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西班牙
Drafting the mediation clause in franchise agreements
2018年5月31日
- 分销协议
- 特许经营
法国是特许经营关系网的大市场，近2000家特许经营关系网处于运营状态。这是最成功的商业发展计划之一。
特许人必须主要遵守法国关于预先披露信息的规定以及法国和欧盟的竞争条例等规定。虽然对授予特许者来说，对关系网质量和品牌形象的控制是一个非常重要且合法的问题，但授予特许者不能过多地干预特许经营人的日常活动，因为特许经营人是独立商家。因此，授予特许人与特许经营人之间的关系只能建立在商法的基础上，而不能建立在劳动法的基础上。然而，法国最近的规定将导致授予特许者与特许经营者和他们的雇员一起实施某些劳动法。
在法国经营特许经营关系网的外国特许经营者确实必须知道如何应对《劳动法》（2016年8月8日）及其法令（2017年5月4日）所带来的限制，并自2017年5月7日起生效，该法令涉及为整个特许经营关系网设立一个雇员论坛。事实上，这个社会对话委员会可以对特许经营关系网的组织工作产生深刻的影响。
首先，新的社会对话委员会只关心经营者受特许权协议约束的关系网。因此，商标许可和分销合同似乎没有包括在内。特许权协议应被理解为由三项单独协议构成的特殊合同：商标许可协议、专有技术许可协议和商业或技术援助协议。然而，2016年8月8日的法律却造成了一些混乱，规定社会对话委员会所涉及的特许协议是“引用《法国商法典》第L330-3条”协议，尽管该条不仅没有界定特许合同的定义，而且可以适用于其他合同（独家分销协议），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
此外，根据该法案，只有包括“对特许经营企业的工作组织和条件有影响的条款”的具体特许协议才会受到关注。尽管该法没有界定这些条款，一方面，是否需要社会对话委员会取决于确定这些条款；另一方面，特许经营者在组织和管理其业务，包括在雇佣劳工事务方面，本质上独立于授予特许人。因此，有必要对所有特许经营协议进行就业审计（例如，如果条款规定营业时间或规定着装怎么办？），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
最后，只有在法国雇用至少300名（全职）工作人员的特许经营关系网才要求设立社会对话委员会。这似乎不包括特许经营人的雇员或不受特许经营协议约束的经营者的雇员(例如受商标许可合同约束的经营者)。
意味着长期谈判的实现
即使满足了法律要求，授予特许人也没有义务自发成立社会对话委员会。然而，一旦工会要求成立社会对话委员会，授予特许人就有义务积极参加该行业发起的谈判，与所有特许经营者核实其关系网上的雇员人数是否达到300人的门槛，然后建立一个由雇员（工会）代表和雇主（授予特许人和特许经营人）代表组成的“谈判论坛”，用来达成创建和组织未来社会对话委员会的协议。
与工会和特许经营者的谈判将在6达成协议但须经授予特许人、工会和至少30%的特许经营者(占关系网雇员的30%)的同意。该协议应确定社会对话委员会的组成、其成员的任职方式、任期、会议的频率、如果需要，雇员可以为委员会贡献多长时间、委员会实现其宗旨所需的物质或财政手段、以及如何处理费用和代表的旅费和生活津贴等问题。最后一个问题可能不仅是授予特许人关注的一个主要问题，而且也是特许经营人-雇主关注的一个主要方面。由于没有达成这样的协议，该法令规定设立社会对话委员会，其中有几项严格和最低限度的规定，可能会给授予特许人造成不合理的负担。
一旦成立，内部规则将确切界定社会对话委员会的运作方式（所需的多数人、会议通知和引荐来源、讨论内容的公布等）。
无事生非？
社会对话委员会无权调查案件或作出具有约束力的裁决，但社会对话委员会必须让大家知道特许经营者加盟或离开销售关系网的情况，以及“授予特许者的决定，易于影响到特许经营者雇员的数量和结构、工作时间或就业、工作和职业培训条件”。
社会对话委员会还可就如何改善贯穿整个关系网的条件提出建议。
社会对话委员会的影响终究相当有限，但授予特许人必须认真掌握和控制规则的实施，以避免损失自己的特许经营商的时间和精力以及关系网的混乱。
Not what you would expect
When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!
The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.
This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.
However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.
In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.
Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an “in-house” operation” in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.
What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?
Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.
Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.
As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.
The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!
However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to “justify” avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.
In this respect, in many cases simple “non-satisfaction” was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.
There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.
Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.
Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.
The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.
In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.
It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.
At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.
One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.
Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.
No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.
The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.
Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.
The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.
Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?
The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.
Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.
The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).
In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.
From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.
What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?
Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.
The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).
With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.
Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.
From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.
It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.
By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.
In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.
根据欧盟电子商务部门的调查，超过50%的互联网市场和36%的零售商提供数据给价格搜索引擎，如 Idealo，谷歌购物Google Shopping，或Shopzilla。相比之下，大约10%的经销商受到价格比较引擎禁令的影响（见委员会工作人员工作文件SWD（2017）154定稿，S.32图B.4和欧盟委员会第37页，电子商务部门调查的最后报告，第10页）。
不过，联邦法院最近确认，价格比较引擎的禁令是反竞争和无效的。在具体案例中，爱世克斯（跑鞋品牌名）通常禁止德国零售商支持在线分销中的价格搜索引擎：
“此外，经授权的…经销商不得…通过为这些价格比较引擎提供特定于应用程序的接口（“APIs”）来支持价格比较引擎的功能。”
此外，该协议还包含了对第三方平台广告的广泛禁止：爱世克斯禁止其授权经销商允许第三方在第三方网站上以任何形式使用爱世克斯的商标，以便直接引导客户访问被授权的爱世克斯经销商的网站。
爱世克斯的分销协议首先由德国竞争管理机构Bundeskartellamt作为试点案例进行调查(由于许多体育零售商对体育设备制造商的互联网转售限制提出了申诉，因此对阿迪达斯提起了另一起试点案件)。2015年，Bundeskartellamt裁定，爱世克斯对价格比较引擎的禁令违反了反垄断法，因为它将违反第101条(1) TFEU，sec.1 《禁止限制竞争法》。提出的理由是，这种禁令的主要目的是控制和限制价格竞争，而牺牲消费者的利益。这项决定首先得到了Düsseldorf高等地区法院的确认（2017年4月5日的裁决，案件号：VI-Kart 13/15(V)，见Legalmondo文章，点击这里）。
现在，联邦法院再次确认了这项裁决（2017年12月12日的决定，第KVZ 41/17号案件）。爱世克斯的裁决特别值得注意，因为它是德国法院继欧盟法院关于科蒂（全球最大的香水生产公司）的平台禁令作出裁决裁决之后作出的首项裁决（见Legalmondo的文章，点击这里）。因此，这是法院今后将如何处理互联网转售限制的第一个迹象。
因此，联邦法院指出，对价格搜索引擎的普遍禁止“至少”要限制向终端消费者的被动销售（第23款, 25款)–这种限制甚至将是这种禁令的预期目的。法院认为，根据《科蒂判决》（点击此出查看），一般平台禁令的可接受性并不意味着一般价格比较禁令的可接受性（第28款及其后款）。尤其是“限制组合”–即第三方平台价格比较引擎和广告宣传禁令–会产生影响。因为它没有确保潜在客户能够“实际进入”经销商网站（第30款） –在这种情况下，联邦最高法院允许提供这种“实质性准入”所需的充分或必要的条件；在这种情况下，一般价格比较引擎禁令仍可继续得到允许。
实用贴士：
- 在欧盟一级，法院和欧盟委员会都没有就普遍禁止价格比较引擎的有效性采取立场。然而，在英国，竞争和市场管理局对价格搜索引擎禁令也采取了类似的批评观点（“宝马在CMA行动后改变了对汽车比较网站的政策”），将其作为德国的行政实践和司法管辖权。
- 事实上，根据联邦最高法院的判决，Düsseldorf高级地区法院（Asics）和法兰克福高等地区法院（Deuter）已经指出以下区别可能适用于：
- 一般价格比较引擎禁令是–根据联邦法院–反竞争的，因此通常是无效的–尽管如果不与广泛的广告禁令相结合，这些禁令仍然是允许的，这样就可以保证潜在的客户能够访问经销商网站。
- 单独的价格比较引擎禁令和使用价格比较门户网站的其他较温和的限制/标准是允许的，例如关于产品插画或说明以及产品环境（例如要求经销商只能提供新产品）。
进一步了解细节: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb: „Nicht Ideal(o)“ – Kombination aus Preissuchmaschinen-Verbot und Logo-Klausel, in: ZVertriebsR 2018, 118 ff.
- 除此之外，制造商可以–在排他性分销网络内–禁止其分销商主动向制造商保留的或由制造商分配给另一分销商的客户提供在线广告，并指明所使用的语言。原则上，所有其他可能的质量标准也是允许的，只要他们和线下分销标准等效（因为“委员会认为，规定网上销售的标准与从实体店销售的标准总体上不等于硬核限制，从而劝阻指定经销商使用互联网接触更多和更多样化的客户的任何义务”，《纵向限制准则》，第56条）。
有关更多信息，请参见：
- 有关实践现状的概述，包括示范合约条款：Rohrßen, Vertriebsvorgaben im E-Commerce 2018: Praxisübersichts und Folgen des “Coty”-Urteils des EuGH, in: GRUR-Prax 2018, 39-41 以及
- 特别是关于平台禁令和可能起草分配协议: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb von Markenartikeln: Zulässigkeit von Plattformverboten nach dem EuGH-Urteil Coty – Auswirkungen auf Fachhändler- bzw. Selektiv-, Exklusiv-, Franchise- und offene Vertriebsverträge –, in: DB 2018. 300-306.
- 关于在互联网销售平台中嵌入的搜索功能中是否允许使用商标和公司徽标，见联邦法院最近于2018年2月15日发布的两项裁决（案件号：I ZR 138/16 re “Ortlieb” 和案件号 I ZR 201/1 re “gofit“).
Agreements restricting competition are prohibited as anticompetitive agreements by Article 101 TFEU unless the agreement’s impact on trade or competition is not appreciable (cf. the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case, C-226/11, judgment of 13 December 2012). Whether an agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition or is in the “safe harbour” can be assessed according to the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice. Accordingly, an agreement is particularly appreciable if its object is to restrict competition. This applies in particular to so-called hardcore restrictions, such as vertical price maintenance (or resale price maintenance = “RPM”).
Regarding a special offer for dietary products, the German Higher Regional Court of Celle surprisingly took a different view and decided that even resale price maintenance could be considered non-appreciable and thus falling outside the ban of anticompetitive business practices under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 07.04.2016, Case 13 U 124/15 [Kart]). In this case, the manufacturer made a special offer to a group of its customers (pharmacies) with a special purchase discount: once, for a limited period and limited to a maximum quantity. In return, the customers should commit themselves to “present the product clearly… and not fall below a resale price of EUR 15.95“.
The Hanover Regional Court had instead seen the agreement as an unlawful resale price maintenance (judgment of 25 August 2015, Case 18 O 91/15) – and now the German Federal Court confirmed the same: the minimum prices specified here within the advertising campaign appreciably restrict competition and are thus banned as anticompetitive business practice under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 17 October 2017, Case KZR 59/16). This corresponds to the case law of the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case (see above) and the German Federal Court with regard to the sales requirement “one bar extra “ (i.e. without extra charge compared to the usual package size) of the Italian confectionery manufacturer Ferrero (judgment of 08.04.2003, Case KZR 3/02) – because the latter explicitly concerns “the scope for price increases resulting from the increased contents of the package” – not, however, the retailer’s decision to set prices freely downwards.
Practical tips
Vertical price fixing is generally prohibited, whereas providing a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP, also “recommended retail price”) and maximum selling prices are allowed – this is briefly the principle of German and European antitrust law on pricing frameworks. Furthermore, recommended retail prices and maximum selling prices (“MSP”) are subject to the restriction that they ” they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties” (Article 4 lit. a Vertical Block Exemptions Regulation). That means:
- the manufacturer or supplier may provide guidance,
- however, the reseller may set his sales prices freely.
Exceptions may apply – in addition to the RPM on the price of books or in the case of specialisation agreements – by way of the efficiency defence under Article 101 (3) TFEU in individual cases, e.g.
- in the introductory period when launching new products on the market, or
- in the case of short-term special offers if accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency, for example by investing the higher margin into better customer advice, which benefits all customers and Resale Price Maintenance prevents retailers who do not offer the customer advice from free riding (cf. EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 225).
Such actions, however, require excellent preparation because manufacturers can only set resale prices for very short periods if they can convincingly demonstrate efficiency gains such as preventing free-riders.
In the case of fixed prices, the competition authorities quickly become sensitive. For example, fines for vertical price maintenance have recently been imposed again in Germany. In this respect, special care must be taken particularly in distribution and sales agreements.
- Correspondingly, each company’s sales team should continue following the previous case law on recommended retail prices, maximum selling prices and discount campaigns. Guidance for the practice is provided by
- the Federal Cartel Office’s paper of July 2017 on the prohibition of fixed prices in stationary food retailing,
- the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (para. 48 et seq., 223 et seq.) and the „Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice“ – all three, however, must always be assessed in the light of current case law because the understanding of the EU Commission contained in these documents does not bind neither the courts nor the national antitrust authorities.
“日默瓦（行李箱品牌名）所有者终止了在欧洲的所有分销协议”——2018年3月9日，德国主要商业报纸“Handelsblatt”的标题。终止原因是：日默瓦——著名高质量的行李箱品牌制造商——其在2011年后，于2018年重新设计它的分销网络：日默瓦的目标是再次提高其质量选择标准，不再将其产品卖给传统的商店，而是提供现代的购物体验。
原则上，制造商可以根据其营销战略和任何变化的需求自由设计和开发其分销系统。相似地，他们可以在原则上自由选择销售中间商（分销商/经销商、特许经营者、代理人等）的数量和名称。他们原则上也可以自由转向选择性分销，目的是使其产品的分销符合某些标准（特别是关于分销的质量），从而也有可能减少分销商的数量。然而，作为例外，分销商可能强迫制造商提供这些产品——即制造商有很大的市场支配力。在这种情况下，与分销商订立合同从而产生交货义务的义务可能源自禁止歧视的规定。（德国《反竞争限制法》第1、20条，1、2款，19项）。
如果制造商重新设计他们的分销网络——就像日默瓦以前和现在所做的那样，那么这个问题就变得特别相关，日默瓦在2011/2012年转向选择性分销（关于选择性分销的优点和可能的分销限制，见Legalmondo文章）。为了重新设计其分销网络，日默瓦终止了以前的分销协议，并提出缔结新的分销协议——根据新的协议，新的分销商承诺以某种方式展示货物，并购买和使用日默瓦的店内系统。日默瓦认为，原分销商的表现与新的商业理念和销售策略不符，这就是双方未能达成缔结一份新协议的原因。于是，分销商提出诉讼，目的是订立一份新的经销商合同，从而交付他的经销商店。
慕尼黑地区法院驳回了这项诉讼请求(2014年9月9日的裁决，编号7249/13 HKO)。不过，慕尼黑高等地区法院确认了这种索赔(2015年9月17日的裁定，注释第U 3886/1/4 Kart)——主张制造商在有关的“高价和高质量手提箱市场”中处于领导地位，或者，相反地，如果分销商具有依赖性，并且因为制造商的手提箱不能被其他同等的手提箱所取代。这种依赖性尤其通过高分销率表现（即制造商提供了大量可比较的分销商）以及独特的设计和相关的高认可价值。现在，联邦法院推翻了这一判决，并将其发回重审(2017年12月12日的裁决，编号：KZR 50/15)。原因：分销商对制造商的产品分类依赖（“Spitzenstellungsabhängigkeit”作为“Sortimentsbedingte Abhängigkeit”的特例）没有得到充分的证明。尽管高分销率通常是决定性的，但在目前这样的质量选择性分销制度中，其意义可能不大。重新设计分销系统的决定性因素：“如果供应商选择在某个时间点转换到一个高质量的选择性分销系统，在之前的一段时间里，与品种相关的依赖关系通常会以较高的分销率来表示。”（第19款）
制造商尤其可以提出两个论点，反对这种所谓的分类相关依赖关系，即
(一)由制造商自行供应其产品的分销商数目远低于提供其产品的分销商总数（即包括通过其他渠道购买该产品的分销商）；及
(二) 分销率将根据那些可与要求进入分配系统和交付的分销商相媲美的分销商确定（第27款)–正如德国联邦法院先前在裁定室内装潢案例（2000年5月9日的裁定，参考KZR 28/98，p. 12）。
Practical conclusions
实际结论
“没有什么比改变更永恒”：在重新设计分销系统时，要仔细考虑是否想要/需要过渡安排–或者最好不考虑过渡安排。一个很好的不考虑过渡安排的理由是：它们可能会使排除不想要的分销商变得更加困难。因此，在日默瓦一案中，慕尼黑的较高地区法院驳回了制造商的反驳意见，即分销商的商业模式“以讨价还价为目标”–辩称，制造商给其他分销商“订立协议后12个月”的时间来满足新的定性标准。
有关定性标准（也是要求/规格），请参阅Legalmondo上的其他文章，特别是关于平台禁令和价格比较禁令的文章，请参见Legalmondo上的文章。
地域封锁是一种歧视性做法，由于客户的国籍或其居住地或营业地，阻止客户（主要是网上客户）从另一欧盟成员国的网站获取和（或）购买产品或服务。
欧盟条例在2018年2月28日颁布的关于解决基于客户国籍、居住地或营业地在国内市场上的不合理的地域封锁和其他形式的歧视的欧盟第2018/302号条例将于2018年12月2日生效。
当前情况
欧盟委员会对欧盟的1万多个电子商务网站进行了“秘密购物”调查。地域封锁指数相当高！63%的网站不允许购物者从另一个欧盟国家购买商品（甚至包括86%的家用电器和79%的电子和计算机硬件）。
另一方面，当电子商务的价值和数量就全球来说，年复一年地大幅增长时，只有50%的欧洲客户从设在另一个欧盟成员国的网上商店购买产品，但这种现象只是在国内范围而非整个欧洲。
2017年6月23日，欧洲理事会要求切实执行数字单一市场战略的所有内容，包括跨界交付、消费者保护和禁止不当地域封锁。
现行法律框架的缺失
欧洲联盟指令（欧盟第2006/123/CE号指令）和TFUE第101条已经解决了基于国籍、地区或住所或营业地的歧视做法。
根据欧盟指令第20(2)条，欧盟成员国必须确保专业人员不因客户的居住地、营业所或国籍而区别对待（客观例外情况除外）。另一方面，关于纵向限制的欧盟竞争法(《欧盟运行条例》第101条和集体豁免条例及其指南)认为，对被动销售的限制是违反欧盟竞争规则的核心限制。然而，这两套规则(欧盟指令和竞争法框架)在实践中似乎并不完全有效。
在这方面，欧盟委员会在最近关于电子商务部门竞争调查的报告中表明，地域封锁尤其在欧洲电子商务部门内得到了大规模使用。
地域封锁条例的目的
地域封锁条例的目的是防止专业人员在处理跨国界电子商务交易时，基于国籍、居住地或客户营业地而实施的直接或间接歧视。
地域封锁条例的范围
新的条例将只适用于企业与最终用户或企业之间的网上销售。
新条例将适用于在欧盟内运作的网站或在欧盟以外运作但向设立在欧盟内的客户提供货物或服务的网站。
电子网站的管理新规是什么？
关于访问网站的问题
根据该条例，企业不得以与互联网用户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的理由，通过使用技术措施来阻止或限制其进入网络接口。然而，只要客户明确同意，并且仍然可以轻松访问他们原先试图访问的网站版本，企业就有权将客的访问方向改变到他们试图访问的网站之外的另一个网站。
关于网站的销售条款和条件
该规则禁止企业在下列三种情况下，根据客户的国籍、居住地或营业地（特别是他们的IP地址），提供不同的一般条件来取得货物或服务：
提供送货服务的企业将售出的商品送达到另外的欧盟成员国交付（或在企业与客户共同商定的地点收取货物）的；
企业提供的电子化服务，如云、数据存储、主机服务等。（但不提供访问受版权保护的内容的服务，如流媒体或在线游戏服务）；
顾客获得的在各个国家均可运行的商务服务（如汽车租赁和旅馆住宿服务或体育或文化活动的票务服务）。
关于网站上的付款方式
该条例禁止企业以与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地、支付账户所在地或支付服务提供者的设立地有关的理由，对已接受的支付手段适用不同的支付条件（条件是必须符合认证要求，付款交易必须以企业接受的货币进行）。
这项规定对电子零售商有什么影响？
尽管在形式上被排除在该条例范围之外，但供应商与分销商或批发商之间的关系仍将受到该条例的影响，因为根据分销商之间的协议规定，分销商承诺不进行被动销售（例如，阻止或限制进入网站），由于与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的原因“将自动无效”。
因此，地域封锁条例对分销商的影响是双重的：第一，在与客户（最终用户或用户企业）的关系中产生直接影响；第二，在其根据独家分销协议所承担的义务方面产生间接影响。
地域封锁条例必须与现行竞争法框架相协调，特别是与制定适用于网上销售的具体规则的纵向限制指导方针相协调。网上销售被比作被动销售。指导方针中提到4个实践中为了间接保证地方保护主义，在供应商和独家分销商同意的情况下被禁止的例子：
独家经销商应阻止另一地区的客户访问其网站，或自动将其转到供应商或其他经销商的网站，
如果买方的信用卡数据显示买方不是独家经销商的专有区域，独家经销商应终止网上销售。
限制独家分销商通过互联网销售的份额（但合同可规定按绝对值计算的最低线下目标，并规定与离线销售相比，网上销售保持一致）。
独家分销商对在互联网上销售的货物支付的价格，应高于对准备在离线销售的货物支付的价格。
制造商将必须决定是采用一个独一无二的欧洲门户网站报价还是多个地方商业报价，众所周知，每个范畴的客户端是有可能存在价格差异的。
事实上，新规定并没有强制电子零售商协调其价格政策，它们只是必须允许欧盟消费者自由和容易地访问其网站的任何版本。同样，该条例并没有规定电子零售商必须将产品运往欧洲各地，而只是允许欧盟消费者从他们想要的任何网站购买商品，并在必要时自行安排发货。
最后，在更为契约性的层面上，尚不十分清楚新的地域封锁规则如何直接或间接地影响适用于消费者合同的冲突法规则，根据罗马第1号规定(Rome I Regulation)，特别是在允许消费者在本网站所在国的外国网站上购买产品时（这意味着在消费者所在国无特定交货制度已建立。）
因此，B2C网站的一般条款和条件需要在营销和法律两方面进行审查和调整。
Once convinced of the utility of mediation as a method of resolving conflicts between franchisor and franchisee and taken the decision to include a clause in the contracts that provides for it, the last step would be what elements should be taken into account when drafting it.
- The previous negotiation. It seems advisable that both parties grant themselves the possibility of trying to solve the problem with a previous formal negotiation. Mediation does not exclude the previous attempt made by the interested parties or their lawyers; however, it seems advisable to contractually provide a suitable end according to the circumstances. Experience shows that lengthening this phase too long may result in the conflict becoming more complicated and even more difficult to approach mediation.
- The clause may also provide for the place where the mediation will take place. Again at this point the parties are free. It is convenient that this is accurate indicating the concrete city.
- The language in which the mediation will be developed is the a faculty of the parties. There will be no difficulty in mediations in which both parties use the same language, but it is very convenient in contracts with parties that have different languages, or that belong to regions or countries with different co-official languages. The drafting or signing of the contract in a specific language does not presuppose that this must be the language of the mediation. It is an element to be taken into account also when requesting a mediator who can use that language in the chosen mediation institution.
- The procedure can also be decided by the parties. In particular, the number of sessions, the maximum expected duration, the participation of advisors, etc. Keep in mind that the greater or lesser regulation will allow to avoid future conflicts in this respect, although it will also imply a greater limit to the freedom of the parties that, nevertheless, will remain free to modify the agreement by mutual consent.
- The term of the mediation can also be contemplated. This would allow, for example, to prevent mediation from being extended only for purely procedural strategic purposes or to gather information from the other party before starting a procedure, etc. The professional mediators, however, are able to identify these manoeuvres, also having the power to put an end to mediation in those cases.
- Choosing the mediator or the mediation institution is an important choice. The parties can agree on who will be their mediator, indicate in the contract the elements to choose it, or submit directly to a Mediation Institution so that it is the one who designates it according to its own rules. These decisions can be alternatives (that is, that the parties agree on the mediator and, in case of lack of agreement, submit to an institution that names it), or they can be unique. The designation of an Institution requires that it has a sufficient guarantee of stability (avoid designating short-term institutions or without much future guarantee), with a sufficient panel of mediators depending on the characteristics of the mediation (language, competence, experience) and that allows the necessary flexibility for its operation.
- Finally, it is convenient that the clause includes an alternative way in case the mediation does not succeed either because the parties do not reach an agreement, or because they withdraw from the mediation. It is important to recall that mediation does not close the doors to the conflict be resolved by recourse to ordinary jurisdiction or arbitration. And in terms of specialized arbitration in distribution contracts, the IDArb (https://www.idiproject.com/content/idarb-idi-arbitration-project) is an excellent option.
On the topic of the importance of Mediation in Distribution Agreements, you can check out the recording our webinar “Mediation in International Conflicts”
加拿大 
波兰 
巴西 
越南
写信给 Ignacio
Germany – Distribution of original products and gray market
2018年5月22日
-
德国
- 分销协议
法国是特许经营关系网的大市场，近2000家特许经营关系网处于运营状态。这是最成功的商业发展计划之一。
特许人必须主要遵守法国关于预先披露信息的规定以及法国和欧盟的竞争条例等规定。虽然对授予特许者来说，对关系网质量和品牌形象的控制是一个非常重要且合法的问题，但授予特许者不能过多地干预特许经营人的日常活动，因为特许经营人是独立商家。因此，授予特许人与特许经营人之间的关系只能建立在商法的基础上，而不能建立在劳动法的基础上。然而，法国最近的规定将导致授予特许者与特许经营者和他们的雇员一起实施某些劳动法。
在法国经营特许经营关系网的外国特许经营者确实必须知道如何应对《劳动法》（2016年8月8日）及其法令（2017年5月4日）所带来的限制，并自2017年5月7日起生效，该法令涉及为整个特许经营关系网设立一个雇员论坛。事实上，这个社会对话委员会可以对特许经营关系网的组织工作产生深刻的影响。
首先，新的社会对话委员会只关心经营者受特许权协议约束的关系网。因此，商标许可和分销合同似乎没有包括在内。特许权协议应被理解为由三项单独协议构成的特殊合同：商标许可协议、专有技术许可协议和商业或技术援助协议。然而，2016年8月8日的法律却造成了一些混乱，规定社会对话委员会所涉及的特许协议是“引用《法国商法典》第L330-3条”协议，尽管该条不仅没有界定特许合同的定义，而且可以适用于其他合同（独家分销协议），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
此外，根据该法案，只有包括“对特许经营企业的工作组织和条件有影响的条款”的具体特许协议才会受到关注。尽管该法没有界定这些条款，一方面，是否需要社会对话委员会取决于确定这些条款；另一方面，特许经营者在组织和管理其业务，包括在雇佣劳工事务方面，本质上独立于授予特许人。因此，有必要对所有特许经营协议进行就业审计（例如，如果条款规定营业时间或规定着装怎么办？），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
最后，只有在法国雇用至少300名（全职）工作人员的特许经营关系网才要求设立社会对话委员会。这似乎不包括特许经营人的雇员或不受特许经营协议约束的经营者的雇员(例如受商标许可合同约束的经营者)。
意味着长期谈判的实现
即使满足了法律要求，授予特许人也没有义务自发成立社会对话委员会。然而，一旦工会要求成立社会对话委员会，授予特许人就有义务积极参加该行业发起的谈判，与所有特许经营者核实其关系网上的雇员人数是否达到300人的门槛，然后建立一个由雇员（工会）代表和雇主（授予特许人和特许经营人）代表组成的“谈判论坛”，用来达成创建和组织未来社会对话委员会的协议。
与工会和特许经营者的谈判将在6达成协议但须经授予特许人、工会和至少30%的特许经营者(占关系网雇员的30%)的同意。该协议应确定社会对话委员会的组成、其成员的任职方式、任期、会议的频率、如果需要，雇员可以为委员会贡献多长时间、委员会实现其宗旨所需的物质或财政手段、以及如何处理费用和代表的旅费和生活津贴等问题。最后一个问题可能不仅是授予特许人关注的一个主要问题，而且也是特许经营人-雇主关注的一个主要方面。由于没有达成这样的协议，该法令规定设立社会对话委员会，其中有几项严格和最低限度的规定，可能会给授予特许人造成不合理的负担。
一旦成立，内部规则将确切界定社会对话委员会的运作方式（所需的多数人、会议通知和引荐来源、讨论内容的公布等）。
无事生非？
社会对话委员会无权调查案件或作出具有约束力的裁决，但社会对话委员会必须让大家知道特许经营者加盟或离开销售关系网的情况，以及“授予特许者的决定，易于影响到特许经营者雇员的数量和结构、工作时间或就业、工作和职业培训条件”。
社会对话委员会还可就如何改善贯穿整个关系网的条件提出建议。
社会对话委员会的影响终究相当有限，但授予特许人必须认真掌握和控制规则的实施，以避免损失自己的特许经营商的时间和精力以及关系网的混乱。
Not what you would expect
When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!
