Mediación y el Covid19 – Qué podemos aprender

13 de abril de 2020

  • España
  • Contratos
  • Litigios

El procedimiento arbitral en España se caracteriza, y constituye una de sus grandes ventajas, por la dificultad de anular o revocar judicialmente el laudo; las partes saben que el laudo que se dicte es en la mayoría de los casos firme y definitivo y pone punto final al conflicto.

El art. 41 de la Ley de Arbitraje únicamente permite la anulación del laudo por razones de forma (inexistencia o invalidez del convenio arbitral, falta de notificación a alguna de las partes sobre la designación del árbitro o de las actuaciones arbitrales, indebida designación de los árbitros o que los árbitros hayan resuelto sobre materias que no eran o no podían ser objeto de arbitraje por imperio de la ley). Y adicionalmente el laudo también es anulable cuando es contrario al “orden público”.

Que cosa sea el “orden público” como para dar lugar, en caso de vulneración, a la anulación del laudo, es cuestión que de siempre ha sido controvertida y debatida; ya en la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 se alude el “orden público” como causa de denegación del reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros. Como recuerda el Tribunal Constitucional (“TC”) en la sentencia que comentamos, citando su propia jurisprudencia, “el orden público material es el conjunto de principios jurídicos públicos y privados, políticos, morales y económicos que son absolutamente obligatorios para la conservación de la sociedad en un pueblo y en una época determinada y el orden público procesal se configura como el conjunto de formalidades y principios necesarios de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico procesal y solo el arbitraje que contradiga alguno o algunos de tales principios podrá ser tachado de nulo por vulneración del orden público”.

A título de ejemplo, durante 2018 se presentaron 38 demandas de anulación de laudos ante los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia (“TSJ”) de los que 31 se fundamentaban en vulneración del orden público; resultaron estimadas 8 de las demandas (21%), 5 por vulneración del orden público y 3 por invalidez del convenio arbitral.

El TSJ de Madrid ha venido manteniendo en los últimos tiempos una interpretación muy “expansiva” del orden público, lo que ha generado dudas y temores en las instituciones y Cortes Arbitrales, por el efecto disuasorio que dicha posición podría tener a la hora de elegir Madrid como sede de arbitrajes, nacionales o internacionales.

Y en la línea interpretativa a la que nos referimos, el TSJ de Madrid ha mantenido el siguiente y sorprendente criterio: dictado un laudo e interpuesta demanda de anulación por una de las partes, los litigantes alcanzaron un acuerdo extrajudicial y solicitaron conjuntamente  el archivo de la demanda de anulación; es decir, ambos daban el laudo por bueno y definitivo; el TSJ rechazó la petición y siguió adelante hasta dictar sentencia anulando el laudo, argumentando que como la demanda de anulación se basaba en la infracción del orden público, entonces ya la materia no era disponible por las partes y no era, en opinión del Tribunal, susceptible de transacción o renuncia.

No era esta la primera vez que el TSJ adoptaba esta postura: impetrada la anulación de un laudo por ser contrario al “orden público”, las partes ya no tenían la posibilidad de transar y renunciar a la demanda de anulación.

Por primera vez el asunto ha llegado al Tribunal Constitucional (TC): en un reciente fallo del 15 de junio de 2020, el TC ha sido claro y rotundo; recuerda en su sentencia que el proceso civil se fundamenta en el principio de “disposición de las partes para regular sus intereses privados, es decir, para iniciar la actividad jurisdiccional, determinar el objeto del proceso y ponerle fin cuando estimen conveniente”. Es lo que llamamos “justicia rogada”; y este principio aplica no solo a los procedimientos civiles ante los tribunales ordinarios sino también a los procedimientos arbitrales; asimismo afirma la sentencia que el arbitraje está configurado por la Ley como un mecanismo heterónomo de resolución de conflictos al que es consustancial la mínima intervención de los órganos judiciales a favor de la autonomía de la voluntad.

Y concluye sentando que la acción de anulación debe ser entendida como un proceso de control externo sobre el laudo que no permite una decisión sobre el fondo de la decisión de los árbitros, al estar tasadas las causas, lo que justifica que “el control de los laudos tenga carácter limitado y solo pueda obtenerse la anulación del laudo en casos excepcionales”.

En suma, entiende y proclama el TC que es contrario al derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva que protege el art. 24 de la Constitución la negativa del Tribunal a reconocer la virtualidad de un acuerdo alcanzado entre los litigantes con fundamento en el poder dispositivo de las partes sin que medie norma prohibitiva que así lo autorice e imponiendo una decisión que subvierte el principio dispositivo o de “justicia rogada” que inspira el proceso civil; por lo que concede el amparo solicitado y ordena retrotraer las actuaciones al momento anterior al auto que denegó virtualidad a la solicitud conjunta de archivo para que el TSJ dicte otra resolución acompasada al criterio del TC.

En suma, no podrá ya nunca más el TSJM impedir a los litigantes transar y poner fin a una demanda de anulación de laudo (como ocurre pacífica y habitualmente con los recursos de apelación o de casación) y además deberá tomar en consideración en adelante la interpretación restrictiva del concepto de orden público que ha establecido el TC en esta importante sentencia. En efecto, el arbitraje español sale muy reforzado con esta sentencia del TC.

The COVID-19 pandemic’s dramatic disruption of the legal and business landscape has included a steep drop in overall M&A activity in Q1 2020.  Much of this decrease has been due to decreased target valuations, tighter access by buyers to liquidity, and perhaps above all underlying uncertainty as to the crisis’s duration.

For pending transactions, whether the buyer can walk away from the deal (or seek a purchase price reduction) by invoking a material adverse change (MAC) or material adverse effect (MAE) clause – or another clause in the purchase agreement – due to COVID-19 has become a question of increasing relevance.  MAC/MAE clauses typically allow a buyer to terminate an acquisition agreement if a MAC or MAE occurs between signing and closing.

Actual litigated cases in this area have been few and far between, as under longstanding Delaware case law[1], buyer has the burden of proving MAC or MAE, irrespective of who initiates the lawsuit.  And the standard of proof is high – a buyer must show that the effects of the intervening event are sufficiently large and long lasting as compared to an equivalent period of the prior year.  A short-term or immaterial deviation will not suffice.  In fact, Delaware courts have only once found a MAC, in the December 2018 case Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG.

And yet, since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous widely reported COVID-19 related M&A litigations have been initiated with the Delaware Court of Chancery.  These include:

  • Bed, Bath & Beyond suing 1-800-Flowers (Del. Ch. April 1, 2020) to complete its acquisition of Perosnalizationmall.com (purchaser sought an extension in closing, without citing specifically the contractual basis for the request);
  • Level 4 Yoga, franchisee of CorePower Yoga, suing CorePower Yoga (Del. Ch. Apr 2, 2020) to compel CorePower Yoga to purchase of Level 4 Yoga studios (after CorePower Yoga took the position that studio closings resulting from COVID-19 stay-at-home orders violated the ordinary course covenant);
  • Oberman, Tivoli & Pickert suing Cast & Crew (Del. Ch. Apr 6, 2020), an industry competitor, to complete its purchase of Oberman’s subsidiary (Cast & Crew maintained it was not obligated to close based on alleged insufficiencies in financial data provided in diligence);
  • SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc. (Del. Ch. Apr 22, 2020), in which buyer sought a declaratory judgment in its favor on termination); and
  • L Brands, Inc. v. SP VS Buyer L.P., Sycamore Partners III, L.P., and Sycamore Partners III-A, L.P (Del. Ch. Apr 23), in which seller instead seeks declaratory judgment in its favor on buyer obligation to close.

Such cases, typically signed up at an early stage of the pandemic, are likely to increase.  Delaware M&A-MAC-related jurisprudence suggests that buyers seeking to cite MAC in asserting their positions should expect an uphill fight, given buyer’s high burden of proof.  Indeed, Delaware courts’ sole finding of a MAC in Akorn was based on rather extreme facts: target’s (Akorn’s) business deteriorated significantly (40% and 20% drops in profit and equity value, respectively), measured over a full year.  And quite material to the Court’s decision was the likely devastating effect on Akorn’s business resulting from Akorn’s deceptive conduct vis-à-vis the FDA.

By contrast, cases before and after Akorn, courts have not found a MAC/MAE, including in the 2019 case Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.  There, Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC) agreed to purchase Channel Medsystems, Inc., an early stage medical device company.  The sale was conditioned on Channel receiving FDA approval for its sole product, Cerene. In late December 2017, Channel discovered that falsified information from reports by its Vice President of Quality (as part of a scheme to steal over $2 million from Channel) was included in Channel’s FDA submissions.  BSC terminated the merger agreement in May 2018, asserting that Channel’s false representations and warranties constituted a MAC.

The court disagreed.  While Channel and Akron both involved a fraud element, Chanel successfully resubmitted its FDA application, such that the fraudulent behavior – the court found – would not cause the FDA to reject the Cerene device.  BSC also failed to show sufficiently large or long-lasting effects on Channel’s financial position.  Channel thus reaffirmed the high bar under pre-Akron Delaware jurisprudence for courts to find a MAC/MAE (See e.g. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005); Hexion Specialty Chemicals v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008)).

Applied to COVID-19, buyers may have challenges in invoking MAC/MAE clauses under their purchase agreements.

First, it may simply be premature at this juncture for a buyer to show the type of longer-term effects that have been required under Delaware jurisprudence.  The long-term effects of COVID-19 itself are unclear.  Of course, as weeks turn into months and longer, this may change.

A second challenge is certain carve-outs typically included in MAC/MAE clauses.  Notably, it is typical for these clauses to include exceptions for general economic and financial conditions generally affecting a target’s industry, unless a buyer can demonstrate that they have disproportionately affected the target.

A buyer may be able to point to other clauses in a purchase agreement in seeking to walk away from the deal.  Of note is the ordinary course covenant that applies to the period between signing and closing.  By definition, most targets are unable to carry out business during the COVID-19 crisis consistent with past practice.  It is unclear whether courts will allow for a literal reading of these clauses, or interpret them taking into account the broader risk allocation regime as evidenced by the MAC or MAE clause in the agreement, and in doing so reject a buyer’s position.

For unsigned deals, there may be some early lessons for practitioners as they prepare draft purchase agreements.  On buyer walk-away rights, buyers will want to ensure that the MAE/MAC definition includes express reference to “pandemics” and “epidemics”, if not to “COVID-19” itself.  Conversely, Sellers may wish to seek to loosen ordinary course covenant language, such as by including express exceptions for actions required by the MAC or MAE and otherwise ensure that they comply with all obligations under their control.  Buyers will also want to pay close attention to how COVID-19 affects other aspects of the purchase agreement, including seeking more robust representations and warranties on the impact of COVID-19 on the target’s business.

 

[1] Although the discussion of this based Delaware law, caselaw in other U.S. jurisdictions often is consistent Delaware.  

This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

Novel technology in proceedings

Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

  • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
  • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
  • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
  • the matter concerns an international dispute.

The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

“All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

  • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
  • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
  • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
  • the disclosure of confidential documents
  • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
  • the manner of taking witness testimony
  • the costs of the proceedings.

Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

  • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
  • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
  • The defendant submits its defence statement.
  • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
  • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
  • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
  • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
  • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

«Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

Escuchar es altamente eficaz

En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

«Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

«Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

«El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

Las emociones son importantes

Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

«Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

[NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

The English common law is a primary choice of law for international business, because it consistently gives the parties exactly what they agreed: what you see in the contract is what you get.

The same cannot be said for the English legal system: there are barristers, solicitors, Inns of Court, chambers, compulsory disclosure, cross-examination and the loser pays rule. There is much to confuse non-English lawyers and mistakes can be expensive for their clients. Those who know enough to avoid confusion can add real value for clients who have English law disputes.

This blog focuses on a single feature which is key for international lawyers’ understanding of the English legal system: why it has two kinds of lawyer – barristers and solicitors – and what each of them does.

Barristers and solicitors: what is the difference?

To understand the difference, the key thing to bear in mind is that they run completely different business models to support their legal practices.

Solicitors practice within law firms: profit sharing entities, familiar to lawyers around the world. This risk-sharing model allows senior lawyers to employ teams of junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases: corresponding with the client, the court and the opposing parties and collecting the evidence for trial.

Barristers are self-employed individuals. They operate from ‘chambers’, which are cost-sharing organisations; barristers practising in chambers together do not share profit or spread risk. They cannot employ junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases; they do not collect evidence, correspond with the court, opposing party or the client. Instead, they are specialist sub-contractors to law firms in England and around the world. Those law firms do all that heavy lifting that allows barristers to conduct their practices.

What barristers do

What, then, do law firms ask them to do? Two things: to provide advocacy services and the detailed legal advice necessary for effective advocacy. That means they have particular familiarity with three key aspects of English dispute resolution:

  1. the detail of the cases which are the source of the common law,
  2. the cross-examination of witnesses; and
  3. the oral and written judicial argument that pulls the first two aspects together.

But aren’t those the fun bits of being a lawyer? Well, yes. So why would a law firm outsource the fun bits? Well, that depends on the kind of law firm…

English solicitors’ reasons for using barristers

Let’s take English solicitors first. You have to bear in mind two characteristics of common law dispute resolution. The first has already been mentioned: the source of law is not a readily-comprehensible, unifying civil code, but thousands of cases decided over centuries; it takes time to master the case law in sufficient detail to argue cases.

The second is the nature of hearings: they take time because of the detailed case law that needs to be considered and because a great deal of work is done orally: from argument to the cross-examination of witnesses. Trials are all-consuming and can last months. So the nature of common law trial work means you have to focus all your time and attention on it to succeed.

That gives the English law firm a choice: it can either recruit and manage expensive, in-house advocacy talent, or it can outsource it. The former is capital-intensive and risky. The latter involves no capital and no risk. You might object that risk is necessary for reward; and true it is. But the existence of a ready supply of barristers in England means solicitors do not have to take that particular business risk in addition to all the other risks they have to take in order to run successful disputes practices.

The existence of barristers allows solicitors to make the following calculation: few cases come to trial; most settle. Solicitors make most of their income preparing cases for trial, not in trial. So it is less risky and more profitable to recruit junior lawyers to help prepare cases for trial rather than recruit senior advocates to fight trials. If the trial happens, solicitors retain a barrister as advocate in the case; they make just enough of the barrister before trial to ensure the trial will run smoothly if it does happen. Meanwhile, the senior solicitors focus on managing their teams of lawyers and winning new business to keep their practices growing. It is an effective business model, even if it leaves the fun bits to barristers.

The risk-reduction that barristers offer to solicitors is more extensive than that basic analysis allows. First, solicitors do not take the risk of losing a client by instructing a barrister on their cases; the barrister’s clients are law firms: no risk there. Second, a firm’s choice to recruit in house advocates is a choice taken once and once only, for better or worse. By contrast, a firm’s choice to instruct a barrister is taken on each new case, so it can choose an advocate with precisely the right expertise for the case. That means the firm can sell its trial preparation practice to assist in disputes in which the firm itself lacks specialist expertise. That reduces the firm’s risk and maintains its profitability.

All in all, therefore, barristers’ and solicitors’ different business models allow them to run complimentary, not competitive practices.

Non-English lawyers’ reasons to use barristers

Now let us consider why non-English law firms would use barristers. The answer is: for the same reasons, but more so. Many non-English law firms have clients with disputes under English law. Most feel the need to pass those cases on to an English law firm; if they do, they lose all or almost all the revenue from the case. To the extent they stay involved, they have little control over the process or the outcome, but they do have the unenviable task of handing the English firm’s very large invoices to their client. It is rarely a comfortable experience.

Note, however: the more sophisticated non-English law firms engage a barrister as their own sub-contractor on English law cases. That completely changes their experience of conducting English law disputes.

In arbitrations, the non-English law firm is free to do exactly the same job an English solicitor; the sub-contracted barrister provides the English law advice and advocacy that the law firm itself cannot provide. By stepping into the shoes of the English law firm, the non-English firm both reduces its client’s legal costs and takes a larger share of them.

In litigation, the non-English law firms must engage a solicitor, but the sophisticated firm nevertheless engages a barrister as its own sub-contractor, rather than allowing the solicitor to engage the barrister. That gives the non-English firm a better flow of information and greater control over the process, so it can better manage its client’s expectations and liabilities.

So: sophisticated non-English law firms do not let the English law firms reap all the competitive advantages barristers offer to law firms; they take those advantages for themselves. Your firm should do so too. Be sophisticated: develop trusted relations with an internationally-minded barrister today; it will be invaluable when your client is involved in a dispute under English law.

Are arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance contracts enforceable against a third party which is acting directly against the insurer in third party liability insurances?

Such direct action is admitted by French law in liability insurances, as defined in article 124-3 of the Insurance Code.

In just a few months two radically different approaches have been taken by the French Cour de cassation (Civ.1, 19 December 2018, n°17-28.951) and the ECJ in Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd (13 July 2017, C-368/16) and KABEG v. MMA IARD (20 July 2017, C-340/16).

The case submitted to the Cour de cassation represented a third party exercising a direct right of action before French Courts against the insurer of a floating barge which had caused him a damage. The Supreme Court accepted that the insurer could validly oppose the arbitration clause, which was in the policy against the third party, and therefore judged that French Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. The Supreme Court applied the well-established principle of Compétence-Compétence – materialized in article 1448 of the French Code de Procédure Civile – to stay the case, considering that the arbitration clause could not be set aside. The Court therefore judged that the applicability of the arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitrators by priority.

A year before, the ECJ had ruled in the opposite direction in a case where a jurisdiction clause was applicable in the insurance policy. In Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd, the ECJ stated that the clause could not be opposed to the third party acting directly against the insurer. According to the Court, the insurers’ liability towards the insured has a contractual nature when based on the policy, whereas it is extra-contractual when the liability is based on a direct action from a third party. In a previous ruling the Court had considered (Sté financière et industrielle du Peloux (12 May 2005, C-112/03) that the jurisdiction clause cannot be opposed to the beneficiary of an insurance policy if he is not the policyholder (for instance in a collective insurance).

One sees a clear difference in treatment between arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause when it comes to deciding on their opposability to the victim exercising a direct action against the insurer.

Article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an arbitration cannot be opposed to a party which has not contracted for the purpose of its business activity. The French Cour de cassation grounded its decision on the fact that the clauses of the main contract could be opposed to the third party. If the latter was entitled to apply the insurance contract, it was therefore entitled to invoke article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

The Russian law allows the parties to agree on recovery of contractual penalty for failure by the parties to fulfill contractual obligations.

Below are some typical examples of provisions that stipulate contractual penalty:

In the event of untimely delivery of the Goods under the Contract the Buyer shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 (zero point one) percent from the total value of untimely delivered Goods for each day of delay.

In the event of untimely payment for the Goods under the Contract the Seller shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 percent from the total value of untimely paid Goods for each day of delay.

The Civil Code of Russia (art. 333) allows the court to decrease the amount of penalty if such amount of penalty is disproportionate to the consequences of breach of contractual obligations, with that the court shall be entitled to decrease penalty only if the debtor files a motion with the request to decrease such excessive amount of penalty.

The decrease of penalty determined by the contract and subject to payment by the person who conducts business activities is allowed only in exceptional cases, if it is proved that the recovery of penalty in the amount stipulated by the contract can lead to receipt of the unjustified profit by the creditor.

In practice the parties file motions with the court of first instance with the request to decrease penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code and the court usually decreases the amount of penalty at its discretion.

In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Russia dated 29.05.2018 (case #A43-26319/2016) the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of penalty even in the amount exceeding the total value of the contract was justified provided that the debtor failed to file a motion with the court of first instance with the request to decrease such penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code.

In this case the customer ordered the contractor to produce a pressure vessel. The price of such works of the contractor amounted to 2.700.000 rubles. The parties agreed that the pressure vessel will be produced by the contractor till 30.01.2015. The contractor produced the pressure vessel only on 01.03.2016.

The contract stipulated that in case of violation of terms of performance of works the contractor will pay to the customer a fixed fine in the amount of 5% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each violation as well as penalty in the amount of 0,3% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each day of delay starting with the 4th day of delay.

As a result, the customer demanded that the contractor pays penalty in the amount of 3.355.170 rubles.

The court of first instance ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered that the client shall pay the amount of penalty in full since the contractor failed to provide evidence that confirmed due fulfillment of the contract by the contractor, or that the contractor failed to perform its obligations in time due to circumstances that were out of his control. With that the contractor also failed to dispute the amount of penalty and failed to file a motion on application of art. 333 of the Civil Code.

The appeal court changed the ruling of the court of first instance and decreased the amount of penalty to 326.781 rubles based on its conclusions that the customer abused its rights by including in the contract the unfair penalty provisions.

The Cassation Court agreed with conclusions of the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the rulings of both the Cassation Court and Court of Appeal and the decision of the court of first instance remained in force.

The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the contractor failed to file a motion with the request to decrease the amount of penalty and apply art. 333 of the Civil Code in the court of first instance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no right to decrease the amount of penalty at its own initiative.

The latest conclusions of the Supreme Court confirm that the contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract and the courts are not allowed to decrease such excessive amount of penalty at its own initiative.

Thus, if you have any dispute in Russia, please ensure that your company is duly represented in state commercial courts, since the failure of the parties to appear in court of first instance and file respective motions might lead to serious negative consequences that the failing party might not be able to cure in the courts of appeal.

Not what you would expect 

When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!

The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.

This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.

However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.

In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.

Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an «in-house» operation» in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.

What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?

Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.

Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.

As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.

The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!

However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to «justify» avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.

In this respect, in many cases simple «non-satisfaction» was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.

There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.

Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.

Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.

The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.

In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.

Ignacio Alonso

Áreas de práctica

  • Agencia
  • Derecho Societario
  • Contratos de distribución
  • Franquicia
Contáctanos Ignacio

Contacta con Ignacio





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    Barristers: what they are, and why they exist

    5 de abril de 2020

    • Inglaterra
    • Litigios

    El procedimiento arbitral en España se caracteriza, y constituye una de sus grandes ventajas, por la dificultad de anular o revocar judicialmente el laudo; las partes saben que el laudo que se dicte es en la mayoría de los casos firme y definitivo y pone punto final al conflicto.

    El art. 41 de la Ley de Arbitraje únicamente permite la anulación del laudo por razones de forma (inexistencia o invalidez del convenio arbitral, falta de notificación a alguna de las partes sobre la designación del árbitro o de las actuaciones arbitrales, indebida designación de los árbitros o que los árbitros hayan resuelto sobre materias que no eran o no podían ser objeto de arbitraje por imperio de la ley). Y adicionalmente el laudo también es anulable cuando es contrario al “orden público”.

    Que cosa sea el “orden público” como para dar lugar, en caso de vulneración, a la anulación del laudo, es cuestión que de siempre ha sido controvertida y debatida; ya en la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 se alude el “orden público” como causa de denegación del reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros. Como recuerda el Tribunal Constitucional (“TC”) en la sentencia que comentamos, citando su propia jurisprudencia, “el orden público material es el conjunto de principios jurídicos públicos y privados, políticos, morales y económicos que son absolutamente obligatorios para la conservación de la sociedad en un pueblo y en una época determinada y el orden público procesal se configura como el conjunto de formalidades y principios necesarios de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico procesal y solo el arbitraje que contradiga alguno o algunos de tales principios podrá ser tachado de nulo por vulneración del orden público”.

    A título de ejemplo, durante 2018 se presentaron 38 demandas de anulación de laudos ante los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia (“TSJ”) de los que 31 se fundamentaban en vulneración del orden público; resultaron estimadas 8 de las demandas (21%), 5 por vulneración del orden público y 3 por invalidez del convenio arbitral.

    El TSJ de Madrid ha venido manteniendo en los últimos tiempos una interpretación muy “expansiva” del orden público, lo que ha generado dudas y temores en las instituciones y Cortes Arbitrales, por el efecto disuasorio que dicha posición podría tener a la hora de elegir Madrid como sede de arbitrajes, nacionales o internacionales.

    Y en la línea interpretativa a la que nos referimos, el TSJ de Madrid ha mantenido el siguiente y sorprendente criterio: dictado un laudo e interpuesta demanda de anulación por una de las partes, los litigantes alcanzaron un acuerdo extrajudicial y solicitaron conjuntamente  el archivo de la demanda de anulación; es decir, ambos daban el laudo por bueno y definitivo; el TSJ rechazó la petición y siguió adelante hasta dictar sentencia anulando el laudo, argumentando que como la demanda de anulación se basaba en la infracción del orden público, entonces ya la materia no era disponible por las partes y no era, en opinión del Tribunal, susceptible de transacción o renuncia.

    No era esta la primera vez que el TSJ adoptaba esta postura: impetrada la anulación de un laudo por ser contrario al “orden público”, las partes ya no tenían la posibilidad de transar y renunciar a la demanda de anulación.

    Por primera vez el asunto ha llegado al Tribunal Constitucional (TC): en un reciente fallo del 15 de junio de 2020, el TC ha sido claro y rotundo; recuerda en su sentencia que el proceso civil se fundamenta en el principio de “disposición de las partes para regular sus intereses privados, es decir, para iniciar la actividad jurisdiccional, determinar el objeto del proceso y ponerle fin cuando estimen conveniente”. Es lo que llamamos “justicia rogada”; y este principio aplica no solo a los procedimientos civiles ante los tribunales ordinarios sino también a los procedimientos arbitrales; asimismo afirma la sentencia que el arbitraje está configurado por la Ley como un mecanismo heterónomo de resolución de conflictos al que es consustancial la mínima intervención de los órganos judiciales a favor de la autonomía de la voluntad.

