Daños punitivos – En Italia la Corte de Casación abre la puerta

6 de diciembre de 2017

  • Italia
  • Comercio internacional
  • Contratos
  • Derecho internacional
  • Litigios
  • Reclamación de deudas

It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

“…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

“…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

“Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

Conclusions

If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

La cuestión del litisconsorcio necesario respecto a los beneficiarios de un trust en la acción revocatoria es objeto de amplio debate desde hace tiempo lo que ha llevado a dos corrientes contrastantes entre ellas, superadas por la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Casación n. 19376 del 3 de agosto de 2017.

Según una primera corriente, los beneficiarios del trust no deben considerarse partes necesarias del juicio de revocatoria porqué el objeto de la demanda no es el acto con el que se constituye el trust sino el sucesivo acto dispositivo, llevado a cabo por el “settlor” con el que el nuevo ente, en la persona del trustee, viene dotado de un patrimonio, sin que sea solicitada la participación de los beneficiarios.

Los beneficiarios no podrían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios ya que no siendo directamente titulares de los bienes otorgados en el trust no sufririan en la hipótesis de revocación del acto dispositivo de un perjuicio sino que al máximo se lesionaría un mero interés a la integridad patrimonial del ente.

No estando dotado el trust de personalidad jurídica sino siendo un conjunto de bienes y relaciones destinadas a un fin determinado, en interés de uno o mas beneficiarios y formalmente a nombre del  «trustee», este último resultaría ser el único sujeto que además de poder disponer en via exclusiva de los derechos otorgados en el patrimonio vinculado, estaría legitimado a oponerlos en las relaciones frente a terceros, incluso defendiéndose en juicio (Tribunal de Apelación de Milán, sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2016): de hecho solo frente a dicho “trustee”  el acreedor del “settlor” podría correctamente iniciar la ejecución forzosa, una vez reconocida la ineficacia relativa del acto dispositivo a consecuencia del juicio de revocatoria.

Según otra orientación, en cambio, los beneficiarios del trust deben considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria ya que, aun no siendo titulares del patrimonio vinculado, estarían de todas formas interesados en los efectos de la sentencia que dispone la revocació del acto por el que se otorgan los bienes al trust, siendo su posición sea jurídica que de hecho perjudicada por los efectos de dicha resolución.

A una conclusión análoga se podría llegar incluso a través de una interpretación en sentido contrario de la jurisprudencia en materia de fondo patrimonial.

Con referencia a dicha figura, la Casación ha, de hecho excluido la legitimación pasiva de los hijos de los que lo constituyen, en juicios análogos, en cuanto los mismos no podrían tener pretensiones judiciales directamente frente a sus padres administradores del fondo patrimonial (Casación Civil, sentencia n. 10641 de 15 mayo de 2014, Casación Civil, sentencia n. 18065 de 8 septiembre de 2004; Casación Civil, sentencia n. 5402 del 17 de marzo de 2004) .

Los beneficiarios del trust, en cambio, pudiendo tener pretensiones sea frente al trust que frente al trustee, deberían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en todos aquellos juicios que se refirieren a cualquier aspecto del acto dispositivo (S. Bartoli, Azione revocatoria di trust e litisconsorzio necessario rispetto ai beneficiari: la prima pronunzia della Cassazione, Il Caso, 22 de Noviembre de 2017).

A aclarar la cuestión ha intervenido recentemente el Tribunal de Casación que, con la sentencia n. 19376 del 3 de agosto 2017, ha propuesto soluciones alternativas a aquellas apenas comentadas, capaz de terminar en parte con el contraste interpretativo descrito.

El caso examinado por los magistrados y relativo al otorgamiento de determinados bienes, antes a un “fondo patrimonial” y sucesivamente a un trust, por parte de unos conyuge que, a través de dichos instrumentos, han destinado parte del proprio patrimonio a las necesidades de vida y de estudio de los hijos.

Los actos dispositivos han sido pero considerados perjudiciales para los propios intereses por un banco, acreedor de uno de los cónyuges, que ha por lo tanto ejercitado la revocatoria, obteniendo sea en primer que en segundo grado, la declaratoria de ineficacia, en virtud del art. 2901 c.c, del “fondo patrimonial” y del trust.

Contra la sentencia de apelación, los cónyuges han propuesto recurso de Casación, por falta de integración del contradictorio en el juicio de apelación, no habiendo el Tribunal de Apelación ordenado la intervención en el proceso de los hijos – benericiarios y solicitando, por tanto, la nulidad de todo el proceso.

Los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación, examinado el caso, no han considerado válidos los motivos propuesto con el recurso.

Según el Tribunal de Casación, de hecho, en la hipótesis de “fondo patrimonial”, no produciéndose ninguna mutación en la titularidad de los bienes, que siguen siendo de titularidad de padres – constituyentes del fondo y que no surgiendo ningún derecho subjetivo a favor de los hijos beneficiarios, estos no pueden ser en ningún modo considerados litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria del fondo, como es afrirmado por constante jurisprudencia sea de los Tribunales de Apelación que de Casación (véase la anteriormente citada).

Según el Tribunal de Casación se llega a una conclusión análoga con referencia al trust.

En relación a dicha cuestión los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación consideran no poder adherir a ninguna de las orientaciones que se han formado en jurisprudencia, y ofrecen, como anticipado, una tercera via interpretativa según la cual los beneficiarios del trust pueden ser considerados legitimarios pasivos en la revocatoria solo cuando el acto costitutivo del trust reconozca a los mismos la titularidad de derechos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al mismo.

En ausencia de un expreso reconocimiento de dichas prerrogativas, el único legitimado pasivo en el juicio de revocatorio es el trustee.

El trust, de hecho, se convierte en operativo, explica el Tribunal de Casación, mediante dos tipologías de actos, el primero de caracter unilateral, finalizado exclusivamente a la sua institución y el segundo (o los segundos, pudiendo el “settlor” proceder a una pluralidad de negocios distintos) de natura dispositiva, dirigido a transmitir los bienes al trustee.

Si el acto costitutivo por si mismo no parece idóneo a determinar ningún  perjuicio a los acreedores del “settlor”, no afectando la consistencia de su patrimonio y, por tanto, su capacidad de cumplir con las propias obligaciones, no se puede decir lo mismo de los actos con los que lo bienes se transmiten al trustee, el cual convirtiéndose en el único sujeto legitimado a disponer de los mismos, se convierte en el único a poder oponerse en un juicio para tutelarse.

Es claro dicho aspecto, los jueces del Tribunal de Casación han observado además como el eventual interés de los beneficiarios a la correcta administración del patrimonio otorgado en el trust no represente, desde un punto de vista teórico, una hipótesis de interés directo e inmediato a intervenir en el juicio de revocatoria, que justifique la participación de los beneficiarios como litisconsortes necesarios.

El interés a la correcta administración del trust constituye una posición jurídica que se refiere exclusivamente a las relaciones entre los beneficiarios y el “trustee” y que, en ningún modo puede afectar a los acreedores del “settlor”.

A una conclusión distinta se podría llegar cuando el regolamento del trust hubiese permitido de calificar los beneficiarios como actuales beneficiarios de la renta o como beneficiarios finales con derecho inmediato a recibir la titularidad de los bienes otorgados en trust, independientemente de cualquier valoración discrecional del “trustee “.

Solo così, de hecho, los beneficiarios habrían podido hacer valer un interés directo e inmediato en la controversia que justificaría la necesidad de citarlos en juicio.

Por lo tanto, en las hipótesis en que los beneficiarios no sean titulares de derechos subjetivos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al trust, además del deudor, legitimado pasivo en la acción revocatoria es solo el “trustee”, en cuanto único sujeto de referencia en las relaciones con terceros y por tanto también en las relaciones con los acreedores del “settlor”, único titular de los derechos sobre bienes sujetos a “segregación”.

La solución ofrecida por el Tribunal de Casación es homogénea con cuanto previsto por el derecho inglés, en el que nuestro ordenamiento se ha inspirado para la figura del trust, según la cual en los juicios  iniciados por los acreedores del “settlor” frente al trust, la protección de este se encarga al trustee, en lugar o junto con los beneficiarios (Di Sapio, Muritano, “Solo il «trustee» partecipa al giudizio di revoca del trust”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 de noviembre de 2017).

Por lo tanto, como en Italia, también en los sistemas anglosajones los beneficiarios no son parte necesaria del proceso pero pueden intervenir volontariamente en el mismo para evitar ser perjudicados por la sentencia de revocatoria.

El autor de este artículo es Giovanni Izzo.

¿Cómo asegurase que a largo plazo pueda ejecutarse un crédito? En Suiza un acreedor podrá embargar los bienes de un deudor siempre que se cumplan ciertas condiciones. En la práctica, existen dos situaciones por las cuales se considera que se lleve a cabo un embargo de los activos: la primera de ellas es cuando el acreedor posee una acción contra un deudor sin residencia en Suiza, mientras que la segunda, es cuando el acreedor posee un título ejecutivo fundado en una sentencia favorable o en un laudo o resolución arbitral.

Sin lugar a duda, el mercado financiero suizo continúa jugando un papel predominante en el mundo financiero actual, a pesar de la presión reguladora que afronta. La jurisdicción suiza, por tanto, es relevante para los acreedores que deseen obtener el embrago de bienes por parte de un deudor que posea cuentas bancarias u otros bienes en Suiza. Si bien en la práctica, el embargo de bienes se efectúa sobre cuentas bancarias, es posible utilizar la misma obligación para embargar otros bienes con el mismo efecto, por ejemplo, bienes inmuebles, obras de arte o bienes de terceros a su vez acreedores del deudor.

A instancia de parte, el acreedor puede solicitar un embargo ex parte de bienes del deudor que se encuentren en Suiza ante el tribunal del lugar donde se encuentre la sede del banco o donde se sitúen los bienes, siempre y cuando se demuestre que existan prima facie los tres requisitos previstos por la Ley federal sobre la ejecución y sobre el concurso de acreedores (“DEBA”), es decir, que:

  • El acreedor que solicita el embargo posea un título fundado en un crédito exigible y ordinario.
  • Se den los presupuestos legales necesarios para obtener un embargo.
  • Los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza.

Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, los presupuestos legales más relevantes para obtener el embargo de bienes son:

  • Que el deudor no sea residente en Suiza y que el crédito en sí esté lo suficientemente conectado con Suiza o que esté fundado en un reconocimiento de la deuda por parte del deudor (“embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza”).
  • Que el acreedor posea una sentencia ejecutiva favorable o un laudo arbitral contra el deudor (“Título ejecutivo”)

Embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza: Según la DEBA, el mero hecho de que los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza no es suficiente como para establecer una “suficiente conexión con Suiza”. Dicho presupuesto depende en gran parte de los hechos específicos de la cuestión que se valorarán por parte del Juez caso por caso. La jurisprudencia suiza ha confirmado algunos criterios de conexión: que el contrato entre las partes se haya firmado o deba de ejecutarse en Suiza; que el contrato entre las partes esté regulado por la ley suiza, que el acreedor viva en Suiza o que el crédito del acreedor esté conectado a una actividad comercial desarrollada en Suiza.

Título ejecutivo: Para poder solicitar el embargo de los bienes, el acreedor debe además, cumplir con el segundo presupuesto legal, esto es, poseer un título ejecutivo. La DEBA no realiza distinciones entre sentencias y laudos o arbitrales pronunciados tanto en una jurisdicción interna como en una jurisdicción extranjera. Simplemente deben ser ejecutivos (teniendo en consideración el Convenio de Lugano, la Ley federal sobre derecho internacional privado – en el caso de un laudo arbitral dictado por una corte arbitral no suiza – teniendo en consideración el Convención de Nueva York), todas las sentencias favorables o los laudos arbitrales podrán obtener el embargo de los bienes que se encuentren en Suiza.

El tribunal suizo solicitará al acreedor que demuestre prime facie la existencia de los presupuestos legales para llevar a cabo el embargo, como anteriormente descrito. Debido a que el embargo se otorgará ex parte, en muchos casos, dicha acción tomará al deudor por sorpresa. Gracias a este efecto sorpresa y a la naturaleza del embargo, cuyo objetivo es que el deudor no pueda deshacerse de los activos, tal medio tiene un grande potencial para ayudar al acreedor a asegurarse y quedarse satisfecho de su crédito.

Con la reciente sentencia 16601/2017, la Corte Suprema – después de diferentes pronunciamientos contrarios – ha abierto la posibilidad de reconocer en Italia las sentencias extranjeras que contengan daños punitivos.

En este breve artículo veremos en qué consisten los daños punitivos, cuáles son las condiciones por las cuales podrían reconocerse y aplicarse en Italia y, sobretodo, qué medidas conviene tomar para afrontar este nuevo riesgo.

Los daños punitivos, en inglés punitive damages, son un instituto jurídico originario de los ordenamientos anglosajones que prevén la posibilidad de reconocer a la parte perjudicada una indemnización adicional respecto a la compensación del daño sufrido, en los casos en los que el causante del daño haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave (“malice” y “gross negligence”, respectivamente).

Con los daños punitivos, además de la función compensatoria, la indemnización del daño también asume una finalidad sancionadora, típica del derecho penal, actuando como elemento de disuasión ante otros potenciales infractores.

En los ordenamientos en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, el reconocimiento y la cuantificación de la indemnización se someten a la discrecionalidad del juez.

En los Estados Unidos de América los daños punitivos se prevén en los principios de common law, pero se disciplinan de modo diverso en cada uno de los Estados. Sin embargo, en general, se aplican siempre que la conducta del causante del daño haya sido dirigida a causar el daño intencionadamente o, se haya llevado a cabo sin tener en cuenta las normas de seguridad preestablecidas. Por lo general, no pueden reconocerse por el incumplimiento de un contrato, salvo que no se determine como un ilícito (tort) autónomo.

En algunos Estados se prevén límites máximos a los daños punitivos, a veces incorporados en los daños compensatorios, otras veces como cuantía máxima. Además, la Corte Suprema de los EEUU ha intervenido en diferentes casos para limitar el importe de condena.

En los ordenamientos de civil law, entre ellos Italia, el instituto de daños punitivos tradicionalmente no se reconoce, ya que la sanción al causante del daño se considera que queda al margen de los principios del derecho civil, basándose en la concepción de que la indemnización por daños tiene como objetivo restaurar la esfera patrimonial del perjudicado.

En consecuencia, el reconocimiento de los daños punitivos en una sentencia, se obstaculizaban por el límite de orden público y tales sentencias no tenían acceso en el espacio jurídico italiano.

La sentencia de las Secciones Unidas núm. 16601/2017, de 5 de julio de 2017 de la Corte Suprema de Casación ha girado las cartas sobre la mesa.

En el presente caso se solicitó a la Corte de Apelación de Venecia el reconocimiento (ex. Art. 64 de la Ley 218/1995) de tres sentencias de la District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida que, admitió una denuncia de garantía interpuesta por un revendedor americano de cascos contra la sociedad productora italiana, por la cual se había condenado a ésta última al pago de 1.436.136,87 USD (además de gastos e intereses) en base al resarcimiento de los daños causas por un defecto del casco utilizado en un accidente de tráfico.