The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.
This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.
However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.
In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.
Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an “in-house” operation” in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.
What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?
Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.
Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.
As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.
The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!
However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to “justify” avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.
In this respect, in many cases simple “non-satisfaction” was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.
There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.
Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.
Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.
The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.
In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.
It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.
At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.
One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.
Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.
No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.
The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.
Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.
The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.
Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?
The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.
Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.
The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).
In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.
From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.
What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?
Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.
The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).
With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.
Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.
From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.
It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.
By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.
In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.
根据欧盟电子商务部门的调查，超过50%的互联网市场和36%的零售商提供数据给价格搜索引擎，如 Idealo，谷歌购物Google Shopping，或Shopzilla。相比之下，大约10%的经销商受到价格比较引擎禁令的影响（见委员会工作人员工作文件SWD（2017）154定稿，S.32图B.4和欧盟委员会第37页，电子商务部门调查的最后报告，第10页）。
不过，联邦法院最近确认，价格比较引擎的禁令是反竞争和无效的。在具体案例中，爱世克斯（跑鞋品牌名）通常禁止德国零售商支持在线分销中的价格搜索引擎：
“此外，经授权的…经销商不得…通过为这些价格比较引擎提供特定于应用程序的接口（“APIs”）来支持价格比较引擎的功能。”
此外，该协议还包含了对第三方平台广告的广泛禁止：爱世克斯禁止其授权经销商允许第三方在第三方网站上以任何形式使用爱世克斯的商标，以便直接引导客户访问被授权的爱世克斯经销商的网站。
爱世克斯的分销协议首先由德国竞争管理机构Bundeskartellamt作为试点案例进行调查(由于许多体育零售商对体育设备制造商的互联网转售限制提出了申诉，因此对阿迪达斯提起了另一起试点案件)。2015年，Bundeskartellamt裁定，爱世克斯对价格比较引擎的禁令违反了反垄断法，因为它将违反第101条(1) TFEU，sec.1 《禁止限制竞争法》。提出的理由是，这种禁令的主要目的是控制和限制价格竞争，而牺牲消费者的利益。这项决定首先得到了Düsseldorf高等地区法院的确认（2017年4月5日的裁决，案件号：VI-Kart 13/15(V)，见Legalmondo文章，点击这里）。
现在，联邦法院再次确认了这项裁决（2017年12月12日的决定，第KVZ 41/17号案件）。爱世克斯的裁决特别值得注意，因为它是德国法院继欧盟法院关于科蒂（全球最大的香水生产公司）的平台禁令作出裁决裁决之后作出的首项裁决（见Legalmondo的文章，点击这里）。因此，这是法院今后将如何处理互联网转售限制的第一个迹象。
因此，联邦法院指出，对价格搜索引擎的普遍禁止“至少”要限制向终端消费者的被动销售（第23款, 25款)–这种限制甚至将是这种禁令的预期目的。法院认为，根据《科蒂判决》（点击此出查看），一般平台禁令的可接受性并不意味着一般价格比较禁令的可接受性（第28款及其后款）。尤其是“限制组合”–即第三方平台价格比较引擎和广告宣传禁令–会产生影响。因为它没有确保潜在客户能够“实际进入”经销商网站（第30款） –在这种情况下，联邦最高法院允许提供这种“实质性准入”所需的充分或必要的条件；在这种情况下，一般价格比较引擎禁令仍可继续得到允许。
实用贴士：
- 在欧盟一级，法院和欧盟委员会都没有就普遍禁止价格比较引擎的有效性采取立场。然而，在英国，竞争和市场管理局对价格搜索引擎禁令也采取了类似的批评观点（“宝马在CMA行动后改变了对汽车比较网站的政策”），将其作为德国的行政实践和司法管辖权。
- 事实上，根据联邦最高法院的判决，Düsseldorf高级地区法院（Asics）和法兰克福高等地区法院（Deuter）已经指出以下区别可能适用于：
- 一般价格比较引擎禁令是–根据联邦法院–反竞争的，因此通常是无效的–尽管如果不与广泛的广告禁令相结合，这些禁令仍然是允许的，这样就可以保证潜在的客户能够访问经销商网站。
- 单独的价格比较引擎禁令和使用价格比较门户网站的其他较温和的限制/标准是允许的，例如关于产品插画或说明以及产品环境（例如要求经销商只能提供新产品）。
进一步了解细节: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb: „Nicht Ideal(o)“ – Kombination aus Preissuchmaschinen-Verbot und Logo-Klausel, in: ZVertriebsR 2018, 118 ff.
- 除此之外，制造商可以–在排他性分销网络内–禁止其分销商主动向制造商保留的或由制造商分配给另一分销商的客户提供在线广告，并指明所使用的语言。原则上，所有其他可能的质量标准也是允许的，只要他们和线下分销标准等效（因为“委员会认为，规定网上销售的标准与从实体店销售的标准总体上不等于硬核限制，从而劝阻指定经销商使用互联网接触更多和更多样化的客户的任何义务”，《纵向限制准则》，第56条）。
有关更多信息，请参见：
- 有关实践现状的概述，包括示范合约条款：Rohrßen, Vertriebsvorgaben im E-Commerce 2018: Praxisübersichts und Folgen des “Coty”-Urteils des EuGH, in: GRUR-Prax 2018, 39-41 以及
- 特别是关于平台禁令和可能起草分配协议: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb von Markenartikeln: Zulässigkeit von Plattformverboten nach dem EuGH-Urteil Coty – Auswirkungen auf Fachhändler- bzw. Selektiv-, Exklusiv-, Franchise- und offene Vertriebsverträge –, in: DB 2018. 300-306.
- 关于在互联网销售平台中嵌入的搜索功能中是否允许使用商标和公司徽标，见联邦法院最近于2018年2月15日发布的两项裁决（案件号：I ZR 138/16 re “Ortlieb” 和案件号 I ZR 201/1 re “gofit“).
Agreements restricting competition are prohibited as anticompetitive agreements by Article 101 TFEU unless the agreement’s impact on trade or competition is not appreciable (cf. the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case, C-226/11, judgment of 13 December 2012). Whether an agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition or is in the “safe harbour” can be assessed according to the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice. Accordingly, an agreement is particularly appreciable if its object is to restrict competition. This applies in particular to so-called hardcore restrictions, such as vertical price maintenance (or resale price maintenance = “RPM”).
Regarding a special offer for dietary products, the German Higher Regional Court of Celle surprisingly took a different view and decided that even resale price maintenance could be considered non-appreciable and thus falling outside the ban of anticompetitive business practices under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 07.04.2016, Case 13 U 124/15 [Kart]). In this case, the manufacturer made a special offer to a group of its customers (pharmacies) with a special purchase discount: once, for a limited period and limited to a maximum quantity. In return, the customers should commit themselves to “present the product clearly… and not fall below a resale price of EUR 15.95“.
The Hanover Regional Court had instead seen the agreement as an unlawful resale price maintenance (judgment of 25 August 2015, Case 18 O 91/15) – and now the German Federal Court confirmed the same: the minimum prices specified here within the advertising campaign appreciably restrict competition and are thus banned as anticompetitive business practice under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 17 October 2017, Case KZR 59/16). This corresponds to the case law of the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case (see above) and the German Federal Court with regard to the sales requirement “one bar extra “ (i.e. without extra charge compared to the usual package size) of the Italian confectionery manufacturer Ferrero (judgment of 08.04.2003, Case KZR 3/02) – because the latter explicitly concerns “the scope for price increases resulting from the increased contents of the package” – not, however, the retailer’s decision to set prices freely downwards.
Practical tips
Vertical price fixing is generally prohibited, whereas providing a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP, also “recommended retail price”) and maximum selling prices are allowed – this is briefly the principle of German and European antitrust law on pricing frameworks. Furthermore, recommended retail prices and maximum selling prices (“MSP”) are subject to the restriction that they ” they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties” (Article 4 lit. a Vertical Block Exemptions Regulation). That means:
- the manufacturer or supplier may provide guidance,
- however, the reseller may set his sales prices freely.
Exceptions may apply – in addition to the RPM on the price of books or in the case of specialisation agreements – by way of the efficiency defence under Article 101 (3) TFEU in individual cases, e.g.
- in the introductory period when launching new products on the market, or
- in the case of short-term special offers if accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency, for example by investing the higher margin into better customer advice, which benefits all customers and Resale Price Maintenance prevents retailers who do not offer the customer advice from free riding (cf. EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 225).
Such actions, however, require excellent preparation because manufacturers can only set resale prices for very short periods if they can convincingly demonstrate efficiency gains such as preventing free-riders.
In the case of fixed prices, the competition authorities quickly become sensitive. For example, fines for vertical price maintenance have recently been imposed again in Germany. In this respect, special care must be taken particularly in distribution and sales agreements.
- Correspondingly, each company’s sales team should continue following the previous case law on recommended retail prices, maximum selling prices and discount campaigns. Guidance for the practice is provided by
- the Federal Cartel Office’s paper of July 2017 on the prohibition of fixed prices in stationary food retailing,
- the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (para. 48 et seq., 223 et seq.) and the „Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice“ – all three, however, must always be assessed in the light of current case law because the understanding of the EU Commission contained in these documents does not bind neither the courts nor the national antitrust authorities.
“日默瓦（行李箱品牌名）所有者终止了在欧洲的所有分销协议”——2018年3月9日，德国主要商业报纸“Handelsblatt”的标题。终止原因是：日默瓦——著名高质量的行李箱品牌制造商——其在2011年后，于2018年重新设计它的分销网络：日默瓦的目标是再次提高其质量选择标准，不再将其产品卖给传统的商店，而是提供现代的购物体验。
原则上，制造商可以根据其营销战略和任何变化的需求自由设计和开发其分销系统。相似地，他们可以在原则上自由选择销售中间商（分销商/经销商、特许经营者、代理人等）的数量和名称。他们原则上也可以自由转向选择性分销，目的是使其产品的分销符合某些标准（特别是关于分销的质量），从而也有可能减少分销商的数量。然而，作为例外，分销商可能强迫制造商提供这些产品——即制造商有很大的市场支配力。在这种情况下，与分销商订立合同从而产生交货义务的义务可能源自禁止歧视的规定。（德国《反竞争限制法》第1、20条，1、2款，19项）。
如果制造商重新设计他们的分销网络——就像日默瓦以前和现在所做的那样，那么这个问题就变得特别相关，日默瓦在2011/2012年转向选择性分销（关于选择性分销的优点和可能的分销限制，见Legalmondo文章）。为了重新设计其分销网络，日默瓦终止了以前的分销协议，并提出缔结新的分销协议——根据新的协议，新的分销商承诺以某种方式展示货物，并购买和使用日默瓦的店内系统。日默瓦认为，原分销商的表现与新的商业理念和销售策略不符，这就是双方未能达成缔结一份新协议的原因。于是，分销商提出诉讼，目的是订立一份新的经销商合同，从而交付他的经销商店。
慕尼黑地区法院驳回了这项诉讼请求(2014年9月9日的裁决，编号7249/13 HKO)。不过，慕尼黑高等地区法院确认了这种索赔(2015年9月17日的裁定，注释第U 3886/1/4 Kart)——主张制造商在有关的“高价和高质量手提箱市场”中处于领导地位，或者，相反地，如果分销商具有依赖性，并且因为制造商的手提箱不能被其他同等的手提箱所取代。这种依赖性尤其通过高分销率表现（即制造商提供了大量可比较的分销商）以及独特的设计和相关的高认可价值。现在，联邦法院推翻了这一判决，并将其发回重审(2017年12月12日的裁决，编号：KZR 50/15)。原因：分销商对制造商的产品分类依赖（“Spitzenstellungsabhängigkeit”作为“Sortimentsbedingte Abhängigkeit”的特例）没有得到充分的证明。尽管高分销率通常是决定性的，但在目前这样的质量选择性分销制度中，其意义可能不大。重新设计分销系统的决定性因素：“如果供应商选择在某个时间点转换到一个高质量的选择性分销系统，在之前的一段时间里，与品种相关的依赖关系通常会以较高的分销率来表示。”（第19款）
制造商尤其可以提出两个论点，反对这种所谓的分类相关依赖关系，即
(一)由制造商自行供应其产品的分销商数目远低于提供其产品的分销商总数（即包括通过其他渠道购买该产品的分销商）；及
(二) 分销率将根据那些可与要求进入分配系统和交付的分销商相媲美的分销商确定（第27款)–正如德国联邦法院先前在裁定室内装潢案例（2000年5月9日的裁定，参考KZR 28/98，p. 12）。
Practical conclusions
实际结论
“没有什么比改变更永恒”：在重新设计分销系统时，要仔细考虑是否想要/需要过渡安排–或者最好不考虑过渡安排。一个很好的不考虑过渡安排的理由是：它们可能会使排除不想要的分销商变得更加困难。因此，在日默瓦一案中，慕尼黑的较高地区法院驳回了制造商的反驳意见，即分销商的商业模式“以讨价还价为目标”–辩称，制造商给其他分销商“订立协议后12个月”的时间来满足新的定性标准。
有关定性标准（也是要求/规格），请参阅Legalmondo上的其他文章，特别是关于平台禁令和价格比较禁令的文章，请参见Legalmondo上的文章。
地域封锁是一种歧视性做法，由于客户的国籍或其居住地或营业地，阻止客户（主要是网上客户）从另一欧盟成员国的网站获取和（或）购买产品或服务。
欧盟条例在2018年2月28日颁布的关于解决基于客户国籍、居住地或营业地在国内市场上的不合理的地域封锁和其他形式的歧视的欧盟第2018/302号条例将于2018年12月2日生效。
当前情况
欧盟委员会对欧盟的1万多个电子商务网站进行了“秘密购物”调查。地域封锁指数相当高！63%的网站不允许购物者从另一个欧盟国家购买商品（甚至包括86%的家用电器和79%的电子和计算机硬件）。
另一方面，当电子商务的价值和数量就全球来说，年复一年地大幅增长时，只有50%的欧洲客户从设在另一个欧盟成员国的网上商店购买产品，但这种现象只是在国内范围而非整个欧洲。
2017年6月23日，欧洲理事会要求切实执行数字单一市场战略的所有内容，包括跨界交付、消费者保护和禁止不当地域封锁。
现行法律框架的缺失
欧洲联盟指令（欧盟第2006/123/CE号指令）和TFUE第101条已经解决了基于国籍、地区或住所或营业地的歧视做法。
根据欧盟指令第20(2)条，欧盟成员国必须确保专业人员不因客户的居住地、营业所或国籍而区别对待（客观例外情况除外）。另一方面，关于纵向限制的欧盟竞争法(《欧盟运行条例》第101条和集体豁免条例及其指南)认为，对被动销售的限制是违反欧盟竞争规则的核心限制。然而，这两套规则(欧盟指令和竞争法框架)在实践中似乎并不完全有效。
在这方面，欧盟委员会在最近关于电子商务部门竞争调查的报告中表明，地域封锁尤其在欧洲电子商务部门内得到了大规模使用。
地域封锁条例的目的
地域封锁条例的目的是防止专业人员在处理跨国界电子商务交易时，基于国籍、居住地或客户营业地而实施的直接或间接歧视。
地域封锁条例的范围
新的条例将只适用于企业与最终用户或企业之间的网上销售。
新条例将适用于在欧盟内运作的网站或在欧盟以外运作但向设立在欧盟内的客户提供货物或服务的网站。
电子网站的管理新规是什么？
关于访问网站的问题
根据该条例，企业不得以与互联网用户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的理由，通过使用技术措施来阻止或限制其进入网络接口。然而，只要客户明确同意，并且仍然可以轻松访问他们原先试图访问的网站版本，企业就有权将客的访问方向改变到他们试图访问的网站之外的另一个网站。
关于网站的销售条款和条件
该规则禁止企业在下列三种情况下，根据客户的国籍、居住地或营业地（特别是他们的IP地址），提供不同的一般条件来取得货物或服务：
提供送货服务的企业将售出的商品送达到另外的欧盟成员国交付（或在企业与客户共同商定的地点收取货物）的；
企业提供的电子化服务，如云、数据存储、主机服务等。（但不提供访问受版权保护的内容的服务，如流媒体或在线游戏服务）；
顾客获得的在各个国家均可运行的商务服务（如汽车租赁和旅馆住宿服务或体育或文化活动的票务服务）。
关于网站上的付款方式
该条例禁止企业以与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地、支付账户所在地或支付服务提供者的设立地有关的理由，对已接受的支付手段适用不同的支付条件（条件是必须符合认证要求，付款交易必须以企业接受的货币进行）。
这项规定对电子零售商有什么影响？
尽管在形式上被排除在该条例范围之外，但供应商与分销商或批发商之间的关系仍将受到该条例的影响，因为根据分销商之间的协议规定，分销商承诺不进行被动销售（例如，阻止或限制进入网站），由于与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的原因“将自动无效”。
因此，地域封锁条例对分销商的影响是双重的：第一，在与客户（最终用户或用户企业）的关系中产生直接影响；第二，在其根据独家分销协议所承担的义务方面产生间接影响。
地域封锁条例必须与现行竞争法框架相协调，特别是与制定适用于网上销售的具体规则的纵向限制指导方针相协调。网上销售被比作被动销售。指导方针中提到4个实践中为了间接保证地方保护主义，在供应商和独家分销商同意的情况下被禁止的例子：
独家经销商应阻止另一地区的客户访问其网站，或自动将其转到供应商或其他经销商的网站，
如果买方的信用卡数据显示买方不是独家经销商的专有区域，独家经销商应终止网上销售。
限制独家分销商通过互联网销售的份额（但合同可规定按绝对值计算的最低线下目标，并规定与离线销售相比，网上销售保持一致）。
独家分销商对在互联网上销售的货物支付的价格，应高于对准备在离线销售的货物支付的价格。
制造商将必须决定是采用一个独一无二的欧洲门户网站报价还是多个地方商业报价，众所周知，每个范畴的客户端是有可能存在价格差异的。
事实上，新规定并没有强制电子零售商协调其价格政策，它们只是必须允许欧盟消费者自由和容易地访问其网站的任何版本。同样，该条例并没有规定电子零售商必须将产品运往欧洲各地，而只是允许欧盟消费者从他们想要的任何网站购买商品，并在必要时自行安排发货。
最后，在更为契约性的层面上，尚不十分清楚新的地域封锁规则如何直接或间接地影响适用于消费者合同的冲突法规则，根据罗马第1号规定(Rome I Regulation)，特别是在允许消费者在本网站所在国的外国网站上购买产品时（这意味着在消费者所在国无特定交货制度已建立。）
因此，B2C网站的一般条款和条件需要在营销和法律两方面进行审查和调整。
Once convinced of the utility of mediation as a method of resolving conflicts between franchisor and franchisee and taken the decision to include a clause in the contracts that provides for it, the last step would be what elements should be taken into account when drafting it.
- The previous negotiation. It seems advisable that both parties grant themselves the possibility of trying to solve the problem with a previous formal negotiation. Mediation does not exclude the previous attempt made by the interested parties or their lawyers; however, it seems advisable to contractually provide a suitable end according to the circumstances. Experience shows that lengthening this phase too long may result in the conflict becoming more complicated and even more difficult to approach mediation.
- The clause may also provide for the place where the mediation will take place. Again at this point the parties are free. It is convenient that this is accurate indicating the concrete city.
- The language in which the mediation will be developed is the a faculty of the parties. There will be no difficulty in mediations in which both parties use the same language, but it is very convenient in contracts with parties that have different languages, or that belong to regions or countries with different co-official languages. The drafting or signing of the contract in a specific language does not presuppose that this must be the language of the mediation. It is an element to be taken into account also when requesting a mediator who can use that language in the chosen mediation institution.
- The procedure can also be decided by the parties. In particular, the number of sessions, the maximum expected duration, the participation of advisors, etc. Keep in mind that the greater or lesser regulation will allow to avoid future conflicts in this respect, although it will also imply a greater limit to the freedom of the parties that, nevertheless, will remain free to modify the agreement by mutual consent.
- The term of the mediation can also be contemplated. This would allow, for example, to prevent mediation from being extended only for purely procedural strategic purposes or to gather information from the other party before starting a procedure, etc. The professional mediators, however, are able to identify these manoeuvres, also having the power to put an end to mediation in those cases.
- Choosing the mediator or the mediation institution is an important choice. The parties can agree on who will be their mediator, indicate in the contract the elements to choose it, or submit directly to a Mediation Institution so that it is the one who designates it according to its own rules. These decisions can be alternatives (that is, that the parties agree on the mediator and, in case of lack of agreement, submit to an institution that names it), or they can be unique. The designation of an Institution requires that it has a sufficient guarantee of stability (avoid designating short-term institutions or without much future guarantee), with a sufficient panel of mediators depending on the characteristics of the mediation (language, competence, experience) and that allows the necessary flexibility for its operation.
- Finally, it is convenient that the clause includes an alternative way in case the mediation does not succeed either because the parties do not reach an agreement, or because they withdraw from the mediation. It is important to recall that mediation does not close the doors to the conflict be resolved by recourse to ordinary jurisdiction or arbitration. And in terms of specialized arbitration in distribution contracts, the IDArb (https://www.idiproject.com/content/idarb-idi-arbitration-project) is an excellent option.
On the topic of the importance of Mediation in Distribution Agreements, you can check out the recording our webinar “Mediation in International Conflicts”
通过佣金代理商分销–最后可获赔偿！
2018年5月5日
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德国
- 分销协议
法国是特许经营关系网的大市场，近2000家特许经营关系网处于运营状态。这是最成功的商业发展计划之一。
特许人必须主要遵守法国关于预先披露信息的规定以及法国和欧盟的竞争条例等规定。虽然对授予特许者来说，对关系网质量和品牌形象的控制是一个非常重要且合法的问题，但授予特许者不能过多地干预特许经营人的日常活动，因为特许经营人是独立商家。因此，授予特许人与特许经营人之间的关系只能建立在商法的基础上，而不能建立在劳动法的基础上。然而，法国最近的规定将导致授予特许者与特许经营者和他们的雇员一起实施某些劳动法。
在法国经营特许经营关系网的外国特许经营者确实必须知道如何应对《劳动法》（2016年8月8日）及其法令（2017年5月4日）所带来的限制，并自2017年5月7日起生效，该法令涉及为整个特许经营关系网设立一个雇员论坛。事实上，这个社会对话委员会可以对特许经营关系网的组织工作产生深刻的影响。
首先，新的社会对话委员会只关心经营者受特许权协议约束的关系网。因此，商标许可和分销合同似乎没有包括在内。特许权协议应被理解为由三项单独协议构成的特殊合同：商标许可协议、专有技术许可协议和商业或技术援助协议。然而，2016年8月8日的法律却造成了一些混乱，规定社会对话委员会所涉及的特许协议是“引用《法国商法典》第L330-3条”协议，尽管该条不仅没有界定特许合同的定义，而且可以适用于其他合同（独家分销协议），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
此外，根据该法案，只有包括“对特许经营企业的工作组织和条件有影响的条款”的具体特许协议才会受到关注。尽管该法没有界定这些条款，一方面，是否需要社会对话委员会取决于确定这些条款；另一方面，特许经营者在组织和管理其业务，包括在雇佣劳工事务方面，本质上独立于授予特许人。因此，有必要对所有特许经营协议进行就业审计（例如，如果条款规定营业时间或规定着装怎么办？），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
最后，只有在法国雇用至少300名（全职）工作人员的特许经营关系网才要求设立社会对话委员会。这似乎不包括特许经营人的雇员或不受特许经营协议约束的经营者的雇员(例如受商标许可合同约束的经营者)。
意味着长期谈判的实现
即使满足了法律要求，授予特许人也没有义务自发成立社会对话委员会。然而，一旦工会要求成立社会对话委员会，授予特许人就有义务积极参加该行业发起的谈判，与所有特许经营者核实其关系网上的雇员人数是否达到300人的门槛，然后建立一个由雇员（工会）代表和雇主（授予特许人和特许经营人）代表组成的“谈判论坛”，用来达成创建和组织未来社会对话委员会的协议。
与工会和特许经营者的谈判将在6达成协议但须经授予特许人、工会和至少30%的特许经营者(占关系网雇员的30%)的同意。该协议应确定社会对话委员会的组成、其成员的任职方式、任期、会议的频率、如果需要，雇员可以为委员会贡献多长时间、委员会实现其宗旨所需的物质或财政手段、以及如何处理费用和代表的旅费和生活津贴等问题。最后一个问题可能不仅是授予特许人关注的一个主要问题，而且也是特许经营人-雇主关注的一个主要方面。由于没有达成这样的协议，该法令规定设立社会对话委员会，其中有几项严格和最低限度的规定，可能会给授予特许人造成不合理的负担。
一旦成立，内部规则将确切界定社会对话委员会的运作方式（所需的多数人、会议通知和引荐来源、讨论内容的公布等）。
无事生非？
社会对话委员会无权调查案件或作出具有约束力的裁决，但社会对话委员会必须让大家知道特许经营者加盟或离开销售关系网的情况，以及“授予特许者的决定，易于影响到特许经营者雇员的数量和结构、工作时间或就业、工作和职业培训条件”。
社会对话委员会还可就如何改善贯穿整个关系网的条件提出建议。
社会对话委员会的影响终究相当有限，但授予特许人必须认真掌握和控制规则的实施，以避免损失自己的特许经营商的时间和精力以及关系网的混乱。
Not what you would expect
When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!
The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.
This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.
However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.
In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.
Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an “in-house” operation” in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.
What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?
Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.
Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.
As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.
The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!
However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to “justify” avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.
In this respect, in many cases simple “non-satisfaction” was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.
There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.
Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.
Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.
The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.
In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.
It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.
At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.
One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.
Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.
No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.
The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.
Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.
The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.
Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?
The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.
Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.
The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).
In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.
From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.
What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?
Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.
The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).
With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.
Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.
From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.
It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.
By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.
In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.
根据欧盟电子商务部门的调查，超过50%的互联网市场和36%的零售商提供数据给价格搜索引擎，如 Idealo，谷歌购物Google Shopping，或Shopzilla。相比之下，大约10%的经销商受到价格比较引擎禁令的影响（见委员会工作人员工作文件SWD（2017）154定稿，S.32图B.4和欧盟委员会第37页，电子商务部门调查的最后报告，第10页）。
不过，联邦法院最近确认，价格比较引擎的禁令是反竞争和无效的。在具体案例中，爱世克斯（跑鞋品牌名）通常禁止德国零售商支持在线分销中的价格搜索引擎：
“此外，经授权的…经销商不得…通过为这些价格比较引擎提供特定于应用程序的接口（“APIs”）来支持价格比较引擎的功能。”
此外，该协议还包含了对第三方平台广告的广泛禁止：爱世克斯禁止其授权经销商允许第三方在第三方网站上以任何形式使用爱世克斯的商标，以便直接引导客户访问被授权的爱世克斯经销商的网站。
爱世克斯的分销协议首先由德国竞争管理机构Bundeskartellamt作为试点案例进行调查(由于许多体育零售商对体育设备制造商的互联网转售限制提出了申诉，因此对阿迪达斯提起了另一起试点案件)。2015年，Bundeskartellamt裁定，爱世克斯对价格比较引擎的禁令违反了反垄断法，因为它将违反第101条(1) TFEU，sec.1 《禁止限制竞争法》。提出的理由是，这种禁令的主要目的是控制和限制价格竞争，而牺牲消费者的利益。这项决定首先得到了Düsseldorf高等地区法院的确认（2017年4月5日的裁决，案件号：VI-Kart 13/15(V)，见Legalmondo文章，点击这里）。
现在，联邦法院再次确认了这项裁决（2017年12月12日的决定，第KVZ 41/17号案件）。爱世克斯的裁决特别值得注意，因为它是德国法院继欧盟法院关于科蒂（全球最大的香水生产公司）的平台禁令作出裁决裁决之后作出的首项裁决（见Legalmondo的文章，点击这里）。因此，这是法院今后将如何处理互联网转售限制的第一个迹象。
因此，联邦法院指出，对价格搜索引擎的普遍禁止“至少”要限制向终端消费者的被动销售（第23款, 25款)–这种限制甚至将是这种禁令的预期目的。法院认为，根据《科蒂判决》（点击此出查看），一般平台禁令的可接受性并不意味着一般价格比较禁令的可接受性（第28款及其后款）。尤其是“限制组合”–即第三方平台价格比较引擎和广告宣传禁令–会产生影响。因为它没有确保潜在客户能够“实际进入”经销商网站（第30款） –在这种情况下，联邦最高法院允许提供这种“实质性准入”所需的充分或必要的条件；在这种情况下，一般价格比较引擎禁令仍可继续得到允许。
实用贴士：
- 在欧盟一级，法院和欧盟委员会都没有就普遍禁止价格比较引擎的有效性采取立场。然而，在英国，竞争和市场管理局对价格搜索引擎禁令也采取了类似的批评观点（“宝马在CMA行动后改变了对汽车比较网站的政策”），将其作为德国的行政实践和司法管辖权。
- 事实上，根据联邦最高法院的判决，Düsseldorf高级地区法院（Asics）和法兰克福高等地区法院（Deuter）已经指出以下区别可能适用于：
- 一般价格比较引擎禁令是–根据联邦法院–反竞争的，因此通常是无效的–尽管如果不与广泛的广告禁令相结合，这些禁令仍然是允许的，这样就可以保证潜在的客户能够访问经销商网站。
- 单独的价格比较引擎禁令和使用价格比较门户网站的其他较温和的限制/标准是允许的，例如关于产品插画或说明以及产品环境（例如要求经销商只能提供新产品）。
进一步了解细节: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb: „Nicht Ideal(o)“ – Kombination aus Preissuchmaschinen-Verbot und Logo-Klausel, in: ZVertriebsR 2018, 118 ff.