    Y concluye sentando que la acción de anulación debe ser entendida como un proceso de control externo sobre el laudo que no permite una decisión sobre el fondo de la decisión de los árbitros, al estar tasadas las causas, lo que justifica que “el control de los laudos tenga carácter limitado y solo pueda obtenerse la anulación del laudo en casos excepcionales”.

    En suma, entiende y proclama el TC que es contrario al derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva que protege el art. 24 de la Constitución la negativa del Tribunal a reconocer la virtualidad de un acuerdo alcanzado entre los litigantes con fundamento en el poder dispositivo de las partes sin que medie norma prohibitiva que así lo autorice e imponiendo una decisión que subvierte el principio dispositivo o de “justicia rogada” que inspira el proceso civil; por lo que concede el amparo solicitado y ordena retrotraer las actuaciones al momento anterior al auto que denegó virtualidad a la solicitud conjunta de archivo para que el TSJ dicte otra resolución acompasada al criterio del TC.

    En suma, no podrá ya nunca más el TSJM impedir a los litigantes transar y poner fin a una demanda de anulación de laudo (como ocurre pacífica y habitualmente con los recursos de apelación o de casación) y además deberá tomar en consideración en adelante la interpretación restrictiva del concepto de orden público que ha establecido el TC en esta importante sentencia. En efecto, el arbitraje español sale muy reforzado con esta sentencia del TC.

    The COVID-19 pandemic’s dramatic disruption of the legal and business landscape has included a steep drop in overall M&A activity in Q1 2020.  Much of this decrease has been due to decreased target valuations, tighter access by buyers to liquidity, and perhaps above all underlying uncertainty as to the crisis’s duration.

    For pending transactions, whether the buyer can walk away from the deal (or seek a purchase price reduction) by invoking a material adverse change (MAC) or material adverse effect (MAE) clause – or another clause in the purchase agreement – due to COVID-19 has become a question of increasing relevance.  MAC/MAE clauses typically allow a buyer to terminate an acquisition agreement if a MAC or MAE occurs between signing and closing.

    Actual litigated cases in this area have been few and far between, as under longstanding Delaware case law[1], buyer has the burden of proving MAC or MAE, irrespective of who initiates the lawsuit.  And the standard of proof is high – a buyer must show that the effects of the intervening event are sufficiently large and long lasting as compared to an equivalent period of the prior year.  A short-term or immaterial deviation will not suffice.  In fact, Delaware courts have only once found a MAC, in the December 2018 case Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG.

    And yet, since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous widely reported COVID-19 related M&A litigations have been initiated with the Delaware Court of Chancery.  These include:

    • Bed, Bath & Beyond suing 1-800-Flowers (Del. Ch. April 1, 2020) to complete its acquisition of Perosnalizationmall.com (purchaser sought an extension in closing, without citing specifically the contractual basis for the request);
    • Level 4 Yoga, franchisee of CorePower Yoga, suing CorePower Yoga (Del. Ch. Apr 2, 2020) to compel CorePower Yoga to purchase of Level 4 Yoga studios (after CorePower Yoga took the position that studio closings resulting from COVID-19 stay-at-home orders violated the ordinary course covenant);
    • Oberman, Tivoli & Pickert suing Cast & Crew (Del. Ch. Apr 6, 2020), an industry competitor, to complete its purchase of Oberman’s subsidiary (Cast & Crew maintained it was not obligated to close based on alleged insufficiencies in financial data provided in diligence);
    • SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc. (Del. Ch. Apr 22, 2020), in which buyer sought a declaratory judgment in its favor on termination); and
    • L Brands, Inc. v. SP VS Buyer L.P., Sycamore Partners III, L.P., and Sycamore Partners III-A, L.P (Del. Ch. Apr 23), in which seller instead seeks declaratory judgment in its favor on buyer obligation to close.

    Such cases, typically signed up at an early stage of the pandemic, are likely to increase.  Delaware M&A-MAC-related jurisprudence suggests that buyers seeking to cite MAC in asserting their positions should expect an uphill fight, given buyer’s high burden of proof.  Indeed, Delaware courts’ sole finding of a MAC in Akorn was based on rather extreme facts: target’s (Akorn’s) business deteriorated significantly (40% and 20% drops in profit and equity value, respectively), measured over a full year.  And quite material to the Court’s decision was the likely devastating effect on Akorn’s business resulting from Akorn’s deceptive conduct vis-à-vis the FDA.

    By contrast, cases before and after Akorn, courts have not found a MAC/MAE, including in the 2019 case Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.  There, Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC) agreed to purchase Channel Medsystems, Inc., an early stage medical device company.  The sale was conditioned on Channel receiving FDA approval for its sole product, Cerene. In late December 2017, Channel discovered that falsified information from reports by its Vice President of Quality (as part of a scheme to steal over $2 million from Channel) was included in Channel’s FDA submissions.  BSC terminated the merger agreement in May 2018, asserting that Channel’s false representations and warranties constituted a MAC.

    The court disagreed.  While Channel and Akron both involved a fraud element, Chanel successfully resubmitted its FDA application, such that the fraudulent behavior – the court found – would not cause the FDA to reject the Cerene device.  BSC also failed to show sufficiently large or long-lasting effects on Channel’s financial position.  Channel thus reaffirmed the high bar under pre-Akron Delaware jurisprudence for courts to find a MAC/MAE (See e.g. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005); Hexion Specialty Chemicals v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008)).

    Applied to COVID-19, buyers may have challenges in invoking MAC/MAE clauses under their purchase agreements.

    First, it may simply be premature at this juncture for a buyer to show the type of longer-term effects that have been required under Delaware jurisprudence.  The long-term effects of COVID-19 itself are unclear.  Of course, as weeks turn into months and longer, this may change.

    A second challenge is certain carve-outs typically included in MAC/MAE clauses.  Notably, it is typical for these clauses to include exceptions for general economic and financial conditions generally affecting a target’s industry, unless a buyer can demonstrate that they have disproportionately affected the target.

    A buyer may be able to point to other clauses in a purchase agreement in seeking to walk away from the deal.  Of note is the ordinary course covenant that applies to the period between signing and closing.  By definition, most targets are unable to carry out business during the COVID-19 crisis consistent with past practice.  It is unclear whether courts will allow for a literal reading of these clauses, or interpret them taking into account the broader risk allocation regime as evidenced by the MAC or MAE clause in the agreement, and in doing so reject a buyer’s position.

    For unsigned deals, there may be some early lessons for practitioners as they prepare draft purchase agreements.  On buyer walk-away rights, buyers will want to ensure that the MAE/MAC definition includes express reference to “pandemics” and “epidemics”, if not to “COVID-19” itself.  Conversely, Sellers may wish to seek to loosen ordinary course covenant language, such as by including express exceptions for actions required by the MAC or MAE and otherwise ensure that they comply with all obligations under their control.  Buyers will also want to pay close attention to how COVID-19 affects other aspects of the purchase agreement, including seeking more robust representations and warranties on the impact of COVID-19 on the target’s business.

     

    [1] Although the discussion of this based Delaware law, caselaw in other U.S. jurisdictions often is consistent Delaware.  

    This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

    This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

    In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

    English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

    The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

    This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

    The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

    The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

    As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

    The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

    Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

    The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

    Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

    Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

    Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

    The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

    Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

    The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

    There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

    The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

    The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

    As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

    Novel technology in proceedings

    Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

    And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

    Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

    Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

    Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

    • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
    • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
    • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
    • the matter concerns an international dispute.

    The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

    “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

    The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

    Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

    We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

    To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

    Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

    Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

    • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
    • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
    • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
    • the disclosure of confidential documents
    • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
    • the manner of taking witness testimony
    • the costs of the proceedings.

    Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

    All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

    The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

    • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
    • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
    • The defendant submits its defence statement.
    • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
    • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
    • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
    • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
    • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

    Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

    As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

    Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

    Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

    Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

    La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

    Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

    «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

    Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

    Escuchar es altamente eficaz

    En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

    Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

    «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

    Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

    En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

    «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

    Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

    La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

    En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

    «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

    Las emociones son importantes

    Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

    «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

    [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

    The English common law is a primary choice of law for international business, because it consistently gives the parties exactly what they agreed: what you see in the contract is what you get.

    The same cannot be said for the English legal system: there are barristers, solicitors, Inns of Court, chambers, compulsory disclosure, cross-examination and the loser pays rule. There is much to confuse non-English lawyers and mistakes can be expensive for their clients. Those who know enough to avoid confusion can add real value for clients who have English law disputes.

    This blog focuses on a single feature which is key for international lawyers’ understanding of the English legal system: why it has two kinds of lawyer – barristers and solicitors – and what each of them does.

    Barristers and solicitors: what is the difference?

    To understand the difference, the key thing to bear in mind is that they run completely different business models to support their legal practices.

    Solicitors practice within law firms: profit sharing entities, familiar to lawyers around the world. This risk-sharing model allows senior lawyers to employ teams of junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases: corresponding with the client, the court and the opposing parties and collecting the evidence for trial.

    Barristers are self-employed individuals. They operate from ‘chambers’, which are cost-sharing organisations; barristers practising in chambers together do not share profit or spread risk. They cannot employ junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases; they do not collect evidence, correspond with the court, opposing party or the client. Instead, they are specialist sub-contractors to law firms in England and around the world. Those law firms do all that heavy lifting that allows barristers to conduct their practices.

    What barristers do

    What, then, do law firms ask them to do? Two things: to provide advocacy services and the detailed legal advice necessary for effective advocacy. That means they have particular familiarity with three key aspects of English dispute resolution:

    1. the detail of the cases which are the source of the common law,
    2. the cross-examination of witnesses; and
    3. the oral and written judicial argument that pulls the first two aspects together.

    But aren’t those the fun bits of being a lawyer? Well, yes. So why would a law firm outsource the fun bits? Well, that depends on the kind of law firm…

    English solicitors’ reasons for using barristers

    Let’s take English solicitors first. You have to bear in mind two characteristics of common law dispute resolution. The first has already been mentioned: the source of law is not a readily-comprehensible, unifying civil code, but thousands of cases decided over centuries; it takes time to master the case law in sufficient detail to argue cases.

    The second is the nature of hearings: they take time because of the detailed case law that needs to be considered and because a great deal of work is done orally: from argument to the cross-examination of witnesses. Trials are all-consuming and can last months. So the nature of common law trial work means you have to focus all your time and attention on it to succeed.

    That gives the English law firm a choice: it can either recruit and manage expensive, in-house advocacy talent, or it can outsource it. The former is capital-intensive and risky. The latter involves no capital and no risk. You might object that risk is necessary for reward; and true it is. But the existence of a ready supply of barristers in England means solicitors do not have to take that particular business risk in addition to all the other risks they have to take in order to run successful disputes practices.

    The existence of barristers allows solicitors to make the following calculation: few cases come to trial; most settle. Solicitors make most of their income preparing cases for trial, not in trial. So it is less risky and more profitable to recruit junior lawyers to help prepare cases for trial rather than recruit senior advocates to fight trials. If the trial happens, solicitors retain a barrister as advocate in the case; they make just enough of the barrister before trial to ensure the trial will run smoothly if it does happen. Meanwhile, the senior solicitors focus on managing their teams of lawyers and winning new business to keep their practices growing. It is an effective business model, even if it leaves the fun bits to barristers.

    The risk-reduction that barristers offer to solicitors is more extensive than that basic analysis allows. First, solicitors do not take the risk of losing a client by instructing a barrister on their cases; the barrister’s clients are law firms: no risk there. Second, a firm’s choice to recruit in house advocates is a choice taken once and once only, for better or worse. By contrast, a firm’s choice to instruct a barrister is taken on each new case, so it can choose an advocate with precisely the right expertise for the case. That means the firm can sell its trial preparation practice to assist in disputes in which the firm itself lacks specialist expertise. That reduces the firm’s risk and maintains its profitability.

    All in all, therefore, barristers’ and solicitors’ different business models allow them to run complimentary, not competitive practices.

    Non-English lawyers’ reasons to use barristers

    Now let us consider why non-English law firms would use barristers. The answer is: for the same reasons, but more so. Many non-English law firms have clients with disputes under English law. Most feel the need to pass those cases on to an English law firm; if they do, they lose all or almost all the revenue from the case. To the extent they stay involved, they have little control over the process or the outcome, but they do have the unenviable task of handing the English firm’s very large invoices to their client. It is rarely a comfortable experience.

    Note, however: the more sophisticated non-English law firms engage a barrister as their own sub-contractor on English law cases. That completely changes their experience of conducting English law disputes.

    In arbitrations, the non-English law firm is free to do exactly the same job an English solicitor; the sub-contracted barrister provides the English law advice and advocacy that the law firm itself cannot provide. By stepping into the shoes of the English law firm, the non-English firm both reduces its client’s legal costs and takes a larger share of them.

    In litigation, the non-English law firms must engage a solicitor, but the sophisticated firm nevertheless engages a barrister as its own sub-contractor, rather than allowing the solicitor to engage the barrister. That gives the non-English firm a better flow of information and greater control over the process, so it can better manage its client’s expectations and liabilities.

    So: sophisticated non-English law firms do not let the English law firms reap all the competitive advantages barristers offer to law firms; they take those advantages for themselves. Your firm should do so too. Be sophisticated: develop trusted relations with an internationally-minded barrister today; it will be invaluable when your client is involved in a dispute under English law.

    Are arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance contracts enforceable against a third party which is acting directly against the insurer in third party liability insurances?

    Such direct action is admitted by French law in liability insurances, as defined in article 124-3 of the Insurance Code.

    In just a few months two radically different approaches have been taken by the French Cour de cassation (Civ.1, 19 December 2018, n°17-28.951) and the ECJ in Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd (13 July 2017, C-368/16) and KABEG v. MMA IARD (20 July 2017, C-340/16).

    The case submitted to the Cour de cassation represented a third party exercising a direct right of action before French Courts against the insurer of a floating barge which had caused him a damage. The Supreme Court accepted that the insurer could validly oppose the arbitration clause, which was in the policy against the third party, and therefore judged that French Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. The Supreme Court applied the well-established principle of Compétence-Compétence – materialized in article 1448 of the French Code de Procédure Civile – to stay the case, considering that the arbitration clause could not be set aside. The Court therefore judged that the applicability of the arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitrators by priority.

    A year before, the ECJ had ruled in the opposite direction in a case where a jurisdiction clause was applicable in the insurance policy. In Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd, the ECJ stated that the clause could not be opposed to the third party acting directly against the insurer. According to the Court, the insurers’ liability towards the insured has a contractual nature when based on the policy, whereas it is extra-contractual when the liability is based on a direct action from a third party. In a previous ruling the Court had considered (Sté financière et industrielle du Peloux (12 May 2005, C-112/03) that the jurisdiction clause cannot be opposed to the beneficiary of an insurance policy if he is not the policyholder (for instance in a collective insurance).

    One sees a clear difference in treatment between arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause when it comes to deciding on their opposability to the victim exercising a direct action against the insurer.

    Article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an arbitration cannot be opposed to a party which has not contracted for the purpose of its business activity. The French Cour de cassation grounded its decision on the fact that the clauses of the main contract could be opposed to the third party. If the latter was entitled to apply the insurance contract, it was therefore entitled to invoke article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

    The Russian law allows the parties to agree on recovery of contractual penalty for failure by the parties to fulfill contractual obligations.

    Below are some typical examples of provisions that stipulate contractual penalty:

    In the event of untimely delivery of the Goods under the Contract the Buyer shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 (zero point one) percent from the total value of untimely delivered Goods for each day of delay.

    In the event of untimely payment for the Goods under the Contract the Seller shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 percent from the total value of untimely paid Goods for each day of delay.

    The Civil Code of Russia (art. 333) allows the court to decrease the amount of penalty if such amount of penalty is disproportionate to the consequences of breach of contractual obligations, with that the court shall be entitled to decrease penalty only if the debtor files a motion with the request to decrease such excessive amount of penalty.

    The decrease of penalty determined by the contract and subject to payment by the person who conducts business activities is allowed only in exceptional cases, if it is proved that the recovery of penalty in the amount stipulated by the contract can lead to receipt of the unjustified profit by the creditor.

    In practice the parties file motions with the court of first instance with the request to decrease penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code and the court usually decreases the amount of penalty at its discretion.

    In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Russia dated 29.05.2018 (case #A43-26319/2016) the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of penalty even in the amount exceeding the total value of the contract was justified provided that the debtor failed to file a motion with the court of first instance with the request to decrease such penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code.

    In this case the customer ordered the contractor to produce a pressure vessel. The price of such works of the contractor amounted to 2.700.000 rubles. The parties agreed that the pressure vessel will be produced by the contractor till 30.01.2015. The contractor produced the pressure vessel only on 01.03.2016.

    The contract stipulated that in case of violation of terms of performance of works the contractor will pay to the customer a fixed fine in the amount of 5% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each violation as well as penalty in the amount of 0,3% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each day of delay starting with the 4th day of delay.

    As a result, the customer demanded that the contractor pays penalty in the amount of 3.355.170 rubles.

    The court of first instance ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered that the client shall pay the amount of penalty in full since the contractor failed to provide evidence that confirmed due fulfillment of the contract by the contractor, or that the contractor failed to perform its obligations in time due to circumstances that were out of his control. With that the contractor also failed to dispute the amount of penalty and failed to file a motion on application of art. 333 of the Civil Code.

    The appeal court changed the ruling of the court of first instance and decreased the amount of penalty to 326.781 rubles based on its conclusions that the customer abused its rights by including in the contract the unfair penalty provisions.

    The Cassation Court agreed with conclusions of the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the rulings of both the Cassation Court and Court of Appeal and the decision of the court of first instance remained in force.

    The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the contractor failed to file a motion with the request to decrease the amount of penalty and apply art. 333 of the Civil Code in the court of first instance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no right to decrease the amount of penalty at its own initiative.

    The latest conclusions of the Supreme Court confirm that the contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract and the courts are not allowed to decrease such excessive amount of penalty at its own initiative.

    Thus, if you have any dispute in Russia, please ensure that your company is duly represented in state commercial courts, since the failure of the parties to appear in court of first instance and file respective motions might lead to serious negative consequences that the failing party might not be able to cure in the courts of appeal.

    Not what you would expect 

    When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!

    The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.

    This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.

    However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.

    In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.

    Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an «in-house» operation» in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.

    What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?

    Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.

    Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.

    As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.

    The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!

    However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to «justify» avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.

    In this respect, in many cases simple «non-satisfaction» was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.

    There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.

    Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.

    Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.

    The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.

    In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.

    Richard Samuel

    Áreas de práctica

    • Arbitraje
    • Reclamación de deudas
    • Derecho Internacional Privado
    Contáctanos Richard

    Contacta con Richard





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      France – Direct action against the insurer and enforceability of arbitration clause

      29 de agosto de 2019

      • Francia
      • Arbitraje
      • Seguros
      • Litigios

      El procedimiento arbitral en España se caracteriza, y constituye una de sus grandes ventajas, por la dificultad de anular o revocar judicialmente el laudo; las partes saben que el laudo que se dicte es en la mayoría de los casos firme y definitivo y pone punto final al conflicto.

      El art. 41 de la Ley de Arbitraje únicamente permite la anulación del laudo por razones de forma (inexistencia o invalidez del convenio arbitral, falta de notificación a alguna de las partes sobre la designación del árbitro o de las actuaciones arbitrales, indebida designación de los árbitros o que los árbitros hayan resuelto sobre materias que no eran o no podían ser objeto de arbitraje por imperio de la ley). Y adicionalmente el laudo también es anulable cuando es contrario al “orden público”.

      Que cosa sea el “orden público” como para dar lugar, en caso de vulneración, a la anulación del laudo, es cuestión que de siempre ha sido controvertida y debatida; ya en la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 se alude el “orden público” como causa de denegación del reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros. Como recuerda el Tribunal Constitucional (“TC”) en la sentencia que comentamos, citando su propia jurisprudencia, “el orden público material es el conjunto de principios jurídicos públicos y privados, políticos, morales y económicos que son absolutamente obligatorios para la conservación de la sociedad en un pueblo y en una época determinada y el orden público procesal se configura como el conjunto de formalidades y principios necesarios de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico procesal y solo el arbitraje que contradiga alguno o algunos de tales principios podrá ser tachado de nulo por vulneración del orden público”.

      A título de ejemplo, durante 2018 se presentaron 38 demandas de anulación de laudos ante los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia (“TSJ”) de los que 31 se fundamentaban en vulneración del orden público; resultaron estimadas 8 de las demandas (21%), 5 por vulneración del orden público y 3 por invalidez del convenio arbitral.

      El TSJ de Madrid ha venido manteniendo en los últimos tiempos una interpretación muy “expansiva” del orden público, lo que ha generado dudas y temores en las instituciones y Cortes Arbitrales, por el efecto disuasorio que dicha posición podría tener a la hora de elegir Madrid como sede de arbitrajes, nacionales o internacionales.

      Y en la línea interpretativa a la que nos referimos, el TSJ de Madrid ha mantenido el siguiente y sorprendente criterio: dictado un laudo e interpuesta demanda de anulación por una de las partes, los litigantes alcanzaron un acuerdo extrajudicial y solicitaron conjuntamente  el archivo de la demanda de anulación; es decir, ambos daban el laudo por bueno y definitivo; el TSJ rechazó la petición y siguió adelante hasta dictar sentencia anulando el laudo, argumentando que como la demanda de anulación se basaba en la infracción del orden público, entonces ya la materia no era disponible por las partes y no era, en opinión del Tribunal, susceptible de transacción o renuncia.

      No era esta la primera vez que el TSJ adoptaba esta postura: impetrada la anulación de un laudo por ser contrario al “orden público”, las partes ya no tenían la posibilidad de transar y renunciar a la demanda de anulación.

      Por primera vez el asunto ha llegado al Tribunal Constitucional (TC): en un reciente fallo del 15 de junio de 2020, el TC ha sido claro y rotundo; recuerda en su sentencia que el proceso civil se fundamenta en el principio de “disposición de las partes para regular sus intereses privados, es decir, para iniciar la actividad jurisdiccional, determinar el objeto del proceso y ponerle fin cuando estimen conveniente”. Es lo que llamamos “justicia rogada”; y este principio aplica no solo a los procedimientos civiles ante los tribunales ordinarios sino también a los procedimientos arbitrales; asimismo afirma la sentencia que el arbitraje está configurado por la Ley como un mecanismo heterónomo de resolución de conflictos al que es consustancial la mínima intervención de los órganos judiciales a favor de la autonomía de la voluntad.

      Y concluye sentando que la acción de anulación debe ser entendida como un proceso de control externo sobre el laudo que no permite una decisión sobre el fondo de la decisión de los árbitros, al estar tasadas las causas, lo que justifica que “el control de los laudos tenga carácter limitado y solo pueda obtenerse la anulación del laudo en casos excepcionales”.

      En suma, entiende y proclama el TC que es contrario al derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva que protege el art. 24 de la Constitución la negativa del Tribunal a reconocer la virtualidad de un acuerdo alcanzado entre los litigantes con fundamento en el poder dispositivo de las partes sin que medie norma prohibitiva que así lo autorice e imponiendo una decisión que subvierte el principio dispositivo o de “justicia rogada” que inspira el proceso civil; por lo que concede el amparo solicitado y ordena retrotraer las actuaciones al momento anterior al auto que denegó virtualidad a la solicitud conjunta de archivo para que el TSJ dicte otra resolución acompasada al criterio del TC.

      En suma, no podrá ya nunca más el TSJM impedir a los litigantes transar y poner fin a una demanda de anulación de laudo (como ocurre pacífica y habitualmente con los recursos de apelación o de casación) y además deberá tomar en consideración en adelante la interpretación restrictiva del concepto de orden público que ha establecido el TC en esta importante sentencia. En efecto, el arbitraje español sale muy reforzado con esta sentencia del TC.

      The COVID-19 pandemic’s dramatic disruption of the legal and business landscape has included a steep drop in overall M&A activity in Q1 2020.  Much of this decrease has been due to decreased target valuations, tighter access by buyers to liquidity, and perhaps above all underlying uncertainty as to the crisis’s duration.

      For pending transactions, whether the buyer can walk away from the deal (or seek a purchase price reduction) by invoking a material adverse change (MAC) or material adverse effect (MAE) clause – or another clause in the purchase agreement – due to COVID-19 has become a question of increasing relevance.  MAC/MAE clauses typically allow a buyer to terminate an acquisition agreement if a MAC or MAE occurs between signing and closing.

      Actual litigated cases in this area have been few and far between, as under longstanding Delaware case law[1], buyer has the burden of proving MAC or MAE, irrespective of who initiates the lawsuit.  And the standard of proof is high – a buyer must show that the effects of the intervening event are sufficiently large and long lasting as compared to an equivalent period of the prior year.  A short-term or immaterial deviation will not suffice.  In fact, Delaware courts have only once found a MAC, in the December 2018 case Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG.