La Corte de Apelación de Venecia reconoció la eficacia de la sentencia del juez extranjero, considerando que el importe era meramente indemnizatorio y no punitivo. La decisión fue recurrida en Casación por la parte condenada, que sostenía la contrariedad al orden publico de la sentencia estadunidense, en base a la orientación jurisprudencial hasta ese momento.

La Casación ha confirmado la decisión de la Corte de Apelación, considerando que el importe no es punitivo y ha declarado el reconocimiento de la sentencia estadunidense en Italia.

Las Secciones Unidas, por su parte, han aprovechado la ocasión para afrontar la cuestión inherente a la admisibilidad de los daños punitivos en Italia, cambiando la orientación histórica de la Corte Suprema (véase Cass. 1781/2012).

Según la Corte, la noción de responsabilidad civil entendida como mera reparación de los daños sufridos, se debe considerar como obsoleta dada la evolución del instituto a través de intervenciones legislativas y jurisprudenciales nacionales y europeas, que han introducido medidas indemnizatorias con finalidad sancionadora y disuasiva. De hecho, en el ordenamiento italiano es posible encontrar diversos casos de indemnización por daños con finalidad sancionadora: en materia de difamación en medios de comunicación (art. 12 L. 47/48), derechos de autor (art. 158 L 633/41), propiedad industrial (art. 125 D. Lgs 30/2005), abuso del proceso (art. 96.3 c.p.c. y art. 26.2 c.p.a.), derecho laboral (art. 18.14 c.p.c.), derecho de familia (art. 709-ter c.p.c.), etc.

De este modo, la Corte de Casación ha introducido el siguiente principio de derecho: “En el vigente ordenamiento italiano, a la responsabilidad civil no solo se le asigna el deber de restaurar la esfera patrimonial del sujeto que ha sufrido la lesión, porque se consideran incluidas en el sistema la función de disuasión y la función sancionadora de la responsabilidad civil. Por tanto, no es ontológicamente incompatible con el ordenamiento italiano el instituto de origen estadunidense de la indemnización punitiva”.

La consecuencia, a tener en muy cuenta, es que el pronunciamiento abre la puerta a posibles deliberaciones de sentencias extranjeras, que condenen a una de las partes al pago de un importe superior respecto al importe calculado para compensar el prejuicio creado a causa de un daño.

Sin embargo, a tal fin, la Corte Suprema ha dispuesto algunas condiciones para que la sentencia extranjera pueda reconocerse. La decisión ha debido ser tomada en el ordenamiento extranjero en base a:

  1. Garantizar la tipicidad de la condena.
  2. La previsibilidad de la misma.
  3. Los límites cuantificativos.

Los posibles efectos de la Sentencia en el ordenamiento italiano

En primer lugar, hay que tener claro que la Sentencia no ha modificado el sistema indemnizatorio interno del ordenamiento italiano. En otras palabras, la Sentencia no permitirá a los jueces italianos condenar por daños punitivos al interno de los procedimientos italianos.

En cambio, por lo que respecta a las sentencias extranjeras, ahora será posible obtener la indemnización por daños punitivos a través del reconocimiento y la ejecución en el sistema italiano de una decisión extranjera que prevea la condena de dicha tipología de daño, con la condición de que se respeten los mencionados presupuestos.

Por todo lo expuesto, las empresas que hayan invertido o que realicen negocios en países en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, tendrán que tener en consideración dicho riesgo.

Los instrumentos para tutelarse

El empresario quien opere en mercados extranjeros en los que se prevén los daños punitivos debe considerar con atención este riesgo.

La óptica debe ser necesariamente de prevención y los instrumentos a disposición son diversos: en primer lugar, la adopción de cláusulas contractuales que prevean la renuncia del perjudicado a este tipo de daño o, que acuerden un límite a la indemnización de los daños contractuales, por ejemplo limitándolos al valor de los productos o a los servicios ofrecidos.

Es además fundamental, que se conozca la legislación y la jurisprudencia de los mercados en los cuales se opera, incluso indirectamente (por ejemplo, con la distribución comercial de los productos) con el fin de escoger de modo consciente la ley aplicable al contrato y la modalidad de resolución de controversias (por ejemplo, con previsión de la exclusiva jurisdiccional del foro del país que no prevea daños punitivos).

Finalmente, este tipo de responsabilidad y riesgo puede ser objeto de valoración con pólizas aseguradoras que ofrecen una cobertura específica respecto a eventuales condenas de indemnización de daños punitivos.

[Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of «sufficient justification» and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

How much does it tell us?

Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

  • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
  • a frustration or a force majeure.

There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

  • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
  • the good faith of the parties;
  • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
  • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
  • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

  • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
  • sudden;
  • unpredictable.

To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

  • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
  • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
  • a constant increase in turnover;
  • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
  • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
  • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
  • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
  • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

  • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
  • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
  • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

Compensation for a damage

The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

International law

The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

  • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
  • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

Roberto Luzi Crivellini

Áreas de práctica

  • Arbitraje
  • Contratos de distribución
  • Comercio internacional
  • Derecho Internacional Privado
  • Derecho Inmobiliario
Contáctanos Roberto

Contacta con Roberto





    Lea la política de privacidad de Legalmondo.
    Este sitio está protegido por reCAPTCHA y se aplican la Política de privacidad de Google y los Términos de servicio.

    Boycot of Israeli products and business –  Risk to be sued for damages

    1 de noviembre de 2017

    • Israel
    • Comercio internacional
    • Litigios

    It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

    At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

    One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

    Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

    No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

    The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

    Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

    The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

    Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

    The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

    Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

    The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

    In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

    From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

    What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

    Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

    The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

    With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

    Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

    From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

    It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

    By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

    In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

    State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

    Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

    “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

    “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

    The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

    One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

    “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

    As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

    Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

    There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

    A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

    The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

    In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

    The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

    The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

    The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

    The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

    In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

    Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

    Conclusions

    If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

    If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

    And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

    La cuestión del litisconsorcio necesario respecto a los beneficiarios de un trust en la acción revocatoria es objeto de amplio debate desde hace tiempo lo que ha llevado a dos corrientes contrastantes entre ellas, superadas por la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Casación n. 19376 del 3 de agosto de 2017.

    Según una primera corriente, los beneficiarios del trust no deben considerarse partes necesarias del juicio de revocatoria porqué el objeto de la demanda no es el acto con el que se constituye el trust sino el sucesivo acto dispositivo, llevado a cabo por el “settlor” con el que el nuevo ente, en la persona del trustee, viene dotado de un patrimonio, sin que sea solicitada la participación de los beneficiarios.

    Los beneficiarios no podrían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios ya que no siendo directamente titulares de los bienes otorgados en el trust no sufririan en la hipótesis de revocación del acto dispositivo de un perjuicio sino que al máximo se lesionaría un mero interés a la integridad patrimonial del ente.

    No estando dotado el trust de personalidad jurídica sino siendo un conjunto de bienes y relaciones destinadas a un fin determinado, en interés de uno o mas beneficiarios y formalmente a nombre del  «trustee», este último resultaría ser el único sujeto que además de poder disponer en via exclusiva de los derechos otorgados en el patrimonio vinculado, estaría legitimado a oponerlos en las relaciones frente a terceros, incluso defendiéndose en juicio (Tribunal de Apelación de Milán, sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2016): de hecho solo frente a dicho “trustee”  el acreedor del “settlor” podría correctamente iniciar la ejecución forzosa, una vez reconocida la ineficacia relativa del acto dispositivo a consecuencia del juicio de revocatoria.

    Según otra orientación, en cambio, los beneficiarios del trust deben considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria ya que, aun no siendo titulares del patrimonio vinculado, estarían de todas formas interesados en los efectos de la sentencia que dispone la revocació del acto por el que se otorgan los bienes al trust, siendo su posición sea jurídica que de hecho perjudicada por los efectos de dicha resolución.

    A una conclusión análoga se podría llegar incluso a través de una interpretación en sentido contrario de la jurisprudencia en materia de fondo patrimonial.

    Con referencia a dicha figura, la Casación ha, de hecho excluido la legitimación pasiva de los hijos de los que lo constituyen, en juicios análogos, en cuanto los mismos no podrían tener pretensiones judiciales directamente frente a sus padres administradores del fondo patrimonial (Casación Civil, sentencia n. 10641 de 15 mayo de 2014, Casación Civil, sentencia n. 18065 de 8 septiembre de 2004; Casación Civil, sentencia n. 5402 del 17 de marzo de 2004) .

    Los beneficiarios del trust, en cambio, pudiendo tener pretensiones sea frente al trust que frente al trustee, deberían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en todos aquellos juicios que se refirieren a cualquier aspecto del acto dispositivo (S. Bartoli, Azione revocatoria di trust e litisconsorzio necessario rispetto ai beneficiari: la prima pronunzia della Cassazione, Il Caso, 22 de Noviembre de 2017).

    A aclarar la cuestión ha intervenido recentemente el Tribunal de Casación que, con la sentencia n. 19376 del 3 de agosto 2017, ha propuesto soluciones alternativas a aquellas apenas comentadas, capaz de terminar en parte con el contraste interpretativo descrito.

    El caso examinado por los magistrados y relativo al otorgamiento de determinados bienes, antes a un “fondo patrimonial” y sucesivamente a un trust, por parte de unos conyuge que, a través de dichos instrumentos, han destinado parte del proprio patrimonio a las necesidades de vida y de estudio de los hijos.

    Los actos dispositivos han sido pero considerados perjudiciales para los propios intereses por un banco, acreedor de uno de los cónyuges, que ha por lo tanto ejercitado la revocatoria, obteniendo sea en primer que en segundo grado, la declaratoria de ineficacia, en virtud del art. 2901 c.c, del “fondo patrimonial” y del trust.

    Contra la sentencia de apelación, los cónyuges han propuesto recurso de Casación, por falta de integración del contradictorio en el juicio de apelación, no habiendo el Tribunal de Apelación ordenado la intervención en el proceso de los hijos – benericiarios y solicitando, por tanto, la nulidad de todo el proceso.

    Los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación, examinado el caso, no han considerado válidos los motivos propuesto con el recurso.

    Según el Tribunal de Casación, de hecho, en la hipótesis de “fondo patrimonial”, no produciéndose ninguna mutación en la titularidad de los bienes, que siguen siendo de titularidad de padres – constituyentes del fondo y que no surgiendo ningún derecho subjetivo a favor de los hijos beneficiarios, estos no pueden ser en ningún modo considerados litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria del fondo, como es afrirmado por constante jurisprudencia sea de los Tribunales de Apelación que de Casación (véase la anteriormente citada).

    Según el Tribunal de Casación se llega a una conclusión análoga con referencia al trust.

    En relación a dicha cuestión los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación consideran no poder adherir a ninguna de las orientaciones que se han formado en jurisprudencia, y ofrecen, como anticipado, una tercera via interpretativa según la cual los beneficiarios del trust pueden ser considerados legitimarios pasivos en la revocatoria solo cuando el acto costitutivo del trust reconozca a los mismos la titularidad de derechos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al mismo.

    En ausencia de un expreso reconocimiento de dichas prerrogativas, el único legitimado pasivo en el juicio de revocatorio es el trustee.

    El trust, de hecho, se convierte en operativo, explica el Tribunal de Casación, mediante dos tipologías de actos, el primero de caracter unilateral, finalizado exclusivamente a la sua institución y el segundo (o los segundos, pudiendo el “settlor” proceder a una pluralidad de negocios distintos) de natura dispositiva, dirigido a transmitir los bienes al trustee.

    Si el acto costitutivo por si mismo no parece idóneo a determinar ningún  perjuicio a los acreedores del “settlor”, no afectando la consistencia de su patrimonio y, por tanto, su capacidad de cumplir con las propias obligaciones, no se puede decir lo mismo de los actos con los que lo bienes se transmiten al trustee, el cual convirtiéndose en el único sujeto legitimado a disponer de los mismos, se convierte en el único a poder oponerse en un juicio para tutelarse.

    Es claro dicho aspecto, los jueces del Tribunal de Casación han observado además como el eventual interés de los beneficiarios a la correcta administración del patrimonio otorgado en el trust no represente, desde un punto de vista teórico, una hipótesis de interés directo e inmediato a intervenir en el juicio de revocatoria, que justifique la participación de los beneficiarios como litisconsortes necesarios.

    El interés a la correcta administración del trust constituye una posición jurídica que se refiere exclusivamente a las relaciones entre los beneficiarios y el “trustee” y que, en ningún modo puede afectar a los acreedores del “settlor”.

    A una conclusión distinta se podría llegar cuando el regolamento del trust hubiese permitido de calificar los beneficiarios como actuales beneficiarios de la renta o como beneficiarios finales con derecho inmediato a recibir la titularidad de los bienes otorgados en trust, independientemente de cualquier valoración discrecional del “trustee “.

    Solo così, de hecho, los beneficiarios habrían podido hacer valer un interés directo e inmediato en la controversia que justificaría la necesidad de citarlos en juicio.

    Por lo tanto, en las hipótesis en que los beneficiarios no sean titulares de derechos subjetivos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al trust, además del deudor, legitimado pasivo en la acción revocatoria es solo el “trustee”, en cuanto único sujeto de referencia en las relaciones con terceros y por tanto también en las relaciones con los acreedores del “settlor”, único titular de los derechos sobre bienes sujetos a “segregación”.

    La solución ofrecida por el Tribunal de Casación es homogénea con cuanto previsto por el derecho inglés, en el que nuestro ordenamiento se ha inspirado para la figura del trust, según la cual en los juicios  iniciados por los acreedores del “settlor” frente al trust, la protección de este se encarga al trustee, en lugar o junto con los beneficiarios (Di Sapio, Muritano, “Solo il «trustee» partecipa al giudizio di revoca del trust”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 de noviembre de 2017).

    Por lo tanto, como en Italia, también en los sistemas anglosajones los beneficiarios no son parte necesaria del proceso pero pueden intervenir volontariamente en el mismo para evitar ser perjudicados por la sentencia de revocatoria.

    El autor de este artículo es Giovanni Izzo.

    ¿Cómo asegurase que a largo plazo pueda ejecutarse un crédito? En Suiza un acreedor podrá embargar los bienes de un deudor siempre que se cumplan ciertas condiciones. En la práctica, existen dos situaciones por las cuales se considera que se lleve a cabo un embargo de los activos: la primera de ellas es cuando el acreedor posee una acción contra un deudor sin residencia en Suiza, mientras que la segunda, es cuando el acreedor posee un título ejecutivo fundado en una sentencia favorable o en un laudo o resolución arbitral.

    Sin lugar a duda, el mercado financiero suizo continúa jugando un papel predominante en el mundo financiero actual, a pesar de la presión reguladora que afronta. La jurisdicción suiza, por tanto, es relevante para los acreedores que deseen obtener el embrago de bienes por parte de un deudor que posea cuentas bancarias u otros bienes en Suiza. Si bien en la práctica, el embargo de bienes se efectúa sobre cuentas bancarias, es posible utilizar la misma obligación para embargar otros bienes con el mismo efecto, por ejemplo, bienes inmuebles, obras de arte o bienes de terceros a su vez acreedores del deudor.

