclairé et exempt de tout vice de la part du candidat à l’entrée dans le réseau.

Comment prouver la remise des informations?

La charge de la preuve de la remise du DIP incombe au débiteur de cette obligation : le franchiseur (Cass. com., 7 juillet 2004, n° 02-15.950). L’idéal pour le franchiseur est de faire signer et dater le DIP par le franchisé le jour de sa remise et d’en conserver la preuve.

La clause contractuelle par laquelle le franchisé reconnaît avoir reçu un DIP complet ne constitue pas une preuve suffisante de la remise effective d’un DIP complet (Cass. com., 10 janvier 2018, n° 15-25.287).

Le franchiseur est-il tenu d’une obligation d’actualisation du DIP jusqu’à la signature du contrat

Dans un arrêt du 26 juin 2024 (n°23-1 14.085 PB) la Cour de cassation retient que la conformité formelle du DIP à la date de sa remise ne suffit pas à exonérer le franchiseur de toute responsabilité précontractuelle. Cette solution est confirmée par un arrêt du 4 décembre 2024 (n° 23-16.684).

Ces deux décisions semblent consacrer une obligation d’actualisation du DIP pesant sur la tête de réseau durant toute la période séparant la remise du document de la conclusion du contrat. Lorsque des événements significatifs surviennent dans cet intervalle (procédure collective affectant des membres du réseau, contentieux majeur, modification structurelle du réseau) la tête de réseau est tenue d’en informer spontanément le candidat. Le juge examine alors si le manquement à cette obligation était susceptible d’altérer l’appréciation que le candidat pouvait avoir du réseau et, partant, de vicier son consentement (Cass. com., 26 juin 2024, op. cit.). Le franchiseur ne saurait donc se retrancher derrière la régularité initiale du DIP pour s’affranchir de son devoir d’information dès lors que la situation du réseau a évolué de manière significative avant la signature du contrat.

Sanctions en cas de manquement aux obligations précontractuelles d’information

Sanction pénale

Le non-respect des obligations relatives au DIP peut exposer le franchiseur ou le fournisseur à une amende pénale pouvant aller jusqu’à 1 500 euros, portée à 3 000 euros en cas de récidive, le montant étant multiplié par cinq pour les personnes morales (article R. 330-2 du Code de commerce).

Nullité du contrat pour dol

Le contrat peut être annulé en cas de manquement à l’article 1112-1 ou à l’article L. 330-3. Dans les deux cas, le non-respect de l’obligation d’information n’est sanctionné que si le demandeur démontre que son consentement a été vicié par l’erreur, le dol ou la violence. Le juge procède à une appréciation in concreto, tenant compte notamment de l’expérience professionnelle et des diligences personnelles du distributeur : un candidat averti aura plus de difficultés à caractériser un dol, et son expérience dans le secteur concerné peut suffire à exonérer le franchiseur (CA Paris, pôle 5 – ch. 11, 26 avr. 2024, n° 21/13205), quand bien même les informations communiquées lacunaires ou inexactes (CA Paris, 20 janv. 2021, n° 19/03382).

Le cas échéant, les parties doivent être remises dans l’état antérieur à la conclusion du contrat.

S’agissant des éléments constitutifs du dol, les tribunaux en apprécient strictement les deux conditions:

• (Un élément matériel) l’existence d’un mensonge ou d’une réticence dolosive (article 1137 du Code civil) ;
• Et (un élément intentionnel) l’intention de tromper son cocontractant (article 1130 du Code civil).

Dommages et intérêts

Bien que les demandes en nullité soient soumises à des conditions très strictes, les franchisés et distributeurs peuvent alternativement obtenir des dommages et intérêts sur le fondement de la responsabilité délictuelle pour manquement à l’obligation précontractuelle d’information, sous réserve de démontrer une faute (information incomplète ou erronée), un préjudice indemnisable (celui-ci se limite à la perte de chance de ne pas contracter ou de contracter à des conditions plus avantageuses – voir en ce sens : Cass. com., 15 mars 2017, n° 15-16.406) et le lien de causalité entre les deux.

From Reporting to Governance and Risk Allocation

Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) considerations are playing an increasingly influential role in how businesses operate, invest, and manage risk, especially within the European Union, where corporate sustainability and responsibility regulation have been on the agenda in recent years.

With the adoption of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), many companies anticipated a significant shift in compliance. Since then, the EU has introduced simplification measures to streamline reporting and due diligence obligations, reduce the administrative burden, and improve proportionality, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while maintaining the core sustainability objectives.

While opinions may differ regarding the evolution of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) in EU regulation and the subsequent postponements of reporting obligations, regulatory developments appear to have, in practice, supported a shift in perspective. Sustainability is no longer viewed solely as a reporting requirement, but increasingly as a matter of governance, strategy, and risk allocation. This development is welcome, as the regulatory framework’s underlying objective is to advance the green transition, which in turn requires a change in how companies integrate sustainability into their decision-making and operations.

This focus on sustainability influences businesses of all sizes, including SMEs. Even companies not directly subject to the CSRD or CSDDD anticipate that ESG requirements will be passed down through the supply chain. Many non-reporting SMEs are already embedding sustainability practices, and this trend is likely to continue. In other words, sustainability policies are already affecting companies well before any formal reporting obligations kick in.

Environmental, Social, and Governance in Contract Architecture

One of the key means of implementing environmental, social, and governance obligations and objectives in day-to-day business operations is through commercial contracts and the requirements and commitments embedded in them.

Even where a company itself is not directly subject to extensive reporting or due diligence obligations, corporate sustainability and responsibility expectations flow through the market via contractual relationships. Larger undertakings within the scope of CSRD and, in due course, the CSDDD require contractual assurances, information rights, and cooperation from their business partners, including SMEs operating within their supply chains. As a result, corporate sustainability and responsibility become a question of contractual architecture. Companies must consider not only price mechanisms, liability caps and termination triggers, but also how environmental, social and governance risks and obligations are addressed and allocated between the parties through legally enforceable contractual terms.

Translating Policies into Binding Obligations

A typical starting point is the incorporation of a code of conduct or sustainability policies into commercial contracts, often by reference and through an express obligation on the contracting party to comply with them. From a legal standpoint, this raises important drafting questions. Many codes are drafted as high-level public statements. When such policies are converted into contractual commitments, their wording, scope, and hierarchy relative to the main agreement require careful consideration. The obligations must be sufficiently clear to define the parties’ expectations, coherent with other contractual provisions, and proportionate to the commercial relationship. The obligations must also be capable of practical implementation and effective monitoring in the context of the agreement.

In practical terms, this may mean requiring the supplier to comply with specific labour standards, maintain documented environmental management procedures, report on emissions data, ensure traceability of key raw materials, or allow reasonable access for audits. Clearly defining what is expected, how compliance is demonstrated, and what consequences follow from non-compliance is essential for the clause to function effectively. Otherwise, clauses that appear comprehensive in theory and ambitious in scope may offer limited enforceability in practice, and their impact may remain marginal if compliance cannot be effectively monitored and verified. If policies are not properly translated into binding and operational obligations, the company risks a mismatch between what it promises publicly and what is actually required under its contracts. This may undermine consistency, weaken risk management, and expose the company to reputational and governance risks if its own stated principles cannot be enforced within its supply or distribution chain.

As part of this process, companies must also consider the protection of trade secrets and confidential information. For example, broad audit or data-reporting obligations may raise concerns about sensitive business information. Contractual terms should balance transparency with the need to protect legitimately proprietary data. Clauses such as confidentiality agreements or carve-outs for trade secrets can be used to ensure that sharing ESG-related information does not compromise confidential business information or competitive advantages.

Environmental, Social and Governance Clauses Across Different Contract Types

Besides codes of conduct and sustainability policies, environmental, social and governance-related clauses increasingly take more tailored and transaction-specific forms. In shareholder agreements, sustainability objectives may be reflected in governance structures or even linked to financial outcomes, for example by aligning dividend policies or incentive mechanisms with agreed climate targets. In employment contracts, obligations may extend beyond general compliance and include participation in corporate sustainability training programmes or adherence to internal sustainability guidelines as part of performance expectations.

In supply and manufacturing agreements, environmental, social and governance provisions may address traceability of raw materials, emissions reporting, waste management, energy efficiency standards or the right to replace a supplier if its environmental practices materially conflict with the contracting party’s sustainability commitments. Such contractual mechanisms increasingly affect SMEs operating as suppliers, as ESG expectations pass through the supply chain.

Construction contracts often include detailed requirements regarding material selection, lifecycle impacts, carbon footprint calculations and recycling or waste reduction procedures. For example, in Finland, legislation imposes low-carbon and energy efficiency requirements for new buildings, and a party undertaking a construction project is subject to mandatory reporting obligations relating to construction and demolition waste. These statutory requirements are typically reflected and implemented in the relevant project and construction contracts.

Across these different contract types, the practical significance is consistent. Environmental, social and governance considerations move from the level of general policy into legally enforceable obligations tailored to each specific legal relationship. Contracts function as a mechanism for allocating responsibility, managing compliance risk and aligning commercial incentives with sustainability objectives.

Proportionate Monitoring and Audit Rights

In the contractual implementation and monitoring of environmental, social and governance obligations, audit and information rights play a central role. They are closely linked to effective oversight and form an integral part of a coherent contractual framework. In practice, companies typically seek access to relevant data from their business partners and, where appropriate, establish inspection or audit rights to enable meaningful monitoring and verification, whether conducted directly by the company or, commonly, by an independent expert appointed for that purpose.

However, such arrangements must remain balanced. Overly burdensome provisions may needlessly disrupt day-to-day operations and reduce the willingness to cooperate, particularly for SMEs with limited administrative capacity. By contrast, well-designed mechanisms that balance transparency with confidentiality and operational feasibility are more defensible and more likely to function effectively in practice.

Contractual Remedies

As a general principle, the consequences of a breach are determined by the terms agreed between the parties. In practice, the parties will typically first seek to resolve the matter through discussion and good faith negotiations, allowing the non-compliant party an opportunity to clarify the situation and implement corrective actions within a reasonable timeframe. If negotiations do not lead to a resolution, it may be appropriate to proceed to stronger measures, such as contractual penalties, indemnification obligations, price adjustments, temporary suspension rights or other agreed sanctions, applied in light of the nature and severity of the breach.

The contract should clearly define what constitutes a breach, how it is assessed and what remedies are available in each scenario. Clear and proportionate step-by-step remedy structures enhance legal certainty, reduce the risk of disputes and ensure that material or repeated breaches may trigger more significant consequences, including termination where justified.

Strategic and Voluntary Environmental, Social and Governance Commitments

In the current EU landscape, implementing ESG considerations in commercial contracts is no longer simply a matter of reacting to directives. It is a broader exercise in risk management and corporate governance. Even as the implementation details of the directives may continue to evolve, market expectations, financing conditions and reputational considerations remain key drivers of sustainability integration.

In addition, some companies choose to position themselves as frontrunners in sustainability for strategic and reputational reasons. They may therefore incorporate voluntary environmental, social and governance mechanisms and requirements into their contracts that go beyond, or are not directly derived from, binding directives. By doing so, they signal to investors, customers and other stakeholders that sustainability is treated as a core business priority rather than merely a compliance obligation.

At the same time, it is important to recognise the practical limits of such commitments. Ambitious sustainability requirements may be more challenging for SMEs with limited financial and administrative resources. Meeting extensive reporting, certification or traceability standards can require investments in systems, personnel and external expertise. If contractual expectations are not calibrated to the size and capacity of the counterparty, they may limit the ability of SMEs to participate in certain supply chains. A balanced and proportionate approach helps ensure that sustainability objectives remain achievable and commercially workable across the contractual chain.

Conclusion

For legal practitioners, the central task is not to increase the number of environmental, social and governance clauses as such, but to ensure their quality, coherence and practical relevance. The objective is to design contractual mechanisms that are proportionate, enforceable and aligned with the company’s actual risk profile, industry context and sustainability priorities. Commercial contracts remain one of the most concrete tools for translating sustainability strategy into operational practice. Moreover, every contract lawyer should understand and apply key sustainability principles in their work, ensuring that ESG commitments become integral to legal advice and contract drafting.

The Strait of Hormuz is likely the most strategically important point for the global oil trade. In fact, approximately 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through this narrow passage between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf every day.

Following the outbreak of war in the region, the impact on energy markets was almost immediate: oil prices quickly rose above $100 per barrel, and it is unclear how high they may climb in the coming weeks and months. As a result, transportation, production, and procurement costs are rising across industrial supply chains in many sectors.

For many companies engaged in international trade, this phenomenon creates a very real problem. Contracts signed months (or years) earlier—perhaps at a fixed price—must be fulfilled in a completely different economic context.

A manufacturer that sells goods for delivery in six or twelve months may find itself producing and shipping at much higher energy costs, while the price agreed upon with the customer remains unchanged.

This is a situation that recurs cyclically, for various reasons: from the COVID-19 pandemic to the subsequent raw materials crisis, and on to current geopolitical tensions.

When the increase in costs is so sudden and significant, a question inevitably arises: must the contract still be performed under the original terms, or is it possible to suspend or renegotiate the agreement to adapt it to the new circumstances?

The answer depends on several factors: first and foremost, on what the parties have (or have not) provided for in the contract, but also on the law applicable to the relationship and on the interpretation that judges or arbitrators may give to the rules in the event of a dispute.

Force Majeure and Hardship: Two Different Concepts

When extraordinary events occur—such as a war, an energy crisis, or the disruption of a trade route—many operators immediately invoke force majeure. However, in most cases, these situations fall instead under the category of hardship.

It is therefore essential to distinguish between these two situations.

When an Event Constitutes Force Majeure

Force majeure applies to cases where an extraordinary and unforeseeable event makes it impossible to perform the contract.

The characteristics of the grounds for exemption from liability depend on the law applicable to the commercial relationship, but generally require:

• unpredictability of the event;
• the event being beyond the affected party’s control;
• the impossibility of avoiding or overcoming the event through reasonable efforts.

Typical examples include:

• orders from authorities requiring the suspension of production
• embargoes or export bans
• logistical disruptions caused by war

In these situations, performance is not merely more costly: it becomes objectively impossible. The consequence is that the party unable to perform is generally exempt from liability for the duration of the event.

Hardship

The situation is different when performance of the contract remains possible but becomes economically much more burdensome.

The concept of hardship is generally based on four prerequisites:

1. an event occurring after the conclusion of the contract
2. unpredictability and extraordinary nature of the event
3. a substantial alteration of the economic balance of the contract
4. excessive burden of performance, but not impossibility

A sharp increase in the price of oil, gas, or other raw materials often falls into this category.

Goods can be produced and delivered, but doing so may entail costs far higher than those anticipated when the contract was signed.

The ripple effect along the international supply chain

In global industrial supply chains, the same goods are often the subject of a series of consecutive contracts.

The manufacturer sells to a trader, who sells to a processing company, which resells to an importer in another country, who in turn distributes the product to the end market.

When a hardship event occurs—such as a sharp rise in energy prices—the effect tends to ripple throughout the entire supply chain.

The first party affected by the cost increase will try to pass the increase on to its contractual counterpart, who, in turn, will find themselves in the same situation with the next link in the chain.

The risk is clear: one of the operators in the middle of the chain may face increased upstream costs without being able to pass them on downstream.

This is one of the most common problems in international supply chains.

What happens if there is no clause regarding price fluctuations

In commercial practice, it often happens that parties operate on the basis of orders and order confirmations without a formal written contract, or that a contract exists but contains no provisions regarding price fluctuations or hardship.

In such cases, when costs increase sharply, it is necessary to determine which law applies to individual sales contracts across the supply chain.

This can lead to very different situations:

• one law may allow for price revision or termination of the contract
• another law aplicable to a second contract may not provide for equivalent remedies
• a third contract may contain much more restrictive contractual clauses

The practical result is that an operator in the middle of the chain may face a price increase from their supplier without being able to pass it on to the customer.

A Common Legal Framework: The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG)

Fortunately, many international sales contracts are governed by the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).

The convention has been ratified by 97 countries, including Italy and most major trading partners, such as the U.S., Canada, China, Germany, France, Spain, etc.

The central provision is Article 79, according to which a party is not liable for non-performance if it proves that the non-performance is due to an impediment:

• beyond its control
• unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract
• unavoidable or insurmountable

Traditionally, this provision has been applied to cases of force majeure.

In recent years, there has been debate over whether it can also be applied to cases of hardship, but international case law tends to be very cautious.

International case law on Hardship

Court decisions reflect a rather strict approach.

In some cases, even very significant increases in raw material costs have not been considered sufficient to modify or suspend the contract.

The reasoning is simple: those who operate professionally in international trade must take into account a certain degree of market volatility.

Only when the increase in costs exceeds an exceptional and unforeseeable level such as to radically alter the balance of the contract can hardship be invoked.

One of the most frequently cited cases is the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision in the Scafom case, which recognized the right to renegotiate the contract following a 70% increase in the price of steel.

However, such cases are relatively rare.

Generic clauses that serve no purpose

Many contracts contain hardship clauses copied from standard templates (boilerplate).

The problem is that these clauses often:

• list the effects of hardship
• but do not define when hardship actually occurs

The result is that, when prices rise, the parties may have very different opinions on what constitutes an “exceptional” increase and whether the event in question was “unforeseeable” or not.

The clause, therefore, does not resolve the issue, but defers it to discussion between the parties and, in the event of a failure to reach an agreement, to the courts or arbitrators.

What criteria can define a hardship situation

To make the clause truly effective, it is useful to establish objective parameters.

Among the most commonly used in international contracts:

• an increase or decrease in the price of a raw material beyond a certain threshold (±20% or ±30%)
• an increase in transportation or logistics costs within certain limits;
• significant fluctuations in the exchange rate beyond a specified range;
• the introduction of tariffs or trade restrictions

These parameters, linked to tolerance ranges, allow the parties to quickly and unambiguously identify a hardship event.

Remedies in the Event of Hardship

An effective clause should also address how to handle the situation.

The most common solutions are:

• renegotiation of the contract in good faith
• apply an automatic price adjustment
• appointment of an independent third-party expert to determine the new price
• temporary suspension of the contract
• right of withdrawal if no agreement is reached

These tools allow the parties to manage the crisis without resorting to litigation.

Audit of existing contracts: what to do now

At this point, the practical question becomes: how should we manage the issue in existing business relationships?

The first step is to conduct an audit of existing contracts with suppliers and customers.

1. Introduce comprehensive contracts in new relationships

If the relationships are governed solely by purchase orders and order confirmations, it is advisable to take this opportunity to draft comprehensive international sales contracts that include:

• a hardship clause
• warranty provisions
• remedies for breach
• limitations of liability

2. Update existing contracts

If the relationship is already governed by a contract, you should check whether a hardship clause exists.

If not, it may be useful to propose to the other party:

• a new contract, or
• a contract addendum dedicated to managing price fluctuations.

This helps prevent future conflicts and provides both parties with an effective tool to manage potential price shocks along the supply chain.

Conclusion

Commodity and energy crises demonstrate how exposed international contracts are to sudden changes in economic conditions. When a contract does not clearly address hardship management, the risk does not disappear; it simply shifts along the supply chain until it settles on the weakest link.

For this reason, companies operating within international supply chains should view the hardship clause as a strategic tool for managing contractual risk. A well-drafted contract does not eliminate market volatility, but it allows the parties to address it with clear rules, reducing uncertainty and preventing disputes.

Executive Summary

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) remains one of the most ambitious integration projects in the world. Yet, several years into its operational phase, it has not (yet) delivered the structural shift many expected. A recent analysis underscores the gap between political momentum and economic reality: implementation remains uneven, the agreement is still used by only a portion of participating states, and non-tariff barriers and infrastructure deficits continue to dominate the cost of doing business across borders.  For Egypt, the opportunity is still real — but it depends less on treaty headlines and more on enabling conditions: trade logistics, customs efficiency, regulatory convergence, and competitive industrial capacity. 

Looking Back: The Promise of a Single African Market

When the AfCFTA was launched, expectations were understandably high. A continent-wide trade framework was supposed to reduce tariffs, facilitate trade in goods and services, and strengthen regional value chains — with the broader goal of moving African economies up the value ladder.

In my 2022 article, I asked whether AfCFTA could become a game changer for Egypt, given Egypt’s industrial base, strategic geography, and the potential to diversify export markets beyond traditional partners. (For background, see the earlier article here”).

The Reality Check: Intra-African Trade Remains Structurally Weak

Several years later, the interim assessment is sobering. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) recently put it, AfCFTA is not a “game changer” yet, and only about half of member states currently meet the practical prerequisites to trade under the agreement.

A deeper reason is structural: no other world region trades so little with itself, and while statistics may undercount informal cross-border flows (especially in food), the overall picture remains unchanged.

Trade integration cannot deliver transformative outcomes if production, logistics, and institutions do not support scale.

Implementation Has Been Slow — and Often Symbolic

Operationalisation did not start with full-scale liberalisation. Instead, the AfCFTA began with a pilot approach: the Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) launched in October 2022, initially with eight states, later joined by additional countries, including Nigeria and South Africa by spring 2025.

The GTI created valuable learning effects, but it also underlined a key point: early progress was often presented through symbolic deals, while product coverage and volumes remained limited. FAZ highlights that only selected goods could be traded duty-free and that key sectors remained constrained for a long time due to missing or unresolved technical rules.

A pilot, however, cannot substitute for full operational certainty — the kind businesses need to restructure supply chains and invest.

Tariffs Are Not the Main Barrier — Trade Costs Are

AfCFTA is frequently discussed in terms of tariff liberalisation. Yet, evidence suggests that the largest gains do not come from tariffs but from reducing non-tariff barriers and improving trade infrastructure.

FAZ points to a central reality: tariffs tend to add around 20–30% to intra-African trade costs, whereas non-tariff costs can be far higher — driven by bureaucracy, lack of harmonised standards, inefficient border processes, and transport barriers.

This is the crux: even with reduced tariffs, trade will not expand meaningfully if goods still cannot move cheaply, quickly, and predictably.

Integration Complexity and Distributional Politics

Africa’s integration landscape is shaped by multiple overlapping regional economic communities and trade regimes. This creates legal and administrative complexity — often described as an integration “spaghetti bowl.” FAZ notes the challenge of coordination and the continued fragmentation of rules.

There is also a political economy dimension. Intra-African trade is heavily influenced by a small number of larger economies — and the distribution of benefits matters. FAZ highlights the dominance of major players (notably South Africa) and the concern that tariff liberalisation alone may entrench existing industrial advantages.

Where governments expect asymmetric outcomes, resistance often takes the form of delay, narrow implementation, or persistent non-tariff barriers.

What This Means for Egypt: The Opportunity Is Real — But Conditional

Egypt’s strategic case for AfCFTA participation remains strong: industrial potential, geographic location, and the opportunity to access and shape growing markets. But the experience so far suggests that the treaty text alone does not generate trade flows.

For Egypt’s private sector, the decisive factors are practical:

• predictable and efficient customs clearance and border procedures,
• logistics corridors and port efficiency,
• regulatory convergence (standards, certification, compliance),
• stable access to trade finance and payments,
• competitive energy and production conditions for manufacturing and processing.

AfCFTA can support these developments — but it cannot replace them.

The “Game Changer” Pathway: What Must Happen Next

FAZ concludes that AfCFTA will only become truly impactful if it is paired with the fundamentals: major infrastructure investment, stronger production and processing capacity, and a credible industrial policy.

At the same time, Africa faces a classic chicken-and-egg problem: without development there is limited investment appeal; without investment there is limited development.

For Egypt and its partners, a pragmatic strategy would be to:

1. treat AfCFTA as a platform for real trade-cost reduction, not only tariff debates;
2. focus on a limited number of scalable corridors and sectors where regional value chains can realistically grow;
3. strengthen implementation capacity so that preferences become usable for firms — especially SMEs;
4. enhance legal certainty and dispute resolution reliability for cross-border commerce.

Conclusion

AfCFTA remains a landmark achievement in terms of political commitment. But as of today, it has not yet been the “game changer” many hoped for.

For Egypt, the key question is no longer whether AfCFTA is visionary — it is. The question is whether governments and businesses can translate it into lower real trade costs, higher competitiveness, and bankable cross-border transactions. If those enabling conditions improve, AfCFTA’s promise can still become commercial reality.

After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

Why wine matters in this agreement

The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

1. tariff liberalisation;
2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the « Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures » (SPS) and « Technical Barriers to Trade » (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

Geographical indications: protection and tension

One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
2. transition periods for local operators;
3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

Services, distribution, and market structure

Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

1. logistics providers
2. distribution networks
3. commercial representation
4. marketing and advertising agencies

For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

Legal advisors will need to consider:

1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
3. compliance with competition rules

The implementation gap: where risk lies

Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

1. managing client expectations
2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

What should lawyers be doing now?

Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

Final sip

The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

Lors d’évènements de grande ampleur, tels que la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026, certaines entreprises tentent d’associer « sauvagement » leur marque ou image à l’évènement par une pratique d’« ambush marketing » (marketing d’embuscade) définie par la jurisprudence comme une « stratégie publicitaire mise en place par une entreprise afin d’associer son image commerciale à celle d’un événement et donc de profiter de l’impact médiatique dudit événement sans s’acquitter des droits qui y sont relatifs et sans avoir obtenu au préalable l’autorisation de l’organisateur de l’événement » (CA Paris, 2e chambre, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912). Une pratique risquée et sanctionnée, mais parfois envisageable.

Points clés à retenir

• L’ambush marketing est une pratique sanctionnée mais qui n’est pas interdite en soi.
• En contrepartie de leurs investissements dans la compétition, les sponsors et partenaires officiels de la FIFA bénéficient d’une protection juridique très importante, par l’intermédiaire de divers textes généraux (contrefaçon, parasitisme, propriété intellectuelle) ou plus particuliers (droit du sport), contre toutes formes d’ambush marketing.
• La Coupe du Monde de la FIFA fait l’objet d’une protection renforcée fondée sur un portefeuille étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier et sur les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, en l’absence de législation française spécifique comparable à celle instituée pour les Jeux Olympiques.
• Ces droits ne sont pas absolus et il reste néanmoins de minces opportunités permettant une pratique, astucieuse, du marketing d’embuscade.

La protection des sponsors et partenaires officiels de la Coupe du Monde contre l’ambush marketing

Fort d’une audience mondiale de près de 5 milliards de personnes sur l’ensemble des plateformes lors de sa dernière édition au Qatar en 2022 – dont plus de 1,5 milliard pour la seule finale – la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 est l’évènement sportif le plus suivi de la planète. Accueilli pour la première fois par trois pays (Canada, Mexique et États-Unis), il réunit 48 équipes et plus de 1 200 joueurs pour 104 matchs dans 16 stades. Son organisation est financée dans une large mesure par les différents partenaires, sponsors et détenteurs de droits officiels, qui bénéficient en contrepartie d’un droit exclusif d’utilisation des marques et propriétés intellectuelles officielles de la FIFA afin d’y associer leur propre image et signes distinctifs.

La pratique d’ambush marketing n’est pas sanctionnée en tant que telle par le droit français, mais de nombreux textes épars permettent de protéger largement les sponsors et partenaires de manifestations sportives de dimension mondiale contre l’ambush marketing. Ils sont en effet légitimes à pouvoir jouir paisiblement des droits qui leur sont offerts en contrepartie de leurs larges investissements réalisés dans le cadre d’évènements tels que, par exemple, les coupes du monde de football ou de rugby, ou les Jeux Olympiques.

Peuvent notamment être invoqués par les sponsors officiels et par les organisateurs de telles manifestations :

• les protections « classiques » offertes par le droit de la propriété intellectuelle (droit des marques et droit d’auteur) au titre de l’action en contrefaçon fondée sur le Code de la propriété intellectuelle,
• le droit de la responsabilité civile (parasitisme et concurrence déloyale fondés sur l’article 1240 du Code civil),
• le droit de la consommation (pratiques commerciales trompeuses),
• mais aussi des textes plus spécifiques tels que la protection des droits d’exploitation des fédérations sportives et des organisateurs de manifestations sportives prévue par l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, qui confère aux organisateurs de manifestations sportives un monopole d’exploitation.

Sur ces fondements, ont par exemple été sanctionnées les pratiques d’ambush marketing suivantes :

• L’exploitation d’une compétition de tennis et l’utilisation, pendant l’évènement sportif, de la marque associée à celui-ci : L’organisation de paris en ligne portant sur le tournoi de Roland Garros, utilisant le signe protégé et la marque Roland Garros pour viser les matchs sur lesquels les paris étaient organisés. L’exploitation illicite de la compétition sportive est sanctionnée à hauteur de 400 000 euros sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, la Fédération française de tennis étant seule propriétaire du droit d’exploitation de Roland Garros. L’utilisation de la marque est également sanctionnée au titre de la contrefaçon (à hauteur de 300 000 euros) et du parasitisme (à hauteur de 500 000 euros) (CA Paris, 14 oct. 2009, n° 08/19179).
• Une campagne publicitaire réalisée pendant un festival de cinéma reproduisant la marque déposée de l’évènement : L’organisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, d’une opération de communication digitale par une marque de cosmétique à travers la publication de vidéos sur ses réseaux sociaux, sur certains plans desquelles était visible l’affiche officielle du festival de Cannes, l’une d’elles reproduisant la marque déposée de la palme d’or. Sanctionnée sur les fondements de la contrefaçon de droits d’auteur et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (TJ Paris, 11 déc. 2020, n° 19/08543).
• Une campagne publicitaire visant à se voir attribuer à tort la qualité de partenaire officiel d’un évènement : L’utilisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, du slogan « coiffeur officiel des femmes » associé aux expressions « Cannes » et « Festival de Cannes », laissant faussement croire au public que l’entreprise était partenaire officiel du festival. Sanctionnée sur le fondement de la concurrence déloyale et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (CA Paris, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912).

Ces sanctions pécuniaires peuvent se cumuler avec des injonctions de cessation des pratiques et/ou des mesures de publication dans la presse, sous astreinte.

La protection spécifique des marques de la FIFA

À la différence des Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024, qui bénéficiaient d’une loi française spécifique en tant que pays hôte (loi n° 2018-202 du 26 mars 2018 relative à l’organisation des Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024) et réservant notamment les espaces publicitaires à proximité des sites de compétition aux seuls partenaires officiels, la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 ne se tenant pas sur le territoire français, aucun dispositif légal français équivalent n’est applicable. La protection des partenaires et sponsors officiels repose donc sur le droit commun, mais elle n’en est pas moins solide.

La FIFA a constitué un portefeuille très étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier, protégées en France par les dispositions du Code de la propriété intellectuelle. Ces marques comprennent notamment la marque verbale et figurative FIFA®, les marques FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, ainsi que l’emblème officiel de la compétition (combinant le trophée et le chiffre 26), le slogan officiel « We Are 26™ » / « Nous Sommes 26™ », les logos des seize villes hôtes, et la police typographique officielle « FWC 26 », protégée par le droit d’auteur. Seuls les détenteurs de droits de la FIFA, c’est-à-dire les Partenaires FIFA (au premier rang desquels figurent Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways et Visa), les Sponsors Plus, les Sponsors officiels et les Supporters régionaux, sont autorisés à utiliser à des fins commerciales cette propriété intellectuelle officielle.

La FIFA a publié des directives relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, qui précisent en détail les usages autorisés et interdits des marques et logos liés à la Coupe du Monde 2026. Selon ces directives, sont notamment prohibés, sans autorisation, toute utilisation des marques officielles dans une publicité commerciale ; l’intégration de la propriété intellectuelle officielle dans un nom commercial ou un nom de domaine ; l’organisation de concours ou jeux-concours créant une association avec la compétition ; l’utilisation des marques officielles pour décorer un magasin ; et l’usage par un compte professionnel de hashtags officiels dans un but commercial. Ces directives précisent en outre que la protection s’étend non seulement à la reproduction à l’identique des marques officielles, mais également à leurs variantes dont la similitude peut prêter à confusion. Cette protection rappelée par les lignes directrices est en cohérence avec la protection élargie accordée aux marques notoires en droit français par l’article L.713-5 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle.

Les leçons des JO de Paris 2024 : quels risques pour les marques ?

Les Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024 ont donné lieu à un contentieux abondant qui éclaire concrètement les risques auxquels s’exposent les entreprises tentées par l’ambush marketing lors d’un évènement sportif majeur. Si ces décisions ont été rendues dans le contexte spécifique des JO, pendant lesquels protections légales spécifiques renforcées s’appliquaient, elles constituent néanmoins un avertissement direct pour les marques qui envisageraient des stratégies similaires lors de la Coupe du Monde, sur le fondement du droit commun.

• L’utilisation de symboles officiels sur des supports physiques itinérants : Pendant les JO de Paris 2024, une société chinoise du secteur laitier avait fait circuler dans Paris des bus arborant les anneaux olympiques associés à ses propres marques, tout en se présentant comme « la seule société laitière chinoise présente à Paris 2024 ». La Cour d’appel de Paris a confirmé tant le parasitisme que la contrefaçon de marque, et condamné les sociétés concernées, en référé, au paiement d’une provision de 20 000 euros, assortie d’une astreinte de 20 000 euros par jour et par infraction constatée, visant à faire cesser la diffusion des publicités (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 2, 21 nov. 2025, n° 24/15283 ; TJ Paris, ordonnance de référé du 8 août 2024, 24/55463).
• La retransmission non autorisée de compétitions : Le tribunal judiciaire de Paris a ordonné en référé, pendant les JO, la cessation immédiate de la diffusion de compétitions olympiques par une plateforme de streaming ne disposant pas des droits médias correspondants, sous astreinte de 1 500 euros par infraction constatée, 3 000 euros par jour pour les distributions continues et 5 000 euros par jour pour défaut de retrait (TJ Paris, réf., 18 sept. 2024, n° 24/53019). Ainsi, toute plateforme retransmettant des matchs de la Coupe du Monde sans détenir les droits cédés par la FIFA s’expose à des mesures d’urgence immédiates, sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport.
• La protection élargie de la marque notoire : La Cour de cassation a confirmé que la protection des marques olympiques s’étendait au-delà de la reproduction stricto sensu : il suffit que la marque soit évoquée ou suggérée, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de démontrer un risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public. Cette solution, fondée sur l’article L.713-5 du code de la propriété intellectuelle, s’est appliquée à un bar ayant utilisé les anneaux olympiques sur ses sous-bocks pour promouvoir ses soirées de retransmission (Cass. crim., 17 janv. 2017, n° 15-86.363). Les marques de la FIFA étant tout aussi notoires sur le plan mondial, le même régime protecteur leur est applicable : une simple évocation des marques officielles, même sans reproduction littérale, pourra caractériser une atteinte sanctionnable.

Certaines opérations marketing peuvent échapper à toute sanction

L’analyse de la jurisprudence et des pratiques promotionnelles permet néanmoins de comprendre les contours de certaines pratiques publicitaires qui pourraient être autorisées (non sanctionnées par les textes susmentionnés), sous réserve qu’elles soient préparées et présentées avec habileté. En voici quelques exemples.

Communication sur un ton décalé ou humoristique : Une approche décalée, voire humoristique, peut permettre d’échapper aux sanctions susvisées.