- 除此之外，制造商可以–在排他性分销网络内–禁止其分销商主动向制造商保留的或由制造商分配给另一分销商的客户提供在线广告，并指明所使用的语言。原则上，所有其他可能的质量标准也是允许的，只要他们和线下分销标准等效（因为“委员会认为，规定网上销售的标准与从实体店销售的标准总体上不等于硬核限制，从而劝阻指定经销商使用互联网接触更多和更多样化的客户的任何义务”，《纵向限制准则》，第56条）。
有关更多信息，请参见：
- 有关实践现状的概述，包括示范合约条款：Rohrßen, Vertriebsvorgaben im E-Commerce 2018: Praxisübersichts und Folgen des “Coty”-Urteils des EuGH, in: GRUR-Prax 2018, 39-41 以及
- 特别是关于平台禁令和可能起草分配协议: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb von Markenartikeln: Zulässigkeit von Plattformverboten nach dem EuGH-Urteil Coty – Auswirkungen auf Fachhändler- bzw. Selektiv-, Exklusiv-, Franchise- und offene Vertriebsverträge –, in: DB 2018. 300-306.
- 关于在互联网销售平台中嵌入的搜索功能中是否允许使用商标和公司徽标，见联邦法院最近于2018年2月15日发布的两项裁决（案件号：I ZR 138/16 re “Ortlieb” 和案件号 I ZR 201/1 re “gofit“).
Agreements restricting competition are prohibited as anticompetitive agreements by Article 101 TFEU unless the agreement’s impact on trade or competition is not appreciable (cf. the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case, C-226/11, judgment of 13 December 2012). Whether an agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition or is in the “safe harbour” can be assessed according to the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice. Accordingly, an agreement is particularly appreciable if its object is to restrict competition. This applies in particular to so-called hardcore restrictions, such as vertical price maintenance (or resale price maintenance = “RPM”).
Regarding a special offer for dietary products, the German Higher Regional Court of Celle surprisingly took a different view and decided that even resale price maintenance could be considered non-appreciable and thus falling outside the ban of anticompetitive business practices under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 07.04.2016, Case 13 U 124/15 [Kart]). In this case, the manufacturer made a special offer to a group of its customers (pharmacies) with a special purchase discount: once, for a limited period and limited to a maximum quantity. In return, the customers should commit themselves to “present the product clearly… and not fall below a resale price of EUR 15.95“.
The Hanover Regional Court had instead seen the agreement as an unlawful resale price maintenance (judgment of 25 August 2015, Case 18 O 91/15) – and now the German Federal Court confirmed the same: the minimum prices specified here within the advertising campaign appreciably restrict competition and are thus banned as anticompetitive business practice under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 17 October 2017, Case KZR 59/16). This corresponds to the case law of the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case (see above) and the German Federal Court with regard to the sales requirement “one bar extra “ (i.e. without extra charge compared to the usual package size) of the Italian confectionery manufacturer Ferrero (judgment of 08.04.2003, Case KZR 3/02) – because the latter explicitly concerns “the scope for price increases resulting from the increased contents of the package” – not, however, the retailer’s decision to set prices freely downwards.
Practical tips
Vertical price fixing is generally prohibited, whereas providing a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP, also “recommended retail price”) and maximum selling prices are allowed – this is briefly the principle of German and European antitrust law on pricing frameworks. Furthermore, recommended retail prices and maximum selling prices (“MSP”) are subject to the restriction that they ” they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties” (Article 4 lit. a Vertical Block Exemptions Regulation). That means:
- the manufacturer or supplier may provide guidance,
- however, the reseller may set his sales prices freely.
Exceptions may apply – in addition to the RPM on the price of books or in the case of specialisation agreements – by way of the efficiency defence under Article 101 (3) TFEU in individual cases, e.g.
- in the introductory period when launching new products on the market, or
- in the case of short-term special offers if accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency, for example by investing the higher margin into better customer advice, which benefits all customers and Resale Price Maintenance prevents retailers who do not offer the customer advice from free riding (cf. EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 225).
Such actions, however, require excellent preparation because manufacturers can only set resale prices for very short periods if they can convincingly demonstrate efficiency gains such as preventing free-riders.
In the case of fixed prices, the competition authorities quickly become sensitive. For example, fines for vertical price maintenance have recently been imposed again in Germany. In this respect, special care must be taken particularly in distribution and sales agreements.
- Correspondingly, each company’s sales team should continue following the previous case law on recommended retail prices, maximum selling prices and discount campaigns. Guidance for the practice is provided by
- the Federal Cartel Office’s paper of July 2017 on the prohibition of fixed prices in stationary food retailing,
- the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (para. 48 et seq., 223 et seq.) and the „Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice“ – all three, however, must always be assessed in the light of current case law because the understanding of the EU Commission contained in these documents does not bind neither the courts nor the national antitrust authorities.
“日默瓦（行李箱品牌名）所有者终止了在欧洲的所有分销协议”——2018年3月9日，德国主要商业报纸“Handelsblatt”的标题。终止原因是：日默瓦——著名高质量的行李箱品牌制造商——其在2011年后，于2018年重新设计它的分销网络：日默瓦的目标是再次提高其质量选择标准，不再将其产品卖给传统的商店，而是提供现代的购物体验。
原则上，制造商可以根据其营销战略和任何变化的需求自由设计和开发其分销系统。相似地，他们可以在原则上自由选择销售中间商（分销商/经销商、特许经营者、代理人等）的数量和名称。他们原则上也可以自由转向选择性分销，目的是使其产品的分销符合某些标准（特别是关于分销的质量），从而也有可能减少分销商的数量。然而，作为例外，分销商可能强迫制造商提供这些产品——即制造商有很大的市场支配力。在这种情况下，与分销商订立合同从而产生交货义务的义务可能源自禁止歧视的规定。（德国《反竞争限制法》第1、20条，1、2款，19项）。
如果制造商重新设计他们的分销网络——就像日默瓦以前和现在所做的那样，那么这个问题就变得特别相关，日默瓦在2011/2012年转向选择性分销（关于选择性分销的优点和可能的分销限制，见Legalmondo文章）。为了重新设计其分销网络，日默瓦终止了以前的分销协议，并提出缔结新的分销协议——根据新的协议，新的分销商承诺以某种方式展示货物，并购买和使用日默瓦的店内系统。日默瓦认为，原分销商的表现与新的商业理念和销售策略不符，这就是双方未能达成缔结一份新协议的原因。于是，分销商提出诉讼，目的是订立一份新的经销商合同，从而交付他的经销商店。
慕尼黑地区法院驳回了这项诉讼请求(2014年9月9日的裁决，编号7249/13 HKO)。不过，慕尼黑高等地区法院确认了这种索赔(2015年9月17日的裁定，注释第U 3886/1/4 Kart)——主张制造商在有关的“高价和高质量手提箱市场”中处于领导地位，或者，相反地，如果分销商具有依赖性，并且因为制造商的手提箱不能被其他同等的手提箱所取代。这种依赖性尤其通过高分销率表现（即制造商提供了大量可比较的分销商）以及独特的设计和相关的高认可价值。现在，联邦法院推翻了这一判决，并将其发回重审(2017年12月12日的裁决，编号：KZR 50/15)。原因：分销商对制造商的产品分类依赖（“Spitzenstellungsabhängigkeit”作为“Sortimentsbedingte Abhängigkeit”的特例）没有得到充分的证明。尽管高分销率通常是决定性的，但在目前这样的质量选择性分销制度中，其意义可能不大。重新设计分销系统的决定性因素：“如果供应商选择在某个时间点转换到一个高质量的选择性分销系统，在之前的一段时间里，与品种相关的依赖关系通常会以较高的分销率来表示。”（第19款）
制造商尤其可以提出两个论点，反对这种所谓的分类相关依赖关系，即
(一)由制造商自行供应其产品的分销商数目远低于提供其产品的分销商总数（即包括通过其他渠道购买该产品的分销商）；及
(二) 分销率将根据那些可与要求进入分配系统和交付的分销商相媲美的分销商确定（第27款)–正如德国联邦法院先前在裁定室内装潢案例（2000年5月9日的裁定，参考KZR 28/98，p. 12）。
Practical conclusions
实际结论
“没有什么比改变更永恒”：在重新设计分销系统时，要仔细考虑是否想要/需要过渡安排–或者最好不考虑过渡安排。一个很好的不考虑过渡安排的理由是：它们可能会使排除不想要的分销商变得更加困难。因此，在日默瓦一案中，慕尼黑的较高地区法院驳回了制造商的反驳意见，即分销商的商业模式“以讨价还价为目标”–辩称，制造商给其他分销商“订立协议后12个月”的时间来满足新的定性标准。
有关定性标准（也是要求/规格），请参阅Legalmondo上的其他文章，特别是关于平台禁令和价格比较禁令的文章，请参见Legalmondo上的文章。
地域封锁是一种歧视性做法，由于客户的国籍或其居住地或营业地，阻止客户（主要是网上客户）从另一欧盟成员国的网站获取和（或）购买产品或服务。
欧盟条例在2018年2月28日颁布的关于解决基于客户国籍、居住地或营业地在国内市场上的不合理的地域封锁和其他形式的歧视的欧盟第2018/302号条例将于2018年12月2日生效。
当前情况
欧盟委员会对欧盟的1万多个电子商务网站进行了“秘密购物”调查。地域封锁指数相当高！63%的网站不允许购物者从另一个欧盟国家购买商品（甚至包括86%的家用电器和79%的电子和计算机硬件）。
另一方面，当电子商务的价值和数量就全球来说，年复一年地大幅增长时，只有50%的欧洲客户从设在另一个欧盟成员国的网上商店购买产品，但这种现象只是在国内范围而非整个欧洲。
2017年6月23日，欧洲理事会要求切实执行数字单一市场战略的所有内容，包括跨界交付、消费者保护和禁止不当地域封锁。
现行法律框架的缺失
欧洲联盟指令（欧盟第2006/123/CE号指令）和TFUE第101条已经解决了基于国籍、地区或住所或营业地的歧视做法。
根据欧盟指令第20(2)条，欧盟成员国必须确保专业人员不因客户的居住地、营业所或国籍而区别对待（客观例外情况除外）。另一方面，关于纵向限制的欧盟竞争法(《欧盟运行条例》第101条和集体豁免条例及其指南)认为，对被动销售的限制是违反欧盟竞争规则的核心限制。然而，这两套规则(欧盟指令和竞争法框架)在实践中似乎并不完全有效。
在这方面，欧盟委员会在最近关于电子商务部门竞争调查的报告中表明，地域封锁尤其在欧洲电子商务部门内得到了大规模使用。
地域封锁条例的目的
地域封锁条例的目的是防止专业人员在处理跨国界电子商务交易时，基于国籍、居住地或客户营业地而实施的直接或间接歧视。
地域封锁条例的范围
新的条例将只适用于企业与最终用户或企业之间的网上销售。
新条例将适用于在欧盟内运作的网站或在欧盟以外运作但向设立在欧盟内的客户提供货物或服务的网站。
电子网站的管理新规是什么？
关于访问网站的问题
根据该条例，企业不得以与互联网用户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的理由，通过使用技术措施来阻止或限制其进入网络接口。然而，只要客户明确同意，并且仍然可以轻松访问他们原先试图访问的网站版本，企业就有权将客的访问方向改变到他们试图访问的网站之外的另一个网站。
关于网站的销售条款和条件
该规则禁止企业在下列三种情况下，根据客户的国籍、居住地或营业地（特别是他们的IP地址），提供不同的一般条件来取得货物或服务：
提供送货服务的企业将售出的商品送达到另外的欧盟成员国交付（或在企业与客户共同商定的地点收取货物）的；
企业提供的电子化服务，如云、数据存储、主机服务等。（但不提供访问受版权保护的内容的服务，如流媒体或在线游戏服务）；
顾客获得的在各个国家均可运行的商务服务（如汽车租赁和旅馆住宿服务或体育或文化活动的票务服务）。
关于网站上的付款方式
该条例禁止企业以与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地、支付账户所在地或支付服务提供者的设立地有关的理由，对已接受的支付手段适用不同的支付条件（条件是必须符合认证要求，付款交易必须以企业接受的货币进行）。
这项规定对电子零售商有什么影响？
尽管在形式上被排除在该条例范围之外，但供应商与分销商或批发商之间的关系仍将受到该条例的影响，因为根据分销商之间的协议规定，分销商承诺不进行被动销售（例如，阻止或限制进入网站），由于与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的原因“将自动无效”。
因此，地域封锁条例对分销商的影响是双重的：第一，在与客户（最终用户或用户企业）的关系中产生直接影响；第二，在其根据独家分销协议所承担的义务方面产生间接影响。
地域封锁条例必须与现行竞争法框架相协调，特别是与制定适用于网上销售的具体规则的纵向限制指导方针相协调。网上销售被比作被动销售。指导方针中提到4个实践中为了间接保证地方保护主义，在供应商和独家分销商同意的情况下被禁止的例子：
独家经销商应阻止另一地区的客户访问其网站，或自动将其转到供应商或其他经销商的网站，
如果买方的信用卡数据显示买方不是独家经销商的专有区域，独家经销商应终止网上销售。
限制独家分销商通过互联网销售的份额（但合同可规定按绝对值计算的最低线下目标，并规定与离线销售相比，网上销售保持一致）。
独家分销商对在互联网上销售的货物支付的价格，应高于对准备在离线销售的货物支付的价格。
制造商将必须决定是采用一个独一无二的欧洲门户网站报价还是多个地方商业报价，众所周知，每个范畴的客户端是有可能存在价格差异的。
事实上，新规定并没有强制电子零售商协调其价格政策，它们只是必须允许欧盟消费者自由和容易地访问其网站的任何版本。同样，该条例并没有规定电子零售商必须将产品运往欧洲各地，而只是允许欧盟消费者从他们想要的任何网站购买商品，并在必要时自行安排发货。
最后，在更为契约性的层面上，尚不十分清楚新的地域封锁规则如何直接或间接地影响适用于消费者合同的冲突法规则，根据罗马第1号规定(Rome I Regulation)，特别是在允许消费者在本网站所在国的外国网站上购买产品时（这意味着在消费者所在国无特定交货制度已建立。）
因此，B2C网站的一般条款和条件需要在营销和法律两方面进行审查和调整。
Once convinced of the utility of mediation as a method of resolving conflicts between franchisor and franchisee and taken the decision to include a clause in the contracts that provides for it, the last step would be what elements should be taken into account when drafting it.
- The previous negotiation. It seems advisable that both parties grant themselves the possibility of trying to solve the problem with a previous formal negotiation. Mediation does not exclude the previous attempt made by the interested parties or their lawyers; however, it seems advisable to contractually provide a suitable end according to the circumstances. Experience shows that lengthening this phase too long may result in the conflict becoming more complicated and even more difficult to approach mediation.
- The clause may also provide for the place where the mediation will take place. Again at this point the parties are free. It is convenient that this is accurate indicating the concrete city.
- The language in which the mediation will be developed is the a faculty of the parties. There will be no difficulty in mediations in which both parties use the same language, but it is very convenient in contracts with parties that have different languages, or that belong to regions or countries with different co-official languages. The drafting or signing of the contract in a specific language does not presuppose that this must be the language of the mediation. It is an element to be taken into account also when requesting a mediator who can use that language in the chosen mediation institution.
- The procedure can also be decided by the parties. In particular, the number of sessions, the maximum expected duration, the participation of advisors, etc. Keep in mind that the greater or lesser regulation will allow to avoid future conflicts in this respect, although it will also imply a greater limit to the freedom of the parties that, nevertheless, will remain free to modify the agreement by mutual consent.
- The term of the mediation can also be contemplated. This would allow, for example, to prevent mediation from being extended only for purely procedural strategic purposes or to gather information from the other party before starting a procedure, etc. The professional mediators, however, are able to identify these manoeuvres, also having the power to put an end to mediation in those cases.
- Choosing the mediator or the mediation institution is an important choice. The parties can agree on who will be their mediator, indicate in the contract the elements to choose it, or submit directly to a Mediation Institution so that it is the one who designates it according to its own rules. These decisions can be alternatives (that is, that the parties agree on the mediator and, in case of lack of agreement, submit to an institution that names it), or they can be unique. The designation of an Institution requires that it has a sufficient guarantee of stability (avoid designating short-term institutions or without much future guarantee), with a sufficient panel of mediators depending on the characteristics of the mediation (language, competence, experience) and that allows the necessary flexibility for its operation.
- Finally, it is convenient that the clause includes an alternative way in case the mediation does not succeed either because the parties do not reach an agreement, or because they withdraw from the mediation. It is important to recall that mediation does not close the doors to the conflict be resolved by recourse to ordinary jurisdiction or arbitration. And in terms of specialized arbitration in distribution contracts, the IDArb (https://www.idiproject.com/content/idarb-idi-arbitration-project) is an excellent option.
On the topic of the importance of Mediation in Distribution Agreements, you can check out the recording our webinar “Mediation in International Conflicts”
写信给 Benedikt
Mediation and franchise agreements – best practices
2018年5月3日
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西班牙
- 分销协议
- 特许经营
法国是特许经营关系网的大市场，近2000家特许经营关系网处于运营状态。这是最成功的商业发展计划之一。
特许人必须主要遵守法国关于预先披露信息的规定以及法国和欧盟的竞争条例等规定。虽然对授予特许者来说，对关系网质量和品牌形象的控制是一个非常重要且合法的问题，但授予特许者不能过多地干预特许经营人的日常活动，因为特许经营人是独立商家。因此，授予特许人与特许经营人之间的关系只能建立在商法的基础上，而不能建立在劳动法的基础上。然而，法国最近的规定将导致授予特许者与特许经营者和他们的雇员一起实施某些劳动法。
在法国经营特许经营关系网的外国特许经营者确实必须知道如何应对《劳动法》（2016年8月8日）及其法令（2017年5月4日）所带来的限制，并自2017年5月7日起生效，该法令涉及为整个特许经营关系网设立一个雇员论坛。事实上，这个社会对话委员会可以对特许经营关系网的组织工作产生深刻的影响。
首先，新的社会对话委员会只关心经营者受特许权协议约束的关系网。因此，商标许可和分销合同似乎没有包括在内。特许权协议应被理解为由三项单独协议构成的特殊合同：商标许可协议、专有技术许可协议和商业或技术援助协议。然而，2016年8月8日的法律却造成了一些混乱，规定社会对话委员会所涉及的特许协议是“引用《法国商法典》第L330-3条”协议，尽管该条不仅没有界定特许合同的定义，而且可以适用于其他合同（独家分销协议），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
此外，根据该法案，只有包括“对特许经营企业的工作组织和条件有影响的条款”的具体特许协议才会受到关注。尽管该法没有界定这些条款，一方面，是否需要社会对话委员会取决于确定这些条款；另一方面，特许经营者在组织和管理其业务，包括在雇佣劳工事务方面，本质上独立于授予特许人。因此，有必要对所有特许经营协议进行就业审计（例如，如果条款规定营业时间或规定着装怎么办？），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
最后，只有在法国雇用至少300名（全职）工作人员的特许经营关系网才要求设立社会对话委员会。这似乎不包括特许经营人的雇员或不受特许经营协议约束的经营者的雇员(例如受商标许可合同约束的经营者)。
意味着长期谈判的实现
即使满足了法律要求，授予特许人也没有义务自发成立社会对话委员会。然而，一旦工会要求成立社会对话委员会，授予特许人就有义务积极参加该行业发起的谈判，与所有特许经营者核实其关系网上的雇员人数是否达到300人的门槛，然后建立一个由雇员（工会）代表和雇主（授予特许人和特许经营人）代表组成的“谈判论坛”，用来达成创建和组织未来社会对话委员会的协议。
与工会和特许经营者的谈判将在6达成协议但须经授予特许人、工会和至少30%的特许经营者(占关系网雇员的30%)的同意。该协议应确定社会对话委员会的组成、其成员的任职方式、任期、会议的频率、如果需要，雇员可以为委员会贡献多长时间、委员会实现其宗旨所需的物质或财政手段、以及如何处理费用和代表的旅费和生活津贴等问题。最后一个问题可能不仅是授予特许人关注的一个主要问题，而且也是特许经营人-雇主关注的一个主要方面。由于没有达成这样的协议，该法令规定设立社会对话委员会，其中有几项严格和最低限度的规定，可能会给授予特许人造成不合理的负担。
一旦成立，内部规则将确切界定社会对话委员会的运作方式（所需的多数人、会议通知和引荐来源、讨论内容的公布等）。
无事生非？
社会对话委员会无权调查案件或作出具有约束力的裁决，但社会对话委员会必须让大家知道特许经营者加盟或离开销售关系网的情况，以及“授予特许者的决定，易于影响到特许经营者雇员的数量和结构、工作时间或就业、工作和职业培训条件”。
社会对话委员会还可就如何改善贯穿整个关系网的条件提出建议。
社会对话委员会的影响终究相当有限，但授予特许人必须认真掌握和控制规则的实施，以避免损失自己的特许经营商的时间和精力以及关系网的混乱。
Not what you would expect
When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!
The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.
This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.
However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.
In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.
Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an “in-house” operation” in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.
What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?
Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.
Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.
As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.
The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!
However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to “justify” avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.
In this respect, in many cases simple “non-satisfaction” was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.
There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.
Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.
Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.
The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.
In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.
It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.
At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.
One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.
Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.
No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.
The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.
Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.
The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.
Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?
The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.
Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.
The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).
In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.
From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.
What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?
Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.
The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).
With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.
Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.
From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.
It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.
By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.
In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.
根据欧盟电子商务部门的调查，超过50%的互联网市场和36%的零售商提供数据给价格搜索引擎，如 Idealo，谷歌购物Google Shopping，或Shopzilla。相比之下，大约10%的经销商受到价格比较引擎禁令的影响（见委员会工作人员工作文件SWD（2017）154定稿，S.32图B.4和欧盟委员会第37页，电子商务部门调查的最后报告，第10页）。
不过，联邦法院最近确认，价格比较引擎的禁令是反竞争和无效的。在具体案例中，爱世克斯（跑鞋品牌名）通常禁止德国零售商支持在线分销中的价格搜索引擎：
“此外，经授权的…经销商不得…通过为这些价格比较引擎提供特定于应用程序的接口（“APIs”）来支持价格比较引擎的功能。”
此外，该协议还包含了对第三方平台广告的广泛禁止：爱世克斯禁止其授权经销商允许第三方在第三方网站上以任何形式使用爱世克斯的商标，以便直接引导客户访问被授权的爱世克斯经销商的网站。
爱世克斯的分销协议首先由德国竞争管理机构Bundeskartellamt作为试点案例进行调查(由于许多体育零售商对体育设备制造商的互联网转售限制提出了申诉，因此对阿迪达斯提起了另一起试点案件)。2015年，Bundeskartellamt裁定，爱世克斯对价格比较引擎的禁令违反了反垄断法，因为它将违反第101条(1) TFEU，sec.1 《禁止限制竞争法》。提出的理由是，这种禁令的主要目的是控制和限制价格竞争，而牺牲消费者的利益。这项决定首先得到了Düsseldorf高等地区法院的确认（2017年4月5日的裁决，案件号：VI-Kart 13/15(V)，见Legalmondo文章，点击这里）。
现在，联邦法院再次确认了这项裁决（2017年12月12日的决定，第KVZ 41/17号案件）。爱世克斯的裁决特别值得注意，因为它是德国法院继欧盟法院关于科蒂（全球最大的香水生产公司）的平台禁令作出裁决裁决之后作出的首项裁决（见Legalmondo的文章，点击这里）。因此，这是法院今后将如何处理互联网转售限制的第一个迹象。
因此，联邦法院指出，对价格搜索引擎的普遍禁止“至少”要限制向终端消费者的被动销售（第23款, 25款)–这种限制甚至将是这种禁令的预期目的。法院认为，根据《科蒂判决》（点击此出查看），一般平台禁令的可接受性并不意味着一般价格比较禁令的可接受性（第28款及其后款）。尤其是“限制组合”–即第三方平台价格比较引擎和广告宣传禁令–会产生影响。因为它没有确保潜在客户能够“实际进入”经销商网站（第30款） –在这种情况下，联邦最高法院允许提供这种“实质性准入”所需的充分或必要的条件；在这种情况下，一般价格比较引擎禁令仍可继续得到允许。
实用贴士：
- 在欧盟一级，法院和欧盟委员会都没有就普遍禁止价格比较引擎的有效性采取立场。然而，在英国，竞争和市场管理局对价格搜索引擎禁令也采取了类似的批评观点（“宝马在CMA行动后改变了对汽车比较网站的政策”），将其作为德国的行政实践和司法管辖权。
- 事实上，根据联邦最高法院的判决，Düsseldorf高级地区法院（Asics）和法兰克福高等地区法院（Deuter）已经指出以下区别可能适用于：
- 一般价格比较引擎禁令是–根据联邦法院–反竞争的，因此通常是无效的–尽管如果不与广泛的广告禁令相结合，这些禁令仍然是允许的，这样就可以保证潜在的客户能够访问经销商网站。
- 单独的价格比较引擎禁令和使用价格比较门户网站的其他较温和的限制/标准是允许的，例如关于产品插画或说明以及产品环境（例如要求经销商只能提供新产品）。
进一步了解细节: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb: „Nicht Ideal(o)“ – Kombination aus Preissuchmaschinen-Verbot und Logo-Klausel, in: ZVertriebsR 2018, 118 ff.
- 除此之外，制造商可以–在排他性分销网络内–禁止其分销商主动向制造商保留的或由制造商分配给另一分销商的客户提供在线广告，并指明所使用的语言。原则上，所有其他可能的质量标准也是允许的，只要他们和线下分销标准等效（因为“委员会认为，规定网上销售的标准与从实体店销售的标准总体上不等于硬核限制，从而劝阻指定经销商使用互联网接触更多和更多样化的客户的任何义务”，《纵向限制准则》，第56条）。
有关更多信息，请参见：
- 有关实践现状的概述，包括示范合约条款：Rohrßen, Vertriebsvorgaben im E-Commerce 2018: Praxisübersichts und Folgen des “Coty”-Urteils des EuGH, in: GRUR-Prax 2018, 39-41 以及
- 特别是关于平台禁令和可能起草分配协议: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb von Markenartikeln: Zulässigkeit von Plattformverboten nach dem EuGH-Urteil Coty – Auswirkungen auf Fachhändler- bzw. Selektiv-, Exklusiv-, Franchise- und offene Vertriebsverträge –, in: DB 2018. 300-306.
- 关于在互联网销售平台中嵌入的搜索功能中是否允许使用商标和公司徽标，见联邦法院最近于2018年2月15日发布的两项裁决（案件号：I ZR 138/16 re “Ortlieb” 和案件号 I ZR 201/1 re “gofit“).
Agreements restricting competition are prohibited as anticompetitive agreements by Article 101 TFEU unless the agreement’s impact on trade or competition is not appreciable (cf. the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case, C-226/11, judgment of 13 December 2012). Whether an agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition or is in the “safe harbour” can be assessed according to the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice. Accordingly, an agreement is particularly appreciable if its object is to restrict competition. This applies in particular to so-called hardcore restrictions, such as vertical price maintenance (or resale price maintenance = “RPM”).
Regarding a special offer for dietary products, the German Higher Regional Court of Celle surprisingly took a different view and decided that even resale price maintenance could be considered non-appreciable and thus falling outside the ban of anticompetitive business practices under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 07.04.2016, Case 13 U 124/15 [Kart]). In this case, the manufacturer made a special offer to a group of its customers (pharmacies) with a special purchase discount: once, for a limited period and limited to a maximum quantity. In return, the customers should commit themselves to “present the product clearly… and not fall below a resale price of EUR 15.95“.