    A instancia de parte, el acreedor puede solicitar un embargo ex parte de bienes del deudor que se encuentren en Suiza ante el tribunal del lugar donde se encuentre la sede del banco o donde se sitúen los bienes, siempre y cuando se demuestre que existan prima facie los tres requisitos previstos por la Ley federal sobre la ejecución y sobre el concurso de acreedores (“DEBA”), es decir, que:

    • El acreedor que solicita el embargo posea un título fundado en un crédito exigible y ordinario.
    • Se den los presupuestos legales necesarios para obtener un embargo.
    • Los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza.

    Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, los presupuestos legales más relevantes para obtener el embargo de bienes son:

    • Que el deudor no sea residente en Suiza y que el crédito en sí esté lo suficientemente conectado con Suiza o que esté fundado en un reconocimiento de la deuda por parte del deudor (“embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza”).
    • Que el acreedor posea una sentencia ejecutiva favorable o un laudo arbitral contra el deudor (“Título ejecutivo”)

    Embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza: Según la DEBA, el mero hecho de que los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza no es suficiente como para establecer una “suficiente conexión con Suiza”. Dicho presupuesto depende en gran parte de los hechos específicos de la cuestión que se valorarán por parte del Juez caso por caso. La jurisprudencia suiza ha confirmado algunos criterios de conexión: que el contrato entre las partes se haya firmado o deba de ejecutarse en Suiza; que el contrato entre las partes esté regulado por la ley suiza, que el acreedor viva en Suiza o que el crédito del acreedor esté conectado a una actividad comercial desarrollada en Suiza.

    Título ejecutivo: Para poder solicitar el embargo de los bienes, el acreedor debe además, cumplir con el segundo presupuesto legal, esto es, poseer un título ejecutivo. La DEBA no realiza distinciones entre sentencias y laudos o arbitrales pronunciados tanto en una jurisdicción interna como en una jurisdicción extranjera. Simplemente deben ser ejecutivos (teniendo en consideración el Convenio de Lugano, la Ley federal sobre derecho internacional privado – en el caso de un laudo arbitral dictado por una corte arbitral no suiza – teniendo en consideración el Convención de Nueva York), todas las sentencias favorables o los laudos arbitrales podrán obtener el embargo de los bienes que se encuentren en Suiza.

    El tribunal suizo solicitará al acreedor que demuestre prime facie la existencia de los presupuestos legales para llevar a cabo el embargo, como anteriormente descrito. Debido a que el embargo se otorgará ex parte, en muchos casos, dicha acción tomará al deudor por sorpresa. Gracias a este efecto sorpresa y a la naturaleza del embargo, cuyo objetivo es que el deudor no pueda deshacerse de los activos, tal medio tiene un grande potencial para ayudar al acreedor a asegurarse y quedarse satisfecho de su crédito.

    Con la reciente sentencia 16601/2017, la Corte Suprema – después de diferentes pronunciamientos contrarios – ha abierto la posibilidad de reconocer en Italia las sentencias extranjeras que contengan daños punitivos.

    En este breve artículo veremos en qué consisten los daños punitivos, cuáles son las condiciones por las cuales podrían reconocerse y aplicarse en Italia y, sobretodo, qué medidas conviene tomar para afrontar este nuevo riesgo.

    Los daños punitivos, en inglés punitive damages, son un instituto jurídico originario de los ordenamientos anglosajones que prevén la posibilidad de reconocer a la parte perjudicada una indemnización adicional respecto a la compensación del daño sufrido, en los casos en los que el causante del daño haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave (“malice” y “gross negligence”, respectivamente).

    Con los daños punitivos, además de la función compensatoria, la indemnización del daño también asume una finalidad sancionadora, típica del derecho penal, actuando como elemento de disuasión ante otros potenciales infractores.

    En los ordenamientos en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, el reconocimiento y la cuantificación de la indemnización se someten a la discrecionalidad del juez.

    En los Estados Unidos de América los daños punitivos se prevén en los principios de common law, pero se disciplinan de modo diverso en cada uno de los Estados. Sin embargo, en general, se aplican siempre que la conducta del causante del daño haya sido dirigida a causar el daño intencionadamente o, se haya llevado a cabo sin tener en cuenta las normas de seguridad preestablecidas. Por lo general, no pueden reconocerse por el incumplimiento de un contrato, salvo que no se determine como un ilícito (tort) autónomo.

    En algunos Estados se prevén límites máximos a los daños punitivos, a veces incorporados en los daños compensatorios, otras veces como cuantía máxima. Además, la Corte Suprema de los EEUU ha intervenido en diferentes casos para limitar el importe de condena.

    En los ordenamientos de civil law, entre ellos Italia, el instituto de daños punitivos tradicionalmente no se reconoce, ya que la sanción al causante del daño se considera que queda al margen de los principios del derecho civil, basándose en la concepción de que la indemnización por daños tiene como objetivo restaurar la esfera patrimonial del perjudicado.

    En consecuencia, el reconocimiento de los daños punitivos en una sentencia, se obstaculizaban por el límite de orden público y tales sentencias no tenían acceso en el espacio jurídico italiano.

    La sentencia de las Secciones Unidas núm. 16601/2017, de 5 de julio de 2017 de la Corte Suprema de Casación ha girado las cartas sobre la mesa.

    En el presente caso se solicitó a la Corte de Apelación de Venecia el reconocimiento (ex. Art. 64 de la Ley 218/1995) de tres sentencias de la District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida que, admitió una denuncia de garantía interpuesta por un revendedor americano de cascos contra la sociedad productora italiana, por la cual se había condenado a ésta última al pago de 1.436.136,87 USD (además de gastos e intereses) en base al resarcimiento de los daños causas por un defecto del casco utilizado en un accidente de tráfico.

    La Corte de Apelación de Venecia reconoció la eficacia de la sentencia del juez extranjero, considerando que el importe era meramente indemnizatorio y no punitivo. La decisión fue recurrida en Casación por la parte condenada, que sostenía la contrariedad al orden publico de la sentencia estadunidense, en base a la orientación jurisprudencial hasta ese momento.

    La Casación ha confirmado la decisión de la Corte de Apelación, considerando que el importe no es punitivo y ha declarado el reconocimiento de la sentencia estadunidense en Italia.

    Las Secciones Unidas, por su parte, han aprovechado la ocasión para afrontar la cuestión inherente a la admisibilidad de los daños punitivos en Italia, cambiando la orientación histórica de la Corte Suprema (véase Cass. 1781/2012).

    Según la Corte, la noción de responsabilidad civil entendida como mera reparación de los daños sufridos, se debe considerar como obsoleta dada la evolución del instituto a través de intervenciones legislativas y jurisprudenciales nacionales y europeas, que han introducido medidas indemnizatorias con finalidad sancionadora y disuasiva. De hecho, en el ordenamiento italiano es posible encontrar diversos casos de indemnización por daños con finalidad sancionadora: en materia de difamación en medios de comunicación (art. 12 L. 47/48), derechos de autor (art. 158 L 633/41), propiedad industrial (art. 125 D. Lgs 30/2005), abuso del proceso (art. 96.3 c.p.c. y art. 26.2 c.p.a.), derecho laboral (art. 18.14 c.p.c.), derecho de familia (art. 709-ter c.p.c.), etc.

    De este modo, la Corte de Casación ha introducido el siguiente principio de derecho: “En el vigente ordenamiento italiano, a la responsabilidad civil no solo se le asigna el deber de restaurar la esfera patrimonial del sujeto que ha sufrido la lesión, porque se consideran incluidas en el sistema la función de disuasión y la función sancionadora de la responsabilidad civil. Por tanto, no es ontológicamente incompatible con el ordenamiento italiano el instituto de origen estadunidense de la indemnización punitiva”.

    La consecuencia, a tener en muy cuenta, es que el pronunciamiento abre la puerta a posibles deliberaciones de sentencias extranjeras, que condenen a una de las partes al pago de un importe superior respecto al importe calculado para compensar el prejuicio creado a causa de un daño.

    Sin embargo, a tal fin, la Corte Suprema ha dispuesto algunas condiciones para que la sentencia extranjera pueda reconocerse. La decisión ha debido ser tomada en el ordenamiento extranjero en base a:

    1. Garantizar la tipicidad de la condena.
    2. La previsibilidad de la misma.
    3. Los límites cuantificativos.

    Los posibles efectos de la Sentencia en el ordenamiento italiano

    En primer lugar, hay que tener claro que la Sentencia no ha modificado el sistema indemnizatorio interno del ordenamiento italiano. En otras palabras, la Sentencia no permitirá a los jueces italianos condenar por daños punitivos al interno de los procedimientos italianos.

    En cambio, por lo que respecta a las sentencias extranjeras, ahora será posible obtener la indemnización por daños punitivos a través del reconocimiento y la ejecución en el sistema italiano de una decisión extranjera que prevea la condena de dicha tipología de daño, con la condición de que se respeten los mencionados presupuestos.

    Por todo lo expuesto, las empresas que hayan invertido o que realicen negocios en países en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, tendrán que tener en consideración dicho riesgo.

    Los instrumentos para tutelarse

    El empresario quien opere en mercados extranjeros en los que se prevén los daños punitivos debe considerar con atención este riesgo.

    La óptica debe ser necesariamente de prevención y los instrumentos a disposición son diversos: en primer lugar, la adopción de cláusulas contractuales que prevean la renuncia del perjudicado a este tipo de daño o, que acuerden un límite a la indemnización de los daños contractuales, por ejemplo limitándolos al valor de los productos o a los servicios ofrecidos.

    Es además fundamental, que se conozca la legislación y la jurisprudencia de los mercados en los cuales se opera, incluso indirectamente (por ejemplo, con la distribución comercial de los productos) con el fin de escoger de modo consciente la ley aplicable al contrato y la modalidad de resolución de controversias (por ejemplo, con previsión de la exclusiva jurisdiccional del foro del país que no prevea daños punitivos).

    Finalmente, este tipo de responsabilidad y riesgo puede ser objeto de valoración con pólizas aseguradoras que ofrecen una cobertura específica respecto a eventuales condenas de indemnización de daños punitivos.

    [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

    It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

    In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

    This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

    Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

    Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

    Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

    The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of «sufficient justification» and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

    As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

    The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

    It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

    To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

    Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

    One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

    On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

    Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

    Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

    How much does it tell us?

    Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

    The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

    If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

    Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

    This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

    Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

    Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

    The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

    The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

    It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

    There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

    • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
    • a frustration or a force majeure.

    There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

    The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

    What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

    The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

    A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

    If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

    • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
    • the good faith of the parties;
    • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
    • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
    • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

    What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

    The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

    The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

    • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
    • sudden;
    • unpredictable.

    To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

    • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
    • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
    • a constant increase in turnover;
    • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
    • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
    • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
    • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
    • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

    The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

    • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
    • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
    • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

    Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

    Compensation for a damage

    The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

    The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

    The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

    International law

    The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

    However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

    The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

    The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

    In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

    • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
    • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

    In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

    In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

    The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

    Benjamin Leventhal

    Áreas de práctica

    • Arbitraje
    • Derecho Societario
    • Derecho Internacional Privado
    Contáctanos Benjamin

    Contacta con Benjamin





      Lea la política de privacidad de Legalmondo.
      Este sitio está protegido por reCAPTCHA y se aplican la Política de privacidad de Google y los Términos de servicio.

      A US Court Judgment Enforced in China – What Does it Mean for You?

      9 de octubre de 2017

      • China
      • EEUU
      • Arbitraje
      • Litigios

      It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

      At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

      One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

      Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

      No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

      The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

      Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

      The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

      Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

      The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

      Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

      The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

      In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

      From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

      What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

      Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

      The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

      With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

      Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

      From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

      It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

      By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

      In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

      State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

      Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

      “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

      “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

      The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

      One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

      “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

      As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

      Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

      There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

      A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

      The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

      In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

      The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

      The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

      The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

      The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

      In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

      Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

      Conclusions

      If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

      If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

      And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

      La cuestión del litisconsorcio necesario respecto a los beneficiarios de un trust en la acción revocatoria es objeto de amplio debate desde hace tiempo lo que ha llevado a dos corrientes contrastantes entre ellas, superadas por la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Casación n. 19376 del 3 de agosto de 2017.

      Según una primera corriente, los beneficiarios del trust no deben considerarse partes necesarias del juicio de revocatoria porqué el objeto de la demanda no es el acto con el que se constituye el trust sino el sucesivo acto dispositivo, llevado a cabo por el “settlor” con el que el nuevo ente, en la persona del trustee, viene dotado de un patrimonio, sin que sea solicitada la participación de los beneficiarios.

      Los beneficiarios no podrían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios ya que no siendo directamente titulares de los bienes otorgados en el trust no sufririan en la hipótesis de revocación del acto dispositivo de un perjuicio sino que al máximo se lesionaría un mero interés a la integridad patrimonial del ente.

      No estando dotado el trust de personalidad jurídica sino siendo un conjunto de bienes y relaciones destinadas a un fin determinado, en interés de uno o mas beneficiarios y formalmente a nombre del  «trustee», este último resultaría ser el único sujeto que además de poder disponer en via exclusiva de los derechos otorgados en el patrimonio vinculado, estaría legitimado a oponerlos en las relaciones frente a terceros, incluso defendiéndose en juicio (Tribunal de Apelación de Milán, sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2016): de hecho solo frente a dicho “trustee”  el acreedor del “settlor” podría correctamente iniciar la ejecución forzosa, una vez reconocida la ineficacia relativa del acto dispositivo a consecuencia del juicio de revocatoria.

      Según otra orientación, en cambio, los beneficiarios del trust deben considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria ya que, aun no siendo titulares del patrimonio vinculado, estarían de todas formas interesados en los efectos de la sentencia que dispone la revocació del acto por el que se otorgan los bienes al trust, siendo su posición sea jurídica que de hecho perjudicada por los efectos de dicha resolución.

      A una conclusión análoga se podría llegar incluso a través de una interpretación en sentido contrario de la jurisprudencia en materia de fondo patrimonial.

      Con referencia a dicha figura, la Casación ha, de hecho excluido la legitimación pasiva de los hijos de los que lo constituyen, en juicios análogos, en cuanto los mismos no podrían tener pretensiones judiciales directamente frente a sus padres administradores del fondo patrimonial (Casación Civil, sentencia n. 10641 de 15 mayo de 2014, Casación Civil, sentencia n. 18065 de 8 septiembre de 2004; Casación Civil, sentencia n. 5402 del 17 de marzo de 2004) .

      Los beneficiarios del trust, en cambio, pudiendo tener pretensiones sea frente al trust que frente al trustee, deberían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en todos aquellos juicios que se refirieren a cualquier aspecto del acto dispositivo (S. Bartoli, Azione revocatoria di trust e litisconsorzio necessario rispetto ai beneficiari: la prima pronunzia della Cassazione, Il Caso, 22 de Noviembre de 2017).

      A aclarar la cuestión ha intervenido recentemente el Tribunal de Casación que, con la sentencia n. 19376 del 3 de agosto 2017, ha propuesto soluciones alternativas a aquellas apenas comentadas, capaz de terminar en parte con el contraste interpretativo descrito.

      El caso examinado por los magistrados y relativo al otorgamiento de determinados bienes, antes a un “fondo patrimonial” y sucesivamente a un trust, por parte de unos conyuge que, a través de dichos instrumentos, han destinado parte del proprio patrimonio a las necesidades de vida y de estudio de los hijos.