• Ainsi, la marque de chips Vico du groupe Intersnack avait lancé en 2016 une campagne promotionnelle autour du slogan « Vico, partenaire des supporters à domicile ».
• La société irlandaise Paddy Power avait pour sa part parrainé une course de l’œuf dans la cuiller à « London », village de Bourgogne, pour afficher à Londres pendant les JO de 2012 le slogan : « Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year ! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is) ». Le comité d’organisation des JO avait échoué à faire cesser cette campagne. Humour anglais …
• Le groupe Heineken avait quant à lui commercialisé pendant l’Euro 2016, dont Carlsberg était le sponsor officiel, une gamme de bouteilles aux couleurs des drapeaux de 21 pays ayant « marqué son histoire », parmi lesquels une majorité de participants à la compétition.

Communication d’une donnée informative à titre publicitaire : A été jugé licite l’utilisation de résultats d’un match de rugby et l’annonce d’un prochain match dans un journal pour la promotion d’un véhicule automobile, la publicité indiquant : « France 13 Angleterre 24 – la Fiat 500 félicite l’Angleterre pour sa victoire et donne rendez-vous à l’équipe de France le 9 mars pour France-Italie ». Les juges ont considéré que cette publication « se borne à reproduire un résultat sportif d’actualité, acquis et rendu public en première page du journal d’information sportive, et à faire état d’une rencontre future également connue comme déjà annoncée par le journal dans un article d’information » (Cass. com., 20 mai 2014, n° 13-12.102).

Sponsoring de joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde : Toute société peut conclure des partenariats avec des joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA, par exemple en leur fournissant des équipements ou des vêtements portant son logo. Les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle précisent expressément qu’elles « ne contiennent aucune affirmation relative à des droits détenus par des tierces parties telles que les joueurs, clubs, associations membres [ou] confédérations ». Les directives de la FIFA confirment par ailleurs explicitement que les images génériques liées au football, aux équipes nationales ou aux drapeaux de pays n’entrent pas dans la propriété intellectuelle officielle. La prudence s’impose néanmoins : le partenariat ne doit pas créer l’impression d’une association commerciale avec la FIFA ou la compétition, ni utiliser les marques officielles de la FIFA.

L’approche combinée juridique et marketing dans la conception et la préparation du message d’une telle opération de communication est essentielle pour éviter des poursuites judiciaires, notamment sur le fondement du parasitisme. Certaines campagnes publicitaires peuvent donc légitimement être envisagées, notamment quand elles sont astucieuses.

Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

What the EU decision does (and does not) do

The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

How different payment types are affected in practice

Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

Country notes (alphabetical)

Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

Practical next steps for EU companies

1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

En droit français, les franchiseurs et les distributeurs sont soumis à deux types d’obligations précontractuelles d’information : chaque partie doit spontanément informer son futur partenaire de toute information qu’elle sait déterminante pour son consentement. De plus, pour certains contrats — notamment le contrat de franchise — il existe une obligation de communiquer un nombre limité d’informations dans un document dédié. Ces obligations précontractuelles sont d’ordre public. Ainsi, ces deux obligations s’appliquent simultanément au franchiseur, au distributeur ou au concessionnaire lors de la négociation d’un contrat avec un partenaire.

Points clés à retenir

• Les informations requises par le DIP doivent être intégralement renseignées et actualisées ;
• Les informations non exigées par le DIP mais communiquées par le franchiseur doivent être soigneusement sélectionnées et sincères ;
• Le franchisé doit avoir la possibilité de solliciter des informations complémentaires auprès du franchiseur ;
• L’expérience du franchisé dans le secteur économique concerné permet au franchiseur de limiter considérablement son exposition au risque de nullité du contrat pour vice du consentement ;
• Le franchiseur doit conserver la preuve de la remise effective des informations précontractuelles, qu’elles soient obligatoires ou non.
• L’obligation générale d’information de droit commun (article 1112-1 du Code civil) peut s’appliquer concurremment avec l’obligation spéciale prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce.

Obligation générale d’information applicable à tous les contractants

Quelle est l’étendue de cette obligation précontractuelle d’information ?

Cette obligation s’impose à tous les cocontractants, pour tout type de contrat. En effet, l’article 1112-1 du Code civil dispose que :

(§. 1) Celle des parties qui connaît une information dont l’importance est déterminante pour le consentement de l’autre doit l’en informer dès lors que, légitimement, cette dernière ignore cette information ou fait confiance à son cocontractant.

(§. 3) Ont une importance déterminante les informations qui ont un lien direct et nécessaire avec le contenu du contrat ou la qualité des parties.

Cette obligation s’applique à toutes les parties contractantes, pour tout type de contrat.

La jurisprudence s’est prononcée sur la question du cumul de cette obligation de droit commun, avec l’obligation spéciale d’information prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce (cf infra), en répondant par la positive (CA Paris, 27 mars 2024, n° 22/12665). Le périmètre de cette dernière a toutefois été circonscrit par la Cour de cassation : seules les informations présentant un lien direct et nécessaire avec l’objet du contrat ou la qualité des parties sont soumises à obligation de communication (Cass. com., 14 mai 2025, n° 23-17.948).

À qui incombe la charge de la preuve?

La charge de la preuve repose sur celui qui soutient que l’information lui était due. Il doit alors démontrer (i) que l’autre partie lui devait cette information, mais (ii) ne la lui a pas fournie (article 1112-1 (§. 4) du Code civil).

Obligation spéciale d’information applicable aux contrats de franchise et de distribution

Quels contrats sont soumis à cette règle particulière?

Le droit français impose (art. L. 330-3 du Code de commerce) la communication d’un document d’information précontractuelle (« DIP ») ainsi que du projet de contrat, par toute personne :

• qui accorde à une autre personne le droit d’utiliser une marque, une enseigne ou un nom commercial,
• tout en exigeant un engagement exclusif ou quasi-exclusif pour l’exercice de son activité (par exemple, une obligation d’achat exclusif). Le caractère quasi-exclusif fait l’objet d’une appréciation casuistique par les juges français, indépendamment du seuil de 80% des achats prévu par le règlement UE 2022/720, qui n’est utilisé que comme un repère indicatif.

Concrètement, le DIP doit être remis, par exemple, au franchisé, au distributeur, au concessionnaire ou au licencié de marque, par son franchiseur, fournisseur ou concédant, dès lors que les deux conditions précitées sont réunies. Récemment la jurisprudence française a d’ailleurs eu l’occasion de rappeler que le champ d’application du DIP ne se limitait pas à la franchise, mais également et notamment, au contrat de concession, dès lors que les conditions précitées sont réunies (CA Paris, 22 mai 2024, n° 22/08672).

À quel moment le DIP doit-il être remis?

Le DIP et le projet de contrat doivent être communiqués au moins 20 jours avant la signature du contrat, et, le cas échéant, avant le paiement de toute somme exigée préalablement à la signature (notamment en cas de réservation).

Quelles informations doivent figurer dans le DIP?

L’article R. 330-1 du Code de commerce impose que le DIP mentionne les informations suivantes (liste non exhaustive) relatives :

• Au franchiseur (identité et expérience des dirigeants, parcours professionnel, etc.) ;
• À l’activité du franchiseur (notamment la date de création, le siège social, les références bancaires, l’historique du développement de l’enseigne, les comptes annuels, etc.) ;
• Au réseau (liste des membres avec indication de la date de signature des contrats, liste des établissements proposant les mêmes produits ou services dans la zone d’activité envisagée, nombre de membres ayant quitté le réseau au cours de l’année précédant la remise du DIP avec indication des motifs de départ, etc.) ;
• À la marque concédée (date d’enregistrement, titularité et conditions d’exploitation) ;
• À l’état général du marché (relatif aux produits ou services visés par le contrat) et à l’état local du marché (relatif à la zone d’activité envisagée), ainsi qu’aux facteurs de concurrence et aux perspectives de développement. La Cour de cassation a jugé, s’agissant du marché local, que le franchiseur n’était pas tenu de réaliser une étude de marché, mais que s’il en fournit une, celle-ci doit être exacte et vérifiable (Cass. com., 18 oct. 2023, n° 22-19.329).
• Aux éléments essentiels du projet de contrat, et notamment : sa durée, les conditions de renouvellement, de résiliation et de cession, ainsi que l’étendue des exclusivités accordées ;
• Aux obligations financières pesant sur le cocontractant : nature et montant des dépenses et investissements à engager avant le démarrage de l’activité (droit d’entrée, frais d’installation, etc.).

Au-delà de comporter l’ensemble des informations mentionnées par l’article précité, le DIP doit répondre à une exigence qualitative. En effet toutes les informations communiquées, y compris celles transmises spontanément, doivent être exactes et sincères, afin de garantir un consentement éclairé et exempt de tout vice de la part du candidat à l’entrée dans le réseau.

Comment prouver la remise des informations?

La charge de la preuve de la remise du DIP incombe au débiteur de cette obligation : le franchiseur (Cass. com., 7 juillet 2004, n° 02-15.950). L’idéal pour le franchiseur est de faire signer et dater le DIP par le franchisé le jour de sa remise et d’en conserver la preuve.

La clause contractuelle par laquelle le franchisé reconnaît avoir reçu un DIP complet ne constitue pas une preuve suffisante de la remise effective d’un DIP complet (Cass. com., 10 janvier 2018, n° 15-25.287).

Le franchiseur est-il tenu d’une obligation d’actualisation du DIP jusqu’à la signature du contrat

Dans un arrêt du 26 juin 2024 (n°23-1 14.085 PB) la Cour de cassation retient que la conformité formelle du DIP à la date de sa remise ne suffit pas à exonérer le franchiseur de toute responsabilité précontractuelle. Cette solution est confirmée par un arrêt du 4 décembre 2024 (n° 23-16.684).

Ces deux décisions semblent consacrer une obligation d’actualisation du DIP pesant sur la tête de réseau durant toute la période séparant la remise du document de la conclusion du contrat. Lorsque des événements significatifs surviennent dans cet intervalle (procédure collective affectant des membres du réseau, contentieux majeur, modification structurelle du réseau) la tête de réseau est tenue d’en informer spontanément le candidat. Le juge examine alors si le manquement à cette obligation était susceptible d’altérer l’appréciation que le candidat pouvait avoir du réseau et, partant, de vicier son consentement (Cass. com., 26 juin 2024, op. cit.). Le franchiseur ne saurait donc se retrancher derrière la régularité initiale du DIP pour s’affranchir de son devoir d’information dès lors que la situation du réseau a évolué de manière significative avant la signature du contrat.

Sanctions en cas de manquement aux obligations précontractuelles d’information

Sanction pénale

Le non-respect des obligations relatives au DIP peut exposer le franchiseur ou le fournisseur à une amende pénale pouvant aller jusqu’à 1 500 euros, portée à 3 000 euros en cas de récidive, le montant étant multiplié par cinq pour les personnes morales (article R. 330-2 du Code de commerce).

Nullité du contrat pour dol

Le contrat peut être annulé en cas de manquement à l’article 1112-1 ou à l’article L. 330-3. Dans les deux cas, le non-respect de l’obligation d’information n’est sanctionné que si le demandeur démontre que son consentement a été vicié par l’erreur, le dol ou la violence. Le juge procède à une appréciation in concreto, tenant compte notamment de l’expérience professionnelle et des diligences personnelles du distributeur : un candidat averti aura plus de difficultés à caractériser un dol, et son expérience dans le secteur concerné peut suffire à exonérer le franchiseur (CA Paris, pôle 5 – ch. 11, 26 avr. 2024, n° 21/13205), quand bien même les informations communiquées lacunaires ou inexactes (CA Paris, 20 janv. 2021, n° 19/03382).

Le cas échéant, les parties doivent être remises dans l’état antérieur à la conclusion du contrat.

S’agissant des éléments constitutifs du dol, les tribunaux en apprécient strictement les deux conditions:

• (Un élément matériel) l’existence d’un mensonge ou d’une réticence dolosive (article 1137 du Code civil) ;
• Et (un élément intentionnel) l’intention de tromper son cocontractant (article 1130 du Code civil).

Dommages et intérêts

Bien que les demandes en nullité soient soumises à des conditions très strictes, les franchisés et distributeurs peuvent alternativement obtenir des dommages et intérêts sur le fondement de la responsabilité délictuelle pour manquement à l’obligation précontractuelle d’information, sous réserve de démontrer une faute (information incomplète ou erronée), un préjudice indemnisable (celui-ci se limite à la perte de chance de ne pas contracter ou de contracter à des conditions plus avantageuses – voir en ce sens : Cass. com., 15 mars 2017, n° 15-16.406) et le lien de causalité entre les deux.

From Reporting to Governance and Risk Allocation

Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) considerations are playing an increasingly influential role in how businesses operate, invest, and manage risk, especially within the European Union, where corporate sustainability and responsibility regulation have been on the agenda in recent years.

With the adoption of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), many companies anticipated a significant shift in compliance. Since then, the EU has introduced simplification measures to streamline reporting and due diligence obligations, reduce the administrative burden, and improve proportionality, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while maintaining the core sustainability objectives.

While opinions may differ regarding the evolution of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) in EU regulation and the subsequent postponements of reporting obligations, regulatory developments appear to have, in practice, supported a shift in perspective. Sustainability is no longer viewed solely as a reporting requirement, but increasingly as a matter of governance, strategy, and risk allocation. This development is welcome, as the regulatory framework’s underlying objective is to advance the green transition, which in turn requires a change in how companies integrate sustainability into their decision-making and operations.

This focus on sustainability influences businesses of all sizes, including SMEs. Even companies not directly subject to the CSRD or CSDDD anticipate that ESG requirements will be passed down through the supply chain. Many non-reporting SMEs are already embedding sustainability practices, and this trend is likely to continue. In other words, sustainability policies are already affecting companies well before any formal reporting obligations kick in.

Environmental, Social, and Governance in Contract Architecture

One of the key means of implementing environmental, social, and governance obligations and objectives in day-to-day business operations is through commercial contracts and the requirements and commitments embedded in them.

Even where a company itself is not directly subject to extensive reporting or due diligence obligations, corporate sustainability and responsibility expectations flow through the market via contractual relationships. Larger undertakings within the scope of CSRD and, in due course, the CSDDD require contractual assurances, information rights, and cooperation from their business partners, including SMEs operating within their supply chains. As a result, corporate sustainability and responsibility become a question of contractual architecture. Companies must consider not only price mechanisms, liability caps and termination triggers, but also how environmental, social and governance risks and obligations are addressed and allocated between the parties through legally enforceable contractual terms.

Translating Policies into Binding Obligations

A typical starting point is the incorporation of a code of conduct or sustainability policies into commercial contracts, often by reference and through an express obligation on the contracting party to comply with them. From a legal standpoint, this raises important drafting questions. Many codes are drafted as high-level public statements. When such policies are converted into contractual commitments, their wording, scope, and hierarchy relative to the main agreement require careful consideration. The obligations must be sufficiently clear to define the parties’ expectations, coherent with other contractual provisions, and proportionate to the commercial relationship. The obligations must also be capable of practical implementation and effective monitoring in the context of the agreement.

In practical terms, this may mean requiring the supplier to comply with specific labour standards, maintain documented environmental management procedures, report on emissions data, ensure traceability of key raw materials, or allow reasonable access for audits. Clearly defining what is expected, how compliance is demonstrated, and what consequences follow from non-compliance is essential for the clause to function effectively. Otherwise, clauses that appear comprehensive in theory and ambitious in scope may offer limited enforceability in practice, and their impact may remain marginal if compliance cannot be effectively monitored and verified. If policies are not properly translated into binding and operational obligations, the company risks a mismatch between what it promises publicly and what is actually required under its contracts. This may undermine consistency, weaken risk management, and expose the company to reputational and governance risks if its own stated principles cannot be enforced within its supply or distribution chain.

As part of this process, companies must also consider the protection of trade secrets and confidential information. For example, broad audit or data-reporting obligations may raise concerns about sensitive business information. Contractual terms should balance transparency with the need to protect legitimately proprietary data. Clauses such as confidentiality agreements or carve-outs for trade secrets can be used to ensure that sharing ESG-related information does not compromise confidential business information or competitive advantages.

Environmental, Social and Governance Clauses Across Different Contract Types

Besides codes of conduct and sustainability policies, environmental, social and governance-related clauses increasingly take more tailored and transaction-specific forms. In shareholder agreements, sustainability objectives may be reflected in governance structures or even linked to financial outcomes, for example by aligning dividend policies or incentive mechanisms with agreed climate targets. In employment contracts, obligations may extend beyond general compliance and include participation in corporate sustainability training programmes or adherence to internal sustainability guidelines as part of performance expectations.

In supply and manufacturing agreements, environmental, social and governance provisions may address traceability of raw materials, emissions reporting, waste management, energy efficiency standards or the right to replace a supplier if its environmental practices materially conflict with the contracting party’s sustainability commitments. Such contractual mechanisms increasingly affect SMEs operating as suppliers, as ESG expectations pass through the supply chain.

Construction contracts often include detailed requirements regarding material selection, lifecycle impacts, carbon footprint calculations and recycling or waste reduction procedures. For example, in Finland, legislation imposes low-carbon and energy efficiency requirements for new buildings, and a party undertaking a construction project is subject to mandatory reporting obligations relating to construction and demolition waste. These statutory requirements are typically reflected and implemented in the relevant project and construction contracts.

Across these different contract types, the practical significance is consistent. Environmental, social and governance considerations move from the level of general policy into legally enforceable obligations tailored to each specific legal relationship. Contracts function as a mechanism for allocating responsibility, managing compliance risk and aligning commercial incentives with sustainability objectives.

Proportionate Monitoring and Audit Rights

In the contractual implementation and monitoring of environmental, social and governance obligations, audit and information rights play a central role. They are closely linked to effective oversight and form an integral part of a coherent contractual framework. In practice, companies typically seek access to relevant data from their business partners and, where appropriate, establish inspection or audit rights to enable meaningful monitoring and verification, whether conducted directly by the company or, commonly, by an independent expert appointed for that purpose.

However, such arrangements must remain balanced. Overly burdensome provisions may needlessly disrupt day-to-day operations and reduce the willingness to cooperate, particularly for SMEs with limited administrative capacity. By contrast, well-designed mechanisms that balance transparency with confidentiality and operational feasibility are more defensible and more likely to function effectively in practice.

Contractual Remedies

As a general principle, the consequences of a breach are determined by the terms agreed between the parties. In practice, the parties will typically first seek to resolve the matter through discussion and good faith negotiations, allowing the non-compliant party an opportunity to clarify the situation and implement corrective actions within a reasonable timeframe. If negotiations do not lead to a resolution, it may be appropriate to proceed to stronger measures, such as contractual penalties, indemnification obligations, price adjustments, temporary suspension rights or other agreed sanctions, applied in light of the nature and severity of the breach.

The contract should clearly define what constitutes a breach, how it is assessed and what remedies are available in each scenario. Clear and proportionate step-by-step remedy structures enhance legal certainty, reduce the risk of disputes and ensure that material or repeated breaches may trigger more significant consequences, including termination where justified.

Strategic and Voluntary Environmental, Social and Governance Commitments

In the current EU landscape, implementing ESG considerations in commercial contracts is no longer simply a matter of reacting to directives. It is a broader exercise in risk management and corporate governance. Even as the implementation details of the directives may continue to evolve, market expectations, financing conditions and reputational considerations remain key drivers of sustainability integration.

In addition, some companies choose to position themselves as frontrunners in sustainability for strategic and reputational reasons. They may therefore incorporate voluntary environmental, social and governance mechanisms and requirements into their contracts that go beyond, or are not directly derived from, binding directives. By doing so, they signal to investors, customers and other stakeholders that sustainability is treated as a core business priority rather than merely a compliance obligation.

At the same time, it is important to recognise the practical limits of such commitments. Ambitious sustainability requirements may be more challenging for SMEs with limited financial and administrative resources. Meeting extensive reporting, certification or traceability standards can require investments in systems, personnel and external expertise. If contractual expectations are not calibrated to the size and capacity of the counterparty, they may limit the ability of SMEs to participate in certain supply chains. A balanced and proportionate approach helps ensure that sustainability objectives remain achievable and commercially workable across the contractual chain.

Conclusion

For legal practitioners, the central task is not to increase the number of environmental, social and governance clauses as such, but to ensure their quality, coherence and practical relevance. The objective is to design contractual mechanisms that are proportionate, enforceable and aligned with the company’s actual risk profile, industry context and sustainability priorities. Commercial contracts remain one of the most concrete tools for translating sustainability strategy into operational practice. Moreover, every contract lawyer should understand and apply key sustainability principles in their work, ensuring that ESG commitments become integral to legal advice and contract drafting.

The Strait of Hormuz is likely the most strategically important point for the global oil trade. In fact, approximately 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through this narrow passage between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf every day.

Following the outbreak of war in the region, the impact on energy markets was almost immediate: oil prices quickly rose above $100 per barrel, and it is unclear how high they may climb in the coming weeks and months. As a result, transportation, production, and procurement costs are rising across industrial supply chains in many sectors.

For many companies engaged in international trade, this phenomenon creates a very real problem. Contracts signed months (or years) earlier—perhaps at a fixed price—must be fulfilled in a completely different economic context.

A manufacturer that sells goods for delivery in six or twelve months may find itself producing and shipping at much higher energy costs, while the price agreed upon with the customer remains unchanged.

This is a situation that recurs cyclically, for various reasons: from the COVID-19 pandemic to the subsequent raw materials crisis, and on to current geopolitical tensions.

When the increase in costs is so sudden and significant, a question inevitably arises: must the contract still be performed under the original terms, or is it possible to suspend or renegotiate the agreement to adapt it to the new circumstances?

The answer depends on several factors: first and foremost, on what the parties have (or have not) provided for in the contract, but also on the law applicable to the relationship and on the interpretation that judges or arbitrators may give to the rules in the event of a dispute.

Force Majeure and Hardship: Two Different Concepts

When extraordinary events occur—such as a war, an energy crisis, or the disruption of a trade route—many operators immediately invoke force majeure. However, in most cases, these situations fall instead under the category of hardship.

It is therefore essential to distinguish between these two situations.

When an Event Constitutes Force Majeure

Force majeure applies to cases where an extraordinary and unforeseeable event makes it impossible to perform the contract.

The characteristics of the grounds for exemption from liability depend on the law applicable to the commercial relationship, but generally require:

• unpredictability of the event;
• the event being beyond the affected party’s control;
• the impossibility of avoiding or overcoming the event through reasonable efforts.

Typical examples include:

• orders from authorities requiring the suspension of production
• embargoes or export bans
• logistical disruptions caused by war

In these situations, performance is not merely more costly: it becomes objectively impossible. The consequence is that the party unable to perform is generally exempt from liability for the duration of the event.

Hardship

The situation is different when performance of the contract remains possible but becomes economically much more burdensome.

The concept of hardship is generally based on four prerequisites:

1. an event occurring after the conclusion of the contract
2. unpredictability and extraordinary nature of the event
3. a substantial alteration of the economic balance of the contract
4. excessive burden of performance, but not impossibility

A sharp increase in the price of oil, gas, or other raw materials often falls into this category.

Goods can be produced and delivered, but doing so may entail costs far higher than those anticipated when the contract was signed.

The ripple effect along the international supply chain

In global industrial supply chains, the same goods are often the subject of a series of consecutive contracts.

The manufacturer sells to a trader, who sells to a processing company, which resells to an importer in another country, who in turn distributes the product to the end market.

When a hardship event occurs—such as a sharp rise in energy prices—the effect tends to ripple throughout the entire supply chain.

The first party affected by the cost increase will try to pass the increase on to its contractual counterpart, who, in turn, will find themselves in the same situation with the next link in the chain.

The risk is clear: one of the operators in the middle of the chain may face increased upstream costs without being able to pass them on downstream.

This is one of the most common problems in international supply chains.

What happens if there is no clause regarding price fluctuations

In commercial practice, it often happens that parties operate on the basis of orders and order confirmations without a formal written contract, or that a contract exists but contains no provisions regarding price fluctuations or hardship.

In such cases, when costs increase sharply, it is necessary to determine which law applies to individual sales contracts across the supply chain.

This can lead to very different situations:

• one law may allow for price revision or termination of the contract
• another law aplicable to a second contract may not provide for equivalent remedies
• a third contract may contain much more restrictive contractual clauses

The practical result is that an operator in the middle of the chain may face a price increase from their supplier without being able to pass it on to the customer.

A Common Legal Framework: The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG)

Fortunately, many international sales contracts are governed by the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).

The convention has been ratified by 97 countries, including Italy and most major trading partners, such as the U.S., Canada, China, Germany, France, Spain, etc.

The central provision is Article 79, according to which a party is not liable for non-performance if it proves that the non-performance is due to an impediment:

• beyond its control
• unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract
• unavoidable or insurmountable

Traditionally, this provision has been applied to cases of force majeure.

In recent years, there has been debate over whether it can also be applied to cases of hardship, but international case law tends to be very cautious.

International case law on Hardship

Court decisions reflect a rather strict approach.

In some cases, even very significant increases in raw material costs have not been considered sufficient to modify or suspend the contract.

The reasoning is simple: those who operate professionally in international trade must take into account a certain degree of market volatility.

Only when the increase in costs exceeds an exceptional and unforeseeable level such as to radically alter the balance of the contract can hardship be invoked.

One of the most frequently cited cases is the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision in the Scafom case, which recognized the right to renegotiate the contract following a 70% increase in the price of steel.

However, such cases are relatively rare.

Generic clauses that serve no purpose

Many contracts contain hardship clauses copied from standard templates (boilerplate).

The problem is that these clauses often:

• list the effects of hardship
• but do not define when hardship actually occurs

The result is that, when prices rise, the parties may have very different opinions on what constitutes an “exceptional” increase and whether the event in question was “unforeseeable” or not.

The clause, therefore, does not resolve the issue, but defers it to discussion between the parties and, in the event of a failure to reach an agreement, to the courts or arbitrators.

What criteria can define a hardship situation

To make the clause truly effective, it is useful to establish objective parameters.

Among the most commonly used in international contracts:

• an increase or decrease in the price of a raw material beyond a certain threshold (±20% or ±30%)
• an increase in transportation or logistics costs within certain limits;
• significant fluctuations in the exchange rate beyond a specified range;
• the introduction of tariffs or trade restrictions

These parameters, linked to tolerance ranges, allow the parties to quickly and unambiguously identify a hardship event.

Remedies in the Event of Hardship

An effective clause should also address how to handle the situation.

The most common solutions are:

• renegotiation of the contract in good faith
• apply an automatic price adjustment
• appointment of an independent third-party expert to determine the new price
• temporary suspension of the contract
• right of withdrawal if no agreement is reached

These tools allow the parties to manage the crisis without resorting to litigation.

Audit of existing contracts: what to do now

At this point, the practical question becomes: how should we manage the issue in existing business relationships?

The first step is to conduct an audit of existing contracts with suppliers and customers.

1. Introduce comprehensive contracts in new relationships

If the relationships are governed solely by purchase orders and order confirmations, it is advisable to take this opportunity to draft comprehensive international sales contracts that include:

• a hardship clause
• warranty provisions
• remedies for breach
• limitations of liability

2. Update existing contracts

If the relationship is already governed by a contract, you should check whether a hardship clause exists.

If not, it may be useful to propose to the other party:

• a new contract, or
• a contract addendum dedicated to managing price fluctuations.

This helps prevent future conflicts and provides both parties with an effective tool to manage potential price shocks along the supply chain.

Conclusion

Commodity and energy crises demonstrate how exposed international contracts are to sudden changes in economic conditions. When a contract does not clearly address hardship management, the risk does not disappear; it simply shifts along the supply chain until it settles on the weakest link.

For this reason, companies operating within international supply chains should view the hardship clause as a strategic tool for managing contractual risk. A well-drafted contract does not eliminate market volatility, but it allows the parties to address it with clear rules, reducing uncertainty and preventing disputes.

Executive Summary

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) remains one of the most ambitious integration projects in the world. Yet, several years into its operational phase, it has not (yet) delivered the structural shift many expected. A recent analysis underscores the gap between political momentum and economic reality: implementation remains uneven, the agreement is still used by only a portion of participating states, and non-tariff barriers and infrastructure deficits continue to dominate the cost of doing business across borders.  For Egypt, the opportunity is still real — but it depends less on treaty headlines and more on enabling conditions: trade logistics, customs efficiency, regulatory convergence, and competitive industrial capacity. 

Looking Back: The Promise of a Single African Market

When the AfCFTA was launched, expectations were understandably high. A continent-wide trade framework was supposed to reduce tariffs, facilitate trade in goods and services, and strengthen regional value chains — with the broader goal of moving African economies up the value ladder.

In my 2022 article, I asked whether AfCFTA could become a game changer for Egypt, given Egypt’s industrial base, strategic geography, and the potential to diversify export markets beyond traditional partners. (For background, see the earlier article here”).

The Reality Check: Intra-African Trade Remains Structurally Weak

Several years later, the interim assessment is sobering. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) recently put it, AfCFTA is not a “game changer” yet, and only about half of member states currently meet the practical prerequisites to trade under the agreement.

A deeper reason is structural: no other world region trades so little with itself, and while statistics may undercount informal cross-border flows (especially in food), the overall picture remains unchanged.

Trade integration cannot deliver transformative outcomes if production, logistics, and institutions do not support scale.

Implementation Has Been Slow — and Often Symbolic

Operationalisation did not start with full-scale liberalisation. Instead, the AfCFTA began with a pilot approach: the Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) launched in October 2022, initially with eight states, later joined by additional countries, including Nigeria and South Africa by spring 2025.

The GTI created valuable learning effects, but it also underlined a key point: early progress was often presented through symbolic deals, while product coverage and volumes remained limited. FAZ highlights that only selected goods could be traded duty-free and that key sectors remained constrained for a long time due to missing or unresolved technical rules.

A pilot, however, cannot substitute for full operational certainty — the kind businesses need to restructure supply chains and invest.

Tariffs Are Not the Main Barrier — Trade Costs Are

AfCFTA is frequently discussed in terms of tariff liberalisation. Yet, evidence suggests that the largest gains do not come from tariffs but from reducing non-tariff barriers and improving trade infrastructure.

FAZ points to a central reality: tariffs tend to add around 20–30% to intra-African trade costs, whereas non-tariff costs can be far higher — driven by bureaucracy, lack of harmonised standards, inefficient border processes, and transport barriers.

This is the crux: even with reduced tariffs, trade will not expand meaningfully if goods still cannot move cheaply, quickly, and predictably.

Integration Complexity and Distributional Politics

Africa’s integration landscape is shaped by multiple overlapping regional economic communities and trade regimes. This creates legal and administrative complexity — often described as an integration “spaghetti bowl.” FAZ notes the challenge of coordination and the continued fragmentation of rules.

There is also a political economy dimension. Intra-African trade is heavily influenced by a small number of larger economies — and the distribution of benefits matters. FAZ highlights the dominance of major players (notably South Africa) and the concern that tariff liberalisation alone may entrench existing industrial advantages.

Where governments expect asymmetric outcomes, resistance often takes the form of delay, narrow implementation, or persistent non-tariff barriers.

What This Means for Egypt: The Opportunity Is Real — But Conditional

Egypt’s strategic case for AfCFTA participation remains strong: industrial potential, geographic location, and the opportunity to access and shape growing markets. But the experience so far suggests that the treaty text alone does not generate trade flows.

For Egypt’s private sector, the decisive factors are practical:

• predictable and efficient customs clearance and border procedures,
• logistics corridors and port efficiency,
• regulatory convergence (standards, certification, compliance),
• stable access to trade finance and payments,
• competitive energy and production conditions for manufacturing and processing.

AfCFTA can support these developments — but it cannot replace them.

The “Game Changer” Pathway: What Must Happen Next

FAZ concludes that AfCFTA will only become truly impactful if it is paired with the fundamentals: major infrastructure investment, stronger production and processing capacity, and a credible industrial policy.

At the same time, Africa faces a classic chicken-and-egg problem: without development there is limited investment appeal; without investment there is limited development.

For Egypt and its partners, a pragmatic strategy would be to:

1. treat AfCFTA as a platform for real trade-cost reduction, not only tariff debates;
2. focus on a limited number of scalable corridors and sectors where regional value chains can realistically grow;
3. strengthen implementation capacity so that preferences become usable for firms — especially SMEs;
4. enhance legal certainty and dispute resolution reliability for cross-border commerce.

Conclusion

AfCFTA remains a landmark achievement in terms of political commitment. But as of today, it has not yet been the “game changer” many hoped for.

For Egypt, the key question is no longer whether AfCFTA is visionary — it is. The question is whether governments and businesses can translate it into lower real trade costs, higher competitiveness, and bankable cross-border transactions. If those enabling conditions improve, AfCFTA’s promise can still become commercial reality.

After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

Why wine matters in this agreement

The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

1. tariff liberalisation;
2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the « Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures » (SPS) and « Technical Barriers to Trade » (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

Geographical indications: protection and tension

One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
2. transition periods for local operators;
3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

Services, distribution, and market structure

Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

1. logistics providers
2. distribution networks
3. commercial representation
4. marketing and advertising agencies

For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

Legal advisors will need to consider:

1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
3. compliance with competition rules

The implementation gap: where risk lies

Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

1. managing client expectations
2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

What should lawyers be doing now?

Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

Final sip

The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

Lors d’évènements de grande ampleur, tels que la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026, certaines entreprises tentent d’associer « sauvagement » leur marque ou image à l’évènement par une pratique d’« ambush marketing » (marketing d’embuscade) définie par la jurisprudence comme une « stratégie publicitaire mise en place par une entreprise afin d’associer son image commerciale à celle d’un événement et donc de profiter de l’impact médiatique dudit événement sans s’acquitter des droits qui y sont relatifs et sans avoir obtenu au préalable l’autorisation de l’organisateur de l’événement » (CA Paris, 2e chambre, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912). Une pratique risquée et sanctionnée, mais parfois envisageable.

Points clés à retenir

• L’ambush marketing est une pratique sanctionnée mais qui n’est pas interdite en soi.
• En contrepartie de leurs investissements dans la compétition, les sponsors et partenaires officiels de la FIFA bénéficient d’une protection juridique très importante, par l’intermédiaire de divers textes généraux (contrefaçon, parasitisme, propriété intellectuelle) ou plus particuliers (droit du sport), contre toutes formes d’ambush marketing.
• La Coupe du Monde de la FIFA fait l’objet d’une protection renforcée fondée sur un portefeuille étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier et sur les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, en l’absence de législation française spécifique comparable à celle instituée pour les Jeux Olympiques.
• Ces droits ne sont pas absolus et il reste néanmoins de minces opportunités permettant une pratique, astucieuse, du marketing d’embuscade.

La protection des sponsors et partenaires officiels de la Coupe du Monde contre l’ambush marketing

Fort d’une audience mondiale de près de 5 milliards de personnes sur l’ensemble des plateformes lors de sa dernière édition au Qatar en 2022 – dont plus de 1,5 milliard pour la seule finale – la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 est l’évènement sportif le plus suivi de la planète. Accueilli pour la première fois par trois pays (Canada, Mexique et États-Unis), il réunit 48 équipes et plus de 1 200 joueurs pour 104 matchs dans 16 stades. Son organisation est financée dans une large mesure par les différents partenaires, sponsors et détenteurs de droits officiels, qui bénéficient en contrepartie d’un droit exclusif d’utilisation des marques et propriétés intellectuelles officielles de la FIFA afin d’y associer leur propre image et signes distinctifs.