      And yet, since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous widely reported COVID-19 related M&A litigations have been initiated with the Delaware Court of Chancery.  These include:

      • Bed, Bath & Beyond suing 1-800-Flowers (Del. Ch. April 1, 2020) to complete its acquisition of Perosnalizationmall.com (purchaser sought an extension in closing, without citing specifically the contractual basis for the request);
      • Level 4 Yoga, franchisee of CorePower Yoga, suing CorePower Yoga (Del. Ch. Apr 2, 2020) to compel CorePower Yoga to purchase of Level 4 Yoga studios (after CorePower Yoga took the position that studio closings resulting from COVID-19 stay-at-home orders violated the ordinary course covenant);
      • Oberman, Tivoli & Pickert suing Cast & Crew (Del. Ch. Apr 6, 2020), an industry competitor, to complete its purchase of Oberman’s subsidiary (Cast & Crew maintained it was not obligated to close based on alleged insufficiencies in financial data provided in diligence);
      • SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc. (Del. Ch. Apr 22, 2020), in which buyer sought a declaratory judgment in its favor on termination); and
      • L Brands, Inc. v. SP VS Buyer L.P., Sycamore Partners III, L.P., and Sycamore Partners III-A, L.P (Del. Ch. Apr 23), in which seller instead seeks declaratory judgment in its favor on buyer obligation to close.

      Such cases, typically signed up at an early stage of the pandemic, are likely to increase.  Delaware M&A-MAC-related jurisprudence suggests that buyers seeking to cite MAC in asserting their positions should expect an uphill fight, given buyer’s high burden of proof.  Indeed, Delaware courts’ sole finding of a MAC in Akorn was based on rather extreme facts: target’s (Akorn’s) business deteriorated significantly (40% and 20% drops in profit and equity value, respectively), measured over a full year.  And quite material to the Court’s decision was the likely devastating effect on Akorn’s business resulting from Akorn’s deceptive conduct vis-à-vis the FDA.

      By contrast, cases before and after Akorn, courts have not found a MAC/MAE, including in the 2019 case Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.  There, Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC) agreed to purchase Channel Medsystems, Inc., an early stage medical device company.  The sale was conditioned on Channel receiving FDA approval for its sole product, Cerene. In late December 2017, Channel discovered that falsified information from reports by its Vice President of Quality (as part of a scheme to steal over $2 million from Channel) was included in Channel’s FDA submissions.  BSC terminated the merger agreement in May 2018, asserting that Channel’s false representations and warranties constituted a MAC.

      The court disagreed.  While Channel and Akron both involved a fraud element, Chanel successfully resubmitted its FDA application, such that the fraudulent behavior – the court found – would not cause the FDA to reject the Cerene device.  BSC also failed to show sufficiently large or long-lasting effects on Channel’s financial position.  Channel thus reaffirmed the high bar under pre-Akron Delaware jurisprudence for courts to find a MAC/MAE (See e.g. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005); Hexion Specialty Chemicals v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008)).

      Applied to COVID-19, buyers may have challenges in invoking MAC/MAE clauses under their purchase agreements.

      First, it may simply be premature at this juncture for a buyer to show the type of longer-term effects that have been required under Delaware jurisprudence.  The long-term effects of COVID-19 itself are unclear.  Of course, as weeks turn into months and longer, this may change.

      A second challenge is certain carve-outs typically included in MAC/MAE clauses.  Notably, it is typical for these clauses to include exceptions for general economic and financial conditions generally affecting a target’s industry, unless a buyer can demonstrate that they have disproportionately affected the target.

      A buyer may be able to point to other clauses in a purchase agreement in seeking to walk away from the deal.  Of note is the ordinary course covenant that applies to the period between signing and closing.  By definition, most targets are unable to carry out business during the COVID-19 crisis consistent with past practice.  It is unclear whether courts will allow for a literal reading of these clauses, or interpret them taking into account the broader risk allocation regime as evidenced by the MAC or MAE clause in the agreement, and in doing so reject a buyer’s position.

      For unsigned deals, there may be some early lessons for practitioners as they prepare draft purchase agreements.  On buyer walk-away rights, buyers will want to ensure that the MAE/MAC definition includes express reference to “pandemics” and “epidemics”, if not to “COVID-19” itself.  Conversely, Sellers may wish to seek to loosen ordinary course covenant language, such as by including express exceptions for actions required by the MAC or MAE and otherwise ensure that they comply with all obligations under their control.  Buyers will also want to pay close attention to how COVID-19 affects other aspects of the purchase agreement, including seeking more robust representations and warranties on the impact of COVID-19 on the target’s business.

       

      [1] Although the discussion of this based Delaware law, caselaw in other U.S. jurisdictions often is consistent Delaware.  

      This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

      This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

      In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

      English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

      The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

      This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

      The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

      The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

      As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

      The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

      Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

      The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

      Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

      Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

      Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

      The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

      Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

      The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

      There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

      The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

      The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

      As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

      Novel technology in proceedings

      Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

      And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

      Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

      Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

      Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

      • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
      • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
      • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
      • the matter concerns an international dispute.

      The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

      “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

      The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

      Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

      We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

      To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

      Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

      Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

      • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
      • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
      • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
      • the disclosure of confidential documents
      • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
      • the manner of taking witness testimony
      • the costs of the proceedings.

      Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

      All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

      The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

      • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
      • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
      • The defendant submits its defence statement.
      • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
      • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
      • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
      • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
      • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

      Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

      As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

      Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

      Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

      Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

      La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

      Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

      «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

      Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

      Escuchar es altamente eficaz

      En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

      Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

      «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

      Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

      En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

      «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

      Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

      La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

      En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

      «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

      Las emociones son importantes

      Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

      «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

      [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

      The English common law is a primary choice of law for international business, because it consistently gives the parties exactly what they agreed: what you see in the contract is what you get.

      The same cannot be said for the English legal system: there are barristers, solicitors, Inns of Court, chambers, compulsory disclosure, cross-examination and the loser pays rule. There is much to confuse non-English lawyers and mistakes can be expensive for their clients. Those who know enough to avoid confusion can add real value for clients who have English law disputes.

      This blog focuses on a single feature which is key for international lawyers’ understanding of the English legal system: why it has two kinds of lawyer – barristers and solicitors – and what each of them does.

      Barristers and solicitors: what is the difference?

      To understand the difference, the key thing to bear in mind is that they run completely different business models to support their legal practices.

      Solicitors practice within law firms: profit sharing entities, familiar to lawyers around the world. This risk-sharing model allows senior lawyers to employ teams of junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases: corresponding with the client, the court and the opposing parties and collecting the evidence for trial.

      Barristers are self-employed individuals. They operate from ‘chambers’, which are cost-sharing organisations; barristers practising in chambers together do not share profit or spread risk. They cannot employ junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases; they do not collect evidence, correspond with the court, opposing party or the client. Instead, they are specialist sub-contractors to law firms in England and around the world. Those law firms do all that heavy lifting that allows barristers to conduct their practices.

      What barristers do

      What, then, do law firms ask them to do? Two things: to provide advocacy services and the detailed legal advice necessary for effective advocacy. That means they have particular familiarity with three key aspects of English dispute resolution:

      1. the detail of the cases which are the source of the common law,
      2. the cross-examination of witnesses; and
      3. the oral and written judicial argument that pulls the first two aspects together.

      But aren’t those the fun bits of being a lawyer? Well, yes. So why would a law firm outsource the fun bits? Well, that depends on the kind of law firm…

      English solicitors’ reasons for using barristers

      Let’s take English solicitors first. You have to bear in mind two characteristics of common law dispute resolution. The first has already been mentioned: the source of law is not a readily-comprehensible, unifying civil code, but thousands of cases decided over centuries; it takes time to master the case law in sufficient detail to argue cases.

      The second is the nature of hearings: they take time because of the detailed case law that needs to be considered and because a great deal of work is done orally: from argument to the cross-examination of witnesses. Trials are all-consuming and can last months. So the nature of common law trial work means you have to focus all your time and attention on it to succeed.

      That gives the English law firm a choice: it can either recruit and manage expensive, in-house advocacy talent, or it can outsource it. The former is capital-intensive and risky. The latter involves no capital and no risk. You might object that risk is necessary for reward; and true it is. But the existence of a ready supply of barristers in England means solicitors do not have to take that particular business risk in addition to all the other risks they have to take in order to run successful disputes practices.

      The existence of barristers allows solicitors to make the following calculation: few cases come to trial; most settle. Solicitors make most of their income preparing cases for trial, not in trial. So it is less risky and more profitable to recruit junior lawyers to help prepare cases for trial rather than recruit senior advocates to fight trials. If the trial happens, solicitors retain a barrister as advocate in the case; they make just enough of the barrister before trial to ensure the trial will run smoothly if it does happen. Meanwhile, the senior solicitors focus on managing their teams of lawyers and winning new business to keep their practices growing. It is an effective business model, even if it leaves the fun bits to barristers.

      The risk-reduction that barristers offer to solicitors is more extensive than that basic analysis allows. First, solicitors do not take the risk of losing a client by instructing a barrister on their cases; the barrister’s clients are law firms: no risk there. Second, a firm’s choice to recruit in house advocates is a choice taken once and once only, for better or worse. By contrast, a firm’s choice to instruct a barrister is taken on each new case, so it can choose an advocate with precisely the right expertise for the case. That means the firm can sell its trial preparation practice to assist in disputes in which the firm itself lacks specialist expertise. That reduces the firm’s risk and maintains its profitability.

      All in all, therefore, barristers’ and solicitors’ different business models allow them to run complimentary, not competitive practices.

      Non-English lawyers’ reasons to use barristers

      Now let us consider why non-English law firms would use barristers. The answer is: for the same reasons, but more so. Many non-English law firms have clients with disputes under English law. Most feel the need to pass those cases on to an English law firm; if they do, they lose all or almost all the revenue from the case. To the extent they stay involved, they have little control over the process or the outcome, but they do have the unenviable task of handing the English firm’s very large invoices to their client. It is rarely a comfortable experience.

      Note, however: the more sophisticated non-English law firms engage a barrister as their own sub-contractor on English law cases. That completely changes their experience of conducting English law disputes.

      In arbitrations, the non-English law firm is free to do exactly the same job an English solicitor; the sub-contracted barrister provides the English law advice and advocacy that the law firm itself cannot provide. By stepping into the shoes of the English law firm, the non-English firm both reduces its client’s legal costs and takes a larger share of them.

      In litigation, the non-English law firms must engage a solicitor, but the sophisticated firm nevertheless engages a barrister as its own sub-contractor, rather than allowing the solicitor to engage the barrister. That gives the non-English firm a better flow of information and greater control over the process, so it can better manage its client’s expectations and liabilities.

      So: sophisticated non-English law firms do not let the English law firms reap all the competitive advantages barristers offer to law firms; they take those advantages for themselves. Your firm should do so too. Be sophisticated: develop trusted relations with an internationally-minded barrister today; it will be invaluable when your client is involved in a dispute under English law.

      Are arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance contracts enforceable against a third party which is acting directly against the insurer in third party liability insurances?

      Such direct action is admitted by French law in liability insurances, as defined in article 124-3 of the Insurance Code.

      In just a few months two radically different approaches have been taken by the French Cour de cassation (Civ.1, 19 December 2018, n°17-28.951) and the ECJ in Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd (13 July 2017, C-368/16) and KABEG v. MMA IARD (20 July 2017, C-340/16).

      The case submitted to the Cour de cassation represented a third party exercising a direct right of action before French Courts against the insurer of a floating barge which had caused him a damage. The Supreme Court accepted that the insurer could validly oppose the arbitration clause, which was in the policy against the third party, and therefore judged that French Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. The Supreme Court applied the well-established principle of Compétence-Compétence – materialized in article 1448 of the French Code de Procédure Civile – to stay the case, considering that the arbitration clause could not be set aside. The Court therefore judged that the applicability of the arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitrators by priority.

      A year before, the ECJ had ruled in the opposite direction in a case where a jurisdiction clause was applicable in the insurance policy. In Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd, the ECJ stated that the clause could not be opposed to the third party acting directly against the insurer. According to the Court, the insurers’ liability towards the insured has a contractual nature when based on the policy, whereas it is extra-contractual when the liability is based on a direct action from a third party. In a previous ruling the Court had considered (Sté financière et industrielle du Peloux (12 May 2005, C-112/03) that the jurisdiction clause cannot be opposed to the beneficiary of an insurance policy if he is not the policyholder (for instance in a collective insurance).

      One sees a clear difference in treatment between arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause when it comes to deciding on their opposability to the victim exercising a direct action against the insurer.

      Article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an arbitration cannot be opposed to a party which has not contracted for the purpose of its business activity. The French Cour de cassation grounded its decision on the fact that the clauses of the main contract could be opposed to the third party. If the latter was entitled to apply the insurance contract, it was therefore entitled to invoke article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

      The Russian law allows the parties to agree on recovery of contractual penalty for failure by the parties to fulfill contractual obligations.

      Below are some typical examples of provisions that stipulate contractual penalty:

      In the event of untimely delivery of the Goods under the Contract the Buyer shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 (zero point one) percent from the total value of untimely delivered Goods for each day of delay.

      In the event of untimely payment for the Goods under the Contract the Seller shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 percent from the total value of untimely paid Goods for each day of delay.

      The Civil Code of Russia (art. 333) allows the court to decrease the amount of penalty if such amount of penalty is disproportionate to the consequences of breach of contractual obligations, with that the court shall be entitled to decrease penalty only if the debtor files a motion with the request to decrease such excessive amount of penalty.

      The decrease of penalty determined by the contract and subject to payment by the person who conducts business activities is allowed only in exceptional cases, if it is proved that the recovery of penalty in the amount stipulated by the contract can lead to receipt of the unjustified profit by the creditor.

      In practice the parties file motions with the court of first instance with the request to decrease penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code and the court usually decreases the amount of penalty at its discretion.

      In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Russia dated 29.05.2018 (case #A43-26319/2016) the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of penalty even in the amount exceeding the total value of the contract was justified provided that the debtor failed to file a motion with the court of first instance with the request to decrease such penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code.

      In this case the customer ordered the contractor to produce a pressure vessel. The price of such works of the contractor amounted to 2.700.000 rubles. The parties agreed that the pressure vessel will be produced by the contractor till 30.01.2015. The contractor produced the pressure vessel only on 01.03.2016.

      The contract stipulated that in case of violation of terms of performance of works the contractor will pay to the customer a fixed fine in the amount of 5% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each violation as well as penalty in the amount of 0,3% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each day of delay starting with the 4th day of delay.

      As a result, the customer demanded that the contractor pays penalty in the amount of 3.355.170 rubles.

      The court of first instance ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered that the client shall pay the amount of penalty in full since the contractor failed to provide evidence that confirmed due fulfillment of the contract by the contractor, or that the contractor failed to perform its obligations in time due to circumstances that were out of his control. With that the contractor also failed to dispute the amount of penalty and failed to file a motion on application of art. 333 of the Civil Code.

      The appeal court changed the ruling of the court of first instance and decreased the amount of penalty to 326.781 rubles based on its conclusions that the customer abused its rights by including in the contract the unfair penalty provisions.

      The Cassation Court agreed with conclusions of the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the rulings of both the Cassation Court and Court of Appeal and the decision of the court of first instance remained in force.

      The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the contractor failed to file a motion with the request to decrease the amount of penalty and apply art. 333 of the Civil Code in the court of first instance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no right to decrease the amount of penalty at its own initiative.

      The latest conclusions of the Supreme Court confirm that the contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract and the courts are not allowed to decrease such excessive amount of penalty at its own initiative.

      Thus, if you have any dispute in Russia, please ensure that your company is duly represented in state commercial courts, since the failure of the parties to appear in court of first instance and file respective motions might lead to serious negative consequences that the failing party might not be able to cure in the courts of appeal.

      Not what you would expect 

      When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!

      The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.

      This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.

      However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.

      In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.

      Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an «in-house» operation» in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.

      What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?

      Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.

      Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.

      As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.

      The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!

      However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to «justify» avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.

      In this respect, in many cases simple «non-satisfaction» was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.

      There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.

      Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.

      Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.

      The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.

      In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.

      Alexandre Malan

      Áreas de práctica

      • Arbitraje
      • Contratos de distribución
      • Seguros
      • Comercio internacional
      • Derecho Internacional Privado
      Contáctanos Alexandre

      Contacta con Alexandre





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        Russia – Contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract

        18 de septiembre de 2018

        • Rusia
        • Derecho Societario
        • Litigios

        El procedimiento arbitral en España se caracteriza, y constituye una de sus grandes ventajas, por la dificultad de anular o revocar judicialmente el laudo; las partes saben que el laudo que se dicte es en la mayoría de los casos firme y definitivo y pone punto final al conflicto.

        El art. 41 de la Ley de Arbitraje únicamente permite la anulación del laudo por razones de forma (inexistencia o invalidez del convenio arbitral, falta de notificación a alguna de las partes sobre la designación del árbitro o de las actuaciones arbitrales, indebida designación de los árbitros o que los árbitros hayan resuelto sobre materias que no eran o no podían ser objeto de arbitraje por imperio de la ley). Y adicionalmente el laudo también es anulable cuando es contrario al “orden público”.

        Que cosa sea el “orden público” como para dar lugar, en caso de vulneración, a la anulación del laudo, es cuestión que de siempre ha sido controvertida y debatida; ya en la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 se alude el “orden público” como causa de denegación del reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros. Como recuerda el Tribunal Constitucional (“TC”) en la sentencia que comentamos, citando su propia jurisprudencia, “el orden público material es el conjunto de principios jurídicos públicos y privados, políticos, morales y económicos que son absolutamente obligatorios para la conservación de la sociedad en un pueblo y en una época determinada y el orden público procesal se configura como el conjunto de formalidades y principios necesarios de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico procesal y solo el arbitraje que contradiga alguno o algunos de tales principios podrá ser tachado de nulo por vulneración del orden público”.

        A título de ejemplo, durante 2018 se presentaron 38 demandas de anulación de laudos ante los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia (“TSJ”) de los que 31 se fundamentaban en vulneración del orden público; resultaron estimadas 8 de las demandas (21%), 5 por vulneración del orden público y 3 por invalidez del convenio arbitral.

        El TSJ de Madrid ha venido manteniendo en los últimos tiempos una interpretación muy “expansiva” del orden público, lo que ha generado dudas y temores en las instituciones y Cortes Arbitrales, por el efecto disuasorio que dicha posición podría tener a la hora de elegir Madrid como sede de arbitrajes, nacionales o internacionales.

        Y en la línea interpretativa a la que nos referimos, el TSJ de Madrid ha mantenido el siguiente y sorprendente criterio: dictado un laudo e interpuesta demanda de anulación por una de las partes, los litigantes alcanzaron un acuerdo extrajudicial y solicitaron conjuntamente  el archivo de la demanda de anulación; es decir, ambos daban el laudo por bueno y definitivo; el TSJ rechazó la petición y siguió adelante hasta dictar sentencia anulando el laudo, argumentando que como la demanda de anulación se basaba en la infracción del orden público, entonces ya la materia no era disponible por las partes y no era, en opinión del Tribunal, susceptible de transacción o renuncia.

        No era esta la primera vez que el TSJ adoptaba esta postura: impetrada la anulación de un laudo por ser contrario al “orden público”, las partes ya no tenían la posibilidad de transar y renunciar a la demanda de anulación.

        Por primera vez el asunto ha llegado al Tribunal Constitucional (TC): en un reciente fallo del 15 de junio de 2020, el TC ha sido claro y rotundo; recuerda en su sentencia que el proceso civil se fundamenta en el principio de “disposición de las partes para regular sus intereses privados, es decir, para iniciar la actividad jurisdiccional, determinar el objeto del proceso y ponerle fin cuando estimen conveniente”. Es lo que llamamos “justicia rogada”; y este principio aplica no solo a los procedimientos civiles ante los tribunales ordinarios sino también a los procedimientos arbitrales; asimismo afirma la sentencia que el arbitraje está configurado por la Ley como un mecanismo heterónomo de resolución de conflictos al que es consustancial la mínima intervención de los órganos judiciales a favor de la autonomía de la voluntad.

        Y concluye sentando que la acción de anulación debe ser entendida como un proceso de control externo sobre el laudo que no permite una decisión sobre el fondo de la decisión de los árbitros, al estar tasadas las causas, lo que justifica que “el control de los laudos tenga carácter limitado y solo pueda obtenerse la anulación del laudo en casos excepcionales”.

        En suma, entiende y proclama el TC que es contrario al derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva que protege el art. 24 de la Constitución la negativa del Tribunal a reconocer la virtualidad de un acuerdo alcanzado entre los litigantes con fundamento en el poder dispositivo de las partes sin que medie norma prohibitiva que así lo autorice e imponiendo una decisión que subvierte el principio dispositivo o de “justicia rogada” que inspira el proceso civil; por lo que concede el amparo solicitado y ordena retrotraer las actuaciones al momento anterior al auto que denegó virtualidad a la solicitud conjunta de archivo para que el TSJ dicte otra resolución acompasada al criterio del TC.

        En suma, no podrá ya nunca más el TSJM impedir a los litigantes transar y poner fin a una demanda de anulación de laudo (como ocurre pacífica y habitualmente con los recursos de apelación o de casación) y además deberá tomar en consideración en adelante la interpretación restrictiva del concepto de orden público que ha establecido el TC en esta importante sentencia. En efecto, el arbitraje español sale muy reforzado con esta sentencia del TC.

        The COVID-19 pandemic’s dramatic disruption of the legal and business landscape has included a steep drop in overall M&A activity in Q1 2020.  Much of this decrease has been due to decreased target valuations, tighter access by buyers to liquidity, and perhaps above all underlying uncertainty as to the crisis’s duration.

        For pending transactions, whether the buyer can walk away from the deal (or seek a purchase price reduction) by invoking a material adverse change (MAC) or material adverse effect (MAE) clause – or another clause in the purchase agreement – due to COVID-19 has become a question of increasing relevance.  MAC/MAE clauses typically allow a buyer to terminate an acquisition agreement if a MAC or MAE occurs between signing and closing.

        Actual litigated cases in this area have been few and far between, as under longstanding Delaware case law[1], buyer has the burden of proving MAC or MAE, irrespective of who initiates the lawsuit.  And the standard of proof is high – a buyer must show that the effects of the intervening event are sufficiently large and long lasting as compared to an equivalent period of the prior year.  A short-term or immaterial deviation will not suffice.  In fact, Delaware courts have only once found a MAC, in the December 2018 case Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG.

        And yet, since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous widely reported COVID-19 related M&A litigations have been initiated with the Delaware Court of Chancery.  These include:

        • Bed, Bath & Beyond suing 1-800-Flowers (Del. Ch. April 1, 2020) to complete its acquisition of Perosnalizationmall.com (purchaser sought an extension in closing, without citing specifically the contractual basis for the request);
        • Level 4 Yoga, franchisee of CorePower Yoga, suing CorePower Yoga (Del. Ch. Apr 2, 2020) to compel CorePower Yoga to purchase of Level 4 Yoga studios (after CorePower Yoga took the position that studio closings resulting from COVID-19 stay-at-home orders violated the ordinary course covenant);
        • Oberman, Tivoli & Pickert suing Cast & Crew (Del. Ch. Apr 6, 2020), an industry competitor, to complete its purchase of Oberman’s subsidiary (Cast & Crew maintained it was not obligated to close based on alleged insufficiencies in financial data provided in diligence);
        • SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc. (Del. Ch. Apr 22, 2020), in which buyer sought a declaratory judgment in its favor on termination); and
        • L Brands, Inc. v. SP VS Buyer L.P., Sycamore Partners III, L.P., and Sycamore Partners III-A, L.P (Del. Ch. Apr 23), in which seller instead seeks declaratory judgment in its favor on buyer obligation to close.

        Such cases, typically signed up at an early stage of the pandemic, are likely to increase.  Delaware M&A-MAC-related jurisprudence suggests that buyers seeking to cite MAC in asserting their positions should expect an uphill fight, given buyer’s high burden of proof.  Indeed, Delaware courts’ sole finding of a MAC in Akorn was based on rather extreme facts: target’s (Akorn’s) business deteriorated significantly (40% and 20% drops in profit and equity value, respectively), measured over a full year.  And quite material to the Court’s decision was the likely devastating effect on Akorn’s business resulting from Akorn’s deceptive conduct vis-à-vis the FDA.

        By contrast, cases before and after Akorn, courts have not found a MAC/MAE, including in the 2019 case Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.  There, Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC) agreed to purchase Channel Medsystems, Inc., an early stage medical device company.  The sale was conditioned on Channel receiving FDA approval for its sole product, Cerene. In late December 2017, Channel discovered that falsified information from reports by its Vice President of Quality (as part of a scheme to steal over $2 million from Channel) was included in Channel’s FDA submissions.  BSC terminated the merger agreement in May 2018, asserting that Channel’s false representations and warranties constituted a MAC.

        The court disagreed.  While Channel and Akron both involved a fraud element, Chanel successfully resubmitted its FDA application, such that the fraudulent behavior – the court found – would not cause the FDA to reject the Cerene device.  BSC also failed to show sufficiently large or long-lasting effects on Channel’s financial position.  Channel thus reaffirmed the high bar under pre-Akron Delaware jurisprudence for courts to find a MAC/MAE (See e.g. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005); Hexion Specialty Chemicals v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008)).