      Los actos dispositivos han sido pero considerados perjudiciales para los propios intereses por un banco, acreedor de uno de los cónyuges, que ha por lo tanto ejercitado la revocatoria, obteniendo sea en primer que en segundo grado, la declaratoria de ineficacia, en virtud del art. 2901 c.c, del “fondo patrimonial” y del trust.

      Contra la sentencia de apelación, los cónyuges han propuesto recurso de Casación, por falta de integración del contradictorio en el juicio de apelación, no habiendo el Tribunal de Apelación ordenado la intervención en el proceso de los hijos – benericiarios y solicitando, por tanto, la nulidad de todo el proceso.

      Los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación, examinado el caso, no han considerado válidos los motivos propuesto con el recurso.

      Según el Tribunal de Casación, de hecho, en la hipótesis de “fondo patrimonial”, no produciéndose ninguna mutación en la titularidad de los bienes, que siguen siendo de titularidad de padres – constituyentes del fondo y que no surgiendo ningún derecho subjetivo a favor de los hijos beneficiarios, estos no pueden ser en ningún modo considerados litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria del fondo, como es afrirmado por constante jurisprudencia sea de los Tribunales de Apelación que de Casación (véase la anteriormente citada).

      Según el Tribunal de Casación se llega a una conclusión análoga con referencia al trust.

      En relación a dicha cuestión los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación consideran no poder adherir a ninguna de las orientaciones que se han formado en jurisprudencia, y ofrecen, como anticipado, una tercera via interpretativa según la cual los beneficiarios del trust pueden ser considerados legitimarios pasivos en la revocatoria solo cuando el acto costitutivo del trust reconozca a los mismos la titularidad de derechos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al mismo.

      En ausencia de un expreso reconocimiento de dichas prerrogativas, el único legitimado pasivo en el juicio de revocatorio es el trustee.

      El trust, de hecho, se convierte en operativo, explica el Tribunal de Casación, mediante dos tipologías de actos, el primero de caracter unilateral, finalizado exclusivamente a la sua institución y el segundo (o los segundos, pudiendo el “settlor” proceder a una pluralidad de negocios distintos) de natura dispositiva, dirigido a transmitir los bienes al trustee.

      Si el acto costitutivo por si mismo no parece idóneo a determinar ningún  perjuicio a los acreedores del “settlor”, no afectando la consistencia de su patrimonio y, por tanto, su capacidad de cumplir con las propias obligaciones, no se puede decir lo mismo de los actos con los que lo bienes se transmiten al trustee, el cual convirtiéndose en el único sujeto legitimado a disponer de los mismos, se convierte en el único a poder oponerse en un juicio para tutelarse.

      Es claro dicho aspecto, los jueces del Tribunal de Casación han observado además como el eventual interés de los beneficiarios a la correcta administración del patrimonio otorgado en el trust no represente, desde un punto de vista teórico, una hipótesis de interés directo e inmediato a intervenir en el juicio de revocatoria, que justifique la participación de los beneficiarios como litisconsortes necesarios.

      El interés a la correcta administración del trust constituye una posición jurídica que se refiere exclusivamente a las relaciones entre los beneficiarios y el “trustee” y que, en ningún modo puede afectar a los acreedores del “settlor”.

      A una conclusión distinta se podría llegar cuando el regolamento del trust hubiese permitido de calificar los beneficiarios como actuales beneficiarios de la renta o como beneficiarios finales con derecho inmediato a recibir la titularidad de los bienes otorgados en trust, independientemente de cualquier valoración discrecional del “trustee “.

      Solo così, de hecho, los beneficiarios habrían podido hacer valer un interés directo e inmediato en la controversia que justificaría la necesidad de citarlos en juicio.

      Por lo tanto, en las hipótesis en que los beneficiarios no sean titulares de derechos subjetivos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al trust, además del deudor, legitimado pasivo en la acción revocatoria es solo el “trustee”, en cuanto único sujeto de referencia en las relaciones con terceros y por tanto también en las relaciones con los acreedores del “settlor”, único titular de los derechos sobre bienes sujetos a “segregación”.

      La solución ofrecida por el Tribunal de Casación es homogénea con cuanto previsto por el derecho inglés, en el que nuestro ordenamiento se ha inspirado para la figura del trust, según la cual en los juicios  iniciados por los acreedores del “settlor” frente al trust, la protección de este se encarga al trustee, en lugar o junto con los beneficiarios (Di Sapio, Muritano, “Solo il «trustee» partecipa al giudizio di revoca del trust”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 de noviembre de 2017).

      Por lo tanto, como en Italia, también en los sistemas anglosajones los beneficiarios no son parte necesaria del proceso pero pueden intervenir volontariamente en el mismo para evitar ser perjudicados por la sentencia de revocatoria.

      El autor de este artículo es Giovanni Izzo.

      ¿Cómo asegurase que a largo plazo pueda ejecutarse un crédito? En Suiza un acreedor podrá embargar los bienes de un deudor siempre que se cumplan ciertas condiciones. En la práctica, existen dos situaciones por las cuales se considera que se lleve a cabo un embargo de los activos: la primera de ellas es cuando el acreedor posee una acción contra un deudor sin residencia en Suiza, mientras que la segunda, es cuando el acreedor posee un título ejecutivo fundado en una sentencia favorable o en un laudo o resolución arbitral.

      Sin lugar a duda, el mercado financiero suizo continúa jugando un papel predominante en el mundo financiero actual, a pesar de la presión reguladora que afronta. La jurisdicción suiza, por tanto, es relevante para los acreedores que deseen obtener el embrago de bienes por parte de un deudor que posea cuentas bancarias u otros bienes en Suiza. Si bien en la práctica, el embargo de bienes se efectúa sobre cuentas bancarias, es posible utilizar la misma obligación para embargar otros bienes con el mismo efecto, por ejemplo, bienes inmuebles, obras de arte o bienes de terceros a su vez acreedores del deudor.

      A instancia de parte, el acreedor puede solicitar un embargo ex parte de bienes del deudor que se encuentren en Suiza ante el tribunal del lugar donde se encuentre la sede del banco o donde se sitúen los bienes, siempre y cuando se demuestre que existan prima facie los tres requisitos previstos por la Ley federal sobre la ejecución y sobre el concurso de acreedores (“DEBA”), es decir, que:

      • El acreedor que solicita el embargo posea un título fundado en un crédito exigible y ordinario.
      • Se den los presupuestos legales necesarios para obtener un embargo.
      • Los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza.

      Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, los presupuestos legales más relevantes para obtener el embargo de bienes son:

      • Que el deudor no sea residente en Suiza y que el crédito en sí esté lo suficientemente conectado con Suiza o que esté fundado en un reconocimiento de la deuda por parte del deudor (“embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza”).
      • Que el acreedor posea una sentencia ejecutiva favorable o un laudo arbitral contra el deudor (“Título ejecutivo”)

      Embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza: Según la DEBA, el mero hecho de que los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza no es suficiente como para establecer una “suficiente conexión con Suiza”. Dicho presupuesto depende en gran parte de los hechos específicos de la cuestión que se valorarán por parte del Juez caso por caso. La jurisprudencia suiza ha confirmado algunos criterios de conexión: que el contrato entre las partes se haya firmado o deba de ejecutarse en Suiza; que el contrato entre las partes esté regulado por la ley suiza, que el acreedor viva en Suiza o que el crédito del acreedor esté conectado a una actividad comercial desarrollada en Suiza.

      Título ejecutivo: Para poder solicitar el embargo de los bienes, el acreedor debe además, cumplir con el segundo presupuesto legal, esto es, poseer un título ejecutivo. La DEBA no realiza distinciones entre sentencias y laudos o arbitrales pronunciados tanto en una jurisdicción interna como en una jurisdicción extranjera. Simplemente deben ser ejecutivos (teniendo en consideración el Convenio de Lugano, la Ley federal sobre derecho internacional privado – en el caso de un laudo arbitral dictado por una corte arbitral no suiza – teniendo en consideración el Convención de Nueva York), todas las sentencias favorables o los laudos arbitrales podrán obtener el embargo de los bienes que se encuentren en Suiza.

      El tribunal suizo solicitará al acreedor que demuestre prime facie la existencia de los presupuestos legales para llevar a cabo el embargo, como anteriormente descrito. Debido a que el embargo se otorgará ex parte, en muchos casos, dicha acción tomará al deudor por sorpresa. Gracias a este efecto sorpresa y a la naturaleza del embargo, cuyo objetivo es que el deudor no pueda deshacerse de los activos, tal medio tiene un grande potencial para ayudar al acreedor a asegurarse y quedarse satisfecho de su crédito.

      Con la reciente sentencia 16601/2017, la Corte Suprema – después de diferentes pronunciamientos contrarios – ha abierto la posibilidad de reconocer en Italia las sentencias extranjeras que contengan daños punitivos.

      En este breve artículo veremos en qué consisten los daños punitivos, cuáles son las condiciones por las cuales podrían reconocerse y aplicarse en Italia y, sobretodo, qué medidas conviene tomar para afrontar este nuevo riesgo.

      Los daños punitivos, en inglés punitive damages, son un instituto jurídico originario de los ordenamientos anglosajones que prevén la posibilidad de reconocer a la parte perjudicada una indemnización adicional respecto a la compensación del daño sufrido, en los casos en los que el causante del daño haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave (“malice” y “gross negligence”, respectivamente).

      Con los daños punitivos, además de la función compensatoria, la indemnización del daño también asume una finalidad sancionadora, típica del derecho penal, actuando como elemento de disuasión ante otros potenciales infractores.

      En los ordenamientos en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, el reconocimiento y la cuantificación de la indemnización se someten a la discrecionalidad del juez.

      En los Estados Unidos de América los daños punitivos se prevén en los principios de common law, pero se disciplinan de modo diverso en cada uno de los Estados. Sin embargo, en general, se aplican siempre que la conducta del causante del daño haya sido dirigida a causar el daño intencionadamente o, se haya llevado a cabo sin tener en cuenta las normas de seguridad preestablecidas. Por lo general, no pueden reconocerse por el incumplimiento de un contrato, salvo que no se determine como un ilícito (tort) autónomo.

      En algunos Estados se prevén límites máximos a los daños punitivos, a veces incorporados en los daños compensatorios, otras veces como cuantía máxima. Además, la Corte Suprema de los EEUU ha intervenido en diferentes casos para limitar el importe de condena.

      En los ordenamientos de civil law, entre ellos Italia, el instituto de daños punitivos tradicionalmente no se reconoce, ya que la sanción al causante del daño se considera que queda al margen de los principios del derecho civil, basándose en la concepción de que la indemnización por daños tiene como objetivo restaurar la esfera patrimonial del perjudicado.

      En consecuencia, el reconocimiento de los daños punitivos en una sentencia, se obstaculizaban por el límite de orden público y tales sentencias no tenían acceso en el espacio jurídico italiano.

      La sentencia de las Secciones Unidas núm. 16601/2017, de 5 de julio de 2017 de la Corte Suprema de Casación ha girado las cartas sobre la mesa.

      En el presente caso se solicitó a la Corte de Apelación de Venecia el reconocimiento (ex. Art. 64 de la Ley 218/1995) de tres sentencias de la District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida que, admitió una denuncia de garantía interpuesta por un revendedor americano de cascos contra la sociedad productora italiana, por la cual se había condenado a ésta última al pago de 1.436.136,87 USD (además de gastos e intereses) en base al resarcimiento de los daños causas por un defecto del casco utilizado en un accidente de tráfico.

      La Corte de Apelación de Venecia reconoció la eficacia de la sentencia del juez extranjero, considerando que el importe era meramente indemnizatorio y no punitivo. La decisión fue recurrida en Casación por la parte condenada, que sostenía la contrariedad al orden publico de la sentencia estadunidense, en base a la orientación jurisprudencial hasta ese momento.

      La Casación ha confirmado la decisión de la Corte de Apelación, considerando que el importe no es punitivo y ha declarado el reconocimiento de la sentencia estadunidense en Italia.

      Las Secciones Unidas, por su parte, han aprovechado la ocasión para afrontar la cuestión inherente a la admisibilidad de los daños punitivos en Italia, cambiando la orientación histórica de la Corte Suprema (véase Cass. 1781/2012).

      Según la Corte, la noción de responsabilidad civil entendida como mera reparación de los daños sufridos, se debe considerar como obsoleta dada la evolución del instituto a través de intervenciones legislativas y jurisprudenciales nacionales y europeas, que han introducido medidas indemnizatorias con finalidad sancionadora y disuasiva. De hecho, en el ordenamiento italiano es posible encontrar diversos casos de indemnización por daños con finalidad sancionadora: en materia de difamación en medios de comunicación (art. 12 L. 47/48), derechos de autor (art. 158 L 633/41), propiedad industrial (art. 125 D. Lgs 30/2005), abuso del proceso (art. 96.3 c.p.c. y art. 26.2 c.p.a.), derecho laboral (art. 18.14 c.p.c.), derecho de familia (art. 709-ter c.p.c.), etc.

      De este modo, la Corte de Casación ha introducido el siguiente principio de derecho: “En el vigente ordenamiento italiano, a la responsabilidad civil no solo se le asigna el deber de restaurar la esfera patrimonial del sujeto que ha sufrido la lesión, porque se consideran incluidas en el sistema la función de disuasión y la función sancionadora de la responsabilidad civil. Por tanto, no es ontológicamente incompatible con el ordenamiento italiano el instituto de origen estadunidense de la indemnización punitiva”.

      La consecuencia, a tener en muy cuenta, es que el pronunciamiento abre la puerta a posibles deliberaciones de sentencias extranjeras, que condenen a una de las partes al pago de un importe superior respecto al importe calculado para compensar el prejuicio creado a causa de un daño.

      Sin embargo, a tal fin, la Corte Suprema ha dispuesto algunas condiciones para que la sentencia extranjera pueda reconocerse. La decisión ha debido ser tomada en el ordenamiento extranjero en base a:

      1. Garantizar la tipicidad de la condena.
      2. La previsibilidad de la misma.
      3. Los límites cuantificativos.

      Los posibles efectos de la Sentencia en el ordenamiento italiano

      En primer lugar, hay que tener claro que la Sentencia no ha modificado el sistema indemnizatorio interno del ordenamiento italiano. En otras palabras, la Sentencia no permitirá a los jueces italianos condenar por daños punitivos al interno de los procedimientos italianos.

      En cambio, por lo que respecta a las sentencias extranjeras, ahora será posible obtener la indemnización por daños punitivos a través del reconocimiento y la ejecución en el sistema italiano de una decisión extranjera que prevea la condena de dicha tipología de daño, con la condición de que se respeten los mencionados presupuestos.

      Por todo lo expuesto, las empresas que hayan invertido o que realicen negocios en países en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, tendrán que tener en consideración dicho riesgo.

      Los instrumentos para tutelarse

      El empresario quien opere en mercados extranjeros en los que se prevén los daños punitivos debe considerar con atención este riesgo.

      La óptica debe ser necesariamente de prevención y los instrumentos a disposición son diversos: en primer lugar, la adopción de cláusulas contractuales que prevean la renuncia del perjudicado a este tipo de daño o, que acuerden un límite a la indemnización de los daños contractuales, por ejemplo limitándolos al valor de los productos o a los servicios ofrecidos.