La pratique d’ambush marketing n’est pas sanctionnée en tant que telle par le droit français, mais de nombreux textes épars permettent de protéger largement les sponsors et partenaires de manifestations sportives de dimension mondiale contre l’ambush marketing. Ils sont en effet légitimes à pouvoir jouir paisiblement des droits qui leur sont offerts en contrepartie de leurs larges investissements réalisés dans le cadre d’évènements tels que, par exemple, les coupes du monde de football ou de rugby, ou les Jeux Olympiques.

Peuvent notamment être invoqués par les sponsors officiels et par les organisateurs de telles manifestations :

• les protections « classiques » offertes par le droit de la propriété intellectuelle (droit des marques et droit d’auteur) au titre de l’action en contrefaçon fondée sur le Code de la propriété intellectuelle,
• le droit de la responsabilité civile (parasitisme et concurrence déloyale fondés sur l’article 1240 du Code civil),
• le droit de la consommation (pratiques commerciales trompeuses),
• mais aussi des textes plus spécifiques tels que la protection des droits d’exploitation des fédérations sportives et des organisateurs de manifestations sportives prévue par l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, qui confère aux organisateurs de manifestations sportives un monopole d’exploitation.

Sur ces fondements, ont par exemple été sanctionnées les pratiques d’ambush marketing suivantes :

• L’exploitation d’une compétition de tennis et l’utilisation, pendant l’évènement sportif, de la marque associée à celui-ci : L’organisation de paris en ligne portant sur le tournoi de Roland Garros, utilisant le signe protégé et la marque Roland Garros pour viser les matchs sur lesquels les paris étaient organisés. L’exploitation illicite de la compétition sportive est sanctionnée à hauteur de 400 000 euros sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, la Fédération française de tennis étant seule propriétaire du droit d’exploitation de Roland Garros. L’utilisation de la marque est également sanctionnée au titre de la contrefaçon (à hauteur de 300 000 euros) et du parasitisme (à hauteur de 500 000 euros) (CA Paris, 14 oct. 2009, n° 08/19179).
• Une campagne publicitaire réalisée pendant un festival de cinéma reproduisant la marque déposée de l’évènement : L’organisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, d’une opération de communication digitale par une marque de cosmétique à travers la publication de vidéos sur ses réseaux sociaux, sur certains plans desquelles était visible l’affiche officielle du festival de Cannes, l’une d’elles reproduisant la marque déposée de la palme d’or. Sanctionnée sur les fondements de la contrefaçon de droits d’auteur et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (TJ Paris, 11 déc. 2020, n° 19/08543).
• Une campagne publicitaire visant à se voir attribuer à tort la qualité de partenaire officiel d’un évènement : L’utilisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, du slogan « coiffeur officiel des femmes » associé aux expressions « Cannes » et « Festival de Cannes », laissant faussement croire au public que l’entreprise était partenaire officiel du festival. Sanctionnée sur le fondement de la concurrence déloyale et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (CA Paris, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912).

Ces sanctions pécuniaires peuvent se cumuler avec des injonctions de cessation des pratiques et/ou des mesures de publication dans la presse, sous astreinte.

La protection spécifique des marques de la FIFA

À la différence des Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024, qui bénéficiaient d’une loi française spécifique en tant que pays hôte (loi n° 2018-202 du 26 mars 2018 relative à l’organisation des Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024) et réservant notamment les espaces publicitaires à proximité des sites de compétition aux seuls partenaires officiels, la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 ne se tenant pas sur le territoire français, aucun dispositif légal français équivalent n’est applicable. La protection des partenaires et sponsors officiels repose donc sur le droit commun, mais elle n’en est pas moins solide.

La FIFA a constitué un portefeuille très étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier, protégées en France par les dispositions du Code de la propriété intellectuelle. Ces marques comprennent notamment la marque verbale et figurative FIFA®, les marques FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, ainsi que l’emblème officiel de la compétition (combinant le trophée et le chiffre 26), le slogan officiel « We Are 26™ » / « Nous Sommes 26™ », les logos des seize villes hôtes, et la police typographique officielle « FWC 26 », protégée par le droit d’auteur. Seuls les détenteurs de droits de la FIFA, c’est-à-dire les Partenaires FIFA (au premier rang desquels figurent Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways et Visa), les Sponsors Plus, les Sponsors officiels et les Supporters régionaux, sont autorisés à utiliser à des fins commerciales cette propriété intellectuelle officielle.

La FIFA a publié des directives relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, qui précisent en détail les usages autorisés et interdits des marques et logos liés à la Coupe du Monde 2026. Selon ces directives, sont notamment prohibés, sans autorisation, toute utilisation des marques officielles dans une publicité commerciale ; l’intégration de la propriété intellectuelle officielle dans un nom commercial ou un nom de domaine ; l’organisation de concours ou jeux-concours créant une association avec la compétition ; l’utilisation des marques officielles pour décorer un magasin ; et l’usage par un compte professionnel de hashtags officiels dans un but commercial. Ces directives précisent en outre que la protection s’étend non seulement à la reproduction à l’identique des marques officielles, mais également à leurs variantes dont la similitude peut prêter à confusion. Cette protection rappelée par les lignes directrices est en cohérence avec la protection élargie accordée aux marques notoires en droit français par l’article L.713-5 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle.

Les leçons des JO de Paris 2024 : quels risques pour les marques ?

Les Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024 ont donné lieu à un contentieux abondant qui éclaire concrètement les risques auxquels s’exposent les entreprises tentées par l’ambush marketing lors d’un évènement sportif majeur. Si ces décisions ont été rendues dans le contexte spécifique des JO, pendant lesquels protections légales spécifiques renforcées s’appliquaient, elles constituent néanmoins un avertissement direct pour les marques qui envisageraient des stratégies similaires lors de la Coupe du Monde, sur le fondement du droit commun.

• L’utilisation de symboles officiels sur des supports physiques itinérants : Pendant les JO de Paris 2024, une société chinoise du secteur laitier avait fait circuler dans Paris des bus arborant les anneaux olympiques associés à ses propres marques, tout en se présentant comme « la seule société laitière chinoise présente à Paris 2024 ». La Cour d’appel de Paris a confirmé tant le parasitisme que la contrefaçon de marque, et condamné les sociétés concernées, en référé, au paiement d’une provision de 20 000 euros, assortie d’une astreinte de 20 000 euros par jour et par infraction constatée, visant à faire cesser la diffusion des publicités (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 2, 21 nov. 2025, n° 24/15283 ; TJ Paris, ordonnance de référé du 8 août 2024, 24/55463).
• La retransmission non autorisée de compétitions : Le tribunal judiciaire de Paris a ordonné en référé, pendant les JO, la cessation immédiate de la diffusion de compétitions olympiques par une plateforme de streaming ne disposant pas des droits médias correspondants, sous astreinte de 1 500 euros par infraction constatée, 3 000 euros par jour pour les distributions continues et 5 000 euros par jour pour défaut de retrait (TJ Paris, réf., 18 sept. 2024, n° 24/53019). Ainsi, toute plateforme retransmettant des matchs de la Coupe du Monde sans détenir les droits cédés par la FIFA s’expose à des mesures d’urgence immédiates, sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport.
• La protection élargie de la marque notoire : La Cour de cassation a confirmé que la protection des marques olympiques s’étendait au-delà de la reproduction stricto sensu : il suffit que la marque soit évoquée ou suggérée, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de démontrer un risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public. Cette solution, fondée sur l’article L.713-5 du code de la propriété intellectuelle, s’est appliquée à un bar ayant utilisé les anneaux olympiques sur ses sous-bocks pour promouvoir ses soirées de retransmission (Cass. crim., 17 janv. 2017, n° 15-86.363). Les marques de la FIFA étant tout aussi notoires sur le plan mondial, le même régime protecteur leur est applicable : une simple évocation des marques officielles, même sans reproduction littérale, pourra caractériser une atteinte sanctionnable.

Certaines opérations marketing peuvent échapper à toute sanction

L’analyse de la jurisprudence et des pratiques promotionnelles permet néanmoins de comprendre les contours de certaines pratiques publicitaires qui pourraient être autorisées (non sanctionnées par les textes susmentionnés), sous réserve qu’elles soient préparées et présentées avec habileté. En voici quelques exemples.

Communication sur un ton décalé ou humoristique : Une approche décalée, voire humoristique, peut permettre d’échapper aux sanctions susvisées.

• Ainsi, la marque de chips Vico du groupe Intersnack avait lancé en 2016 une campagne promotionnelle autour du slogan « Vico, partenaire des supporters à domicile ».
• La société irlandaise Paddy Power avait pour sa part parrainé une course de l’œuf dans la cuiller à « London », village de Bourgogne, pour afficher à Londres pendant les JO de 2012 le slogan : « Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year ! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is) ». Le comité d’organisation des JO avait échoué à faire cesser cette campagne. Humour anglais …
• Le groupe Heineken avait quant à lui commercialisé pendant l’Euro 2016, dont Carlsberg était le sponsor officiel, une gamme de bouteilles aux couleurs des drapeaux de 21 pays ayant « marqué son histoire », parmi lesquels une majorité de participants à la compétition.

Communication d’une donnée informative à titre publicitaire : A été jugé licite l’utilisation de résultats d’un match de rugby et l’annonce d’un prochain match dans un journal pour la promotion d’un véhicule automobile, la publicité indiquant : « France 13 Angleterre 24 – la Fiat 500 félicite l’Angleterre pour sa victoire et donne rendez-vous à l’équipe de France le 9 mars pour France-Italie ». Les juges ont considéré que cette publication « se borne à reproduire un résultat sportif d’actualité, acquis et rendu public en première page du journal d’information sportive, et à faire état d’une rencontre future également connue comme déjà annoncée par le journal dans un article d’information » (Cass. com., 20 mai 2014, n° 13-12.102).

Sponsoring de joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde : Toute société peut conclure des partenariats avec des joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA, par exemple en leur fournissant des équipements ou des vêtements portant son logo. Les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle précisent expressément qu’elles « ne contiennent aucune affirmation relative à des droits détenus par des tierces parties telles que les joueurs, clubs, associations membres [ou] confédérations ». Les directives de la FIFA confirment par ailleurs explicitement que les images génériques liées au football, aux équipes nationales ou aux drapeaux de pays n’entrent pas dans la propriété intellectuelle officielle. La prudence s’impose néanmoins : le partenariat ne doit pas créer l’impression d’une association commerciale avec la FIFA ou la compétition, ni utiliser les marques officielles de la FIFA.

L’approche combinée juridique et marketing dans la conception et la préparation du message d’une telle opération de communication est essentielle pour éviter des poursuites judiciaires, notamment sur le fondement du parasitisme. Certaines campagnes publicitaires peuvent donc légitimement être envisagées, notamment quand elles sont astucieuses.

Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

What the EU decision does (and does not) do

The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

How different payment types are affected in practice

Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

Country notes (alphabetical)

Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

Practical next steps for EU companies

1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

En droit français, les franchiseurs et les distributeurs sont soumis à deux types d’obligations précontractuelles d’information : chaque partie doit spontanément informer son futur partenaire de toute information qu’elle sait déterminante pour son consentement. De plus, pour certains contrats — notamment le contrat de franchise — il existe une obligation de communiquer un nombre limité d’informations dans un document dédié. Ces obligations précontractuelles sont d’ordre public. Ainsi, ces deux obligations s’appliquent simultanément au franchiseur, au distributeur ou au concessionnaire lors de la négociation d’un contrat avec un partenaire.

Points clés à retenir

• Les informations requises par le DIP doivent être intégralement renseignées et actualisées ;
• Les informations non exigées par le DIP mais communiquées par le franchiseur doivent être soigneusement sélectionnées et sincères ;
• Le franchisé doit avoir la possibilité de solliciter des informations complémentaires auprès du franchiseur ;
• L’expérience du franchisé dans le secteur économique concerné permet au franchiseur de limiter considérablement son exposition au risque de nullité du contrat pour vice du consentement ;
• Le franchiseur doit conserver la preuve de la remise effective des informations précontractuelles, qu’elles soient obligatoires ou non.
• L’obligation générale d’information de droit commun (article 1112-1 du Code civil) peut s’appliquer concurremment avec l’obligation spéciale prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce.

Obligation générale d’information applicable à tous les contractants

Quelle est l’étendue de cette obligation précontractuelle d’information ?

Cette obligation s’impose à tous les cocontractants, pour tout type de contrat. En effet, l’article 1112-1 du Code civil dispose que :

(§. 1) Celle des parties qui connaît une information dont l’importance est déterminante pour le consentement de l’autre doit l’en informer dès lors que, légitimement, cette dernière ignore cette information ou fait confiance à son cocontractant.

(§. 3) Ont une importance déterminante les informations qui ont un lien direct et nécessaire avec le contenu du contrat ou la qualité des parties.

Cette obligation s’applique à toutes les parties contractantes, pour tout type de contrat.

La jurisprudence s’est prononcée sur la question du cumul de cette obligation de droit commun, avec l’obligation spéciale d’information prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce (cf infra), en répondant par la positive (CA Paris, 27 mars 2024, n° 22/12665). Le périmètre de cette dernière a toutefois été circonscrit par la Cour de cassation : seules les informations présentant un lien direct et nécessaire avec l’objet du contrat ou la qualité des parties sont soumises à obligation de communication (Cass. com., 14 mai 2025, n° 23-17.948).

À qui incombe la charge de la preuve?

La charge de la preuve repose sur celui qui soutient que l’information lui était due. Il doit alors démontrer (i) que l’autre partie lui devait cette information, mais (ii) ne la lui a pas fournie (article 1112-1 (§. 4) du Code civil).

Obligation spéciale d’information applicable aux contrats de franchise et de distribution

Quels contrats sont soumis à cette règle particulière?

Le droit français impose (art. L. 330-3 du Code de commerce) la communication d’un document d’information précontractuelle (« DIP ») ainsi que du projet de contrat, par toute personne :

• qui accorde à une autre personne le droit d’utiliser une marque, une enseigne ou un nom commercial,
• tout en exigeant un engagement exclusif ou quasi-exclusif pour l’exercice de son activité (par exemple, une obligation d’achat exclusif). Le caractère quasi-exclusif fait l’objet d’une appréciation casuistique par les juges français, indépendamment du seuil de 80% des achats prévu par le règlement UE 2022/720, qui n’est utilisé que comme un repère indicatif.

Concrètement, le DIP doit être remis, par exemple, au franchisé, au distributeur, au concessionnaire ou au licencié de marque, par son franchiseur, fournisseur ou concédant, dès lors que les deux conditions précitées sont réunies. Récemment la jurisprudence française a d’ailleurs eu l’occasion de rappeler que le champ d’application du DIP ne se limitait pas à la franchise, mais également et notamment, au contrat de concession, dès lors que les conditions précitées sont réunies (CA Paris, 22 mai 2024, n° 22/08672).

À quel moment le DIP doit-il être remis?

Le DIP et le projet de contrat doivent être communiqués au moins 20 jours avant la signature du contrat, et, le cas échéant, avant le paiement de toute somme exigée préalablement à la signature (notamment en cas de réservation).

Quelles informations doivent figurer dans le DIP?

L’article R. 330-1 du Code de commerce impose que le DIP mentionne les informations suivantes (liste non exhaustive) relatives :

• Au franchiseur (identité et expérience des dirigeants, parcours professionnel, etc.) ;
• À l’activité du franchiseur (notamment la date de création, le siège social, les références bancaires, l’historique du développement de l’enseigne, les comptes annuels, etc.) ;
• Au réseau (liste des membres avec indication de la date de signature des contrats, liste des établissements proposant les mêmes produits ou services dans la zone d’activité envisagée, nombre de membres ayant quitté le réseau au cours de l’année précédant la remise du DIP avec indication des motifs de départ, etc.) ;
• À la marque concédée (date d’enregistrement, titularité et conditions d’exploitation) ;
• À l’état général du marché (relatif aux produits ou services visés par le contrat) et à l’état local du marché (relatif à la zone d’activité envisagée), ainsi qu’aux facteurs de concurrence et aux perspectives de développement. La Cour de cassation a jugé, s’agissant du marché local, que le franchiseur n’était pas tenu de réaliser une étude de marché, mais que s’il en fournit une, celle-ci doit être exacte et vérifiable (Cass. com., 18 oct. 2023, n° 22-19.329).
• Aux éléments essentiels du projet de contrat, et notamment : sa durée, les conditions de renouvellement, de résiliation et de cession, ainsi que l’étendue des exclusivités accordées ;
• Aux obligations financières pesant sur le cocontractant : nature et montant des dépenses et investissements à engager avant le démarrage de l’activité (droit d’entrée, frais d’installation, etc.).

Au-delà de comporter l’ensemble des informations mentionnées par l’article précité, le DIP doit répondre à une exigence qualitative. En effet toutes les informations communiquées, y compris celles transmises spontanément, doivent être exactes et sincères, afin de garantir un consentement éclairé et exempt de tout vice de la part du candidat à l’entrée dans le réseau.

Comment prouver la remise des informations?

La charge de la preuve de la remise du DIP incombe au débiteur de cette obligation : le franchiseur (Cass. com., 7 juillet 2004, n° 02-15.950). L’idéal pour le franchiseur est de faire signer et dater le DIP par le franchisé le jour de sa remise et d’en conserver la preuve.

La clause contractuelle par laquelle le franchisé reconnaît avoir reçu un DIP complet ne constitue pas une preuve suffisante de la remise effective d’un DIP complet (Cass. com., 10 janvier 2018, n° 15-25.287).

Le franchiseur est-il tenu d’une obligation d’actualisation du DIP jusqu’à la signature du contrat

Dans un arrêt du 26 juin 2024 (n°23-1 14.085 PB) la Cour de cassation retient que la conformité formelle du DIP à la date de sa remise ne suffit pas à exonérer le franchiseur de toute responsabilité précontractuelle. Cette solution est confirmée par un arrêt du 4 décembre 2024 (n° 23-16.684).

Ces deux décisions semblent consacrer une obligation d’actualisation du DIP pesant sur la tête de réseau durant toute la période séparant la remise du document de la conclusion du contrat. Lorsque des événements significatifs surviennent dans cet intervalle (procédure collective affectant des membres du réseau, contentieux majeur, modification structurelle du réseau) la tête de réseau est tenue d’en informer spontanément le candidat. Le juge examine alors si le manquement à cette obligation était susceptible d’altérer l’appréciation que le candidat pouvait avoir du réseau et, partant, de vicier son consentement (Cass. com., 26 juin 2024, op. cit.). Le franchiseur ne saurait donc se retrancher derrière la régularité initiale du DIP pour s’affranchir de son devoir d’information dès lors que la situation du réseau a évolué de manière significative avant la signature du contrat.

Sanctions en cas de manquement aux obligations précontractuelles d’information

Sanction pénale

Le non-respect des obligations relatives au DIP peut exposer le franchiseur ou le fournisseur à une amende pénale pouvant aller jusqu’à 1 500 euros, portée à 3 000 euros en cas de récidive, le montant étant multiplié par cinq pour les personnes morales (article R. 330-2 du Code de commerce).

Nullité du contrat pour dol

Le contrat peut être annulé en cas de manquement à l’article 1112-1 ou à l’article L. 330-3. Dans les deux cas, le non-respect de l’obligation d’information n’est sanctionné que si le demandeur démontre que son consentement a été vicié par l’erreur, le dol ou la violence. Le juge procède à une appréciation in concreto, tenant compte notamment de l’expérience professionnelle et des diligences personnelles du distributeur : un candidat averti aura plus de difficultés à caractériser un dol, et son expérience dans le secteur concerné peut suffire à exonérer le franchiseur (CA Paris, pôle 5 – ch. 11, 26 avr. 2024, n° 21/13205), quand bien même les informations communiquées lacunaires ou inexactes (CA Paris, 20 janv. 2021, n° 19/03382).

Le cas échéant, les parties doivent être remises dans l’état antérieur à la conclusion du contrat.

S’agissant des éléments constitutifs du dol, les tribunaux en apprécient strictement les deux conditions:

• (Un élément matériel) l’existence d’un mensonge ou d’une réticence dolosive (article 1137 du Code civil) ;
• Et (un élément intentionnel) l’intention de tromper son cocontractant (article 1130 du Code civil).

Dommages et intérêts

Bien que les demandes en nullité soient soumises à des conditions très strictes, les franchisés et distributeurs peuvent alternativement obtenir des dommages et intérêts sur le fondement de la responsabilité délictuelle pour manquement à l’obligation précontractuelle d’information, sous réserve de démontrer une faute (information incomplète ou erronée), un préjudice indemnisable (celui-ci se limite à la perte de chance de ne pas contracter ou de contracter à des conditions plus avantageuses – voir en ce sens : Cass. com., 15 mars 2017, n° 15-16.406) et le lien de causalité entre les deux.

From Reporting to Governance and Risk Allocation

Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) considerations are playing an increasingly influential role in how businesses operate, invest, and manage risk, especially within the European Union, where corporate sustainability and responsibility regulation have been on the agenda in recent years.

With the adoption of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), many companies anticipated a significant shift in compliance. Since then, the EU has introduced simplification measures to streamline reporting and due diligence obligations, reduce the administrative burden, and improve proportionality, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while maintaining the core sustainability objectives.

While opinions may differ regarding the evolution of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) in EU regulation and the subsequent postponements of reporting obligations, regulatory developments appear to have, in practice, supported a shift in perspective. Sustainability is no longer viewed solely as a reporting requirement, but increasingly as a matter of governance, strategy, and risk allocation. This development is welcome, as the regulatory framework’s underlying objective is to advance the green transition, which in turn requires a change in how companies integrate sustainability into their decision-making and operations.

This focus on sustainability influences businesses of all sizes, including SMEs. Even companies not directly subject to the CSRD or CSDDD anticipate that ESG requirements will be passed down through the supply chain. Many non-reporting SMEs are already embedding sustainability practices, and this trend is likely to continue. In other words, sustainability policies are already affecting companies well before any formal reporting obligations kick in.

Environmental, Social, and Governance in Contract Architecture

One of the key means of implementing environmental, social, and governance obligations and objectives in day-to-day business operations is through commercial contracts and the requirements and commitments embedded in them.

Even where a company itself is not directly subject to extensive reporting or due diligence obligations, corporate sustainability and responsibility expectations flow through the market via contractual relationships. Larger undertakings within the scope of CSRD and, in due course, the CSDDD require contractual assurances, information rights, and cooperation from their business partners, including SMEs operating within their supply chains. As a result, corporate sustainability and responsibility become a question of contractual architecture. Companies must consider not only price mechanisms, liability caps and termination triggers, but also how environmental, social and governance risks and obligations are addressed and allocated between the parties through legally enforceable contractual terms.

Translating Policies into Binding Obligations

A typical starting point is the incorporation of a code of conduct or sustainability policies into commercial contracts, often by reference and through an express obligation on the contracting party to comply with them. From a legal standpoint, this raises important drafting questions. Many codes are drafted as high-level public statements. When such policies are converted into contractual commitments, their wording, scope, and hierarchy relative to the main agreement require careful consideration. The obligations must be sufficiently clear to define the parties’ expectations, coherent with other contractual provisions, and proportionate to the commercial relationship. The obligations must also be capable of practical implementation and effective monitoring in the context of the agreement.

In practical terms, this may mean requiring the supplier to comply with specific labour standards, maintain documented environmental management procedures, report on emissions data, ensure traceability of key raw materials, or allow reasonable access for audits. Clearly defining what is expected, how compliance is demonstrated, and what consequences follow from non-compliance is essential for the clause to function effectively. Otherwise, clauses that appear comprehensive in theory and ambitious in scope may offer limited enforceability in practice, and their impact may remain marginal if compliance cannot be effectively monitored and verified. If policies are not properly translated into binding and operational obligations, the company risks a mismatch between what it promises publicly and what is actually required under its contracts. This may undermine consistency, weaken risk management, and expose the company to reputational and governance risks if its own stated principles cannot be enforced within its supply or distribution chain.

As part of this process, companies must also consider the protection of trade secrets and confidential information. For example, broad audit or data-reporting obligations may raise concerns about sensitive business information. Contractual terms should balance transparency with the need to protect legitimately proprietary data. Clauses such as confidentiality agreements or carve-outs for trade secrets can be used to ensure that sharing ESG-related information does not compromise confidential business information or competitive advantages.

Environmental, Social and Governance Clauses Across Different Contract Types

Besides codes of conduct and sustainability policies, environmental, social and governance-related clauses increasingly take more tailored and transaction-specific forms. In shareholder agreements, sustainability objectives may be reflected in governance structures or even linked to financial outcomes, for example by aligning dividend policies or incentive mechanisms with agreed climate targets. In employment contracts, obligations may extend beyond general compliance and include participation in corporate sustainability training programmes or adherence to internal sustainability guidelines as part of performance expectations.

In supply and manufacturing agreements, environmental, social and governance provisions may address traceability of raw materials, emissions reporting, waste management, energy efficiency standards or the right to replace a supplier if its environmental practices materially conflict with the contracting party’s sustainability commitments. Such contractual mechanisms increasingly affect SMEs operating as suppliers, as ESG expectations pass through the supply chain.

Construction contracts often include detailed requirements regarding material selection, lifecycle impacts, carbon footprint calculations and recycling or waste reduction procedures. For example, in Finland, legislation imposes low-carbon and energy efficiency requirements for new buildings, and a party undertaking a construction project is subject to mandatory reporting obligations relating to construction and demolition waste. These statutory requirements are typically reflected and implemented in the relevant project and construction contracts.

Across these different contract types, the practical significance is consistent. Environmental, social and governance considerations move from the level of general policy into legally enforceable obligations tailored to each specific legal relationship. Contracts function as a mechanism for allocating responsibility, managing compliance risk and aligning commercial incentives with sustainability objectives.

Proportionate Monitoring and Audit Rights

In the contractual implementation and monitoring of environmental, social and governance obligations, audit and information rights play a central role. They are closely linked to effective oversight and form an integral part of a coherent contractual framework. In practice, companies typically seek access to relevant data from their business partners and, where appropriate, establish inspection or audit rights to enable meaningful monitoring and verification, whether conducted directly by the company or, commonly, by an independent expert appointed for that purpose.

However, such arrangements must remain balanced. Overly burdensome provisions may needlessly disrupt day-to-day operations and reduce the willingness to cooperate, particularly for SMEs with limited administrative capacity. By contrast, well-designed mechanisms that balance transparency with confidentiality and operational feasibility are more defensible and more likely to function effectively in practice.

Contractual Remedies

As a general principle, the consequences of a breach are determined by the terms agreed between the parties. In practice, the parties will typically first seek to resolve the matter through discussion and good faith negotiations, allowing the non-compliant party an opportunity to clarify the situation and implement corrective actions within a reasonable timeframe. If negotiations do not lead to a resolution, it may be appropriate to proceed to stronger measures, such as contractual penalties, indemnification obligations, price adjustments, temporary suspension rights or other agreed sanctions, applied in light of the nature and severity of the breach.

The contract should clearly define what constitutes a breach, how it is assessed and what remedies are available in each scenario. Clear and proportionate step-by-step remedy structures enhance legal certainty, reduce the risk of disputes and ensure that material or repeated breaches may trigger more significant consequences, including termination where justified.

Strategic and Voluntary Environmental, Social and Governance Commitments

In the current EU landscape, implementing ESG considerations in commercial contracts is no longer simply a matter of reacting to directives. It is a broader exercise in risk management and corporate governance. Even as the implementation details of the directives may continue to evolve, market expectations, financing conditions and reputational considerations remain key drivers of sustainability integration.

In addition, some companies choose to position themselves as frontrunners in sustainability for strategic and reputational reasons. They may therefore incorporate voluntary environmental, social and governance mechanisms and requirements into their contracts that go beyond, or are not directly derived from, binding directives. By doing so, they signal to investors, customers and other stakeholders that sustainability is treated as a core business priority rather than merely a compliance obligation.

At the same time, it is important to recognise the practical limits of such commitments. Ambitious sustainability requirements may be more challenging for SMEs with limited financial and administrative resources. Meeting extensive reporting, certification or traceability standards can require investments in systems, personnel and external expertise. If contractual expectations are not calibrated to the size and capacity of the counterparty, they may limit the ability of SMEs to participate in certain supply chains. A balanced and proportionate approach helps ensure that sustainability objectives remain achievable and commercially workable across the contractual chain.

Conclusion

For legal practitioners, the central task is not to increase the number of environmental, social and governance clauses as such, but to ensure their quality, coherence and practical relevance. The objective is to design contractual mechanisms that are proportionate, enforceable and aligned with the company’s actual risk profile, industry context and sustainability priorities. Commercial contracts remain one of the most concrete tools for translating sustainability strategy into operational practice. Moreover, every contract lawyer should understand and apply key sustainability principles in their work, ensuring that ESG commitments become integral to legal advice and contract drafting.

The Strait of Hormuz is likely the most strategically important point for the global oil trade. In fact, approximately 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through this narrow passage between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf every day.

Following the outbreak of war in the region, the impact on energy markets was almost immediate: oil prices quickly rose above $100 per barrel, and it is unclear how high they may climb in the coming weeks and months. As a result, transportation, production, and procurement costs are rising across industrial supply chains in many sectors.

For many companies engaged in international trade, this phenomenon creates a very real problem. Contracts signed months (or years) earlier—perhaps at a fixed price—must be fulfilled in a completely different economic context.

A manufacturer that sells goods for delivery in six or twelve months may find itself producing and shipping at much higher energy costs, while the price agreed upon with the customer remains unchanged.

This is a situation that recurs cyclically, for various reasons: from the COVID-19 pandemic to the subsequent raw materials crisis, and on to current geopolitical tensions.

When the increase in costs is so sudden and significant, a question inevitably arises: must the contract still be performed under the original terms, or is it possible to suspend or renegotiate the agreement to adapt it to the new circumstances?

The answer depends on several factors: first and foremost, on what the parties have (or have not) provided for in the contract, but also on the law applicable to the relationship and on the interpretation that judges or arbitrators may give to the rules in the event of a dispute.

Force Majeure and Hardship: Two Different Concepts

When extraordinary events occur—such as a war, an energy crisis, or the disruption of a trade route—many operators immediately invoke force majeure. However, in most cases, these situations fall instead under the category of hardship.

It is therefore essential to distinguish between these two situations.

When an Event Constitutes Force Majeure

Force majeure applies to cases where an extraordinary and unforeseeable event makes it impossible to perform the contract.

The characteristics of the grounds for exemption from liability depend on the law applicable to the commercial relationship, but generally require:

• unpredictability of the event;
• the event being beyond the affected party’s control;
• the impossibility of avoiding or overcoming the event through reasonable efforts.

Typical examples include:

• orders from authorities requiring the suspension of production
• embargoes or export bans
• logistical disruptions caused by war

In these situations, performance is not merely more costly: it becomes objectively impossible. The consequence is that the party unable to perform is generally exempt from liability for the duration of the event.

Hardship

The situation is different when performance of the contract remains possible but becomes economically much more burdensome.

The concept of hardship is generally based on four prerequisites:

1. an event occurring after the conclusion of the contract
2. unpredictability and extraordinary nature of the event
3. a substantial alteration of the economic balance of the contract
4. excessive burden of performance, but not impossibility

A sharp increase in the price of oil, gas, or other raw materials often falls into this category.

Goods can be produced and delivered, but doing so may entail costs far higher than those anticipated when the contract was signed.

The ripple effect along the international supply chain

In global industrial supply chains, the same goods are often the subject of a series of consecutive contracts.

The manufacturer sells to a trader, who sells to a processing company, which resells to an importer in another country, who in turn distributes the product to the end market.

When a hardship event occurs—such as a sharp rise in energy prices—the effect tends to ripple throughout the entire supply chain.

The first party affected by the cost increase will try to pass the increase on to its contractual counterpart, who, in turn, will find themselves in the same situation with the next link in the chain.

The risk is clear: one of the operators in the middle of the chain may face increased upstream costs without being able to pass them on downstream.

This is one of the most common problems in international supply chains.

What happens if there is no clause regarding price fluctuations

In commercial practice, it often happens that parties operate on the basis of orders and order confirmations without a formal written contract, or that a contract exists but contains no provisions regarding price fluctuations or hardship.

In such cases, when costs increase sharply, it is necessary to determine which law applies to individual sales contracts across the supply chain.

This can lead to very different situations:

• one law may allow for price revision or termination of the contract
• another law aplicable to a second contract may not provide for equivalent remedies
• a third contract may contain much more restrictive contractual clauses

The practical result is that an operator in the middle of the chain may face a price increase from their supplier without being able to pass it on to the customer.

A Common Legal Framework: The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG)

Fortunately, many international sales contracts are governed by the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).

The convention has been ratified by 97 countries, including Italy and most major trading partners, such as the U.S., Canada, China, Germany, France, Spain, etc.

The central provision is Article 79, according to which a party is not liable for non-performance if it proves that the non-performance is due to an impediment:

• beyond its control
• unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract
• unavoidable or insurmountable

Traditionally, this provision has been applied to cases of force majeure.

In recent years, there has been debate over whether it can also be applied to cases of hardship, but international case law tends to be very cautious.

International case law on Hardship

Court decisions reflect a rather strict approach.

In some cases, even very significant increases in raw material costs have not been considered sufficient to modify or suspend the contract.

The reasoning is simple: those who operate professionally in international trade must take into account a certain degree of market volatility.

Only when the increase in costs exceeds an exceptional and unforeseeable level such as to radically alter the balance of the contract can hardship be invoked.

One of the most frequently cited cases is the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision in the Scafom case, which recognized the right to renegotiate the contract following a 70% increase in the price of steel.

However, such cases are relatively rare.

Generic clauses that serve no purpose

Many contracts contain hardship clauses copied from standard templates (boilerplate).

The problem is that these clauses often:

• list the effects of hardship
• but do not define when hardship actually occurs

The result is that, when prices rise, the parties may have very different opinions on what constitutes an “exceptional” increase and whether the event in question was “unforeseeable” or not.

The clause, therefore, does not resolve the issue, but defers it to discussion between the parties and, in the event of a failure to reach an agreement, to the courts or arbitrators.

What criteria can define a hardship situation

To make the clause truly effective, it is useful to establish objective parameters.

Among the most commonly used in international contracts:

• an increase or decrease in the price of a raw material beyond a certain threshold (±20% or ±30%)
• an increase in transportation or logistics costs within certain limits;
• significant fluctuations in the exchange rate beyond a specified range;
• the introduction of tariffs or trade restrictions

These parameters, linked to tolerance ranges, allow the parties to quickly and unambiguously identify a hardship event.

Remedies in the Event of Hardship

An effective clause should also address how to handle the situation.

The most common solutions are:

• renegotiation of the contract in good faith
• apply an automatic price adjustment
• appointment of an independent third-party expert to determine the new price
• temporary suspension of the contract
• right of withdrawal if no agreement is reached

These tools allow the parties to manage the crisis without resorting to litigation.

Audit of existing contracts: what to do now

At this point, the practical question becomes: how should we manage the issue in existing business relationships?

The first step is to conduct an audit of existing contracts with suppliers and customers.

1. Introduce comprehensive contracts in new relationships

If the relationships are governed solely by purchase orders and order confirmations, it is advisable to take this opportunity to draft comprehensive international sales contracts that include:

• a hardship clause
• warranty provisions
• remedies for breach
• limitations of liability

2. Update existing contracts

If the relationship is already governed by a contract, you should check whether a hardship clause exists.