The Hanover Regional Court had instead seen the agreement as an unlawful resale price maintenance (judgment of 25 August 2015, Case 18 O 91/15) – and now the German Federal Court confirmed the same: the minimum prices specified here within the advertising campaign appreciably restrict competition and are thus banned as anticompetitive business practice under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 17 October 2017, Case KZR 59/16). This corresponds to the case law of the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case (see above) and the German Federal Court with regard to the sales requirement “one bar extra “ (i.e. without extra charge compared to the usual package size) of the Italian confectionery manufacturer Ferrero (judgment of 08.04.2003, Case KZR 3/02) – because the latter explicitly concerns “the scope for price increases resulting from the increased contents of the package” – not, however, the retailer’s decision to set prices freely downwards.
Practical tips
Vertical price fixing is generally prohibited, whereas providing a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP, also “recommended retail price”) and maximum selling prices are allowed – this is briefly the principle of German and European antitrust law on pricing frameworks. Furthermore, recommended retail prices and maximum selling prices (“MSP”) are subject to the restriction that they ” they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties” (Article 4 lit. a Vertical Block Exemptions Regulation). That means:
- the manufacturer or supplier may provide guidance,
- however, the reseller may set his sales prices freely.
Exceptions may apply – in addition to the RPM on the price of books or in the case of specialisation agreements – by way of the efficiency defence under Article 101 (3) TFEU in individual cases, e.g.
- in the introductory period when launching new products on the market, or
- in the case of short-term special offers if accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency, for example by investing the higher margin into better customer advice, which benefits all customers and Resale Price Maintenance prevents retailers who do not offer the customer advice from free riding (cf. EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 225).
Such actions, however, require excellent preparation because manufacturers can only set resale prices for very short periods if they can convincingly demonstrate efficiency gains such as preventing free-riders.
In the case of fixed prices, the competition authorities quickly become sensitive. For example, fines for vertical price maintenance have recently been imposed again in Germany. In this respect, special care must be taken particularly in distribution and sales agreements.
- Correspondingly, each company’s sales team should continue following the previous case law on recommended retail prices, maximum selling prices and discount campaigns. Guidance for the practice is provided by
- the Federal Cartel Office’s paper of July 2017 on the prohibition of fixed prices in stationary food retailing,
- the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (para. 48 et seq., 223 et seq.) and the „Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice“ – all three, however, must always be assessed in the light of current case law because the understanding of the EU Commission contained in these documents does not bind neither the courts nor the national antitrust authorities.
“日默瓦（行李箱品牌名）所有者终止了在欧洲的所有分销协议”——2018年3月9日，德国主要商业报纸“Handelsblatt”的标题。终止原因是：日默瓦——著名高质量的行李箱品牌制造商——其在2011年后，于2018年重新设计它的分销网络：日默瓦的目标是再次提高其质量选择标准，不再将其产品卖给传统的商店，而是提供现代的购物体验。
原则上，制造商可以根据其营销战略和任何变化的需求自由设计和开发其分销系统。相似地，他们可以在原则上自由选择销售中间商（分销商/经销商、特许经营者、代理人等）的数量和名称。他们原则上也可以自由转向选择性分销，目的是使其产品的分销符合某些标准（特别是关于分销的质量），从而也有可能减少分销商的数量。然而，作为例外，分销商可能强迫制造商提供这些产品——即制造商有很大的市场支配力。在这种情况下，与分销商订立合同从而产生交货义务的义务可能源自禁止歧视的规定。（德国《反竞争限制法》第1、20条，1、2款，19项）。
如果制造商重新设计他们的分销网络——就像日默瓦以前和现在所做的那样，那么这个问题就变得特别相关，日默瓦在2011/2012年转向选择性分销（关于选择性分销的优点和可能的分销限制，见Legalmondo文章）。为了重新设计其分销网络，日默瓦终止了以前的分销协议，并提出缔结新的分销协议——根据新的协议，新的分销商承诺以某种方式展示货物，并购买和使用日默瓦的店内系统。日默瓦认为，原分销商的表现与新的商业理念和销售策略不符，这就是双方未能达成缔结一份新协议的原因。于是，分销商提出诉讼，目的是订立一份新的经销商合同，从而交付他的经销商店。
慕尼黑地区法院驳回了这项诉讼请求(2014年9月9日的裁决，编号7249/13 HKO)。不过，慕尼黑高等地区法院确认了这种索赔(2015年9月17日的裁定，注释第U 3886/1/4 Kart)——主张制造商在有关的“高价和高质量手提箱市场”中处于领导地位，或者，相反地，如果分销商具有依赖性，并且因为制造商的手提箱不能被其他同等的手提箱所取代。这种依赖性尤其通过高分销率表现（即制造商提供了大量可比较的分销商）以及独特的设计和相关的高认可价值。现在，联邦法院推翻了这一判决，并将其发回重审(2017年12月12日的裁决，编号：KZR 50/15)。原因：分销商对制造商的产品分类依赖（“Spitzenstellungsabhängigkeit”作为“Sortimentsbedingte Abhängigkeit”的特例）没有得到充分的证明。尽管高分销率通常是决定性的，但在目前这样的质量选择性分销制度中，其意义可能不大。重新设计分销系统的决定性因素：“如果供应商选择在某个时间点转换到一个高质量的选择性分销系统，在之前的一段时间里，与品种相关的依赖关系通常会以较高的分销率来表示。”（第19款）
制造商尤其可以提出两个论点，反对这种所谓的分类相关依赖关系，即
(一)由制造商自行供应其产品的分销商数目远低于提供其产品的分销商总数（即包括通过其他渠道购买该产品的分销商）；及
(二) 分销率将根据那些可与要求进入分配系统和交付的分销商相媲美的分销商确定（第27款)–正如德国联邦法院先前在裁定室内装潢案例（2000年5月9日的裁定，参考KZR 28/98，p. 12）。
Practical conclusions
实际结论
“没有什么比改变更永恒”：在重新设计分销系统时，要仔细考虑是否想要/需要过渡安排–或者最好不考虑过渡安排。一个很好的不考虑过渡安排的理由是：它们可能会使排除不想要的分销商变得更加困难。因此，在日默瓦一案中，慕尼黑的较高地区法院驳回了制造商的反驳意见，即分销商的商业模式“以讨价还价为目标”–辩称，制造商给其他分销商“订立协议后12个月”的时间来满足新的定性标准。
有关定性标准（也是要求/规格），请参阅Legalmondo上的其他文章，特别是关于平台禁令和价格比较禁令的文章，请参见Legalmondo上的文章。
地域封锁是一种歧视性做法，由于客户的国籍或其居住地或营业地，阻止客户（主要是网上客户）从另一欧盟成员国的网站获取和（或）购买产品或服务。
欧盟条例在2018年2月28日颁布的关于解决基于客户国籍、居住地或营业地在国内市场上的不合理的地域封锁和其他形式的歧视的欧盟第2018/302号条例将于2018年12月2日生效。
当前情况
欧盟委员会对欧盟的1万多个电子商务网站进行了“秘密购物”调查。地域封锁指数相当高！63%的网站不允许购物者从另一个欧盟国家购买商品（甚至包括86%的家用电器和79%的电子和计算机硬件）。
另一方面，当电子商务的价值和数量就全球来说，年复一年地大幅增长时，只有50%的欧洲客户从设在另一个欧盟成员国的网上商店购买产品，但这种现象只是在国内范围而非整个欧洲。
2017年6月23日，欧洲理事会要求切实执行数字单一市场战略的所有内容，包括跨界交付、消费者保护和禁止不当地域封锁。
现行法律框架的缺失
欧洲联盟指令（欧盟第2006/123/CE号指令）和TFUE第101条已经解决了基于国籍、地区或住所或营业地的歧视做法。
根据欧盟指令第20(2)条，欧盟成员国必须确保专业人员不因客户的居住地、营业所或国籍而区别对待（客观例外情况除外）。另一方面，关于纵向限制的欧盟竞争法(《欧盟运行条例》第101条和集体豁免条例及其指南)认为，对被动销售的限制是违反欧盟竞争规则的核心限制。然而，这两套规则(欧盟指令和竞争法框架)在实践中似乎并不完全有效。
在这方面，欧盟委员会在最近关于电子商务部门竞争调查的报告中表明，地域封锁尤其在欧洲电子商务部门内得到了大规模使用。
地域封锁条例的目的
地域封锁条例的目的是防止专业人员在处理跨国界电子商务交易时，基于国籍、居住地或客户营业地而实施的直接或间接歧视。
地域封锁条例的范围
新的条例将只适用于企业与最终用户或企业之间的网上销售。
新条例将适用于在欧盟内运作的网站或在欧盟以外运作但向设立在欧盟内的客户提供货物或服务的网站。
电子网站的管理新规是什么？
关于访问网站的问题
根据该条例，企业不得以与互联网用户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的理由，通过使用技术措施来阻止或限制其进入网络接口。然而，只要客户明确同意，并且仍然可以轻松访问他们原先试图访问的网站版本，企业就有权将客的访问方向改变到他们试图访问的网站之外的另一个网站。
关于网站的销售条款和条件
该规则禁止企业在下列三种情况下，根据客户的国籍、居住地或营业地（特别是他们的IP地址），提供不同的一般条件来取得货物或服务：
提供送货服务的企业将售出的商品送达到另外的欧盟成员国交付（或在企业与客户共同商定的地点收取货物）的；
企业提供的电子化服务，如云、数据存储、主机服务等。（但不提供访问受版权保护的内容的服务，如流媒体或在线游戏服务）；
顾客获得的在各个国家均可运行的商务服务（如汽车租赁和旅馆住宿服务或体育或文化活动的票务服务）。
关于网站上的付款方式
该条例禁止企业以与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地、支付账户所在地或支付服务提供者的设立地有关的理由，对已接受的支付手段适用不同的支付条件（条件是必须符合认证要求，付款交易必须以企业接受的货币进行）。
这项规定对电子零售商有什么影响？
尽管在形式上被排除在该条例范围之外，但供应商与分销商或批发商之间的关系仍将受到该条例的影响，因为根据分销商之间的协议规定，分销商承诺不进行被动销售（例如，阻止或限制进入网站），由于与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的原因“将自动无效”。
因此，地域封锁条例对分销商的影响是双重的：第一，在与客户（最终用户或用户企业）的关系中产生直接影响；第二，在其根据独家分销协议所承担的义务方面产生间接影响。
地域封锁条例必须与现行竞争法框架相协调，特别是与制定适用于网上销售的具体规则的纵向限制指导方针相协调。网上销售被比作被动销售。指导方针中提到4个实践中为了间接保证地方保护主义，在供应商和独家分销商同意的情况下被禁止的例子：
独家经销商应阻止另一地区的客户访问其网站，或自动将其转到供应商或其他经销商的网站，
如果买方的信用卡数据显示买方不是独家经销商的专有区域，独家经销商应终止网上销售。
限制独家分销商通过互联网销售的份额（但合同可规定按绝对值计算的最低线下目标，并规定与离线销售相比，网上销售保持一致）。
独家分销商对在互联网上销售的货物支付的价格，应高于对准备在离线销售的货物支付的价格。
制造商将必须决定是采用一个独一无二的欧洲门户网站报价还是多个地方商业报价，众所周知，每个范畴的客户端是有可能存在价格差异的。
事实上，新规定并没有强制电子零售商协调其价格政策，它们只是必须允许欧盟消费者自由和容易地访问其网站的任何版本。同样，该条例并没有规定电子零售商必须将产品运往欧洲各地，而只是允许欧盟消费者从他们想要的任何网站购买商品，并在必要时自行安排发货。
最后，在更为契约性的层面上，尚不十分清楚新的地域封锁规则如何直接或间接地影响适用于消费者合同的冲突法规则，根据罗马第1号规定(Rome I Regulation)，特别是在允许消费者在本网站所在国的外国网站上购买产品时（这意味着在消费者所在国无特定交货制度已建立。）
因此，B2C网站的一般条款和条件需要在营销和法律两方面进行审查和调整。
Once convinced of the utility of mediation as a method of resolving conflicts between franchisor and franchisee and taken the decision to include a clause in the contracts that provides for it, the last step would be what elements should be taken into account when drafting it.
- The previous negotiation. It seems advisable that both parties grant themselves the possibility of trying to solve the problem with a previous formal negotiation. Mediation does not exclude the previous attempt made by the interested parties or their lawyers; however, it seems advisable to contractually provide a suitable end according to the circumstances. Experience shows that lengthening this phase too long may result in the conflict becoming more complicated and even more difficult to approach mediation.
- The clause may also provide for the place where the mediation will take place. Again at this point the parties are free. It is convenient that this is accurate indicating the concrete city.
- The language in which the mediation will be developed is the a faculty of the parties. There will be no difficulty in mediations in which both parties use the same language, but it is very convenient in contracts with parties that have different languages, or that belong to regions or countries with different co-official languages. The drafting or signing of the contract in a specific language does not presuppose that this must be the language of the mediation. It is an element to be taken into account also when requesting a mediator who can use that language in the chosen mediation institution.
- The procedure can also be decided by the parties. In particular, the number of sessions, the maximum expected duration, the participation of advisors, etc. Keep in mind that the greater or lesser regulation will allow to avoid future conflicts in this respect, although it will also imply a greater limit to the freedom of the parties that, nevertheless, will remain free to modify the agreement by mutual consent.
- The term of the mediation can also be contemplated. This would allow, for example, to prevent mediation from being extended only for purely procedural strategic purposes or to gather information from the other party before starting a procedure, etc. The professional mediators, however, are able to identify these manoeuvres, also having the power to put an end to mediation in those cases.
- Choosing the mediator or the mediation institution is an important choice. The parties can agree on who will be their mediator, indicate in the contract the elements to choose it, or submit directly to a Mediation Institution so that it is the one who designates it according to its own rules. These decisions can be alternatives (that is, that the parties agree on the mediator and, in case of lack of agreement, submit to an institution that names it), or they can be unique. The designation of an Institution requires that it has a sufficient guarantee of stability (avoid designating short-term institutions or without much future guarantee), with a sufficient panel of mediators depending on the characteristics of the mediation (language, competence, experience) and that allows the necessary flexibility for its operation.
- Finally, it is convenient that the clause includes an alternative way in case the mediation does not succeed either because the parties do not reach an agreement, or because they withdraw from the mediation. It is important to recall that mediation does not close the doors to the conflict be resolved by recourse to ordinary jurisdiction or arbitration. And in terms of specialized arbitration in distribution contracts, the IDArb (https://www.idiproject.com/content/idarb-idi-arbitration-project) is an excellent option.
On the topic of the importance of Mediation in Distribution Agreements, you can check out the recording our webinar “Mediation in International Conflicts”
写信给 Ignacio
Mediation and franchise agreements
2018年4月10日
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西班牙
- 分销协议
- 特许经营
法国是特许经营关系网的大市场，近2000家特许经营关系网处于运营状态。这是最成功的商业发展计划之一。
特许人必须主要遵守法国关于预先披露信息的规定以及法国和欧盟的竞争条例等规定。虽然对授予特许者来说，对关系网质量和品牌形象的控制是一个非常重要且合法的问题，但授予特许者不能过多地干预特许经营人的日常活动，因为特许经营人是独立商家。因此，授予特许人与特许经营人之间的关系只能建立在商法的基础上，而不能建立在劳动法的基础上。然而，法国最近的规定将导致授予特许者与特许经营者和他们的雇员一起实施某些劳动法。
在法国经营特许经营关系网的外国特许经营者确实必须知道如何应对《劳动法》（2016年8月8日）及其法令（2017年5月4日）所带来的限制，并自2017年5月7日起生效，该法令涉及为整个特许经营关系网设立一个雇员论坛。事实上，这个社会对话委员会可以对特许经营关系网的组织工作产生深刻的影响。
首先，新的社会对话委员会只关心经营者受特许权协议约束的关系网。因此，商标许可和分销合同似乎没有包括在内。特许权协议应被理解为由三项单独协议构成的特殊合同：商标许可协议、专有技术许可协议和商业或技术援助协议。然而，2016年8月8日的法律却造成了一些混乱，规定社会对话委员会所涉及的特许协议是“引用《法国商法典》第L330-3条”协议，尽管该条不仅没有界定特许合同的定义，而且可以适用于其他合同（独家分销协议），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
此外，根据该法案，只有包括“对特许经营企业的工作组织和条件有影响的条款”的具体特许协议才会受到关注。尽管该法没有界定这些条款，一方面，是否需要社会对话委员会取决于确定这些条款；另一方面，特许经营者在组织和管理其业务，包括在雇佣劳工事务方面，本质上独立于授予特许人。因此，有必要对所有特许经营协议进行就业审计（例如，如果条款规定营业时间或规定着装怎么办？），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
最后，只有在法国雇用至少300名（全职）工作人员的特许经营关系网才要求设立社会对话委员会。这似乎不包括特许经营人的雇员或不受特许经营协议约束的经营者的雇员(例如受商标许可合同约束的经营者)。
意味着长期谈判的实现
即使满足了法律要求，授予特许人也没有义务自发成立社会对话委员会。然而，一旦工会要求成立社会对话委员会，授予特许人就有义务积极参加该行业发起的谈判，与所有特许经营者核实其关系网上的雇员人数是否达到300人的门槛，然后建立一个由雇员（工会）代表和雇主（授予特许人和特许经营人）代表组成的“谈判论坛”，用来达成创建和组织未来社会对话委员会的协议。
与工会和特许经营者的谈判将在6达成协议但须经授予特许人、工会和至少30%的特许经营者(占关系网雇员的30%)的同意。该协议应确定社会对话委员会的组成、其成员的任职方式、任期、会议的频率、如果需要，雇员可以为委员会贡献多长时间、委员会实现其宗旨所需的物质或财政手段、以及如何处理费用和代表的旅费和生活津贴等问题。最后一个问题可能不仅是授予特许人关注的一个主要问题，而且也是特许经营人-雇主关注的一个主要方面。由于没有达成这样的协议，该法令规定设立社会对话委员会，其中有几项严格和最低限度的规定，可能会给授予特许人造成不合理的负担。
一旦成立，内部规则将确切界定社会对话委员会的运作方式（所需的多数人、会议通知和引荐来源、讨论内容的公布等）。
无事生非？
社会对话委员会无权调查案件或作出具有约束力的裁决，但社会对话委员会必须让大家知道特许经营者加盟或离开销售关系网的情况，以及“授予特许者的决定，易于影响到特许经营者雇员的数量和结构、工作时间或就业、工作和职业培训条件”。
社会对话委员会还可就如何改善贯穿整个关系网的条件提出建议。
社会对话委员会的影响终究相当有限，但授予特许人必须认真掌握和控制规则的实施，以避免损失自己的特许经营商的时间和精力以及关系网的混乱。
Not what you would expect
When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!
The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.
This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.
However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.
In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.
Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an “in-house” operation” in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.
What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?
Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.
Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.
As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.
The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!
However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to “justify” avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.
In this respect, in many cases simple “non-satisfaction” was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.
There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.
Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.
Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.
The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.
In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.
It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.
At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.
One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.
Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.
No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.
The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.
Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.
The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.
Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?
The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.
Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.
The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).
In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.
From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.
What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?
Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.
The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).
With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.
Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.
From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.
It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.
By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.
In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.
根据欧盟电子商务部门的调查，超过50%的互联网市场和36%的零售商提供数据给价格搜索引擎，如 Idealo，谷歌购物Google Shopping，或Shopzilla。相比之下，大约10%的经销商受到价格比较引擎禁令的影响（见委员会工作人员工作文件SWD（2017）154定稿，S.32图B.4和欧盟委员会第37页，电子商务部门调查的最后报告，第10页）。
不过，联邦法院最近确认，价格比较引擎的禁令是反竞争和无效的。在具体案例中，爱世克斯（跑鞋品牌名）通常禁止德国零售商支持在线分销中的价格搜索引擎：
“此外，经授权的…经销商不得…通过为这些价格比较引擎提供特定于应用程序的接口（“APIs”）来支持价格比较引擎的功能。”
此外，该协议还包含了对第三方平台广告的广泛禁止：爱世克斯禁止其授权经销商允许第三方在第三方网站上以任何形式使用爱世克斯的商标，以便直接引导客户访问被授权的爱世克斯经销商的网站。
爱世克斯的分销协议首先由德国竞争管理机构Bundeskartellamt作为试点案例进行调查(由于许多体育零售商对体育设备制造商的互联网转售限制提出了申诉，因此对阿迪达斯提起了另一起试点案件)。2015年，Bundeskartellamt裁定，爱世克斯对价格比较引擎的禁令违反了反垄断法，因为它将违反第101条(1) TFEU，sec.1 《禁止限制竞争法》。提出的理由是，这种禁令的主要目的是控制和限制价格竞争，而牺牲消费者的利益。这项决定首先得到了Düsseldorf高等地区法院的确认（2017年4月5日的裁决，案件号：VI-Kart 13/15(V)，见Legalmondo文章，点击这里）。
现在，联邦法院再次确认了这项裁决（2017年12月12日的决定，第KVZ 41/17号案件）。爱世克斯的裁决特别值得注意，因为它是德国法院继欧盟法院关于科蒂（全球最大的香水生产公司）的平台禁令作出裁决裁决之后作出的首项裁决（见Legalmondo的文章，点击这里）。因此，这是法院今后将如何处理互联网转售限制的第一个迹象。
因此，联邦法院指出，对价格搜索引擎的普遍禁止“至少”要限制向终端消费者的被动销售（第23款, 25款)–这种限制甚至将是这种禁令的预期目的。法院认为，根据《科蒂判决》（点击此出查看），一般平台禁令的可接受性并不意味着一般价格比较禁令的可接受性（第28款及其后款）。尤其是“限制组合”–即第三方平台价格比较引擎和广告宣传禁令–会产生影响。因为它没有确保潜在客户能够“实际进入”经销商网站（第30款） –在这种情况下，联邦最高法院允许提供这种“实质性准入”所需的充分或必要的条件；在这种情况下，一般价格比较引擎禁令仍可继续得到允许。
实用贴士：
- 在欧盟一级，法院和欧盟委员会都没有就普遍禁止价格比较引擎的有效性采取立场。然而，在英国，竞争和市场管理局对价格搜索引擎禁令也采取了类似的批评观点（“宝马在CMA行动后改变了对汽车比较网站的政策”），将其作为德国的行政实践和司法管辖权。
- 事实上，根据联邦最高法院的判决，Düsseldorf高级地区法院（Asics）和法兰克福高等地区法院（Deuter）已经指出以下区别可能适用于：
- 一般价格比较引擎禁令是–根据联邦法院–反竞争的，因此通常是无效的–尽管如果不与广泛的广告禁令相结合，这些禁令仍然是允许的，这样就可以保证潜在的客户能够访问经销商网站。
- 单独的价格比较引擎禁令和使用价格比较门户网站的其他较温和的限制/标准是允许的，例如关于产品插画或说明以及产品环境（例如要求经销商只能提供新产品）。
进一步了解细节: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb: „Nicht Ideal(o)“ – Kombination aus Preissuchmaschinen-Verbot und Logo-Klausel, in: ZVertriebsR 2018, 118 ff.
- 除此之外，制造商可以–在排他性分销网络内–禁止其分销商主动向制造商保留的或由制造商分配给另一分销商的客户提供在线广告，并指明所使用的语言。原则上，所有其他可能的质量标准也是允许的，只要他们和线下分销标准等效（因为“委员会认为，规定网上销售的标准与从实体店销售的标准总体上不等于硬核限制，从而劝阻指定经销商使用互联网接触更多和更多样化的客户的任何义务”，《纵向限制准则》，第56条）。
有关更多信息，请参见：
- 有关实践现状的概述，包括示范合约条款：Rohrßen, Vertriebsvorgaben im E-Commerce 2018: Praxisübersichts und Folgen des “Coty”-Urteils des EuGH, in: GRUR-Prax 2018, 39-41 以及
- 特别是关于平台禁令和可能起草分配协议: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb von Markenartikeln: Zulässigkeit von Plattformverboten nach dem EuGH-Urteil Coty – Auswirkungen auf Fachhändler- bzw. Selektiv-, Exklusiv-, Franchise- und offene Vertriebsverträge –, in: DB 2018. 300-306.
- 关于在互联网销售平台中嵌入的搜索功能中是否允许使用商标和公司徽标，见联邦法院最近于2018年2月15日发布的两项裁决（案件号：I ZR 138/16 re “Ortlieb” 和案件号 I ZR 201/1 re “gofit“).
Agreements restricting competition are prohibited as anticompetitive agreements by Article 101 TFEU unless the agreement’s impact on trade or competition is not appreciable (cf. the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case, C-226/11, judgment of 13 December 2012). Whether an agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition or is in the “safe harbour” can be assessed according to the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice. Accordingly, an agreement is particularly appreciable if its object is to restrict competition. This applies in particular to so-called hardcore restrictions, such as vertical price maintenance (or resale price maintenance = “RPM”).
Regarding a special offer for dietary products, the German Higher Regional Court of Celle surprisingly took a different view and decided that even resale price maintenance could be considered non-appreciable and thus falling outside the ban of anticompetitive business practices under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 07.04.2016, Case 13 U 124/15 [Kart]). In this case, the manufacturer made a special offer to a group of its customers (pharmacies) with a special purchase discount: once, for a limited period and limited to a maximum quantity. In return, the customers should commit themselves to “present the product clearly… and not fall below a resale price of EUR 15.95“.
The Hanover Regional Court had instead seen the agreement as an unlawful resale price maintenance (judgment of 25 August 2015, Case 18 O 91/15) – and now the German Federal Court confirmed the same: the minimum prices specified here within the advertising campaign appreciably restrict competition and are thus banned as anticompetitive business practice under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 17 October 2017, Case KZR 59/16). This corresponds to the case law of the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case (see above) and the German Federal Court with regard to the sales requirement “one bar extra “ (i.e. without extra charge compared to the usual package size) of the Italian confectionery manufacturer Ferrero (judgment of 08.04.2003, Case KZR 3/02) – because the latter explicitly concerns “the scope for price increases resulting from the increased contents of the package” – not, however, the retailer’s decision to set prices freely downwards.
Practical tips
Vertical price fixing is generally prohibited, whereas providing a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP, also “recommended retail price”) and maximum selling prices are allowed – this is briefly the principle of German and European antitrust law on pricing frameworks. Furthermore, recommended retail prices and maximum selling prices (“MSP”) are subject to the restriction that they ” they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties” (Article 4 lit. a Vertical Block Exemptions Regulation). That means:
- the manufacturer or supplier may provide guidance,
- however, the reseller may set his sales prices freely.
Exceptions may apply – in addition to the RPM on the price of books or in the case of specialisation agreements – by way of the efficiency defence under Article 101 (3) TFEU in individual cases, e.g.
- in the introductory period when launching new products on the market, or
- in the case of short-term special offers if accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency, for example by investing the higher margin into better customer advice, which benefits all customers and Resale Price Maintenance prevents retailers who do not offer the customer advice from free riding (cf. EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 225).
Such actions, however, require excellent preparation because manufacturers can only set resale prices for very short periods if they can convincingly demonstrate efficiency gains such as preventing free-riders.
In the case of fixed prices, the competition authorities quickly become sensitive. For example, fines for vertical price maintenance have recently been imposed again in Germany. In this respect, special care must be taken particularly in distribution and sales agreements.
- Correspondingly, each company’s sales team should continue following the previous case law on recommended retail prices, maximum selling prices and discount campaigns. Guidance for the practice is provided by
- the Federal Cartel Office’s paper of July 2017 on the prohibition of fixed prices in stationary food retailing,
- the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (para. 48 et seq., 223 et seq.) and the „Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice“ – all three, however, must always be assessed in the light of current case law because the understanding of the EU Commission contained in these documents does not bind neither the courts nor the national antitrust authorities.