      Es además fundamental, que se conozca la legislación y la jurisprudencia de los mercados en los cuales se opera, incluso indirectamente (por ejemplo, con la distribución comercial de los productos) con el fin de escoger de modo consciente la ley aplicable al contrato y la modalidad de resolución de controversias (por ejemplo, con previsión de la exclusiva jurisdiccional del foro del país que no prevea daños punitivos).

      Finalmente, este tipo de responsabilidad y riesgo puede ser objeto de valoración con pólizas aseguradoras que ofrecen una cobertura específica respecto a eventuales condenas de indemnización de daños punitivos.

      [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

      It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

      In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

      This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

      Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

      Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

      Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

      The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of «sufficient justification» and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

      As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

      The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

      It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

      To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

      Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

      One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

      On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

      Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

      Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

      How much does it tell us?

      Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

      The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

      If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

      Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

      This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

      Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

      Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

      The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

      The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

      It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

      There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

      • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
      • a frustration or a force majeure.

      There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

      The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

      What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

      The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

      A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

      If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

      • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
      • the good faith of the parties;
      • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
      • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
      • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

      What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

      The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

      The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

      • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
      • sudden;
      • unpredictable.

      To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

      • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
      • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
      • a constant increase in turnover;
      • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
      • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
      • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
      • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
      • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

      The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

      • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
      • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
      • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

      Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

      Compensation for a damage

      The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

      The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

      The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

      International law

      The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

      However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

      The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

      The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

      In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

      • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
      • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

      In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

      In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

      The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

      France – Abrupt termination of contract

      26 de septiembre de 2017

      • Francia
      • Contratos
      • Contratos de distribución
      • Litigios

      It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

      At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

      One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

      Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

      No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

      The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

      Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

      The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

      Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

      The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

      Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

      The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

      In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

      From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

      What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

      Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

      The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

      With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

      Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

      From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

      It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

      By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

      In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

      State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

      Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

      “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

      “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

      The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

      One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

      “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

      As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

      Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

      There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

      A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

      The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

      In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

      The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

      The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

      The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

      The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

      In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

      Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

      Conclusions

      If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

      If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

      And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

      La cuestión del litisconsorcio necesario respecto a los beneficiarios de un trust en la acción revocatoria es objeto de amplio debate desde hace tiempo lo que ha llevado a dos corrientes contrastantes entre ellas, superadas por la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Casación n. 19376 del 3 de agosto de 2017.

      Según una primera corriente, los beneficiarios del trust no deben considerarse partes necesarias del juicio de revocatoria porqué el objeto de la demanda no es el acto con el que se constituye el trust sino el sucesivo acto dispositivo, llevado a cabo por el “settlor” con el que el nuevo ente, en la persona del trustee, viene dotado de un patrimonio, sin que sea solicitada la participación de los beneficiarios.

      Los beneficiarios no podrían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios ya que no siendo directamente titulares de los bienes otorgados en el trust no sufririan en la hipótesis de revocación del acto dispositivo de un perjuicio sino que al máximo se lesionaría un mero interés a la integridad patrimonial del ente.

      No estando dotado el trust de personalidad jurídica sino siendo un conjunto de bienes y relaciones destinadas a un fin determinado, en interés de uno o mas beneficiarios y formalmente a nombre del  «trustee», este último resultaría ser el único sujeto que además de poder disponer en via exclusiva de los derechos otorgados en el patrimonio vinculado, estaría legitimado a oponerlos en las relaciones frente a terceros, incluso defendiéndose en juicio (Tribunal de Apelación de Milán, sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2016): de hecho solo frente a dicho “trustee”  el acreedor del “settlor” podría correctamente iniciar la ejecución forzosa, una vez reconocida la ineficacia relativa del acto dispositivo a consecuencia del juicio de revocatoria.

      Según otra orientación, en cambio, los beneficiarios del trust deben considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria ya que, aun no siendo titulares del patrimonio vinculado, estarían de todas formas interesados en los efectos de la sentencia que dispone la revocació del acto por el que se otorgan los bienes al trust, siendo su posición sea jurídica que de hecho perjudicada por los efectos de dicha resolución.

      A una conclusión análoga se podría llegar incluso a través de una interpretación en sentido contrario de la jurisprudencia en materia de fondo patrimonial.

      Con referencia a dicha figura, la Casación ha, de hecho excluido la legitimación pasiva de los hijos de los que lo constituyen, en juicios análogos, en cuanto los mismos no podrían tener pretensiones judiciales directamente frente a sus padres administradores del fondo patrimonial (Casación Civil, sentencia n. 10641 de 15 mayo de 2014, Casación Civil, sentencia n. 18065 de 8 septiembre de 2004; Casación Civil, sentencia n. 5402 del 17 de marzo de 2004) .

      Los beneficiarios del trust, en cambio, pudiendo tener pretensiones sea frente al trust que frente al trustee, deberían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en todos aquellos juicios que se refirieren a cualquier aspecto del acto dispositivo (S. Bartoli, Azione revocatoria di trust e litisconsorzio necessario rispetto ai beneficiari: la prima pronunzia della Cassazione, Il Caso, 22 de Noviembre de 2017).

      A aclarar la cuestión ha intervenido recentemente el Tribunal de Casación que, con la sentencia n. 19376 del 3 de agosto 2017, ha propuesto soluciones alternativas a aquellas apenas comentadas, capaz de terminar en parte con el contraste interpretativo descrito.

      El caso examinado por los magistrados y relativo al otorgamiento de determinados bienes, antes a un “fondo patrimonial” y sucesivamente a un trust, por parte de unos conyuge que, a través de dichos instrumentos, han destinado parte del proprio patrimonio a las necesidades de vida y de estudio de los hijos.

      Los actos dispositivos han sido pero considerados perjudiciales para los propios intereses por un banco, acreedor de uno de los cónyuges, que ha por lo tanto ejercitado la revocatoria, obteniendo sea en primer que en segundo grado, la declaratoria de ineficacia, en virtud del art. 2901 c.c, del “fondo patrimonial” y del trust.

      Contra la sentencia de apelación, los cónyuges han propuesto recurso de Casación, por falta de integración del contradictorio en el juicio de apelación, no habiendo el Tribunal de Apelación ordenado la intervención en el proceso de los hijos – benericiarios y solicitando, por tanto, la nulidad de todo el proceso.

      Los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación, examinado el caso, no han considerado válidos los motivos propuesto con el recurso.

      Según el Tribunal de Casación, de hecho, en la hipótesis de “fondo patrimonial”, no produciéndose ninguna mutación en la titularidad de los bienes, que siguen siendo de titularidad de padres – constituyentes del fondo y que no surgiendo ningún derecho subjetivo a favor de los hijos beneficiarios, estos no pueden ser en ningún modo considerados litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria del fondo, como es afrirmado por constante jurisprudencia sea de los Tribunales de Apelación que de Casación (véase la anteriormente citada).

      Según el Tribunal de Casación se llega a una conclusión análoga con referencia al trust.

      En relación a dicha cuestión los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación consideran no poder adherir a ninguna de las orientaciones que se han formado en jurisprudencia, y ofrecen, como anticipado, una tercera via interpretativa según la cual los beneficiarios del trust pueden ser considerados legitimarios pasivos en la revocatoria solo cuando el acto costitutivo del trust reconozca a los mismos la titularidad de derechos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al mismo.

      En ausencia de un expreso reconocimiento de dichas prerrogativas, el único legitimado pasivo en el juicio de revocatorio es el trustee.

      El trust, de hecho, se convierte en operativo, explica el Tribunal de Casación, mediante dos tipologías de actos, el primero de caracter unilateral, finalizado exclusivamente a la sua institución y el segundo (o los segundos, pudiendo el “settlor” proceder a una pluralidad de negocios distintos) de natura dispositiva, dirigido a transmitir los bienes al trustee.

      Si el acto costitutivo por si mismo no parece idóneo a determinar ningún  perjuicio a los acreedores del “settlor”, no afectando la consistencia de su patrimonio y, por tanto, su capacidad de cumplir con las propias obligaciones, no se puede decir lo mismo de los actos con los que lo bienes se transmiten al trustee, el cual convirtiéndose en el único sujeto legitimado a disponer de los mismos, se convierte en el único a poder oponerse en un juicio para tutelarse.

      Es claro dicho aspecto, los jueces del Tribunal de Casación han observado además como el eventual interés de los beneficiarios a la correcta administración del patrimonio otorgado en el trust no represente, desde un punto de vista teórico, una hipótesis de interés directo e inmediato a intervenir en el juicio de revocatoria, que justifique la participación de los beneficiarios como litisconsortes necesarios.

      El interés a la correcta administración del trust constituye una posición jurídica que se refiere exclusivamente a las relaciones entre los beneficiarios y el “trustee” y que, en ningún modo puede afectar a los acreedores del “settlor”.

      A una conclusión distinta se podría llegar cuando el regolamento del trust hubiese permitido de calificar los beneficiarios como actuales beneficiarios de la renta o como beneficiarios finales con derecho inmediato a recibir la titularidad de los bienes otorgados en trust, independientemente de cualquier valoración discrecional del “trustee “.

      Solo così, de hecho, los beneficiarios habrían podido hacer valer un interés directo e inmediato en la controversia que justificaría la necesidad de citarlos en juicio.

      Por lo tanto, en las hipótesis en que los beneficiarios no sean titulares de derechos subjetivos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al trust, además del deudor, legitimado pasivo en la acción revocatoria es solo el “trustee”, en cuanto único sujeto de referencia en las relaciones con terceros y por tanto también en las relaciones con los acreedores del “settlor”, único titular de los derechos sobre bienes sujetos a “segregación”.

      La solución ofrecida por el Tribunal de Casación es homogénea con cuanto previsto por el derecho inglés, en el que nuestro ordenamiento se ha inspirado para la figura del trust, según la cual en los juicios  iniciados por los acreedores del “settlor” frente al trust, la protección de este se encarga al trustee, en lugar o junto con los beneficiarios (Di Sapio, Muritano, “Solo il «trustee» partecipa al giudizio di revoca del trust”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 de noviembre de 2017).

      Por lo tanto, como en Italia, también en los sistemas anglosajones los beneficiarios no son parte necesaria del proceso pero pueden intervenir volontariamente en el mismo para evitar ser perjudicados por la sentencia de revocatoria.

      El autor de este artículo es Giovanni Izzo.

      ¿Cómo asegurase que a largo plazo pueda ejecutarse un crédito? En Suiza un acreedor podrá embargar los bienes de un deudor siempre que se cumplan ciertas condiciones. En la práctica, existen dos situaciones por las cuales se considera que se lleve a cabo un embargo de los activos: la primera de ellas es cuando el acreedor posee una acción contra un deudor sin residencia en Suiza, mientras que la segunda, es cuando el acreedor posee un título ejecutivo fundado en una sentencia favorable o en un laudo o resolución arbitral.

      Sin lugar a duda, el mercado financiero suizo continúa jugando un papel predominante en el mundo financiero actual, a pesar de la presión reguladora que afronta. La jurisdicción suiza, por tanto, es relevante para los acreedores que deseen obtener el embrago de bienes por parte de un deudor que posea cuentas bancarias u otros bienes en Suiza. Si bien en la práctica, el embargo de bienes se efectúa sobre cuentas bancarias, es posible utilizar la misma obligación para embargar otros bienes con el mismo efecto, por ejemplo, bienes inmuebles, obras de arte o bienes de terceros a su vez acreedores del deudor.

      A instancia de parte, el acreedor puede solicitar un embargo ex parte de bienes del deudor que se encuentren en Suiza ante el tribunal del lugar donde se encuentre la sede del banco o donde se sitúen los bienes, siempre y cuando se demuestre que existan prima facie los tres requisitos previstos por la Ley federal sobre la ejecución y sobre el concurso de acreedores (“DEBA”), es decir, que:

      • El acreedor que solicita el embargo posea un título fundado en un crédito exigible y ordinario.
      • Se den los presupuestos legales necesarios para obtener un embargo.
      • Los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza.

      Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, los presupuestos legales más relevantes para obtener el embargo de bienes son:

      • Que el deudor no sea residente en Suiza y que el crédito en sí esté lo suficientemente conectado con Suiza o que esté fundado en un reconocimiento de la deuda por parte del deudor (“embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza”).
      • Que el acreedor posea una sentencia ejecutiva favorable o un laudo arbitral contra el deudor (“Título ejecutivo”)

      Embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza: Según la DEBA, el mero hecho de que los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza no es suficiente como para establecer una “suficiente conexión con Suiza”. Dicho presupuesto depende en gran parte de los hechos específicos de la cuestión que se valorarán por parte del Juez caso por caso. La jurisprudencia suiza ha confirmado algunos criterios de conexión: que el contrato entre las partes se haya firmado o deba de ejecutarse en Suiza; que el contrato entre las partes esté regulado por la ley suiza, que el acreedor viva en Suiza o que el crédito del acreedor esté conectado a una actividad comercial desarrollada en Suiza.

      Título ejecutivo: Para poder solicitar el embargo de los bienes, el acreedor debe además, cumplir con el segundo presupuesto legal, esto es, poseer un título ejecutivo. La DEBA no realiza distinciones entre sentencias y laudos o arbitrales pronunciados tanto en una jurisdicción interna como en una jurisdicción extranjera. Simplemente deben ser ejecutivos (teniendo en consideración el Convenio de Lugano, la Ley federal sobre derecho internacional privado – en el caso de un laudo arbitral dictado por una corte arbitral no suiza – teniendo en consideración el Convención de Nueva York), todas las sentencias favorables o los laudos arbitrales podrán obtener el embargo de los bienes que se encuentren en Suiza.

      El tribunal suizo solicitará al acreedor que demuestre prime facie la existencia de los presupuestos legales para llevar a cabo el embargo, como anteriormente descrito. Debido a que el embargo se otorgará ex parte, en muchos casos, dicha acción tomará al deudor por sorpresa. Gracias a este efecto sorpresa y a la naturaleza del embargo, cuyo objetivo es que el deudor no pueda deshacerse de los activos, tal medio tiene un grande potencial para ayudar al acreedor a asegurarse y quedarse satisfecho de su crédito.

      Con la reciente sentencia 16601/2017, la Corte Suprema – después de diferentes pronunciamientos contrarios – ha abierto la posibilidad de reconocer en Italia las sentencias extranjeras que contengan daños punitivos.

      En este breve artículo veremos en qué consisten los daños punitivos, cuáles son las condiciones por las cuales podrían reconocerse y aplicarse en Italia y, sobretodo, qué medidas conviene tomar para afrontar este nuevo riesgo.

      Los daños punitivos, en inglés punitive damages, son un instituto jurídico originario de los ordenamientos anglosajones que prevén la posibilidad de reconocer a la parte perjudicada una indemnización adicional respecto a la compensación del daño sufrido, en los casos en los que el causante del daño haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave (“malice” y “gross negligence”, respectivamente).

      Con los daños punitivos, además de la función compensatoria, la indemnización del daño también asume una finalidad sancionadora, típica del derecho penal, actuando como elemento de disuasión ante otros potenciales infractores.

      En los ordenamientos en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, el reconocimiento y la cuantificación de la indemnización se someten a la discrecionalidad del juez.