        Applied to COVID-19, buyers may have challenges in invoking MAC/MAE clauses under their purchase agreements.

        First, it may simply be premature at this juncture for a buyer to show the type of longer-term effects that have been required under Delaware jurisprudence.  The long-term effects of COVID-19 itself are unclear.  Of course, as weeks turn into months and longer, this may change.

        A second challenge is certain carve-outs typically included in MAC/MAE clauses.  Notably, it is typical for these clauses to include exceptions for general economic and financial conditions generally affecting a target’s industry, unless a buyer can demonstrate that they have disproportionately affected the target.

        A buyer may be able to point to other clauses in a purchase agreement in seeking to walk away from the deal.  Of note is the ordinary course covenant that applies to the period between signing and closing.  By definition, most targets are unable to carry out business during the COVID-19 crisis consistent with past practice.  It is unclear whether courts will allow for a literal reading of these clauses, or interpret them taking into account the broader risk allocation regime as evidenced by the MAC or MAE clause in the agreement, and in doing so reject a buyer’s position.

        For unsigned deals, there may be some early lessons for practitioners as they prepare draft purchase agreements.  On buyer walk-away rights, buyers will want to ensure that the MAE/MAC definition includes express reference to “pandemics” and “epidemics”, if not to “COVID-19” itself.  Conversely, Sellers may wish to seek to loosen ordinary course covenant language, such as by including express exceptions for actions required by the MAC or MAE and otherwise ensure that they comply with all obligations under their control.  Buyers will also want to pay close attention to how COVID-19 affects other aspects of the purchase agreement, including seeking more robust representations and warranties on the impact of COVID-19 on the target’s business.

         

        [1] Although the discussion of this based Delaware law, caselaw in other U.S. jurisdictions often is consistent Delaware.  

        This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

        This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

        In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

        English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

        The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

        This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

        The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

        The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

        As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

        The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

        Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

        The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

        Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

        Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

        Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

        The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

        Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

        The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

        There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

        The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

        The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

        As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

        Novel technology in proceedings

        Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

        And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

        Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

        Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

        Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

        • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
        • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
        • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
        • the matter concerns an international dispute.

        The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

        “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

        The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

        Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

        We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

        To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

        Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

        Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

        • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
        • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
        • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
        • the disclosure of confidential documents
        • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
        • the manner of taking witness testimony
        • the costs of the proceedings.

        Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

        All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

        The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

        • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
        • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
        • The defendant submits its defence statement.
        • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
        • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
        • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
        • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
        • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

        Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

        As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

        Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

        Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

        Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

        La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

        Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

        «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

        Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

        Escuchar es altamente eficaz

        En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

        Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

        «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

        Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

        En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

        «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

        Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

        La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

        En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

        «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

        Las emociones son importantes

        Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

        «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

        [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

        The English common law is a primary choice of law for international business, because it consistently gives the parties exactly what they agreed: what you see in the contract is what you get.

        The same cannot be said for the English legal system: there are barristers, solicitors, Inns of Court, chambers, compulsory disclosure, cross-examination and the loser pays rule. There is much to confuse non-English lawyers and mistakes can be expensive for their clients. Those who know enough to avoid confusion can add real value for clients who have English law disputes.

        This blog focuses on a single feature which is key for international lawyers’ understanding of the English legal system: why it has two kinds of lawyer – barristers and solicitors – and what each of them does.

        Barristers and solicitors: what is the difference?

        To understand the difference, the key thing to bear in mind is that they run completely different business models to support their legal practices.

        Solicitors practice within law firms: profit sharing entities, familiar to lawyers around the world. This risk-sharing model allows senior lawyers to employ teams of junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases: corresponding with the client, the court and the opposing parties and collecting the evidence for trial.

        Barristers are self-employed individuals. They operate from ‘chambers’, which are cost-sharing organisations; barristers practising in chambers together do not share profit or spread risk. They cannot employ junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases; they do not collect evidence, correspond with the court, opposing party or the client. Instead, they are specialist sub-contractors to law firms in England and around the world. Those law firms do all that heavy lifting that allows barristers to conduct their practices.

        What barristers do

        What, then, do law firms ask them to do? Two things: to provide advocacy services and the detailed legal advice necessary for effective advocacy. That means they have particular familiarity with three key aspects of English dispute resolution:

        1. the detail of the cases which are the source of the common law,
        2. the cross-examination of witnesses; and
        3. the oral and written judicial argument that pulls the first two aspects together.

        But aren’t those the fun bits of being a lawyer? Well, yes. So why would a law firm outsource the fun bits? Well, that depends on the kind of law firm…

        English solicitors’ reasons for using barristers

        Let’s take English solicitors first. You have to bear in mind two characteristics of common law dispute resolution. The first has already been mentioned: the source of law is not a readily-comprehensible, unifying civil code, but thousands of cases decided over centuries; it takes time to master the case law in sufficient detail to argue cases.

        The second is the nature of hearings: they take time because of the detailed case law that needs to be considered and because a great deal of work is done orally: from argument to the cross-examination of witnesses. Trials are all-consuming and can last months. So the nature of common law trial work means you have to focus all your time and attention on it to succeed.

        That gives the English law firm a choice: it can either recruit and manage expensive, in-house advocacy talent, or it can outsource it. The former is capital-intensive and risky. The latter involves no capital and no risk. You might object that risk is necessary for reward; and true it is. But the existence of a ready supply of barristers in England means solicitors do not have to take that particular business risk in addition to all the other risks they have to take in order to run successful disputes practices.

        The existence of barristers allows solicitors to make the following calculation: few cases come to trial; most settle. Solicitors make most of their income preparing cases for trial, not in trial. So it is less risky and more profitable to recruit junior lawyers to help prepare cases for trial rather than recruit senior advocates to fight trials. If the trial happens, solicitors retain a barrister as advocate in the case; they make just enough of the barrister before trial to ensure the trial will run smoothly if it does happen. Meanwhile, the senior solicitors focus on managing their teams of lawyers and winning new business to keep their practices growing. It is an effective business model, even if it leaves the fun bits to barristers.

        The risk-reduction that barristers offer to solicitors is more extensive than that basic analysis allows. First, solicitors do not take the risk of losing a client by instructing a barrister on their cases; the barrister’s clients are law firms: no risk there. Second, a firm’s choice to recruit in house advocates is a choice taken once and once only, for better or worse. By contrast, a firm’s choice to instruct a barrister is taken on each new case, so it can choose an advocate with precisely the right expertise for the case. That means the firm can sell its trial preparation practice to assist in disputes in which the firm itself lacks specialist expertise. That reduces the firm’s risk and maintains its profitability.

        All in all, therefore, barristers’ and solicitors’ different business models allow them to run complimentary, not competitive practices.

        Non-English lawyers’ reasons to use barristers

        Now let us consider why non-English law firms would use barristers. The answer is: for the same reasons, but more so. Many non-English law firms have clients with disputes under English law. Most feel the need to pass those cases on to an English law firm; if they do, they lose all or almost all the revenue from the case. To the extent they stay involved, they have little control over the process or the outcome, but they do have the unenviable task of handing the English firm’s very large invoices to their client. It is rarely a comfortable experience.

        Note, however: the more sophisticated non-English law firms engage a barrister as their own sub-contractor on English law cases. That completely changes their experience of conducting English law disputes.

        In arbitrations, the non-English law firm is free to do exactly the same job an English solicitor; the sub-contracted barrister provides the English law advice and advocacy that the law firm itself cannot provide. By stepping into the shoes of the English law firm, the non-English firm both reduces its client’s legal costs and takes a larger share of them.

        In litigation, the non-English law firms must engage a solicitor, but the sophisticated firm nevertheless engages a barrister as its own sub-contractor, rather than allowing the solicitor to engage the barrister. That gives the non-English firm a better flow of information and greater control over the process, so it can better manage its client’s expectations and liabilities.

        So: sophisticated non-English law firms do not let the English law firms reap all the competitive advantages barristers offer to law firms; they take those advantages for themselves. Your firm should do so too. Be sophisticated: develop trusted relations with an internationally-minded barrister today; it will be invaluable when your client is involved in a dispute under English law.

        Are arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance contracts enforceable against a third party which is acting directly against the insurer in third party liability insurances?

        Such direct action is admitted by French law in liability insurances, as defined in article 124-3 of the Insurance Code.

        In just a few months two radically different approaches have been taken by the French Cour de cassation (Civ.1, 19 December 2018, n°17-28.951) and the ECJ in Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd (13 July 2017, C-368/16) and KABEG v. MMA IARD (20 July 2017, C-340/16).

        The case submitted to the Cour de cassation represented a third party exercising a direct right of action before French Courts against the insurer of a floating barge which had caused him a damage. The Supreme Court accepted that the insurer could validly oppose the arbitration clause, which was in the policy against the third party, and therefore judged that French Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. The Supreme Court applied the well-established principle of Compétence-Compétence – materialized in article 1448 of the French Code de Procédure Civile – to stay the case, considering that the arbitration clause could not be set aside. The Court therefore judged that the applicability of the arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitrators by priority.

        A year before, the ECJ had ruled in the opposite direction in a case where a jurisdiction clause was applicable in the insurance policy. In Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd, the ECJ stated that the clause could not be opposed to the third party acting directly against the insurer. According to the Court, the insurers’ liability towards the insured has a contractual nature when based on the policy, whereas it is extra-contractual when the liability is based on a direct action from a third party. In a previous ruling the Court had considered (Sté financière et industrielle du Peloux (12 May 2005, C-112/03) that the jurisdiction clause cannot be opposed to the beneficiary of an insurance policy if he is not the policyholder (for instance in a collective insurance).

        One sees a clear difference in treatment between arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause when it comes to deciding on their opposability to the victim exercising a direct action against the insurer.

        Article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an arbitration cannot be opposed to a party which has not contracted for the purpose of its business activity. The French Cour de cassation grounded its decision on the fact that the clauses of the main contract could be opposed to the third party. If the latter was entitled to apply the insurance contract, it was therefore entitled to invoke article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

        The Russian law allows the parties to agree on recovery of contractual penalty for failure by the parties to fulfill contractual obligations.

        Below are some typical examples of provisions that stipulate contractual penalty:

        In the event of untimely delivery of the Goods under the Contract the Buyer shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 (zero point one) percent from the total value of untimely delivered Goods for each day of delay.

        In the event of untimely payment for the Goods under the Contract the Seller shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 percent from the total value of untimely paid Goods for each day of delay.

        The Civil Code of Russia (art. 333) allows the court to decrease the amount of penalty if such amount of penalty is disproportionate to the consequences of breach of contractual obligations, with that the court shall be entitled to decrease penalty only if the debtor files a motion with the request to decrease such excessive amount of penalty.

        The decrease of penalty determined by the contract and subject to payment by the person who conducts business activities is allowed only in exceptional cases, if it is proved that the recovery of penalty in the amount stipulated by the contract can lead to receipt of the unjustified profit by the creditor.

        In practice the parties file motions with the court of first instance with the request to decrease penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code and the court usually decreases the amount of penalty at its discretion.

        In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Russia dated 29.05.2018 (case #A43-26319/2016) the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of penalty even in the amount exceeding the total value of the contract was justified provided that the debtor failed to file a motion with the court of first instance with the request to decrease such penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code.

        In this case the customer ordered the contractor to produce a pressure vessel. The price of such works of the contractor amounted to 2.700.000 rubles. The parties agreed that the pressure vessel will be produced by the contractor till 30.01.2015. The contractor produced the pressure vessel only on 01.03.2016.

        The contract stipulated that in case of violation of terms of performance of works the contractor will pay to the customer a fixed fine in the amount of 5% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each violation as well as penalty in the amount of 0,3% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each day of delay starting with the 4th day of delay.

        As a result, the customer demanded that the contractor pays penalty in the amount of 3.355.170 rubles.

        The court of first instance ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered that the client shall pay the amount of penalty in full since the contractor failed to provide evidence that confirmed due fulfillment of the contract by the contractor, or that the contractor failed to perform its obligations in time due to circumstances that were out of his control. With that the contractor also failed to dispute the amount of penalty and failed to file a motion on application of art. 333 of the Civil Code.

        The appeal court changed the ruling of the court of first instance and decreased the amount of penalty to 326.781 rubles based on its conclusions that the customer abused its rights by including in the contract the unfair penalty provisions.

        The Cassation Court agreed with conclusions of the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the rulings of both the Cassation Court and Court of Appeal and the decision of the court of first instance remained in force.

        The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the contractor failed to file a motion with the request to decrease the amount of penalty and apply art. 333 of the Civil Code in the court of first instance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no right to decrease the amount of penalty at its own initiative.

        The latest conclusions of the Supreme Court confirm that the contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract and the courts are not allowed to decrease such excessive amount of penalty at its own initiative.

        Thus, if you have any dispute in Russia, please ensure that your company is duly represented in state commercial courts, since the failure of the parties to appear in court of first instance and file respective motions might lead to serious negative consequences that the failing party might not be able to cure in the courts of appeal.

        Not what you would expect 

        When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!

        The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.

        This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.

        However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.

        In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.

        Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an «in-house» operation» in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.

        What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?

        Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.

        Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.

        As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.

        The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!

        However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to «justify» avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.

        In this respect, in many cases simple «non-satisfaction» was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.

        There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.

        Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.

        Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.

        The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.

        In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.

        Alexander Katzendorn

        Áreas de práctica

        • Arbitraje
        • Derecho Societario
        • Comercio internacional
        • Derecho Internacional Privado
        • Derecho Fiscal y Tributario
        Contáctanos Alexander

        Contacta con Alexander





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          Israel – Termination of international business

          4 de septiembre de 2018

          • Israel
          • Contratos de distribución
          • Litigios

          El procedimiento arbitral en España se caracteriza, y constituye una de sus grandes ventajas, por la dificultad de anular o revocar judicialmente el laudo; las partes saben que el laudo que se dicte es en la mayoría de los casos firme y definitivo y pone punto final al conflicto.

          El art. 41 de la Ley de Arbitraje únicamente permite la anulación del laudo por razones de forma (inexistencia o invalidez del convenio arbitral, falta de notificación a alguna de las partes sobre la designación del árbitro o de las actuaciones arbitrales, indebida designación de los árbitros o que los árbitros hayan resuelto sobre materias que no eran o no podían ser objeto de arbitraje por imperio de la ley). Y adicionalmente el laudo también es anulable cuando es contrario al “orden público”.

          Que cosa sea el “orden público” como para dar lugar, en caso de vulneración, a la anulación del laudo, es cuestión que de siempre ha sido controvertida y debatida; ya en la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 se alude el “orden público” como causa de denegación del reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros. Como recuerda el Tribunal Constitucional (“TC”) en la sentencia que comentamos, citando su propia jurisprudencia, “el orden público material es el conjunto de principios jurídicos públicos y privados, políticos, morales y económicos que son absolutamente obligatorios para la conservación de la sociedad en un pueblo y en una época determinada y el orden público procesal se configura como el conjunto de formalidades y principios necesarios de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico procesal y solo el arbitraje que contradiga alguno o algunos de tales principios podrá ser tachado de nulo por vulneración del orden público”.

          A título de ejemplo, durante 2018 se presentaron 38 demandas de anulación de laudos ante los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia (“TSJ”) de los que 31 se fundamentaban en vulneración del orden público; resultaron estimadas 8 de las demandas (21%), 5 por vulneración del orden público y 3 por invalidez del convenio arbitral.

          El TSJ de Madrid ha venido manteniendo en los últimos tiempos una interpretación muy “expansiva” del orden público, lo que ha generado dudas y temores en las instituciones y Cortes Arbitrales, por el efecto disuasorio que dicha posición podría tener a la hora de elegir Madrid como sede de arbitrajes, nacionales o internacionales.

          Y en la línea interpretativa a la que nos referimos, el TSJ de Madrid ha mantenido el siguiente y sorprendente criterio: dictado un laudo e interpuesta demanda de anulación por una de las partes, los litigantes alcanzaron un acuerdo extrajudicial y solicitaron conjuntamente  el archivo de la demanda de anulación; es decir, ambos daban el laudo por bueno y definitivo; el TSJ rechazó la petición y siguió adelante hasta dictar sentencia anulando el laudo, argumentando que como la demanda de anulación se basaba en la infracción del orden público, entonces ya la materia no era disponible por las partes y no era, en opinión del Tribunal, susceptible de transacción o renuncia.

          No era esta la primera vez que el TSJ adoptaba esta postura: impetrada la anulación de un laudo por ser contrario al “orden público”, las partes ya no tenían la posibilidad de transar y renunciar a la demanda de anulación.

          Por primera vez el asunto ha llegado al Tribunal Constitucional (TC): en un reciente fallo del 15 de junio de 2020, el TC ha sido claro y rotundo; recuerda en su sentencia que el proceso civil se fundamenta en el principio de “disposición de las partes para regular sus intereses privados, es decir, para iniciar la actividad jurisdiccional, determinar el objeto del proceso y ponerle fin cuando estimen conveniente”. Es lo que llamamos “justicia rogada”; y este principio aplica no solo a los procedimientos civiles ante los tribunales ordinarios sino también a los procedimientos arbitrales; asimismo afirma la sentencia que el arbitraje está configurado por la Ley como un mecanismo heterónomo de resolución de conflictos al que es consustancial la mínima intervención de los órganos judiciales a favor de la autonomía de la voluntad.

          Y concluye sentando que la acción de anulación debe ser entendida como un proceso de control externo sobre el laudo que no permite una decisión sobre el fondo de la decisión de los árbitros, al estar tasadas las causas, lo que justifica que “el control de los laudos tenga carácter limitado y solo pueda obtenerse la anulación del laudo en casos excepcionales”.

          En suma, entiende y proclama el TC que es contrario al derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva que protege el art. 24 de la Constitución la negativa del Tribunal a reconocer la virtualidad de un acuerdo alcanzado entre los litigantes con fundamento en el poder dispositivo de las partes sin que medie norma prohibitiva que así lo autorice e imponiendo una decisión que subvierte el principio dispositivo o de “justicia rogada” que inspira el proceso civil; por lo que concede el amparo solicitado y ordena retrotraer las actuaciones al momento anterior al auto que denegó virtualidad a la solicitud conjunta de archivo para que el TSJ dicte otra resolución acompasada al criterio del TC.

          En suma, no podrá ya nunca más el TSJM impedir a los litigantes transar y poner fin a una demanda de anulación de laudo (como ocurre pacífica y habitualmente con los recursos de apelación o de casación) y además deberá tomar en consideración en adelante la interpretación restrictiva del concepto de orden público que ha establecido el TC en esta importante sentencia. En efecto, el arbitraje español sale muy reforzado con esta sentencia del TC.

          The COVID-19 pandemic’s dramatic disruption of the legal and business landscape has included a steep drop in overall M&A activity in Q1 2020.  Much of this decrease has been due to decreased target valuations, tighter access by buyers to liquidity, and perhaps above all underlying uncertainty as to the crisis’s duration.

          For pending transactions, whether the buyer can walk away from the deal (or seek a purchase price reduction) by invoking a material adverse change (MAC) or material adverse effect (MAE) clause – or another clause in the purchase agreement – due to COVID-19 has become a question of increasing relevance.  MAC/MAE clauses typically allow a buyer to terminate an acquisition agreement if a MAC or MAE occurs between signing and closing.

          Actual litigated cases in this area have been few and far between, as under longstanding Delaware case law[1], buyer has the burden of proving MAC or MAE, irrespective of who initiates the lawsuit.  And the standard of proof is high – a buyer must show that the effects of the intervening event are sufficiently large and long lasting as compared to an equivalent period of the prior year.  A short-term or immaterial deviation will not suffice.  In fact, Delaware courts have only once found a MAC, in the December 2018 case Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG.

          And yet, since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous widely reported COVID-19 related M&A litigations have been initiated with the Delaware Court of Chancery.  These include:

          • Bed, Bath & Beyond suing 1-800-Flowers (Del. Ch. April 1, 2020) to complete its acquisition of Perosnalizationmall.com (purchaser sought an extension in closing, without citing specifically the contractual basis for the request);
          • Level 4 Yoga, franchisee of CorePower Yoga, suing CorePower Yoga (Del. Ch. Apr 2, 2020) to compel CorePower Yoga to purchase of Level 4 Yoga studios (after CorePower Yoga took the position that studio closings resulting from COVID-19 stay-at-home orders violated the ordinary course covenant);
          • Oberman, Tivoli & Pickert suing Cast & Crew (Del. Ch. Apr 6, 2020), an industry competitor, to complete its purchase of Oberman’s subsidiary (Cast & Crew maintained it was not obligated to close based on alleged insufficiencies in financial data provided in diligence);
          • SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc. (Del. Ch. Apr 22, 2020), in which buyer sought a declaratory judgment in its favor on termination); and
          • L Brands, Inc. v. SP VS Buyer L.P., Sycamore Partners III, L.P., and Sycamore Partners III-A, L.P (Del. Ch. Apr 23), in which seller instead seeks declaratory judgment in its favor on buyer obligation to close.

          Such cases, typically signed up at an early stage of the pandemic, are likely to increase.  Delaware M&A-MAC-related jurisprudence suggests that buyers seeking to cite MAC in asserting their positions should expect an uphill fight, given buyer’s high burden of proof.  Indeed, Delaware courts’ sole finding of a MAC in Akorn was based on rather extreme facts: target’s (Akorn’s) business deteriorated significantly (40% and 20% drops in profit and equity value, respectively), measured over a full year.  And quite material to the Court’s decision was the likely devastating effect on Akorn’s business resulting from Akorn’s deceptive conduct vis-à-vis the FDA.

          By contrast, cases before and after Akorn, courts have not found a MAC/MAE, including in the 2019 case Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.  There, Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC) agreed to purchase Channel Medsystems, Inc., an early stage medical device company.  The sale was conditioned on Channel receiving FDA approval for its sole product, Cerene. In late December 2017, Channel discovered that falsified information from reports by its Vice President of Quality (as part of a scheme to steal over $2 million from Channel) was included in Channel’s FDA submissions.  BSC terminated the merger agreement in May 2018, asserting that Channel’s false representations and warranties constituted a MAC.

          The court disagreed.  While Channel and Akron both involved a fraud element, Chanel successfully resubmitted its FDA application, such that the fraudulent behavior – the court found – would not cause the FDA to reject the Cerene device.  BSC also failed to show sufficiently large or long-lasting effects on Channel’s financial position.  Channel thus reaffirmed the high bar under pre-Akron Delaware jurisprudence for courts to find a MAC/MAE (See e.g. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005); Hexion Specialty Chemicals v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008)).

          Applied to COVID-19, buyers may have challenges in invoking MAC/MAE clauses under their purchase agreements.

          First, it may simply be premature at this juncture for a buyer to show the type of longer-term effects that have been required under Delaware jurisprudence.  The long-term effects of COVID-19 itself are unclear.  Of course, as weeks turn into months and longer, this may change.

          A second challenge is certain carve-outs typically included in MAC/MAE clauses.  Notably, it is typical for these clauses to include exceptions for general economic and financial conditions generally affecting a target’s industry, unless a buyer can demonstrate that they have disproportionately affected the target.

          A buyer may be able to point to other clauses in a purchase agreement in seeking to walk away from the deal.  Of note is the ordinary course covenant that applies to the period between signing and closing.  By definition, most targets are unable to carry out business during the COVID-19 crisis consistent with past practice.  It is unclear whether courts will allow for a literal reading of these clauses, or interpret them taking into account the broader risk allocation regime as evidenced by the MAC or MAE clause in the agreement, and in doing so reject a buyer’s position.

          For unsigned deals, there may be some early lessons for practitioners as they prepare draft purchase agreements.  On buyer walk-away rights, buyers will want to ensure that the MAE/MAC definition includes express reference to “pandemics” and “epidemics”, if not to “COVID-19” itself.  Conversely, Sellers may wish to seek to loosen ordinary course covenant language, such as by including express exceptions for actions required by the MAC or MAE and otherwise ensure that they comply with all obligations under their control.  Buyers will also want to pay close attention to how COVID-19 affects other aspects of the purchase agreement, including seeking more robust representations and warranties on the impact of COVID-19 on the target’s business.

           

          [1] Although the discussion of this based Delaware law, caselaw in other U.S. jurisdictions often is consistent Delaware.  

          This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

          This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

          In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

          English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

          The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

          This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

          The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

          The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

          As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

          The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

          Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

          The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

          Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

          Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

          Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

          The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

          Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

          The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

          There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

          The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

          The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

          As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

          Novel technology in proceedings

          Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

          And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

          Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

          Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

          Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

          • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
          • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
          • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
          • the matter concerns an international dispute.

          The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

          “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

          The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

          Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

          We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

          To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

          Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

          Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

          • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
          • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
          • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
          • the disclosure of confidential documents
          • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
          • the manner of taking witness testimony
          • the costs of the proceedings.

          Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

          All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

          The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

          • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
          • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
          • The defendant submits its defence statement.
          • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
          • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
          • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
          • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
          • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

          Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

          As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

          Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

          Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

          Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

          La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

          Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

          «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

          Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

          Escuchar es altamente eficaz

          En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

          Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

          «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

          Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

          En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

          «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

          Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

          La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

          En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

          «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

          Las emociones son importantes

          Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

          «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

          [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

          The English common law is a primary choice of law for international business, because it consistently gives the parties exactly what they agreed: what you see in the contract is what you get.