“日默瓦（行李箱品牌名）所有者终止了在欧洲的所有分销协议”——2018年3月9日，德国主要商业报纸“Handelsblatt”的标题。终止原因是：日默瓦——著名高质量的行李箱品牌制造商——其在2011年后，于2018年重新设计它的分销网络：日默瓦的目标是再次提高其质量选择标准，不再将其产品卖给传统的商店，而是提供现代的购物体验。
原则上，制造商可以根据其营销战略和任何变化的需求自由设计和开发其分销系统。相似地，他们可以在原则上自由选择销售中间商（分销商/经销商、特许经营者、代理人等）的数量和名称。他们原则上也可以自由转向选择性分销，目的是使其产品的分销符合某些标准（特别是关于分销的质量），从而也有可能减少分销商的数量。然而，作为例外，分销商可能强迫制造商提供这些产品——即制造商有很大的市场支配力。在这种情况下，与分销商订立合同从而产生交货义务的义务可能源自禁止歧视的规定。（德国《反竞争限制法》第1、20条，1、2款，19项）。
如果制造商重新设计他们的分销网络——就像日默瓦以前和现在所做的那样，那么这个问题就变得特别相关，日默瓦在2011/2012年转向选择性分销（关于选择性分销的优点和可能的分销限制，见Legalmondo文章）。为了重新设计其分销网络，日默瓦终止了以前的分销协议，并提出缔结新的分销协议——根据新的协议，新的分销商承诺以某种方式展示货物，并购买和使用日默瓦的店内系统。日默瓦认为，原分销商的表现与新的商业理念和销售策略不符，这就是双方未能达成缔结一份新协议的原因。于是，分销商提出诉讼，目的是订立一份新的经销商合同，从而交付他的经销商店。
慕尼黑地区法院驳回了这项诉讼请求(2014年9月9日的裁决，编号7249/13 HKO)。不过，慕尼黑高等地区法院确认了这种索赔(2015年9月17日的裁定，注释第U 3886/1/4 Kart)——主张制造商在有关的“高价和高质量手提箱市场”中处于领导地位，或者，相反地，如果分销商具有依赖性，并且因为制造商的手提箱不能被其他同等的手提箱所取代。这种依赖性尤其通过高分销率表现（即制造商提供了大量可比较的分销商）以及独特的设计和相关的高认可价值。现在，联邦法院推翻了这一判决，并将其发回重审(2017年12月12日的裁决，编号：KZR 50/15)。原因：分销商对制造商的产品分类依赖（“Spitzenstellungsabhängigkeit”作为“Sortimentsbedingte Abhängigkeit”的特例）没有得到充分的证明。尽管高分销率通常是决定性的，但在目前这样的质量选择性分销制度中，其意义可能不大。重新设计分销系统的决定性因素：“如果供应商选择在某个时间点转换到一个高质量的选择性分销系统，在之前的一段时间里，与品种相关的依赖关系通常会以较高的分销率来表示。”（第19款）
制造商尤其可以提出两个论点，反对这种所谓的分类相关依赖关系，即
(一)由制造商自行供应其产品的分销商数目远低于提供其产品的分销商总数（即包括通过其他渠道购买该产品的分销商）；及
(二) 分销率将根据那些可与要求进入分配系统和交付的分销商相媲美的分销商确定（第27款)–正如德国联邦法院先前在裁定室内装潢案例（2000年5月9日的裁定，参考KZR 28/98，p. 12）。
Practical conclusions
实际结论
“没有什么比改变更永恒”：在重新设计分销系统时，要仔细考虑是否想要/需要过渡安排–或者最好不考虑过渡安排。一个很好的不考虑过渡安排的理由是：它们可能会使排除不想要的分销商变得更加困难。因此，在日默瓦一案中，慕尼黑的较高地区法院驳回了制造商的反驳意见，即分销商的商业模式“以讨价还价为目标”–辩称，制造商给其他分销商“订立协议后12个月”的时间来满足新的定性标准。
有关定性标准（也是要求/规格），请参阅Legalmondo上的其他文章，特别是关于平台禁令和价格比较禁令的文章，请参见Legalmondo上的文章。
地域封锁是一种歧视性做法，由于客户的国籍或其居住地或营业地，阻止客户（主要是网上客户）从另一欧盟成员国的网站获取和（或）购买产品或服务。
欧盟条例在2018年2月28日颁布的关于解决基于客户国籍、居住地或营业地在国内市场上的不合理的地域封锁和其他形式的歧视的欧盟第2018/302号条例将于2018年12月2日生效。
当前情况
欧盟委员会对欧盟的1万多个电子商务网站进行了“秘密购物”调查。地域封锁指数相当高！63%的网站不允许购物者从另一个欧盟国家购买商品（甚至包括86%的家用电器和79%的电子和计算机硬件）。
另一方面，当电子商务的价值和数量就全球来说，年复一年地大幅增长时，只有50%的欧洲客户从设在另一个欧盟成员国的网上商店购买产品，但这种现象只是在国内范围而非整个欧洲。
2017年6月23日，欧洲理事会要求切实执行数字单一市场战略的所有内容，包括跨界交付、消费者保护和禁止不当地域封锁。
现行法律框架的缺失
欧洲联盟指令（欧盟第2006/123/CE号指令）和TFUE第101条已经解决了基于国籍、地区或住所或营业地的歧视做法。
根据欧盟指令第20(2)条，欧盟成员国必须确保专业人员不因客户的居住地、营业所或国籍而区别对待（客观例外情况除外）。另一方面，关于纵向限制的欧盟竞争法(《欧盟运行条例》第101条和集体豁免条例及其指南)认为，对被动销售的限制是违反欧盟竞争规则的核心限制。然而，这两套规则(欧盟指令和竞争法框架)在实践中似乎并不完全有效。
在这方面，欧盟委员会在最近关于电子商务部门竞争调查的报告中表明，地域封锁尤其在欧洲电子商务部门内得到了大规模使用。
地域封锁条例的目的
地域封锁条例的目的是防止专业人员在处理跨国界电子商务交易时，基于国籍、居住地或客户营业地而实施的直接或间接歧视。
地域封锁条例的范围
新的条例将只适用于企业与最终用户或企业之间的网上销售。
新条例将适用于在欧盟内运作的网站或在欧盟以外运作但向设立在欧盟内的客户提供货物或服务的网站。
电子网站的管理新规是什么？
关于访问网站的问题
根据该条例，企业不得以与互联网用户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的理由，通过使用技术措施来阻止或限制其进入网络接口。然而，只要客户明确同意，并且仍然可以轻松访问他们原先试图访问的网站版本，企业就有权将客的访问方向改变到他们试图访问的网站之外的另一个网站。
关于网站的销售条款和条件
该规则禁止企业在下列三种情况下，根据客户的国籍、居住地或营业地（特别是他们的IP地址），提供不同的一般条件来取得货物或服务：
提供送货服务的企业将售出的商品送达到另外的欧盟成员国交付（或在企业与客户共同商定的地点收取货物）的；
企业提供的电子化服务，如云、数据存储、主机服务等。（但不提供访问受版权保护的内容的服务，如流媒体或在线游戏服务）；
顾客获得的在各个国家均可运行的商务服务（如汽车租赁和旅馆住宿服务或体育或文化活动的票务服务）。
关于网站上的付款方式
该条例禁止企业以与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地、支付账户所在地或支付服务提供者的设立地有关的理由，对已接受的支付手段适用不同的支付条件（条件是必须符合认证要求，付款交易必须以企业接受的货币进行）。
这项规定对电子零售商有什么影响？
尽管在形式上被排除在该条例范围之外，但供应商与分销商或批发商之间的关系仍将受到该条例的影响，因为根据分销商之间的协议规定，分销商承诺不进行被动销售（例如，阻止或限制进入网站），由于与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的原因“将自动无效”。
因此，地域封锁条例对分销商的影响是双重的：第一，在与客户（最终用户或用户企业）的关系中产生直接影响；第二，在其根据独家分销协议所承担的义务方面产生间接影响。
地域封锁条例必须与现行竞争法框架相协调，特别是与制定适用于网上销售的具体规则的纵向限制指导方针相协调。网上销售被比作被动销售。指导方针中提到4个实践中为了间接保证地方保护主义，在供应商和独家分销商同意的情况下被禁止的例子：
独家经销商应阻止另一地区的客户访问其网站，或自动将其转到供应商或其他经销商的网站，
如果买方的信用卡数据显示买方不是独家经销商的专有区域，独家经销商应终止网上销售。
限制独家分销商通过互联网销售的份额（但合同可规定按绝对值计算的最低线下目标，并规定与离线销售相比，网上销售保持一致）。
独家分销商对在互联网上销售的货物支付的价格，应高于对准备在离线销售的货物支付的价格。
制造商将必须决定是采用一个独一无二的欧洲门户网站报价还是多个地方商业报价，众所周知，每个范畴的客户端是有可能存在价格差异的。
事实上，新规定并没有强制电子零售商协调其价格政策，它们只是必须允许欧盟消费者自由和容易地访问其网站的任何版本。同样，该条例并没有规定电子零售商必须将产品运往欧洲各地，而只是允许欧盟消费者从他们想要的任何网站购买商品，并在必要时自行安排发货。
最后，在更为契约性的层面上，尚不十分清楚新的地域封锁规则如何直接或间接地影响适用于消费者合同的冲突法规则，根据罗马第1号规定(Rome I Regulation)，特别是在允许消费者在本网站所在国的外国网站上购买产品时（这意味着在消费者所在国无特定交货制度已建立。）
因此，B2C网站的一般条款和条件需要在营销和法律两方面进行审查和调整。
Once convinced of the utility of mediation as a method of resolving conflicts between franchisor and franchisee and taken the decision to include a clause in the contracts that provides for it, the last step would be what elements should be taken into account when drafting it.
- The previous negotiation. It seems advisable that both parties grant themselves the possibility of trying to solve the problem with a previous formal negotiation. Mediation does not exclude the previous attempt made by the interested parties or their lawyers; however, it seems advisable to contractually provide a suitable end according to the circumstances. Experience shows that lengthening this phase too long may result in the conflict becoming more complicated and even more difficult to approach mediation.
- The clause may also provide for the place where the mediation will take place. Again at this point the parties are free. It is convenient that this is accurate indicating the concrete city.
- The language in which the mediation will be developed is the a faculty of the parties. There will be no difficulty in mediations in which both parties use the same language, but it is very convenient in contracts with parties that have different languages, or that belong to regions or countries with different co-official languages. The drafting or signing of the contract in a specific language does not presuppose that this must be the language of the mediation. It is an element to be taken into account also when requesting a mediator who can use that language in the chosen mediation institution.
- The procedure can also be decided by the parties. In particular, the number of sessions, the maximum expected duration, the participation of advisors, etc. Keep in mind that the greater or lesser regulation will allow to avoid future conflicts in this respect, although it will also imply a greater limit to the freedom of the parties that, nevertheless, will remain free to modify the agreement by mutual consent.
- The term of the mediation can also be contemplated. This would allow, for example, to prevent mediation from being extended only for purely procedural strategic purposes or to gather information from the other party before starting a procedure, etc. The professional mediators, however, are able to identify these manoeuvres, also having the power to put an end to mediation in those cases.
- Choosing the mediator or the mediation institution is an important choice. The parties can agree on who will be their mediator, indicate in the contract the elements to choose it, or submit directly to a Mediation Institution so that it is the one who designates it according to its own rules. These decisions can be alternatives (that is, that the parties agree on the mediator and, in case of lack of agreement, submit to an institution that names it), or they can be unique. The designation of an Institution requires that it has a sufficient guarantee of stability (avoid designating short-term institutions or without much future guarantee), with a sufficient panel of mediators depending on the characteristics of the mediation (language, competence, experience) and that allows the necessary flexibility for its operation.
- Finally, it is convenient that the clause includes an alternative way in case the mediation does not succeed either because the parties do not reach an agreement, or because they withdraw from the mediation. It is important to recall that mediation does not close the doors to the conflict be resolved by recourse to ordinary jurisdiction or arbitration. And in terms of specialized arbitration in distribution contracts, the IDArb (https://www.idiproject.com/content/idarb-idi-arbitration-project) is an excellent option.
On the topic of the importance of Mediation in Distribution Agreements, you can check out the recording our webinar “Mediation in International Conflicts”
写信给 Ignacio
意大利 – “网络税”
2018年3月23日
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意大利
- 分销协议
- 电子商务
法国是特许经营关系网的大市场，近2000家特许经营关系网处于运营状态。这是最成功的商业发展计划之一。
特许人必须主要遵守法国关于预先披露信息的规定以及法国和欧盟的竞争条例等规定。虽然对授予特许者来说，对关系网质量和品牌形象的控制是一个非常重要且合法的问题，但授予特许者不能过多地干预特许经营人的日常活动，因为特许经营人是独立商家。因此，授予特许人与特许经营人之间的关系只能建立在商法的基础上，而不能建立在劳动法的基础上。然而，法国最近的规定将导致授予特许者与特许经营者和他们的雇员一起实施某些劳动法。
在法国经营特许经营关系网的外国特许经营者确实必须知道如何应对《劳动法》（2016年8月8日）及其法令（2017年5月4日）所带来的限制，并自2017年5月7日起生效，该法令涉及为整个特许经营关系网设立一个雇员论坛。事实上，这个社会对话委员会可以对特许经营关系网的组织工作产生深刻的影响。
首先，新的社会对话委员会只关心经营者受特许权协议约束的关系网。因此，商标许可和分销合同似乎没有包括在内。特许权协议应被理解为由三项单独协议构成的特殊合同：商标许可协议、专有技术许可协议和商业或技术援助协议。然而，2016年8月8日的法律却造成了一些混乱，规定社会对话委员会所涉及的特许协议是“引用《法国商法典》第L330-3条”协议，尽管该条不仅没有界定特许合同的定义，而且可以适用于其他合同（独家分销协议），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
此外，根据该法案，只有包括“对特许经营企业的工作组织和条件有影响的条款”的具体特许协议才会受到关注。尽管该法没有界定这些条款，一方面，是否需要社会对话委员会取决于确定这些条款；另一方面，特许经营者在组织和管理其业务，包括在雇佣劳工事务方面，本质上独立于授予特许人。因此，有必要对所有特许经营协议进行就业审计（例如，如果条款规定营业时间或规定着装怎么办？），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
最后，只有在法国雇用至少300名（全职）工作人员的特许经营关系网才要求设立社会对话委员会。这似乎不包括特许经营人的雇员或不受特许经营协议约束的经营者的雇员(例如受商标许可合同约束的经营者)。
意味着长期谈判的实现
即使满足了法律要求，授予特许人也没有义务自发成立社会对话委员会。然而，一旦工会要求成立社会对话委员会，授予特许人就有义务积极参加该行业发起的谈判，与所有特许经营者核实其关系网上的雇员人数是否达到300人的门槛，然后建立一个由雇员（工会）代表和雇主（授予特许人和特许经营人）代表组成的“谈判论坛”，用来达成创建和组织未来社会对话委员会的协议。
与工会和特许经营者的谈判将在6达成协议但须经授予特许人、工会和至少30%的特许经营者(占关系网雇员的30%)的同意。该协议应确定社会对话委员会的组成、其成员的任职方式、任期、会议的频率、如果需要，雇员可以为委员会贡献多长时间、委员会实现其宗旨所需的物质或财政手段、以及如何处理费用和代表的旅费和生活津贴等问题。最后一个问题可能不仅是授予特许人关注的一个主要问题，而且也是特许经营人-雇主关注的一个主要方面。由于没有达成这样的协议，该法令规定设立社会对话委员会，其中有几项严格和最低限度的规定，可能会给授予特许人造成不合理的负担。
一旦成立，内部规则将确切界定社会对话委员会的运作方式（所需的多数人、会议通知和引荐来源、讨论内容的公布等）。
无事生非？
社会对话委员会无权调查案件或作出具有约束力的裁决，但社会对话委员会必须让大家知道特许经营者加盟或离开销售关系网的情况，以及“授予特许者的决定，易于影响到特许经营者雇员的数量和结构、工作时间或就业、工作和职业培训条件”。
社会对话委员会还可就如何改善贯穿整个关系网的条件提出建议。
社会对话委员会的影响终究相当有限，但授予特许人必须认真掌握和控制规则的实施，以避免损失自己的特许经营商的时间和精力以及关系网的混乱。
Not what you would expect
When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!
The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.
This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.
However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.
In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.
Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an “in-house” operation” in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.
What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?
Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.
Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.
As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.
The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!
However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to “justify” avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.
In this respect, in many cases simple “non-satisfaction” was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.
There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.
Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.
Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.
The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.
In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.
It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.
At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.
One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.
Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.
No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.
The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.
Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.
The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.
Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?
The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.
Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.
The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).
In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.
From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.
What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?
Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.
The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).
With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.
Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.
From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.
It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.
By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.
In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.
根据欧盟电子商务部门的调查，超过50%的互联网市场和36%的零售商提供数据给价格搜索引擎，如 Idealo，谷歌购物Google Shopping，或Shopzilla。相比之下，大约10%的经销商受到价格比较引擎禁令的影响（见委员会工作人员工作文件SWD（2017）154定稿，S.32图B.4和欧盟委员会第37页，电子商务部门调查的最后报告，第10页）。
不过，联邦法院最近确认，价格比较引擎的禁令是反竞争和无效的。在具体案例中，爱世克斯（跑鞋品牌名）通常禁止德国零售商支持在线分销中的价格搜索引擎：
“此外，经授权的…经销商不得…通过为这些价格比较引擎提供特定于应用程序的接口（“APIs”）来支持价格比较引擎的功能。”
此外，该协议还包含了对第三方平台广告的广泛禁止：爱世克斯禁止其授权经销商允许第三方在第三方网站上以任何形式使用爱世克斯的商标，以便直接引导客户访问被授权的爱世克斯经销商的网站。
爱世克斯的分销协议首先由德国竞争管理机构Bundeskartellamt作为试点案例进行调查(由于许多体育零售商对体育设备制造商的互联网转售限制提出了申诉，因此对阿迪达斯提起了另一起试点案件)。2015年，Bundeskartellamt裁定，爱世克斯对价格比较引擎的禁令违反了反垄断法，因为它将违反第101条(1) TFEU，sec.1 《禁止限制竞争法》。提出的理由是，这种禁令的主要目的是控制和限制价格竞争，而牺牲消费者的利益。这项决定首先得到了Düsseldorf高等地区法院的确认（2017年4月5日的裁决，案件号：VI-Kart 13/15(V)，见Legalmondo文章，点击这里）。
现在，联邦法院再次确认了这项裁决（2017年12月12日的决定，第KVZ 41/17号案件）。爱世克斯的裁决特别值得注意，因为它是德国法院继欧盟法院关于科蒂（全球最大的香水生产公司）的平台禁令作出裁决裁决之后作出的首项裁决（见Legalmondo的文章，点击这里）。因此，这是法院今后将如何处理互联网转售限制的第一个迹象。
因此，联邦法院指出，对价格搜索引擎的普遍禁止“至少”要限制向终端消费者的被动销售（第23款, 25款)–这种限制甚至将是这种禁令的预期目的。法院认为，根据《科蒂判决》（点击此出查看），一般平台禁令的可接受性并不意味着一般价格比较禁令的可接受性（第28款及其后款）。尤其是“限制组合”–即第三方平台价格比较引擎和广告宣传禁令–会产生影响。因为它没有确保潜在客户能够“实际进入”经销商网站（第30款） –在这种情况下，联邦最高法院允许提供这种“实质性准入”所需的充分或必要的条件；在这种情况下，一般价格比较引擎禁令仍可继续得到允许。
实用贴士：
- 在欧盟一级，法院和欧盟委员会都没有就普遍禁止价格比较引擎的有效性采取立场。然而，在英国，竞争和市场管理局对价格搜索引擎禁令也采取了类似的批评观点（“宝马在CMA行动后改变了对汽车比较网站的政策”），将其作为德国的行政实践和司法管辖权。
- 事实上，根据联邦最高法院的判决，Düsseldorf高级地区法院（Asics）和法兰克福高等地区法院（Deuter）已经指出以下区别可能适用于：
- 一般价格比较引擎禁令是–根据联邦法院–反竞争的，因此通常是无效的–尽管如果不与广泛的广告禁令相结合，这些禁令仍然是允许的，这样就可以保证潜在的客户能够访问经销商网站。
- 单独的价格比较引擎禁令和使用价格比较门户网站的其他较温和的限制/标准是允许的，例如关于产品插画或说明以及产品环境（例如要求经销商只能提供新产品）。
进一步了解细节: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb: „Nicht Ideal(o)“ – Kombination aus Preissuchmaschinen-Verbot und Logo-Klausel, in: ZVertriebsR 2018, 118 ff.
- 除此之外，制造商可以–在排他性分销网络内–禁止其分销商主动向制造商保留的或由制造商分配给另一分销商的客户提供在线广告，并指明所使用的语言。原则上，所有其他可能的质量标准也是允许的，只要他们和线下分销标准等效（因为“委员会认为，规定网上销售的标准与从实体店销售的标准总体上不等于硬核限制，从而劝阻指定经销商使用互联网接触更多和更多样化的客户的任何义务”，《纵向限制准则》，第56条）。
有关更多信息，请参见：
- 有关实践现状的概述，包括示范合约条款：Rohrßen, Vertriebsvorgaben im E-Commerce 2018: Praxisübersichts und Folgen des “Coty”-Urteils des EuGH, in: GRUR-Prax 2018, 39-41 以及
- 特别是关于平台禁令和可能起草分配协议: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb von Markenartikeln: Zulässigkeit von Plattformverboten nach dem EuGH-Urteil Coty – Auswirkungen auf Fachhändler- bzw. Selektiv-, Exklusiv-, Franchise- und offene Vertriebsverträge –, in: DB 2018. 300-306.
- 关于在互联网销售平台中嵌入的搜索功能中是否允许使用商标和公司徽标，见联邦法院最近于2018年2月15日发布的两项裁决（案件号：I ZR 138/16 re “Ortlieb” 和案件号 I ZR 201/1 re “gofit“).
Agreements restricting competition are prohibited as anticompetitive agreements by Article 101 TFEU unless the agreement’s impact on trade or competition is not appreciable (cf. the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case, C-226/11, judgment of 13 December 2012). Whether an agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition or is in the “safe harbour” can be assessed according to the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice. Accordingly, an agreement is particularly appreciable if its object is to restrict competition. This applies in particular to so-called hardcore restrictions, such as vertical price maintenance (or resale price maintenance = “RPM”).
Regarding a special offer for dietary products, the German Higher Regional Court of Celle surprisingly took a different view and decided that even resale price maintenance could be considered non-appreciable and thus falling outside the ban of anticompetitive business practices under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 07.04.2016, Case 13 U 124/15 [Kart]). In this case, the manufacturer made a special offer to a group of its customers (pharmacies) with a special purchase discount: once, for a limited period and limited to a maximum quantity. In return, the customers should commit themselves to “present the product clearly… and not fall below a resale price of EUR 15.95“.
The Hanover Regional Court had instead seen the agreement as an unlawful resale price maintenance (judgment of 25 August 2015, Case 18 O 91/15) – and now the German Federal Court confirmed the same: the minimum prices specified here within the advertising campaign appreciably restrict competition and are thus banned as anticompetitive business practice under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 17 October 2017, Case KZR 59/16). This corresponds to the case law of the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case (see above) and the German Federal Court with regard to the sales requirement “one bar extra “ (i.e. without extra charge compared to the usual package size) of the Italian confectionery manufacturer Ferrero (judgment of 08.04.2003, Case KZR 3/02) – because the latter explicitly concerns “the scope for price increases resulting from the increased contents of the package” – not, however, the retailer’s decision to set prices freely downwards.
Practical tips
Vertical price fixing is generally prohibited, whereas providing a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP, also “recommended retail price”) and maximum selling prices are allowed – this is briefly the principle of German and European antitrust law on pricing frameworks. Furthermore, recommended retail prices and maximum selling prices (“MSP”) are subject to the restriction that they ” they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties” (Article 4 lit. a Vertical Block Exemptions Regulation). That means:
- the manufacturer or supplier may provide guidance,
- however, the reseller may set his sales prices freely.
Exceptions may apply – in addition to the RPM on the price of books or in the case of specialisation agreements – by way of the efficiency defence under Article 101 (3) TFEU in individual cases, e.g.
- in the introductory period when launching new products on the market, or
- in the case of short-term special offers if accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency, for example by investing the higher margin into better customer advice, which benefits all customers and Resale Price Maintenance prevents retailers who do not offer the customer advice from free riding (cf. EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 225).
Such actions, however, require excellent preparation because manufacturers can only set resale prices for very short periods if they can convincingly demonstrate efficiency gains such as preventing free-riders.
In the case of fixed prices, the competition authorities quickly become sensitive. For example, fines for vertical price maintenance have recently been imposed again in Germany. In this respect, special care must be taken particularly in distribution and sales agreements.
- Correspondingly, each company’s sales team should continue following the previous case law on recommended retail prices, maximum selling prices and discount campaigns. Guidance for the practice is provided by
- the Federal Cartel Office’s paper of July 2017 on the prohibition of fixed prices in stationary food retailing,
- the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (para. 48 et seq., 223 et seq.) and the „Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice“ – all three, however, must always be assessed in the light of current case law because the understanding of the EU Commission contained in these documents does not bind neither the courts nor the national antitrust authorities.
“日默瓦（行李箱品牌名）所有者终止了在欧洲的所有分销协议”——2018年3月9日，德国主要商业报纸“Handelsblatt”的标题。终止原因是：日默瓦——著名高质量的行李箱品牌制造商——其在2011年后，于2018年重新设计它的分销网络：日默瓦的目标是再次提高其质量选择标准，不再将其产品卖给传统的商店，而是提供现代的购物体验。
原则上，制造商可以根据其营销战略和任何变化的需求自由设计和开发其分销系统。相似地，他们可以在原则上自由选择销售中间商（分销商/经销商、特许经营者、代理人等）的数量和名称。他们原则上也可以自由转向选择性分销，目的是使其产品的分销符合某些标准（特别是关于分销的质量），从而也有可能减少分销商的数量。然而，作为例外，分销商可能强迫制造商提供这些产品——即制造商有很大的市场支配力。在这种情况下，与分销商订立合同从而产生交货义务的义务可能源自禁止歧视的规定。（德国《反竞争限制法》第1、20条，1、2款，19项）。
如果制造商重新设计他们的分销网络——就像日默瓦以前和现在所做的那样，那么这个问题就变得特别相关，日默瓦在2011/2012年转向选择性分销（关于选择性分销的优点和可能的分销限制，见Legalmondo文章）。为了重新设计其分销网络，日默瓦终止了以前的分销协议，并提出缔结新的分销协议——根据新的协议，新的分销商承诺以某种方式展示货物，并购买和使用日默瓦的店内系统。日默瓦认为，原分销商的表现与新的商业理念和销售策略不符，这就是双方未能达成缔结一份新协议的原因。于是，分销商提出诉讼，目的是订立一份新的经销商合同，从而交付他的经销商店。
慕尼黑地区法院驳回了这项诉讼请求(2014年9月9日的裁决，编号7249/13 HKO)。不过，慕尼黑高等地区法院确认了这种索赔(2015年9月17日的裁定，注释第U 3886/1/4 Kart)——主张制造商在有关的“高价和高质量手提箱市场”中处于领导地位，或者，相反地，如果分销商具有依赖性，并且因为制造商的手提箱不能被其他同等的手提箱所取代。这种依赖性尤其通过高分销率表现（即制造商提供了大量可比较的分销商）以及独特的设计和相关的高认可价值。现在，联邦法院推翻了这一判决，并将其发回重审(2017年12月12日的裁决，编号：KZR 50/15)。原因：分销商对制造商的产品分类依赖（“Spitzenstellungsabhängigkeit”作为“Sortimentsbedingte Abhängigkeit”的特例）没有得到充分的证明。尽管高分销率通常是决定性的，但在目前这样的质量选择性分销制度中，其意义可能不大。重新设计分销系统的决定性因素：“如果供应商选择在某个时间点转换到一个高质量的选择性分销系统，在之前的一段时间里，与品种相关的依赖关系通常会以较高的分销率来表示。”（第19款）
制造商尤其可以提出两个论点，反对这种所谓的分类相关依赖关系，即
(一)由制造商自行供应其产品的分销商数目远低于提供其产品的分销商总数（即包括通过其他渠道购买该产品的分销商）；及
(二) 分销率将根据那些可与要求进入分配系统和交付的分销商相媲美的分销商确定（第27款)–正如德国联邦法院先前在裁定室内装潢案例（2000年5月9日的裁定，参考KZR 28/98，p. 12）。
Practical conclusions
实际结论
“没有什么比改变更永恒”：在重新设计分销系统时，要仔细考虑是否想要/需要过渡安排–或者最好不考虑过渡安排。一个很好的不考虑过渡安排的理由是：它们可能会使排除不想要的分销商变得更加困难。因此，在日默瓦一案中，慕尼黑的较高地区法院驳回了制造商的反驳意见，即分销商的商业模式“以讨价还价为目标”–辩称，制造商给其他分销商“订立协议后12个月”的时间来满足新的定性标准。
有关定性标准（也是要求/规格），请参阅Legalmondo上的其他文章，特别是关于平台禁令和价格比较禁令的文章，请参见Legalmondo上的文章。
地域封锁是一种歧视性做法，由于客户的国籍或其居住地或营业地，阻止客户（主要是网上客户）从另一欧盟成员国的网站获取和（或）购买产品或服务。
欧盟条例在2018年2月28日颁布的关于解决基于客户国籍、居住地或营业地在国内市场上的不合理的地域封锁和其他形式的歧视的欧盟第2018/302号条例将于2018年12月2日生效。
当前情况
欧盟委员会对欧盟的1万多个电子商务网站进行了“秘密购物”调查。地域封锁指数相当高！63%的网站不允许购物者从另一个欧盟国家购买商品（甚至包括86%的家用电器和79%的电子和计算机硬件）。
另一方面，当电子商务的价值和数量就全球来说，年复一年地大幅增长时，只有50%的欧洲客户从设在另一个欧盟成员国的网上商店购买产品，但这种现象只是在国内范围而非整个欧洲。
2017年6月23日，欧洲理事会要求切实执行数字单一市场战略的所有内容，包括跨界交付、消费者保护和禁止不当地域封锁。
现行法律框架的缺失
欧洲联盟指令（欧盟第2006/123/CE号指令）和TFUE第101条已经解决了基于国籍、地区或住所或营业地的歧视做法。
根据欧盟指令第20(2)条，欧盟成员国必须确保专业人员不因客户的居住地、营业所或国籍而区别对待（客观例外情况除外）。另一方面，关于纵向限制的欧盟竞争法(《欧盟运行条例》第101条和集体豁免条例及其指南)认为，对被动销售的限制是违反欧盟竞争规则的核心限制。然而，这两套规则(欧盟指令和竞争法框架)在实践中似乎并不完全有效。
在这方面，欧盟委员会在最近关于电子商务部门竞争调查的报告中表明，地域封锁尤其在欧洲电子商务部门内得到了大规模使用。
地域封锁条例的目的
地域封锁条例的目的是防止专业人员在处理跨国界电子商务交易时，基于国籍、居住地或客户营业地而实施的直接或间接歧视。
地域封锁条例的范围
新的条例将只适用于企业与最终用户或企业之间的网上销售。
新条例将适用于在欧盟内运作的网站或在欧盟以外运作但向设立在欧盟内的客户提供货物或服务的网站。
电子网站的管理新规是什么？
关于访问网站的问题
根据该条例，企业不得以与互联网用户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的理由，通过使用技术措施来阻止或限制其进入网络接口。然而，只要客户明确同意，并且仍然可以轻松访问他们原先试图访问的网站版本，企业就有权将客的访问方向改变到他们试图访问的网站之外的另一个网站。
关于网站的销售条款和条件
该规则禁止企业在下列三种情况下，根据客户的国籍、居住地或营业地（特别是他们的IP地址），提供不同的一般条件来取得货物或服务：
提供送货服务的企业将售出的商品送达到另外的欧盟成员国交付（或在企业与客户共同商定的地点收取货物）的；
企业提供的电子化服务，如云、数据存储、主机服务等。（但不提供访问受版权保护的内容的服务，如流媒体或在线游戏服务）；
顾客获得的在各个国家均可运行的商务服务（如汽车租赁和旅馆住宿服务或体育或文化活动的票务服务）。
关于网站上的付款方式
该条例禁止企业以与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地、支付账户所在地或支付服务提供者的设立地有关的理由，对已接受的支付手段适用不同的支付条件（条件是必须符合认证要求，付款交易必须以企业接受的货币进行）。
这项规定对电子零售商有什么影响？
尽管在形式上被排除在该条例范围之外，但供应商与分销商或批发商之间的关系仍将受到该条例的影响，因为根据分销商之间的协议规定，分销商承诺不进行被动销售（例如，阻止或限制进入网站），由于与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的原因“将自动无效”。
因此，地域封锁条例对分销商的影响是双重的：第一，在与客户（最终用户或用户企业）的关系中产生直接影响；第二，在其根据独家分销协议所承担的义务方面产生间接影响。
地域封锁条例必须与现行竞争法框架相协调，特别是与制定适用于网上销售的具体规则的纵向限制指导方针相协调。网上销售被比作被动销售。指导方针中提到4个实践中为了间接保证地方保护主义，在供应商和独家分销商同意的情况下被禁止的例子：
独家经销商应阻止另一地区的客户访问其网站，或自动将其转到供应商或其他经销商的网站，
如果买方的信用卡数据显示买方不是独家经销商的专有区域，独家经销商应终止网上销售。
限制独家分销商通过互联网销售的份额（但合同可规定按绝对值计算的最低线下目标，并规定与离线销售相比，网上销售保持一致）。
独家分销商对在互联网上销售的货物支付的价格，应高于对准备在离线销售的货物支付的价格。
制造商将必须决定是采用一个独一无二的欧洲门户网站报价还是多个地方商业报价，众所周知，每个范畴的客户端是有可能存在价格差异的。
事实上，新规定并没有强制电子零售商协调其价格政策，它们只是必须允许欧盟消费者自由和容易地访问其网站的任何版本。同样，该条例并没有规定电子零售商必须将产品运往欧洲各地，而只是允许欧盟消费者从他们想要的任何网站购买商品，并在必要时自行安排发货。
最后，在更为契约性的层面上，尚不十分清楚新的地域封锁规则如何直接或间接地影响适用于消费者合同的冲突法规则，根据罗马第1号规定(Rome I Regulation)，特别是在允许消费者在本网站所在国的外国网站上购买产品时（这意味着在消费者所在国无特定交货制度已建立。）
因此，B2C网站的一般条款和条件需要在营销和法律两方面进行审查和调整。
Once convinced of the utility of mediation as a method of resolving conflicts between franchisor and franchisee and taken the decision to include a clause in the contracts that provides for it, the last step would be what elements should be taken into account when drafting it.