      En los Estados Unidos de América los daños punitivos se prevén en los principios de common law, pero se disciplinan de modo diverso en cada uno de los Estados. Sin embargo, en general, se aplican siempre que la conducta del causante del daño haya sido dirigida a causar el daño intencionadamente o, se haya llevado a cabo sin tener en cuenta las normas de seguridad preestablecidas. Por lo general, no pueden reconocerse por el incumplimiento de un contrato, salvo que no se determine como un ilícito (tort) autónomo.

      En algunos Estados se prevén límites máximos a los daños punitivos, a veces incorporados en los daños compensatorios, otras veces como cuantía máxima. Además, la Corte Suprema de los EEUU ha intervenido en diferentes casos para limitar el importe de condena.

      En los ordenamientos de civil law, entre ellos Italia, el instituto de daños punitivos tradicionalmente no se reconoce, ya que la sanción al causante del daño se considera que queda al margen de los principios del derecho civil, basándose en la concepción de que la indemnización por daños tiene como objetivo restaurar la esfera patrimonial del perjudicado.

      En consecuencia, el reconocimiento de los daños punitivos en una sentencia, se obstaculizaban por el límite de orden público y tales sentencias no tenían acceso en el espacio jurídico italiano.

      La sentencia de las Secciones Unidas núm. 16601/2017, de 5 de julio de 2017 de la Corte Suprema de Casación ha girado las cartas sobre la mesa.

      En el presente caso se solicitó a la Corte de Apelación de Venecia el reconocimiento (ex. Art. 64 de la Ley 218/1995) de tres sentencias de la District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida que, admitió una denuncia de garantía interpuesta por un revendedor americano de cascos contra la sociedad productora italiana, por la cual se había condenado a ésta última al pago de 1.436.136,87 USD (además de gastos e intereses) en base al resarcimiento de los daños causas por un defecto del casco utilizado en un accidente de tráfico.

      La Corte de Apelación de Venecia reconoció la eficacia de la sentencia del juez extranjero, considerando que el importe era meramente indemnizatorio y no punitivo. La decisión fue recurrida en Casación por la parte condenada, que sostenía la contrariedad al orden publico de la sentencia estadunidense, en base a la orientación jurisprudencial hasta ese momento.

      La Casación ha confirmado la decisión de la Corte de Apelación, considerando que el importe no es punitivo y ha declarado el reconocimiento de la sentencia estadunidense en Italia.

      Las Secciones Unidas, por su parte, han aprovechado la ocasión para afrontar la cuestión inherente a la admisibilidad de los daños punitivos en Italia, cambiando la orientación histórica de la Corte Suprema (véase Cass. 1781/2012).

      Según la Corte, la noción de responsabilidad civil entendida como mera reparación de los daños sufridos, se debe considerar como obsoleta dada la evolución del instituto a través de intervenciones legislativas y jurisprudenciales nacionales y europeas, que han introducido medidas indemnizatorias con finalidad sancionadora y disuasiva. De hecho, en el ordenamiento italiano es posible encontrar diversos casos de indemnización por daños con finalidad sancionadora: en materia de difamación en medios de comunicación (art. 12 L. 47/48), derechos de autor (art. 158 L 633/41), propiedad industrial (art. 125 D. Lgs 30/2005), abuso del proceso (art. 96.3 c.p.c. y art. 26.2 c.p.a.), derecho laboral (art. 18.14 c.p.c.), derecho de familia (art. 709-ter c.p.c.), etc.

      De este modo, la Corte de Casación ha introducido el siguiente principio de derecho: “En el vigente ordenamiento italiano, a la responsabilidad civil no solo se le asigna el deber de restaurar la esfera patrimonial del sujeto que ha sufrido la lesión, porque se consideran incluidas en el sistema la función de disuasión y la función sancionadora de la responsabilidad civil. Por tanto, no es ontológicamente incompatible con el ordenamiento italiano el instituto de origen estadunidense de la indemnización punitiva”.

      La consecuencia, a tener en muy cuenta, es que el pronunciamiento abre la puerta a posibles deliberaciones de sentencias extranjeras, que condenen a una de las partes al pago de un importe superior respecto al importe calculado para compensar el prejuicio creado a causa de un daño.

      Sin embargo, a tal fin, la Corte Suprema ha dispuesto algunas condiciones para que la sentencia extranjera pueda reconocerse. La decisión ha debido ser tomada en el ordenamiento extranjero en base a:

      1. Garantizar la tipicidad de la condena.
      2. La previsibilidad de la misma.
      3. Los límites cuantificativos.

      Los posibles efectos de la Sentencia en el ordenamiento italiano

      En primer lugar, hay que tener claro que la Sentencia no ha modificado el sistema indemnizatorio interno del ordenamiento italiano. En otras palabras, la Sentencia no permitirá a los jueces italianos condenar por daños punitivos al interno de los procedimientos italianos.

      En cambio, por lo que respecta a las sentencias extranjeras, ahora será posible obtener la indemnización por daños punitivos a través del reconocimiento y la ejecución en el sistema italiano de una decisión extranjera que prevea la condena de dicha tipología de daño, con la condición de que se respeten los mencionados presupuestos.

      Por todo lo expuesto, las empresas que hayan invertido o que realicen negocios en países en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, tendrán que tener en consideración dicho riesgo.

      Los instrumentos para tutelarse

      El empresario quien opere en mercados extranjeros en los que se prevén los daños punitivos debe considerar con atención este riesgo.

      La óptica debe ser necesariamente de prevención y los instrumentos a disposición son diversos: en primer lugar, la adopción de cláusulas contractuales que prevean la renuncia del perjudicado a este tipo de daño o, que acuerden un límite a la indemnización de los daños contractuales, por ejemplo limitándolos al valor de los productos o a los servicios ofrecidos.

      Es además fundamental, que se conozca la legislación y la jurisprudencia de los mercados en los cuales se opera, incluso indirectamente (por ejemplo, con la distribución comercial de los productos) con el fin de escoger de modo consciente la ley aplicable al contrato y la modalidad de resolución de controversias (por ejemplo, con previsión de la exclusiva jurisdiccional del foro del país que no prevea daños punitivos).

      Finalmente, este tipo de responsabilidad y riesgo puede ser objeto de valoración con pólizas aseguradoras que ofrecen una cobertura específica respecto a eventuales condenas de indemnización de daños punitivos.

      [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

      It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

      In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

      This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

      Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

      Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

      Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

      The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of «sufficient justification» and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

      As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

      The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

      It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

      To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

      Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

      One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

      On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

      Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

      Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

      How much does it tell us?

      Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

      The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

      If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

      Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

      This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

      Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

      Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

      The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

      The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

      It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

      There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

      • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
      • a frustration or a force majeure.

      There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

      The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

      What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

      The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

      A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

      If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

      • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
      • the good faith of the parties;
      • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
      • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
      • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

      What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

      The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

      The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

      • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
      • sudden;
      • unpredictable.

      To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

      • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
      • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
      • a constant increase in turnover;
      • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
      • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
      • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
      • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
      • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

      The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

      • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
      • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
      • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

      Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

      Compensation for a damage

      The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

      The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

      The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

      International law

      The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

      However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

      The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

      The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

      In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

      • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
      • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

      In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

      In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

      The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

      Marika Devaux

      Áreas de práctica

      • Arbitraje
      • Contratos
      • Reclamación de deudas
      • Contratos de distribución
      • Derecho Internacional Privado
      Contáctanos Marika

      Contacta con Marika





        Lea la política de privacidad de Legalmondo.
        Este sitio está protegido por reCAPTCHA y se aplican la Política de privacidad de Google y los Términos de servicio.

        To infinity and beyond – Perpetual contracts under Québec law

        9 de agosto de 2017

        • Canadá
        • Contratos
        • Litigios

        It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

        At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

        One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

        Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

        No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

        The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

        Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

        The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

        Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

        The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

        Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

        The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

        In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

        From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

        What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

        Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

        The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

        With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

        Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

        From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

        It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

        By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

        In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

        State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

        Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

        “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

        “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

        The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

        One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

        “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

        As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

        Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

        There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

        A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

        The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

        In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

        The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

        The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

        The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

        The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

        In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

        Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

        Conclusions

        If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

        If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

        And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

        La cuestión del litisconsorcio necesario respecto a los beneficiarios de un trust en la acción revocatoria es objeto de amplio debate desde hace tiempo lo que ha llevado a dos corrientes contrastantes entre ellas, superadas por la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Casación n. 19376 del 3 de agosto de 2017.

        Según una primera corriente, los beneficiarios del trust no deben considerarse partes necesarias del juicio de revocatoria porqué el objeto de la demanda no es el acto con el que se constituye el trust sino el sucesivo acto dispositivo, llevado a cabo por el “settlor” con el que el nuevo ente, en la persona del trustee, viene dotado de un patrimonio, sin que sea solicitada la participación de los beneficiarios.

        Los beneficiarios no podrían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios ya que no siendo directamente titulares de los bienes otorgados en el trust no sufririan en la hipótesis de revocación del acto dispositivo de un perjuicio sino que al máximo se lesionaría un mero interés a la integridad patrimonial del ente.

        No estando dotado el trust de personalidad jurídica sino siendo un conjunto de bienes y relaciones destinadas a un fin determinado, en interés de uno o mas beneficiarios y formalmente a nombre del  «trustee», este último resultaría ser el único sujeto que además de poder disponer en via exclusiva de los derechos otorgados en el patrimonio vinculado, estaría legitimado a oponerlos en las relaciones frente a terceros, incluso defendiéndose en juicio (Tribunal de Apelación de Milán, sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2016): de hecho solo frente a dicho “trustee”  el acreedor del “settlor” podría correctamente iniciar la ejecución forzosa, una vez reconocida la ineficacia relativa del acto dispositivo a consecuencia del juicio de revocatoria.

        Según otra orientación, en cambio, los beneficiarios del trust deben considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria ya que, aun no siendo titulares del patrimonio vinculado, estarían de todas formas interesados en los efectos de la sentencia que dispone la revocació del acto por el que se otorgan los bienes al trust, siendo su posición sea jurídica que de hecho perjudicada por los efectos de dicha resolución.

        A una conclusión análoga se podría llegar incluso a través de una interpretación en sentido contrario de la jurisprudencia en materia de fondo patrimonial.

        Con referencia a dicha figura, la Casación ha, de hecho excluido la legitimación pasiva de los hijos de los que lo constituyen, en juicios análogos, en cuanto los mismos no podrían tener pretensiones judiciales directamente frente a sus padres administradores del fondo patrimonial (Casación Civil, sentencia n. 10641 de 15 mayo de 2014, Casación Civil, sentencia n. 18065 de 8 septiembre de 2004; Casación Civil, sentencia n. 5402 del 17 de marzo de 2004) .

        Los beneficiarios del trust, en cambio, pudiendo tener pretensiones sea frente al trust que frente al trustee, deberían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en todos aquellos juicios que se refirieren a cualquier aspecto del acto dispositivo (S. Bartoli, Azione revocatoria di trust e litisconsorzio necessario rispetto ai beneficiari: la prima pronunzia della Cassazione, Il Caso, 22 de Noviembre de 2017).

        A aclarar la cuestión ha intervenido recentemente el Tribunal de Casación que, con la sentencia n. 19376 del 3 de agosto 2017, ha propuesto soluciones alternativas a aquellas apenas comentadas, capaz de terminar en parte con el contraste interpretativo descrito.

        El caso examinado por los magistrados y relativo al otorgamiento de determinados bienes, antes a un “fondo patrimonial” y sucesivamente a un trust, por parte de unos conyuge que, a través de dichos instrumentos, han destinado parte del proprio patrimonio a las necesidades de vida y de estudio de los hijos.

        Los actos dispositivos han sido pero considerados perjudiciales para los propios intereses por un banco, acreedor de uno de los cónyuges, que ha por lo tanto ejercitado la revocatoria, obteniendo sea en primer que en segundo grado, la declaratoria de ineficacia, en virtud del art. 2901 c.c, del “fondo patrimonial” y del trust.

        Contra la sentencia de apelación, los cónyuges han propuesto recurso de Casación, por falta de integración del contradictorio en el juicio de apelación, no habiendo el Tribunal de Apelación ordenado la intervención en el proceso de los hijos – benericiarios y solicitando, por tanto, la nulidad de todo el proceso.

        Los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación, examinado el caso, no han considerado válidos los motivos propuesto con el recurso.

        Según el Tribunal de Casación, de hecho, en la hipótesis de “fondo patrimonial”, no produciéndose ninguna mutación en la titularidad de los bienes, que siguen siendo de titularidad de padres – constituyentes del fondo y que no surgiendo ningún derecho subjetivo a favor de los hijos beneficiarios, estos no pueden ser en ningún modo considerados litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria del fondo, como es afrirmado por constante jurisprudencia sea de los Tribunales de Apelación que de Casación (véase la anteriormente citada).

        Según el Tribunal de Casación se llega a una conclusión análoga con referencia al trust.

        En relación a dicha cuestión los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación consideran no poder adherir a ninguna de las orientaciones que se han formado en jurisprudencia, y ofrecen, como anticipado, una tercera via interpretativa según la cual los beneficiarios del trust pueden ser considerados legitimarios pasivos en la revocatoria solo cuando el acto costitutivo del trust reconozca a los mismos la titularidad de derechos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al mismo.

        En ausencia de un expreso reconocimiento de dichas prerrogativas, el único legitimado pasivo en el juicio de revocatorio es el trustee.

        El trust, de hecho, se convierte en operativo, explica el Tribunal de Casación, mediante dos tipologías de actos, el primero de caracter unilateral, finalizado exclusivamente a la sua institución y el segundo (o los segundos, pudiendo el “settlor” proceder a una pluralidad de negocios distintos) de natura dispositiva, dirigido a transmitir los bienes al trustee.

        Si el acto costitutivo por si mismo no parece idóneo a determinar ningún  perjuicio a los acreedores del “settlor”, no afectando la consistencia de su patrimonio y, por tanto, su capacidad de cumplir con las propias obligaciones, no se puede decir lo mismo de los actos con los que lo bienes se transmiten al trustee, el cual convirtiéndose en el único sujeto legitimado a disponer de los mismos, se convierte en el único a poder oponerse en un juicio para tutelarse.

        Es claro dicho aspecto, los jueces del Tribunal de Casación han observado además como el eventual interés de los beneficiarios a la correcta administración del patrimonio otorgado en el trust no represente, desde un punto de vista teórico, una hipótesis de interés directo e inmediato a intervenir en el juicio de revocatoria, que justifique la participación de los beneficiarios como litisconsortes necesarios.

        El interés a la correcta administración del trust constituye una posición jurídica que se refiere exclusivamente a las relaciones entre los beneficiarios y el “trustee” y que, en ningún modo puede afectar a los acreedores del “settlor”.

        A una conclusión distinta se podría llegar cuando el regolamento del trust hubiese permitido de calificar los beneficiarios como actuales beneficiarios de la renta o como beneficiarios finales con derecho inmediato a recibir la titularidad de los bienes otorgados en trust, independientemente de cualquier valoración discrecional del “trustee “.

        Solo così, de hecho, los beneficiarios habrían podido hacer valer un interés directo e inmediato en la controversia que justificaría la necesidad de citarlos en juicio.