If not, it may be useful to propose to the other party:

• a new contract, or
• a contract addendum dedicated to managing price fluctuations.

This helps prevent future conflicts and provides both parties with an effective tool to manage potential price shocks along the supply chain.

Conclusion

Commodity and energy crises demonstrate how exposed international contracts are to sudden changes in economic conditions. When a contract does not clearly address hardship management, the risk does not disappear; it simply shifts along the supply chain until it settles on the weakest link.

For this reason, companies operating within international supply chains should view the hardship clause as a strategic tool for managing contractual risk. A well-drafted contract does not eliminate market volatility, but it allows the parties to address it with clear rules, reducing uncertainty and preventing disputes.

Executive Summary

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) remains one of the most ambitious integration projects in the world. Yet, several years into its operational phase, it has not (yet) delivered the structural shift many expected. A recent analysis underscores the gap between political momentum and economic reality: implementation remains uneven, the agreement is still used by only a portion of participating states, and non-tariff barriers and infrastructure deficits continue to dominate the cost of doing business across borders.  For Egypt, the opportunity is still real — but it depends less on treaty headlines and more on enabling conditions: trade logistics, customs efficiency, regulatory convergence, and competitive industrial capacity. 

Looking Back: The Promise of a Single African Market

When the AfCFTA was launched, expectations were understandably high. A continent-wide trade framework was supposed to reduce tariffs, facilitate trade in goods and services, and strengthen regional value chains — with the broader goal of moving African economies up the value ladder.

In my 2022 article, I asked whether AfCFTA could become a game changer for Egypt, given Egypt’s industrial base, strategic geography, and the potential to diversify export markets beyond traditional partners. (For background, see the earlier article here”).

The Reality Check: Intra-African Trade Remains Structurally Weak

Several years later, the interim assessment is sobering. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) recently put it, AfCFTA is not a “game changer” yet, and only about half of member states currently meet the practical prerequisites to trade under the agreement.

A deeper reason is structural: no other world region trades so little with itself, and while statistics may undercount informal cross-border flows (especially in food), the overall picture remains unchanged.

Trade integration cannot deliver transformative outcomes if production, logistics, and institutions do not support scale.

Implementation Has Been Slow — and Often Symbolic

Operationalisation did not start with full-scale liberalisation. Instead, the AfCFTA began with a pilot approach: the Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) launched in October 2022, initially with eight states, later joined by additional countries, including Nigeria and South Africa by spring 2025.

The GTI created valuable learning effects, but it also underlined a key point: early progress was often presented through symbolic deals, while product coverage and volumes remained limited. FAZ highlights that only selected goods could be traded duty-free and that key sectors remained constrained for a long time due to missing or unresolved technical rules.

A pilot, however, cannot substitute for full operational certainty — the kind businesses need to restructure supply chains and invest.

Tariffs Are Not the Main Barrier — Trade Costs Are

AfCFTA is frequently discussed in terms of tariff liberalisation. Yet, evidence suggests that the largest gains do not come from tariffs but from reducing non-tariff barriers and improving trade infrastructure.

FAZ points to a central reality: tariffs tend to add around 20–30% to intra-African trade costs, whereas non-tariff costs can be far higher — driven by bureaucracy, lack of harmonised standards, inefficient border processes, and transport barriers.

This is the crux: even with reduced tariffs, trade will not expand meaningfully if goods still cannot move cheaply, quickly, and predictably.

Integration Complexity and Distributional Politics

Africa’s integration landscape is shaped by multiple overlapping regional economic communities and trade regimes. This creates legal and administrative complexity — often described as an integration “spaghetti bowl.” FAZ notes the challenge of coordination and the continued fragmentation of rules.

There is also a political economy dimension. Intra-African trade is heavily influenced by a small number of larger economies — and the distribution of benefits matters. FAZ highlights the dominance of major players (notably South Africa) and the concern that tariff liberalisation alone may entrench existing industrial advantages.

Where governments expect asymmetric outcomes, resistance often takes the form of delay, narrow implementation, or persistent non-tariff barriers.

What This Means for Egypt: The Opportunity Is Real — But Conditional

Egypt’s strategic case for AfCFTA participation remains strong: industrial potential, geographic location, and the opportunity to access and shape growing markets. But the experience so far suggests that the treaty text alone does not generate trade flows.

For Egypt’s private sector, the decisive factors are practical:

• predictable and efficient customs clearance and border procedures,
• logistics corridors and port efficiency,
• regulatory convergence (standards, certification, compliance),
• stable access to trade finance and payments,
• competitive energy and production conditions for manufacturing and processing.

AfCFTA can support these developments — but it cannot replace them.

The “Game Changer” Pathway: What Must Happen Next

FAZ concludes that AfCFTA will only become truly impactful if it is paired with the fundamentals: major infrastructure investment, stronger production and processing capacity, and a credible industrial policy.

At the same time, Africa faces a classic chicken-and-egg problem: without development there is limited investment appeal; without investment there is limited development.

For Egypt and its partners, a pragmatic strategy would be to:

1. treat AfCFTA as a platform for real trade-cost reduction, not only tariff debates;
2. focus on a limited number of scalable corridors and sectors where regional value chains can realistically grow;
3. strengthen implementation capacity so that preferences become usable for firms — especially SMEs;
4. enhance legal certainty and dispute resolution reliability for cross-border commerce.

Conclusion

AfCFTA remains a landmark achievement in terms of political commitment. But as of today, it has not yet been the “game changer” many hoped for.

For Egypt, the key question is no longer whether AfCFTA is visionary — it is. The question is whether governments and businesses can translate it into lower real trade costs, higher competitiveness, and bankable cross-border transactions. If those enabling conditions improve, AfCFTA’s promise can still become commercial reality.

After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

Why wine matters in this agreement

The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

1. tariff liberalisation;
2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the « Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures » (SPS) and « Technical Barriers to Trade » (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

Geographical indications: protection and tension

One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
2. transition periods for local operators;
3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

Services, distribution, and market structure

Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

1. logistics providers
2. distribution networks
3. commercial representation
4. marketing and advertising agencies

For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

Legal advisors will need to consider:

1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
3. compliance with competition rules

The implementation gap: where risk lies

Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

1. managing client expectations
2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

What should lawyers be doing now?

Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

Final sip

The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

Lors d’évènements de grande ampleur, tels que la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026, certaines entreprises tentent d’associer « sauvagement » leur marque ou image à l’évènement par une pratique d’« ambush marketing » (marketing d’embuscade) définie par la jurisprudence comme une « stratégie publicitaire mise en place par une entreprise afin d’associer son image commerciale à celle d’un événement et donc de profiter de l’impact médiatique dudit événement sans s’acquitter des droits qui y sont relatifs et sans avoir obtenu au préalable l’autorisation de l’organisateur de l’événement » (CA Paris, 2e chambre, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912). Une pratique risquée et sanctionnée, mais parfois envisageable.

Points clés à retenir

• L’ambush marketing est une pratique sanctionnée mais qui n’est pas interdite en soi.
• En contrepartie de leurs investissements dans la compétition, les sponsors et partenaires officiels de la FIFA bénéficient d’une protection juridique très importante, par l’intermédiaire de divers textes généraux (contrefaçon, parasitisme, propriété intellectuelle) ou plus particuliers (droit du sport), contre toutes formes d’ambush marketing.
• La Coupe du Monde de la FIFA fait l’objet d’une protection renforcée fondée sur un portefeuille étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier et sur les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, en l’absence de législation française spécifique comparable à celle instituée pour les Jeux Olympiques.
• Ces droits ne sont pas absolus et il reste néanmoins de minces opportunités permettant une pratique, astucieuse, du marketing d’embuscade.

La protection des sponsors et partenaires officiels de la Coupe du Monde contre l’ambush marketing

Fort d’une audience mondiale de près de 5 milliards de personnes sur l’ensemble des plateformes lors de sa dernière édition au Qatar en 2022 – dont plus de 1,5 milliard pour la seule finale – la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 est l’évènement sportif le plus suivi de la planète. Accueilli pour la première fois par trois pays (Canada, Mexique et États-Unis), il réunit 48 équipes et plus de 1 200 joueurs pour 104 matchs dans 16 stades. Son organisation est financée dans une large mesure par les différents partenaires, sponsors et détenteurs de droits officiels, qui bénéficient en contrepartie d’un droit exclusif d’utilisation des marques et propriétés intellectuelles officielles de la FIFA afin d’y associer leur propre image et signes distinctifs.

La pratique d’ambush marketing n’est pas sanctionnée en tant que telle par le droit français, mais de nombreux textes épars permettent de protéger largement les sponsors et partenaires de manifestations sportives de dimension mondiale contre l’ambush marketing. Ils sont en effet légitimes à pouvoir jouir paisiblement des droits qui leur sont offerts en contrepartie de leurs larges investissements réalisés dans le cadre d’évènements tels que, par exemple, les coupes du monde de football ou de rugby, ou les Jeux Olympiques.

Peuvent notamment être invoqués par les sponsors officiels et par les organisateurs de telles manifestations :

• les protections « classiques » offertes par le droit de la propriété intellectuelle (droit des marques et droit d’auteur) au titre de l’action en contrefaçon fondée sur le Code de la propriété intellectuelle,
• le droit de la responsabilité civile (parasitisme et concurrence déloyale fondés sur l’article 1240 du Code civil),
• le droit de la consommation (pratiques commerciales trompeuses),
• mais aussi des textes plus spécifiques tels que la protection des droits d’exploitation des fédérations sportives et des organisateurs de manifestations sportives prévue par l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, qui confère aux organisateurs de manifestations sportives un monopole d’exploitation.

Sur ces fondements, ont par exemple été sanctionnées les pratiques d’ambush marketing suivantes :

• L’exploitation d’une compétition de tennis et l’utilisation, pendant l’évènement sportif, de la marque associée à celui-ci : L’organisation de paris en ligne portant sur le tournoi de Roland Garros, utilisant le signe protégé et la marque Roland Garros pour viser les matchs sur lesquels les paris étaient organisés. L’exploitation illicite de la compétition sportive est sanctionnée à hauteur de 400 000 euros sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, la Fédération française de tennis étant seule propriétaire du droit d’exploitation de Roland Garros. L’utilisation de la marque est également sanctionnée au titre de la contrefaçon (à hauteur de 300 000 euros) et du parasitisme (à hauteur de 500 000 euros) (CA Paris, 14 oct. 2009, n° 08/19179).
• Une campagne publicitaire réalisée pendant un festival de cinéma reproduisant la marque déposée de l’évènement : L’organisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, d’une opération de communication digitale par une marque de cosmétique à travers la publication de vidéos sur ses réseaux sociaux, sur certains plans desquelles était visible l’affiche officielle du festival de Cannes, l’une d’elles reproduisant la marque déposée de la palme d’or. Sanctionnée sur les fondements de la contrefaçon de droits d’auteur et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (TJ Paris, 11 déc. 2020, n° 19/08543).
• Une campagne publicitaire visant à se voir attribuer à tort la qualité de partenaire officiel d’un évènement : L’utilisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, du slogan « coiffeur officiel des femmes » associé aux expressions « Cannes » et « Festival de Cannes », laissant faussement croire au public que l’entreprise était partenaire officiel du festival. Sanctionnée sur le fondement de la concurrence déloyale et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (CA Paris, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912).

Ces sanctions pécuniaires peuvent se cumuler avec des injonctions de cessation des pratiques et/ou des mesures de publication dans la presse, sous astreinte.

La protection spécifique des marques de la FIFA

À la différence des Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024, qui bénéficiaient d’une loi française spécifique en tant que pays hôte (loi n° 2018-202 du 26 mars 2018 relative à l’organisation des Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024) et réservant notamment les espaces publicitaires à proximité des sites de compétition aux seuls partenaires officiels, la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 ne se tenant pas sur le territoire français, aucun dispositif légal français équivalent n’est applicable. La protection des partenaires et sponsors officiels repose donc sur le droit commun, mais elle n’en est pas moins solide.

La FIFA a constitué un portefeuille très étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier, protégées en France par les dispositions du Code de la propriété intellectuelle. Ces marques comprennent notamment la marque verbale et figurative FIFA®, les marques FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, ainsi que l’emblème officiel de la compétition (combinant le trophée et le chiffre 26), le slogan officiel « We Are 26™ » / « Nous Sommes 26™ », les logos des seize villes hôtes, et la police typographique officielle « FWC 26 », protégée par le droit d’auteur. Seuls les détenteurs de droits de la FIFA, c’est-à-dire les Partenaires FIFA (au premier rang desquels figurent Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways et Visa), les Sponsors Plus, les Sponsors officiels et les Supporters régionaux, sont autorisés à utiliser à des fins commerciales cette propriété intellectuelle officielle.

La FIFA a publié des directives relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, qui précisent en détail les usages autorisés et interdits des marques et logos liés à la Coupe du Monde 2026. Selon ces directives, sont notamment prohibés, sans autorisation, toute utilisation des marques officielles dans une publicité commerciale ; l’intégration de la propriété intellectuelle officielle dans un nom commercial ou un nom de domaine ; l’organisation de concours ou jeux-concours créant une association avec la compétition ; l’utilisation des marques officielles pour décorer un magasin ; et l’usage par un compte professionnel de hashtags officiels dans un but commercial. Ces directives précisent en outre que la protection s’étend non seulement à la reproduction à l’identique des marques officielles, mais également à leurs variantes dont la similitude peut prêter à confusion. Cette protection rappelée par les lignes directrices est en cohérence avec la protection élargie accordée aux marques notoires en droit français par l’article L.713-5 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle.

Les leçons des JO de Paris 2024 : quels risques pour les marques ?

Les Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024 ont donné lieu à un contentieux abondant qui éclaire concrètement les risques auxquels s’exposent les entreprises tentées par l’ambush marketing lors d’un évènement sportif majeur. Si ces décisions ont été rendues dans le contexte spécifique des JO, pendant lesquels protections légales spécifiques renforcées s’appliquaient, elles constituent néanmoins un avertissement direct pour les marques qui envisageraient des stratégies similaires lors de la Coupe du Monde, sur le fondement du droit commun.

• L’utilisation de symboles officiels sur des supports physiques itinérants : Pendant les JO de Paris 2024, une société chinoise du secteur laitier avait fait circuler dans Paris des bus arborant les anneaux olympiques associés à ses propres marques, tout en se présentant comme « la seule société laitière chinoise présente à Paris 2024 ». La Cour d’appel de Paris a confirmé tant le parasitisme que la contrefaçon de marque, et condamné les sociétés concernées, en référé, au paiement d’une provision de 20 000 euros, assortie d’une astreinte de 20 000 euros par jour et par infraction constatée, visant à faire cesser la diffusion des publicités (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 2, 21 nov. 2025, n° 24/15283 ; TJ Paris, ordonnance de référé du 8 août 2024, 24/55463).
• La retransmission non autorisée de compétitions : Le tribunal judiciaire de Paris a ordonné en référé, pendant les JO, la cessation immédiate de la diffusion de compétitions olympiques par une plateforme de streaming ne disposant pas des droits médias correspondants, sous astreinte de 1 500 euros par infraction constatée, 3 000 euros par jour pour les distributions continues et 5 000 euros par jour pour défaut de retrait (TJ Paris, réf., 18 sept. 2024, n° 24/53019). Ainsi, toute plateforme retransmettant des matchs de la Coupe du Monde sans détenir les droits cédés par la FIFA s’expose à des mesures d’urgence immédiates, sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport.
• La protection élargie de la marque notoire : La Cour de cassation a confirmé que la protection des marques olympiques s’étendait au-delà de la reproduction stricto sensu : il suffit que la marque soit évoquée ou suggérée, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de démontrer un risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public. Cette solution, fondée sur l’article L.713-5 du code de la propriété intellectuelle, s’est appliquée à un bar ayant utilisé les anneaux olympiques sur ses sous-bocks pour promouvoir ses soirées de retransmission (Cass. crim., 17 janv. 2017, n° 15-86.363). Les marques de la FIFA étant tout aussi notoires sur le plan mondial, le même régime protecteur leur est applicable : une simple évocation des marques officielles, même sans reproduction littérale, pourra caractériser une atteinte sanctionnable.

Certaines opérations marketing peuvent échapper à toute sanction

L’analyse de la jurisprudence et des pratiques promotionnelles permet néanmoins de comprendre les contours de certaines pratiques publicitaires qui pourraient être autorisées (non sanctionnées par les textes susmentionnés), sous réserve qu’elles soient préparées et présentées avec habileté. En voici quelques exemples.

Communication sur un ton décalé ou humoristique : Une approche décalée, voire humoristique, peut permettre d’échapper aux sanctions susvisées.

• Ainsi, la marque de chips Vico du groupe Intersnack avait lancé en 2016 une campagne promotionnelle autour du slogan « Vico, partenaire des supporters à domicile ».
• La société irlandaise Paddy Power avait pour sa part parrainé une course de l’œuf dans la cuiller à « London », village de Bourgogne, pour afficher à Londres pendant les JO de 2012 le slogan : « Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year ! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is) ». Le comité d’organisation des JO avait échoué à faire cesser cette campagne. Humour anglais …
• Le groupe Heineken avait quant à lui commercialisé pendant l’Euro 2016, dont Carlsberg était le sponsor officiel, une gamme de bouteilles aux couleurs des drapeaux de 21 pays ayant « marqué son histoire », parmi lesquels une majorité de participants à la compétition.

Communication d’une donnée informative à titre publicitaire : A été jugé licite l’utilisation de résultats d’un match de rugby et l’annonce d’un prochain match dans un journal pour la promotion d’un véhicule automobile, la publicité indiquant : « France 13 Angleterre 24 – la Fiat 500 félicite l’Angleterre pour sa victoire et donne rendez-vous à l’équipe de France le 9 mars pour France-Italie ». Les juges ont considéré que cette publication « se borne à reproduire un résultat sportif d’actualité, acquis et rendu public en première page du journal d’information sportive, et à faire état d’une rencontre future également connue comme déjà annoncée par le journal dans un article d’information » (Cass. com., 20 mai 2014, n° 13-12.102).

Sponsoring de joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde : Toute société peut conclure des partenariats avec des joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA, par exemple en leur fournissant des équipements ou des vêtements portant son logo. Les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle précisent expressément qu’elles « ne contiennent aucune affirmation relative à des droits détenus par des tierces parties telles que les joueurs, clubs, associations membres [ou] confédérations ». Les directives de la FIFA confirment par ailleurs explicitement que les images génériques liées au football, aux équipes nationales ou aux drapeaux de pays n’entrent pas dans la propriété intellectuelle officielle. La prudence s’impose néanmoins : le partenariat ne doit pas créer l’impression d’une association commerciale avec la FIFA ou la compétition, ni utiliser les marques officielles de la FIFA.

L’approche combinée juridique et marketing dans la conception et la préparation du message d’une telle opération de communication est essentielle pour éviter des poursuites judiciaires, notamment sur le fondement du parasitisme. Certaines campagnes publicitaires peuvent donc légitimement être envisagées, notamment quand elles sont astucieuses.

Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

What the EU decision does (and does not) do

The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

How different payment types are affected in practice

Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

Country notes (alphabetical)

Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

Practical next steps for EU companies

1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

En droit français, les franchiseurs et les distributeurs sont soumis à deux types d’obligations précontractuelles d’information : chaque partie doit spontanément informer son futur partenaire de toute information qu’elle sait déterminante pour son consentement. De plus, pour certains contrats — notamment le contrat de franchise — il existe une obligation de communiquer un nombre limité d’informations dans un document dédié. Ces obligations précontractuelles sont d’ordre public. Ainsi, ces deux obligations s’appliquent simultanément au franchiseur, au distributeur ou au concessionnaire lors de la négociation d’un contrat avec un partenaire.

Points clés à retenir

• Les informations requises par le DIP doivent être intégralement renseignées et actualisées ;
• Les informations non exigées par le DIP mais communiquées par le franchiseur doivent être soigneusement sélectionnées et sincères ;
• Le franchisé doit avoir la possibilité de solliciter des informations complémentaires auprès du franchiseur ;
• L’expérience du franchisé dans le secteur économique concerné permet au franchiseur de limiter considérablement son exposition au risque de nullité du contrat pour vice du consentement ;
• Le franchiseur doit conserver la preuve de la remise effective des informations précontractuelles, qu’elles soient obligatoires ou non.
• L’obligation générale d’information de droit commun (article 1112-1 du Code civil) peut s’appliquer concurremment avec l’obligation spéciale prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce.

Obligation générale d’information applicable à tous les contractants

Quelle est l’étendue de cette obligation précontractuelle d’information ?

Cette obligation s’impose à tous les cocontractants, pour tout type de contrat. En effet, l’article 1112-1 du Code civil dispose que :

(§. 1) Celle des parties qui connaît une information dont l’importance est déterminante pour le consentement de l’autre doit l’en informer dès lors que, légitimement, cette dernière ignore cette information ou fait confiance à son cocontractant.

(§. 3) Ont une importance déterminante les informations qui ont un lien direct et nécessaire avec le contenu du contrat ou la qualité des parties.

Cette obligation s’applique à toutes les parties contractantes, pour tout type de contrat.

La jurisprudence s’est prononcée sur la question du cumul de cette obligation de droit commun, avec l’obligation spéciale d’information prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce (cf infra), en répondant par la positive (CA Paris, 27 mars 2024, n° 22/12665). Le périmètre de cette dernière a toutefois été circonscrit par la Cour de cassation : seules les informations présentant un lien direct et nécessaire avec l’objet du contrat ou la qualité des parties sont soumises à obligation de communication (Cass. com., 14 mai 2025, n° 23-17.948).

À qui incombe la charge de la preuve?

La charge de la preuve repose sur celui qui soutient que l’information lui était due. Il doit alors démontrer (i) que l’autre partie lui devait cette information, mais (ii) ne la lui a pas fournie (article 1112-1 (§. 4) du Code civil).

Obligation spéciale d’information applicable aux contrats de franchise et de distribution

Quels contrats sont soumis à cette règle particulière?

Le droit français impose (art. L. 330-3 du Code de commerce) la communication d’un document d’information précontractuelle (« DIP ») ainsi que du projet de contrat, par toute personne :

• qui accorde à une autre personne le droit d’utiliser une marque, une enseigne ou un nom commercial,
• tout en exigeant un engagement exclusif ou quasi-exclusif pour l’exercice de son activité (par exemple, une obligation d’achat exclusif). Le caractère quasi-exclusif fait l’objet d’une appréciation casuistique par les juges français, indépendamment du seuil de 80% des achats prévu par le règlement UE 2022/720, qui n’est utilisé que comme un repère indicatif.

Concrètement, le DIP doit être remis, par exemple, au franchisé, au distributeur, au concessionnaire ou au licencié de marque, par son franchiseur, fournisseur ou concédant, dès lors que les deux conditions précitées sont réunies. Récemment la jurisprudence française a d’ailleurs eu l’occasion de rappeler que le champ d’application du DIP ne se limitait pas à la franchise, mais également et notamment, au contrat de concession, dès lors que les conditions précitées sont réunies (CA Paris, 22 mai 2024, n° 22/08672).

À quel moment le DIP doit-il être remis?

Le DIP et le projet de contrat doivent être communiqués au moins 20 jours avant la signature du contrat, et, le cas échéant, avant le paiement de toute somme exigée préalablement à la signature (notamment en cas de réservation).

Quelles informations doivent figurer dans le DIP?

L’article R. 330-1 du Code de commerce impose que le DIP mentionne les informations suivantes (liste non exhaustive) relatives :

• Au franchiseur (identité et expérience des dirigeants, parcours professionnel, etc.) ;
• À l’activité du franchiseur (notamment la date de création, le siège social, les références bancaires, l’historique du développement de l’enseigne, les comptes annuels, etc.) ;
• Au réseau (liste des membres avec indication de la date de signature des contrats, liste des établissements proposant les mêmes produits ou services dans la zone d’activité envisagée, nombre de membres ayant quitté le réseau au cours de l’année précédant la remise du DIP avec indication des motifs de départ, etc.) ;
• À la marque concédée (date d’enregistrement, titularité et conditions d’exploitation) ;
• À l’état général du marché (relatif aux produits ou services visés par le contrat) et à l’état local du marché (relatif à la zone d’activité envisagée), ainsi qu’aux facteurs de concurrence et aux perspectives de développement. La Cour de cassation a jugé, s’agissant du marché local, que le franchiseur n’était pas tenu de réaliser une étude de marché, mais que s’il en fournit une, celle-ci doit être exacte et vérifiable (Cass. com., 18 oct. 2023, n° 22-19.329).
• Aux éléments essentiels du projet de contrat, et notamment : sa durée, les conditions de renouvellement, de résiliation et de cession, ainsi que l’étendue des exclusivités accordées ;
• Aux obligations financières pesant sur le cocontractant : nature et montant des dépenses et investissements à engager avant le démarrage de l’activité (droit d’entrée, frais d’installation, etc.).

Au-delà de comporter l’ensemble des informations mentionnées par l’article précité, le DIP doit répondre à une exigence qualitative. En effet toutes les informations communiquées, y compris celles transmises spontanément, doivent être exactes et sincères, afin de garantir un consentement éclairé et exempt de tout vice de la part du candidat à l’entrée dans le réseau.

Comment prouver la remise des informations?

La charge de la preuve de la remise du DIP incombe au débiteur de cette obligation : le franchiseur (Cass. com., 7 juillet 2004, n° 02-15.950). L’idéal pour le franchiseur est de faire signer et dater le DIP par le franchisé le jour de sa remise et d’en conserver la preuve.

La clause contractuelle par laquelle le franchisé reconnaît avoir reçu un DIP complet ne constitue pas une preuve suffisante de la remise effective d’un DIP complet (Cass. com., 10 janvier 2018, n° 15-25.287).

Le franchiseur est-il tenu d’une obligation d’actualisation du DIP jusqu’à la signature du contrat

Dans un arrêt du 26 juin 2024 (n°23-1 14.085 PB) la Cour de cassation retient que la conformité formelle du DIP à la date de sa remise ne suffit pas à exonérer le franchiseur de toute responsabilité précontractuelle. Cette solution est confirmée par un arrêt du 4 décembre 2024 (n° 23-16.684).

Ces deux décisions semblent consacrer une obligation d’actualisation du DIP pesant sur la tête de réseau durant toute la période séparant la remise du document de la conclusion du contrat. Lorsque des événements significatifs surviennent dans cet intervalle (procédure collective affectant des membres du réseau, contentieux majeur, modification structurelle du réseau) la tête de réseau est tenue d’en informer spontanément le candidat. Le juge examine alors si le manquement à cette obligation était susceptible d’altérer l’appréciation que le candidat pouvait avoir du réseau et, partant, de vicier son consentement (Cass. com., 26 juin 2024, op. cit.). Le franchiseur ne saurait donc se retrancher derrière la régularité initiale du DIP pour s’affranchir de son devoir d’information dès lors que la situation du réseau a évolué de manière significative avant la signature du contrat.

Sanctions en cas de manquement aux obligations précontractuelles d’information

Sanction pénale

Le non-respect des obligations relatives au DIP peut exposer le franchiseur ou le fournisseur à une amende pénale pouvant aller jusqu’à 1 500 euros, portée à 3 000 euros en cas de récidive, le montant étant multiplié par cinq pour les personnes morales (article R. 330-2 du Code de commerce).

Nullité du contrat pour dol

Le contrat peut être annulé en cas de manquement à l’article 1112-1 ou à l’article L. 330-3. Dans les deux cas, le non-respect de l’obligation d’information n’est sanctionné que si le demandeur démontre que son consentement a été vicié par l’erreur, le dol ou la violence. Le juge procède à une appréciation in concreto, tenant compte notamment de l’expérience professionnelle et des diligences personnelles du distributeur : un candidat averti aura plus de difficultés à caractériser un dol, et son expérience dans le secteur concerné peut suffire à exonérer le franchiseur (CA Paris, pôle 5 – ch. 11, 26 avr. 2024, n° 21/13205), quand bien même les informations communiquées lacunaires ou inexactes (CA Paris, 20 janv. 2021, n° 19/03382).

Le cas échéant, les parties doivent être remises dans l’état antérieur à la conclusion du contrat.

S’agissant des éléments constitutifs du dol, les tribunaux en apprécient strictement les deux conditions:

• (Un élément matériel) l’existence d’un mensonge ou d’une réticence dolosive (article 1137 du Code civil) ;
• Et (un élément intentionnel) l’intention de tromper son cocontractant (article 1130 du Code civil).

Dommages et intérêts

Bien que les demandes en nullité soient soumises à des conditions très strictes, les franchisés et distributeurs peuvent alternativement obtenir des dommages et intérêts sur le fondement de la responsabilité délictuelle pour manquement à l’obligation précontractuelle d’information, sous réserve de démontrer une faute (information incomplète ou erronée), un préjudice indemnisable (celui-ci se limite à la perte de chance de ne pas contracter ou de contracter à des conditions plus avantageuses – voir en ce sens : Cass. com., 15 mars 2017, n° 15-16.406) et le lien de causalité entre les deux.

From Reporting to Governance and Risk Allocation

Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) considerations are playing an increasingly influential role in how businesses operate, invest, and manage risk, especially within the European Union, where corporate sustainability and responsibility regulation have been on the agenda in recent years.

With the adoption of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), many companies anticipated a significant shift in compliance. Since then, the EU has introduced simplification measures to streamline reporting and due diligence obligations, reduce the administrative burden, and improve proportionality, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while maintaining the core sustainability objectives.

While opinions may differ regarding the evolution of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) in EU regulation and the subsequent postponements of reporting obligations, regulatory developments appear to have, in practice, supported a shift in perspective. Sustainability is no longer viewed solely as a reporting requirement, but increasingly as a matter of governance, strategy, and risk allocation. This development is welcome, as the regulatory framework’s underlying objective is to advance the green transition, which in turn requires a change in how companies integrate sustainability into their decision-making and operations.

This focus on sustainability influences businesses of all sizes, including SMEs. Even companies not directly subject to the CSRD or CSDDD anticipate that ESG requirements will be passed down through the supply chain. Many non-reporting SMEs are already embedding sustainability practices, and this trend is likely to continue. In other words, sustainability policies are already affecting companies well before any formal reporting obligations kick in.

Environmental, Social, and Governance in Contract Architecture

One of the key means of implementing environmental, social, and governance obligations and objectives in day-to-day business operations is through commercial contracts and the requirements and commitments embedded in them.

Even where a company itself is not directly subject to extensive reporting or due diligence obligations, corporate sustainability and responsibility expectations flow through the market via contractual relationships. Larger undertakings within the scope of CSRD and, in due course, the CSDDD require contractual assurances, information rights, and cooperation from their business partners, including SMEs operating within their supply chains. As a result, corporate sustainability and responsibility become a question of contractual architecture. Companies must consider not only price mechanisms, liability caps and termination triggers, but also how environmental, social and governance risks and obligations are addressed and allocated between the parties through legally enforceable contractual terms.

Translating Policies into Binding Obligations

A typical starting point is the incorporation of a code of conduct or sustainability policies into commercial contracts, often by reference and through an express obligation on the contracting party to comply with them. From a legal standpoint, this raises important drafting questions. Many codes are drafted as high-level public statements. When such policies are converted into contractual commitments, their wording, scope, and hierarchy relative to the main agreement require careful consideration. The obligations must be sufficiently clear to define the parties’ expectations, coherent with other contractual provisions, and proportionate to the commercial relationship. The obligations must also be capable of practical implementation and effective monitoring in the context of the agreement.

In practical terms, this may mean requiring the supplier to comply with specific labour standards, maintain documented environmental management procedures, report on emissions data, ensure traceability of key raw materials, or allow reasonable access for audits. Clearly defining what is expected, how compliance is demonstrated, and what consequences follow from non-compliance is essential for the clause to function effectively. Otherwise, clauses that appear comprehensive in theory and ambitious in scope may offer limited enforceability in practice, and their impact may remain marginal if compliance cannot be effectively monitored and verified. If policies are not properly translated into binding and operational obligations, the company risks a mismatch between what it promises publicly and what is actually required under its contracts. This may undermine consistency, weaken risk management, and expose the company to reputational and governance risks if its own stated principles cannot be enforced within its supply or distribution chain.

As part of this process, companies must also consider the protection of trade secrets and confidential information. For example, broad audit or data-reporting obligations may raise concerns about sensitive business information. Contractual terms should balance transparency with the need to protect legitimately proprietary data. Clauses such as confidentiality agreements or carve-outs for trade secrets can be used to ensure that sharing ESG-related information does not compromise confidential business information or competitive advantages.

Environmental, Social and Governance Clauses Across Different Contract Types

Besides codes of conduct and sustainability policies, environmental, social and governance-related clauses increasingly take more tailored and transaction-specific forms. In shareholder agreements, sustainability objectives may be reflected in governance structures or even linked to financial outcomes, for example by aligning dividend policies or incentive mechanisms with agreed climate targets. In employment contracts, obligations may extend beyond general compliance and include participation in corporate sustainability training programmes or adherence to internal sustainability guidelines as part of performance expectations.

In supply and manufacturing agreements, environmental, social and governance provisions may address traceability of raw materials, emissions reporting, waste management, energy efficiency standards or the right to replace a supplier if its environmental practices materially conflict with the contracting party’s sustainability commitments. Such contractual mechanisms increasingly affect SMEs operating as suppliers, as ESG expectations pass through the supply chain.

Construction contracts often include detailed requirements regarding material selection, lifecycle impacts, carbon footprint calculations and recycling or waste reduction procedures. For example, in Finland, legislation imposes low-carbon and energy efficiency requirements for new buildings, and a party undertaking a construction project is subject to mandatory reporting obligations relating to construction and demolition waste. These statutory requirements are typically reflected and implemented in the relevant project and construction contracts.

Across these different contract types, the practical significance is consistent. Environmental, social and governance considerations move from the level of general policy into legally enforceable obligations tailored to each specific legal relationship. Contracts function as a mechanism for allocating responsibility, managing compliance risk and aligning commercial incentives with sustainability objectives.

Proportionate Monitoring and Audit Rights

In the contractual implementation and monitoring of environmental, social and governance obligations, audit and information rights play a central role. They are closely linked to effective oversight and form an integral part of a coherent contractual framework. In practice, companies typically seek access to relevant data from their business partners and, where appropriate, establish inspection or audit rights to enable meaningful monitoring and verification, whether conducted directly by the company or, commonly, by an independent expert appointed for that purpose.

However, such arrangements must remain balanced. Overly burdensome provisions may needlessly disrupt day-to-day operations and reduce the willingness to cooperate, particularly for SMEs with limited administrative capacity. By contrast, well-designed mechanisms that balance transparency with confidentiality and operational feasibility are more defensible and more likely to function effectively in practice.

Contractual Remedies

As a general principle, the consequences of a breach are determined by the terms agreed between the parties. In practice, the parties will typically first seek to resolve the matter through discussion and good faith negotiations, allowing the non-compliant party an opportunity to clarify the situation and implement corrective actions within a reasonable timeframe. If negotiations do not lead to a resolution, it may be appropriate to proceed to stronger measures, such as contractual penalties, indemnification obligations, price adjustments, temporary suspension rights or other agreed sanctions, applied in light of the nature and severity of the breach.

The contract should clearly define what constitutes a breach, how it is assessed and what remedies are available in each scenario. Clear and proportionate step-by-step remedy structures enhance legal certainty, reduce the risk of disputes and ensure that material or repeated breaches may trigger more significant consequences, including termination where justified.