- The previous negotiation. It seems advisable that both parties grant themselves the possibility of trying to solve the problem with a previous formal negotiation. Mediation does not exclude the previous attempt made by the interested parties or their lawyers; however, it seems advisable to contractually provide a suitable end according to the circumstances. Experience shows that lengthening this phase too long may result in the conflict becoming more complicated and even more difficult to approach mediation.
- The clause may also provide for the place where the mediation will take place. Again at this point the parties are free. It is convenient that this is accurate indicating the concrete city.
- The language in which the mediation will be developed is the a faculty of the parties. There will be no difficulty in mediations in which both parties use the same language, but it is very convenient in contracts with parties that have different languages, or that belong to regions or countries with different co-official languages. The drafting or signing of the contract in a specific language does not presuppose that this must be the language of the mediation. It is an element to be taken into account also when requesting a mediator who can use that language in the chosen mediation institution.
- The procedure can also be decided by the parties. In particular, the number of sessions, the maximum expected duration, the participation of advisors, etc. Keep in mind that the greater or lesser regulation will allow to avoid future conflicts in this respect, although it will also imply a greater limit to the freedom of the parties that, nevertheless, will remain free to modify the agreement by mutual consent.
- The term of the mediation can also be contemplated. This would allow, for example, to prevent mediation from being extended only for purely procedural strategic purposes or to gather information from the other party before starting a procedure, etc. The professional mediators, however, are able to identify these manoeuvres, also having the power to put an end to mediation in those cases.
- Choosing the mediator or the mediation institution is an important choice. The parties can agree on who will be their mediator, indicate in the contract the elements to choose it, or submit directly to a Mediation Institution so that it is the one who designates it according to its own rules. These decisions can be alternatives (that is, that the parties agree on the mediator and, in case of lack of agreement, submit to an institution that names it), or they can be unique. The designation of an Institution requires that it has a sufficient guarantee of stability (avoid designating short-term institutions or without much future guarantee), with a sufficient panel of mediators depending on the characteristics of the mediation (language, competence, experience) and that allows the necessary flexibility for its operation.
- Finally, it is convenient that the clause includes an alternative way in case the mediation does not succeed either because the parties do not reach an agreement, or because they withdraw from the mediation. It is important to recall that mediation does not close the doors to the conflict be resolved by recourse to ordinary jurisdiction or arbitration. And in terms of specialized arbitration in distribution contracts, the IDArb (https://www.idiproject.com/content/idarb-idi-arbitration-project) is an excellent option.
On the topic of the importance of Mediation in Distribution Agreements, you can check out the recording our webinar “Mediation in International Conflicts”
写信给 Roberto
France – The commercial agency contract
2018年1月2日
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法国
- 机构
- 分销协议
法国是特许经营关系网的大市场，近2000家特许经营关系网处于运营状态。这是最成功的商业发展计划之一。
特许人必须主要遵守法国关于预先披露信息的规定以及法国和欧盟的竞争条例等规定。虽然对授予特许者来说，对关系网质量和品牌形象的控制是一个非常重要且合法的问题，但授予特许者不能过多地干预特许经营人的日常活动，因为特许经营人是独立商家。因此，授予特许人与特许经营人之间的关系只能建立在商法的基础上，而不能建立在劳动法的基础上。然而，法国最近的规定将导致授予特许者与特许经营者和他们的雇员一起实施某些劳动法。
在法国经营特许经营关系网的外国特许经营者确实必须知道如何应对《劳动法》（2016年8月8日）及其法令（2017年5月4日）所带来的限制，并自2017年5月7日起生效，该法令涉及为整个特许经营关系网设立一个雇员论坛。事实上，这个社会对话委员会可以对特许经营关系网的组织工作产生深刻的影响。
首先，新的社会对话委员会只关心经营者受特许权协议约束的关系网。因此，商标许可和分销合同似乎没有包括在内。特许权协议应被理解为由三项单独协议构成的特殊合同：商标许可协议、专有技术许可协议和商业或技术援助协议。然而，2016年8月8日的法律却造成了一些混乱，规定社会对话委员会所涉及的特许协议是“引用《法国商法典》第L330-3条”协议，尽管该条不仅没有界定特许合同的定义，而且可以适用于其他合同（独家分销协议），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
此外，根据该法案，只有包括“对特许经营企业的工作组织和条件有影响的条款”的具体特许协议才会受到关注。尽管该法没有界定这些条款，一方面，是否需要社会对话委员会取决于确定这些条款；另一方面，特许经营者在组织和管理其业务，包括在雇佣劳工事务方面，本质上独立于授予特许人。因此，有必要对所有特许经营协议进行就业审计（例如，如果条款规定营业时间或规定着装怎么办？），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
最后，只有在法国雇用至少300名（全职）工作人员的特许经营关系网才要求设立社会对话委员会。这似乎不包括特许经营人的雇员或不受特许经营协议约束的经营者的雇员(例如受商标许可合同约束的经营者)。
意味着长期谈判的实现
即使满足了法律要求，授予特许人也没有义务自发成立社会对话委员会。然而，一旦工会要求成立社会对话委员会，授予特许人就有义务积极参加该行业发起的谈判，与所有特许经营者核实其关系网上的雇员人数是否达到300人的门槛，然后建立一个由雇员（工会）代表和雇主（授予特许人和特许经营人）代表组成的“谈判论坛”，用来达成创建和组织未来社会对话委员会的协议。
与工会和特许经营者的谈判将在6达成协议但须经授予特许人、工会和至少30%的特许经营者(占关系网雇员的30%)的同意。该协议应确定社会对话委员会的组成、其成员的任职方式、任期、会议的频率、如果需要，雇员可以为委员会贡献多长时间、委员会实现其宗旨所需的物质或财政手段、以及如何处理费用和代表的旅费和生活津贴等问题。最后一个问题可能不仅是授予特许人关注的一个主要问题，而且也是特许经营人-雇主关注的一个主要方面。由于没有达成这样的协议，该法令规定设立社会对话委员会，其中有几项严格和最低限度的规定，可能会给授予特许人造成不合理的负担。
一旦成立，内部规则将确切界定社会对话委员会的运作方式（所需的多数人、会议通知和引荐来源、讨论内容的公布等）。
无事生非？
社会对话委员会无权调查案件或作出具有约束力的裁决，但社会对话委员会必须让大家知道特许经营者加盟或离开销售关系网的情况，以及“授予特许者的决定，易于影响到特许经营者雇员的数量和结构、工作时间或就业、工作和职业培训条件”。
社会对话委员会还可就如何改善贯穿整个关系网的条件提出建议。
社会对话委员会的影响终究相当有限，但授予特许人必须认真掌握和控制规则的实施，以避免损失自己的特许经营商的时间和精力以及关系网的混乱。
Not what you would expect
When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!
The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.
This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.
However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.
In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.
Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an “in-house” operation” in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.
What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?
Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.
Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.
As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.
The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!
However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to “justify” avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.
In this respect, in many cases simple “non-satisfaction” was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.
There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.
Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.
Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.
The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.
In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.
It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.
At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.
One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.
Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.
No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.
The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.
Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.
The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.
Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?
The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.
Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.
The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).
In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.
From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.
What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?
Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.
The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).
With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.
Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.
From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.
It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.
By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.
In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.
根据欧盟电子商务部门的调查，超过50%的互联网市场和36%的零售商提供数据给价格搜索引擎，如 Idealo，谷歌购物Google Shopping，或Shopzilla。相比之下，大约10%的经销商受到价格比较引擎禁令的影响（见委员会工作人员工作文件SWD（2017）154定稿，S.32图B.4和欧盟委员会第37页，电子商务部门调查的最后报告，第10页）。
不过，联邦法院最近确认，价格比较引擎的禁令是反竞争和无效的。在具体案例中，爱世克斯（跑鞋品牌名）通常禁止德国零售商支持在线分销中的价格搜索引擎：
“此外，经授权的…经销商不得…通过为这些价格比较引擎提供特定于应用程序的接口（“APIs”）来支持价格比较引擎的功能。”
此外，该协议还包含了对第三方平台广告的广泛禁止：爱世克斯禁止其授权经销商允许第三方在第三方网站上以任何形式使用爱世克斯的商标，以便直接引导客户访问被授权的爱世克斯经销商的网站。
爱世克斯的分销协议首先由德国竞争管理机构Bundeskartellamt作为试点案例进行调查(由于许多体育零售商对体育设备制造商的互联网转售限制提出了申诉，因此对阿迪达斯提起了另一起试点案件)。2015年，Bundeskartellamt裁定，爱世克斯对价格比较引擎的禁令违反了反垄断法，因为它将违反第101条(1) TFEU，sec.1 《禁止限制竞争法》。提出的理由是，这种禁令的主要目的是控制和限制价格竞争，而牺牲消费者的利益。这项决定首先得到了Düsseldorf高等地区法院的确认（2017年4月5日的裁决，案件号：VI-Kart 13/15(V)，见Legalmondo文章，点击这里）。
现在，联邦法院再次确认了这项裁决（2017年12月12日的决定，第KVZ 41/17号案件）。爱世克斯的裁决特别值得注意，因为它是德国法院继欧盟法院关于科蒂（全球最大的香水生产公司）的平台禁令作出裁决裁决之后作出的首项裁决（见Legalmondo的文章，点击这里）。因此，这是法院今后将如何处理互联网转售限制的第一个迹象。
因此，联邦法院指出，对价格搜索引擎的普遍禁止“至少”要限制向终端消费者的被动销售（第23款, 25款)–这种限制甚至将是这种禁令的预期目的。法院认为，根据《科蒂判决》（点击此出查看），一般平台禁令的可接受性并不意味着一般价格比较禁令的可接受性（第28款及其后款）。尤其是“限制组合”–即第三方平台价格比较引擎和广告宣传禁令–会产生影响。因为它没有确保潜在客户能够“实际进入”经销商网站（第30款） –在这种情况下，联邦最高法院允许提供这种“实质性准入”所需的充分或必要的条件；在这种情况下，一般价格比较引擎禁令仍可继续得到允许。
实用贴士：
- 在欧盟一级，法院和欧盟委员会都没有就普遍禁止价格比较引擎的有效性采取立场。然而，在英国，竞争和市场管理局对价格搜索引擎禁令也采取了类似的批评观点（“宝马在CMA行动后改变了对汽车比较网站的政策”），将其作为德国的行政实践和司法管辖权。
- 事实上，根据联邦最高法院的判决，Düsseldorf高级地区法院（Asics）和法兰克福高等地区法院（Deuter）已经指出以下区别可能适用于：
- 一般价格比较引擎禁令是–根据联邦法院–反竞争的，因此通常是无效的–尽管如果不与广泛的广告禁令相结合，这些禁令仍然是允许的，这样就可以保证潜在的客户能够访问经销商网站。
- 单独的价格比较引擎禁令和使用价格比较门户网站的其他较温和的限制/标准是允许的，例如关于产品插画或说明以及产品环境（例如要求经销商只能提供新产品）。
进一步了解细节: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb: „Nicht Ideal(o)“ – Kombination aus Preissuchmaschinen-Verbot und Logo-Klausel, in: ZVertriebsR 2018, 118 ff.
- 除此之外，制造商可以–在排他性分销网络内–禁止其分销商主动向制造商保留的或由制造商分配给另一分销商的客户提供在线广告，并指明所使用的语言。原则上，所有其他可能的质量标准也是允许的，只要他们和线下分销标准等效（因为“委员会认为，规定网上销售的标准与从实体店销售的标准总体上不等于硬核限制，从而劝阻指定经销商使用互联网接触更多和更多样化的客户的任何义务”，《纵向限制准则》，第56条）。
有关更多信息，请参见：
- 有关实践现状的概述，包括示范合约条款：Rohrßen, Vertriebsvorgaben im E-Commerce 2018: Praxisübersichts und Folgen des “Coty”-Urteils des EuGH, in: GRUR-Prax 2018, 39-41 以及
- 特别是关于平台禁令和可能起草分配协议: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb von Markenartikeln: Zulässigkeit von Plattformverboten nach dem EuGH-Urteil Coty – Auswirkungen auf Fachhändler- bzw. Selektiv-, Exklusiv-, Franchise- und offene Vertriebsverträge –, in: DB 2018. 300-306.
- 关于在互联网销售平台中嵌入的搜索功能中是否允许使用商标和公司徽标，见联邦法院最近于2018年2月15日发布的两项裁决（案件号：I ZR 138/16 re “Ortlieb” 和案件号 I ZR 201/1 re “gofit“).
Agreements restricting competition are prohibited as anticompetitive agreements by Article 101 TFEU unless the agreement’s impact on trade or competition is not appreciable (cf. the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case, C-226/11, judgment of 13 December 2012). Whether an agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition or is in the “safe harbour” can be assessed according to the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice. Accordingly, an agreement is particularly appreciable if its object is to restrict competition. This applies in particular to so-called hardcore restrictions, such as vertical price maintenance (or resale price maintenance = “RPM”).
Regarding a special offer for dietary products, the German Higher Regional Court of Celle surprisingly took a different view and decided that even resale price maintenance could be considered non-appreciable and thus falling outside the ban of anticompetitive business practices under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 07.04.2016, Case 13 U 124/15 [Kart]). In this case, the manufacturer made a special offer to a group of its customers (pharmacies) with a special purchase discount: once, for a limited period and limited to a maximum quantity. In return, the customers should commit themselves to “present the product clearly… and not fall below a resale price of EUR 15.95“.
The Hanover Regional Court had instead seen the agreement as an unlawful resale price maintenance (judgment of 25 August 2015, Case 18 O 91/15) – and now the German Federal Court confirmed the same: the minimum prices specified here within the advertising campaign appreciably restrict competition and are thus banned as anticompetitive business practice under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 17 October 2017, Case KZR 59/16). This corresponds to the case law of the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case (see above) and the German Federal Court with regard to the sales requirement “one bar extra “ (i.e. without extra charge compared to the usual package size) of the Italian confectionery manufacturer Ferrero (judgment of 08.04.2003, Case KZR 3/02) – because the latter explicitly concerns “the scope for price increases resulting from the increased contents of the package” – not, however, the retailer’s decision to set prices freely downwards.
Practical tips
Vertical price fixing is generally prohibited, whereas providing a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP, also “recommended retail price”) and maximum selling prices are allowed – this is briefly the principle of German and European antitrust law on pricing frameworks. Furthermore, recommended retail prices and maximum selling prices (“MSP”) are subject to the restriction that they ” they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties” (Article 4 lit. a Vertical Block Exemptions Regulation). That means:
- the manufacturer or supplier may provide guidance,
- however, the reseller may set his sales prices freely.
Exceptions may apply – in addition to the RPM on the price of books or in the case of specialisation agreements – by way of the efficiency defence under Article 101 (3) TFEU in individual cases, e.g.
- in the introductory period when launching new products on the market, or
- in the case of short-term special offers if accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency, for example by investing the higher margin into better customer advice, which benefits all customers and Resale Price Maintenance prevents retailers who do not offer the customer advice from free riding (cf. EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 225).
Such actions, however, require excellent preparation because manufacturers can only set resale prices for very short periods if they can convincingly demonstrate efficiency gains such as preventing free-riders.
In the case of fixed prices, the competition authorities quickly become sensitive. For example, fines for vertical price maintenance have recently been imposed again in Germany. In this respect, special care must be taken particularly in distribution and sales agreements.
- Correspondingly, each company’s sales team should continue following the previous case law on recommended retail prices, maximum selling prices and discount campaigns. Guidance for the practice is provided by
- the Federal Cartel Office’s paper of July 2017 on the prohibition of fixed prices in stationary food retailing,
- the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (para. 48 et seq., 223 et seq.) and the „Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice“ – all three, however, must always be assessed in the light of current case law because the understanding of the EU Commission contained in these documents does not bind neither the courts nor the national antitrust authorities.
“日默瓦（行李箱品牌名）所有者终止了在欧洲的所有分销协议”——2018年3月9日，德国主要商业报纸“Handelsblatt”的标题。终止原因是：日默瓦——著名高质量的行李箱品牌制造商——其在2011年后，于2018年重新设计它的分销网络：日默瓦的目标是再次提高其质量选择标准，不再将其产品卖给传统的商店，而是提供现代的购物体验。
原则上，制造商可以根据其营销战略和任何变化的需求自由设计和开发其分销系统。相似地，他们可以在原则上自由选择销售中间商（分销商/经销商、特许经营者、代理人等）的数量和名称。他们原则上也可以自由转向选择性分销，目的是使其产品的分销符合某些标准（特别是关于分销的质量），从而也有可能减少分销商的数量。然而，作为例外，分销商可能强迫制造商提供这些产品——即制造商有很大的市场支配力。在这种情况下，与分销商订立合同从而产生交货义务的义务可能源自禁止歧视的规定。（德国《反竞争限制法》第1、20条，1、2款，19项）。
如果制造商重新设计他们的分销网络——就像日默瓦以前和现在所做的那样，那么这个问题就变得特别相关，日默瓦在2011/2012年转向选择性分销（关于选择性分销的优点和可能的分销限制，见Legalmondo文章）。为了重新设计其分销网络，日默瓦终止了以前的分销协议，并提出缔结新的分销协议——根据新的协议，新的分销商承诺以某种方式展示货物，并购买和使用日默瓦的店内系统。日默瓦认为，原分销商的表现与新的商业理念和销售策略不符，这就是双方未能达成缔结一份新协议的原因。于是，分销商提出诉讼，目的是订立一份新的经销商合同，从而交付他的经销商店。
慕尼黑地区法院驳回了这项诉讼请求(2014年9月9日的裁决，编号7249/13 HKO)。不过，慕尼黑高等地区法院确认了这种索赔(2015年9月17日的裁定，注释第U 3886/1/4 Kart)——主张制造商在有关的“高价和高质量手提箱市场”中处于领导地位，或者，相反地，如果分销商具有依赖性，并且因为制造商的手提箱不能被其他同等的手提箱所取代。这种依赖性尤其通过高分销率表现（即制造商提供了大量可比较的分销商）以及独特的设计和相关的高认可价值。现在，联邦法院推翻了这一判决，并将其发回重审(2017年12月12日的裁决，编号：KZR 50/15)。原因：分销商对制造商的产品分类依赖（“Spitzenstellungsabhängigkeit”作为“Sortimentsbedingte Abhängigkeit”的特例）没有得到充分的证明。尽管高分销率通常是决定性的，但在目前这样的质量选择性分销制度中，其意义可能不大。重新设计分销系统的决定性因素：“如果供应商选择在某个时间点转换到一个高质量的选择性分销系统，在之前的一段时间里，与品种相关的依赖关系通常会以较高的分销率来表示。”（第19款）
制造商尤其可以提出两个论点，反对这种所谓的分类相关依赖关系，即
(一)由制造商自行供应其产品的分销商数目远低于提供其产品的分销商总数（即包括通过其他渠道购买该产品的分销商）；及
(二) 分销率将根据那些可与要求进入分配系统和交付的分销商相媲美的分销商确定（第27款)–正如德国联邦法院先前在裁定室内装潢案例（2000年5月9日的裁定，参考KZR 28/98，p. 12）。
Practical conclusions
实际结论
“没有什么比改变更永恒”：在重新设计分销系统时，要仔细考虑是否想要/需要过渡安排–或者最好不考虑过渡安排。一个很好的不考虑过渡安排的理由是：它们可能会使排除不想要的分销商变得更加困难。因此，在日默瓦一案中，慕尼黑的较高地区法院驳回了制造商的反驳意见，即分销商的商业模式“以讨价还价为目标”–辩称，制造商给其他分销商“订立协议后12个月”的时间来满足新的定性标准。
有关定性标准（也是要求/规格），请参阅Legalmondo上的其他文章，特别是关于平台禁令和价格比较禁令的文章，请参见Legalmondo上的文章。
地域封锁是一种歧视性做法，由于客户的国籍或其居住地或营业地，阻止客户（主要是网上客户）从另一欧盟成员国的网站获取和（或）购买产品或服务。
欧盟条例在2018年2月28日颁布的关于解决基于客户国籍、居住地或营业地在国内市场上的不合理的地域封锁和其他形式的歧视的欧盟第2018/302号条例将于2018年12月2日生效。
当前情况
欧盟委员会对欧盟的1万多个电子商务网站进行了“秘密购物”调查。地域封锁指数相当高！63%的网站不允许购物者从另一个欧盟国家购买商品（甚至包括86%的家用电器和79%的电子和计算机硬件）。
另一方面，当电子商务的价值和数量就全球来说，年复一年地大幅增长时，只有50%的欧洲客户从设在另一个欧盟成员国的网上商店购买产品，但这种现象只是在国内范围而非整个欧洲。
2017年6月23日，欧洲理事会要求切实执行数字单一市场战略的所有内容，包括跨界交付、消费者保护和禁止不当地域封锁。
现行法律框架的缺失
欧洲联盟指令（欧盟第2006/123/CE号指令）和TFUE第101条已经解决了基于国籍、地区或住所或营业地的歧视做法。
根据欧盟指令第20(2)条，欧盟成员国必须确保专业人员不因客户的居住地、营业所或国籍而区别对待（客观例外情况除外）。另一方面，关于纵向限制的欧盟竞争法(《欧盟运行条例》第101条和集体豁免条例及其指南)认为，对被动销售的限制是违反欧盟竞争规则的核心限制。然而，这两套规则(欧盟指令和竞争法框架)在实践中似乎并不完全有效。
在这方面，欧盟委员会在最近关于电子商务部门竞争调查的报告中表明，地域封锁尤其在欧洲电子商务部门内得到了大规模使用。
地域封锁条例的目的
地域封锁条例的目的是防止专业人员在处理跨国界电子商务交易时，基于国籍、居住地或客户营业地而实施的直接或间接歧视。
地域封锁条例的范围
新的条例将只适用于企业与最终用户或企业之间的网上销售。
新条例将适用于在欧盟内运作的网站或在欧盟以外运作但向设立在欧盟内的客户提供货物或服务的网站。
电子网站的管理新规是什么？
关于访问网站的问题
根据该条例，企业不得以与互联网用户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的理由，通过使用技术措施来阻止或限制其进入网络接口。然而，只要客户明确同意，并且仍然可以轻松访问他们原先试图访问的网站版本，企业就有权将客的访问方向改变到他们试图访问的网站之外的另一个网站。
关于网站的销售条款和条件
该规则禁止企业在下列三种情况下，根据客户的国籍、居住地或营业地（特别是他们的IP地址），提供不同的一般条件来取得货物或服务：
提供送货服务的企业将售出的商品送达到另外的欧盟成员国交付（或在企业与客户共同商定的地点收取货物）的；
企业提供的电子化服务，如云、数据存储、主机服务等。（但不提供访问受版权保护的内容的服务，如流媒体或在线游戏服务）；
顾客获得的在各个国家均可运行的商务服务（如汽车租赁和旅馆住宿服务或体育或文化活动的票务服务）。
关于网站上的付款方式
该条例禁止企业以与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地、支付账户所在地或支付服务提供者的设立地有关的理由，对已接受的支付手段适用不同的支付条件（条件是必须符合认证要求，付款交易必须以企业接受的货币进行）。
这项规定对电子零售商有什么影响？
尽管在形式上被排除在该条例范围之外，但供应商与分销商或批发商之间的关系仍将受到该条例的影响，因为根据分销商之间的协议规定，分销商承诺不进行被动销售（例如，阻止或限制进入网站），由于与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的原因“将自动无效”。
因此，地域封锁条例对分销商的影响是双重的：第一，在与客户（最终用户或用户企业）的关系中产生直接影响；第二，在其根据独家分销协议所承担的义务方面产生间接影响。
地域封锁条例必须与现行竞争法框架相协调，特别是与制定适用于网上销售的具体规则的纵向限制指导方针相协调。网上销售被比作被动销售。指导方针中提到4个实践中为了间接保证地方保护主义，在供应商和独家分销商同意的情况下被禁止的例子：
独家经销商应阻止另一地区的客户访问其网站，或自动将其转到供应商或其他经销商的网站，
如果买方的信用卡数据显示买方不是独家经销商的专有区域，独家经销商应终止网上销售。
限制独家分销商通过互联网销售的份额（但合同可规定按绝对值计算的最低线下目标，并规定与离线销售相比，网上销售保持一致）。
独家分销商对在互联网上销售的货物支付的价格，应高于对准备在离线销售的货物支付的价格。
制造商将必须决定是采用一个独一无二的欧洲门户网站报价还是多个地方商业报价，众所周知，每个范畴的客户端是有可能存在价格差异的。
事实上，新规定并没有强制电子零售商协调其价格政策，它们只是必须允许欧盟消费者自由和容易地访问其网站的任何版本。同样，该条例并没有规定电子零售商必须将产品运往欧洲各地，而只是允许欧盟消费者从他们想要的任何网站购买商品，并在必要时自行安排发货。
最后，在更为契约性的层面上，尚不十分清楚新的地域封锁规则如何直接或间接地影响适用于消费者合同的冲突法规则，根据罗马第1号规定(Rome I Regulation)，特别是在允许消费者在本网站所在国的外国网站上购买产品时（这意味着在消费者所在国无特定交货制度已建立。）
因此，B2C网站的一般条款和条件需要在营销和法律两方面进行审查和调整。
Once convinced of the utility of mediation as a method of resolving conflicts between franchisor and franchisee and taken the decision to include a clause in the contracts that provides for it, the last step would be what elements should be taken into account when drafting it.