          The same cannot be said for the English legal system: there are barristers, solicitors, Inns of Court, chambers, compulsory disclosure, cross-examination and the loser pays rule. There is much to confuse non-English lawyers and mistakes can be expensive for their clients. Those who know enough to avoid confusion can add real value for clients who have English law disputes.

          This blog focuses on a single feature which is key for international lawyers’ understanding of the English legal system: why it has two kinds of lawyer – barristers and solicitors – and what each of them does.

          Barristers and solicitors: what is the difference?

          To understand the difference, the key thing to bear in mind is that they run completely different business models to support their legal practices.

          Solicitors practice within law firms: profit sharing entities, familiar to lawyers around the world. This risk-sharing model allows senior lawyers to employ teams of junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases: corresponding with the client, the court and the opposing parties and collecting the evidence for trial.

          Barristers are self-employed individuals. They operate from ‘chambers’, which are cost-sharing organisations; barristers practising in chambers together do not share profit or spread risk. They cannot employ junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases; they do not collect evidence, correspond with the court, opposing party or the client. Instead, they are specialist sub-contractors to law firms in England and around the world. Those law firms do all that heavy lifting that allows barristers to conduct their practices.

          What barristers do

          What, then, do law firms ask them to do? Two things: to provide advocacy services and the detailed legal advice necessary for effective advocacy. That means they have particular familiarity with three key aspects of English dispute resolution:

          1. the detail of the cases which are the source of the common law,
          2. the cross-examination of witnesses; and
          3. the oral and written judicial argument that pulls the first two aspects together.

          But aren’t those the fun bits of being a lawyer? Well, yes. So why would a law firm outsource the fun bits? Well, that depends on the kind of law firm…

          English solicitors’ reasons for using barristers

          Let’s take English solicitors first. You have to bear in mind two characteristics of common law dispute resolution. The first has already been mentioned: the source of law is not a readily-comprehensible, unifying civil code, but thousands of cases decided over centuries; it takes time to master the case law in sufficient detail to argue cases.

          The second is the nature of hearings: they take time because of the detailed case law that needs to be considered and because a great deal of work is done orally: from argument to the cross-examination of witnesses. Trials are all-consuming and can last months. So the nature of common law trial work means you have to focus all your time and attention on it to succeed.

          That gives the English law firm a choice: it can either recruit and manage expensive, in-house advocacy talent, or it can outsource it. The former is capital-intensive and risky. The latter involves no capital and no risk. You might object that risk is necessary for reward; and true it is. But the existence of a ready supply of barristers in England means solicitors do not have to take that particular business risk in addition to all the other risks they have to take in order to run successful disputes practices.

          The existence of barristers allows solicitors to make the following calculation: few cases come to trial; most settle. Solicitors make most of their income preparing cases for trial, not in trial. So it is less risky and more profitable to recruit junior lawyers to help prepare cases for trial rather than recruit senior advocates to fight trials. If the trial happens, solicitors retain a barrister as advocate in the case; they make just enough of the barrister before trial to ensure the trial will run smoothly if it does happen. Meanwhile, the senior solicitors focus on managing their teams of lawyers and winning new business to keep their practices growing. It is an effective business model, even if it leaves the fun bits to barristers.

          The risk-reduction that barristers offer to solicitors is more extensive than that basic analysis allows. First, solicitors do not take the risk of losing a client by instructing a barrister on their cases; the barrister’s clients are law firms: no risk there. Second, a firm’s choice to recruit in house advocates is a choice taken once and once only, for better or worse. By contrast, a firm’s choice to instruct a barrister is taken on each new case, so it can choose an advocate with precisely the right expertise for the case. That means the firm can sell its trial preparation practice to assist in disputes in which the firm itself lacks specialist expertise. That reduces the firm’s risk and maintains its profitability.

          All in all, therefore, barristers’ and solicitors’ different business models allow them to run complimentary, not competitive practices.

          Non-English lawyers’ reasons to use barristers

          Now let us consider why non-English law firms would use barristers. The answer is: for the same reasons, but more so. Many non-English law firms have clients with disputes under English law. Most feel the need to pass those cases on to an English law firm; if they do, they lose all or almost all the revenue from the case. To the extent they stay involved, they have little control over the process or the outcome, but they do have the unenviable task of handing the English firm’s very large invoices to their client. It is rarely a comfortable experience.

          Note, however: the more sophisticated non-English law firms engage a barrister as their own sub-contractor on English law cases. That completely changes their experience of conducting English law disputes.

          In arbitrations, the non-English law firm is free to do exactly the same job an English solicitor; the sub-contracted barrister provides the English law advice and advocacy that the law firm itself cannot provide. By stepping into the shoes of the English law firm, the non-English firm both reduces its client’s legal costs and takes a larger share of them.

          In litigation, the non-English law firms must engage a solicitor, but the sophisticated firm nevertheless engages a barrister as its own sub-contractor, rather than allowing the solicitor to engage the barrister. That gives the non-English firm a better flow of information and greater control over the process, so it can better manage its client’s expectations and liabilities.

          So: sophisticated non-English law firms do not let the English law firms reap all the competitive advantages barristers offer to law firms; they take those advantages for themselves. Your firm should do so too. Be sophisticated: develop trusted relations with an internationally-minded barrister today; it will be invaluable when your client is involved in a dispute under English law.

          Are arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance contracts enforceable against a third party which is acting directly against the insurer in third party liability insurances?

          Such direct action is admitted by French law in liability insurances, as defined in article 124-3 of the Insurance Code.

          In just a few months two radically different approaches have been taken by the French Cour de cassation (Civ.1, 19 December 2018, n°17-28.951) and the ECJ in Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd (13 July 2017, C-368/16) and KABEG v. MMA IARD (20 July 2017, C-340/16).

          The case submitted to the Cour de cassation represented a third party exercising a direct right of action before French Courts against the insurer of a floating barge which had caused him a damage. The Supreme Court accepted that the insurer could validly oppose the arbitration clause, which was in the policy against the third party, and therefore judged that French Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. The Supreme Court applied the well-established principle of Compétence-Compétence – materialized in article 1448 of the French Code de Procédure Civile – to stay the case, considering that the arbitration clause could not be set aside. The Court therefore judged that the applicability of the arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitrators by priority.

          A year before, the ECJ had ruled in the opposite direction in a case where a jurisdiction clause was applicable in the insurance policy. In Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd, the ECJ stated that the clause could not be opposed to the third party acting directly against the insurer. According to the Court, the insurers’ liability towards the insured has a contractual nature when based on the policy, whereas it is extra-contractual when the liability is based on a direct action from a third party. In a previous ruling the Court had considered (Sté financière et industrielle du Peloux (12 May 2005, C-112/03) that the jurisdiction clause cannot be opposed to the beneficiary of an insurance policy if he is not the policyholder (for instance in a collective insurance).

          One sees a clear difference in treatment between arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause when it comes to deciding on their opposability to the victim exercising a direct action against the insurer.

          Article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an arbitration cannot be opposed to a party which has not contracted for the purpose of its business activity. The French Cour de cassation grounded its decision on the fact that the clauses of the main contract could be opposed to the third party. If the latter was entitled to apply the insurance contract, it was therefore entitled to invoke article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

          The Russian law allows the parties to agree on recovery of contractual penalty for failure by the parties to fulfill contractual obligations.

          Below are some typical examples of provisions that stipulate contractual penalty:

          In the event of untimely delivery of the Goods under the Contract the Buyer shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 (zero point one) percent from the total value of untimely delivered Goods for each day of delay.

          In the event of untimely payment for the Goods under the Contract the Seller shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 percent from the total value of untimely paid Goods for each day of delay.

          The Civil Code of Russia (art. 333) allows the court to decrease the amount of penalty if such amount of penalty is disproportionate to the consequences of breach of contractual obligations, with that the court shall be entitled to decrease penalty only if the debtor files a motion with the request to decrease such excessive amount of penalty.

          The decrease of penalty determined by the contract and subject to payment by the person who conducts business activities is allowed only in exceptional cases, if it is proved that the recovery of penalty in the amount stipulated by the contract can lead to receipt of the unjustified profit by the creditor.

          In practice the parties file motions with the court of first instance with the request to decrease penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code and the court usually decreases the amount of penalty at its discretion.

          In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Russia dated 29.05.2018 (case #A43-26319/2016) the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of penalty even in the amount exceeding the total value of the contract was justified provided that the debtor failed to file a motion with the court of first instance with the request to decrease such penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code.

          In this case the customer ordered the contractor to produce a pressure vessel. The price of such works of the contractor amounted to 2.700.000 rubles. The parties agreed that the pressure vessel will be produced by the contractor till 30.01.2015. The contractor produced the pressure vessel only on 01.03.2016.

          The contract stipulated that in case of violation of terms of performance of works the contractor will pay to the customer a fixed fine in the amount of 5% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each violation as well as penalty in the amount of 0,3% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each day of delay starting with the 4th day of delay.

          As a result, the customer demanded that the contractor pays penalty in the amount of 3.355.170 rubles.

          The court of first instance ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered that the client shall pay the amount of penalty in full since the contractor failed to provide evidence that confirmed due fulfillment of the contract by the contractor, or that the contractor failed to perform its obligations in time due to circumstances that were out of his control. With that the contractor also failed to dispute the amount of penalty and failed to file a motion on application of art. 333 of the Civil Code.

          The appeal court changed the ruling of the court of first instance and decreased the amount of penalty to 326.781 rubles based on its conclusions that the customer abused its rights by including in the contract the unfair penalty provisions.

          The Cassation Court agreed with conclusions of the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the rulings of both the Cassation Court and Court of Appeal and the decision of the court of first instance remained in force.

          The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the contractor failed to file a motion with the request to decrease the amount of penalty and apply art. 333 of the Civil Code in the court of first instance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no right to decrease the amount of penalty at its own initiative.

          The latest conclusions of the Supreme Court confirm that the contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract and the courts are not allowed to decrease such excessive amount of penalty at its own initiative.

          Thus, if you have any dispute in Russia, please ensure that your company is duly represented in state commercial courts, since the failure of the parties to appear in court of first instance and file respective motions might lead to serious negative consequences that the failing party might not be able to cure in the courts of appeal.

          Not what you would expect 

          When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!

          The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.

          This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.

          However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.

          In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.

          Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an «in-house» operation» in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.

          What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?

          Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.

          Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.

          As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.

          The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!

          However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to «justify» avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.

          In this respect, in many cases simple «non-satisfaction» was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.

          There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.

          Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.

          Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.

          The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.

          In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.

          Benjamin Leventhal

          Áreas de práctica

          • Arbitraje
          • Derecho Societario
          • Derecho Internacional Privado
          Contáctanos Benjamin

          Contacta con Benjamin





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            Sales Distribution Agreement – Goods or Services?

            28 de agosto de 2018

            • Italia
            • Contratos de distribución
            • Litigios

            El procedimiento arbitral en España se caracteriza, y constituye una de sus grandes ventajas, por la dificultad de anular o revocar judicialmente el laudo; las partes saben que el laudo que se dicte es en la mayoría de los casos firme y definitivo y pone punto final al conflicto.

            El art. 41 de la Ley de Arbitraje únicamente permite la anulación del laudo por razones de forma (inexistencia o invalidez del convenio arbitral, falta de notificación a alguna de las partes sobre la designación del árbitro o de las actuaciones arbitrales, indebida designación de los árbitros o que los árbitros hayan resuelto sobre materias que no eran o no podían ser objeto de arbitraje por imperio de la ley). Y adicionalmente el laudo también es anulable cuando es contrario al “orden público”.

            Que cosa sea el “orden público” como para dar lugar, en caso de vulneración, a la anulación del laudo, es cuestión que de siempre ha sido controvertida y debatida; ya en la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 se alude el “orden público” como causa de denegación del reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros. Como recuerda el Tribunal Constitucional (“TC”) en la sentencia que comentamos, citando su propia jurisprudencia, “el orden público material es el conjunto de principios jurídicos públicos y privados, políticos, morales y económicos que son absolutamente obligatorios para la conservación de la sociedad en un pueblo y en una época determinada y el orden público procesal se configura como el conjunto de formalidades y principios necesarios de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico procesal y solo el arbitraje que contradiga alguno o algunos de tales principios podrá ser tachado de nulo por vulneración del orden público”.

            A título de ejemplo, durante 2018 se presentaron 38 demandas de anulación de laudos ante los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia (“TSJ”) de los que 31 se fundamentaban en vulneración del orden público; resultaron estimadas 8 de las demandas (21%), 5 por vulneración del orden público y 3 por invalidez del convenio arbitral.

            El TSJ de Madrid ha venido manteniendo en los últimos tiempos una interpretación muy “expansiva” del orden público, lo que ha generado dudas y temores en las instituciones y Cortes Arbitrales, por el efecto disuasorio que dicha posición podría tener a la hora de elegir Madrid como sede de arbitrajes, nacionales o internacionales.

            Y en la línea interpretativa a la que nos referimos, el TSJ de Madrid ha mantenido el siguiente y sorprendente criterio: dictado un laudo e interpuesta demanda de anulación por una de las partes, los litigantes alcanzaron un acuerdo extrajudicial y solicitaron conjuntamente  el archivo de la demanda de anulación; es decir, ambos daban el laudo por bueno y definitivo; el TSJ rechazó la petición y siguió adelante hasta dictar sentencia anulando el laudo, argumentando que como la demanda de anulación se basaba en la infracción del orden público, entonces ya la materia no era disponible por las partes y no era, en opinión del Tribunal, susceptible de transacción o renuncia.

            No era esta la primera vez que el TSJ adoptaba esta postura: impetrada la anulación de un laudo por ser contrario al “orden público”, las partes ya no tenían la posibilidad de transar y renunciar a la demanda de anulación.

            Por primera vez el asunto ha llegado al Tribunal Constitucional (TC): en un reciente fallo del 15 de junio de 2020, el TC ha sido claro y rotundo; recuerda en su sentencia que el proceso civil se fundamenta en el principio de “disposición de las partes para regular sus intereses privados, es decir, para iniciar la actividad jurisdiccional, determinar el objeto del proceso y ponerle fin cuando estimen conveniente”. Es lo que llamamos “justicia rogada”; y este principio aplica no solo a los procedimientos civiles ante los tribunales ordinarios sino también a los procedimientos arbitrales; asimismo afirma la sentencia que el arbitraje está configurado por la Ley como un mecanismo heterónomo de resolución de conflictos al que es consustancial la mínima intervención de los órganos judiciales a favor de la autonomía de la voluntad.

            Y concluye sentando que la acción de anulación debe ser entendida como un proceso de control externo sobre el laudo que no permite una decisión sobre el fondo de la decisión de los árbitros, al estar tasadas las causas, lo que justifica que “el control de los laudos tenga carácter limitado y solo pueda obtenerse la anulación del laudo en casos excepcionales”.

            En suma, entiende y proclama el TC que es contrario al derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva que protege el art. 24 de la Constitución la negativa del Tribunal a reconocer la virtualidad de un acuerdo alcanzado entre los litigantes con fundamento en el poder dispositivo de las partes sin que medie norma prohibitiva que así lo autorice e imponiendo una decisión que subvierte el principio dispositivo o de “justicia rogada” que inspira el proceso civil; por lo que concede el amparo solicitado y ordena retrotraer las actuaciones al momento anterior al auto que denegó virtualidad a la solicitud conjunta de archivo para que el TSJ dicte otra resolución acompasada al criterio del TC.

            En suma, no podrá ya nunca más el TSJM impedir a los litigantes transar y poner fin a una demanda de anulación de laudo (como ocurre pacífica y habitualmente con los recursos de apelación o de casación) y además deberá tomar en consideración en adelante la interpretación restrictiva del concepto de orden público que ha establecido el TC en esta importante sentencia. En efecto, el arbitraje español sale muy reforzado con esta sentencia del TC.

            The COVID-19 pandemic’s dramatic disruption of the legal and business landscape has included a steep drop in overall M&A activity in Q1 2020.  Much of this decrease has been due to decreased target valuations, tighter access by buyers to liquidity, and perhaps above all underlying uncertainty as to the crisis’s duration.

            For pending transactions, whether the buyer can walk away from the deal (or seek a purchase price reduction) by invoking a material adverse change (MAC) or material adverse effect (MAE) clause – or another clause in the purchase agreement – due to COVID-19 has become a question of increasing relevance.  MAC/MAE clauses typically allow a buyer to terminate an acquisition agreement if a MAC or MAE occurs between signing and closing.

            Actual litigated cases in this area have been few and far between, as under longstanding Delaware case law[1], buyer has the burden of proving MAC or MAE, irrespective of who initiates the lawsuit.  And the standard of proof is high – a buyer must show that the effects of the intervening event are sufficiently large and long lasting as compared to an equivalent period of the prior year.  A short-term or immaterial deviation will not suffice.  In fact, Delaware courts have only once found a MAC, in the December 2018 case Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG.

            And yet, since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous widely reported COVID-19 related M&A litigations have been initiated with the Delaware Court of Chancery.  These include:

            • Bed, Bath & Beyond suing 1-800-Flowers (Del. Ch. April 1, 2020) to complete its acquisition of Perosnalizationmall.com (purchaser sought an extension in closing, without citing specifically the contractual basis for the request);
            • Level 4 Yoga, franchisee of CorePower Yoga, suing CorePower Yoga (Del. Ch. Apr 2, 2020) to compel CorePower Yoga to purchase of Level 4 Yoga studios (after CorePower Yoga took the position that studio closings resulting from COVID-19 stay-at-home orders violated the ordinary course covenant);
            • Oberman, Tivoli & Pickert suing Cast & Crew (Del. Ch. Apr 6, 2020), an industry competitor, to complete its purchase of Oberman’s subsidiary (Cast & Crew maintained it was not obligated to close based on alleged insufficiencies in financial data provided in diligence);
            • SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc. (Del. Ch. Apr 22, 2020), in which buyer sought a declaratory judgment in its favor on termination); and
            • L Brands, Inc. v. SP VS Buyer L.P., Sycamore Partners III, L.P., and Sycamore Partners III-A, L.P (Del. Ch. Apr 23), in which seller instead seeks declaratory judgment in its favor on buyer obligation to close.

            Such cases, typically signed up at an early stage of the pandemic, are likely to increase.  Delaware M&A-MAC-related jurisprudence suggests that buyers seeking to cite MAC in asserting their positions should expect an uphill fight, given buyer’s high burden of proof.  Indeed, Delaware courts’ sole finding of a MAC in Akorn was based on rather extreme facts: target’s (Akorn’s) business deteriorated significantly (40% and 20% drops in profit and equity value, respectively), measured over a full year.  And quite material to the Court’s decision was the likely devastating effect on Akorn’s business resulting from Akorn’s deceptive conduct vis-à-vis the FDA.

            By contrast, cases before and after Akorn, courts have not found a MAC/MAE, including in the 2019 case Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.  There, Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC) agreed to purchase Channel Medsystems, Inc., an early stage medical device company.  The sale was conditioned on Channel receiving FDA approval for its sole product, Cerene. In late December 2017, Channel discovered that falsified information from reports by its Vice President of Quality (as part of a scheme to steal over $2 million from Channel) was included in Channel’s FDA submissions.  BSC terminated the merger agreement in May 2018, asserting that Channel’s false representations and warranties constituted a MAC.

            The court disagreed.  While Channel and Akron both involved a fraud element, Chanel successfully resubmitted its FDA application, such that the fraudulent behavior – the court found – would not cause the FDA to reject the Cerene device.  BSC also failed to show sufficiently large or long-lasting effects on Channel’s financial position.  Channel thus reaffirmed the high bar under pre-Akron Delaware jurisprudence for courts to find a MAC/MAE (See e.g. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005); Hexion Specialty Chemicals v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008)).

            Applied to COVID-19, buyers may have challenges in invoking MAC/MAE clauses under their purchase agreements.

            First, it may simply be premature at this juncture for a buyer to show the type of longer-term effects that have been required under Delaware jurisprudence.  The long-term effects of COVID-19 itself are unclear.  Of course, as weeks turn into months and longer, this may change.

            A second challenge is certain carve-outs typically included in MAC/MAE clauses.  Notably, it is typical for these clauses to include exceptions for general economic and financial conditions generally affecting a target’s industry, unless a buyer can demonstrate that they have disproportionately affected the target.

            A buyer may be able to point to other clauses in a purchase agreement in seeking to walk away from the deal.  Of note is the ordinary course covenant that applies to the period between signing and closing.  By definition, most targets are unable to carry out business during the COVID-19 crisis consistent with past practice.  It is unclear whether courts will allow for a literal reading of these clauses, or interpret them taking into account the broader risk allocation regime as evidenced by the MAC or MAE clause in the agreement, and in doing so reject a buyer’s position.

            For unsigned deals, there may be some early lessons for practitioners as they prepare draft purchase agreements.  On buyer walk-away rights, buyers will want to ensure that the MAE/MAC definition includes express reference to “pandemics” and “epidemics”, if not to “COVID-19” itself.  Conversely, Sellers may wish to seek to loosen ordinary course covenant language, such as by including express exceptions for actions required by the MAC or MAE and otherwise ensure that they comply with all obligations under their control.  Buyers will also want to pay close attention to how COVID-19 affects other aspects of the purchase agreement, including seeking more robust representations and warranties on the impact of COVID-19 on the target’s business.

             

            [1] Although the discussion of this based Delaware law, caselaw in other U.S. jurisdictions often is consistent Delaware.  

            This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

            This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

            In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

            English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

            The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

            This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

            The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

            The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

            As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

            The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

            Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

            The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

            Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

            Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

            Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

            The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

            Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

            The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

            There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

            The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

            The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

            As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

            Novel technology in proceedings

            Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

            And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

            Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

            Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

            Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

            • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
            • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
            • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
            • the matter concerns an international dispute.

            The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

            “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

            The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

            Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

            We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

            To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

            Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

            Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

            • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
            • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
            • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
            • the disclosure of confidential documents
            • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
            • the manner of taking witness testimony
            • the costs of the proceedings.

            Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

            All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

            The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

            • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
            • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
            • The defendant submits its defence statement.
            • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
            • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
            • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
            • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
            • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

            Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

            As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

            Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

            Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

            Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

            La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

            Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

            «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

            Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

            Escuchar es altamente eficaz

            En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

            Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

            «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

            Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

            En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

            «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

            Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

            La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

            En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

            «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

            Las emociones son importantes

            Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

            «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

            [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

            The English common law is a primary choice of law for international business, because it consistently gives the parties exactly what they agreed: what you see in the contract is what you get.

            The same cannot be said for the English legal system: there are barristers, solicitors, Inns of Court, chambers, compulsory disclosure, cross-examination and the loser pays rule. There is much to confuse non-English lawyers and mistakes can be expensive for their clients. Those who know enough to avoid confusion can add real value for clients who have English law disputes.

            This blog focuses on a single feature which is key for international lawyers’ understanding of the English legal system: why it has two kinds of lawyer – barristers and solicitors – and what each of them does.

            Barristers and solicitors: what is the difference?

            To understand the difference, the key thing to bear in mind is that they run completely different business models to support their legal practices.

            Solicitors practice within law firms: profit sharing entities, familiar to lawyers around the world. This risk-sharing model allows senior lawyers to employ teams of junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases: corresponding with the client, the court and the opposing parties and collecting the evidence for trial.

            Barristers are self-employed individuals. They operate from ‘chambers’, which are cost-sharing organisations; barristers practising in chambers together do not share profit or spread risk. They cannot employ junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases; they do not collect evidence, correspond with the court, opposing party or the client. Instead, they are specialist sub-contractors to law firms in England and around the world. Those law firms do all that heavy lifting that allows barristers to conduct their practices.

            What barristers do

            What, then, do law firms ask them to do? Two things: to provide advocacy services and the detailed legal advice necessary for effective advocacy. That means they have particular familiarity with three key aspects of English dispute resolution:

            1. the detail of the cases which are the source of the common law,
            2. the cross-examination of witnesses; and
            3. the oral and written judicial argument that pulls the first two aspects together.

            But aren’t those the fun bits of being a lawyer? Well, yes. So why would a law firm outsource the fun bits? Well, that depends on the kind of law firm…

            English solicitors’ reasons for using barristers

            Let’s take English solicitors first. You have to bear in mind two characteristics of common law dispute resolution. The first has already been mentioned: the source of law is not a readily-comprehensible, unifying civil code, but thousands of cases decided over centuries; it takes time to master the case law in sufficient detail to argue cases.

            The second is the nature of hearings: they take time because of the detailed case law that needs to be considered and because a great deal of work is done orally: from argument to the cross-examination of witnesses. Trials are all-consuming and can last months. So the nature of common law trial work means you have to focus all your time and attention on it to succeed.

            That gives the English law firm a choice: it can either recruit and manage expensive, in-house advocacy talent, or it can outsource it. The former is capital-intensive and risky. The latter involves no capital and no risk. You might object that risk is necessary for reward; and true it is. But the existence of a ready supply of barristers in England means solicitors do not have to take that particular business risk in addition to all the other risks they have to take in order to run successful disputes practices.