Strategic and Voluntary Environmental, Social and Governance Commitments

In the current EU landscape, implementing ESG considerations in commercial contracts is no longer simply a matter of reacting to directives. It is a broader exercise in risk management and corporate governance. Even as the implementation details of the directives may continue to evolve, market expectations, financing conditions and reputational considerations remain key drivers of sustainability integration.

In addition, some companies choose to position themselves as frontrunners in sustainability for strategic and reputational reasons. They may therefore incorporate voluntary environmental, social and governance mechanisms and requirements into their contracts that go beyond, or are not directly derived from, binding directives. By doing so, they signal to investors, customers and other stakeholders that sustainability is treated as a core business priority rather than merely a compliance obligation.

At the same time, it is important to recognise the practical limits of such commitments. Ambitious sustainability requirements may be more challenging for SMEs with limited financial and administrative resources. Meeting extensive reporting, certification or traceability standards can require investments in systems, personnel and external expertise. If contractual expectations are not calibrated to the size and capacity of the counterparty, they may limit the ability of SMEs to participate in certain supply chains. A balanced and proportionate approach helps ensure that sustainability objectives remain achievable and commercially workable across the contractual chain.

Conclusion

For legal practitioners, the central task is not to increase the number of environmental, social and governance clauses as such, but to ensure their quality, coherence and practical relevance. The objective is to design contractual mechanisms that are proportionate, enforceable and aligned with the company’s actual risk profile, industry context and sustainability priorities. Commercial contracts remain one of the most concrete tools for translating sustainability strategy into operational practice. Moreover, every contract lawyer should understand and apply key sustainability principles in their work, ensuring that ESG commitments become integral to legal advice and contract drafting.

The Strait of Hormuz is likely the most strategically important point for the global oil trade. In fact, approximately 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through this narrow passage between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf every day.

Following the outbreak of war in the region, the impact on energy markets was almost immediate: oil prices quickly rose above $100 per barrel, and it is unclear how high they may climb in the coming weeks and months. As a result, transportation, production, and procurement costs are rising across industrial supply chains in many sectors.

For many companies engaged in international trade, this phenomenon creates a very real problem. Contracts signed months (or years) earlier—perhaps at a fixed price—must be fulfilled in a completely different economic context.

A manufacturer that sells goods for delivery in six or twelve months may find itself producing and shipping at much higher energy costs, while the price agreed upon with the customer remains unchanged.

This is a situation that recurs cyclically, for various reasons: from the COVID-19 pandemic to the subsequent raw materials crisis, and on to current geopolitical tensions.

When the increase in costs is so sudden and significant, a question inevitably arises: must the contract still be performed under the original terms, or is it possible to suspend or renegotiate the agreement to adapt it to the new circumstances?

The answer depends on several factors: first and foremost, on what the parties have (or have not) provided for in the contract, but also on the law applicable to the relationship and on the interpretation that judges or arbitrators may give to the rules in the event of a dispute.

Force Majeure and Hardship: Two Different Concepts

When extraordinary events occur—such as a war, an energy crisis, or the disruption of a trade route—many operators immediately invoke force majeure. However, in most cases, these situations fall instead under the category of hardship.

It is therefore essential to distinguish between these two situations.

When an Event Constitutes Force Majeure

Force majeure applies to cases where an extraordinary and unforeseeable event makes it impossible to perform the contract.

The characteristics of the grounds for exemption from liability depend on the law applicable to the commercial relationship, but generally require:

• unpredictability of the event;
• the event being beyond the affected party’s control;
• the impossibility of avoiding or overcoming the event through reasonable efforts.

Typical examples include:

• orders from authorities requiring the suspension of production
• embargoes or export bans
• logistical disruptions caused by war

In these situations, performance is not merely more costly: it becomes objectively impossible. The consequence is that the party unable to perform is generally exempt from liability for the duration of the event.

Hardship

The situation is different when performance of the contract remains possible but becomes economically much more burdensome.

The concept of hardship is generally based on four prerequisites:

1. an event occurring after the conclusion of the contract
2. unpredictability and extraordinary nature of the event
3. a substantial alteration of the economic balance of the contract
4. excessive burden of performance, but not impossibility

A sharp increase in the price of oil, gas, or other raw materials often falls into this category.

Goods can be produced and delivered, but doing so may entail costs far higher than those anticipated when the contract was signed.

The ripple effect along the international supply chain

In global industrial supply chains, the same goods are often the subject of a series of consecutive contracts.

The manufacturer sells to a trader, who sells to a processing company, which resells to an importer in another country, who in turn distributes the product to the end market.

When a hardship event occurs—such as a sharp rise in energy prices—the effect tends to ripple throughout the entire supply chain.

The first party affected by the cost increase will try to pass the increase on to its contractual counterpart, who, in turn, will find themselves in the same situation with the next link in the chain.

The risk is clear: one of the operators in the middle of the chain may face increased upstream costs without being able to pass them on downstream.

This is one of the most common problems in international supply chains.

What happens if there is no clause regarding price fluctuations

In commercial practice, it often happens that parties operate on the basis of orders and order confirmations without a formal written contract, or that a contract exists but contains no provisions regarding price fluctuations or hardship.

In such cases, when costs increase sharply, it is necessary to determine which law applies to individual sales contracts across the supply chain.

This can lead to very different situations:

• one law may allow for price revision or termination of the contract
• another law aplicable to a second contract may not provide for equivalent remedies
• a third contract may contain much more restrictive contractual clauses

The practical result is that an operator in the middle of the chain may face a price increase from their supplier without being able to pass it on to the customer.

A Common Legal Framework: The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG)

Fortunately, many international sales contracts are governed by the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).

The convention has been ratified by 97 countries, including Italy and most major trading partners, such as the U.S., Canada, China, Germany, France, Spain, etc.

The central provision is Article 79, according to which a party is not liable for non-performance if it proves that the non-performance is due to an impediment:

• beyond its control
• unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract
• unavoidable or insurmountable

Traditionally, this provision has been applied to cases of force majeure.

In recent years, there has been debate over whether it can also be applied to cases of hardship, but international case law tends to be very cautious.

International case law on Hardship

Court decisions reflect a rather strict approach.

In some cases, even very significant increases in raw material costs have not been considered sufficient to modify or suspend the contract.

The reasoning is simple: those who operate professionally in international trade must take into account a certain degree of market volatility.

Only when the increase in costs exceeds an exceptional and unforeseeable level such as to radically alter the balance of the contract can hardship be invoked.

One of the most frequently cited cases is the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision in the Scafom case, which recognized the right to renegotiate the contract following a 70% increase in the price of steel.

However, such cases are relatively rare.

Generic clauses that serve no purpose

Many contracts contain hardship clauses copied from standard templates (boilerplate).

The problem is that these clauses often:

• list the effects of hardship
• but do not define when hardship actually occurs

The result is that, when prices rise, the parties may have very different opinions on what constitutes an “exceptional” increase and whether the event in question was “unforeseeable” or not.

The clause, therefore, does not resolve the issue, but defers it to discussion between the parties and, in the event of a failure to reach an agreement, to the courts or arbitrators.

What criteria can define a hardship situation

To make the clause truly effective, it is useful to establish objective parameters.

Among the most commonly used in international contracts:

• an increase or decrease in the price of a raw material beyond a certain threshold (±20% or ±30%)
• an increase in transportation or logistics costs within certain limits;
• significant fluctuations in the exchange rate beyond a specified range;
• the introduction of tariffs or trade restrictions

These parameters, linked to tolerance ranges, allow the parties to quickly and unambiguously identify a hardship event.

Remedies in the Event of Hardship

An effective clause should also address how to handle the situation.

The most common solutions are:

• renegotiation of the contract in good faith
• apply an automatic price adjustment
• appointment of an independent third-party expert to determine the new price
• temporary suspension of the contract
• right of withdrawal if no agreement is reached

These tools allow the parties to manage the crisis without resorting to litigation.

Audit of existing contracts: what to do now

At this point, the practical question becomes: how should we manage the issue in existing business relationships?

The first step is to conduct an audit of existing contracts with suppliers and customers.

1. Introduce comprehensive contracts in new relationships

If the relationships are governed solely by purchase orders and order confirmations, it is advisable to take this opportunity to draft comprehensive international sales contracts that include:

• a hardship clause
• warranty provisions
• remedies for breach
• limitations of liability

2. Update existing contracts

If the relationship is already governed by a contract, you should check whether a hardship clause exists.

If not, it may be useful to propose to the other party:

• a new contract, or
• a contract addendum dedicated to managing price fluctuations.

This helps prevent future conflicts and provides both parties with an effective tool to manage potential price shocks along the supply chain.

Conclusion

Commodity and energy crises demonstrate how exposed international contracts are to sudden changes in economic conditions. When a contract does not clearly address hardship management, the risk does not disappear; it simply shifts along the supply chain until it settles on the weakest link.

For this reason, companies operating within international supply chains should view the hardship clause as a strategic tool for managing contractual risk. A well-drafted contract does not eliminate market volatility, but it allows the parties to address it with clear rules, reducing uncertainty and preventing disputes.

Executive Summary

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) remains one of the most ambitious integration projects in the world. Yet, several years into its operational phase, it has not (yet) delivered the structural shift many expected. A recent analysis underscores the gap between political momentum and economic reality: implementation remains uneven, the agreement is still used by only a portion of participating states, and non-tariff barriers and infrastructure deficits continue to dominate the cost of doing business across borders.  For Egypt, the opportunity is still real — but it depends less on treaty headlines and more on enabling conditions: trade logistics, customs efficiency, regulatory convergence, and competitive industrial capacity. 

Looking Back: The Promise of a Single African Market

When the AfCFTA was launched, expectations were understandably high. A continent-wide trade framework was supposed to reduce tariffs, facilitate trade in goods and services, and strengthen regional value chains — with the broader goal of moving African economies up the value ladder.

In my 2022 article, I asked whether AfCFTA could become a game changer for Egypt, given Egypt’s industrial base, strategic geography, and the potential to diversify export markets beyond traditional partners. (For background, see the earlier article here”).

The Reality Check: Intra-African Trade Remains Structurally Weak

Several years later, the interim assessment is sobering. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) recently put it, AfCFTA is not a “game changer” yet, and only about half of member states currently meet the practical prerequisites to trade under the agreement.

A deeper reason is structural: no other world region trades so little with itself, and while statistics may undercount informal cross-border flows (especially in food), the overall picture remains unchanged.

Trade integration cannot deliver transformative outcomes if production, logistics, and institutions do not support scale.

Implementation Has Been Slow — and Often Symbolic

Operationalisation did not start with full-scale liberalisation. Instead, the AfCFTA began with a pilot approach: the Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) launched in October 2022, initially with eight states, later joined by additional countries, including Nigeria and South Africa by spring 2025.

The GTI created valuable learning effects, but it also underlined a key point: early progress was often presented through symbolic deals, while product coverage and volumes remained limited. FAZ highlights that only selected goods could be traded duty-free and that key sectors remained constrained for a long time due to missing or unresolved technical rules.

A pilot, however, cannot substitute for full operational certainty — the kind businesses need to restructure supply chains and invest.

Tariffs Are Not the Main Barrier — Trade Costs Are

AfCFTA is frequently discussed in terms of tariff liberalisation. Yet, evidence suggests that the largest gains do not come from tariffs but from reducing non-tariff barriers and improving trade infrastructure.

FAZ points to a central reality: tariffs tend to add around 20–30% to intra-African trade costs, whereas non-tariff costs can be far higher — driven by bureaucracy, lack of harmonised standards, inefficient border processes, and transport barriers.

This is the crux: even with reduced tariffs, trade will not expand meaningfully if goods still cannot move cheaply, quickly, and predictably.

Integration Complexity and Distributional Politics

Africa’s integration landscape is shaped by multiple overlapping regional economic communities and trade regimes. This creates legal and administrative complexity — often described as an integration “spaghetti bowl.” FAZ notes the challenge of coordination and the continued fragmentation of rules.

There is also a political economy dimension. Intra-African trade is heavily influenced by a small number of larger economies — and the distribution of benefits matters. FAZ highlights the dominance of major players (notably South Africa) and the concern that tariff liberalisation alone may entrench existing industrial advantages.

Where governments expect asymmetric outcomes, resistance often takes the form of delay, narrow implementation, or persistent non-tariff barriers.

What This Means for Egypt: The Opportunity Is Real — But Conditional

Egypt’s strategic case for AfCFTA participation remains strong: industrial potential, geographic location, and the opportunity to access and shape growing markets. But the experience so far suggests that the treaty text alone does not generate trade flows.

For Egypt’s private sector, the decisive factors are practical:

• predictable and efficient customs clearance and border procedures,
• logistics corridors and port efficiency,
• regulatory convergence (standards, certification, compliance),
• stable access to trade finance and payments,
• competitive energy and production conditions for manufacturing and processing.

AfCFTA can support these developments — but it cannot replace them.

The “Game Changer” Pathway: What Must Happen Next

FAZ concludes that AfCFTA will only become truly impactful if it is paired with the fundamentals: major infrastructure investment, stronger production and processing capacity, and a credible industrial policy.

At the same time, Africa faces a classic chicken-and-egg problem: without development there is limited investment appeal; without investment there is limited development.

For Egypt and its partners, a pragmatic strategy would be to:

1. treat AfCFTA as a platform for real trade-cost reduction, not only tariff debates;
2. focus on a limited number of scalable corridors and sectors where regional value chains can realistically grow;
3. strengthen implementation capacity so that preferences become usable for firms — especially SMEs;
4. enhance legal certainty and dispute resolution reliability for cross-border commerce.

Conclusion

AfCFTA remains a landmark achievement in terms of political commitment. But as of today, it has not yet been the “game changer” many hoped for.

For Egypt, the key question is no longer whether AfCFTA is visionary — it is. The question is whether governments and businesses can translate it into lower real trade costs, higher competitiveness, and bankable cross-border transactions. If those enabling conditions improve, AfCFTA’s promise can still become commercial reality.

After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

Why wine matters in this agreement

The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

1. tariff liberalisation;
2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the « Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures » (SPS) and « Technical Barriers to Trade » (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

Geographical indications: protection and tension

One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
2. transition periods for local operators;
3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

Services, distribution, and market structure

Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

1. logistics providers
2. distribution networks
3. commercial representation
4. marketing and advertising agencies

For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

Legal advisors will need to consider:

1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
3. compliance with competition rules

The implementation gap: where risk lies

Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

1. managing client expectations
2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

What should lawyers be doing now?

Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

Final sip

The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

Lors d’évènements de grande ampleur, tels que la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026, certaines entreprises tentent d’associer « sauvagement » leur marque ou image à l’évènement par une pratique d’« ambush marketing » (marketing d’embuscade) définie par la jurisprudence comme une « stratégie publicitaire mise en place par une entreprise afin d’associer son image commerciale à celle d’un événement et donc de profiter de l’impact médiatique dudit événement sans s’acquitter des droits qui y sont relatifs et sans avoir obtenu au préalable l’autorisation de l’organisateur de l’événement » (CA Paris, 2e chambre, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912). Une pratique risquée et sanctionnée, mais parfois envisageable.

Points clés à retenir

• L’ambush marketing est une pratique sanctionnée mais qui n’est pas interdite en soi.
• En contrepartie de leurs investissements dans la compétition, les sponsors et partenaires officiels de la FIFA bénéficient d’une protection juridique très importante, par l’intermédiaire de divers textes généraux (contrefaçon, parasitisme, propriété intellectuelle) ou plus particuliers (droit du sport), contre toutes formes d’ambush marketing.
• La Coupe du Monde de la FIFA fait l’objet d’une protection renforcée fondée sur un portefeuille étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier et sur les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, en l’absence de législation française spécifique comparable à celle instituée pour les Jeux Olympiques.
• Ces droits ne sont pas absolus et il reste néanmoins de minces opportunités permettant une pratique, astucieuse, du marketing d’embuscade.

La protection des sponsors et partenaires officiels de la Coupe du Monde contre l’ambush marketing

Fort d’une audience mondiale de près de 5 milliards de personnes sur l’ensemble des plateformes lors de sa dernière édition au Qatar en 2022 – dont plus de 1,5 milliard pour la seule finale – la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 est l’évènement sportif le plus suivi de la planète. Accueilli pour la première fois par trois pays (Canada, Mexique et États-Unis), il réunit 48 équipes et plus de 1 200 joueurs pour 104 matchs dans 16 stades. Son organisation est financée dans une large mesure par les différents partenaires, sponsors et détenteurs de droits officiels, qui bénéficient en contrepartie d’un droit exclusif d’utilisation des marques et propriétés intellectuelles officielles de la FIFA afin d’y associer leur propre image et signes distinctifs.

La pratique d’ambush marketing n’est pas sanctionnée en tant que telle par le droit français, mais de nombreux textes épars permettent de protéger largement les sponsors et partenaires de manifestations sportives de dimension mondiale contre l’ambush marketing. Ils sont en effet légitimes à pouvoir jouir paisiblement des droits qui leur sont offerts en contrepartie de leurs larges investissements réalisés dans le cadre d’évènements tels que, par exemple, les coupes du monde de football ou de rugby, ou les Jeux Olympiques.

Peuvent notamment être invoqués par les sponsors officiels et par les organisateurs de telles manifestations :

• les protections « classiques » offertes par le droit de la propriété intellectuelle (droit des marques et droit d’auteur) au titre de l’action en contrefaçon fondée sur le Code de la propriété intellectuelle,
• le droit de la responsabilité civile (parasitisme et concurrence déloyale fondés sur l’article 1240 du Code civil),
• le droit de la consommation (pratiques commerciales trompeuses),
• mais aussi des textes plus spécifiques tels que la protection des droits d’exploitation des fédérations sportives et des organisateurs de manifestations sportives prévue par l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, qui confère aux organisateurs de manifestations sportives un monopole d’exploitation.

Sur ces fondements, ont par exemple été sanctionnées les pratiques d’ambush marketing suivantes :

• L’exploitation d’une compétition de tennis et l’utilisation, pendant l’évènement sportif, de la marque associée à celui-ci : L’organisation de paris en ligne portant sur le tournoi de Roland Garros, utilisant le signe protégé et la marque Roland Garros pour viser les matchs sur lesquels les paris étaient organisés. L’exploitation illicite de la compétition sportive est sanctionnée à hauteur de 400 000 euros sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, la Fédération française de tennis étant seule propriétaire du droit d’exploitation de Roland Garros. L’utilisation de la marque est également sanctionnée au titre de la contrefaçon (à hauteur de 300 000 euros) et du parasitisme (à hauteur de 500 000 euros) (CA Paris, 14 oct. 2009, n° 08/19179).
• Une campagne publicitaire réalisée pendant un festival de cinéma reproduisant la marque déposée de l’évènement : L’organisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, d’une opération de communication digitale par une marque de cosmétique à travers la publication de vidéos sur ses réseaux sociaux, sur certains plans desquelles était visible l’affiche officielle du festival de Cannes, l’une d’elles reproduisant la marque déposée de la palme d’or. Sanctionnée sur les fondements de la contrefaçon de droits d’auteur et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (TJ Paris, 11 déc. 2020, n° 19/08543).
• Une campagne publicitaire visant à se voir attribuer à tort la qualité de partenaire officiel d’un évènement : L’utilisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, du slogan « coiffeur officiel des femmes » associé aux expressions « Cannes » et « Festival de Cannes », laissant faussement croire au public que l’entreprise était partenaire officiel du festival. Sanctionnée sur le fondement de la concurrence déloyale et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (CA Paris, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912).

Ces sanctions pécuniaires peuvent se cumuler avec des injonctions de cessation des pratiques et/ou des mesures de publication dans la presse, sous astreinte.

La protection spécifique des marques de la FIFA

À la différence des Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024, qui bénéficiaient d’une loi française spécifique en tant que pays hôte (loi n° 2018-202 du 26 mars 2018 relative à l’organisation des Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024) et réservant notamment les espaces publicitaires à proximité des sites de compétition aux seuls partenaires officiels, la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 ne se tenant pas sur le territoire français, aucun dispositif légal français équivalent n’est applicable. La protection des partenaires et sponsors officiels repose donc sur le droit commun, mais elle n’en est pas moins solide.

La FIFA a constitué un portefeuille très étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier, protégées en France par les dispositions du Code de la propriété intellectuelle. Ces marques comprennent notamment la marque verbale et figurative FIFA®, les marques FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, ainsi que l’emblème officiel de la compétition (combinant le trophée et le chiffre 26), le slogan officiel « We Are 26™ » / « Nous Sommes 26™ », les logos des seize villes hôtes, et la police typographique officielle « FWC 26 », protégée par le droit d’auteur. Seuls les détenteurs de droits de la FIFA, c’est-à-dire les Partenaires FIFA (au premier rang desquels figurent Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways et Visa), les Sponsors Plus, les Sponsors officiels et les Supporters régionaux, sont autorisés à utiliser à des fins commerciales cette propriété intellectuelle officielle.

La FIFA a publié des directives relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, qui précisent en détail les usages autorisés et interdits des marques et logos liés à la Coupe du Monde 2026. Selon ces directives, sont notamment prohibés, sans autorisation, toute utilisation des marques officielles dans une publicité commerciale ; l’intégration de la propriété intellectuelle officielle dans un nom commercial ou un nom de domaine ; l’organisation de concours ou jeux-concours créant une association avec la compétition ; l’utilisation des marques officielles pour décorer un magasin ; et l’usage par un compte professionnel de hashtags officiels dans un but commercial. Ces directives précisent en outre que la protection s’étend non seulement à la reproduction à l’identique des marques officielles, mais également à leurs variantes dont la similitude peut prêter à confusion. Cette protection rappelée par les lignes directrices est en cohérence avec la protection élargie accordée aux marques notoires en droit français par l’article L.713-5 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle.

Les leçons des JO de Paris 2024 : quels risques pour les marques ?

Les Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024 ont donné lieu à un contentieux abondant qui éclaire concrètement les risques auxquels s’exposent les entreprises tentées par l’ambush marketing lors d’un évènement sportif majeur. Si ces décisions ont été rendues dans le contexte spécifique des JO, pendant lesquels protections légales spécifiques renforcées s’appliquaient, elles constituent néanmoins un avertissement direct pour les marques qui envisageraient des stratégies similaires lors de la Coupe du Monde, sur le fondement du droit commun.

• L’utilisation de symboles officiels sur des supports physiques itinérants : Pendant les JO de Paris 2024, une société chinoise du secteur laitier avait fait circuler dans Paris des bus arborant les anneaux olympiques associés à ses propres marques, tout en se présentant comme « la seule société laitière chinoise présente à Paris 2024 ». La Cour d’appel de Paris a confirmé tant le parasitisme que la contrefaçon de marque, et condamné les sociétés concernées, en référé, au paiement d’une provision de 20 000 euros, assortie d’une astreinte de 20 000 euros par jour et par infraction constatée, visant à faire cesser la diffusion des publicités (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 2, 21 nov. 2025, n° 24/15283 ; TJ Paris, ordonnance de référé du 8 août 2024, 24/55463).
• La retransmission non autorisée de compétitions : Le tribunal judiciaire de Paris a ordonné en référé, pendant les JO, la cessation immédiate de la diffusion de compétitions olympiques par une plateforme de streaming ne disposant pas des droits médias correspondants, sous astreinte de 1 500 euros par infraction constatée, 3 000 euros par jour pour les distributions continues et 5 000 euros par jour pour défaut de retrait (TJ Paris, réf., 18 sept. 2024, n° 24/53019). Ainsi, toute plateforme retransmettant des matchs de la Coupe du Monde sans détenir les droits cédés par la FIFA s’expose à des mesures d’urgence immédiates, sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport.
• La protection élargie de la marque notoire : La Cour de cassation a confirmé que la protection des marques olympiques s’étendait au-delà de la reproduction stricto sensu : il suffit que la marque soit évoquée ou suggérée, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de démontrer un risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public. Cette solution, fondée sur l’article L.713-5 du code de la propriété intellectuelle, s’est appliquée à un bar ayant utilisé les anneaux olympiques sur ses sous-bocks pour promouvoir ses soirées de retransmission (Cass. crim., 17 janv. 2017, n° 15-86.363). Les marques de la FIFA étant tout aussi notoires sur le plan mondial, le même régime protecteur leur est applicable : une simple évocation des marques officielles, même sans reproduction littérale, pourra caractériser une atteinte sanctionnable.

Certaines opérations marketing peuvent échapper à toute sanction

L’analyse de la jurisprudence et des pratiques promotionnelles permet néanmoins de comprendre les contours de certaines pratiques publicitaires qui pourraient être autorisées (non sanctionnées par les textes susmentionnés), sous réserve qu’elles soient préparées et présentées avec habileté. En voici quelques exemples.

Communication sur un ton décalé ou humoristique : Une approche décalée, voire humoristique, peut permettre d’échapper aux sanctions susvisées.

• Ainsi, la marque de chips Vico du groupe Intersnack avait lancé en 2016 une campagne promotionnelle autour du slogan « Vico, partenaire des supporters à domicile ».
• La société irlandaise Paddy Power avait pour sa part parrainé une course de l’œuf dans la cuiller à « London », village de Bourgogne, pour afficher à Londres pendant les JO de 2012 le slogan : « Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year ! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is) ». Le comité d’organisation des JO avait échoué à faire cesser cette campagne. Humour anglais …
• Le groupe Heineken avait quant à lui commercialisé pendant l’Euro 2016, dont Carlsberg était le sponsor officiel, une gamme de bouteilles aux couleurs des drapeaux de 21 pays ayant « marqué son histoire », parmi lesquels une majorité de participants à la compétition.

Communication d’une donnée informative à titre publicitaire : A été jugé licite l’utilisation de résultats d’un match de rugby et l’annonce d’un prochain match dans un journal pour la promotion d’un véhicule automobile, la publicité indiquant : « France 13 Angleterre 24 – la Fiat 500 félicite l’Angleterre pour sa victoire et donne rendez-vous à l’équipe de France le 9 mars pour France-Italie ». Les juges ont considéré que cette publication « se borne à reproduire un résultat sportif d’actualité, acquis et rendu public en première page du journal d’information sportive, et à faire état d’une rencontre future également connue comme déjà annoncée par le journal dans un article d’information » (Cass. com., 20 mai 2014, n° 13-12.102).

Sponsoring de joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde : Toute société peut conclure des partenariats avec des joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA, par exemple en leur fournissant des équipements ou des vêtements portant son logo. Les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle précisent expressément qu’elles « ne contiennent aucune affirmation relative à des droits détenus par des tierces parties telles que les joueurs, clubs, associations membres [ou] confédérations ». Les directives de la FIFA confirment par ailleurs explicitement que les images génériques liées au football, aux équipes nationales ou aux drapeaux de pays n’entrent pas dans la propriété intellectuelle officielle. La prudence s’impose néanmoins : le partenariat ne doit pas créer l’impression d’une association commerciale avec la FIFA ou la compétition, ni utiliser les marques officielles de la FIFA.

L’approche combinée juridique et marketing dans la conception et la préparation du message d’une telle opération de communication est essentielle pour éviter des poursuites judiciaires, notamment sur le fondement du parasitisme. Certaines campagnes publicitaires peuvent donc légitimement être envisagées, notamment quand elles sont astucieuses.

Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

What the EU decision does (and does not) do

The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

How different payment types are affected in practice

Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

Country notes (alphabetical)

Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

Practical next steps for EU companies

1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

En droit français, les franchiseurs et les distributeurs sont soumis à deux types d’obligations précontractuelles d’information : chaque partie doit spontanément informer son futur partenaire de toute information qu’elle sait déterminante pour son consentement. De plus, pour certains contrats — notamment le contrat de franchise — il existe une obligation de communiquer un nombre limité d’informations dans un document dédié. Ces obligations précontractuelles sont d’ordre public. Ainsi, ces deux obligations s’appliquent simultanément au franchiseur, au distributeur ou au concessionnaire lors de la négociation d’un contrat avec un partenaire.

Points clés à retenir

• Les informations requises par le DIP doivent être intégralement renseignées et actualisées ;
• Les informations non exigées par le DIP mais communiquées par le franchiseur doivent être soigneusement sélectionnées et sincères ;
• Le franchisé doit avoir la possibilité de solliciter des informations complémentaires auprès du franchiseur ;
• L’expérience du franchisé dans le secteur économique concerné permet au franchiseur de limiter considérablement son exposition au risque de nullité du contrat pour vice du consentement ;
• Le franchiseur doit conserver la preuve de la remise effective des informations précontractuelles, qu’elles soient obligatoires ou non.
• L’obligation générale d’information de droit commun (article 1112-1 du Code civil) peut s’appliquer concurremment avec l’obligation spéciale prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce.

Obligation générale d’information applicable à tous les contractants

Quelle est l’étendue de cette obligation précontractuelle d’information ?

Cette obligation s’impose à tous les cocontractants, pour tout type de contrat. En effet, l’article 1112-1 du Code civil dispose que :

(§. 1) Celle des parties qui connaît une information dont l’importance est déterminante pour le consentement de l’autre doit l’en informer dès lors que, légitimement, cette dernière ignore cette information ou fait confiance à son cocontractant.

(§. 3) Ont une importance déterminante les informations qui ont un lien direct et nécessaire avec le contenu du contrat ou la qualité des parties.

Cette obligation s’applique à toutes les parties contractantes, pour tout type de contrat.

La jurisprudence s’est prononcée sur la question du cumul de cette obligation de droit commun, avec l’obligation spéciale d’information prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce (cf infra), en répondant par la positive (CA Paris, 27 mars 2024, n° 22/12665). Le périmètre de cette dernière a toutefois été circonscrit par la Cour de cassation : seules les informations présentant un lien direct et nécessaire avec l’objet du contrat ou la qualité des parties sont soumises à obligation de communication (Cass. com., 14 mai 2025, n° 23-17.948).

À qui incombe la charge de la preuve?

La charge de la preuve repose sur celui qui soutient que l’information lui était due. Il doit alors démontrer (i) que l’autre partie lui devait cette information, mais (ii) ne la lui a pas fournie (article 1112-1 (§. 4) du Code civil).

Obligation spéciale d’information applicable aux contrats de franchise et de distribution

Quels contrats sont soumis à cette règle particulière?

Le droit français impose (art. L. 330-3 du Code de commerce) la communication d’un document d’information précontractuelle (« DIP ») ainsi que du projet de contrat, par toute personne :

• qui accorde à une autre personne le droit d’utiliser une marque, une enseigne ou un nom commercial,
• tout en exigeant un engagement exclusif ou quasi-exclusif pour l’exercice de son activité (par exemple, une obligation d’achat exclusif). Le caractère quasi-exclusif fait l’objet d’une appréciation casuistique par les juges français, indépendamment du seuil de 80% des achats prévu par le règlement UE 2022/720, qui n’est utilisé que comme un repère indicatif.

Concrètement, le DIP doit être remis, par exemple, au franchisé, au distributeur, au concessionnaire ou au licencié de marque, par son franchiseur, fournisseur ou concédant, dès lors que les deux conditions précitées sont réunies. Récemment la jurisprudence française a d’ailleurs eu l’occasion de rappeler que le champ d’application du DIP ne se limitait pas à la franchise, mais également et notamment, au contrat de concession, dès lors que les conditions précitées sont réunies (CA Paris, 22 mai 2024, n° 22/08672).

À quel moment le DIP doit-il être remis?

Le DIP et le projet de contrat doivent être communiqués au moins 20 jours avant la signature du contrat, et, le cas échéant, avant le paiement de toute somme exigée préalablement à la signature (notamment en cas de réservation).

Quelles informations doivent figurer dans le DIP?

L’article R. 330-1 du Code de commerce impose que le DIP mentionne les informations suivantes (liste non exhaustive) relatives :

• Au franchiseur (identité et expérience des dirigeants, parcours professionnel, etc.) ;
• À l’activité du franchiseur (notamment la date de création, le siège social, les références bancaires, l’historique du développement de l’enseigne, les comptes annuels, etc.) ;
• Au réseau (liste des membres avec indication de la date de signature des contrats, liste des établissements proposant les mêmes produits ou services dans la zone d’activité envisagée, nombre de membres ayant quitté le réseau au cours de l’année précédant la remise du DIP avec indication des motifs de départ, etc.) ;
• À la marque concédée (date d’enregistrement, titularité et conditions d’exploitation) ;
• À l’état général du marché (relatif aux produits ou services visés par le contrat) et à l’état local du marché (relatif à la zone d’activité envisagée), ainsi qu’aux facteurs de concurrence et aux perspectives de développement. La Cour de cassation a jugé, s’agissant du marché local, que le franchiseur n’était pas tenu de réaliser une étude de marché, mais que s’il en fournit une, celle-ci doit être exacte et vérifiable (Cass. com., 18 oct. 2023, n° 22-19.329).
• Aux éléments essentiels du projet de contrat, et notamment : sa durée, les conditions de renouvellement, de résiliation et de cession, ainsi que l’étendue des exclusivités accordées ;
• Aux obligations financières pesant sur le cocontractant : nature et montant des dépenses et investissements à engager avant le démarrage de l’activité (droit d’entrée, frais d’installation, etc.).

Au-delà de comporter l’ensemble des informations mentionnées par l’article précité, le DIP doit répondre à une exigence qualitative. En effet toutes les informations communiquées, y compris celles transmises spontanément, doivent être exactes et sincères, afin de garantir un consentement éclairé et exempt de tout vice de la part du candidat à l’entrée dans le réseau.

Comment prouver la remise des informations?

La charge de la preuve de la remise du DIP incombe au débiteur de cette obligation : le franchiseur (Cass. com., 7 juillet 2004, n° 02-15.950). L’idéal pour le franchiseur est de faire signer et dater le DIP par le franchisé le jour de sa remise et d’en conserver la preuve.

La clause contractuelle par laquelle le franchisé reconnaît avoir reçu un DIP complet ne constitue pas une preuve suffisante de la remise effective d’un DIP complet (Cass. com., 10 janvier 2018, n° 15-25.287).

Le franchiseur est-il tenu d’une obligation d’actualisation du DIP jusqu’à la signature du contrat

Dans un arrêt du 26 juin 2024 (n°23-1 14.085 PB) la Cour de cassation retient que la conformité formelle du DIP à la date de sa remise ne suffit pas à exonérer le franchiseur de toute responsabilité précontractuelle. Cette solution est confirmée par un arrêt du 4 décembre 2024 (n° 23-16.684).

Ces deux décisions semblent consacrer une obligation d’actualisation du DIP pesant sur la tête de réseau durant toute la période séparant la remise du document de la conclusion du contrat. Lorsque des événements significatifs surviennent dans cet intervalle (procédure collective affectant des membres du réseau, contentieux majeur, modification structurelle du réseau) la tête de réseau est tenue d’en informer spontanément le candidat. Le juge examine alors si le manquement à cette obligation était susceptible d’altérer l’appréciation que le candidat pouvait avoir du réseau et, partant, de vicier son consentement (Cass. com., 26 juin 2024, op. cit.). Le franchiseur ne saurait donc se retrancher derrière la régularité initiale du DIP pour s’affranchir de son devoir d’information dès lors que la situation du réseau a évolué de manière significative avant la signature du contrat.