- The previous negotiation. It seems advisable that both parties grant themselves the possibility of trying to solve the problem with a previous formal negotiation. Mediation does not exclude the previous attempt made by the interested parties or their lawyers; however, it seems advisable to contractually provide a suitable end according to the circumstances. Experience shows that lengthening this phase too long may result in the conflict becoming more complicated and even more difficult to approach mediation.
- The clause may also provide for the place where the mediation will take place. Again at this point the parties are free. It is convenient that this is accurate indicating the concrete city.
- The language in which the mediation will be developed is the a faculty of the parties. There will be no difficulty in mediations in which both parties use the same language, but it is very convenient in contracts with parties that have different languages, or that belong to regions or countries with different co-official languages. The drafting or signing of the contract in a specific language does not presuppose that this must be the language of the mediation. It is an element to be taken into account also when requesting a mediator who can use that language in the chosen mediation institution.
- The procedure can also be decided by the parties. In particular, the number of sessions, the maximum expected duration, the participation of advisors, etc. Keep in mind that the greater or lesser regulation will allow to avoid future conflicts in this respect, although it will also imply a greater limit to the freedom of the parties that, nevertheless, will remain free to modify the agreement by mutual consent.
- The term of the mediation can also be contemplated. This would allow, for example, to prevent mediation from being extended only for purely procedural strategic purposes or to gather information from the other party before starting a procedure, etc. The professional mediators, however, are able to identify these manoeuvres, also having the power to put an end to mediation in those cases.
- Choosing the mediator or the mediation institution is an important choice. The parties can agree on who will be their mediator, indicate in the contract the elements to choose it, or submit directly to a Mediation Institution so that it is the one who designates it according to its own rules. These decisions can be alternatives (that is, that the parties agree on the mediator and, in case of lack of agreement, submit to an institution that names it), or they can be unique. The designation of an Institution requires that it has a sufficient guarantee of stability (avoid designating short-term institutions or without much future guarantee), with a sufficient panel of mediators depending on the characteristics of the mediation (language, competence, experience) and that allows the necessary flexibility for its operation.
- Finally, it is convenient that the clause includes an alternative way in case the mediation does not succeed either because the parties do not reach an agreement, or because they withdraw from the mediation. It is important to recall that mediation does not close the doors to the conflict be resolved by recourse to ordinary jurisdiction or arbitration. And in terms of specialized arbitration in distribution contracts, the IDArb (https://www.idiproject.com/content/idarb-idi-arbitration-project) is an excellent option.
On the topic of the importance of Mediation in Distribution Agreements, you can check out the recording our webinar “Mediation in International Conflicts”
写信给 Marika
EU Court of Justice allows online sales restrictions (Coty case)
2017年12月6日
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德国
- 分销协议
- 电子商务
- 国际贸易
法国是特许经营关系网的大市场，近2000家特许经营关系网处于运营状态。这是最成功的商业发展计划之一。
特许人必须主要遵守法国关于预先披露信息的规定以及法国和欧盟的竞争条例等规定。虽然对授予特许者来说，对关系网质量和品牌形象的控制是一个非常重要且合法的问题，但授予特许者不能过多地干预特许经营人的日常活动，因为特许经营人是独立商家。因此，授予特许人与特许经营人之间的关系只能建立在商法的基础上，而不能建立在劳动法的基础上。然而，法国最近的规定将导致授予特许者与特许经营者和他们的雇员一起实施某些劳动法。
在法国经营特许经营关系网的外国特许经营者确实必须知道如何应对《劳动法》（2016年8月8日）及其法令（2017年5月4日）所带来的限制，并自2017年5月7日起生效，该法令涉及为整个特许经营关系网设立一个雇员论坛。事实上，这个社会对话委员会可以对特许经营关系网的组织工作产生深刻的影响。
首先，新的社会对话委员会只关心经营者受特许权协议约束的关系网。因此，商标许可和分销合同似乎没有包括在内。特许权协议应被理解为由三项单独协议构成的特殊合同：商标许可协议、专有技术许可协议和商业或技术援助协议。然而，2016年8月8日的法律却造成了一些混乱，规定社会对话委员会所涉及的特许协议是“引用《法国商法典》第L330-3条”协议，尽管该条不仅没有界定特许合同的定义，而且可以适用于其他合同（独家分销协议），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
此外，根据该法案，只有包括“对特许经营企业的工作组织和条件有影响的条款”的具体特许协议才会受到关注。尽管该法没有界定这些条款，一方面，是否需要社会对话委员会取决于确定这些条款；另一方面，特许经营者在组织和管理其业务，包括在雇佣劳工事务方面，本质上独立于授予特许人。因此，有必要对所有特许经营协议进行就业审计（例如，如果条款规定营业时间或规定着装怎么办？），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
最后，只有在法国雇用至少300名（全职）工作人员的特许经营关系网才要求设立社会对话委员会。这似乎不包括特许经营人的雇员或不受特许经营协议约束的经营者的雇员(例如受商标许可合同约束的经营者)。
意味着长期谈判的实现
即使满足了法律要求，授予特许人也没有义务自发成立社会对话委员会。然而，一旦工会要求成立社会对话委员会，授予特许人就有义务积极参加该行业发起的谈判，与所有特许经营者核实其关系网上的雇员人数是否达到300人的门槛，然后建立一个由雇员（工会）代表和雇主（授予特许人和特许经营人）代表组成的“谈判论坛”，用来达成创建和组织未来社会对话委员会的协议。
与工会和特许经营者的谈判将在6达成协议但须经授予特许人、工会和至少30%的特许经营者(占关系网雇员的30%)的同意。该协议应确定社会对话委员会的组成、其成员的任职方式、任期、会议的频率、如果需要，雇员可以为委员会贡献多长时间、委员会实现其宗旨所需的物质或财政手段、以及如何处理费用和代表的旅费和生活津贴等问题。最后一个问题可能不仅是授予特许人关注的一个主要问题，而且也是特许经营人-雇主关注的一个主要方面。由于没有达成这样的协议，该法令规定设立社会对话委员会，其中有几项严格和最低限度的规定，可能会给授予特许人造成不合理的负担。
一旦成立，内部规则将确切界定社会对话委员会的运作方式（所需的多数人、会议通知和引荐来源、讨论内容的公布等）。
无事生非？
社会对话委员会无权调查案件或作出具有约束力的裁决，但社会对话委员会必须让大家知道特许经营者加盟或离开销售关系网的情况，以及“授予特许者的决定，易于影响到特许经营者雇员的数量和结构、工作时间或就业、工作和职业培训条件”。
社会对话委员会还可就如何改善贯穿整个关系网的条件提出建议。
社会对话委员会的影响终究相当有限，但授予特许人必须认真掌握和控制规则的实施，以避免损失自己的特许经营商的时间和精力以及关系网的混乱。
Not what you would expect
When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!
The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.
This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.
However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.
In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.
Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an “in-house” operation” in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.
What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?
Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.
Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.
As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.
The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!
However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to “justify” avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.
In this respect, in many cases simple “non-satisfaction” was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.
There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.
Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.
Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.
The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.
In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.
It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.
At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.
One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.
Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.
No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.
The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.
Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.
The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.
Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?
The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.
Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.
The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).
In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.
From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.
What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?
Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.
The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).
With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.
Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.
From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.
It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.
By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.
In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.
根据欧盟电子商务部门的调查，超过50%的互联网市场和36%的零售商提供数据给价格搜索引擎，如 Idealo，谷歌购物Google Shopping，或Shopzilla。相比之下，大约10%的经销商受到价格比较引擎禁令的影响（见委员会工作人员工作文件SWD（2017）154定稿，S.32图B.4和欧盟委员会第37页，电子商务部门调查的最后报告，第10页）。
不过，联邦法院最近确认，价格比较引擎的禁令是反竞争和无效的。在具体案例中，爱世克斯（跑鞋品牌名）通常禁止德国零售商支持在线分销中的价格搜索引擎：
“此外，经授权的…经销商不得…通过为这些价格比较引擎提供特定于应用程序的接口（“APIs”）来支持价格比较引擎的功能。”
此外，该协议还包含了对第三方平台广告的广泛禁止：爱世克斯禁止其授权经销商允许第三方在第三方网站上以任何形式使用爱世克斯的商标，以便直接引导客户访问被授权的爱世克斯经销商的网站。
爱世克斯的分销协议首先由德国竞争管理机构Bundeskartellamt作为试点案例进行调查(由于许多体育零售商对体育设备制造商的互联网转售限制提出了申诉，因此对阿迪达斯提起了另一起试点案件)。2015年，Bundeskartellamt裁定，爱世克斯对价格比较引擎的禁令违反了反垄断法，因为它将违反第101条(1) TFEU，sec.1 《禁止限制竞争法》。提出的理由是，这种禁令的主要目的是控制和限制价格竞争，而牺牲消费者的利益。这项决定首先得到了Düsseldorf高等地区法院的确认（2017年4月5日的裁决，案件号：VI-Kart 13/15(V)，见Legalmondo文章，点击这里）。
现在，联邦法院再次确认了这项裁决（2017年12月12日的决定，第KVZ 41/17号案件）。爱世克斯的裁决特别值得注意，因为它是德国法院继欧盟法院关于科蒂（全球最大的香水生产公司）的平台禁令作出裁决裁决之后作出的首项裁决（见Legalmondo的文章，点击这里）。因此，这是法院今后将如何处理互联网转售限制的第一个迹象。
因此，联邦法院指出，对价格搜索引擎的普遍禁止“至少”要限制向终端消费者的被动销售（第23款, 25款)–这种限制甚至将是这种禁令的预期目的。法院认为，根据《科蒂判决》（点击此出查看），一般平台禁令的可接受性并不意味着一般价格比较禁令的可接受性（第28款及其后款）。尤其是“限制组合”–即第三方平台价格比较引擎和广告宣传禁令–会产生影响。因为它没有确保潜在客户能够“实际进入”经销商网站（第30款） –在这种情况下，联邦最高法院允许提供这种“实质性准入”所需的充分或必要的条件；在这种情况下，一般价格比较引擎禁令仍可继续得到允许。
实用贴士：
- 在欧盟一级，法院和欧盟委员会都没有就普遍禁止价格比较引擎的有效性采取立场。然而，在英国，竞争和市场管理局对价格搜索引擎禁令也采取了类似的批评观点（“宝马在CMA行动后改变了对汽车比较网站的政策”），将其作为德国的行政实践和司法管辖权。
- 事实上，根据联邦最高法院的判决，Düsseldorf高级地区法院（Asics）和法兰克福高等地区法院（Deuter）已经指出以下区别可能适用于：
- 一般价格比较引擎禁令是–根据联邦法院–反竞争的，因此通常是无效的–尽管如果不与广泛的广告禁令相结合，这些禁令仍然是允许的，这样就可以保证潜在的客户能够访问经销商网站。
- 单独的价格比较引擎禁令和使用价格比较门户网站的其他较温和的限制/标准是允许的，例如关于产品插画或说明以及产品环境（例如要求经销商只能提供新产品）。
进一步了解细节: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb: „Nicht Ideal(o)“ – Kombination aus Preissuchmaschinen-Verbot und Logo-Klausel, in: ZVertriebsR 2018, 118 ff.
- 除此之外，制造商可以–在排他性分销网络内–禁止其分销商主动向制造商保留的或由制造商分配给另一分销商的客户提供在线广告，并指明所使用的语言。原则上，所有其他可能的质量标准也是允许的，只要他们和线下分销标准等效（因为“委员会认为，规定网上销售的标准与从实体店销售的标准总体上不等于硬核限制，从而劝阻指定经销商使用互联网接触更多和更多样化的客户的任何义务”，《纵向限制准则》，第56条）。
有关更多信息，请参见：
- 有关实践现状的概述，包括示范合约条款：Rohrßen, Vertriebsvorgaben im E-Commerce 2018: Praxisübersichts und Folgen des “Coty”-Urteils des EuGH, in: GRUR-Prax 2018, 39-41 以及
- 特别是关于平台禁令和可能起草分配协议: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb von Markenartikeln: Zulässigkeit von Plattformverboten nach dem EuGH-Urteil Coty – Auswirkungen auf Fachhändler- bzw. Selektiv-, Exklusiv-, Franchise- und offene Vertriebsverträge –, in: DB 2018. 300-306.
- 关于在互联网销售平台中嵌入的搜索功能中是否允许使用商标和公司徽标，见联邦法院最近于2018年2月15日发布的两项裁决（案件号：I ZR 138/16 re “Ortlieb” 和案件号 I ZR 201/1 re “gofit“).
Agreements restricting competition are prohibited as anticompetitive agreements by Article 101 TFEU unless the agreement’s impact on trade or competition is not appreciable (cf. the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case, C-226/11, judgment of 13 December 2012). Whether an agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition or is in the “safe harbour” can be assessed according to the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice. Accordingly, an agreement is particularly appreciable if its object is to restrict competition. This applies in particular to so-called hardcore restrictions, such as vertical price maintenance (or resale price maintenance = “RPM”).
Regarding a special offer for dietary products, the German Higher Regional Court of Celle surprisingly took a different view and decided that even resale price maintenance could be considered non-appreciable and thus falling outside the ban of anticompetitive business practices under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 07.04.2016, Case 13 U 124/15 [Kart]). In this case, the manufacturer made a special offer to a group of its customers (pharmacies) with a special purchase discount: once, for a limited period and limited to a maximum quantity. In return, the customers should commit themselves to “present the product clearly… and not fall below a resale price of EUR 15.95“.
The Hanover Regional Court had instead seen the agreement as an unlawful resale price maintenance (judgment of 25 August 2015, Case 18 O 91/15) – and now the German Federal Court confirmed the same: the minimum prices specified here within the advertising campaign appreciably restrict competition and are thus banned as anticompetitive business practice under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 17 October 2017, Case KZR 59/16). This corresponds to the case law of the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case (see above) and the German Federal Court with regard to the sales requirement “one bar extra “ (i.e. without extra charge compared to the usual package size) of the Italian confectionery manufacturer Ferrero (judgment of 08.04.2003, Case KZR 3/02) – because the latter explicitly concerns “the scope for price increases resulting from the increased contents of the package” – not, however, the retailer’s decision to set prices freely downwards.
Practical tips
Vertical price fixing is generally prohibited, whereas providing a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP, also “recommended retail price”) and maximum selling prices are allowed – this is briefly the principle of German and European antitrust law on pricing frameworks. Furthermore, recommended retail prices and maximum selling prices (“MSP”) are subject to the restriction that they ” they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties” (Article 4 lit. a Vertical Block Exemptions Regulation). That means:
- the manufacturer or supplier may provide guidance,
- however, the reseller may set his sales prices freely.
Exceptions may apply – in addition to the RPM on the price of books or in the case of specialisation agreements – by way of the efficiency defence under Article 101 (3) TFEU in individual cases, e.g.
- in the introductory period when launching new products on the market, or
- in the case of short-term special offers if accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency, for example by investing the higher margin into better customer advice, which benefits all customers and Resale Price Maintenance prevents retailers who do not offer the customer advice from free riding (cf. EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 225).
Such actions, however, require excellent preparation because manufacturers can only set resale prices for very short periods if they can convincingly demonstrate efficiency gains such as preventing free-riders.
In the case of fixed prices, the competition authorities quickly become sensitive. For example, fines for vertical price maintenance have recently been imposed again in Germany. In this respect, special care must be taken particularly in distribution and sales agreements.
- Correspondingly, each company’s sales team should continue following the previous case law on recommended retail prices, maximum selling prices and discount campaigns. Guidance for the practice is provided by
- the Federal Cartel Office’s paper of July 2017 on the prohibition of fixed prices in stationary food retailing,
- the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (para. 48 et seq., 223 et seq.) and the „Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice“ – all three, however, must always be assessed in the light of current case law because the understanding of the EU Commission contained in these documents does not bind neither the courts nor the national antitrust authorities.
“日默瓦（行李箱品牌名）所有者终止了在欧洲的所有分销协议”——2018年3月9日，德国主要商业报纸“Handelsblatt”的标题。终止原因是：日默瓦——著名高质量的行李箱品牌制造商——其在2011年后，于2018年重新设计它的分销网络：日默瓦的目标是再次提高其质量选择标准，不再将其产品卖给传统的商店，而是提供现代的购物体验。
原则上，制造商可以根据其营销战略和任何变化的需求自由设计和开发其分销系统。相似地，他们可以在原则上自由选择销售中间商（分销商/经销商、特许经营者、代理人等）的数量和名称。他们原则上也可以自由转向选择性分销，目的是使其产品的分销符合某些标准（特别是关于分销的质量），从而也有可能减少分销商的数量。然而，作为例外，分销商可能强迫制造商提供这些产品——即制造商有很大的市场支配力。在这种情况下，与分销商订立合同从而产生交货义务的义务可能源自禁止歧视的规定。（德国《反竞争限制法》第1、20条，1、2款，19项）。
如果制造商重新设计他们的分销网络——就像日默瓦以前和现在所做的那样，那么这个问题就变得特别相关，日默瓦在2011/2012年转向选择性分销（关于选择性分销的优点和可能的分销限制，见Legalmondo文章）。为了重新设计其分销网络，日默瓦终止了以前的分销协议，并提出缔结新的分销协议——根据新的协议，新的分销商承诺以某种方式展示货物，并购买和使用日默瓦的店内系统。日默瓦认为，原分销商的表现与新的商业理念和销售策略不符，这就是双方未能达成缔结一份新协议的原因。于是，分销商提出诉讼，目的是订立一份新的经销商合同，从而交付他的经销商店。
慕尼黑地区法院驳回了这项诉讼请求(2014年9月9日的裁决，编号7249/13 HKO)。不过，慕尼黑高等地区法院确认了这种索赔(2015年9月17日的裁定，注释第U 3886/1/4 Kart)——主张制造商在有关的“高价和高质量手提箱市场”中处于领导地位，或者，相反地，如果分销商具有依赖性，并且因为制造商的手提箱不能被其他同等的手提箱所取代。这种依赖性尤其通过高分销率表现（即制造商提供了大量可比较的分销商）以及独特的设计和相关的高认可价值。现在，联邦法院推翻了这一判决，并将其发回重审(2017年12月12日的裁决，编号：KZR 50/15)。原因：分销商对制造商的产品分类依赖（“Spitzenstellungsabhängigkeit”作为“Sortimentsbedingte Abhängigkeit”的特例）没有得到充分的证明。尽管高分销率通常是决定性的，但在目前这样的质量选择性分销制度中，其意义可能不大。重新设计分销系统的决定性因素：“如果供应商选择在某个时间点转换到一个高质量的选择性分销系统，在之前的一段时间里，与品种相关的依赖关系通常会以较高的分销率来表示。”（第19款）
制造商尤其可以提出两个论点，反对这种所谓的分类相关依赖关系，即
(一)由制造商自行供应其产品的分销商数目远低于提供其产品的分销商总数（即包括通过其他渠道购买该产品的分销商）；及
(二) 分销率将根据那些可与要求进入分配系统和交付的分销商相媲美的分销商确定（第27款)–正如德国联邦法院先前在裁定室内装潢案例（2000年5月9日的裁定，参考KZR 28/98，p. 12）。
Practical conclusions
实际结论
“没有什么比改变更永恒”：在重新设计分销系统时，要仔细考虑是否想要/需要过渡安排–或者最好不考虑过渡安排。一个很好的不考虑过渡安排的理由是：它们可能会使排除不想要的分销商变得更加困难。因此，在日默瓦一案中，慕尼黑的较高地区法院驳回了制造商的反驳意见，即分销商的商业模式“以讨价还价为目标”–辩称，制造商给其他分销商“订立协议后12个月”的时间来满足新的定性标准。
有关定性标准（也是要求/规格），请参阅Legalmondo上的其他文章，特别是关于平台禁令和价格比较禁令的文章，请参见Legalmondo上的文章。
地域封锁是一种歧视性做法，由于客户的国籍或其居住地或营业地，阻止客户（主要是网上客户）从另一欧盟成员国的网站获取和（或）购买产品或服务。
欧盟条例在2018年2月28日颁布的关于解决基于客户国籍、居住地或营业地在国内市场上的不合理的地域封锁和其他形式的歧视的欧盟第2018/302号条例将于2018年12月2日生效。
当前情况
欧盟委员会对欧盟的1万多个电子商务网站进行了“秘密购物”调查。地域封锁指数相当高！63%的网站不允许购物者从另一个欧盟国家购买商品（甚至包括86%的家用电器和79%的电子和计算机硬件）。
另一方面，当电子商务的价值和数量就全球来说，年复一年地大幅增长时，只有50%的欧洲客户从设在另一个欧盟成员国的网上商店购买产品，但这种现象只是在国内范围而非整个欧洲。
2017年6月23日，欧洲理事会要求切实执行数字单一市场战略的所有内容，包括跨界交付、消费者保护和禁止不当地域封锁。
现行法律框架的缺失
欧洲联盟指令（欧盟第2006/123/CE号指令）和TFUE第101条已经解决了基于国籍、地区或住所或营业地的歧视做法。
根据欧盟指令第20(2)条，欧盟成员国必须确保专业人员不因客户的居住地、营业所或国籍而区别对待（客观例外情况除外）。另一方面，关于纵向限制的欧盟竞争法(《欧盟运行条例》第101条和集体豁免条例及其指南)认为，对被动销售的限制是违反欧盟竞争规则的核心限制。然而，这两套规则(欧盟指令和竞争法框架)在实践中似乎并不完全有效。
在这方面，欧盟委员会在最近关于电子商务部门竞争调查的报告中表明，地域封锁尤其在欧洲电子商务部门内得到了大规模使用。
地域封锁条例的目的
地域封锁条例的目的是防止专业人员在处理跨国界电子商务交易时，基于国籍、居住地或客户营业地而实施的直接或间接歧视。
地域封锁条例的范围
新的条例将只适用于企业与最终用户或企业之间的网上销售。
新条例将适用于在欧盟内运作的网站或在欧盟以外运作但向设立在欧盟内的客户提供货物或服务的网站。
电子网站的管理新规是什么？
关于访问网站的问题
根据该条例，企业不得以与互联网用户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的理由，通过使用技术措施来阻止或限制其进入网络接口。然而，只要客户明确同意，并且仍然可以轻松访问他们原先试图访问的网站版本，企业就有权将客的访问方向改变到他们试图访问的网站之外的另一个网站。
关于网站的销售条款和条件
该规则禁止企业在下列三种情况下，根据客户的国籍、居住地或营业地（特别是他们的IP地址），提供不同的一般条件来取得货物或服务：
提供送货服务的企业将售出的商品送达到另外的欧盟成员国交付（或在企业与客户共同商定的地点收取货物）的；
企业提供的电子化服务，如云、数据存储、主机服务等。（但不提供访问受版权保护的内容的服务，如流媒体或在线游戏服务）；
顾客获得的在各个国家均可运行的商务服务（如汽车租赁和旅馆住宿服务或体育或文化活动的票务服务）。
关于网站上的付款方式
该条例禁止企业以与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地、支付账户所在地或支付服务提供者的设立地有关的理由，对已接受的支付手段适用不同的支付条件（条件是必须符合认证要求，付款交易必须以企业接受的货币进行）。
这项规定对电子零售商有什么影响？
尽管在形式上被排除在该条例范围之外，但供应商与分销商或批发商之间的关系仍将受到该条例的影响，因为根据分销商之间的协议规定，分销商承诺不进行被动销售（例如，阻止或限制进入网站），由于与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的原因“将自动无效”。
因此，地域封锁条例对分销商的影响是双重的：第一，在与客户（最终用户或用户企业）的关系中产生直接影响；第二，在其根据独家分销协议所承担的义务方面产生间接影响。
地域封锁条例必须与现行竞争法框架相协调，特别是与制定适用于网上销售的具体规则的纵向限制指导方针相协调。网上销售被比作被动销售。指导方针中提到4个实践中为了间接保证地方保护主义，在供应商和独家分销商同意的情况下被禁止的例子：
独家经销商应阻止另一地区的客户访问其网站，或自动将其转到供应商或其他经销商的网站，
如果买方的信用卡数据显示买方不是独家经销商的专有区域，独家经销商应终止网上销售。
限制独家分销商通过互联网销售的份额（但合同可规定按绝对值计算的最低线下目标，并规定与离线销售相比，网上销售保持一致）。
独家分销商对在互联网上销售的货物支付的价格，应高于对准备在离线销售的货物支付的价格。
制造商将必须决定是采用一个独一无二的欧洲门户网站报价还是多个地方商业报价，众所周知，每个范畴的客户端是有可能存在价格差异的。
事实上，新规定并没有强制电子零售商协调其价格政策，它们只是必须允许欧盟消费者自由和容易地访问其网站的任何版本。同样，该条例并没有规定电子零售商必须将产品运往欧洲各地，而只是允许欧盟消费者从他们想要的任何网站购买商品，并在必要时自行安排发货。
最后，在更为契约性的层面上，尚不十分清楚新的地域封锁规则如何直接或间接地影响适用于消费者合同的冲突法规则，根据罗马第1号规定(Rome I Regulation)，特别是在允许消费者在本网站所在国的外国网站上购买产品时（这意味着在消费者所在国无特定交货制度已建立。）
因此，B2C网站的一般条款和条件需要在营销和法律两方面进行审查和调整。
Once convinced of the utility of mediation as a method of resolving conflicts between franchisor and franchisee and taken the decision to include a clause in the contracts that provides for it, the last step would be what elements should be taken into account when drafting it.
- The previous negotiation. It seems advisable that both parties grant themselves the possibility of trying to solve the problem with a previous formal negotiation. Mediation does not exclude the previous attempt made by the interested parties or their lawyers; however, it seems advisable to contractually provide a suitable end according to the circumstances. Experience shows that lengthening this phase too long may result in the conflict becoming more complicated and even more difficult to approach mediation.
- The clause may also provide for the place where the mediation will take place. Again at this point the parties are free. It is convenient that this is accurate indicating the concrete city.
- The language in which the mediation will be developed is the a faculty of the parties. There will be no difficulty in mediations in which both parties use the same language, but it is very convenient in contracts with parties that have different languages, or that belong to regions or countries with different co-official languages. The drafting or signing of the contract in a specific language does not presuppose that this must be the language of the mediation. It is an element to be taken into account also when requesting a mediator who can use that language in the chosen mediation institution.
- The procedure can also be decided by the parties. In particular, the number of sessions, the maximum expected duration, the participation of advisors, etc. Keep in mind that the greater or lesser regulation will allow to avoid future conflicts in this respect, although it will also imply a greater limit to the freedom of the parties that, nevertheless, will remain free to modify the agreement by mutual consent.
- The term of the mediation can also be contemplated. This would allow, for example, to prevent mediation from being extended only for purely procedural strategic purposes or to gather information from the other party before starting a procedure, etc. The professional mediators, however, are able to identify these manoeuvres, also having the power to put an end to mediation in those cases.
- Choosing the mediator or the mediation institution is an important choice. The parties can agree on who will be their mediator, indicate in the contract the elements to choose it, or submit directly to a Mediation Institution so that it is the one who designates it according to its own rules. These decisions can be alternatives (that is, that the parties agree on the mediator and, in case of lack of agreement, submit to an institution that names it), or they can be unique. The designation of an Institution requires that it has a sufficient guarantee of stability (avoid designating short-term institutions or without much future guarantee), with a sufficient panel of mediators depending on the characteristics of the mediation (language, competence, experience) and that allows the necessary flexibility for its operation.
- Finally, it is convenient that the clause includes an alternative way in case the mediation does not succeed either because the parties do not reach an agreement, or because they withdraw from the mediation. It is important to recall that mediation does not close the doors to the conflict be resolved by recourse to ordinary jurisdiction or arbitration. And in terms of specialized arbitration in distribution contracts, the IDArb (https://www.idiproject.com/content/idarb-idi-arbitration-project) is an excellent option.