            The existence of barristers allows solicitors to make the following calculation: few cases come to trial; most settle. Solicitors make most of their income preparing cases for trial, not in trial. So it is less risky and more profitable to recruit junior lawyers to help prepare cases for trial rather than recruit senior advocates to fight trials. If the trial happens, solicitors retain a barrister as advocate in the case; they make just enough of the barrister before trial to ensure the trial will run smoothly if it does happen. Meanwhile, the senior solicitors focus on managing their teams of lawyers and winning new business to keep their practices growing. It is an effective business model, even if it leaves the fun bits to barristers.

            The risk-reduction that barristers offer to solicitors is more extensive than that basic analysis allows. First, solicitors do not take the risk of losing a client by instructing a barrister on their cases; the barrister’s clients are law firms: no risk there. Second, a firm’s choice to recruit in house advocates is a choice taken once and once only, for better or worse. By contrast, a firm’s choice to instruct a barrister is taken on each new case, so it can choose an advocate with precisely the right expertise for the case. That means the firm can sell its trial preparation practice to assist in disputes in which the firm itself lacks specialist expertise. That reduces the firm’s risk and maintains its profitability.

            All in all, therefore, barristers’ and solicitors’ different business models allow them to run complimentary, not competitive practices.

            Non-English lawyers’ reasons to use barristers

            Now let us consider why non-English law firms would use barristers. The answer is: for the same reasons, but more so. Many non-English law firms have clients with disputes under English law. Most feel the need to pass those cases on to an English law firm; if they do, they lose all or almost all the revenue from the case. To the extent they stay involved, they have little control over the process or the outcome, but they do have the unenviable task of handing the English firm’s very large invoices to their client. It is rarely a comfortable experience.

            Note, however: the more sophisticated non-English law firms engage a barrister as their own sub-contractor on English law cases. That completely changes their experience of conducting English law disputes.

            In arbitrations, the non-English law firm is free to do exactly the same job an English solicitor; the sub-contracted barrister provides the English law advice and advocacy that the law firm itself cannot provide. By stepping into the shoes of the English law firm, the non-English firm both reduces its client’s legal costs and takes a larger share of them.

            In litigation, the non-English law firms must engage a solicitor, but the sophisticated firm nevertheless engages a barrister as its own sub-contractor, rather than allowing the solicitor to engage the barrister. That gives the non-English firm a better flow of information and greater control over the process, so it can better manage its client’s expectations and liabilities.

            So: sophisticated non-English law firms do not let the English law firms reap all the competitive advantages barristers offer to law firms; they take those advantages for themselves. Your firm should do so too. Be sophisticated: develop trusted relations with an internationally-minded barrister today; it will be invaluable when your client is involved in a dispute under English law.

            Are arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance contracts enforceable against a third party which is acting directly against the insurer in third party liability insurances?

            Such direct action is admitted by French law in liability insurances, as defined in article 124-3 of the Insurance Code.

            In just a few months two radically different approaches have been taken by the French Cour de cassation (Civ.1, 19 December 2018, n°17-28.951) and the ECJ in Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd (13 July 2017, C-368/16) and KABEG v. MMA IARD (20 July 2017, C-340/16).

            The case submitted to the Cour de cassation represented a third party exercising a direct right of action before French Courts against the insurer of a floating barge which had caused him a damage. The Supreme Court accepted that the insurer could validly oppose the arbitration clause, which was in the policy against the third party, and therefore judged that French Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. The Supreme Court applied the well-established principle of Compétence-Compétence – materialized in article 1448 of the French Code de Procédure Civile – to stay the case, considering that the arbitration clause could not be set aside. The Court therefore judged that the applicability of the arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitrators by priority.

            A year before, the ECJ had ruled in the opposite direction in a case where a jurisdiction clause was applicable in the insurance policy. In Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd, the ECJ stated that the clause could not be opposed to the third party acting directly against the insurer. According to the Court, the insurers’ liability towards the insured has a contractual nature when based on the policy, whereas it is extra-contractual when the liability is based on a direct action from a third party. In a previous ruling the Court had considered (Sté financière et industrielle du Peloux (12 May 2005, C-112/03) that the jurisdiction clause cannot be opposed to the beneficiary of an insurance policy if he is not the policyholder (for instance in a collective insurance).

            One sees a clear difference in treatment between arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause when it comes to deciding on their opposability to the victim exercising a direct action against the insurer.

            Article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an arbitration cannot be opposed to a party which has not contracted for the purpose of its business activity. The French Cour de cassation grounded its decision on the fact that the clauses of the main contract could be opposed to the third party. If the latter was entitled to apply the insurance contract, it was therefore entitled to invoke article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

            The Russian law allows the parties to agree on recovery of contractual penalty for failure by the parties to fulfill contractual obligations.

            Below are some typical examples of provisions that stipulate contractual penalty:

            In the event of untimely delivery of the Goods under the Contract the Buyer shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 (zero point one) percent from the total value of untimely delivered Goods for each day of delay.

            In the event of untimely payment for the Goods under the Contract the Seller shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 percent from the total value of untimely paid Goods for each day of delay.

            The Civil Code of Russia (art. 333) allows the court to decrease the amount of penalty if such amount of penalty is disproportionate to the consequences of breach of contractual obligations, with that the court shall be entitled to decrease penalty only if the debtor files a motion with the request to decrease such excessive amount of penalty.

            The decrease of penalty determined by the contract and subject to payment by the person who conducts business activities is allowed only in exceptional cases, if it is proved that the recovery of penalty in the amount stipulated by the contract can lead to receipt of the unjustified profit by the creditor.

            In practice the parties file motions with the court of first instance with the request to decrease penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code and the court usually decreases the amount of penalty at its discretion.

            In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Russia dated 29.05.2018 (case #A43-26319/2016) the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of penalty even in the amount exceeding the total value of the contract was justified provided that the debtor failed to file a motion with the court of first instance with the request to decrease such penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code.

            In this case the customer ordered the contractor to produce a pressure vessel. The price of such works of the contractor amounted to 2.700.000 rubles. The parties agreed that the pressure vessel will be produced by the contractor till 30.01.2015. The contractor produced the pressure vessel only on 01.03.2016.

            The contract stipulated that in case of violation of terms of performance of works the contractor will pay to the customer a fixed fine in the amount of 5% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each violation as well as penalty in the amount of 0,3% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each day of delay starting with the 4th day of delay.

            As a result, the customer demanded that the contractor pays penalty in the amount of 3.355.170 rubles.

            The court of first instance ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered that the client shall pay the amount of penalty in full since the contractor failed to provide evidence that confirmed due fulfillment of the contract by the contractor, or that the contractor failed to perform its obligations in time due to circumstances that were out of his control. With that the contractor also failed to dispute the amount of penalty and failed to file a motion on application of art. 333 of the Civil Code.

            The appeal court changed the ruling of the court of first instance and decreased the amount of penalty to 326.781 rubles based on its conclusions that the customer abused its rights by including in the contract the unfair penalty provisions.

            The Cassation Court agreed with conclusions of the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the rulings of both the Cassation Court and Court of Appeal and the decision of the court of first instance remained in force.

            The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the contractor failed to file a motion with the request to decrease the amount of penalty and apply art. 333 of the Civil Code in the court of first instance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no right to decrease the amount of penalty at its own initiative.

            The latest conclusions of the Supreme Court confirm that the contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract and the courts are not allowed to decrease such excessive amount of penalty at its own initiative.

            Thus, if you have any dispute in Russia, please ensure that your company is duly represented in state commercial courts, since the failure of the parties to appear in court of first instance and file respective motions might lead to serious negative consequences that the failing party might not be able to cure in the courts of appeal.

            Not what you would expect 

            When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!

            The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.

            This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.

            However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.

            In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.

            Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an «in-house» operation» in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.

            What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?

            Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.

            Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.

            As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.

            The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!

            However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to «justify» avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.

            In this respect, in many cases simple «non-satisfaction» was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.

            There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.

            Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.

            Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.

            The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.

            In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.

            Irene Grassi

            Áreas de práctica

            • Derecho Procesal
            • Contratos de distribución
            • Derecho Internacional Privado
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              Russia – Arbitration or state court?

              10 de julio de 2018

              • Rusia
              • Arbitraje
              • Litigios

              El procedimiento arbitral en España se caracteriza, y constituye una de sus grandes ventajas, por la dificultad de anular o revocar judicialmente el laudo; las partes saben que el laudo que se dicte es en la mayoría de los casos firme y definitivo y pone punto final al conflicto.

              El art. 41 de la Ley de Arbitraje únicamente permite la anulación del laudo por razones de forma (inexistencia o invalidez del convenio arbitral, falta de notificación a alguna de las partes sobre la designación del árbitro o de las actuaciones arbitrales, indebida designación de los árbitros o que los árbitros hayan resuelto sobre materias que no eran o no podían ser objeto de arbitraje por imperio de la ley). Y adicionalmente el laudo también es anulable cuando es contrario al “orden público”.

              Que cosa sea el “orden público” como para dar lugar, en caso de vulneración, a la anulación del laudo, es cuestión que de siempre ha sido controvertida y debatida; ya en la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 se alude el “orden público” como causa de denegación del reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros. Como recuerda el Tribunal Constitucional (“TC”) en la sentencia que comentamos, citando su propia jurisprudencia, “el orden público material es el conjunto de principios jurídicos públicos y privados, políticos, morales y económicos que son absolutamente obligatorios para la conservación de la sociedad en un pueblo y en una época determinada y el orden público procesal se configura como el conjunto de formalidades y principios necesarios de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico procesal y solo el arbitraje que contradiga alguno o algunos de tales principios podrá ser tachado de nulo por vulneración del orden público”.

              A título de ejemplo, durante 2018 se presentaron 38 demandas de anulación de laudos ante los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia (“TSJ”) de los que 31 se fundamentaban en vulneración del orden público; resultaron estimadas 8 de las demandas (21%), 5 por vulneración del orden público y 3 por invalidez del convenio arbitral.

              El TSJ de Madrid ha venido manteniendo en los últimos tiempos una interpretación muy “expansiva” del orden público, lo que ha generado dudas y temores en las instituciones y Cortes Arbitrales, por el efecto disuasorio que dicha posición podría tener a la hora de elegir Madrid como sede de arbitrajes, nacionales o internacionales.

              Y en la línea interpretativa a la que nos referimos, el TSJ de Madrid ha mantenido el siguiente y sorprendente criterio: dictado un laudo e interpuesta demanda de anulación por una de las partes, los litigantes alcanzaron un acuerdo extrajudicial y solicitaron conjuntamente  el archivo de la demanda de anulación; es decir, ambos daban el laudo por bueno y definitivo; el TSJ rechazó la petición y siguió adelante hasta dictar sentencia anulando el laudo, argumentando que como la demanda de anulación se basaba en la infracción del orden público, entonces ya la materia no era disponible por las partes y no era, en opinión del Tribunal, susceptible de transacción o renuncia.

              No era esta la primera vez que el TSJ adoptaba esta postura: impetrada la anulación de un laudo por ser contrario al “orden público”, las partes ya no tenían la posibilidad de transar y renunciar a la demanda de anulación.

              Por primera vez el asunto ha llegado al Tribunal Constitucional (TC): en un reciente fallo del 15 de junio de 2020, el TC ha sido claro y rotundo; recuerda en su sentencia que el proceso civil se fundamenta en el principio de “disposición de las partes para regular sus intereses privados, es decir, para iniciar la actividad jurisdiccional, determinar el objeto del proceso y ponerle fin cuando estimen conveniente”. Es lo que llamamos “justicia rogada”; y este principio aplica no solo a los procedimientos civiles ante los tribunales ordinarios sino también a los procedimientos arbitrales; asimismo afirma la sentencia que el arbitraje está configurado por la Ley como un mecanismo heterónomo de resolución de conflictos al que es consustancial la mínima intervención de los órganos judiciales a favor de la autonomía de la voluntad.

              Y concluye sentando que la acción de anulación debe ser entendida como un proceso de control externo sobre el laudo que no permite una decisión sobre el fondo de la decisión de los árbitros, al estar tasadas las causas, lo que justifica que “el control de los laudos tenga carácter limitado y solo pueda obtenerse la anulación del laudo en casos excepcionales”.

              En suma, entiende y proclama el TC que es contrario al derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva que protege el art. 24 de la Constitución la negativa del Tribunal a reconocer la virtualidad de un acuerdo alcanzado entre los litigantes con fundamento en el poder dispositivo de las partes sin que medie norma prohibitiva que así lo autorice e imponiendo una decisión que subvierte el principio dispositivo o de “justicia rogada” que inspira el proceso civil; por lo que concede el amparo solicitado y ordena retrotraer las actuaciones al momento anterior al auto que denegó virtualidad a la solicitud conjunta de archivo para que el TSJ dicte otra resolución acompasada al criterio del TC.

              En suma, no podrá ya nunca más el TSJM impedir a los litigantes transar y poner fin a una demanda de anulación de laudo (como ocurre pacífica y habitualmente con los recursos de apelación o de casación) y además deberá tomar en consideración en adelante la interpretación restrictiva del concepto de orden público que ha establecido el TC en esta importante sentencia. En efecto, el arbitraje español sale muy reforzado con esta sentencia del TC.

              The COVID-19 pandemic’s dramatic disruption of the legal and business landscape has included a steep drop in overall M&A activity in Q1 2020.  Much of this decrease has been due to decreased target valuations, tighter access by buyers to liquidity, and perhaps above all underlying uncertainty as to the crisis’s duration.

              For pending transactions, whether the buyer can walk away from the deal (or seek a purchase price reduction) by invoking a material adverse change (MAC) or material adverse effect (MAE) clause – or another clause in the purchase agreement – due to COVID-19 has become a question of increasing relevance.  MAC/MAE clauses typically allow a buyer to terminate an acquisition agreement if a MAC or MAE occurs between signing and closing.

              Actual litigated cases in this area have been few and far between, as under longstanding Delaware case law[1], buyer has the burden of proving MAC or MAE, irrespective of who initiates the lawsuit.  And the standard of proof is high – a buyer must show that the effects of the intervening event are sufficiently large and long lasting as compared to an equivalent period of the prior year.  A short-term or immaterial deviation will not suffice.  In fact, Delaware courts have only once found a MAC, in the December 2018 case Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG.

              And yet, since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous widely reported COVID-19 related M&A litigations have been initiated with the Delaware Court of Chancery.  These include:

              • Bed, Bath & Beyond suing 1-800-Flowers (Del. Ch. April 1, 2020) to complete its acquisition of Perosnalizationmall.com (purchaser sought an extension in closing, without citing specifically the contractual basis for the request);
              • Level 4 Yoga, franchisee of CorePower Yoga, suing CorePower Yoga (Del. Ch. Apr 2, 2020) to compel CorePower Yoga to purchase of Level 4 Yoga studios (after CorePower Yoga took the position that studio closings resulting from COVID-19 stay-at-home orders violated the ordinary course covenant);
              • Oberman, Tivoli & Pickert suing Cast & Crew (Del. Ch. Apr 6, 2020), an industry competitor, to complete its purchase of Oberman’s subsidiary (Cast & Crew maintained it was not obligated to close based on alleged insufficiencies in financial data provided in diligence);
              • SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc. (Del. Ch. Apr 22, 2020), in which buyer sought a declaratory judgment in its favor on termination); and
              • L Brands, Inc. v. SP VS Buyer L.P., Sycamore Partners III, L.P., and Sycamore Partners III-A, L.P (Del. Ch. Apr 23), in which seller instead seeks declaratory judgment in its favor on buyer obligation to close.

              Such cases, typically signed up at an early stage of the pandemic, are likely to increase.  Delaware M&A-MAC-related jurisprudence suggests that buyers seeking to cite MAC in asserting their positions should expect an uphill fight, given buyer’s high burden of proof.  Indeed, Delaware courts’ sole finding of a MAC in Akorn was based on rather extreme facts: target’s (Akorn’s) business deteriorated significantly (40% and 20% drops in profit and equity value, respectively), measured over a full year.  And quite material to the Court’s decision was the likely devastating effect on Akorn’s business resulting from Akorn’s deceptive conduct vis-à-vis the FDA.

              By contrast, cases before and after Akorn, courts have not found a MAC/MAE, including in the 2019 case Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.  There, Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC) agreed to purchase Channel Medsystems, Inc., an early stage medical device company.  The sale was conditioned on Channel receiving FDA approval for its sole product, Cerene. In late December 2017, Channel discovered that falsified information from reports by its Vice President of Quality (as part of a scheme to steal over $2 million from Channel) was included in Channel’s FDA submissions.  BSC terminated the merger agreement in May 2018, asserting that Channel’s false representations and warranties constituted a MAC.

              The court disagreed.  While Channel and Akron both involved a fraud element, Chanel successfully resubmitted its FDA application, such that the fraudulent behavior – the court found – would not cause the FDA to reject the Cerene device.  BSC also failed to show sufficiently large or long-lasting effects on Channel’s financial position.  Channel thus reaffirmed the high bar under pre-Akron Delaware jurisprudence for courts to find a MAC/MAE (See e.g. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005); Hexion Specialty Chemicals v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008)).

              Applied to COVID-19, buyers may have challenges in invoking MAC/MAE clauses under their purchase agreements.

              First, it may simply be premature at this juncture for a buyer to show the type of longer-term effects that have been required under Delaware jurisprudence.  The long-term effects of COVID-19 itself are unclear.  Of course, as weeks turn into months and longer, this may change.

              A second challenge is certain carve-outs typically included in MAC/MAE clauses.  Notably, it is typical for these clauses to include exceptions for general economic and financial conditions generally affecting a target’s industry, unless a buyer can demonstrate that they have disproportionately affected the target.

              A buyer may be able to point to other clauses in a purchase agreement in seeking to walk away from the deal.  Of note is the ordinary course covenant that applies to the period between signing and closing.  By definition, most targets are unable to carry out business during the COVID-19 crisis consistent with past practice.  It is unclear whether courts will allow for a literal reading of these clauses, or interpret them taking into account the broader risk allocation regime as evidenced by the MAC or MAE clause in the agreement, and in doing so reject a buyer’s position.

              For unsigned deals, there may be some early lessons for practitioners as they prepare draft purchase agreements.  On buyer walk-away rights, buyers will want to ensure that the MAE/MAC definition includes express reference to “pandemics” and “epidemics”, if not to “COVID-19” itself.  Conversely, Sellers may wish to seek to loosen ordinary course covenant language, such as by including express exceptions for actions required by the MAC or MAE and otherwise ensure that they comply with all obligations under their control.  Buyers will also want to pay close attention to how COVID-19 affects other aspects of the purchase agreement, including seeking more robust representations and warranties on the impact of COVID-19 on the target’s business.

               

              [1] Although the discussion of this based Delaware law, caselaw in other U.S. jurisdictions often is consistent Delaware.  

              This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

              This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

              In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

              English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

              The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

              This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

              The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

              The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

              As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

              The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

              Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

              The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

              Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

              Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

              Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

              The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

              Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

              The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

              There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

              The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

              The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

              As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

              Novel technology in proceedings

              Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

              And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

              Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

              Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

              Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

              • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
              • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
              • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
              • the matter concerns an international dispute.

              The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

              “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

              The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

              Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

              We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

              To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

              Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

              Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

              • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
              • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
              • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
              • the disclosure of confidential documents
              • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
              • the manner of taking witness testimony
              • the costs of the proceedings.

              Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

              All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

              The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

              • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
              • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
              • The defendant submits its defence statement.
              • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
              • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
              • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
              • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
              • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

              Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

              As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

              Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

              Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

              Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

              La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

              Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

              «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

              Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

              Escuchar es altamente eficaz

              En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

              Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

              «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

              Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

              En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

              «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

              Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

              La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

              En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

              «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

              Las emociones son importantes

              Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

              «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

              [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

              The English common law is a primary choice of law for international business, because it consistently gives the parties exactly what they agreed: what you see in the contract is what you get.

              The same cannot be said for the English legal system: there are barristers, solicitors, Inns of Court, chambers, compulsory disclosure, cross-examination and the loser pays rule. There is much to confuse non-English lawyers and mistakes can be expensive for their clients. Those who know enough to avoid confusion can add real value for clients who have English law disputes.

              This blog focuses on a single feature which is key for international lawyers’ understanding of the English legal system: why it has two kinds of lawyer – barristers and solicitors – and what each of them does.

              Barristers and solicitors: what is the difference?

              To understand the difference, the key thing to bear in mind is that they run completely different business models to support their legal practices.

              Solicitors practice within law firms: profit sharing entities, familiar to lawyers around the world. This risk-sharing model allows senior lawyers to employ teams of junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases: corresponding with the client, the court and the opposing parties and collecting the evidence for trial.

              Barristers are self-employed individuals. They operate from ‘chambers’, which are cost-sharing organisations; barristers practising in chambers together do not share profit or spread risk. They cannot employ junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases; they do not collect evidence, correspond with the court, opposing party or the client. Instead, they are specialist sub-contractors to law firms in England and around the world. Those law firms do all that heavy lifting that allows barristers to conduct their practices.

              What barristers do

              What, then, do law firms ask them to do? Two things: to provide advocacy services and the detailed legal advice necessary for effective advocacy. That means they have particular familiarity with three key aspects of English dispute resolution:

              1. the detail of the cases which are the source of the common law,
              2. the cross-examination of witnesses; and
              3. the oral and written judicial argument that pulls the first two aspects together.

              But aren’t those the fun bits of being a lawyer? Well, yes. So why would a law firm outsource the fun bits? Well, that depends on the kind of law firm…

              English solicitors’ reasons for using barristers

              Let’s take English solicitors first. You have to bear in mind two characteristics of common law dispute resolution. The first has already been mentioned: the source of law is not a readily-comprehensible, unifying civil code, but thousands of cases decided over centuries; it takes time to master the case law in sufficient detail to argue cases.

              The second is the nature of hearings: they take time because of the detailed case law that needs to be considered and because a great deal of work is done orally: from argument to the cross-examination of witnesses. Trials are all-consuming and can last months. So the nature of common law trial work means you have to focus all your time and attention on it to succeed.

              That gives the English law firm a choice: it can either recruit and manage expensive, in-house advocacy talent, or it can outsource it. The former is capital-intensive and risky. The latter involves no capital and no risk. You might object that risk is necessary for reward; and true it is. But the existence of a ready supply of barristers in England means solicitors do not have to take that particular business risk in addition to all the other risks they have to take in order to run successful disputes practices.

              The existence of barristers allows solicitors to make the following calculation: few cases come to trial; most settle. Solicitors make most of their income preparing cases for trial, not in trial. So it is less risky and more profitable to recruit junior lawyers to help prepare cases for trial rather than recruit senior advocates to fight trials. If the trial happens, solicitors retain a barrister as advocate in the case; they make just enough of the barrister before trial to ensure the trial will run smoothly if it does happen. Meanwhile, the senior solicitors focus on managing their teams of lawyers and winning new business to keep their practices growing. It is an effective business model, even if it leaves the fun bits to barristers.

              The risk-reduction that barristers offer to solicitors is more extensive than that basic analysis allows. First, solicitors do not take the risk of losing a client by instructing a barrister on their cases; the barrister’s clients are law firms: no risk there. Second, a firm’s choice to recruit in house advocates is a choice taken once and once only, for better or worse. By contrast, a firm’s choice to instruct a barrister is taken on each new case, so it can choose an advocate with precisely the right expertise for the case. That means the firm can sell its trial preparation practice to assist in disputes in which the firm itself lacks specialist expertise. That reduces the firm’s risk and maintains its profitability.

              All in all, therefore, barristers’ and solicitors’ different business models allow them to run complimentary, not competitive practices.

              Non-English lawyers’ reasons to use barristers

              Now let us consider why non-English law firms would use barristers. The answer is: for the same reasons, but more so. Many non-English law firms have clients with disputes under English law. Most feel the need to pass those cases on to an English law firm; if they do, they lose all or almost all the revenue from the case. To the extent they stay involved, they have little control over the process or the outcome, but they do have the unenviable task of handing the English firm’s very large invoices to their client. It is rarely a comfortable experience.

              Note, however: the more sophisticated non-English law firms engage a barrister as their own sub-contractor on English law cases. That completely changes their experience of conducting English law disputes.

              In arbitrations, the non-English law firm is free to do exactly the same job an English solicitor; the sub-contracted barrister provides the English law advice and advocacy that the law firm itself cannot provide. By stepping into the shoes of the English law firm, the non-English firm both reduces its client’s legal costs and takes a larger share of them.

              In litigation, the non-English law firms must engage a solicitor, but the sophisticated firm nevertheless engages a barrister as its own sub-contractor, rather than allowing the solicitor to engage the barrister. That gives the non-English firm a better flow of information and greater control over the process, so it can better manage its client’s expectations and liabilities.

              So: sophisticated non-English law firms do not let the English law firms reap all the competitive advantages barristers offer to law firms; they take those advantages for themselves. Your firm should do so too. Be sophisticated: develop trusted relations with an internationally-minded barrister today; it will be invaluable when your client is involved in a dispute under English law.

              Are arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance contracts enforceable against a third party which is acting directly against the insurer in third party liability insurances?

              Such direct action is admitted by French law in liability insurances, as defined in article 124-3 of the Insurance Code.

              In just a few months two radically different approaches have been taken by the French Cour de cassation (Civ.1, 19 December 2018, n°17-28.951) and the ECJ in Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd (13 July 2017, C-368/16) and KABEG v. MMA IARD (20 July 2017, C-340/16).