Sanctions en cas de manquement aux obligations précontractuelles d’information

Sanction pénale

Le non-respect des obligations relatives au DIP peut exposer le franchiseur ou le fournisseur à une amende pénale pouvant aller jusqu’à 1 500 euros, portée à 3 000 euros en cas de récidive, le montant étant multiplié par cinq pour les personnes morales (article R. 330-2 du Code de commerce).

Nullité du contrat pour dol

Le contrat peut être annulé en cas de manquement à l’article 1112-1 ou à l’article L. 330-3. Dans les deux cas, le non-respect de l’obligation d’information n’est sanctionné que si le demandeur démontre que son consentement a été vicié par l’erreur, le dol ou la violence. Le juge procède à une appréciation in concreto, tenant compte notamment de l’expérience professionnelle et des diligences personnelles du distributeur : un candidat averti aura plus de difficultés à caractériser un dol, et son expérience dans le secteur concerné peut suffire à exonérer le franchiseur (CA Paris, pôle 5 – ch. 11, 26 avr. 2024, n° 21/13205), quand bien même les informations communiquées lacunaires ou inexactes (CA Paris, 20 janv. 2021, n° 19/03382).

Le cas échéant, les parties doivent être remises dans l’état antérieur à la conclusion du contrat.

S’agissant des éléments constitutifs du dol, les tribunaux en apprécient strictement les deux conditions:

• (Un élément matériel) l’existence d’un mensonge ou d’une réticence dolosive (article 1137 du Code civil) ;
• Et (un élément intentionnel) l’intention de tromper son cocontractant (article 1130 du Code civil).

Dommages et intérêts

Bien que les demandes en nullité soient soumises à des conditions très strictes, les franchisés et distributeurs peuvent alternativement obtenir des dommages et intérêts sur le fondement de la responsabilité délictuelle pour manquement à l’obligation précontractuelle d’information, sous réserve de démontrer une faute (information incomplète ou erronée), un préjudice indemnisable (celui-ci se limite à la perte de chance de ne pas contracter ou de contracter à des conditions plus avantageuses – voir en ce sens : Cass. com., 15 mars 2017, n° 15-16.406) et le lien de causalité entre les deux.

From Reporting to Governance and Risk Allocation

Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) considerations are playing an increasingly influential role in how businesses operate, invest, and manage risk, especially within the European Union, where corporate sustainability and responsibility regulation have been on the agenda in recent years.

With the adoption of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), many companies anticipated a significant shift in compliance. Since then, the EU has introduced simplification measures to streamline reporting and due diligence obligations, reduce the administrative burden, and improve proportionality, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while maintaining the core sustainability objectives.

While opinions may differ regarding the evolution of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) in EU regulation and the subsequent postponements of reporting obligations, regulatory developments appear to have, in practice, supported a shift in perspective. Sustainability is no longer viewed solely as a reporting requirement, but increasingly as a matter of governance, strategy, and risk allocation. This development is welcome, as the regulatory framework’s underlying objective is to advance the green transition, which in turn requires a change in how companies integrate sustainability into their decision-making and operations.

This focus on sustainability influences businesses of all sizes, including SMEs. Even companies not directly subject to the CSRD or CSDDD anticipate that ESG requirements will be passed down through the supply chain. Many non-reporting SMEs are already embedding sustainability practices, and this trend is likely to continue. In other words, sustainability policies are already affecting companies well before any formal reporting obligations kick in.

Environmental, Social, and Governance in Contract Architecture

One of the key means of implementing environmental, social, and governance obligations and objectives in day-to-day business operations is through commercial contracts and the requirements and commitments embedded in them.

Even where a company itself is not directly subject to extensive reporting or due diligence obligations, corporate sustainability and responsibility expectations flow through the market via contractual relationships. Larger undertakings within the scope of CSRD and, in due course, the CSDDD require contractual assurances, information rights, and cooperation from their business partners, including SMEs operating within their supply chains. As a result, corporate sustainability and responsibility become a question of contractual architecture. Companies must consider not only price mechanisms, liability caps and termination triggers, but also how environmental, social and governance risks and obligations are addressed and allocated between the parties through legally enforceable contractual terms.

Translating Policies into Binding Obligations

A typical starting point is the incorporation of a code of conduct or sustainability policies into commercial contracts, often by reference and through an express obligation on the contracting party to comply with them. From a legal standpoint, this raises important drafting questions. Many codes are drafted as high-level public statements. When such policies are converted into contractual commitments, their wording, scope, and hierarchy relative to the main agreement require careful consideration. The obligations must be sufficiently clear to define the parties’ expectations, coherent with other contractual provisions, and proportionate to the commercial relationship. The obligations must also be capable of practical implementation and effective monitoring in the context of the agreement.

In practical terms, this may mean requiring the supplier to comply with specific labour standards, maintain documented environmental management procedures, report on emissions data, ensure traceability of key raw materials, or allow reasonable access for audits. Clearly defining what is expected, how compliance is demonstrated, and what consequences follow from non-compliance is essential for the clause to function effectively. Otherwise, clauses that appear comprehensive in theory and ambitious in scope may offer limited enforceability in practice, and their impact may remain marginal if compliance cannot be effectively monitored and verified. If policies are not properly translated into binding and operational obligations, the company risks a mismatch between what it promises publicly and what is actually required under its contracts. This may undermine consistency, weaken risk management, and expose the company to reputational and governance risks if its own stated principles cannot be enforced within its supply or distribution chain.

As part of this process, companies must also consider the protection of trade secrets and confidential information. For example, broad audit or data-reporting obligations may raise concerns about sensitive business information. Contractual terms should balance transparency with the need to protect legitimately proprietary data. Clauses such as confidentiality agreements or carve-outs for trade secrets can be used to ensure that sharing ESG-related information does not compromise confidential business information or competitive advantages.

Environmental, Social and Governance Clauses Across Different Contract Types

Besides codes of conduct and sustainability policies, environmental, social and governance-related clauses increasingly take more tailored and transaction-specific forms. In shareholder agreements, sustainability objectives may be reflected in governance structures or even linked to financial outcomes, for example by aligning dividend policies or incentive mechanisms with agreed climate targets. In employment contracts, obligations may extend beyond general compliance and include participation in corporate sustainability training programmes or adherence to internal sustainability guidelines as part of performance expectations.

In supply and manufacturing agreements, environmental, social and governance provisions may address traceability of raw materials, emissions reporting, waste management, energy efficiency standards or the right to replace a supplier if its environmental practices materially conflict with the contracting party’s sustainability commitments. Such contractual mechanisms increasingly affect SMEs operating as suppliers, as ESG expectations pass through the supply chain.

Construction contracts often include detailed requirements regarding material selection, lifecycle impacts, carbon footprint calculations and recycling or waste reduction procedures. For example, in Finland, legislation imposes low-carbon and energy efficiency requirements for new buildings, and a party undertaking a construction project is subject to mandatory reporting obligations relating to construction and demolition waste. These statutory requirements are typically reflected and implemented in the relevant project and construction contracts.

Across these different contract types, the practical significance is consistent. Environmental, social and governance considerations move from the level of general policy into legally enforceable obligations tailored to each specific legal relationship. Contracts function as a mechanism for allocating responsibility, managing compliance risk and aligning commercial incentives with sustainability objectives.

Proportionate Monitoring and Audit Rights

In the contractual implementation and monitoring of environmental, social and governance obligations, audit and information rights play a central role. They are closely linked to effective oversight and form an integral part of a coherent contractual framework. In practice, companies typically seek access to relevant data from their business partners and, where appropriate, establish inspection or audit rights to enable meaningful monitoring and verification, whether conducted directly by the company or, commonly, by an independent expert appointed for that purpose.

However, such arrangements must remain balanced. Overly burdensome provisions may needlessly disrupt day-to-day operations and reduce the willingness to cooperate, particularly for SMEs with limited administrative capacity. By contrast, well-designed mechanisms that balance transparency with confidentiality and operational feasibility are more defensible and more likely to function effectively in practice.

Contractual Remedies

As a general principle, the consequences of a breach are determined by the terms agreed between the parties. In practice, the parties will typically first seek to resolve the matter through discussion and good faith negotiations, allowing the non-compliant party an opportunity to clarify the situation and implement corrective actions within a reasonable timeframe. If negotiations do not lead to a resolution, it may be appropriate to proceed to stronger measures, such as contractual penalties, indemnification obligations, price adjustments, temporary suspension rights or other agreed sanctions, applied in light of the nature and severity of the breach.

The contract should clearly define what constitutes a breach, how it is assessed and what remedies are available in each scenario. Clear and proportionate step-by-step remedy structures enhance legal certainty, reduce the risk of disputes and ensure that material or repeated breaches may trigger more significant consequences, including termination where justified.

Strategic and Voluntary Environmental, Social and Governance Commitments

In the current EU landscape, implementing ESG considerations in commercial contracts is no longer simply a matter of reacting to directives. It is a broader exercise in risk management and corporate governance. Even as the implementation details of the directives may continue to evolve, market expectations, financing conditions and reputational considerations remain key drivers of sustainability integration.

In addition, some companies choose to position themselves as frontrunners in sustainability for strategic and reputational reasons. They may therefore incorporate voluntary environmental, social and governance mechanisms and requirements into their contracts that go beyond, or are not directly derived from, binding directives. By doing so, they signal to investors, customers and other stakeholders that sustainability is treated as a core business priority rather than merely a compliance obligation.

At the same time, it is important to recognise the practical limits of such commitments. Ambitious sustainability requirements may be more challenging for SMEs with limited financial and administrative resources. Meeting extensive reporting, certification or traceability standards can require investments in systems, personnel and external expertise. If contractual expectations are not calibrated to the size and capacity of the counterparty, they may limit the ability of SMEs to participate in certain supply chains. A balanced and proportionate approach helps ensure that sustainability objectives remain achievable and commercially workable across the contractual chain.

Conclusion

For legal practitioners, the central task is not to increase the number of environmental, social and governance clauses as such, but to ensure their quality, coherence and practical relevance. The objective is to design contractual mechanisms that are proportionate, enforceable and aligned with the company’s actual risk profile, industry context and sustainability priorities. Commercial contracts remain one of the most concrete tools for translating sustainability strategy into operational practice. Moreover, every contract lawyer should understand and apply key sustainability principles in their work, ensuring that ESG commitments become integral to legal advice and contract drafting.

The Strait of Hormuz is likely the most strategically important point for the global oil trade. In fact, approximately 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through this narrow passage between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf every day.

Following the outbreak of war in the region, the impact on energy markets was almost immediate: oil prices quickly rose above $100 per barrel, and it is unclear how high they may climb in the coming weeks and months. As a result, transportation, production, and procurement costs are rising across industrial supply chains in many sectors.

For many companies engaged in international trade, this phenomenon creates a very real problem. Contracts signed months (or years) earlier—perhaps at a fixed price—must be fulfilled in a completely different economic context.

A manufacturer that sells goods for delivery in six or twelve months may find itself producing and shipping at much higher energy costs, while the price agreed upon with the customer remains unchanged.

This is a situation that recurs cyclically, for various reasons: from the COVID-19 pandemic to the subsequent raw materials crisis, and on to current geopolitical tensions.

When the increase in costs is so sudden and significant, a question inevitably arises: must the contract still be performed under the original terms, or is it possible to suspend or renegotiate the agreement to adapt it to the new circumstances?

The answer depends on several factors: first and foremost, on what the parties have (or have not) provided for in the contract, but also on the law applicable to the relationship and on the interpretation that judges or arbitrators may give to the rules in the event of a dispute.

Force Majeure and Hardship: Two Different Concepts

When extraordinary events occur—such as a war, an energy crisis, or the disruption of a trade route—many operators immediately invoke force majeure. However, in most cases, these situations fall instead under the category of hardship.

It is therefore essential to distinguish between these two situations.

When an Event Constitutes Force Majeure

Force majeure applies to cases where an extraordinary and unforeseeable event makes it impossible to perform the contract.

The characteristics of the grounds for exemption from liability depend on the law applicable to the commercial relationship, but generally require:

• unpredictability of the event;
• the event being beyond the affected party’s control;
• the impossibility of avoiding or overcoming the event through reasonable efforts.

Typical examples include:

• orders from authorities requiring the suspension of production
• embargoes or export bans
• logistical disruptions caused by war

In these situations, performance is not merely more costly: it becomes objectively impossible. The consequence is that the party unable to perform is generally exempt from liability for the duration of the event.

Hardship

The situation is different when performance of the contract remains possible but becomes economically much more burdensome.

The concept of hardship is generally based on four prerequisites:

1. an event occurring after the conclusion of the contract
2. unpredictability and extraordinary nature of the event
3. a substantial alteration of the economic balance of the contract
4. excessive burden of performance, but not impossibility

A sharp increase in the price of oil, gas, or other raw materials often falls into this category.

Goods can be produced and delivered, but doing so may entail costs far higher than those anticipated when the contract was signed.

The ripple effect along the international supply chain

In global industrial supply chains, the same goods are often the subject of a series of consecutive contracts.

The manufacturer sells to a trader, who sells to a processing company, which resells to an importer in another country, who in turn distributes the product to the end market.

When a hardship event occurs—such as a sharp rise in energy prices—the effect tends to ripple throughout the entire supply chain.

The first party affected by the cost increase will try to pass the increase on to its contractual counterpart, who, in turn, will find themselves in the same situation with the next link in the chain.

The risk is clear: one of the operators in the middle of the chain may face increased upstream costs without being able to pass them on downstream.

This is one of the most common problems in international supply chains.

What happens if there is no clause regarding price fluctuations

In commercial practice, it often happens that parties operate on the basis of orders and order confirmations without a formal written contract, or that a contract exists but contains no provisions regarding price fluctuations or hardship.

In such cases, when costs increase sharply, it is necessary to determine which law applies to individual sales contracts across the supply chain.

This can lead to very different situations:

• one law may allow for price revision or termination of the contract
• another law aplicable to a second contract may not provide for equivalent remedies
• a third contract may contain much more restrictive contractual clauses

The practical result is that an operator in the middle of the chain may face a price increase from their supplier without being able to pass it on to the customer.

A Common Legal Framework: The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG)

Fortunately, many international sales contracts are governed by the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).

The convention has been ratified by 97 countries, including Italy and most major trading partners, such as the U.S., Canada, China, Germany, France, Spain, etc.

The central provision is Article 79, according to which a party is not liable for non-performance if it proves that the non-performance is due to an impediment:

• beyond its control
• unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract
• unavoidable or insurmountable

Traditionally, this provision has been applied to cases of force majeure.

In recent years, there has been debate over whether it can also be applied to cases of hardship, but international case law tends to be very cautious.

International case law on Hardship

Court decisions reflect a rather strict approach.

In some cases, even very significant increases in raw material costs have not been considered sufficient to modify or suspend the contract.

The reasoning is simple: those who operate professionally in international trade must take into account a certain degree of market volatility.

Only when the increase in costs exceeds an exceptional and unforeseeable level such as to radically alter the balance of the contract can hardship be invoked.

One of the most frequently cited cases is the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision in the Scafom case, which recognized the right to renegotiate the contract following a 70% increase in the price of steel.

However, such cases are relatively rare.

Generic clauses that serve no purpose

Many contracts contain hardship clauses copied from standard templates (boilerplate).

The problem is that these clauses often:

• list the effects of hardship
• but do not define when hardship actually occurs

The result is that, when prices rise, the parties may have very different opinions on what constitutes an “exceptional” increase and whether the event in question was “unforeseeable” or not.

The clause, therefore, does not resolve the issue, but defers it to discussion between the parties and, in the event of a failure to reach an agreement, to the courts or arbitrators.

What criteria can define a hardship situation

To make the clause truly effective, it is useful to establish objective parameters.

Among the most commonly used in international contracts:

• an increase or decrease in the price of a raw material beyond a certain threshold (±20% or ±30%)
• an increase in transportation or logistics costs within certain limits;
• significant fluctuations in the exchange rate beyond a specified range;
• the introduction of tariffs or trade restrictions

These parameters, linked to tolerance ranges, allow the parties to quickly and unambiguously identify a hardship event.

Remedies in the Event of Hardship

An effective clause should also address how to handle the situation.

The most common solutions are:

• renegotiation of the contract in good faith
• apply an automatic price adjustment
• appointment of an independent third-party expert to determine the new price
• temporary suspension of the contract
• right of withdrawal if no agreement is reached

These tools allow the parties to manage the crisis without resorting to litigation.

Audit of existing contracts: what to do now

At this point, the practical question becomes: how should we manage the issue in existing business relationships?

The first step is to conduct an audit of existing contracts with suppliers and customers.

1. Introduce comprehensive contracts in new relationships

If the relationships are governed solely by purchase orders and order confirmations, it is advisable to take this opportunity to draft comprehensive international sales contracts that include:

• a hardship clause
• warranty provisions
• remedies for breach
• limitations of liability

2. Update existing contracts

If the relationship is already governed by a contract, you should check whether a hardship clause exists.

If not, it may be useful to propose to the other party:

• a new contract, or
• a contract addendum dedicated to managing price fluctuations.

This helps prevent future conflicts and provides both parties with an effective tool to manage potential price shocks along the supply chain.

Conclusion

Commodity and energy crises demonstrate how exposed international contracts are to sudden changes in economic conditions. When a contract does not clearly address hardship management, the risk does not disappear; it simply shifts along the supply chain until it settles on the weakest link.

For this reason, companies operating within international supply chains should view the hardship clause as a strategic tool for managing contractual risk. A well-drafted contract does not eliminate market volatility, but it allows the parties to address it with clear rules, reducing uncertainty and preventing disputes.

Executive Summary

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) remains one of the most ambitious integration projects in the world. Yet, several years into its operational phase, it has not (yet) delivered the structural shift many expected. A recent analysis underscores the gap between political momentum and economic reality: implementation remains uneven, the agreement is still used by only a portion of participating states, and non-tariff barriers and infrastructure deficits continue to dominate the cost of doing business across borders.  For Egypt, the opportunity is still real — but it depends less on treaty headlines and more on enabling conditions: trade logistics, customs efficiency, regulatory convergence, and competitive industrial capacity. 

Looking Back: The Promise of a Single African Market

When the AfCFTA was launched, expectations were understandably high. A continent-wide trade framework was supposed to reduce tariffs, facilitate trade in goods and services, and strengthen regional value chains — with the broader goal of moving African economies up the value ladder.

In my 2022 article, I asked whether AfCFTA could become a game changer for Egypt, given Egypt’s industrial base, strategic geography, and the potential to diversify export markets beyond traditional partners. (For background, see the earlier article here”).

The Reality Check: Intra-African Trade Remains Structurally Weak

Several years later, the interim assessment is sobering. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) recently put it, AfCFTA is not a “game changer” yet, and only about half of member states currently meet the practical prerequisites to trade under the agreement.

A deeper reason is structural: no other world region trades so little with itself, and while statistics may undercount informal cross-border flows (especially in food), the overall picture remains unchanged.

Trade integration cannot deliver transformative outcomes if production, logistics, and institutions do not support scale.

Implementation Has Been Slow — and Often Symbolic

Operationalisation did not start with full-scale liberalisation. Instead, the AfCFTA began with a pilot approach: the Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) launched in October 2022, initially with eight states, later joined by additional countries, including Nigeria and South Africa by spring 2025.

The GTI created valuable learning effects, but it also underlined a key point: early progress was often presented through symbolic deals, while product coverage and volumes remained limited. FAZ highlights that only selected goods could be traded duty-free and that key sectors remained constrained for a long time due to missing or unresolved technical rules.

A pilot, however, cannot substitute for full operational certainty — the kind businesses need to restructure supply chains and invest.

Tariffs Are Not the Main Barrier — Trade Costs Are

AfCFTA is frequently discussed in terms of tariff liberalisation. Yet, evidence suggests that the largest gains do not come from tariffs but from reducing non-tariff barriers and improving trade infrastructure.

FAZ points to a central reality: tariffs tend to add around 20–30% to intra-African trade costs, whereas non-tariff costs can be far higher — driven by bureaucracy, lack of harmonised standards, inefficient border processes, and transport barriers.

This is the crux: even with reduced tariffs, trade will not expand meaningfully if goods still cannot move cheaply, quickly, and predictably.

Integration Complexity and Distributional Politics

Africa’s integration landscape is shaped by multiple overlapping regional economic communities and trade regimes. This creates legal and administrative complexity — often described as an integration “spaghetti bowl.” FAZ notes the challenge of coordination and the continued fragmentation of rules.

There is also a political economy dimension. Intra-African trade is heavily influenced by a small number of larger economies — and the distribution of benefits matters. FAZ highlights the dominance of major players (notably South Africa) and the concern that tariff liberalisation alone may entrench existing industrial advantages.

Where governments expect asymmetric outcomes, resistance often takes the form of delay, narrow implementation, or persistent non-tariff barriers.

What This Means for Egypt: The Opportunity Is Real — But Conditional

Egypt’s strategic case for AfCFTA participation remains strong: industrial potential, geographic location, and the opportunity to access and shape growing markets. But the experience so far suggests that the treaty text alone does not generate trade flows.

For Egypt’s private sector, the decisive factors are practical:

• predictable and efficient customs clearance and border procedures,
• logistics corridors and port efficiency,
• regulatory convergence (standards, certification, compliance),
• stable access to trade finance and payments,
• competitive energy and production conditions for manufacturing and processing.

AfCFTA can support these developments — but it cannot replace them.

The “Game Changer” Pathway: What Must Happen Next

FAZ concludes that AfCFTA will only become truly impactful if it is paired with the fundamentals: major infrastructure investment, stronger production and processing capacity, and a credible industrial policy.

At the same time, Africa faces a classic chicken-and-egg problem: without development there is limited investment appeal; without investment there is limited development.

For Egypt and its partners, a pragmatic strategy would be to:

1. treat AfCFTA as a platform for real trade-cost reduction, not only tariff debates;
2. focus on a limited number of scalable corridors and sectors where regional value chains can realistically grow;
3. strengthen implementation capacity so that preferences become usable for firms — especially SMEs;
4. enhance legal certainty and dispute resolution reliability for cross-border commerce.

Conclusion

AfCFTA remains a landmark achievement in terms of political commitment. But as of today, it has not yet been the “game changer” many hoped for.

For Egypt, the key question is no longer whether AfCFTA is visionary — it is. The question is whether governments and businesses can translate it into lower real trade costs, higher competitiveness, and bankable cross-border transactions. If those enabling conditions improve, AfCFTA’s promise can still become commercial reality.

After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

Why wine matters in this agreement

The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

1. tariff liberalisation;
2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the « Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures » (SPS) and « Technical Barriers to Trade » (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

Geographical indications: protection and tension

One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
2. transition periods for local operators;
3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

Services, distribution, and market structure

Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

1. logistics providers
2. distribution networks
3. commercial representation
4. marketing and advertising agencies

For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

Legal advisors will need to consider:

1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
3. compliance with competition rules

The implementation gap: where risk lies

Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

1. managing client expectations
2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

What should lawyers be doing now?

Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

Final sip

The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

Lors d’évènements de grande ampleur, tels que la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026, certaines entreprises tentent d’associer « sauvagement » leur marque ou image à l’évènement par une pratique d’« ambush marketing » (marketing d’embuscade) définie par la jurisprudence comme une « stratégie publicitaire mise en place par une entreprise afin d’associer son image commerciale à celle d’un événement et donc de profiter de l’impact médiatique dudit événement sans s’acquitter des droits qui y sont relatifs et sans avoir obtenu au préalable l’autorisation de l’organisateur de l’événement » (CA Paris, 2e chambre, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912). Une pratique risquée et sanctionnée, mais parfois envisageable.

Points clés à retenir

• L’ambush marketing est une pratique sanctionnée mais qui n’est pas interdite en soi.
• En contrepartie de leurs investissements dans la compétition, les sponsors et partenaires officiels de la FIFA bénéficient d’une protection juridique très importante, par l’intermédiaire de divers textes généraux (contrefaçon, parasitisme, propriété intellectuelle) ou plus particuliers (droit du sport), contre toutes formes d’ambush marketing.
• La Coupe du Monde de la FIFA fait l’objet d’une protection renforcée fondée sur un portefeuille étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier et sur les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, en l’absence de législation française spécifique comparable à celle instituée pour les Jeux Olympiques.
• Ces droits ne sont pas absolus et il reste néanmoins de minces opportunités permettant une pratique, astucieuse, du marketing d’embuscade.

La protection des sponsors et partenaires officiels de la Coupe du Monde contre l’ambush marketing

Fort d’une audience mondiale de près de 5 milliards de personnes sur l’ensemble des plateformes lors de sa dernière édition au Qatar en 2022 – dont plus de 1,5 milliard pour la seule finale – la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 est l’évènement sportif le plus suivi de la planète. Accueilli pour la première fois par trois pays (Canada, Mexique et États-Unis), il réunit 48 équipes et plus de 1 200 joueurs pour 104 matchs dans 16 stades. Son organisation est financée dans une large mesure par les différents partenaires, sponsors et détenteurs de droits officiels, qui bénéficient en contrepartie d’un droit exclusif d’utilisation des marques et propriétés intellectuelles officielles de la FIFA afin d’y associer leur propre image et signes distinctifs.

La pratique d’ambush marketing n’est pas sanctionnée en tant que telle par le droit français, mais de nombreux textes épars permettent de protéger largement les sponsors et partenaires de manifestations sportives de dimension mondiale contre l’ambush marketing. Ils sont en effet légitimes à pouvoir jouir paisiblement des droits qui leur sont offerts en contrepartie de leurs larges investissements réalisés dans le cadre d’évènements tels que, par exemple, les coupes du monde de football ou de rugby, ou les Jeux Olympiques.

Peuvent notamment être invoqués par les sponsors officiels et par les organisateurs de telles manifestations :

• les protections « classiques » offertes par le droit de la propriété intellectuelle (droit des marques et droit d’auteur) au titre de l’action en contrefaçon fondée sur le Code de la propriété intellectuelle,
• le droit de la responsabilité civile (parasitisme et concurrence déloyale fondés sur l’article 1240 du Code civil),
• le droit de la consommation (pratiques commerciales trompeuses),
• mais aussi des textes plus spécifiques tels que la protection des droits d’exploitation des fédérations sportives et des organisateurs de manifestations sportives prévue par l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, qui confère aux organisateurs de manifestations sportives un monopole d’exploitation.

Sur ces fondements, ont par exemple été sanctionnées les pratiques d’ambush marketing suivantes :

• L’exploitation d’une compétition de tennis et l’utilisation, pendant l’évènement sportif, de la marque associée à celui-ci : L’organisation de paris en ligne portant sur le tournoi de Roland Garros, utilisant le signe protégé et la marque Roland Garros pour viser les matchs sur lesquels les paris étaient organisés. L’exploitation illicite de la compétition sportive est sanctionnée à hauteur de 400 000 euros sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, la Fédération française de tennis étant seule propriétaire du droit d’exploitation de Roland Garros. L’utilisation de la marque est également sanctionnée au titre de la contrefaçon (à hauteur de 300 000 euros) et du parasitisme (à hauteur de 500 000 euros) (CA Paris, 14 oct. 2009, n° 08/19179).
• Une campagne publicitaire réalisée pendant un festival de cinéma reproduisant la marque déposée de l’évènement : L’organisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, d’une opération de communication digitale par une marque de cosmétique à travers la publication de vidéos sur ses réseaux sociaux, sur certains plans desquelles était visible l’affiche officielle du festival de Cannes, l’une d’elles reproduisant la marque déposée de la palme d’or. Sanctionnée sur les fondements de la contrefaçon de droits d’auteur et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (TJ Paris, 11 déc. 2020, n° 19/08543).
• Une campagne publicitaire visant à se voir attribuer à tort la qualité de partenaire officiel d’un évènement : L’utilisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, du slogan « coiffeur officiel des femmes » associé aux expressions « Cannes » et « Festival de Cannes », laissant faussement croire au public que l’entreprise était partenaire officiel du festival. Sanctionnée sur le fondement de la concurrence déloyale et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (CA Paris, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912).

Ces sanctions pécuniaires peuvent se cumuler avec des injonctions de cessation des pratiques et/ou des mesures de publication dans la presse, sous astreinte.

La protection spécifique des marques de la FIFA

À la différence des Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024, qui bénéficiaient d’une loi française spécifique en tant que pays hôte (loi n° 2018-202 du 26 mars 2018 relative à l’organisation des Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024) et réservant notamment les espaces publicitaires à proximité des sites de compétition aux seuls partenaires officiels, la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 ne se tenant pas sur le territoire français, aucun dispositif légal français équivalent n’est applicable. La protection des partenaires et sponsors officiels repose donc sur le droit commun, mais elle n’en est pas moins solide.

La FIFA a constitué un portefeuille très étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier, protégées en France par les dispositions du Code de la propriété intellectuelle. Ces marques comprennent notamment la marque verbale et figurative FIFA®, les marques FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, ainsi que l’emblème officiel de la compétition (combinant le trophée et le chiffre 26), le slogan officiel « We Are 26™ » / « Nous Sommes 26™ », les logos des seize villes hôtes, et la police typographique officielle « FWC 26 », protégée par le droit d’auteur. Seuls les détenteurs de droits de la FIFA, c’est-à-dire les Partenaires FIFA (au premier rang desquels figurent Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways et Visa), les Sponsors Plus, les Sponsors officiels et les Supporters régionaux, sont autorisés à utiliser à des fins commerciales cette propriété intellectuelle officielle.

La FIFA a publié des directives relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, qui précisent en détail les usages autorisés et interdits des marques et logos liés à la Coupe du Monde 2026. Selon ces directives, sont notamment prohibés, sans autorisation, toute utilisation des marques officielles dans une publicité commerciale ; l’intégration de la propriété intellectuelle officielle dans un nom commercial ou un nom de domaine ; l’organisation de concours ou jeux-concours créant une association avec la compétition ; l’utilisation des marques officielles pour décorer un magasin ; et l’usage par un compte professionnel de hashtags officiels dans un but commercial. Ces directives précisent en outre que la protection s’étend non seulement à la reproduction à l’identique des marques officielles, mais également à leurs variantes dont la similitude peut prêter à confusion. Cette protection rappelée par les lignes directrices est en cohérence avec la protection élargie accordée aux marques notoires en droit français par l’article L.713-5 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle.

Les leçons des JO de Paris 2024 : quels risques pour les marques ?

Les Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024 ont donné lieu à un contentieux abondant qui éclaire concrètement les risques auxquels s’exposent les entreprises tentées par l’ambush marketing lors d’un évènement sportif majeur. Si ces décisions ont été rendues dans le contexte spécifique des JO, pendant lesquels protections légales spécifiques renforcées s’appliquaient, elles constituent néanmoins un avertissement direct pour les marques qui envisageraient des stratégies similaires lors de la Coupe du Monde, sur le fondement du droit commun.

• L’utilisation de symboles officiels sur des supports physiques itinérants : Pendant les JO de Paris 2024, une société chinoise du secteur laitier avait fait circuler dans Paris des bus arborant les anneaux olympiques associés à ses propres marques, tout en se présentant comme « la seule société laitière chinoise présente à Paris 2024 ». La Cour d’appel de Paris a confirmé tant le parasitisme que la contrefaçon de marque, et condamné les sociétés concernées, en référé, au paiement d’une provision de 20 000 euros, assortie d’une astreinte de 20 000 euros par jour et par infraction constatée, visant à faire cesser la diffusion des publicités (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 2, 21 nov. 2025, n° 24/15283 ; TJ Paris, ordonnance de référé du 8 août 2024, 24/55463).
• La retransmission non autorisée de compétitions : Le tribunal judiciaire de Paris a ordonné en référé, pendant les JO, la cessation immédiate de la diffusion de compétitions olympiques par une plateforme de streaming ne disposant pas des droits médias correspondants, sous astreinte de 1 500 euros par infraction constatée, 3 000 euros par jour pour les distributions continues et 5 000 euros par jour pour défaut de retrait (TJ Paris, réf., 18 sept. 2024, n° 24/53019). Ainsi, toute plateforme retransmettant des matchs de la Coupe du Monde sans détenir les droits cédés par la FIFA s’expose à des mesures d’urgence immédiates, sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport.
• La protection élargie de la marque notoire : La Cour de cassation a confirmé que la protection des marques olympiques s’étendait au-delà de la reproduction stricto sensu : il suffit que la marque soit évoquée ou suggérée, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de démontrer un risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public. Cette solution, fondée sur l’article L.713-5 du code de la propriété intellectuelle, s’est appliquée à un bar ayant utilisé les anneaux olympiques sur ses sous-bocks pour promouvoir ses soirées de retransmission (Cass. crim., 17 janv. 2017, n° 15-86.363). Les marques de la FIFA étant tout aussi notoires sur le plan mondial, le même régime protecteur leur est applicable : une simple évocation des marques officielles, même sans reproduction littérale, pourra caractériser une atteinte sanctionnable.

Certaines opérations marketing peuvent échapper à toute sanction

L’analyse de la jurisprudence et des pratiques promotionnelles permet néanmoins de comprendre les contours de certaines pratiques publicitaires qui pourraient être autorisées (non sanctionnées par les textes susmentionnés), sous réserve qu’elles soient préparées et présentées avec habileté. En voici quelques exemples.

Communication sur un ton décalé ou humoristique : Une approche décalée, voire humoristique, peut permettre d’échapper aux sanctions susvisées.

• Ainsi, la marque de chips Vico du groupe Intersnack avait lancé en 2016 une campagne promotionnelle autour du slogan « Vico, partenaire des supporters à domicile ».
• La société irlandaise Paddy Power avait pour sa part parrainé une course de l’œuf dans la cuiller à « London », village de Bourgogne, pour afficher à Londres pendant les JO de 2012 le slogan : « Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year ! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is) ». Le comité d’organisation des JO avait échoué à faire cesser cette campagne. Humour anglais …
• Le groupe Heineken avait quant à lui commercialisé pendant l’Euro 2016, dont Carlsberg était le sponsor officiel, une gamme de bouteilles aux couleurs des drapeaux de 21 pays ayant « marqué son histoire », parmi lesquels une majorité de participants à la compétition.

Communication d’une donnée informative à titre publicitaire : A été jugé licite l’utilisation de résultats d’un match de rugby et l’annonce d’un prochain match dans un journal pour la promotion d’un véhicule automobile, la publicité indiquant : « France 13 Angleterre 24 – la Fiat 500 félicite l’Angleterre pour sa victoire et donne rendez-vous à l’équipe de France le 9 mars pour France-Italie ». Les juges ont considéré que cette publication « se borne à reproduire un résultat sportif d’actualité, acquis et rendu public en première page du journal d’information sportive, et à faire état d’une rencontre future également connue comme déjà annoncée par le journal dans un article d’information » (Cass. com., 20 mai 2014, n° 13-12.102).

Sponsoring de joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde : Toute société peut conclure des partenariats avec des joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA, par exemple en leur fournissant des équipements ou des vêtements portant son logo. Les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle précisent expressément qu’elles « ne contiennent aucune affirmation relative à des droits détenus par des tierces parties telles que les joueurs, clubs, associations membres [ou] confédérations ». Les directives de la FIFA confirment par ailleurs explicitement que les images génériques liées au football, aux équipes nationales ou aux drapeaux de pays n’entrent pas dans la propriété intellectuelle officielle. La prudence s’impose néanmoins : le partenariat ne doit pas créer l’impression d’une association commerciale avec la FIFA ou la compétition, ni utiliser les marques officielles de la FIFA.