        Por lo tanto, en las hipótesis en que los beneficiarios no sean titulares de derechos subjetivos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al trust, además del deudor, legitimado pasivo en la acción revocatoria es solo el “trustee”, en cuanto único sujeto de referencia en las relaciones con terceros y por tanto también en las relaciones con los acreedores del “settlor”, único titular de los derechos sobre bienes sujetos a “segregación”.

        La solución ofrecida por el Tribunal de Casación es homogénea con cuanto previsto por el derecho inglés, en el que nuestro ordenamiento se ha inspirado para la figura del trust, según la cual en los juicios  iniciados por los acreedores del “settlor” frente al trust, la protección de este se encarga al trustee, en lugar o junto con los beneficiarios (Di Sapio, Muritano, “Solo il «trustee» partecipa al giudizio di revoca del trust”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 de noviembre de 2017).

        Por lo tanto, como en Italia, también en los sistemas anglosajones los beneficiarios no son parte necesaria del proceso pero pueden intervenir volontariamente en el mismo para evitar ser perjudicados por la sentencia de revocatoria.

        El autor de este artículo es Giovanni Izzo.

        ¿Cómo asegurase que a largo plazo pueda ejecutarse un crédito? En Suiza un acreedor podrá embargar los bienes de un deudor siempre que se cumplan ciertas condiciones. En la práctica, existen dos situaciones por las cuales se considera que se lleve a cabo un embargo de los activos: la primera de ellas es cuando el acreedor posee una acción contra un deudor sin residencia en Suiza, mientras que la segunda, es cuando el acreedor posee un título ejecutivo fundado en una sentencia favorable o en un laudo o resolución arbitral.

        Sin lugar a duda, el mercado financiero suizo continúa jugando un papel predominante en el mundo financiero actual, a pesar de la presión reguladora que afronta. La jurisdicción suiza, por tanto, es relevante para los acreedores que deseen obtener el embrago de bienes por parte de un deudor que posea cuentas bancarias u otros bienes en Suiza. Si bien en la práctica, el embargo de bienes se efectúa sobre cuentas bancarias, es posible utilizar la misma obligación para embargar otros bienes con el mismo efecto, por ejemplo, bienes inmuebles, obras de arte o bienes de terceros a su vez acreedores del deudor.

        A instancia de parte, el acreedor puede solicitar un embargo ex parte de bienes del deudor que se encuentren en Suiza ante el tribunal del lugar donde se encuentre la sede del banco o donde se sitúen los bienes, siempre y cuando se demuestre que existan prima facie los tres requisitos previstos por la Ley federal sobre la ejecución y sobre el concurso de acreedores (“DEBA”), es decir, que:

        • El acreedor que solicita el embargo posea un título fundado en un crédito exigible y ordinario.
        • Se den los presupuestos legales necesarios para obtener un embargo.
        • Los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza.

        Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, los presupuestos legales más relevantes para obtener el embargo de bienes son:

        • Que el deudor no sea residente en Suiza y que el crédito en sí esté lo suficientemente conectado con Suiza o que esté fundado en un reconocimiento de la deuda por parte del deudor (“embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza”).
        • Que el acreedor posea una sentencia ejecutiva favorable o un laudo arbitral contra el deudor (“Título ejecutivo”)

        Embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza: Según la DEBA, el mero hecho de que los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza no es suficiente como para establecer una “suficiente conexión con Suiza”. Dicho presupuesto depende en gran parte de los hechos específicos de la cuestión que se valorarán por parte del Juez caso por caso. La jurisprudencia suiza ha confirmado algunos criterios de conexión: que el contrato entre las partes se haya firmado o deba de ejecutarse en Suiza; que el contrato entre las partes esté regulado por la ley suiza, que el acreedor viva en Suiza o que el crédito del acreedor esté conectado a una actividad comercial desarrollada en Suiza.

        Título ejecutivo: Para poder solicitar el embargo de los bienes, el acreedor debe además, cumplir con el segundo presupuesto legal, esto es, poseer un título ejecutivo. La DEBA no realiza distinciones entre sentencias y laudos o arbitrales pronunciados tanto en una jurisdicción interna como en una jurisdicción extranjera. Simplemente deben ser ejecutivos (teniendo en consideración el Convenio de Lugano, la Ley federal sobre derecho internacional privado – en el caso de un laudo arbitral dictado por una corte arbitral no suiza – teniendo en consideración el Convención de Nueva York), todas las sentencias favorables o los laudos arbitrales podrán obtener el embargo de los bienes que se encuentren en Suiza.

        El tribunal suizo solicitará al acreedor que demuestre prime facie la existencia de los presupuestos legales para llevar a cabo el embargo, como anteriormente descrito. Debido a que el embargo se otorgará ex parte, en muchos casos, dicha acción tomará al deudor por sorpresa. Gracias a este efecto sorpresa y a la naturaleza del embargo, cuyo objetivo es que el deudor no pueda deshacerse de los activos, tal medio tiene un grande potencial para ayudar al acreedor a asegurarse y quedarse satisfecho de su crédito.

        Con la reciente sentencia 16601/2017, la Corte Suprema – después de diferentes pronunciamientos contrarios – ha abierto la posibilidad de reconocer en Italia las sentencias extranjeras que contengan daños punitivos.

        En este breve artículo veremos en qué consisten los daños punitivos, cuáles son las condiciones por las cuales podrían reconocerse y aplicarse en Italia y, sobretodo, qué medidas conviene tomar para afrontar este nuevo riesgo.

        Los daños punitivos, en inglés punitive damages, son un instituto jurídico originario de los ordenamientos anglosajones que prevén la posibilidad de reconocer a la parte perjudicada una indemnización adicional respecto a la compensación del daño sufrido, en los casos en los que el causante del daño haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave (“malice” y “gross negligence”, respectivamente).

        Con los daños punitivos, además de la función compensatoria, la indemnización del daño también asume una finalidad sancionadora, típica del derecho penal, actuando como elemento de disuasión ante otros potenciales infractores.

        En los ordenamientos en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, el reconocimiento y la cuantificación de la indemnización se someten a la discrecionalidad del juez.

        En los Estados Unidos de América los daños punitivos se prevén en los principios de common law, pero se disciplinan de modo diverso en cada uno de los Estados. Sin embargo, en general, se aplican siempre que la conducta del causante del daño haya sido dirigida a causar el daño intencionadamente o, se haya llevado a cabo sin tener en cuenta las normas de seguridad preestablecidas. Por lo general, no pueden reconocerse por el incumplimiento de un contrato, salvo que no se determine como un ilícito (tort) autónomo.

        En algunos Estados se prevén límites máximos a los daños punitivos, a veces incorporados en los daños compensatorios, otras veces como cuantía máxima. Además, la Corte Suprema de los EEUU ha intervenido en diferentes casos para limitar el importe de condena.

        En los ordenamientos de civil law, entre ellos Italia, el instituto de daños punitivos tradicionalmente no se reconoce, ya que la sanción al causante del daño se considera que queda al margen de los principios del derecho civil, basándose en la concepción de que la indemnización por daños tiene como objetivo restaurar la esfera patrimonial del perjudicado.

        En consecuencia, el reconocimiento de los daños punitivos en una sentencia, se obstaculizaban por el límite de orden público y tales sentencias no tenían acceso en el espacio jurídico italiano.

        La sentencia de las Secciones Unidas núm. 16601/2017, de 5 de julio de 2017 de la Corte Suprema de Casación ha girado las cartas sobre la mesa.

        En el presente caso se solicitó a la Corte de Apelación de Venecia el reconocimiento (ex. Art. 64 de la Ley 218/1995) de tres sentencias de la District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida que, admitió una denuncia de garantía interpuesta por un revendedor americano de cascos contra la sociedad productora italiana, por la cual se había condenado a ésta última al pago de 1.436.136,87 USD (además de gastos e intereses) en base al resarcimiento de los daños causas por un defecto del casco utilizado en un accidente de tráfico.

        La Corte de Apelación de Venecia reconoció la eficacia de la sentencia del juez extranjero, considerando que el importe era meramente indemnizatorio y no punitivo. La decisión fue recurrida en Casación por la parte condenada, que sostenía la contrariedad al orden publico de la sentencia estadunidense, en base a la orientación jurisprudencial hasta ese momento.

        La Casación ha confirmado la decisión de la Corte de Apelación, considerando que el importe no es punitivo y ha declarado el reconocimiento de la sentencia estadunidense en Italia.

        Las Secciones Unidas, por su parte, han aprovechado la ocasión para afrontar la cuestión inherente a la admisibilidad de los daños punitivos en Italia, cambiando la orientación histórica de la Corte Suprema (véase Cass. 1781/2012).

        Según la Corte, la noción de responsabilidad civil entendida como mera reparación de los daños sufridos, se debe considerar como obsoleta dada la evolución del instituto a través de intervenciones legislativas y jurisprudenciales nacionales y europeas, que han introducido medidas indemnizatorias con finalidad sancionadora y disuasiva. De hecho, en el ordenamiento italiano es posible encontrar diversos casos de indemnización por daños con finalidad sancionadora: en materia de difamación en medios de comunicación (art. 12 L. 47/48), derechos de autor (art. 158 L 633/41), propiedad industrial (art. 125 D. Lgs 30/2005), abuso del proceso (art. 96.3 c.p.c. y art. 26.2 c.p.a.), derecho laboral (art. 18.14 c.p.c.), derecho de familia (art. 709-ter c.p.c.), etc.

        De este modo, la Corte de Casación ha introducido el siguiente principio de derecho: “En el vigente ordenamiento italiano, a la responsabilidad civil no solo se le asigna el deber de restaurar la esfera patrimonial del sujeto que ha sufrido la lesión, porque se consideran incluidas en el sistema la función de disuasión y la función sancionadora de la responsabilidad civil. Por tanto, no es ontológicamente incompatible con el ordenamiento italiano el instituto de origen estadunidense de la indemnización punitiva”.

        La consecuencia, a tener en muy cuenta, es que el pronunciamiento abre la puerta a posibles deliberaciones de sentencias extranjeras, que condenen a una de las partes al pago de un importe superior respecto al importe calculado para compensar el prejuicio creado a causa de un daño.

        Sin embargo, a tal fin, la Corte Suprema ha dispuesto algunas condiciones para que la sentencia extranjera pueda reconocerse. La decisión ha debido ser tomada en el ordenamiento extranjero en base a:

        1. Garantizar la tipicidad de la condena.
        2. La previsibilidad de la misma.
        3. Los límites cuantificativos.

        Los posibles efectos de la Sentencia en el ordenamiento italiano

        En primer lugar, hay que tener claro que la Sentencia no ha modificado el sistema indemnizatorio interno del ordenamiento italiano. En otras palabras, la Sentencia no permitirá a los jueces italianos condenar por daños punitivos al interno de los procedimientos italianos.

        En cambio, por lo que respecta a las sentencias extranjeras, ahora será posible obtener la indemnización por daños punitivos a través del reconocimiento y la ejecución en el sistema italiano de una decisión extranjera que prevea la condena de dicha tipología de daño, con la condición de que se respeten los mencionados presupuestos.

        Por todo lo expuesto, las empresas que hayan invertido o que realicen negocios en países en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, tendrán que tener en consideración dicho riesgo.

        Los instrumentos para tutelarse

        El empresario quien opere en mercados extranjeros en los que se prevén los daños punitivos debe considerar con atención este riesgo.

        La óptica debe ser necesariamente de prevención y los instrumentos a disposición son diversos: en primer lugar, la adopción de cláusulas contractuales que prevean la renuncia del perjudicado a este tipo de daño o, que acuerden un límite a la indemnización de los daños contractuales, por ejemplo limitándolos al valor de los productos o a los servicios ofrecidos.

        Es además fundamental, que se conozca la legislación y la jurisprudencia de los mercados en los cuales se opera, incluso indirectamente (por ejemplo, con la distribución comercial de los productos) con el fin de escoger de modo consciente la ley aplicable al contrato y la modalidad de resolución de controversias (por ejemplo, con previsión de la exclusiva jurisdiccional del foro del país que no prevea daños punitivos).

        Finalmente, este tipo de responsabilidad y riesgo puede ser objeto de valoración con pólizas aseguradoras que ofrecen una cobertura específica respecto a eventuales condenas de indemnización de daños punitivos.

        [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

        It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

        In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

        This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

        Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

        Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

        Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

        The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of «sufficient justification» and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

        As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

        The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

        It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

        To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

        Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

        One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

        On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

        Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

        Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

        How much does it tell us?

        Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

        The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

        If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

        Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

        This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

        Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

        Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

        The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

        The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

        It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

        There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

        • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
        • a frustration or a force majeure.

        There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

        The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

        What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

        The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

        A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

        If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

        • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
        • the good faith of the parties;
        • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
        • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
        • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

        What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

        The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

        The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

        • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
        • sudden;
        • unpredictable.

        To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

        • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
        • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
        • a constant increase in turnover;
        • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
        • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
        • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
        • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
        • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

        The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

        • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
        • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
        • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

        Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

        Compensation for a damage

        The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

        The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

        The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

        International law

        The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

        However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

        The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

        The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

        In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

        • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
        • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

        In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

        In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

        The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

        Switzerland – An excellent choice for arbitration

        17 de julio de 2017

        • Suiza
        • Arbitraje
        • Litigios

        It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

        At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

        One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

        Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

        No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

        The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

        Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

        The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

        Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

        The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

        Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

        The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

        In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

        From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

        What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

        Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

        The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

        With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

        Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

        From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

        It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

        By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

        In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

        State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

        Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

        “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

        “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

        The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

        One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

        “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

        As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

        Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

        There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

        A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

        The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

        In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

        The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

        The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

        The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

        The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

        In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

        Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

        Conclusions

        If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

        If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

        And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

        La cuestión del litisconsorcio necesario respecto a los beneficiarios de un trust en la acción revocatoria es objeto de amplio debate desde hace tiempo lo que ha llevado a dos corrientes contrastantes entre ellas, superadas por la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Casación n. 19376 del 3 de agosto de 2017.

        Según una primera corriente, los beneficiarios del trust no deben considerarse partes necesarias del juicio de revocatoria porqué el objeto de la demanda no es el acto con el que se constituye el trust sino el sucesivo acto dispositivo, llevado a cabo por el “settlor” con el que el nuevo ente, en la persona del trustee, viene dotado de un patrimonio, sin que sea solicitada la participación de los beneficiarios.

        Los beneficiarios no podrían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios ya que no siendo directamente titulares de los bienes otorgados en el trust no sufririan en la hipótesis de revocación del acto dispositivo de un perjuicio sino que al máximo se lesionaría un mero interés a la integridad patrimonial del ente.

        No estando dotado el trust de personalidad jurídica sino siendo un conjunto de bienes y relaciones destinadas a un fin determinado, en interés de uno o mas beneficiarios y formalmente a nombre del  «trustee», este último resultaría ser el único sujeto que además de poder disponer en via exclusiva de los derechos otorgados en el patrimonio vinculado, estaría legitimado a oponerlos en las relaciones frente a terceros, incluso defendiéndose en juicio (Tribunal de Apelación de Milán, sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2016): de hecho solo frente a dicho “trustee”  el acreedor del “settlor” podría correctamente iniciar la ejecución forzosa, una vez reconocida la ineficacia relativa del acto dispositivo a consecuencia del juicio de revocatoria.