              The case submitted to the Cour de cassation represented a third party exercising a direct right of action before French Courts against the insurer of a floating barge which had caused him a damage. The Supreme Court accepted that the insurer could validly oppose the arbitration clause, which was in the policy against the third party, and therefore judged that French Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. The Supreme Court applied the well-established principle of Compétence-Compétence – materialized in article 1448 of the French Code de Procédure Civile – to stay the case, considering that the arbitration clause could not be set aside. The Court therefore judged that the applicability of the arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitrators by priority.

              A year before, the ECJ had ruled in the opposite direction in a case where a jurisdiction clause was applicable in the insurance policy. In Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd, the ECJ stated that the clause could not be opposed to the third party acting directly against the insurer. According to the Court, the insurers’ liability towards the insured has a contractual nature when based on the policy, whereas it is extra-contractual when the liability is based on a direct action from a third party. In a previous ruling the Court had considered (Sté financière et industrielle du Peloux (12 May 2005, C-112/03) that the jurisdiction clause cannot be opposed to the beneficiary of an insurance policy if he is not the policyholder (for instance in a collective insurance).

              One sees a clear difference in treatment between arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause when it comes to deciding on their opposability to the victim exercising a direct action against the insurer.

              Article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an arbitration cannot be opposed to a party which has not contracted for the purpose of its business activity. The French Cour de cassation grounded its decision on the fact that the clauses of the main contract could be opposed to the third party. If the latter was entitled to apply the insurance contract, it was therefore entitled to invoke article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

              The Russian law allows the parties to agree on recovery of contractual penalty for failure by the parties to fulfill contractual obligations.

              Below are some typical examples of provisions that stipulate contractual penalty:

              In the event of untimely delivery of the Goods under the Contract the Buyer shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 (zero point one) percent from the total value of untimely delivered Goods for each day of delay.

              In the event of untimely payment for the Goods under the Contract the Seller shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 percent from the total value of untimely paid Goods for each day of delay.

              The Civil Code of Russia (art. 333) allows the court to decrease the amount of penalty if such amount of penalty is disproportionate to the consequences of breach of contractual obligations, with that the court shall be entitled to decrease penalty only if the debtor files a motion with the request to decrease such excessive amount of penalty.

              The decrease of penalty determined by the contract and subject to payment by the person who conducts business activities is allowed only in exceptional cases, if it is proved that the recovery of penalty in the amount stipulated by the contract can lead to receipt of the unjustified profit by the creditor.

              In practice the parties file motions with the court of first instance with the request to decrease penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code and the court usually decreases the amount of penalty at its discretion.

              In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Russia dated 29.05.2018 (case #A43-26319/2016) the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of penalty even in the amount exceeding the total value of the contract was justified provided that the debtor failed to file a motion with the court of first instance with the request to decrease such penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code.

              In this case the customer ordered the contractor to produce a pressure vessel. The price of such works of the contractor amounted to 2.700.000 rubles. The parties agreed that the pressure vessel will be produced by the contractor till 30.01.2015. The contractor produced the pressure vessel only on 01.03.2016.

              The contract stipulated that in case of violation of terms of performance of works the contractor will pay to the customer a fixed fine in the amount of 5% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each violation as well as penalty in the amount of 0,3% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each day of delay starting with the 4th day of delay.

              As a result, the customer demanded that the contractor pays penalty in the amount of 3.355.170 rubles.

              The court of first instance ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered that the client shall pay the amount of penalty in full since the contractor failed to provide evidence that confirmed due fulfillment of the contract by the contractor, or that the contractor failed to perform its obligations in time due to circumstances that were out of his control. With that the contractor also failed to dispute the amount of penalty and failed to file a motion on application of art. 333 of the Civil Code.

              The appeal court changed the ruling of the court of first instance and decreased the amount of penalty to 326.781 rubles based on its conclusions that the customer abused its rights by including in the contract the unfair penalty provisions.

              The Cassation Court agreed with conclusions of the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the rulings of both the Cassation Court and Court of Appeal and the decision of the court of first instance remained in force.

              The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the contractor failed to file a motion with the request to decrease the amount of penalty and apply art. 333 of the Civil Code in the court of first instance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no right to decrease the amount of penalty at its own initiative.

              The latest conclusions of the Supreme Court confirm that the contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract and the courts are not allowed to decrease such excessive amount of penalty at its own initiative.

              Thus, if you have any dispute in Russia, please ensure that your company is duly represented in state commercial courts, since the failure of the parties to appear in court of first instance and file respective motions might lead to serious negative consequences that the failing party might not be able to cure in the courts of appeal.

              Not what you would expect 

              When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!

              The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.

              This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.

              However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.

              In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.

              Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an «in-house» operation» in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.

              What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?

              Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.

              Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.

              As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.

              The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!

              However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to «justify» avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.

              In this respect, in many cases simple «non-satisfaction» was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.

              There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.

              Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.

              Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.

              The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.

              In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.

              Alexander Katzendorn

              Áreas de práctica

              • Arbitraje
              • Derecho Societario
              • Comercio internacional
              • Derecho Internacional Privado
              • Derecho Fiscal y Tributario
              Contáctanos Alexander

              Contacta con Alexander





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                Italia – Acción revocatoria del trust y beneficiarios

                15 de marzo de 2018

                • Italia
                • Derecho Inmobiliario
                • Litigios

                El procedimiento arbitral en España se caracteriza, y constituye una de sus grandes ventajas, por la dificultad de anular o revocar judicialmente el laudo; las partes saben que el laudo que se dicte es en la mayoría de los casos firme y definitivo y pone punto final al conflicto.

                El art. 41 de la Ley de Arbitraje únicamente permite la anulación del laudo por razones de forma (inexistencia o invalidez del convenio arbitral, falta de notificación a alguna de las partes sobre la designación del árbitro o de las actuaciones arbitrales, indebida designación de los árbitros o que los árbitros hayan resuelto sobre materias que no eran o no podían ser objeto de arbitraje por imperio de la ley). Y adicionalmente el laudo también es anulable cuando es contrario al “orden público”.

                Que cosa sea el “orden público” como para dar lugar, en caso de vulneración, a la anulación del laudo, es cuestión que de siempre ha sido controvertida y debatida; ya en la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 se alude el “orden público” como causa de denegación del reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros. Como recuerda el Tribunal Constitucional (“TC”) en la sentencia que comentamos, citando su propia jurisprudencia, “el orden público material es el conjunto de principios jurídicos públicos y privados, políticos, morales y económicos que son absolutamente obligatorios para la conservación de la sociedad en un pueblo y en una época determinada y el orden público procesal se configura como el conjunto de formalidades y principios necesarios de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico procesal y solo el arbitraje que contradiga alguno o algunos de tales principios podrá ser tachado de nulo por vulneración del orden público”.

                A título de ejemplo, durante 2018 se presentaron 38 demandas de anulación de laudos ante los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia (“TSJ”) de los que 31 se fundamentaban en vulneración del orden público; resultaron estimadas 8 de las demandas (21%), 5 por vulneración del orden público y 3 por invalidez del convenio arbitral.

                El TSJ de Madrid ha venido manteniendo en los últimos tiempos una interpretación muy “expansiva” del orden público, lo que ha generado dudas y temores en las instituciones y Cortes Arbitrales, por el efecto disuasorio que dicha posición podría tener a la hora de elegir Madrid como sede de arbitrajes, nacionales o internacionales.

                Y en la línea interpretativa a la que nos referimos, el TSJ de Madrid ha mantenido el siguiente y sorprendente criterio: dictado un laudo e interpuesta demanda de anulación por una de las partes, los litigantes alcanzaron un acuerdo extrajudicial y solicitaron conjuntamente  el archivo de la demanda de anulación; es decir, ambos daban el laudo por bueno y definitivo; el TSJ rechazó la petición y siguió adelante hasta dictar sentencia anulando el laudo, argumentando que como la demanda de anulación se basaba en la infracción del orden público, entonces ya la materia no era disponible por las partes y no era, en opinión del Tribunal, susceptible de transacción o renuncia.

                No era esta la primera vez que el TSJ adoptaba esta postura: impetrada la anulación de un laudo por ser contrario al “orden público”, las partes ya no tenían la posibilidad de transar y renunciar a la demanda de anulación.

                Por primera vez el asunto ha llegado al Tribunal Constitucional (TC): en un reciente fallo del 15 de junio de 2020, el TC ha sido claro y rotundo; recuerda en su sentencia que el proceso civil se fundamenta en el principio de “disposición de las partes para regular sus intereses privados, es decir, para iniciar la actividad jurisdiccional, determinar el objeto del proceso y ponerle fin cuando estimen conveniente”. Es lo que llamamos “justicia rogada”; y este principio aplica no solo a los procedimientos civiles ante los tribunales ordinarios sino también a los procedimientos arbitrales; asimismo afirma la sentencia que el arbitraje está configurado por la Ley como un mecanismo heterónomo de resolución de conflictos al que es consustancial la mínima intervención de los órganos judiciales a favor de la autonomía de la voluntad.

                Y concluye sentando que la acción de anulación debe ser entendida como un proceso de control externo sobre el laudo que no permite una decisión sobre el fondo de la decisión de los árbitros, al estar tasadas las causas, lo que justifica que “el control de los laudos tenga carácter limitado y solo pueda obtenerse la anulación del laudo en casos excepcionales”.

                En suma, entiende y proclama el TC que es contrario al derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva que protege el art. 24 de la Constitución la negativa del Tribunal a reconocer la virtualidad de un acuerdo alcanzado entre los litigantes con fundamento en el poder dispositivo de las partes sin que medie norma prohibitiva que así lo autorice e imponiendo una decisión que subvierte el principio dispositivo o de “justicia rogada” que inspira el proceso civil; por lo que concede el amparo solicitado y ordena retrotraer las actuaciones al momento anterior al auto que denegó virtualidad a la solicitud conjunta de archivo para que el TSJ dicte otra resolución acompasada al criterio del TC.

                En suma, no podrá ya nunca más el TSJM impedir a los litigantes transar y poner fin a una demanda de anulación de laudo (como ocurre pacífica y habitualmente con los recursos de apelación o de casación) y además deberá tomar en consideración en adelante la interpretación restrictiva del concepto de orden público que ha establecido el TC en esta importante sentencia. En efecto, el arbitraje español sale muy reforzado con esta sentencia del TC.

                The COVID-19 pandemic’s dramatic disruption of the legal and business landscape has included a steep drop in overall M&A activity in Q1 2020.  Much of this decrease has been due to decreased target valuations, tighter access by buyers to liquidity, and perhaps above all underlying uncertainty as to the crisis’s duration.

                For pending transactions, whether the buyer can walk away from the deal (or seek a purchase price reduction) by invoking a material adverse change (MAC) or material adverse effect (MAE) clause – or another clause in the purchase agreement – due to COVID-19 has become a question of increasing relevance.  MAC/MAE clauses typically allow a buyer to terminate an acquisition agreement if a MAC or MAE occurs between signing and closing.

                Actual litigated cases in this area have been few and far between, as under longstanding Delaware case law[1], buyer has the burden of proving MAC or MAE, irrespective of who initiates the lawsuit.  And the standard of proof is high – a buyer must show that the effects of the intervening event are sufficiently large and long lasting as compared to an equivalent period of the prior year.  A short-term or immaterial deviation will not suffice.  In fact, Delaware courts have only once found a MAC, in the December 2018 case Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG.

                And yet, since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous widely reported COVID-19 related M&A litigations have been initiated with the Delaware Court of Chancery.  These include:

                • Bed, Bath & Beyond suing 1-800-Flowers (Del. Ch. April 1, 2020) to complete its acquisition of Perosnalizationmall.com (purchaser sought an extension in closing, without citing specifically the contractual basis for the request);
                • Level 4 Yoga, franchisee of CorePower Yoga, suing CorePower Yoga (Del. Ch. Apr 2, 2020) to compel CorePower Yoga to purchase of Level 4 Yoga studios (after CorePower Yoga took the position that studio closings resulting from COVID-19 stay-at-home orders violated the ordinary course covenant);
                • Oberman, Tivoli & Pickert suing Cast & Crew (Del. Ch. Apr 6, 2020), an industry competitor, to complete its purchase of Oberman’s subsidiary (Cast & Crew maintained it was not obligated to close based on alleged insufficiencies in financial data provided in diligence);
                • SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc. (Del. Ch. Apr 22, 2020), in which buyer sought a declaratory judgment in its favor on termination); and
                • L Brands, Inc. v. SP VS Buyer L.P., Sycamore Partners III, L.P., and Sycamore Partners III-A, L.P (Del. Ch. Apr 23), in which seller instead seeks declaratory judgment in its favor on buyer obligation to close.

                Such cases, typically signed up at an early stage of the pandemic, are likely to increase.  Delaware M&A-MAC-related jurisprudence suggests that buyers seeking to cite MAC in asserting their positions should expect an uphill fight, given buyer’s high burden of proof.  Indeed, Delaware courts’ sole finding of a MAC in Akorn was based on rather extreme facts: target’s (Akorn’s) business deteriorated significantly (40% and 20% drops in profit and equity value, respectively), measured over a full year.  And quite material to the Court’s decision was the likely devastating effect on Akorn’s business resulting from Akorn’s deceptive conduct vis-à-vis the FDA.

                By contrast, cases before and after Akorn, courts have not found a MAC/MAE, including in the 2019 case Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.  There, Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC) agreed to purchase Channel Medsystems, Inc., an early stage medical device company.  The sale was conditioned on Channel receiving FDA approval for its sole product, Cerene. In late December 2017, Channel discovered that falsified information from reports by its Vice President of Quality (as part of a scheme to steal over $2 million from Channel) was included in Channel’s FDA submissions.  BSC terminated the merger agreement in May 2018, asserting that Channel’s false representations and warranties constituted a MAC.

                The court disagreed.  While Channel and Akron both involved a fraud element, Chanel successfully resubmitted its FDA application, such that the fraudulent behavior – the court found – would not cause the FDA to reject the Cerene device.  BSC also failed to show sufficiently large or long-lasting effects on Channel’s financial position.  Channel thus reaffirmed the high bar under pre-Akron Delaware jurisprudence for courts to find a MAC/MAE (See e.g. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005); Hexion Specialty Chemicals v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008)).

                Applied to COVID-19, buyers may have challenges in invoking MAC/MAE clauses under their purchase agreements.

                First, it may simply be premature at this juncture for a buyer to show the type of longer-term effects that have been required under Delaware jurisprudence.  The long-term effects of COVID-19 itself are unclear.  Of course, as weeks turn into months and longer, this may change.

                A second challenge is certain carve-outs typically included in MAC/MAE clauses.  Notably, it is typical for these clauses to include exceptions for general economic and financial conditions generally affecting a target’s industry, unless a buyer can demonstrate that they have disproportionately affected the target.

                A buyer may be able to point to other clauses in a purchase agreement in seeking to walk away from the deal.  Of note is the ordinary course covenant that applies to the period between signing and closing.  By definition, most targets are unable to carry out business during the COVID-19 crisis consistent with past practice.  It is unclear whether courts will allow for a literal reading of these clauses, or interpret them taking into account the broader risk allocation regime as evidenced by the MAC or MAE clause in the agreement, and in doing so reject a buyer’s position.

                For unsigned deals, there may be some early lessons for practitioners as they prepare draft purchase agreements.  On buyer walk-away rights, buyers will want to ensure that the MAE/MAC definition includes express reference to “pandemics” and “epidemics”, if not to “COVID-19” itself.  Conversely, Sellers may wish to seek to loosen ordinary course covenant language, such as by including express exceptions for actions required by the MAC or MAE and otherwise ensure that they comply with all obligations under their control.  Buyers will also want to pay close attention to how COVID-19 affects other aspects of the purchase agreement, including seeking more robust representations and warranties on the impact of COVID-19 on the target’s business.

                 

                [1] Although the discussion of this based Delaware law, caselaw in other U.S. jurisdictions often is consistent Delaware.  

                This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

                This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

                In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

                English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

                The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

                This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

                The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

                The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

                As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

                The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

                Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

                The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

                Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

                Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

                Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

                The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

                Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

                The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

                There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

                The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

                The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

                As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

                Novel technology in proceedings

                Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

                And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

                Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

                Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

                Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

                • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
                • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
                • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
                • the matter concerns an international dispute.

                The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

                “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

                The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

                Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

                We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

                To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

                Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

                Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

                • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
                • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
                • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
                • the disclosure of confidential documents
                • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
                • the manner of taking witness testimony
                • the costs of the proceedings.

                Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

                All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

                The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

                • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
                • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
                • The defendant submits its defence statement.
                • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
                • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
                • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
                • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
                • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

                Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

                As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

                Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

                Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

                Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

                La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

                Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

                «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

                Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

                Escuchar es altamente eficaz

                En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

                Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

                «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

                Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

                En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

                «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

                Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

                La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

                En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

                «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

                Las emociones son importantes

                Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

                «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

                [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

                The English common law is a primary choice of law for international business, because it consistently gives the parties exactly what they agreed: what you see in the contract is what you get.

                The same cannot be said for the English legal system: there are barristers, solicitors, Inns of Court, chambers, compulsory disclosure, cross-examination and the loser pays rule. There is much to confuse non-English lawyers and mistakes can be expensive for their clients. Those who know enough to avoid confusion can add real value for clients who have English law disputes.

                This blog focuses on a single feature which is key for international lawyers’ understanding of the English legal system: why it has two kinds of lawyer – barristers and solicitors – and what each of them does.

                Barristers and solicitors: what is the difference?

                To understand the difference, the key thing to bear in mind is that they run completely different business models to support their legal practices.

                Solicitors practice within law firms: profit sharing entities, familiar to lawyers around the world. This risk-sharing model allows senior lawyers to employ teams of junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases: corresponding with the client, the court and the opposing parties and collecting the evidence for trial.

                Barristers are self-employed individuals. They operate from ‘chambers’, which are cost-sharing organisations; barristers practising in chambers together do not share profit or spread risk. They cannot employ junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases; they do not collect evidence, correspond with the court, opposing party or the client. Instead, they are specialist sub-contractors to law firms in England and around the world. Those law firms do all that heavy lifting that allows barristers to conduct their practices.

                What barristers do

                What, then, do law firms ask them to do? Two things: to provide advocacy services and the detailed legal advice necessary for effective advocacy. That means they have particular familiarity with three key aspects of English dispute resolution:

                1. the detail of the cases which are the source of the common law,
                2. the cross-examination of witnesses; and
                3. the oral and written judicial argument that pulls the first two aspects together.

                But aren’t those the fun bits of being a lawyer? Well, yes. So why would a law firm outsource the fun bits? Well, that depends on the kind of law firm…

                English solicitors’ reasons for using barristers

                Let’s take English solicitors first. You have to bear in mind two characteristics of common law dispute resolution. The first has already been mentioned: the source of law is not a readily-comprehensible, unifying civil code, but thousands of cases decided over centuries; it takes time to master the case law in sufficient detail to argue cases.

                The second is the nature of hearings: they take time because of the detailed case law that needs to be considered and because a great deal of work is done orally: from argument to the cross-examination of witnesses. Trials are all-consuming and can last months. So the nature of common law trial work means you have to focus all your time and attention on it to succeed.

                That gives the English law firm a choice: it can either recruit and manage expensive, in-house advocacy talent, or it can outsource it. The former is capital-intensive and risky. The latter involves no capital and no risk. You might object that risk is necessary for reward; and true it is. But the existence of a ready supply of barristers in England means solicitors do not have to take that particular business risk in addition to all the other risks they have to take in order to run successful disputes practices.

                The existence of barristers allows solicitors to make the following calculation: few cases come to trial; most settle. Solicitors make most of their income preparing cases for trial, not in trial. So it is less risky and more profitable to recruit junior lawyers to help prepare cases for trial rather than recruit senior advocates to fight trials. If the trial happens, solicitors retain a barrister as advocate in the case; they make just enough of the barrister before trial to ensure the trial will run smoothly if it does happen. Meanwhile, the senior solicitors focus on managing their teams of lawyers and winning new business to keep their practices growing. It is an effective business model, even if it leaves the fun bits to barristers.

                The risk-reduction that barristers offer to solicitors is more extensive than that basic analysis allows. First, solicitors do not take the risk of losing a client by instructing a barrister on their cases; the barrister’s clients are law firms: no risk there. Second, a firm’s choice to recruit in house advocates is a choice taken once and once only, for better or worse. By contrast, a firm’s choice to instruct a barrister is taken on each new case, so it can choose an advocate with precisely the right expertise for the case. That means the firm can sell its trial preparation practice to assist in disputes in which the firm itself lacks specialist expertise. That reduces the firm’s risk and maintains its profitability.

                All in all, therefore, barristers’ and solicitors’ different business models allow them to run complimentary, not competitive practices.

                Non-English lawyers’ reasons to use barristers

                Now let us consider why non-English law firms would use barristers. The answer is: for the same reasons, but more so. Many non-English law firms have clients with disputes under English law. Most feel the need to pass those cases on to an English law firm; if they do, they lose all or almost all the revenue from the case. To the extent they stay involved, they have little control over the process or the outcome, but they do have the unenviable task of handing the English firm’s very large invoices to their client. It is rarely a comfortable experience.

                Note, however: the more sophisticated non-English law firms engage a barrister as their own sub-contractor on English law cases. That completely changes their experience of conducting English law disputes.

                In arbitrations, the non-English law firm is free to do exactly the same job an English solicitor; the sub-contracted barrister provides the English law advice and advocacy that the law firm itself cannot provide. By stepping into the shoes of the English law firm, the non-English firm both reduces its client’s legal costs and takes a larger share of them.

                In litigation, the non-English law firms must engage a solicitor, but the sophisticated firm nevertheless engages a barrister as its own sub-contractor, rather than allowing the solicitor to engage the barrister. That gives the non-English firm a better flow of information and greater control over the process, so it can better manage its client’s expectations and liabilities.

                So: sophisticated non-English law firms do not let the English law firms reap all the competitive advantages barristers offer to law firms; they take those advantages for themselves. Your firm should do so too. Be sophisticated: develop trusted relations with an internationally-minded barrister today; it will be invaluable when your client is involved in a dispute under English law.

                Are arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance contracts enforceable against a third party which is acting directly against the insurer in third party liability insurances?

                Such direct action is admitted by French law in liability insurances, as defined in article 124-3 of the Insurance Code.

                In just a few months two radically different approaches have been taken by the French Cour de cassation (Civ.1, 19 December 2018, n°17-28.951) and the ECJ in Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd (13 July 2017, C-368/16) and KABEG v. MMA IARD (20 July 2017, C-340/16).

                The case submitted to the Cour de cassation represented a third party exercising a direct right of action before French Courts against the insurer of a floating barge which had caused him a damage. The Supreme Court accepted that the insurer could validly oppose the arbitration clause, which was in the policy against the third party, and therefore judged that French Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. The Supreme Court applied the well-established principle of Compétence-Compétence – materialized in article 1448 of the French Code de Procédure Civile – to stay the case, considering that the arbitration clause could not be set aside. The Court therefore judged that the applicability of the arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitrators by priority.

                A year before, the ECJ had ruled in the opposite direction in a case where a jurisdiction clause was applicable in the insurance policy. In Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd, the ECJ stated that the clause could not be opposed to the third party acting directly against the insurer. According to the Court, the insurers’ liability towards the insured has a contractual nature when based on the policy, whereas it is extra-contractual when the liability is based on a direct action from a third party. In a previous ruling the Court had considered (Sté financière et industrielle du Peloux (12 May 2005, C-112/03) that the jurisdiction clause cannot be opposed to the beneficiary of an insurance policy if he is not the policyholder (for instance in a collective insurance).

                One sees a clear difference in treatment between arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause when it comes to deciding on their opposability to the victim exercising a direct action against the insurer.

                Article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an arbitration cannot be opposed to a party which has not contracted for the purpose of its business activity. The French Cour de cassation grounded its decision on the fact that the clauses of the main contract could be opposed to the third party. If the latter was entitled to apply the insurance contract, it was therefore entitled to invoke article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

                The Russian law allows the parties to agree on recovery of contractual penalty for failure by the parties to fulfill contractual obligations.

                Below are some typical examples of provisions that stipulate contractual penalty:

                In the event of untimely delivery of the Goods under the Contract the Buyer shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 (zero point one) percent from the total value of untimely delivered Goods for each day of delay.

                In the event of untimely payment for the Goods under the Contract the Seller shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 percent from the total value of untimely paid Goods for each day of delay.

                The Civil Code of Russia (art. 333) allows the court to decrease the amount of penalty if such amount of penalty is disproportionate to the consequences of breach of contractual obligations, with that the court shall be entitled to decrease penalty only if the debtor files a motion with the request to decrease such excessive amount of penalty.

                The decrease of penalty determined by the contract and subject to payment by the person who conducts business activities is allowed only in exceptional cases, if it is proved that the recovery of penalty in the amount stipulated by the contract can lead to receipt of the unjustified profit by the creditor.

                In practice the parties file motions with the court of first instance with the request to decrease penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code and the court usually decreases the amount of penalty at its discretion.

                In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Russia dated 29.05.2018 (case #A43-26319/2016) the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of penalty even in the amount exceeding the total value of the contract was justified provided that the debtor failed to file a motion with the court of first instance with the request to decrease such penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code.