L’approche combinée juridique et marketing dans la conception et la préparation du message d’une telle opération de communication est essentielle pour éviter des poursuites judiciaires, notamment sur le fondement du parasitisme. Certaines campagnes publicitaires peuvent donc légitimement être envisagées, notamment quand elles sont astucieuses.

Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

What the EU decision does (and does not) do

The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

How different payment types are affected in practice

Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

Country notes (alphabetical)

Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.

Netherlands: The Netherlands applies a 25.8% conditional withholding tax on interest, royalties, and (since 1 January 2024) dividends paid to related entities in EU-listed jurisdictions or low-tax jurisdictions, as well as CFC rules with counterevidence possible. The Netherlands follows a static approach: the list applicable for a tax year is based on the EU list as it stood at the end of the preceding year, using the October update as the reference. This means the Dutch 2027 Regulation will include Vietnam only if Vietnam remains on the EU list after the October 2026 review cycle. No withholding tax consequences arise for Dutch payers immediately in 2026 as a direct result of Vietnam’s February 2026 listing, but the October 2026 review date is critical: if Vietnam remains listed, Dutch conditional withholding tax obligations will activate from 1 January 2027. Dutch payers with intragroup dividend, interest, and royalty flows to Vietnam should use the current window to restructure documentation and pricing support and to assess whether existing double tax treaty protections remain effective in light of the conditional WHT mechanics.

Spain: Spain does not mechanically mirror the EU list, but operates its own domestic list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, which is updated separately and can include or exclude jurisdictions differently from Annex I. Spain applies a static approach, with the list specified in law. The practical implication is that the Spanish domestic tax consequences of Vietnam’s listing depend on whether and when Spain updates its domestic list to include Vietnam, rather than arising automatically from the EU Council’s February 2026 decision. For Spain-based procurement and finance teams, do not assume a one-to-one mapping between EU-list status and Spanish domestic tax outcomes, but do treat Vietnam-linked transactions as higher-scrutiny items from an audit and counterparty due diligence perspective, and invest in cleaner contracting, invoice narratives, and performance evidence for services, royalties, and intragroup charges.

Practical next steps for EU companies

1. Map exposures: Identify and quantify all payment streams relating to Vietnamese entities, broken down by payment type (goods, services, royalties, intragroup charges, financing).
2. Understand your Member State’s rules: Confirm which defensive measures apply in the relevant EU payer jurisdiction, when they take effect (immediately or staged), whether the jurisdiction follows the EU list dynamically or statically, what relief conditions exist, and what documentation is required.
3. DAC6 readiness: Assess whether Vietnam-linked arrangements trigger DAC6 reporting obligations (particularly deductible cross-border payments between associated enterprises) and ensure reporting infrastructure is in place.
4. Transfer pricing and substance: Validate intercompany services, royalties and financing arrangements by reassessing pricing, benefit tests and contractual terms; strengthen contemporaneous documentation before year-end.
5. Public CbCR messaging: If within scope, assess public CbCR disclosure implications for Vietnam operations and align tax, legal, ESG and investor-relations communications accordingly.
6. Vendor due diligence: Implement or strengthen due diligence on Vietnamese counterparties, including tax residence evidence, beneficial ownership documentation, and substance and economic activity confirmation.
7. Banking compliance pack: Build a pre-assembled documentation pack for Vietnam-corridor payments (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale, beneficial ownership information) to address bank queries within hours rather than days.
8. Monitor the October 2026 review: Track Vietnam’s progress on EOIR reforms and the EU Code of Conduct Group’s October 2026 review cycle. If Vietnam is removed from Annex I in October 2026, Member States that follow a static approach (Germany, Netherlands) will not apply defensive measures to Vietnam in their 2027 rules; France, which also follows a static approach but applies additional domestic criteria, may nonetheless retain Vietnam on its own non-cooperative state list even after EU delisting. The October 2026 outcome is therefore commercially significant for medium-term planning.
9. Embed internal governance: Install jurisdiction-risk gateways in approval workflows for new entities, contracts, loans, and IP arrangements involving Vietnam, to ensure proper sign-off and documentation from inception.

En droit français, les franchiseurs et les distributeurs sont soumis à deux types d’obligations précontractuelles d’information : chaque partie doit spontanément informer son futur partenaire de toute information qu’elle sait déterminante pour son consentement. De plus, pour certains contrats — notamment le contrat de franchise — il existe une obligation de communiquer un nombre limité d’informations dans un document dédié. Ces obligations précontractuelles sont d’ordre public. Ainsi, ces deux obligations s’appliquent simultanément au franchiseur, au distributeur ou au concessionnaire lors de la négociation d’un contrat avec un partenaire.

Points clés à retenir

• Les informations requises par le DIP doivent être intégralement renseignées et actualisées ;
• Les informations non exigées par le DIP mais communiquées par le franchiseur doivent être soigneusement sélectionnées et sincères ;
• Le franchisé doit avoir la possibilité de solliciter des informations complémentaires auprès du franchiseur ;
• L’expérience du franchisé dans le secteur économique concerné permet au franchiseur de limiter considérablement son exposition au risque de nullité du contrat pour vice du consentement ;
• Le franchiseur doit conserver la preuve de la remise effective des informations précontractuelles, qu’elles soient obligatoires ou non.
• L’obligation générale d’information de droit commun (article 1112-1 du Code civil) peut s’appliquer concurremment avec l’obligation spéciale prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce.

Obligation générale d’information applicable à tous les contractants

Quelle est l’étendue de cette obligation précontractuelle d’information ?

Cette obligation s’impose à tous les cocontractants, pour tout type de contrat. En effet, l’article 1112-1 du Code civil dispose que :

(§. 1) Celle des parties qui connaît une information dont l’importance est déterminante pour le consentement de l’autre doit l’en informer dès lors que, légitimement, cette dernière ignore cette information ou fait confiance à son cocontractant.

(§. 3) Ont une importance déterminante les informations qui ont un lien direct et nécessaire avec le contenu du contrat ou la qualité des parties.

Cette obligation s’applique à toutes les parties contractantes, pour tout type de contrat.

La jurisprudence s’est prononcée sur la question du cumul de cette obligation de droit commun, avec l’obligation spéciale d’information prévue à l’article L. 330-3 du Code de commerce (cf infra), en répondant par la positive (CA Paris, 27 mars 2024, n° 22/12665). Le périmètre de cette dernière a toutefois été circonscrit par la Cour de cassation : seules les informations présentant un lien direct et nécessaire avec l’objet du contrat ou la qualité des parties sont soumises à obligation de communication (Cass. com., 14 mai 2025, n° 23-17.948).

À qui incombe la charge de la preuve?

La charge de la preuve repose sur celui qui soutient que l’information lui était due. Il doit alors démontrer (i) que l’autre partie lui devait cette information, mais (ii) ne la lui a pas fournie (article 1112-1 (§. 4) du Code civil).

Obligation spéciale d’information applicable aux contrats de franchise et de distribution

Quels contrats sont soumis à cette règle particulière?

Le droit français impose (art. L. 330-3 du Code de commerce) la communication d’un document d’information précontractuelle (« DIP ») ainsi que du projet de contrat, par toute personne :

• qui accorde à une autre personne le droit d’utiliser une marque, une enseigne ou un nom commercial,
• tout en exigeant un engagement exclusif ou quasi-exclusif pour l’exercice de son activité (par exemple, une obligation d’achat exclusif). Le caractère quasi-exclusif fait l’objet d’une appréciation casuistique par les juges français, indépendamment du seuil de 80% des achats prévu par le règlement UE 2022/720, qui n’est utilisé que comme un repère indicatif.

Concrètement, le DIP doit être remis, par exemple, au franchisé, au distributeur, au concessionnaire ou au licencié de marque, par son franchiseur, fournisseur ou concédant, dès lors que les deux conditions précitées sont réunies. Récemment la jurisprudence française a d’ailleurs eu l’occasion de rappeler que le champ d’application du DIP ne se limitait pas à la franchise, mais également et notamment, au contrat de concession, dès lors que les conditions précitées sont réunies (CA Paris, 22 mai 2024, n° 22/08672).

À quel moment le DIP doit-il être remis?

Le DIP et le projet de contrat doivent être communiqués au moins 20 jours avant la signature du contrat, et, le cas échéant, avant le paiement de toute somme exigée préalablement à la signature (notamment en cas de réservation).

Quelles informations doivent figurer dans le DIP?

L’article R. 330-1 du Code de commerce impose que le DIP mentionne les informations suivantes (liste non exhaustive) relatives :

• Au franchiseur (identité et expérience des dirigeants, parcours professionnel, etc.) ;
• À l’activité du franchiseur (notamment la date de création, le siège social, les références bancaires, l’historique du développement de l’enseigne, les comptes annuels, etc.) ;
• Au réseau (liste des membres avec indication de la date de signature des contrats, liste des établissements proposant les mêmes produits ou services dans la zone d’activité envisagée, nombre de membres ayant quitté le réseau au cours de l’année précédant la remise du DIP avec indication des motifs de départ, etc.) ;
• À la marque concédée (date d’enregistrement, titularité et conditions d’exploitation) ;
• À l’état général du marché (relatif aux produits ou services visés par le contrat) et à l’état local du marché (relatif à la zone d’activité envisagée), ainsi qu’aux facteurs de concurrence et aux perspectives de développement. La Cour de cassation a jugé, s’agissant du marché local, que le franchiseur n’était pas tenu de réaliser une étude de marché, mais que s’il en fournit une, celle-ci doit être exacte et vérifiable (Cass. com., 18 oct. 2023, n° 22-19.329).
• Aux éléments essentiels du projet de contrat, et notamment : sa durée, les conditions de renouvellement, de résiliation et de cession, ainsi que l’étendue des exclusivités accordées ;
• Aux obligations financières pesant sur le cocontractant : nature et montant des dépenses et investissements à engager avant le démarrage de l’activité (droit d’entrée, frais d’installation, etc.).

Au-delà de comporter l’ensemble des informations mentionnées par l’article précité, le DIP doit répondre à une exigence qualitative. En effet toutes les informations communiquées, y compris celles transmises spontanément, doivent être exactes et sincères, afin de garantir un consentement éclairé et exempt de tout vice de la part du candidat à l’entrée dans le réseau.

Comment prouver la remise des informations?

La charge de la preuve de la remise du DIP incombe au débiteur de cette obligation : le franchiseur (Cass. com., 7 juillet 2004, n° 02-15.950). L’idéal pour le franchiseur est de faire signer et dater le DIP par le franchisé le jour de sa remise et d’en conserver la preuve.

La clause contractuelle par laquelle le franchisé reconnaît avoir reçu un DIP complet ne constitue pas une preuve suffisante de la remise effective d’un DIP complet (Cass. com., 10 janvier 2018, n° 15-25.287).

Le franchiseur est-il tenu d’une obligation d’actualisation du DIP jusqu’à la signature du contrat

Dans un arrêt du 26 juin 2024 (n°23-1 14.085 PB) la Cour de cassation retient que la conformité formelle du DIP à la date de sa remise ne suffit pas à exonérer le franchiseur de toute responsabilité précontractuelle. Cette solution est confirmée par un arrêt du 4 décembre 2024 (n° 23-16.684).

Ces deux décisions semblent consacrer une obligation d’actualisation du DIP pesant sur la tête de réseau durant toute la période séparant la remise du document de la conclusion du contrat. Lorsque des événements significatifs surviennent dans cet intervalle (procédure collective affectant des membres du réseau, contentieux majeur, modification structurelle du réseau) la tête de réseau est tenue d’en informer spontanément le candidat. Le juge examine alors si le manquement à cette obligation était susceptible d’altérer l’appréciation que le candidat pouvait avoir du réseau et, partant, de vicier son consentement (Cass. com., 26 juin 2024, op. cit.). Le franchiseur ne saurait donc se retrancher derrière la régularité initiale du DIP pour s’affranchir de son devoir d’information dès lors que la situation du réseau a évolué de manière significative avant la signature du contrat.

Sanctions en cas de manquement aux obligations précontractuelles d’information

Sanction pénale

Le non-respect des obligations relatives au DIP peut exposer le franchiseur ou le fournisseur à une amende pénale pouvant aller jusqu’à 1 500 euros, portée à 3 000 euros en cas de récidive, le montant étant multiplié par cinq pour les personnes morales (article R. 330-2 du Code de commerce).

Nullité du contrat pour dol

Le contrat peut être annulé en cas de manquement à l’article 1112-1 ou à l’article L. 330-3. Dans les deux cas, le non-respect de l’obligation d’information n’est sanctionné que si le demandeur démontre que son consentement a été vicié par l’erreur, le dol ou la violence. Le juge procède à une appréciation in concreto, tenant compte notamment de l’expérience professionnelle et des diligences personnelles du distributeur : un candidat averti aura plus de difficultés à caractériser un dol, et son expérience dans le secteur concerné peut suffire à exonérer le franchiseur (CA Paris, pôle 5 – ch. 11, 26 avr. 2024, n° 21/13205), quand bien même les informations communiquées lacunaires ou inexactes (CA Paris, 20 janv. 2021, n° 19/03382).

Le cas échéant, les parties doivent être remises dans l’état antérieur à la conclusion du contrat.

S’agissant des éléments constitutifs du dol, les tribunaux en apprécient strictement les deux conditions:

• (Un élément matériel) l’existence d’un mensonge ou d’une réticence dolosive (article 1137 du Code civil) ;
• Et (un élément intentionnel) l’intention de tromper son cocontractant (article 1130 du Code civil).

Dommages et intérêts

Bien que les demandes en nullité soient soumises à des conditions très strictes, les franchisés et distributeurs peuvent alternativement obtenir des dommages et intérêts sur le fondement de la responsabilité délictuelle pour manquement à l’obligation précontractuelle d’information, sous réserve de démontrer une faute (information incomplète ou erronée), un préjudice indemnisable (celui-ci se limite à la perte de chance de ne pas contracter ou de contracter à des conditions plus avantageuses – voir en ce sens : Cass. com., 15 mars 2017, n° 15-16.406) et le lien de causalité entre les deux.

From Reporting to Governance and Risk Allocation

Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) considerations are playing an increasingly influential role in how businesses operate, invest, and manage risk, especially within the European Union, where corporate sustainability and responsibility regulation have been on the agenda in recent years.

With the adoption of the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) and the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD), many companies anticipated a significant shift in compliance. Since then, the EU has introduced simplification measures to streamline reporting and due diligence obligations, reduce the administrative burden, and improve proportionality, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while maintaining the core sustainability objectives.

While opinions may differ regarding the evolution of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) in EU regulation and the subsequent postponements of reporting obligations, regulatory developments appear to have, in practice, supported a shift in perspective. Sustainability is no longer viewed solely as a reporting requirement, but increasingly as a matter of governance, strategy, and risk allocation. This development is welcome, as the regulatory framework’s underlying objective is to advance the green transition, which in turn requires a change in how companies integrate sustainability into their decision-making and operations.

This focus on sustainability influences businesses of all sizes, including SMEs. Even companies not directly subject to the CSRD or CSDDD anticipate that ESG requirements will be passed down through the supply chain. Many non-reporting SMEs are already embedding sustainability practices, and this trend is likely to continue. In other words, sustainability policies are already affecting companies well before any formal reporting obligations kick in.

Environmental, Social, and Governance in Contract Architecture

One of the key means of implementing environmental, social, and governance obligations and objectives in day-to-day business operations is through commercial contracts and the requirements and commitments embedded in them.

Even where a company itself is not directly subject to extensive reporting or due diligence obligations, corporate sustainability and responsibility expectations flow through the market via contractual relationships. Larger undertakings within the scope of CSRD and, in due course, the CSDDD require contractual assurances, information rights, and cooperation from their business partners, including SMEs operating within their supply chains. As a result, corporate sustainability and responsibility become a question of contractual architecture. Companies must consider not only price mechanisms, liability caps and termination triggers, but also how environmental, social and governance risks and obligations are addressed and allocated between the parties through legally enforceable contractual terms.

Translating Policies into Binding Obligations

A typical starting point is the incorporation of a code of conduct or sustainability policies into commercial contracts, often by reference and through an express obligation on the contracting party to comply with them. From a legal standpoint, this raises important drafting questions. Many codes are drafted as high-level public statements. When such policies are converted into contractual commitments, their wording, scope, and hierarchy relative to the main agreement require careful consideration. The obligations must be sufficiently clear to define the parties’ expectations, coherent with other contractual provisions, and proportionate to the commercial relationship. The obligations must also be capable of practical implementation and effective monitoring in the context of the agreement.

In practical terms, this may mean requiring the supplier to comply with specific labour standards, maintain documented environmental management procedures, report on emissions data, ensure traceability of key raw materials, or allow reasonable access for audits. Clearly defining what is expected, how compliance is demonstrated, and what consequences follow from non-compliance is essential for the clause to function effectively. Otherwise, clauses that appear comprehensive in theory and ambitious in scope may offer limited enforceability in practice, and their impact may remain marginal if compliance cannot be effectively monitored and verified. If policies are not properly translated into binding and operational obligations, the company risks a mismatch between what it promises publicly and what is actually required under its contracts. This may undermine consistency, weaken risk management, and expose the company to reputational and governance risks if its own stated principles cannot be enforced within its supply or distribution chain.

As part of this process, companies must also consider the protection of trade secrets and confidential information. For example, broad audit or data-reporting obligations may raise concerns about sensitive business information. Contractual terms should balance transparency with the need to protect legitimately proprietary data. Clauses such as confidentiality agreements or carve-outs for trade secrets can be used to ensure that sharing ESG-related information does not compromise confidential business information or competitive advantages.

Environmental, Social and Governance Clauses Across Different Contract Types

Besides codes of conduct and sustainability policies, environmental, social and governance-related clauses increasingly take more tailored and transaction-specific forms. In shareholder agreements, sustainability objectives may be reflected in governance structures or even linked to financial outcomes, for example by aligning dividend policies or incentive mechanisms with agreed climate targets. In employment contracts, obligations may extend beyond general compliance and include participation in corporate sustainability training programmes or adherence to internal sustainability guidelines as part of performance expectations.

In supply and manufacturing agreements, environmental, social and governance provisions may address traceability of raw materials, emissions reporting, waste management, energy efficiency standards or the right to replace a supplier if its environmental practices materially conflict with the contracting party’s sustainability commitments. Such contractual mechanisms increasingly affect SMEs operating as suppliers, as ESG expectations pass through the supply chain.

Construction contracts often include detailed requirements regarding material selection, lifecycle impacts, carbon footprint calculations and recycling or waste reduction procedures. For example, in Finland, legislation imposes low-carbon and energy efficiency requirements for new buildings, and a party undertaking a construction project is subject to mandatory reporting obligations relating to construction and demolition waste. These statutory requirements are typically reflected and implemented in the relevant project and construction contracts.

Across these different contract types, the practical significance is consistent. Environmental, social and governance considerations move from the level of general policy into legally enforceable obligations tailored to each specific legal relationship. Contracts function as a mechanism for allocating responsibility, managing compliance risk and aligning commercial incentives with sustainability objectives.

Proportionate Monitoring and Audit Rights

In the contractual implementation and monitoring of environmental, social and governance obligations, audit and information rights play a central role. They are closely linked to effective oversight and form an integral part of a coherent contractual framework. In practice, companies typically seek access to relevant data from their business partners and, where appropriate, establish inspection or audit rights to enable meaningful monitoring and verification, whether conducted directly by the company or, commonly, by an independent expert appointed for that purpose.

However, such arrangements must remain balanced. Overly burdensome provisions may needlessly disrupt day-to-day operations and reduce the willingness to cooperate, particularly for SMEs with limited administrative capacity. By contrast, well-designed mechanisms that balance transparency with confidentiality and operational feasibility are more defensible and more likely to function effectively in practice.

Contractual Remedies

As a general principle, the consequences of a breach are determined by the terms agreed between the parties. In practice, the parties will typically first seek to resolve the matter through discussion and good faith negotiations, allowing the non-compliant party an opportunity to clarify the situation and implement corrective actions within a reasonable timeframe. If negotiations do not lead to a resolution, it may be appropriate to proceed to stronger measures, such as contractual penalties, indemnification obligations, price adjustments, temporary suspension rights or other agreed sanctions, applied in light of the nature and severity of the breach.

The contract should clearly define what constitutes a breach, how it is assessed and what remedies are available in each scenario. Clear and proportionate step-by-step remedy structures enhance legal certainty, reduce the risk of disputes and ensure that material or repeated breaches may trigger more significant consequences, including termination where justified.

Strategic and Voluntary Environmental, Social and Governance Commitments

In the current EU landscape, implementing ESG considerations in commercial contracts is no longer simply a matter of reacting to directives. It is a broader exercise in risk management and corporate governance. Even as the implementation details of the directives may continue to evolve, market expectations, financing conditions and reputational considerations remain key drivers of sustainability integration.

In addition, some companies choose to position themselves as frontrunners in sustainability for strategic and reputational reasons. They may therefore incorporate voluntary environmental, social and governance mechanisms and requirements into their contracts that go beyond, or are not directly derived from, binding directives. By doing so, they signal to investors, customers and other stakeholders that sustainability is treated as a core business priority rather than merely a compliance obligation.

At the same time, it is important to recognise the practical limits of such commitments. Ambitious sustainability requirements may be more challenging for SMEs with limited financial and administrative resources. Meeting extensive reporting, certification or traceability standards can require investments in systems, personnel and external expertise. If contractual expectations are not calibrated to the size and capacity of the counterparty, they may limit the ability of SMEs to participate in certain supply chains. A balanced and proportionate approach helps ensure that sustainability objectives remain achievable and commercially workable across the contractual chain.

Conclusion

For legal practitioners, the central task is not to increase the number of environmental, social and governance clauses as such, but to ensure their quality, coherence and practical relevance. The objective is to design contractual mechanisms that are proportionate, enforceable and aligned with the company’s actual risk profile, industry context and sustainability priorities. Commercial contracts remain one of the most concrete tools for translating sustainability strategy into operational practice. Moreover, every contract lawyer should understand and apply key sustainability principles in their work, ensuring that ESG commitments become integral to legal advice and contract drafting.

The Strait of Hormuz is likely the most strategically important point for the global oil trade. In fact, approximately 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through this narrow passage between the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf every day.

Following the outbreak of war in the region, the impact on energy markets was almost immediate: oil prices quickly rose above $100 per barrel, and it is unclear how high they may climb in the coming weeks and months. As a result, transportation, production, and procurement costs are rising across industrial supply chains in many sectors.

For many companies engaged in international trade, this phenomenon creates a very real problem. Contracts signed months (or years) earlier—perhaps at a fixed price—must be fulfilled in a completely different economic context.

A manufacturer that sells goods for delivery in six or twelve months may find itself producing and shipping at much higher energy costs, while the price agreed upon with the customer remains unchanged.

This is a situation that recurs cyclically, for various reasons: from the COVID-19 pandemic to the subsequent raw materials crisis, and on to current geopolitical tensions.

When the increase in costs is so sudden and significant, a question inevitably arises: must the contract still be performed under the original terms, or is it possible to suspend or renegotiate the agreement to adapt it to the new circumstances?

The answer depends on several factors: first and foremost, on what the parties have (or have not) provided for in the contract, but also on the law applicable to the relationship and on the interpretation that judges or arbitrators may give to the rules in the event of a dispute.

Force Majeure and Hardship: Two Different Concepts

When extraordinary events occur—such as a war, an energy crisis, or the disruption of a trade route—many operators immediately invoke force majeure. However, in most cases, these situations fall instead under the category of hardship.

It is therefore essential to distinguish between these two situations.

When an Event Constitutes Force Majeure

Force majeure applies to cases where an extraordinary and unforeseeable event makes it impossible to perform the contract.

The characteristics of the grounds for exemption from liability depend on the law applicable to the commercial relationship, but generally require:

• unpredictability of the event;
• the event being beyond the affected party’s control;
• the impossibility of avoiding or overcoming the event through reasonable efforts.

Typical examples include:

• orders from authorities requiring the suspension of production
• embargoes or export bans
• logistical disruptions caused by war

In these situations, performance is not merely more costly: it becomes objectively impossible. The consequence is that the party unable to perform is generally exempt from liability for the duration of the event.

Hardship

The situation is different when performance of the contract remains possible but becomes economically much more burdensome.

The concept of hardship is generally based on four prerequisites:

1. an event occurring after the conclusion of the contract
2. unpredictability and extraordinary nature of the event
3. a substantial alteration of the economic balance of the contract
4. excessive burden of performance, but not impossibility

A sharp increase in the price of oil, gas, or other raw materials often falls into this category.

Goods can be produced and delivered, but doing so may entail costs far higher than those anticipated when the contract was signed.

The ripple effect along the international supply chain

In global industrial supply chains, the same goods are often the subject of a series of consecutive contracts.

The manufacturer sells to a trader, who sells to a processing company, which resells to an importer in another country, who in turn distributes the product to the end market.

When a hardship event occurs—such as a sharp rise in energy prices—the effect tends to ripple throughout the entire supply chain.

The first party affected by the cost increase will try to pass the increase on to its contractual counterpart, who, in turn, will find themselves in the same situation with the next link in the chain.

The risk is clear: one of the operators in the middle of the chain may face increased upstream costs without being able to pass them on downstream.

This is one of the most common problems in international supply chains.

What happens if there is no clause regarding price fluctuations

In commercial practice, it often happens that parties operate on the basis of orders and order confirmations without a formal written contract, or that a contract exists but contains no provisions regarding price fluctuations or hardship.

In such cases, when costs increase sharply, it is necessary to determine which law applies to individual sales contracts across the supply chain.

This can lead to very different situations:

• one law may allow for price revision or termination of the contract
• another law aplicable to a second contract may not provide for equivalent remedies
• a third contract may contain much more restrictive contractual clauses

The practical result is that an operator in the middle of the chain may face a price increase from their supplier without being able to pass it on to the customer.

A Common Legal Framework: The Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG)

Fortunately, many international sales contracts are governed by the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).

The convention has been ratified by 97 countries, including Italy and most major trading partners, such as the U.S., Canada, China, Germany, France, Spain, etc.

The central provision is Article 79, according to which a party is not liable for non-performance if it proves that the non-performance is due to an impediment:

• beyond its control
• unforeseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract
• unavoidable or insurmountable

Traditionally, this provision has been applied to cases of force majeure.

In recent years, there has been debate over whether it can also be applied to cases of hardship, but international case law tends to be very cautious.

International case law on Hardship

Court decisions reflect a rather strict approach.

In some cases, even very significant increases in raw material costs have not been considered sufficient to modify or suspend the contract.

The reasoning is simple: those who operate professionally in international trade must take into account a certain degree of market volatility.

Only when the increase in costs exceeds an exceptional and unforeseeable level such as to radically alter the balance of the contract can hardship be invoked.

One of the most frequently cited cases is the Belgian Supreme Court’s decision in the Scafom case, which recognized the right to renegotiate the contract following a 70% increase in the price of steel.

However, such cases are relatively rare.

Generic clauses that serve no purpose

Many contracts contain hardship clauses copied from standard templates (boilerplate).

The problem is that these clauses often:

• list the effects of hardship
• but do not define when hardship actually occurs

The result is that, when prices rise, the parties may have very different opinions on what constitutes an “exceptional” increase and whether the event in question was “unforeseeable” or not.

The clause, therefore, does not resolve the issue, but defers it to discussion between the parties and, in the event of a failure to reach an agreement, to the courts or arbitrators.

What criteria can define a hardship situation

To make the clause truly effective, it is useful to establish objective parameters.

Among the most commonly used in international contracts:

• an increase or decrease in the price of a raw material beyond a certain threshold (±20% or ±30%)
• an increase in transportation or logistics costs within certain limits;
• significant fluctuations in the exchange rate beyond a specified range;
• the introduction of tariffs or trade restrictions

These parameters, linked to tolerance ranges, allow the parties to quickly and unambiguously identify a hardship event.

Remedies in the Event of Hardship

An effective clause should also address how to handle the situation.

The most common solutions are:

• renegotiation of the contract in good faith
• apply an automatic price adjustment
• appointment of an independent third-party expert to determine the new price
• temporary suspension of the contract
• right of withdrawal if no agreement is reached

These tools allow the parties to manage the crisis without resorting to litigation.

Audit of existing contracts: what to do now

At this point, the practical question becomes: how should we manage the issue in existing business relationships?

The first step is to conduct an audit of existing contracts with suppliers and customers.

1. Introduce comprehensive contracts in new relationships

If the relationships are governed solely by purchase orders and order confirmations, it is advisable to take this opportunity to draft comprehensive international sales contracts that include:

• a hardship clause
• warranty provisions
• remedies for breach
• limitations of liability

2. Update existing contracts

If the relationship is already governed by a contract, you should check whether a hardship clause exists.

If not, it may be useful to propose to the other party:

• a new contract, or
• a contract addendum dedicated to managing price fluctuations.

This helps prevent future conflicts and provides both parties with an effective tool to manage potential price shocks along the supply chain.

Conclusion

Commodity and energy crises demonstrate how exposed international contracts are to sudden changes in economic conditions. When a contract does not clearly address hardship management, the risk does not disappear; it simply shifts along the supply chain until it settles on the weakest link.

For this reason, companies operating within international supply chains should view the hardship clause as a strategic tool for managing contractual risk. A well-drafted contract does not eliminate market volatility, but it allows the parties to address it with clear rules, reducing uncertainty and preventing disputes.

Executive Summary

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) remains one of the most ambitious integration projects in the world. Yet, several years into its operational phase, it has not (yet) delivered the structural shift many expected. A recent analysis underscores the gap between political momentum and economic reality: implementation remains uneven, the agreement is still used by only a portion of participating states, and non-tariff barriers and infrastructure deficits continue to dominate the cost of doing business across borders.  For Egypt, the opportunity is still real — but it depends less on treaty headlines and more on enabling conditions: trade logistics, customs efficiency, regulatory convergence, and competitive industrial capacity. 

Looking Back: The Promise of a Single African Market

When the AfCFTA was launched, expectations were understandably high. A continent-wide trade framework was supposed to reduce tariffs, facilitate trade in goods and services, and strengthen regional value chains — with the broader goal of moving African economies up the value ladder.

In my 2022 article, I asked whether AfCFTA could become a game changer for Egypt, given Egypt’s industrial base, strategic geography, and the potential to diversify export markets beyond traditional partners. (For background, see the earlier article here”).

The Reality Check: Intra-African Trade Remains Structurally Weak

Several years later, the interim assessment is sobering. As the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) recently put it, AfCFTA is not a “game changer” yet, and only about half of member states currently meet the practical prerequisites to trade under the agreement.

A deeper reason is structural: no other world region trades so little with itself, and while statistics may undercount informal cross-border flows (especially in food), the overall picture remains unchanged.

Trade integration cannot deliver transformative outcomes if production, logistics, and institutions do not support scale.

Implementation Has Been Slow — and Often Symbolic

Operationalisation did not start with full-scale liberalisation. Instead, the AfCFTA began with a pilot approach: the Guided Trade Initiative (GTI) launched in October 2022, initially with eight states, later joined by additional countries, including Nigeria and South Africa by spring 2025.

The GTI created valuable learning effects, but it also underlined a key point: early progress was often presented through symbolic deals, while product coverage and volumes remained limited. FAZ highlights that only selected goods could be traded duty-free and that key sectors remained constrained for a long time due to missing or unresolved technical rules.

A pilot, however, cannot substitute for full operational certainty — the kind businesses need to restructure supply chains and invest.

Tariffs Are Not the Main Barrier — Trade Costs Are

AfCFTA is frequently discussed in terms of tariff liberalisation. Yet, evidence suggests that the largest gains do not come from tariffs but from reducing non-tariff barriers and improving trade infrastructure.

FAZ points to a central reality: tariffs tend to add around 20–30% to intra-African trade costs, whereas non-tariff costs can be far higher — driven by bureaucracy, lack of harmonised standards, inefficient border processes, and transport barriers.

This is the crux: even with reduced tariffs, trade will not expand meaningfully if goods still cannot move cheaply, quickly, and predictably.

Integration Complexity and Distributional Politics

Africa’s integration landscape is shaped by multiple overlapping regional economic communities and trade regimes. This creates legal and administrative complexity — often described as an integration “spaghetti bowl.” FAZ notes the challenge of coordination and the continued fragmentation of rules.

There is also a political economy dimension. Intra-African trade is heavily influenced by a small number of larger economies — and the distribution of benefits matters. FAZ highlights the dominance of major players (notably South Africa) and the concern that tariff liberalisation alone may entrench existing industrial advantages.

Where governments expect asymmetric outcomes, resistance often takes the form of delay, narrow implementation, or persistent non-tariff barriers.

What This Means for Egypt: The Opportunity Is Real — But Conditional

Egypt’s strategic case for AfCFTA participation remains strong: industrial potential, geographic location, and the opportunity to access and shape growing markets. But the experience so far suggests that the treaty text alone does not generate trade flows.

For Egypt’s private sector, the decisive factors are practical:

• predictable and efficient customs clearance and border procedures,
• logistics corridors and port efficiency,
• regulatory convergence (standards, certification, compliance),
• stable access to trade finance and payments,
• competitive energy and production conditions for manufacturing and processing.

AfCFTA can support these developments — but it cannot replace them.

The “Game Changer” Pathway: What Must Happen Next

FAZ concludes that AfCFTA will only become truly impactful if it is paired with the fundamentals: major infrastructure investment, stronger production and processing capacity, and a credible industrial policy.

At the same time, Africa faces a classic chicken-and-egg problem: without development there is limited investment appeal; without investment there is limited development.

For Egypt and its partners, a pragmatic strategy would be to:

1. treat AfCFTA as a platform for real trade-cost reduction, not only tariff debates;
2. focus on a limited number of scalable corridors and sectors where regional value chains can realistically grow;
3. strengthen implementation capacity so that preferences become usable for firms — especially SMEs;
4. enhance legal certainty and dispute resolution reliability for cross-border commerce.

Conclusion

AfCFTA remains a landmark achievement in terms of political commitment. But as of today, it has not yet been the “game changer” many hoped for.

For Egypt, the key question is no longer whether AfCFTA is visionary — it is. The question is whether governments and businesses can translate it into lower real trade costs, higher competitiveness, and bankable cross-border transactions. If those enabling conditions improve, AfCFTA’s promise can still become commercial reality.

After more than twenty years of negotiations, the EU/Mercosur agreement remains in a legally incomplete but commercially relevant stage. For lawyers advising clients in the wine industry, the key issue is no longer whether the agreement will reshape trade, but how and when its provisions will begin to affect market access, regulatory compliance, and competitive positioning.

A negotiated agreement, yet without full legal effect

The trade pillar of the agreement was politically concluded in 2019, followed by ongoing revisions and additional negotiations, particularly on environmental commitments. Even though the full agreement is pending ratification processes on both sides, at this stage, the temporary agreement is already in force, producing its effects.

From a legal standpoint, this creates a hybrid scenario: (i) the text is sufficiently defined to anticipate obligations and opportunities, (ii) but not yet fully binding, (iii) with temporary measures already applicable.

This distinction is critical for legal advisors. The full agreement cannot yet be invoked as applicable law, but it already serves as a reliable roadmap for future regulatory and commercial conditions.

Why wine matters in this agreement

The wine sector sits at the intersection of several key chapters of the agreement:

1. tariff liberalisation;
2. sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures;
3. technical barriers to trade (TBT);
4. intellectual property, particularly geographical indications (GIs).