On the topic of the importance of Mediation in Distribution Agreements, you can check out the recording our webinar “Mediation in International Conflicts”
写信给 Benedikt
Commercial distribution contracts – Six key questions to consider
2017年11月30日
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西班牙
- 机构
- 契约
- 分销协议
- 国际贸易
法国是特许经营关系网的大市场，近2000家特许经营关系网处于运营状态。这是最成功的商业发展计划之一。
特许人必须主要遵守法国关于预先披露信息的规定以及法国和欧盟的竞争条例等规定。虽然对授予特许者来说，对关系网质量和品牌形象的控制是一个非常重要且合法的问题，但授予特许者不能过多地干预特许经营人的日常活动，因为特许经营人是独立商家。因此，授予特许人与特许经营人之间的关系只能建立在商法的基础上，而不能建立在劳动法的基础上。然而，法国最近的规定将导致授予特许者与特许经营者和他们的雇员一起实施某些劳动法。
在法国经营特许经营关系网的外国特许经营者确实必须知道如何应对《劳动法》（2016年8月8日）及其法令（2017年5月4日）所带来的限制，并自2017年5月7日起生效，该法令涉及为整个特许经营关系网设立一个雇员论坛。事实上，这个社会对话委员会可以对特许经营关系网的组织工作产生深刻的影响。
首先，新的社会对话委员会只关心经营者受特许权协议约束的关系网。因此，商标许可和分销合同似乎没有包括在内。特许权协议应被理解为由三项单独协议构成的特殊合同：商标许可协议、专有技术许可协议和商业或技术援助协议。然而，2016年8月8日的法律却造成了一些混乱，规定社会对话委员会所涉及的特许协议是“引用《法国商法典》第L330-3条”协议，尽管该条不仅没有界定特许合同的定义，而且可以适用于其他合同（独家分销协议），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
此外，根据该法案，只有包括“对特许经营企业的工作组织和条件有影响的条款”的具体特许协议才会受到关注。尽管该法没有界定这些条款，一方面，是否需要社会对话委员会取决于确定这些条款；另一方面，特许经营者在组织和管理其业务，包括在雇佣劳工事务方面，本质上独立于授予特许人。因此，有必要对所有特许经营协议进行就业审计（例如，如果条款规定营业时间或规定着装怎么办？），以确定该关系网是否属于该法的范围。
最后，只有在法国雇用至少300名（全职）工作人员的特许经营关系网才要求设立社会对话委员会。这似乎不包括特许经营人的雇员或不受特许经营协议约束的经营者的雇员(例如受商标许可合同约束的经营者)。
意味着长期谈判的实现
即使满足了法律要求，授予特许人也没有义务自发成立社会对话委员会。然而，一旦工会要求成立社会对话委员会，授予特许人就有义务积极参加该行业发起的谈判，与所有特许经营者核实其关系网上的雇员人数是否达到300人的门槛，然后建立一个由雇员（工会）代表和雇主（授予特许人和特许经营人）代表组成的“谈判论坛”，用来达成创建和组织未来社会对话委员会的协议。
与工会和特许经营者的谈判将在6达成协议但须经授予特许人、工会和至少30%的特许经营者(占关系网雇员的30%)的同意。该协议应确定社会对话委员会的组成、其成员的任职方式、任期、会议的频率、如果需要，雇员可以为委员会贡献多长时间、委员会实现其宗旨所需的物质或财政手段、以及如何处理费用和代表的旅费和生活津贴等问题。最后一个问题可能不仅是授予特许人关注的一个主要问题，而且也是特许经营人-雇主关注的一个主要方面。由于没有达成这样的协议，该法令规定设立社会对话委员会，其中有几项严格和最低限度的规定，可能会给授予特许人造成不合理的负担。
一旦成立，内部规则将确切界定社会对话委员会的运作方式（所需的多数人、会议通知和引荐来源、讨论内容的公布等）。
无事生非？
社会对话委员会无权调查案件或作出具有约束力的裁决，但社会对话委员会必须让大家知道特许经营者加盟或离开销售关系网的情况，以及“授予特许者的决定，易于影响到特许经营者雇员的数量和结构、工作时间或就业、工作和职业培训条件”。
社会对话委员会还可就如何改善贯穿整个关系网的条件提出建议。
社会对话委员会的影响终究相当有限，但授予特许人必须认真掌握和控制规则的实施，以避免损失自己的特许经营商的时间和精力以及关系网的混乱。
Not what you would expect
When can you terminate, how should you terminate, and how much are you exposed?!
The outcomes of termination of a business relationship with an Israeli counterpart in Israel arise again and again as a question in many disputes between International corporations and Israeli counterparts, such as distributors or franchisees.
This is mainly because Israeli law does not include specific laws regulating or regarding distribution or franchising or other kinds of business ventures (except a relatively new agency law – referring in a limited manner to specific kinds of agency only) – and thus disputes in said regards are determined based on the general principles of contract law, the contractual and factual bases – obviously resulting in considerable uncertainty as to specific matters.
However, substantial case law, such as in the matter of Johnson & Johnson International that ended up paying compensation in the equivalent to over 1.5 Million US$, indicates the basics and threshold of what can be expected in such disputes, and, if implemented wisely, may assist in planning the disengagement or termination of a business relationship, in a manner that would be the least costly for the terminating party and minimize its exposure to a lawsuit.
In many cases, domestic parties invest many years and/or fortunes, in order to penetrate the domestic market with the foreign service or products, and to promote sales in the subject region, for the benefit of both the international corporation and the domestic party.
Nevertheless, often the international corporation decides for various reasons (such as establishing an “in-house” operation” in the target location or substituting the distributor/franchisee) to terminate the oral or written contractual relationship.
What are the legal foundations involved in such termination as per due notice of termination and corresponding compensation – if at all?
Generally, this issue arises in cases in which the contract does not specify a period of the business relationship, and, as a principle of law, contracts may be terminated by reasonable notice and subject to the fundamental good faith principle.
Contracts are not perceived as binding upon the parties indefinitely. The question is always what is the reasonable time for termination notice, and is the termination done in good faith (which is always a tricky and vague issue). Compensation is commonly awarded in accordance with what the courts find as the due notice period that may also entail compensation for damages related to said breach.
As always, there are exceptions, such as breach of trust toward the manufacturer/franchisor, that may have great impact on any due notice obligations, as far as justification for immediate termination that can be deemed immune to breach of due notice or good faith obligations.
The truth is the reasonability of the due notice varies from case to case!
However, Israeli case law is extremely sensitive to the actual reasoning of termination and how genuine it is, as opposed to asserting a tactical breach argument in an attempt to “justify” avoiding a due notice period or adequate compensation.
In this respect, in many cases simple “non-satisfaction” was denied as a legitimate argument for breach of contract, while safeguarding the freedom of contracts and the right to terminate an ongoing contract with due notice and good faith.
There are various common parameters referred to in the case law, to determine the adequate time of due notice, including, for instance, the magnitude of investment; the time required for rearrangement of business towards the new situation (including time required to find an alternative supplier product which can be marketed); the magnitude of the product/service out of the entire distributor’s business, etc.
Time and again, although not as binding rule, the due notice period seems to be in the range of around 12 months, as a balance between the right of termination and the reasonable time for rearranging the business in light of the termination. There were, however, cases in which due notice for termination was deemed as short as three months and as long as two years – but these are rather exceptional.
Another guiding point in the case law is the factor of exclusivity or non-exclusivity, as well as the concept that the longer the business relationship, the less the distributor/franchisee may expect compensation/reimbursement for investment – based on the concept that he has enjoyed the fruits of the investment.
The outcome of not providing such adequate due notice might result in actual compensation reflecting the loss of profit of the business in the last year before the termination, or for the whole term the court finds a due notice was in place, or, in cases of bad faith, even a longer period reflecting the damages.
In conclusion, given the legal regime in Israel, such exposure might be extremely considerable for any international or foreign business. It would, therefore, be vital and as a consequence of real value to plan the strategy of disengagement/termination of the business with the domestic counterpart in Israel, in advance and prior to executing it, and there are, indeed, adequate and wise strategies that may be implemented for the best result.
It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.
At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.
One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.
Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.
No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.
The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.
Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.
The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.
Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?
The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.
Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.
The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).
In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.
From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.
What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?
Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.
The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).
With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.
Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.
From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.
It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.
By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.
In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.
根据欧盟电子商务部门的调查，超过50%的互联网市场和36%的零售商提供数据给价格搜索引擎，如 Idealo，谷歌购物Google Shopping，或Shopzilla。相比之下，大约10%的经销商受到价格比较引擎禁令的影响（见委员会工作人员工作文件SWD（2017）154定稿，S.32图B.4和欧盟委员会第37页，电子商务部门调查的最后报告，第10页）。
不过，联邦法院最近确认，价格比较引擎的禁令是反竞争和无效的。在具体案例中，爱世克斯（跑鞋品牌名）通常禁止德国零售商支持在线分销中的价格搜索引擎：
“此外，经授权的…经销商不得…通过为这些价格比较引擎提供特定于应用程序的接口（“APIs”）来支持价格比较引擎的功能。”
此外，该协议还包含了对第三方平台广告的广泛禁止：爱世克斯禁止其授权经销商允许第三方在第三方网站上以任何形式使用爱世克斯的商标，以便直接引导客户访问被授权的爱世克斯经销商的网站。
爱世克斯的分销协议首先由德国竞争管理机构Bundeskartellamt作为试点案例进行调查(由于许多体育零售商对体育设备制造商的互联网转售限制提出了申诉，因此对阿迪达斯提起了另一起试点案件)。2015年，Bundeskartellamt裁定，爱世克斯对价格比较引擎的禁令违反了反垄断法，因为它将违反第101条(1) TFEU，sec.1 《禁止限制竞争法》。提出的理由是，这种禁令的主要目的是控制和限制价格竞争，而牺牲消费者的利益。这项决定首先得到了Düsseldorf高等地区法院的确认（2017年4月5日的裁决，案件号：VI-Kart 13/15(V)，见Legalmondo文章，点击这里）。
现在，联邦法院再次确认了这项裁决（2017年12月12日的决定，第KVZ 41/17号案件）。爱世克斯的裁决特别值得注意，因为它是德国法院继欧盟法院关于科蒂（全球最大的香水生产公司）的平台禁令作出裁决裁决之后作出的首项裁决（见Legalmondo的文章，点击这里）。因此，这是法院今后将如何处理互联网转售限制的第一个迹象。
因此，联邦法院指出，对价格搜索引擎的普遍禁止“至少”要限制向终端消费者的被动销售（第23款, 25款)–这种限制甚至将是这种禁令的预期目的。法院认为，根据《科蒂判决》（点击此出查看），一般平台禁令的可接受性并不意味着一般价格比较禁令的可接受性（第28款及其后款）。尤其是“限制组合”–即第三方平台价格比较引擎和广告宣传禁令–会产生影响。因为它没有确保潜在客户能够“实际进入”经销商网站（第30款） –在这种情况下，联邦最高法院允许提供这种“实质性准入”所需的充分或必要的条件；在这种情况下，一般价格比较引擎禁令仍可继续得到允许。
实用贴士：
- 在欧盟一级，法院和欧盟委员会都没有就普遍禁止价格比较引擎的有效性采取立场。然而，在英国，竞争和市场管理局对价格搜索引擎禁令也采取了类似的批评观点（“宝马在CMA行动后改变了对汽车比较网站的政策”），将其作为德国的行政实践和司法管辖权。
- 事实上，根据联邦最高法院的判决，Düsseldorf高级地区法院（Asics）和法兰克福高等地区法院（Deuter）已经指出以下区别可能适用于：
- 一般价格比较引擎禁令是–根据联邦法院–反竞争的，因此通常是无效的–尽管如果不与广泛的广告禁令相结合，这些禁令仍然是允许的，这样就可以保证潜在的客户能够访问经销商网站。
- 单独的价格比较引擎禁令和使用价格比较门户网站的其他较温和的限制/标准是允许的，例如关于产品插画或说明以及产品环境（例如要求经销商只能提供新产品）。
进一步了解细节: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb: „Nicht Ideal(o)“ – Kombination aus Preissuchmaschinen-Verbot und Logo-Klausel, in: ZVertriebsR 2018, 118 ff.
- 除此之外，制造商可以–在排他性分销网络内–禁止其分销商主动向制造商保留的或由制造商分配给另一分销商的客户提供在线广告，并指明所使用的语言。原则上，所有其他可能的质量标准也是允许的，只要他们和线下分销标准等效（因为“委员会认为，规定网上销售的标准与从实体店销售的标准总体上不等于硬核限制，从而劝阻指定经销商使用互联网接触更多和更多样化的客户的任何义务”，《纵向限制准则》，第56条）。
有关更多信息，请参见：
- 有关实践现状的概述，包括示范合约条款：Rohrßen, Vertriebsvorgaben im E-Commerce 2018: Praxisübersichts und Folgen des “Coty”-Urteils des EuGH, in: GRUR-Prax 2018, 39-41 以及
- 特别是关于平台禁令和可能起草分配协议: Rohrßen, Internetvertrieb von Markenartikeln: Zulässigkeit von Plattformverboten nach dem EuGH-Urteil Coty – Auswirkungen auf Fachhändler- bzw. Selektiv-, Exklusiv-, Franchise- und offene Vertriebsverträge –, in: DB 2018. 300-306.
- 关于在互联网销售平台中嵌入的搜索功能中是否允许使用商标和公司徽标，见联邦法院最近于2018年2月15日发布的两项裁决（案件号：I ZR 138/16 re “Ortlieb” 和案件号 I ZR 201/1 re “gofit“).
Agreements restricting competition are prohibited as anticompetitive agreements by Article 101 TFEU unless the agreement’s impact on trade or competition is not appreciable (cf. the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case, C-226/11, judgment of 13 December 2012). Whether an agreement constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition or is in the “safe harbour” can be assessed according to the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice. Accordingly, an agreement is particularly appreciable if its object is to restrict competition. This applies in particular to so-called hardcore restrictions, such as vertical price maintenance (or resale price maintenance = “RPM”).
Regarding a special offer for dietary products, the German Higher Regional Court of Celle surprisingly took a different view and decided that even resale price maintenance could be considered non-appreciable and thus falling outside the ban of anticompetitive business practices under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 07.04.2016, Case 13 U 124/15 [Kart]). In this case, the manufacturer made a special offer to a group of its customers (pharmacies) with a special purchase discount: once, for a limited period and limited to a maximum quantity. In return, the customers should commit themselves to “present the product clearly… and not fall below a resale price of EUR 15.95“.
The Hanover Regional Court had instead seen the agreement as an unlawful resale price maintenance (judgment of 25 August 2015, Case 18 O 91/15) – and now the German Federal Court confirmed the same: the minimum prices specified here within the advertising campaign appreciably restrict competition and are thus banned as anticompetitive business practice under Article 101 TFEU (judgment of 17 October 2017, Case KZR 59/16). This corresponds to the case law of the EU Court of Justice in the Expedia case (see above) and the German Federal Court with regard to the sales requirement “one bar extra “ (i.e. without extra charge compared to the usual package size) of the Italian confectionery manufacturer Ferrero (judgment of 08.04.2003, Case KZR 3/02) – because the latter explicitly concerns “the scope for price increases resulting from the increased contents of the package” – not, however, the retailer’s decision to set prices freely downwards.
Practical tips
Vertical price fixing is generally prohibited, whereas providing a manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP, also “recommended retail price”) and maximum selling prices are allowed – this is briefly the principle of German and European antitrust law on pricing frameworks. Furthermore, recommended retail prices and maximum selling prices (“MSP”) are subject to the restriction that they ” they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties” (Article 4 lit. a Vertical Block Exemptions Regulation). That means:
- the manufacturer or supplier may provide guidance,
- however, the reseller may set his sales prices freely.
Exceptions may apply – in addition to the RPM on the price of books or in the case of specialisation agreements – by way of the efficiency defence under Article 101 (3) TFEU in individual cases, e.g.
- in the introductory period when launching new products on the market, or
- in the case of short-term special offers if accompanied by a corresponding increase in efficiency, for example by investing the higher margin into better customer advice, which benefits all customers and Resale Price Maintenance prevents retailers who do not offer the customer advice from free riding (cf. EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 225).
Such actions, however, require excellent preparation because manufacturers can only set resale prices for very short periods if they can convincingly demonstrate efficiency gains such as preventing free-riders.
In the case of fixed prices, the competition authorities quickly become sensitive. For example, fines for vertical price maintenance have recently been imposed again in Germany. In this respect, special care must be taken particularly in distribution and sales agreements.
- Correspondingly, each company’s sales team should continue following the previous case law on recommended retail prices, maximum selling prices and discount campaigns. Guidance for the practice is provided by
- the Federal Cartel Office’s paper of July 2017 on the prohibition of fixed prices in stationary food retailing,
- the European Commission’s De Minimis Notice, the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (para. 48 et seq., 223 et seq.) and the „Guidance on restrictions of competition “by object” for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice“ – all three, however, must always be assessed in the light of current case law because the understanding of the EU Commission contained in these documents does not bind neither the courts nor the national antitrust authorities.
“日默瓦（行李箱品牌名）所有者终止了在欧洲的所有分销协议”——2018年3月9日，德国主要商业报纸“Handelsblatt”的标题。终止原因是：日默瓦——著名高质量的行李箱品牌制造商——其在2011年后，于2018年重新设计它的分销网络：日默瓦的目标是再次提高其质量选择标准，不再将其产品卖给传统的商店，而是提供现代的购物体验。
原则上，制造商可以根据其营销战略和任何变化的需求自由设计和开发其分销系统。相似地，他们可以在原则上自由选择销售中间商（分销商/经销商、特许经营者、代理人等）的数量和名称。他们原则上也可以自由转向选择性分销，目的是使其产品的分销符合某些标准（特别是关于分销的质量），从而也有可能减少分销商的数量。然而，作为例外，分销商可能强迫制造商提供这些产品——即制造商有很大的市场支配力。在这种情况下，与分销商订立合同从而产生交货义务的义务可能源自禁止歧视的规定。（德国《反竞争限制法》第1、20条，1、2款，19项）。
如果制造商重新设计他们的分销网络——就像日默瓦以前和现在所做的那样，那么这个问题就变得特别相关，日默瓦在2011/2012年转向选择性分销（关于选择性分销的优点和可能的分销限制，见Legalmondo文章）。为了重新设计其分销网络，日默瓦终止了以前的分销协议，并提出缔结新的分销协议——根据新的协议，新的分销商承诺以某种方式展示货物，并购买和使用日默瓦的店内系统。日默瓦认为，原分销商的表现与新的商业理念和销售策略不符，这就是双方未能达成缔结一份新协议的原因。于是，分销商提出诉讼，目的是订立一份新的经销商合同，从而交付他的经销商店。
慕尼黑地区法院驳回了这项诉讼请求(2014年9月9日的裁决，编号7249/13 HKO)。不过，慕尼黑高等地区法院确认了这种索赔(2015年9月17日的裁定，注释第U 3886/1/4 Kart)——主张制造商在有关的“高价和高质量手提箱市场”中处于领导地位，或者，相反地，如果分销商具有依赖性，并且因为制造商的手提箱不能被其他同等的手提箱所取代。这种依赖性尤其通过高分销率表现（即制造商提供了大量可比较的分销商）以及独特的设计和相关的高认可价值。现在，联邦法院推翻了这一判决，并将其发回重审(2017年12月12日的裁决，编号：KZR 50/15)。原因：分销商对制造商的产品分类依赖（“Spitzenstellungsabhängigkeit”作为“Sortimentsbedingte Abhängigkeit”的特例）没有得到充分的证明。尽管高分销率通常是决定性的，但在目前这样的质量选择性分销制度中，其意义可能不大。重新设计分销系统的决定性因素：“如果供应商选择在某个时间点转换到一个高质量的选择性分销系统，在之前的一段时间里，与品种相关的依赖关系通常会以较高的分销率来表示。”（第19款）
制造商尤其可以提出两个论点，反对这种所谓的分类相关依赖关系，即
(一)由制造商自行供应其产品的分销商数目远低于提供其产品的分销商总数（即包括通过其他渠道购买该产品的分销商）；及
(二) 分销率将根据那些可与要求进入分配系统和交付的分销商相媲美的分销商确定（第27款)–正如德国联邦法院先前在裁定室内装潢案例（2000年5月9日的裁定，参考KZR 28/98，p. 12）。
Practical conclusions
实际结论
“没有什么比改变更永恒”：在重新设计分销系统时，要仔细考虑是否想要/需要过渡安排–或者最好不考虑过渡安排。一个很好的不考虑过渡安排的理由是：它们可能会使排除不想要的分销商变得更加困难。因此，在日默瓦一案中，慕尼黑的较高地区法院驳回了制造商的反驳意见，即分销商的商业模式“以讨价还价为目标”–辩称，制造商给其他分销商“订立协议后12个月”的时间来满足新的定性标准。
有关定性标准（也是要求/规格），请参阅Legalmondo上的其他文章，特别是关于平台禁令和价格比较禁令的文章，请参见Legalmondo上的文章。
地域封锁是一种歧视性做法，由于客户的国籍或其居住地或营业地，阻止客户（主要是网上客户）从另一欧盟成员国的网站获取和（或）购买产品或服务。
欧盟条例在2018年2月28日颁布的关于解决基于客户国籍、居住地或营业地在国内市场上的不合理的地域封锁和其他形式的歧视的欧盟第2018/302号条例将于2018年12月2日生效。
当前情况
欧盟委员会对欧盟的1万多个电子商务网站进行了“秘密购物”调查。地域封锁指数相当高！63%的网站不允许购物者从另一个欧盟国家购买商品（甚至包括86%的家用电器和79%的电子和计算机硬件）。
另一方面，当电子商务的价值和数量就全球来说，年复一年地大幅增长时，只有50%的欧洲客户从设在另一个欧盟成员国的网上商店购买产品，但这种现象只是在国内范围而非整个欧洲。
2017年6月23日，欧洲理事会要求切实执行数字单一市场战略的所有内容，包括跨界交付、消费者保护和禁止不当地域封锁。
现行法律框架的缺失
欧洲联盟指令（欧盟第2006/123/CE号指令）和TFUE第101条已经解决了基于国籍、地区或住所或营业地的歧视做法。
根据欧盟指令第20(2)条，欧盟成员国必须确保专业人员不因客户的居住地、营业所或国籍而区别对待（客观例外情况除外）。另一方面，关于纵向限制的欧盟竞争法(《欧盟运行条例》第101条和集体豁免条例及其指南)认为，对被动销售的限制是违反欧盟竞争规则的核心限制。然而，这两套规则(欧盟指令和竞争法框架)在实践中似乎并不完全有效。
在这方面，欧盟委员会在最近关于电子商务部门竞争调查的报告中表明，地域封锁尤其在欧洲电子商务部门内得到了大规模使用。
地域封锁条例的目的
地域封锁条例的目的是防止专业人员在处理跨国界电子商务交易时，基于国籍、居住地或客户营业地而实施的直接或间接歧视。
地域封锁条例的范围
新的条例将只适用于企业与最终用户或企业之间的网上销售。
新条例将适用于在欧盟内运作的网站或在欧盟以外运作但向设立在欧盟内的客户提供货物或服务的网站。
电子网站的管理新规是什么？
关于访问网站的问题
根据该条例，企业不得以与互联网用户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的理由，通过使用技术措施来阻止或限制其进入网络接口。然而，只要客户明确同意，并且仍然可以轻松访问他们原先试图访问的网站版本，企业就有权将客的访问方向改变到他们试图访问的网站之外的另一个网站。
关于网站的销售条款和条件
该规则禁止企业在下列三种情况下，根据客户的国籍、居住地或营业地（特别是他们的IP地址），提供不同的一般条件来取得货物或服务：
提供送货服务的企业将售出的商品送达到另外的欧盟成员国交付（或在企业与客户共同商定的地点收取货物）的；
企业提供的电子化服务，如云、数据存储、主机服务等。（但不提供访问受版权保护的内容的服务，如流媒体或在线游戏服务）；
顾客获得的在各个国家均可运行的商务服务（如汽车租赁和旅馆住宿服务或体育或文化活动的票务服务）。
关于网站上的付款方式
该条例禁止企业以与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地、支付账户所在地或支付服务提供者的设立地有关的理由，对已接受的支付手段适用不同的支付条件（条件是必须符合认证要求，付款交易必须以企业接受的货币进行）。
这项规定对电子零售商有什么影响？
尽管在形式上被排除在该条例范围之外，但供应商与分销商或批发商之间的关系仍将受到该条例的影响，因为根据分销商之间的协议规定，分销商承诺不进行被动销售（例如，阻止或限制进入网站），由于与客户的国籍、居住地或营业地有关的原因“将自动无效”。
因此，地域封锁条例对分销商的影响是双重的：第一，在与客户（最终用户或用户企业）的关系中产生直接影响；第二，在其根据独家分销协议所承担的义务方面产生间接影响。
地域封锁条例必须与现行竞争法框架相协调，特别是与制定适用于网上销售的具体规则的纵向限制指导方针相协调。网上销售被比作被动销售。指导方针中提到4个实践中为了间接保证地方保护主义，在供应商和独家分销商同意的情况下被禁止的例子：
独家经销商应阻止另一地区的客户访问其网站，或自动将其转到供应商或其他经销商的网站，
如果买方的信用卡数据显示买方不是独家经销商的专有区域，独家经销商应终止网上销售。
限制独家分销商通过互联网销售的份额（但合同可规定按绝对值计算的最低线下目标，并规定与离线销售相比，网上销售保持一致）。
独家分销商对在互联网上销售的货物支付的价格，应高于对准备在离线销售的货物支付的价格。
制造商将必须决定是采用一个独一无二的欧洲门户网站报价还是多个地方商业报价，众所周知，每个范畴的客户端是有可能存在价格差异的。
事实上，新规定并没有强制电子零售商协调其价格政策，它们只是必须允许欧盟消费者自由和容易地访问其网站的任何版本。同样，该条例并没有规定电子零售商必须将产品运往欧洲各地，而只是允许欧盟消费者从他们想要的任何网站购买商品，并在必要时自行安排发货。
最后，在更为契约性的层面上，尚不十分清楚新的地域封锁规则如何直接或间接地影响适用于消费者合同的冲突法规则，根据罗马第1号规定(Rome I Regulation)，特别是在允许消费者在本网站所在国的外国网站上购买产品时（这意味着在消费者所在国无特定交货制度已建立。）
因此，B2C网站的一般条款和条件需要在营销和法律两方面进行审查和调整。
Once convinced of the utility of mediation as a method of resolving conflicts between franchisor and franchisee and taken the decision to include a clause in the contracts that provides for it, the last step would be what elements should be taken into account when drafting it.
- The previous negotiation. It seems advisable that both parties grant themselves the possibility of trying to solve the problem with a previous formal negotiation. Mediation does not exclude the previous attempt made by the interested parties or their lawyers; however, it seems advisable to contractually provide a suitable end according to the circumstances. Experience shows that lengthening this phase too long may result in the conflict becoming more complicated and even more difficult to approach mediation.
- The clause may also provide for the place where the mediation will take place. Again at this point the parties are free. It is convenient that this is accurate indicating the concrete city.
- The language in which the mediation will be developed is the a faculty of the parties. There will be no difficulty in mediations in which both parties use the same language, but it is very convenient in contracts with parties that have different languages, or that belong to regions or countries with different co-official languages. The drafting or signing of the contract in a specific language does not presuppose that this must be the language of the mediation. It is an element to be taken into account also when requesting a mediator who can use that language in the chosen mediation institution.
- The procedure can also be decided by the parties. In particular, the number of sessions, the maximum expected duration, the participation of advisors, etc. Keep in mind that the greater or lesser regulation will allow to avoid future conflicts in this respect, although it will also imply a greater limit to the freedom of the parties that, nevertheless, will remain free to modify the agreement by mutual consent.
- The term of the mediation can also be contemplated. This would allow, for example, to prevent mediation from being extended only for purely procedural strategic purposes or to gather information from the other party before starting a procedure, etc. The professional mediators, however, are able to identify these manoeuvres, also having the power to put an end to mediation in those cases.
- Choosing the mediator or the mediation institution is an important choice. The parties can agree on who will be their mediator, indicate in the contract the elements to choose it, or submit directly to a Mediation Institution so that it is the one who designates it according to its own rules. These decisions can be alternatives (that is, that the parties agree on the mediator and, in case of lack of agreement, submit to an institution that names it), or they can be unique. The designation of an Institution requires that it has a sufficient guarantee of stability (avoid designating short-term institutions or without much future guarantee), with a sufficient panel of mediators depending on the characteristics of the mediation (language, competence, experience) and that allows the necessary flexibility for its operation.
- Finally, it is convenient that the clause includes an alternative way in case the mediation does not succeed either because the parties do not reach an agreement, or because they withdraw from the mediation. It is important to recall that mediation does not close the doors to the conflict be resolved by recourse to ordinary jurisdiction or arbitration. And in terms of specialized arbitration in distribution contracts, the IDArb (https://www.idiproject.com/content/idarb-idi-arbitration-project) is an excellent option.
On the topic of the importance of Mediation in Distribution Agreements, you can check out the recording our webinar “Mediation in International Conflicts”
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