                In this case the customer ordered the contractor to produce a pressure vessel. The price of such works of the contractor amounted to 2.700.000 rubles. The parties agreed that the pressure vessel will be produced by the contractor till 30.01.2015. The contractor produced the pressure vessel only on 01.03.2016.

                The contract stipulated that in case of violation of terms of performance of works the contractor will pay to the customer a fixed fine in the amount of 5% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each violation as well as penalty in the amount of 0,3% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each day of delay starting with the 4th day of delay.

                As a result, the customer demanded that the contractor pays penalty in the amount of 3.355.170 rubles.

                The court of first instance ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered that the client shall pay the amount of penalty in full since the contractor failed to provide evidence that confirmed due fulfillment of the contract by the contractor, or that the contractor failed to perform its obligations in time due to circumstances that were out of his control. With that the contractor also failed to dispute the amount of penalty and failed to file a motion on application of art. 333 of the Civil Code.

                The appeal court changed the ruling of the court of first instance and decreased the amount of penalty to 326.781 rubles based on its conclusions that the customer abused its rights by including in the contract the unfair penalty provisions.

                The Cassation Court agreed with conclusions of the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the rulings of both the Cassation Court and Court of Appeal and the decision of the court of first instance remained in force.

                The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the contractor failed to file a motion with the request to decrease the amount of penalty and apply art. 333 of the Civil Code in the court of first instance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no right to decrease the amount of penalty at its own initiative.

                The latest conclusions of the Supreme Court confirm that the contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract and the courts are not allowed to decrease such excessive amount of penalty at its own initiative.

                Thus, if you have any dispute in Russia, please ensure that your company is duly represented in state commercial courts, since the failure of the parties to appear in court of first instance and file respective motions might lead to serious negative consequences that the failing party might not be able to cure in the courts of appeal.

                Not what you would expect 

                When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!

                The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.

                This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.

                However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.

                In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.

                Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an «in-house» operation» in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.

                What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?

                Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.

                Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.

                As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.

                The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!

                However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to «justify» avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.

                In this respect, in many cases simple «non-satisfaction» was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.

                There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.

                Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.

                Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.

                The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.

                In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.

                Suiza – Ejecución de un crédito y embargo de los bienes del deudor

                13 de diciembre de 2017

                • Suiza
                • Arbitraje
                • Litigios
                • Reclamación de deudas

                El procedimiento arbitral en España se caracteriza, y constituye una de sus grandes ventajas, por la dificultad de anular o revocar judicialmente el laudo; las partes saben que el laudo que se dicte es en la mayoría de los casos firme y definitivo y pone punto final al conflicto.

                El art. 41 de la Ley de Arbitraje únicamente permite la anulación del laudo por razones de forma (inexistencia o invalidez del convenio arbitral, falta de notificación a alguna de las partes sobre la designación del árbitro o de las actuaciones arbitrales, indebida designación de los árbitros o que los árbitros hayan resuelto sobre materias que no eran o no podían ser objeto de arbitraje por imperio de la ley). Y adicionalmente el laudo también es anulable cuando es contrario al “orden público”.

                Que cosa sea el “orden público” como para dar lugar, en caso de vulneración, a la anulación del laudo, es cuestión que de siempre ha sido controvertida y debatida; ya en la Convención de Nueva York de 1958 se alude el “orden público” como causa de denegación del reconocimiento de laudos extranjeros. Como recuerda el Tribunal Constitucional (“TC”) en la sentencia que comentamos, citando su propia jurisprudencia, “el orden público material es el conjunto de principios jurídicos públicos y privados, políticos, morales y económicos que son absolutamente obligatorios para la conservación de la sociedad en un pueblo y en una época determinada y el orden público procesal se configura como el conjunto de formalidades y principios necesarios de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico procesal y solo el arbitraje que contradiga alguno o algunos de tales principios podrá ser tachado de nulo por vulneración del orden público”.

                A título de ejemplo, durante 2018 se presentaron 38 demandas de anulación de laudos ante los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia (“TSJ”) de los que 31 se fundamentaban en vulneración del orden público; resultaron estimadas 8 de las demandas (21%), 5 por vulneración del orden público y 3 por invalidez del convenio arbitral.

                El TSJ de Madrid ha venido manteniendo en los últimos tiempos una interpretación muy “expansiva” del orden público, lo que ha generado dudas y temores en las instituciones y Cortes Arbitrales, por el efecto disuasorio que dicha posición podría tener a la hora de elegir Madrid como sede de arbitrajes, nacionales o internacionales.

                Y en la línea interpretativa a la que nos referimos, el TSJ de Madrid ha mantenido el siguiente y sorprendente criterio: dictado un laudo e interpuesta demanda de anulación por una de las partes, los litigantes alcanzaron un acuerdo extrajudicial y solicitaron conjuntamente  el archivo de la demanda de anulación; es decir, ambos daban el laudo por bueno y definitivo; el TSJ rechazó la petición y siguió adelante hasta dictar sentencia anulando el laudo, argumentando que como la demanda de anulación se basaba en la infracción del orden público, entonces ya la materia no era disponible por las partes y no era, en opinión del Tribunal, susceptible de transacción o renuncia.

                No era esta la primera vez que el TSJ adoptaba esta postura: impetrada la anulación de un laudo por ser contrario al “orden público”, las partes ya no tenían la posibilidad de transar y renunciar a la demanda de anulación.

                Por primera vez el asunto ha llegado al Tribunal Constitucional (TC): en un reciente fallo del 15 de junio de 2020, el TC ha sido claro y rotundo; recuerda en su sentencia que el proceso civil se fundamenta en el principio de “disposición de las partes para regular sus intereses privados, es decir, para iniciar la actividad jurisdiccional, determinar el objeto del proceso y ponerle fin cuando estimen conveniente”. Es lo que llamamos “justicia rogada”; y este principio aplica no solo a los procedimientos civiles ante los tribunales ordinarios sino también a los procedimientos arbitrales; asimismo afirma la sentencia que el arbitraje está configurado por la Ley como un mecanismo heterónomo de resolución de conflictos al que es consustancial la mínima intervención de los órganos judiciales a favor de la autonomía de la voluntad.

                Y concluye sentando que la acción de anulación debe ser entendida como un proceso de control externo sobre el laudo que no permite una decisión sobre el fondo de la decisión de los árbitros, al estar tasadas las causas, lo que justifica que “el control de los laudos tenga carácter limitado y solo pueda obtenerse la anulación del laudo en casos excepcionales”.

                En suma, entiende y proclama el TC que es contrario al derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva que protege el art. 24 de la Constitución la negativa del Tribunal a reconocer la virtualidad de un acuerdo alcanzado entre los litigantes con fundamento en el poder dispositivo de las partes sin que medie norma prohibitiva que así lo autorice e imponiendo una decisión que subvierte el principio dispositivo o de “justicia rogada” que inspira el proceso civil; por lo que concede el amparo solicitado y ordena retrotraer las actuaciones al momento anterior al auto que denegó virtualidad a la solicitud conjunta de archivo para que el TSJ dicte otra resolución acompasada al criterio del TC.

                En suma, no podrá ya nunca más el TSJM impedir a los litigantes transar y poner fin a una demanda de anulación de laudo (como ocurre pacífica y habitualmente con los recursos de apelación o de casación) y además deberá tomar en consideración en adelante la interpretación restrictiva del concepto de orden público que ha establecido el TC en esta importante sentencia. En efecto, el arbitraje español sale muy reforzado con esta sentencia del TC.

                The COVID-19 pandemic’s dramatic disruption of the legal and business landscape has included a steep drop in overall M&A activity in Q1 2020.  Much of this decrease has been due to decreased target valuations, tighter access by buyers to liquidity, and perhaps above all underlying uncertainty as to the crisis’s duration.

                For pending transactions, whether the buyer can walk away from the deal (or seek a purchase price reduction) by invoking a material adverse change (MAC) or material adverse effect (MAE) clause – or another clause in the purchase agreement – due to COVID-19 has become a question of increasing relevance.  MAC/MAE clauses typically allow a buyer to terminate an acquisition agreement if a MAC or MAE occurs between signing and closing.

                Actual litigated cases in this area have been few and far between, as under longstanding Delaware case law[1], buyer has the burden of proving MAC or MAE, irrespective of who initiates the lawsuit.  And the standard of proof is high – a buyer must show that the effects of the intervening event are sufficiently large and long lasting as compared to an equivalent period of the prior year.  A short-term or immaterial deviation will not suffice.  In fact, Delaware courts have only once found a MAC, in the December 2018 case Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG.

                And yet, since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous widely reported COVID-19 related M&A litigations have been initiated with the Delaware Court of Chancery.  These include:

                • Bed, Bath & Beyond suing 1-800-Flowers (Del. Ch. April 1, 2020) to complete its acquisition of Perosnalizationmall.com (purchaser sought an extension in closing, without citing specifically the contractual basis for the request);
                • Level 4 Yoga, franchisee of CorePower Yoga, suing CorePower Yoga (Del. Ch. Apr 2, 2020) to compel CorePower Yoga to purchase of Level 4 Yoga studios (after CorePower Yoga took the position that studio closings resulting from COVID-19 stay-at-home orders violated the ordinary course covenant);
                • Oberman, Tivoli & Pickert suing Cast & Crew (Del. Ch. Apr 6, 2020), an industry competitor, to complete its purchase of Oberman’s subsidiary (Cast & Crew maintained it was not obligated to close based on alleged insufficiencies in financial data provided in diligence);
                • SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc. (Del. Ch. Apr 22, 2020), in which buyer sought a declaratory judgment in its favor on termination); and
                • L Brands, Inc. v. SP VS Buyer L.P., Sycamore Partners III, L.P., and Sycamore Partners III-A, L.P (Del. Ch. Apr 23), in which seller instead seeks declaratory judgment in its favor on buyer obligation to close.

                Such cases, typically signed up at an early stage of the pandemic, are likely to increase.  Delaware M&A-MAC-related jurisprudence suggests that buyers seeking to cite MAC in asserting their positions should expect an uphill fight, given buyer’s high burden of proof.  Indeed, Delaware courts’ sole finding of a MAC in Akorn was based on rather extreme facts: target’s (Akorn’s) business deteriorated significantly (40% and 20% drops in profit and equity value, respectively), measured over a full year.  And quite material to the Court’s decision was the likely devastating effect on Akorn’s business resulting from Akorn’s deceptive conduct vis-à-vis the FDA.

                By contrast, cases before and after Akorn, courts have not found a MAC/MAE, including in the 2019 case Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp.  There, Boston Scientific Corporation (BSC) agreed to purchase Channel Medsystems, Inc., an early stage medical device company.  The sale was conditioned on Channel receiving FDA approval for its sole product, Cerene. In late December 2017, Channel discovered that falsified information from reports by its Vice President of Quality (as part of a scheme to steal over $2 million from Channel) was included in Channel’s FDA submissions.  BSC terminated the merger agreement in May 2018, asserting that Channel’s false representations and warranties constituted a MAC.

                The court disagreed.  While Channel and Akron both involved a fraud element, Chanel successfully resubmitted its FDA application, such that the fraudulent behavior – the court found – would not cause the FDA to reject the Cerene device.  BSC also failed to show sufficiently large or long-lasting effects on Channel’s financial position.  Channel thus reaffirmed the high bar under pre-Akron Delaware jurisprudence for courts to find a MAC/MAE (See e.g. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001); Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., 2005 WL 1039027 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005); Hexion Specialty Chemicals v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715 (Del. Ch. 2008)).

                Applied to COVID-19, buyers may have challenges in invoking MAC/MAE clauses under their purchase agreements.

                First, it may simply be premature at this juncture for a buyer to show the type of longer-term effects that have been required under Delaware jurisprudence.  The long-term effects of COVID-19 itself are unclear.  Of course, as weeks turn into months and longer, this may change.

                A second challenge is certain carve-outs typically included in MAC/MAE clauses.  Notably, it is typical for these clauses to include exceptions for general economic and financial conditions generally affecting a target’s industry, unless a buyer can demonstrate that they have disproportionately affected the target.

                A buyer may be able to point to other clauses in a purchase agreement in seeking to walk away from the deal.  Of note is the ordinary course covenant that applies to the period between signing and closing.  By definition, most targets are unable to carry out business during the COVID-19 crisis consistent with past practice.  It is unclear whether courts will allow for a literal reading of these clauses, or interpret them taking into account the broader risk allocation regime as evidenced by the MAC or MAE clause in the agreement, and in doing so reject a buyer’s position.

                For unsigned deals, there may be some early lessons for practitioners as they prepare draft purchase agreements.  On buyer walk-away rights, buyers will want to ensure that the MAE/MAC definition includes express reference to “pandemics” and “epidemics”, if not to “COVID-19” itself.  Conversely, Sellers may wish to seek to loosen ordinary course covenant language, such as by including express exceptions for actions required by the MAC or MAE and otherwise ensure that they comply with all obligations under their control.  Buyers will also want to pay close attention to how COVID-19 affects other aspects of the purchase agreement, including seeking more robust representations and warranties on the impact of COVID-19 on the target’s business.

                 

                [1] Although the discussion of this based Delaware law, caselaw in other U.S. jurisdictions often is consistent Delaware.  

                This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

                This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

                In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

                English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

                The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

                This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

                The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

                The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

                As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

                The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

                Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

                The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

                Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

                Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

                Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

                The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

                Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

                The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

                There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

                The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

                The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

                As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

                Novel technology in proceedings

                Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

                And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

                Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

                Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

                Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

                • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
                • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
                • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
                • the matter concerns an international dispute.

                The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

                “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

                The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

                Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

                We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

                To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

                Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

                Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

                • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
                • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
                • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
                • the disclosure of confidential documents
                • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
                • the manner of taking witness testimony
                • the costs of the proceedings.

                Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

                All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

                The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

                • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
                • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
                • The defendant submits its defence statement.
                • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
                • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
                • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
                • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
                • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

                Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

                As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

                Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

                Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

                Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

                La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

                Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

                «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

                Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

                Escuchar es altamente eficaz

                En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

                Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

                «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

                Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

                En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

                «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

                Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

                La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

                En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

                «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

                Las emociones son importantes

                Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

                «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

                [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

                The English common law is a primary choice of law for international business, because it consistently gives the parties exactly what they agreed: what you see in the contract is what you get.

                The same cannot be said for the English legal system: there are barristers, solicitors, Inns of Court, chambers, compulsory disclosure, cross-examination and the loser pays rule. There is much to confuse non-English lawyers and mistakes can be expensive for their clients. Those who know enough to avoid confusion can add real value for clients who have English law disputes.

                This blog focuses on a single feature which is key for international lawyers’ understanding of the English legal system: why it has two kinds of lawyer – barristers and solicitors – and what each of them does.

                Barristers and solicitors: what is the difference?

                To understand the difference, the key thing to bear in mind is that they run completely different business models to support their legal practices.

                Solicitors practice within law firms: profit sharing entities, familiar to lawyers around the world. This risk-sharing model allows senior lawyers to employ teams of junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases: corresponding with the client, the court and the opposing parties and collecting the evidence for trial.

                Barristers are self-employed individuals. They operate from ‘chambers’, which are cost-sharing organisations; barristers practising in chambers together do not share profit or spread risk. They cannot employ junior lawyers to do the heavy lifting on cases; they do not collect evidence, correspond with the court, opposing party or the client. Instead, they are specialist sub-contractors to law firms in England and around the world. Those law firms do all that heavy lifting that allows barristers to conduct their practices.

                What barristers do

                What, then, do law firms ask them to do? Two things: to provide advocacy services and the detailed legal advice necessary for effective advocacy. That means they have particular familiarity with three key aspects of English dispute resolution:

                1. the detail of the cases which are the source of the common law,
                2. the cross-examination of witnesses; and
                3. the oral and written judicial argument that pulls the first two aspects together.

                But aren’t those the fun bits of being a lawyer? Well, yes. So why would a law firm outsource the fun bits? Well, that depends on the kind of law firm…

                English solicitors’ reasons for using barristers

                Let’s take English solicitors first. You have to bear in mind two characteristics of common law dispute resolution. The first has already been mentioned: the source of law is not a readily-comprehensible, unifying civil code, but thousands of cases decided over centuries; it takes time to master the case law in sufficient detail to argue cases.

                The second is the nature of hearings: they take time because of the detailed case law that needs to be considered and because a great deal of work is done orally: from argument to the cross-examination of witnesses. Trials are all-consuming and can last months. So the nature of common law trial work means you have to focus all your time and attention on it to succeed.

                That gives the English law firm a choice: it can either recruit and manage expensive, in-house advocacy talent, or it can outsource it. The former is capital-intensive and risky. The latter involves no capital and no risk. You might object that risk is necessary for reward; and true it is. But the existence of a ready supply of barristers in England means solicitors do not have to take that particular business risk in addition to all the other risks they have to take in order to run successful disputes practices.

                The existence of barristers allows solicitors to make the following calculation: few cases come to trial; most settle. Solicitors make most of their income preparing cases for trial, not in trial. So it is less risky and more profitable to recruit junior lawyers to help prepare cases for trial rather than recruit senior advocates to fight trials. If the trial happens, solicitors retain a barrister as advocate in the case; they make just enough of the barrister before trial to ensure the trial will run smoothly if it does happen. Meanwhile, the senior solicitors focus on managing their teams of lawyers and winning new business to keep their practices growing. It is an effective business model, even if it leaves the fun bits to barristers.

                The risk-reduction that barristers offer to solicitors is more extensive than that basic analysis allows. First, solicitors do not take the risk of losing a client by instructing a barrister on their cases; the barrister’s clients are law firms: no risk there. Second, a firm’s choice to recruit in house advocates is a choice taken once and once only, for better or worse. By contrast, a firm’s choice to instruct a barrister is taken on each new case, so it can choose an advocate with precisely the right expertise for the case. That means the firm can sell its trial preparation practice to assist in disputes in which the firm itself lacks specialist expertise. That reduces the firm’s risk and maintains its profitability.

                All in all, therefore, barristers’ and solicitors’ different business models allow them to run complimentary, not competitive practices.

                Non-English lawyers’ reasons to use barristers

                Now let us consider why non-English law firms would use barristers. The answer is: for the same reasons, but more so. Many non-English law firms have clients with disputes under English law. Most feel the need to pass those cases on to an English law firm; if they do, they lose all or almost all the revenue from the case. To the extent they stay involved, they have little control over the process or the outcome, but they do have the unenviable task of handing the English firm’s very large invoices to their client. It is rarely a comfortable experience.

                Note, however: the more sophisticated non-English law firms engage a barrister as their own sub-contractor on English law cases. That completely changes their experience of conducting English law disputes.

                In arbitrations, the non-English law firm is free to do exactly the same job an English solicitor; the sub-contracted barrister provides the English law advice and advocacy that the law firm itself cannot provide. By stepping into the shoes of the English law firm, the non-English firm both reduces its client’s legal costs and takes a larger share of them.

                In litigation, the non-English law firms must engage a solicitor, but the sophisticated firm nevertheless engages a barrister as its own sub-contractor, rather than allowing the solicitor to engage the barrister. That gives the non-English firm a better flow of information and greater control over the process, so it can better manage its client’s expectations and liabilities.

                So: sophisticated non-English law firms do not let the English law firms reap all the competitive advantages barristers offer to law firms; they take those advantages for themselves. Your firm should do so too. Be sophisticated: develop trusted relations with an internationally-minded barrister today; it will be invaluable when your client is involved in a dispute under English law.

                Are arbitration and jurisdiction clauses contained in insurance contracts enforceable against a third party which is acting directly against the insurer in third party liability insurances?

                Such direct action is admitted by French law in liability insurances, as defined in article 124-3 of the Insurance Code.

                In just a few months two radically different approaches have been taken by the French Cour de cassation (Civ.1, 19 December 2018, n°17-28.951) and the ECJ in Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd (13 July 2017, C-368/16) and KABEG v. MMA IARD (20 July 2017, C-340/16).

                The case submitted to the Cour de cassation represented a third party exercising a direct right of action before French Courts against the insurer of a floating barge which had caused him a damage. The Supreme Court accepted that the insurer could validly oppose the arbitration clause, which was in the policy against the third party, and therefore judged that French Court had no jurisdiction to decide on the case. The Supreme Court applied the well-established principle of Compétence-Compétence – materialized in article 1448 of the French Code de Procédure Civile – to stay the case, considering that the arbitration clause could not be set aside. The Court therefore judged that the applicability of the arbitration clause should be determined by the arbitrators by priority.

                A year before, the ECJ had ruled in the opposite direction in a case where a jurisdiction clause was applicable in the insurance policy. In Assens Havn v. Navigator Management UK Ltd, the ECJ stated that the clause could not be opposed to the third party acting directly against the insurer. According to the Court, the insurers’ liability towards the insured has a contractual nature when based on the policy, whereas it is extra-contractual when the liability is based on a direct action from a third party. In a previous ruling the Court had considered (Sté financière et industrielle du Peloux (12 May 2005, C-112/03) that the jurisdiction clause cannot be opposed to the beneficiary of an insurance policy if he is not the policyholder (for instance in a collective insurance).

                One sees a clear difference in treatment between arbitration clause and jurisdiction clause when it comes to deciding on their opposability to the victim exercising a direct action against the insurer.

                Article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code states that an arbitration cannot be opposed to a party which has not contracted for the purpose of its business activity. The French Cour de cassation grounded its decision on the fact that the clauses of the main contract could be opposed to the third party. If the latter was entitled to apply the insurance contract, it was therefore entitled to invoke article 2061 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code.

                The Russian law allows the parties to agree on recovery of contractual penalty for failure by the parties to fulfill contractual obligations.

                Below are some typical examples of provisions that stipulate contractual penalty:

                In the event of untimely delivery of the Goods under the Contract the Buyer shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 (zero point one) percent from the total value of untimely delivered Goods for each day of delay.

                In the event of untimely payment for the Goods under the Contract the Seller shall be entitled to claim penalties in amount of 0,1 percent from the total value of untimely paid Goods for each day of delay.

                The Civil Code of Russia (art. 333) allows the court to decrease the amount of penalty if such amount of penalty is disproportionate to the consequences of breach of contractual obligations, with that the court shall be entitled to decrease penalty only if the debtor files a motion with the request to decrease such excessive amount of penalty.

                The decrease of penalty determined by the contract and subject to payment by the person who conducts business activities is allowed only in exceptional cases, if it is proved that the recovery of penalty in the amount stipulated by the contract can lead to receipt of the unjustified profit by the creditor.

                In practice the parties file motions with the court of first instance with the request to decrease penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code and the court usually decreases the amount of penalty at its discretion.

                In a recent case considered by the Supreme Court of Russia dated 29.05.2018 (case #A43-26319/2016) the Supreme Court ruled that the imposition of penalty even in the amount exceeding the total value of the contract was justified provided that the debtor failed to file a motion with the court of first instance with the request to decrease such penalty with reference to art. 333 of the Civil Code.

                In this case the customer ordered the contractor to produce a pressure vessel. The price of such works of the contractor amounted to 2.700.000 rubles. The parties agreed that the pressure vessel will be produced by the contractor till 30.01.2015. The contractor produced the pressure vessel only on 01.03.2016.

                The contract stipulated that in case of violation of terms of performance of works the contractor will pay to the customer a fixed fine in the amount of 5% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each violation as well as penalty in the amount of 0,3% from the price of works that the contractor failed to perform in time for each day of delay starting with the 4th day of delay.

                As a result, the customer demanded that the contractor pays penalty in the amount of 3.355.170 rubles.

                The court of first instance ruled in favor of the contractor and ordered that the client shall pay the amount of penalty in full since the contractor failed to provide evidence that confirmed due fulfillment of the contract by the contractor, or that the contractor failed to perform its obligations in time due to circumstances that were out of his control. With that the contractor also failed to dispute the amount of penalty and failed to file a motion on application of art. 333 of the Civil Code.

                The appeal court changed the ruling of the court of first instance and decreased the amount of penalty to 326.781 rubles based on its conclusions that the customer abused its rights by including in the contract the unfair penalty provisions.

                The Cassation Court agreed with conclusions of the Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court dismissed the rulings of both the Cassation Court and Court of Appeal and the decision of the court of first instance remained in force.

                The Supreme Court based its decision on the fact that the contractor failed to file a motion with the request to decrease the amount of penalty and apply art. 333 of the Civil Code in the court of first instance. Therefore, the Court of Appeal had no right to decrease the amount of penalty at its own initiative.

                The latest conclusions of the Supreme Court confirm that the contractual penalty can exceed the total value of the contract and the courts are not allowed to decrease such excessive amount of penalty at its own initiative.

                Thus, if you have any dispute in Russia, please ensure that your company is duly represented in state commercial courts, since the failure of the parties to appear in court of first instance and file respective motions might lead to serious negative consequences that the failing party might not be able to cure in the courts of appeal.

                Not what you would expect 

                When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!

                The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.

                This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.

                However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.

                In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.

                Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an «in-house» operation» in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.

                What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?

                Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.

                Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.

                As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.

                The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!

                However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to «justify» avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.

                In this respect, in many cases simple «non-satisfaction» was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.

                There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.

                Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.

                Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.

                The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.

                In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.

                Karin Graf

                Áreas de práctica

                • Arbitraje
                • Contratos
                • Reclamación de deudas
                • Derecho Concursal
                • Derecho Internacional Privado
                Contáctanos Karin

                Contacta con Karin





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