This makes wine a multi-layered case study of how the agreement will operate in practice.

At the same time, the economic context reinforces its relevance. The European Union is Mercosur’s second-largest trading partner, with strong complementarities in trade flows. Mercosur’s exports are concentrated in agricultural goods, while EU exports are concentrated in higher value-added categories, where wine is positioned.

Tariffs: gradual but meaningful impact 

Today, wine exports to Mercosur, especially to Brazil, face import duties combined with complex internal taxation. While the agreement does not eliminate all barriers immediately, it provides for progressive tariff reductions and improved quota conditions.

Meanwhile, the Brazilian tax system is under complete reform, which reinforces the importance of specialised legal assistance.

For legal practitioners, this raises practical issues:

1. interpretation of tariff schedules and staging periods;
2. interaction with domestic tax regimes;
3. structuring of distribution agreements to capture tariff advantages over time.

The key point is that tariff benefits will not be uniform or immediate. They will require active legal planning to be effectively utilised.

Beyond tariffs: regulatory friction is the real battlefield

More significant than tariffs are the provisions addressing regulatory barriers.

Wine exports are heavily affected by labelling requirements, certification procedures, sanitary controls, product registration rules and geographical protections.

The agreement introduces commitments to increase transparency and reduce unnecessary barriers, particularly under the « Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures » (SPS) and « Technical Barriers to Trade » (TBT) chapters. However, it does not create full harmonisation.

This means that regulatory compliance will remain jurisdiction-specific, but procedures should become more predictable and less discretionary.

For lawyers, this translates into a shift from navigating opaque systems to advising within a more structured, but still fragmented, regulatory framework.

Geographical indications: protection and tension

One of the most legally sensitive aspects of the agreement is the protection of geographical indications.

The EU seeks recognition and protection of a wide range of European GIs in Mercosur countries, including wine denominations. This implies stronger protection for European producers against the misuse of names and potential restrictions on local producers’ use of certain terms.

From a legal perspective, the new framework raises issues such as:

1. coexistence with pre-existing trademarks;
2. transition periods for local operators;
3. enforcement mechanisms and litigation risks.

This is an area where disputes are likely to arise, particularly in markets with established local practices.

Services, distribution, and market structure

Although often overlooked, service provisions are highly relevant for the wine sector.

Each year, the EU exports nearly €30 billion in services to Mercosur, double the amount in the opposite direction.

The agreement aims to improve conditions for:

1. logistics providers
2. distribution networks
3. commercial representation
4. marketing and advertising agencies

For wine exporters, market access is not only about tariffs but also about how products reach consumers.

Legal advisors will need to consider:

1. distribution agreements and exclusivity clauses
2. regulatory requirements for importers and distributors
3. compliance with competition rules

The implementation gap: where risk lies

Even after ratification, the agreement will not produce immediate uniform effects.

Its implementation will depend on phased tariff reductions, domestic regulatory adjustments and administrative practices.

This creates a gap between formal commitments and practical outcomes.

For lawyers, this is where advisory work becomes most valuable:

1. managing client expectations
2. identifying timing mismatches between legal changes and market reality
3. mitigating risks linked to partial or inconsistent implementation

What should lawyers be doing now?

Treating the agreement as a distant political project is a mistake. The ratification is not around the corner, but it will happen.

Instead of just waiting, legal advisors should:

1. analyze the relevant chapters (tariffs, SPS, TBT, GIs) from a sector-specific perspective;
2. anticipate how domestic law will interact with the agreement;
3. prepare contractual structures that can adapt to phased changes;
4. monitor closely ratification and implementation developments.

In practical terms, the agreement should already be part of strategic legal advice, even before its formal entry into force.

Final sip

The EU/Mercosur agreement will not revolutionise the wine trade overnight. Its impact will be gradual, technical, and often subtle, but for those advising in the sector, it introduces a clear shift. We are moving from a fragmented and often opaque regulatory environment to a more structured, rule-based framework that is complex, but more predictable.

Understanding the agreement in theory is just the first step. The real challenge is to translate its provisions into practical legal strategies before competitors do.

Lors d’évènements de grande ampleur, tels que la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026, certaines entreprises tentent d’associer « sauvagement » leur marque ou image à l’évènement par une pratique d’« ambush marketing » (marketing d’embuscade) définie par la jurisprudence comme une « stratégie publicitaire mise en place par une entreprise afin d’associer son image commerciale à celle d’un événement et donc de profiter de l’impact médiatique dudit événement sans s’acquitter des droits qui y sont relatifs et sans avoir obtenu au préalable l’autorisation de l’organisateur de l’événement » (CA Paris, 2e chambre, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912). Une pratique risquée et sanctionnée, mais parfois envisageable.

Points clés à retenir

• L’ambush marketing est une pratique sanctionnée mais qui n’est pas interdite en soi.
• En contrepartie de leurs investissements dans la compétition, les sponsors et partenaires officiels de la FIFA bénéficient d’une protection juridique très importante, par l’intermédiaire de divers textes généraux (contrefaçon, parasitisme, propriété intellectuelle) ou plus particuliers (droit du sport), contre toutes formes d’ambush marketing.
• La Coupe du Monde de la FIFA fait l’objet d’une protection renforcée fondée sur un portefeuille étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier et sur les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, en l’absence de législation française spécifique comparable à celle instituée pour les Jeux Olympiques.
• Ces droits ne sont pas absolus et il reste néanmoins de minces opportunités permettant une pratique, astucieuse, du marketing d’embuscade.

La protection des sponsors et partenaires officiels de la Coupe du Monde contre l’ambush marketing

Fort d’une audience mondiale de près de 5 milliards de personnes sur l’ensemble des plateformes lors de sa dernière édition au Qatar en 2022 – dont plus de 1,5 milliard pour la seule finale – la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 est l’évènement sportif le plus suivi de la planète. Accueilli pour la première fois par trois pays (Canada, Mexique et États-Unis), il réunit 48 équipes et plus de 1 200 joueurs pour 104 matchs dans 16 stades. Son organisation est financée dans une large mesure par les différents partenaires, sponsors et détenteurs de droits officiels, qui bénéficient en contrepartie d’un droit exclusif d’utilisation des marques et propriétés intellectuelles officielles de la FIFA afin d’y associer leur propre image et signes distinctifs.

La pratique d’ambush marketing n’est pas sanctionnée en tant que telle par le droit français, mais de nombreux textes épars permettent de protéger largement les sponsors et partenaires de manifestations sportives de dimension mondiale contre l’ambush marketing. Ils sont en effet légitimes à pouvoir jouir paisiblement des droits qui leur sont offerts en contrepartie de leurs larges investissements réalisés dans le cadre d’évènements tels que, par exemple, les coupes du monde de football ou de rugby, ou les Jeux Olympiques.

Peuvent notamment être invoqués par les sponsors officiels et par les organisateurs de telles manifestations :

• les protections « classiques » offertes par le droit de la propriété intellectuelle (droit des marques et droit d’auteur) au titre de l’action en contrefaçon fondée sur le Code de la propriété intellectuelle,
• le droit de la responsabilité civile (parasitisme et concurrence déloyale fondés sur l’article 1240 du Code civil),
• le droit de la consommation (pratiques commerciales trompeuses),
• mais aussi des textes plus spécifiques tels que la protection des droits d’exploitation des fédérations sportives et des organisateurs de manifestations sportives prévue par l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, qui confère aux organisateurs de manifestations sportives un monopole d’exploitation.

Sur ces fondements, ont par exemple été sanctionnées les pratiques d’ambush marketing suivantes :

• L’exploitation d’une compétition de tennis et l’utilisation, pendant l’évènement sportif, de la marque associée à celui-ci : L’organisation de paris en ligne portant sur le tournoi de Roland Garros, utilisant le signe protégé et la marque Roland Garros pour viser les matchs sur lesquels les paris étaient organisés. L’exploitation illicite de la compétition sportive est sanctionnée à hauteur de 400 000 euros sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport, la Fédération française de tennis étant seule propriétaire du droit d’exploitation de Roland Garros. L’utilisation de la marque est également sanctionnée au titre de la contrefaçon (à hauteur de 300 000 euros) et du parasitisme (à hauteur de 500 000 euros) (CA Paris, 14 oct. 2009, n° 08/19179).
• Une campagne publicitaire réalisée pendant un festival de cinéma reproduisant la marque déposée de l’évènement : L’organisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, d’une opération de communication digitale par une marque de cosmétique à travers la publication de vidéos sur ses réseaux sociaux, sur certains plans desquelles était visible l’affiche officielle du festival de Cannes, l’une d’elles reproduisant la marque déposée de la palme d’or. Sanctionnée sur les fondements de la contrefaçon de droits d’auteur et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (TJ Paris, 11 déc. 2020, n° 19/08543).
• Une campagne publicitaire visant à se voir attribuer à tort la qualité de partenaire officiel d’un évènement : L’utilisation, pendant le festival de Cannes, du slogan « coiffeur officiel des femmes » associé aux expressions « Cannes » et « Festival de Cannes », laissant faussement croire au public que l’entreprise était partenaire officiel du festival. Sanctionnée sur le fondement de la concurrence déloyale et du parasitisme à hauteur de 50 000 euros (CA Paris, 8 juin 2018, n° 17/12912).

Ces sanctions pécuniaires peuvent se cumuler avec des injonctions de cessation des pratiques et/ou des mesures de publication dans la presse, sous astreinte.

La protection spécifique des marques de la FIFA

À la différence des Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024, qui bénéficiaient d’une loi française spécifique en tant que pays hôte (loi n° 2018-202 du 26 mars 2018 relative à l’organisation des Jeux Olympiques et Paralympiques de 2024) et réservant notamment les espaces publicitaires à proximité des sites de compétition aux seuls partenaires officiels, la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026 ne se tenant pas sur le territoire français, aucun dispositif légal français équivalent n’est applicable. La protection des partenaires et sponsors officiels repose donc sur le droit commun, mais elle n’en est pas moins solide.

La FIFA a constitué un portefeuille très étendu de marques déposées dans le monde entier, protégées en France par les dispositions du Code de la propriété intellectuelle. Ces marques comprennent notamment la marque verbale et figurative FIFA®, les marques FIFA World Cup™, FIFA World Cup 26™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA™, Coupe du Monde de la FIFA 2026™, World Cup™, Copa Mundial™, ainsi que l’emblème officiel de la compétition (combinant le trophée et le chiffre 26), le slogan officiel « We Are 26™ » / « Nous Sommes 26™ », les logos des seize villes hôtes, et la police typographique officielle « FWC 26 », protégée par le droit d’auteur. Seuls les détenteurs de droits de la FIFA, c’est-à-dire les Partenaires FIFA (au premier rang desquels figurent Adidas, Aramco, Coca-Cola, Hyundai/Kia, Qatar Airways et Visa), les Sponsors Plus, les Sponsors officiels et les Supporters régionaux, sont autorisés à utiliser à des fins commerciales cette propriété intellectuelle officielle.

La FIFA a publié des directives relatives à la propriété intellectuelle, qui précisent en détail les usages autorisés et interdits des marques et logos liés à la Coupe du Monde 2026. Selon ces directives, sont notamment prohibés, sans autorisation, toute utilisation des marques officielles dans une publicité commerciale ; l’intégration de la propriété intellectuelle officielle dans un nom commercial ou un nom de domaine ; l’organisation de concours ou jeux-concours créant une association avec la compétition ; l’utilisation des marques officielles pour décorer un magasin ; et l’usage par un compte professionnel de hashtags officiels dans un but commercial. Ces directives précisent en outre que la protection s’étend non seulement à la reproduction à l’identique des marques officielles, mais également à leurs variantes dont la similitude peut prêter à confusion. Cette protection rappelée par les lignes directrices est en cohérence avec la protection élargie accordée aux marques notoires en droit français par l’article L.713-5 du Code de la propriété intellectuelle.

Les leçons des JO de Paris 2024 : quels risques pour les marques ?

Les Jeux Olympiques de Paris 2024 ont donné lieu à un contentieux abondant qui éclaire concrètement les risques auxquels s’exposent les entreprises tentées par l’ambush marketing lors d’un évènement sportif majeur. Si ces décisions ont été rendues dans le contexte spécifique des JO, pendant lesquels protections légales spécifiques renforcées s’appliquaient, elles constituent néanmoins un avertissement direct pour les marques qui envisageraient des stratégies similaires lors de la Coupe du Monde, sur le fondement du droit commun.

• L’utilisation de symboles officiels sur des supports physiques itinérants : Pendant les JO de Paris 2024, une société chinoise du secteur laitier avait fait circuler dans Paris des bus arborant les anneaux olympiques associés à ses propres marques, tout en se présentant comme « la seule société laitière chinoise présente à Paris 2024 ». La Cour d’appel de Paris a confirmé tant le parasitisme que la contrefaçon de marque, et condamné les sociétés concernées, en référé, au paiement d’une provision de 20 000 euros, assortie d’une astreinte de 20 000 euros par jour et par infraction constatée, visant à faire cesser la diffusion des publicités (CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 2, 21 nov. 2025, n° 24/15283 ; TJ Paris, ordonnance de référé du 8 août 2024, 24/55463).
• La retransmission non autorisée de compétitions : Le tribunal judiciaire de Paris a ordonné en référé, pendant les JO, la cessation immédiate de la diffusion de compétitions olympiques par une plateforme de streaming ne disposant pas des droits médias correspondants, sous astreinte de 1 500 euros par infraction constatée, 3 000 euros par jour pour les distributions continues et 5 000 euros par jour pour défaut de retrait (TJ Paris, réf., 18 sept. 2024, n° 24/53019). Ainsi, toute plateforme retransmettant des matchs de la Coupe du Monde sans détenir les droits cédés par la FIFA s’expose à des mesures d’urgence immédiates, sur le fondement de l’article L.333-1 du Code du sport.
• La protection élargie de la marque notoire : La Cour de cassation a confirmé que la protection des marques olympiques s’étendait au-delà de la reproduction stricto sensu : il suffit que la marque soit évoquée ou suggérée, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de démontrer un risque de confusion dans l’esprit du public. Cette solution, fondée sur l’article L.713-5 du code de la propriété intellectuelle, s’est appliquée à un bar ayant utilisé les anneaux olympiques sur ses sous-bocks pour promouvoir ses soirées de retransmission (Cass. crim., 17 janv. 2017, n° 15-86.363). Les marques de la FIFA étant tout aussi notoires sur le plan mondial, le même régime protecteur leur est applicable : une simple évocation des marques officielles, même sans reproduction littérale, pourra caractériser une atteinte sanctionnable.

Certaines opérations marketing peuvent échapper à toute sanction

L’analyse de la jurisprudence et des pratiques promotionnelles permet néanmoins de comprendre les contours de certaines pratiques publicitaires qui pourraient être autorisées (non sanctionnées par les textes susmentionnés), sous réserve qu’elles soient préparées et présentées avec habileté. En voici quelques exemples.

Communication sur un ton décalé ou humoristique : Une approche décalée, voire humoristique, peut permettre d’échapper aux sanctions susvisées.

• Ainsi, la marque de chips Vico du groupe Intersnack avait lancé en 2016 une campagne promotionnelle autour du slogan « Vico, partenaire des supporters à domicile ».
• La société irlandaise Paddy Power avait pour sa part parrainé une course de l’œuf dans la cuiller à « London », village de Bourgogne, pour afficher à Londres pendant les JO de 2012 le slogan : « Official Sponsor of the largest athletics event in London this year ! There you go, we said it. (Ahem, London France that is) ». Le comité d’organisation des JO avait échoué à faire cesser cette campagne. Humour anglais …
• Le groupe Heineken avait quant à lui commercialisé pendant l’Euro 2016, dont Carlsberg était le sponsor officiel, une gamme de bouteilles aux couleurs des drapeaux de 21 pays ayant « marqué son histoire », parmi lesquels une majorité de participants à la compétition.

Communication d’une donnée informative à titre publicitaire : A été jugé licite l’utilisation de résultats d’un match de rugby et l’annonce d’un prochain match dans un journal pour la promotion d’un véhicule automobile, la publicité indiquant : « France 13 Angleterre 24 – la Fiat 500 félicite l’Angleterre pour sa victoire et donne rendez-vous à l’équipe de France le 9 mars pour France-Italie ». Les juges ont considéré que cette publication « se borne à reproduire un résultat sportif d’actualité, acquis et rendu public en première page du journal d’information sportive, et à faire état d’une rencontre future également connue comme déjà annoncée par le journal dans un article d’information » (Cass. com., 20 mai 2014, n° 13-12.102).

Sponsoring de joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde : Toute société peut conclure des partenariats avec des joueurs participant à la Coupe du Monde de la FIFA, par exemple en leur fournissant des équipements ou des vêtements portant son logo. Les directives de la FIFA relatives à la propriété intellectuelle précisent expressément qu’elles « ne contiennent aucune affirmation relative à des droits détenus par des tierces parties telles que les joueurs, clubs, associations membres [ou] confédérations ». Les directives de la FIFA confirment par ailleurs explicitement que les images génériques liées au football, aux équipes nationales ou aux drapeaux de pays n’entrent pas dans la propriété intellectuelle officielle. La prudence s’impose néanmoins : le partenariat ne doit pas créer l’impression d’une association commerciale avec la FIFA ou la compétition, ni utiliser les marques officielles de la FIFA.

L’approche combinée juridique et marketing dans la conception et la préparation du message d’une telle opération de communication est essentielle pour éviter des poursuites judiciaires, notamment sur le fondement du parasitisme. Certaines campagnes publicitaires peuvent donc légitimement être envisagées, notamment quand elles sont astucieuses.

Foreign franchisors entering into franchise agreements in Spain should take careful note of the content of the judgment issued by the Provincial Court of Córdoba on November 20, 2025, and require that the partner(s) and the directors of the franchisee company expressly guarantee and indemnify the payment of any debts arising from the franchise agreement.

Spanish corporate law establishes the principle of liability for the directors of corporations or limited liability companies when the company is subject to dissolution (for example, due to losses that reduce equity to less than 50% of the share capital) and, despite this, they fail to convene a meeting to adopt corrective measures (dissolution or capital increase).

In the case of the aforementioned ruling, the franchisor was unable to collect the debt arising from the franchise agreement from the franchisee due to the latter’s insolvency; so it decided to claim that debt from the company’s administrator based on the provision mentioned above, that is, due to the fact that the franchisee company was facing dissolution due to losses and the administrator had not convened a shareholders’ meeting, as was his obligation, so that the shareholders could decide how to resolve the situation.

The ruling we are discussing from the Court of Appeal of Córdoba upholds the lower court’s decision and dismisses the franchisor’s claim against the sole administrator of the franchisee company, stating that:

With regard to liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, the court recognised the existence of the corporate debts, the presence of grounds for dissolution, the breach of the legal obligations by the corporate administrator, and his liability, but found that a ground for exoneration from liability existed in accordance with the doctrine of “known risk.” Thus, it was noted that the plaintiff is a franchisor and X. S.L. was the franchisee, and it was evident from the electronic communications that the franchisee was under constant monitoring and the franchisor was aware of the risk involved in the operations, halting the shipment of goods (clothing) as soon as the limits of the guarantees granted were exceeded, meaning the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk. For all these reasons, the claim was dismissed.

In conclusion, and in light of the foregoing, the present franchise relationship and its conduct allow us to consider that it has been established that the franchisor (creditor) had greater knowledge of the franchisee’s (debtor’s) financial situation, beyond the information appearing in the annual accounts filed with the Commercial Registry, as it was the franchisee’s primary supplier. And this knowledge and control of the debt by the franchisor (through the increase in orders) justifies the exoneration of the corporate director’s liability for corporate debts under Article 367 of the Capital Companies Act, which leads to the dismissal of the appeal

The legal theory or principle of Known/Accepted Risk, to which the judgment refers, holds that harm caused to a third party, with or without a contractual relationship in place, is not considered unlawful if the victim was aware of the risk and voluntarily assumed it.

This doctrine was initially developed within the framework of tort liability: whoever engages in a risky activity and reaps its benefits must bear its negative consequences, that is, the risk—(cuius commodum, eius incommodum).

However, case law has extended the application of this theory to the field of contractual liability, as demonstrated in the judgment under discussion.

Therefore, since the plaintiff was aware of the defendant’s financial situation and solvency—having “monitored” its activity as a franchisor—and despite this, decided to maintain the contract’s validity, thereby increasing the debt, the ruling holds that the franchisor assumed the risk, which constituted grounds for exonerating the administrator from liability. However, more concerning than the above is that this “known risk” theory could be  considered applicable to the liability of the franchisee company itself, which could be exonerated from liability based on the franchisor’s monitoring of its activities.

The conclusion of all the above is that, based on this application of the known risk theory, franchisors may face difficulties in claiming debts owed by the franchisee company from its directors in the event of the company’s insolvency; therefore, it is highly advisable that, when signing the franchise agreement, a joint and several guarantee for the franchise’s potential future debts be required from its directors and partners, which, moreover, is a fairly standard practice.

In this way, the objection based on the theory of known risk would not come into play.

Vietnam has been added to the EU list of non‑cooperative jurisdictions for tax purposes (Annex I), following the Council’s update of 17 February 2026.

For EU companies buying goods and services from Vietnam, this is not an outright ban on trade, but rather a signal that substantially heightened tax governance scrutiny, documentation expectations, and (in some cases) more demanding payment execution will follow in the months ahead. The EU listing process is designed less to “name and shame” and more to encourage positive change through cooperation and dialogue, but once a jurisdiction is placed on Annex I, EU Member States implement “defensive measures” that can materially affect tax treatment, withholding obligations, and audit intensity for Vietnam-linked transactions.

What the EU decision does (and does not) do

The EU blacklist is a tax‑governance instrument: it does not prohibit EU businesses from importing goods from Vietnam or procuring Vietnamese services, and it does not alter Vietnam’s domestic tax regime, corporate income tax rules, withholding tax framework, or investment policies.

At the same time, the EU can deepen cooperation with Vietnam on the political and economic track while still applying tax‑governance pressure through listing mechanisms, so businesses should be prepared for a “partnership plus scrutiny” environment rather than expecting the two to be perfectly aligned.

In January 2026, the EU and Vietnam upgraded their relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, framed as a platform to strengthen cooperation across areas such as trade and investment, climate/energy, sustainable development and digital transformation-a signal that the blacklisting is a technical compliance tool, not a diplomatic rupture.

The ideological paradox: a Socialist Republic on a tax-haven list

Vietnam’s presence on the blacklist is striking when viewed in its broader political context. The EU blacklist was conceived after major tax-transparency scandals (the Panama Papers and LuxLeaks) to address jurisdictions that facilitate offshore structures or fail to meet information-exchange standards. In the Western imagination, “tax haven” connotes liberal microstates or offshore centres, yet Vietnam, governed by a Communist Party, now sits on the same list. This reflects the reality of Vietnam’s hybrid economic model: politically socialist, but economically pragmatic since the Đổi Mới reforms of the late 1980s, with selective tax incentives for special economic zones, high-tech investments and priority sectors that, in certain cases, can significantly reduce the effective tax burden for foreign investors. The EU’s concern is not Vietnam’s headline corporate tax rate but rather-at this stage-the absence of adequate exchange-of-information infrastructure, though the architecture of its preferential regimes has also attracted scrutiny in the past. The listing is a technical compliance issue, not an ideological one. 

Why Vietnam was added: the listing criteria and timeline

Vietnam has been subject to EU scrutiny since the very first iteration of the EU list in December 2017, when it was placed in Annex II (the “grey list”) alongside jurisdictions that have committed to reform but are not yet fully compliant. In October 2025, Vietnam was removed from Annex II after fulfilling its commitments on country-by-country reporting (CbCR), and appeared, at that point, to be on the path to full compliance. However, shortly afterwards-in November 2025-the OECD Global Forum published its peer review and rated Vietnam “Non-Compliant” with respect to the standard on Exchange of Information on Request (EOIR), a separate compliance area from CbCR, finding that further reforms remained outstanding and that improvements in the CbCR exchange framework were not expected before 2027. This OECD finding directly triggered the February 2026 move to Annex I-an escalation from the grey list to the blacklist, bypassing any intervening period of full compliance.

The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), The three core listing criteria against which Vietnam was assessed are: Criterion 1 (Tax transparency), requiring compliance with AEOI and EOIR standards and membership of the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.; Criterion 2 (Fair taxation), requiring no harmful preferential tax regimes and adequate economic substance rules; and Criterion 3 (Anti-BEPS measures), requiring implementation of OECD anti-BEPS minimum standards including country-by-country reporting. Vietnam’s shortfall was concentrated in Criterion 1, specifically the EOIR standard, which concerns the country’s practical capacity and procedural framework for responding to foreign tax authorities’ requests for information.

Vietnam’s response and the path to delisting

Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded publicly within days of the listing, defending the country’s tax transparency record and stating that the government is implementing a national action plan to follow OECD recommendations and expand tax cooperation with partners including the EU. Vietnam expressed readiness to engage with European authorities to ensure more objective and comprehensive assessments, and to promote cooperation for shared development and prosperity. Practitioner commentary suggests a concrete roadmap is achievable: with legislative amendments (decrees and circulars on EOIR procedures), the establishment of a dedicated EOIR unit, publication of enforcement statistics, and active technical engagement with the EU Code of Conduct Group from now through September 2026, Vietnam could realistically target removal from Annex I at the next EU review cycle in October 2026, although this timeline is ambitious and delisting is by no means guaranteed. The key point for EU businesses is that, while the listing may be relatively short-lived if Vietnam acts decisively, companies should not delay compliance preparations in reliance on early delisting-a proportionate, risk-based response is more appropriate than a wholesale restructuring of Vietnam-linked supply chains.

How different payment types are affected in practice

Goods (imports) are often the most straightforward in substance terms because there is usually a clear chain of documents: purchase orders, shipping documents, customs import paperwork, delivery notes, inspection/acceptance records and matching invoices.

The risk uplift for goods is typically not about whether the purchase is real, but whether the overall supply chain and pricing remain coherent under scrutiny-for example, whether margins and intercompany arrangements around the import flow make commercial sense and are consistently documented.

Services (outsourcing, consulting, IT development, marketing, support) tend to attract more questions because “what was delivered” is harder to evidence than a shipped product.

If your EU entity pays a Vietnamese provider for services, expect to need a well‑organised evidence pack: a clear scope of work, time records or milestones, deliverables (reports, code repositories, tickets), acceptance sign‑offs, and a pricing rationale that matches the level of skill and effort involved.

Royalties and IP-related payments (software licences, trademarks, know‑how, technology access) are particularly sensitive because they combine valuation complexity with cross‑border tax characterisation questions.

Expect pressure-testing of (i) who truly owns and controls the IP, (ii) the contract chain and sublicensing rights, (iii) how the royalty rate was set using benchmarking or comparable arrangements, and (iv) whether the payment is genuinely for IP rather than a disguised service fee.

Intragroup charges (management fees, shared services, cost recharges) are commonly the first area where tax authorities and counterparties ask for “benefit” evidence and allocation logic.

Where Vietnam sits inside a group value chain, be ready to show why a charge exists, how it was calculated, how the recipient benefited, plus consistent intercompany agreements and transfer pricing support.

Financing and treasury flows (interest, guarantees, cash pooling, factoring, trade finance) trigger the most intensive technical review because they involve both tax outcomes and financial crime/compliance sensitivities.

Even where the structure is legitimate, these flows are more likely to be escalated internally for enhanced review and may require more supporting documentation before execution.

How European banks may respond (and what that looks like in practice)

Banks in the EU operate under a risk‑based approach to financial crime and compliance, and they may apply de-risking decisions, meaning they can choose to restrict or exit relationships or transaction types they view as exceeding their risk appetite or being operationally too costly to monitor. EU supervisory frameworks acknowledge that de-risking exists and call for proportionate, evidence-based risk assessments rather than indiscriminate blanket exclusions, but in practice banks have significant discretion.

For an EU company initiating a bank transfer to a Vietnamese counterparty, the following discretionary measures can arise in practice, even where the payment is entirely lawful and commercially routine.

A bank can pause execution and request additional documents before releasing funds, seeking comfort on the purpose and legitimacy of the transaction under its internal controls.

Typical requests include the underlying contract or statement of work, invoices, proof of delivery or performance, an explanation of business purpose, and information on the beneficiary’s beneficial ownership or corporate structure.

A bank can route the payment through manual review queues rather than straight-through processing, particularly for first-time beneficiaries, unusually large amounts, or payments with vague narratives that do not clearly describe the purpose.

This creates operational knock-ons: late supplier settlement, goods held pending payment confirmation, or service suspension where the vendor operates on strict payment triggers.

A bank can impose internal conditions as part of its customer-specific risk controls-for example requiring richer payment details, stricter invoice descriptors, or pre-approval workflows for Vietnam-corridor payments.

A bank can decline to process specific transactions or decide to exit certain corridors, client types, or business models entirely as a risk-management choice. German financial institutions are described as applying enhanced due diligence, requiring full transparency of transaction purpose and ownership for Vietnam-linked payments.

Where a payment is declined, the practical solution is often to adjust the execution setup-alternative banking channel, revised documentation pack, or modified payment mechanics-while keeping the underlying commercial relationship intact.

EU companies are advised to develop a “Banking Compliance Pack” for Vietnam-corridor payments: a pre-assembled set of documents (contract, invoice, proof of delivery/performance, business rationale memo, and beneficial ownership information) that can be submitted proactively or in response to bank queries within hours rather than days.

Non-tax defensive measures and EU funding implications

Beyond tax measures, being on the EU blacklist triggers non-tax consequences that affect Vietnam’s economic relationship with the EU more broadly. EU investment programmes cannot channel funding through entities located in Vietnam, because using such an entity contradicts the core legal purpose of these funds, which are designed to promote good governance, transparency, and the fight against illicit financial flows. Affected funds include the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD/NDICI), which de-risks major investments in areas like energy and digital; the InvestEU programme (which replaced the former EFSI); and the External Lending Mandate (ELM), which provides EIB loans for major infrastructure outside the EU. In addition, the General Framework for STS securitisation imposes separate restrictions on the use of entities in blacklisted jurisdictions within securitisation structures. For Vietnamese entities and their EU partners working on donor-funded or ESG-driven projects, this can be a significant constraint, as subsidiaries and other businesses in Vietnam may be cut off from these sources of EU financing.

DAC6 reporting and public country-by-country reporting

Cross-border arrangements involving Vietnam are now subject to heightened DAC6 scrutiny. In particular, Hallmark C.1(b)(ii) may be triggered where a deductible cross-border payment is made by an EU-based associated enterprise to a tax resident in Vietnam, subject to Member State-specific implementation of the main benefit test and other conditions. Large multinationals (consolidated revenue of EUR 750 million or more in each of the last two fiscal years) must also prepare and publicly disclose a Public Country-by-Country Report. Under the EU Public CbCR Directive, Vietnam activities must be reported separately-not aggregated as “Rest of the World”-disclosing a list of all consolidated subsidiaries, description of activities, number of full-time equivalent employees, revenues (including related-party revenue), profit or loss before tax, income tax accrued and paid, and accumulated earnings. For FY 2025 and FY 2026, Vietnam information is already reportable separately by affected multinationals.

Country notes (alphabetical)

Belgium: Belgium applies non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, and participation exemption limitations linked to both the EU list and certain domestic criteria. A critical Belgian-specific rule is the reporting obligation for payments made to entities in blacklisted jurisdictions where the aggregate of such payments exceeds EUR 100,000 in the taxable period; once this threshold is met, each such payment must be reported in the annual tax return, and any payment that is not reported, or that cannot be justified on specific grounds, is not deductible. Belgium follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning EU list updates take effect automatically without a further domestic step. For Belgian payers, immediate practical priorities are: (i) identifying all Vietnam-linked payment streams above EUR 100,000, (ii) ensuring the reporting mechanism in the annual tax return is in place, and (iii) building the justification file for each reported payment.

France: France applies all four defensive measures-non-deductibility of costs, CFC rules, withholding tax, and participation exemption limitation-but via a national decree-based list that refers to the EU list while also applying additional French domestic criteria. France follows a static approach, updating its domestic non-cooperative state list through an annual Decree in the Official Journal, with tax consequences applying from the first day of the third month following publication. The last French update took place in April 2025, and at the time of writing (May 2026) no subsequent decree incorporating Vietnam has been published. A further update is expected imminently and will likely include Vietnam. Once Vietnam appears on the French list, key measures include: a 75% withholding tax on interest, royalties, dividends and service fees (counterevidence possible); denial of the participation exemption (counterevidence possible for jurisdictions meeting certain criteria); denial of deductibility of interest, royalties and service fees (counterevidence possible); and a stricter CFC rule under which the burden of proof is reversed and foreign withholding taxes cannot be credited against French CFC income. French payers should monitor the next French decree closely and prepare counterevidence files now so they are ready the moment the decree is published.

Germany: Germany applies all four defensive measures through the Tax Haven Defence Act (Steueroasen-Abwehrgesetz, StAbwG), linked to the EU list via a Tax Haven Defence Ordinance that is updated once per year, typically at year-end taking into account the October EU list update. The expected sequence for Vietnam is: December 2026-amendment to the Tax Haven Defence Ordinance to incorporate Vietnam; from 2027 (Year 1)-stricter CFC rules and extended withholding tax of 15% (plus a 5.5% solidarity surcharge) apply to income from financing relationships, insurance or reinsurance services, legal and advisory services, and trading of goods and services; from 2029 (Year 3)-denial of the participation exemption activates; from 2030 (Year 4)-denial of deductible business expenses activates. Importantly, Germany’s extended withholding tax can override double tax treaties. The multi-year ramp-up means that immediate German impacts are CFC scrutiny and withholding tax friction on specific payment types, while the broader expense deduction denial will only bite from 2030 onwards-giving German payers time to prepare, but making early documentation investment worthwhile.

Italy: Italy uses the EU list for monitoring and deductibility purposes under Article 110 TUIR: costs connected with counterparties in Annex I jurisdictions are generally deductible up to “normal value,” while amounts above normal value require evidence of an effective economic interest, and all such costs must be separately indicated in the annual income tax return (Modello REDDITI). Italy’s framework is directly triggered by the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status is effective for Italian purposes from the publication of the Council conclusions in the EU Official Journal, without any further domestic implementing step being required.

For Italian payers, service costs, royalties, and intragroup charges to Vietnam are the most sensitive categories: robust documentation of deliverables, pricing and economic rationale is essential, and accounting teams need to ensure they can cleanly isolate Vietnam-linked costs in the year-end reporting workflow.

Malta: Malta follows a dynamic approach to the EU list, meaning Vietnam’s Annex I status takes effect automatically in Malta’s tax framework. Malta applies a limitation of the participation exemption on dividend income derived from a participating holding in a body of persons that has been resident in a jurisdiction on the EU list for a minimum period of three months during the year immediately preceding the year of assessment, subject to a counter-evidence exception based on “people functions.” Malta does not apply non-deductibility, CFC, or withholding tax defensive measures against EU-listed jurisdictions as primary tools, so the main Malta-specific concern for holding and investment structures is participation exemption eligibility and substance evidence. For Malta-based groups, the practical response is to keep board materials, contracts, and commercial rationale tightly aligned, and to prepare for more intensive counterparty due diligence (beneficial ownership, substance, and tax residency) from EU customers and financial institutions.