        Según otra orientación, en cambio, los beneficiarios del trust deben considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria ya que, aun no siendo titulares del patrimonio vinculado, estarían de todas formas interesados en los efectos de la sentencia que dispone la revocació del acto por el que se otorgan los bienes al trust, siendo su posición sea jurídica que de hecho perjudicada por los efectos de dicha resolución.

        A una conclusión análoga se podría llegar incluso a través de una interpretación en sentido contrario de la jurisprudencia en materia de fondo patrimonial.

        Con referencia a dicha figura, la Casación ha, de hecho excluido la legitimación pasiva de los hijos de los que lo constituyen, en juicios análogos, en cuanto los mismos no podrían tener pretensiones judiciales directamente frente a sus padres administradores del fondo patrimonial (Casación Civil, sentencia n. 10641 de 15 mayo de 2014, Casación Civil, sentencia n. 18065 de 8 septiembre de 2004; Casación Civil, sentencia n. 5402 del 17 de marzo de 2004) .

        Los beneficiarios del trust, en cambio, pudiendo tener pretensiones sea frente al trust que frente al trustee, deberían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en todos aquellos juicios que se refirieren a cualquier aspecto del acto dispositivo (S. Bartoli, Azione revocatoria di trust e litisconsorzio necessario rispetto ai beneficiari: la prima pronunzia della Cassazione, Il Caso, 22 de Noviembre de 2017).

        A aclarar la cuestión ha intervenido recentemente el Tribunal de Casación que, con la sentencia n. 19376 del 3 de agosto 2017, ha propuesto soluciones alternativas a aquellas apenas comentadas, capaz de terminar en parte con el contraste interpretativo descrito.

        El caso examinado por los magistrados y relativo al otorgamiento de determinados bienes, antes a un “fondo patrimonial” y sucesivamente a un trust, por parte de unos conyuge que, a través de dichos instrumentos, han destinado parte del proprio patrimonio a las necesidades de vida y de estudio de los hijos.

        Los actos dispositivos han sido pero considerados perjudiciales para los propios intereses por un banco, acreedor de uno de los cónyuges, que ha por lo tanto ejercitado la revocatoria, obteniendo sea en primer que en segundo grado, la declaratoria de ineficacia, en virtud del art. 2901 c.c, del “fondo patrimonial” y del trust.

        Contra la sentencia de apelación, los cónyuges han propuesto recurso de Casación, por falta de integración del contradictorio en el juicio de apelación, no habiendo el Tribunal de Apelación ordenado la intervención en el proceso de los hijos – benericiarios y solicitando, por tanto, la nulidad de todo el proceso.

        Los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación, examinado el caso, no han considerado válidos los motivos propuesto con el recurso.

        Según el Tribunal de Casación, de hecho, en la hipótesis de “fondo patrimonial”, no produciéndose ninguna mutación en la titularidad de los bienes, que siguen siendo de titularidad de padres – constituyentes del fondo y que no surgiendo ningún derecho subjetivo a favor de los hijos beneficiarios, estos no pueden ser en ningún modo considerados litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria del fondo, como es afrirmado por constante jurisprudencia sea de los Tribunales de Apelación que de Casación (véase la anteriormente citada).

        Según el Tribunal de Casación se llega a una conclusión análoga con referencia al trust.

        En relación a dicha cuestión los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación consideran no poder adherir a ninguna de las orientaciones que se han formado en jurisprudencia, y ofrecen, como anticipado, una tercera via interpretativa según la cual los beneficiarios del trust pueden ser considerados legitimarios pasivos en la revocatoria solo cuando el acto costitutivo del trust reconozca a los mismos la titularidad de derechos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al mismo.

        En ausencia de un expreso reconocimiento de dichas prerrogativas, el único legitimado pasivo en el juicio de revocatorio es el trustee.

        El trust, de hecho, se convierte en operativo, explica el Tribunal de Casación, mediante dos tipologías de actos, el primero de caracter unilateral, finalizado exclusivamente a la sua institución y el segundo (o los segundos, pudiendo el “settlor” proceder a una pluralidad de negocios distintos) de natura dispositiva, dirigido a transmitir los bienes al trustee.

        Si el acto costitutivo por si mismo no parece idóneo a determinar ningún  perjuicio a los acreedores del “settlor”, no afectando la consistencia de su patrimonio y, por tanto, su capacidad de cumplir con las propias obligaciones, no se puede decir lo mismo de los actos con los que lo bienes se transmiten al trustee, el cual convirtiéndose en el único sujeto legitimado a disponer de los mismos, se convierte en el único a poder oponerse en un juicio para tutelarse.

        Es claro dicho aspecto, los jueces del Tribunal de Casación han observado además como el eventual interés de los beneficiarios a la correcta administración del patrimonio otorgado en el trust no represente, desde un punto de vista teórico, una hipótesis de interés directo e inmediato a intervenir en el juicio de revocatoria, que justifique la participación de los beneficiarios como litisconsortes necesarios.

        El interés a la correcta administración del trust constituye una posición jurídica que se refiere exclusivamente a las relaciones entre los beneficiarios y el “trustee” y que, en ningún modo puede afectar a los acreedores del “settlor”.

        A una conclusión distinta se podría llegar cuando el regolamento del trust hubiese permitido de calificar los beneficiarios como actuales beneficiarios de la renta o como beneficiarios finales con derecho inmediato a recibir la titularidad de los bienes otorgados en trust, independientemente de cualquier valoración discrecional del “trustee “.

        Solo così, de hecho, los beneficiarios habrían podido hacer valer un interés directo e inmediato en la controversia que justificaría la necesidad de citarlos en juicio.

        Por lo tanto, en las hipótesis en que los beneficiarios no sean titulares de derechos subjetivos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al trust, además del deudor, legitimado pasivo en la acción revocatoria es solo el “trustee”, en cuanto único sujeto de referencia en las relaciones con terceros y por tanto también en las relaciones con los acreedores del “settlor”, único titular de los derechos sobre bienes sujetos a “segregación”.

        La solución ofrecida por el Tribunal de Casación es homogénea con cuanto previsto por el derecho inglés, en el que nuestro ordenamiento se ha inspirado para la figura del trust, según la cual en los juicios  iniciados por los acreedores del “settlor” frente al trust, la protección de este se encarga al trustee, en lugar o junto con los beneficiarios (Di Sapio, Muritano, “Solo il «trustee» partecipa al giudizio di revoca del trust”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 de noviembre de 2017).

        Por lo tanto, como en Italia, también en los sistemas anglosajones los beneficiarios no son parte necesaria del proceso pero pueden intervenir volontariamente en el mismo para evitar ser perjudicados por la sentencia de revocatoria.

        El autor de este artículo es Giovanni Izzo.

        ¿Cómo asegurase que a largo plazo pueda ejecutarse un crédito? En Suiza un acreedor podrá embargar los bienes de un deudor siempre que se cumplan ciertas condiciones. En la práctica, existen dos situaciones por las cuales se considera que se lleve a cabo un embargo de los activos: la primera de ellas es cuando el acreedor posee una acción contra un deudor sin residencia en Suiza, mientras que la segunda, es cuando el acreedor posee un título ejecutivo fundado en una sentencia favorable o en un laudo o resolución arbitral.

        Sin lugar a duda, el mercado financiero suizo continúa jugando un papel predominante en el mundo financiero actual, a pesar de la presión reguladora que afronta. La jurisdicción suiza, por tanto, es relevante para los acreedores que deseen obtener el embrago de bienes por parte de un deudor que posea cuentas bancarias u otros bienes en Suiza. Si bien en la práctica, el embargo de bienes se efectúa sobre cuentas bancarias, es posible utilizar la misma obligación para embargar otros bienes con el mismo efecto, por ejemplo, bienes inmuebles, obras de arte o bienes de terceros a su vez acreedores del deudor.

        A instancia de parte, el acreedor puede solicitar un embargo ex parte de bienes del deudor que se encuentren en Suiza ante el tribunal del lugar donde se encuentre la sede del banco o donde se sitúen los bienes, siempre y cuando se demuestre que existan prima facie los tres requisitos previstos por la Ley federal sobre la ejecución y sobre el concurso de acreedores (“DEBA”), es decir, que:

        • El acreedor que solicita el embargo posea un título fundado en un crédito exigible y ordinario.
        • Se den los presupuestos legales necesarios para obtener un embargo.
        • Los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza.

        Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, los presupuestos legales más relevantes para obtener el embargo de bienes son:

        • Que el deudor no sea residente en Suiza y que el crédito en sí esté lo suficientemente conectado con Suiza o que esté fundado en un reconocimiento de la deuda por parte del deudor (“embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza”).
        • Que el acreedor posea una sentencia ejecutiva favorable o un laudo arbitral contra el deudor (“Título ejecutivo”)

        Embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza: Según la DEBA, el mero hecho de que los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza no es suficiente como para establecer una “suficiente conexión con Suiza”. Dicho presupuesto depende en gran parte de los hechos específicos de la cuestión que se valorarán por parte del Juez caso por caso. La jurisprudencia suiza ha confirmado algunos criterios de conexión: que el contrato entre las partes se haya firmado o deba de ejecutarse en Suiza; que el contrato entre las partes esté regulado por la ley suiza, que el acreedor viva en Suiza o que el crédito del acreedor esté conectado a una actividad comercial desarrollada en Suiza.

        Título ejecutivo: Para poder solicitar el embargo de los bienes, el acreedor debe además, cumplir con el segundo presupuesto legal, esto es, poseer un título ejecutivo. La DEBA no realiza distinciones entre sentencias y laudos o arbitrales pronunciados tanto en una jurisdicción interna como en una jurisdicción extranjera. Simplemente deben ser ejecutivos (teniendo en consideración el Convenio de Lugano, la Ley federal sobre derecho internacional privado – en el caso de un laudo arbitral dictado por una corte arbitral no suiza – teniendo en consideración el Convención de Nueva York), todas las sentencias favorables o los laudos arbitrales podrán obtener el embargo de los bienes que se encuentren en Suiza.

        El tribunal suizo solicitará al acreedor que demuestre prime facie la existencia de los presupuestos legales para llevar a cabo el embargo, como anteriormente descrito. Debido a que el embargo se otorgará ex parte, en muchos casos, dicha acción tomará al deudor por sorpresa. Gracias a este efecto sorpresa y a la naturaleza del embargo, cuyo objetivo es que el deudor no pueda deshacerse de los activos, tal medio tiene un grande potencial para ayudar al acreedor a asegurarse y quedarse satisfecho de su crédito.

        Con la reciente sentencia 16601/2017, la Corte Suprema – después de diferentes pronunciamientos contrarios – ha abierto la posibilidad de reconocer en Italia las sentencias extranjeras que contengan daños punitivos.

        En este breve artículo veremos en qué consisten los daños punitivos, cuáles son las condiciones por las cuales podrían reconocerse y aplicarse en Italia y, sobretodo, qué medidas conviene tomar para afrontar este nuevo riesgo.

        Los daños punitivos, en inglés punitive damages, son un instituto jurídico originario de los ordenamientos anglosajones que prevén la posibilidad de reconocer a la parte perjudicada una indemnización adicional respecto a la compensación del daño sufrido, en los casos en los que el causante del daño haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave (“malice” y “gross negligence”, respectivamente).

        Con los daños punitivos, además de la función compensatoria, la indemnización del daño también asume una finalidad sancionadora, típica del derecho penal, actuando como elemento de disuasión ante otros potenciales infractores.

        En los ordenamientos en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, el reconocimiento y la cuantificación de la indemnización se someten a la discrecionalidad del juez.

        En los Estados Unidos de América los daños punitivos se prevén en los principios de common law, pero se disciplinan de modo diverso en cada uno de los Estados. Sin embargo, en general, se aplican siempre que la conducta del causante del daño haya sido dirigida a causar el daño intencionadamente o, se haya llevado a cabo sin tener en cuenta las normas de seguridad preestablecidas. Por lo general, no pueden reconocerse por el incumplimiento de un contrato, salvo que no se determine como un ilícito (tort) autónomo.

        En algunos Estados se prevén límites máximos a los daños punitivos, a veces incorporados en los daños compensatorios, otras veces como cuantía máxima. Además, la Corte Suprema de los EEUU ha intervenido en diferentes casos para limitar el importe de condena.

        En los ordenamientos de civil law, entre ellos Italia, el instituto de daños punitivos tradicionalmente no se reconoce, ya que la sanción al causante del daño se considera que queda al margen de los principios del derecho civil, basándose en la concepción de que la indemnización por daños tiene como objetivo restaurar la esfera patrimonial del perjudicado.

        En consecuencia, el reconocimiento de los daños punitivos en una sentencia, se obstaculizaban por el límite de orden público y tales sentencias no tenían acceso en el espacio jurídico italiano.

        La sentencia de las Secciones Unidas núm. 16601/2017, de 5 de julio de 2017 de la Corte Suprema de Casación ha girado las cartas sobre la mesa.

        En el presente caso se solicitó a la Corte de Apelación de Venecia el reconocimiento (ex. Art. 64 de la Ley 218/1995) de tres sentencias de la District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida que, admitió una denuncia de garantía interpuesta por un revendedor americano de cascos contra la sociedad productora italiana, por la cual se había condenado a ésta última al pago de 1.436.136,87 USD (además de gastos e intereses) en base al resarcimiento de los daños causas por un defecto del casco utilizado en un accidente de tráfico.

        La Corte de Apelación de Venecia reconoció la eficacia de la sentencia del juez extranjero, considerando que el importe era meramente indemnizatorio y no punitivo. La decisión fue recurrida en Casación por la parte condenada, que sostenía la contrariedad al orden publico de la sentencia estadunidense, en base a la orientación jurisprudencial hasta ese momento.

        La Casación ha confirmado la decisión de la Corte de Apelación, considerando que el importe no es punitivo y ha declarado el reconocimiento de la sentencia estadunidense en Italia.

        Las Secciones Unidas, por su parte, han aprovechado la ocasión para afrontar la cuestión inherente a la admisibilidad de los daños punitivos en Italia, cambiando la orientación histórica de la Corte Suprema (véase Cass. 1781/2012).

        Según la Corte, la noción de responsabilidad civil entendida como mera reparación de los daños sufridos, se debe considerar como obsoleta dada la evolución del instituto a través de intervenciones legislativas y jurisprudenciales nacionales y europeas, que han introducido medidas indemnizatorias con finalidad sancionadora y disuasiva. De hecho, en el ordenamiento italiano es posible encontrar diversos casos de indemnización por daños con finalidad sancionadora: en materia de difamación en medios de comunicación (art. 12 L. 47/48), derechos de autor (art. 158 L 633/41), propiedad industrial (art. 125 D. Lgs 30/2005), abuso del proceso (art. 96.3 c.p.c. y art. 26.2 c.p.a.), derecho laboral (art. 18.14 c.p.c.), derecho de familia (art. 709-ter c.p.c.), etc.

        De este modo, la Corte de Casación ha introducido el siguiente principio de derecho: “En el vigente ordenamiento italiano, a la responsabilidad civil no solo se le asigna el deber de restaurar la esfera patrimonial del sujeto que ha sufrido la lesión, porque se consideran incluidas en el sistema la función de disuasión y la función sancionadora de la responsabilidad civil. Por tanto, no es ontológicamente incompatible con el ordenamiento italiano el instituto de origen estadunidense de la indemnización punitiva”.

        La consecuencia, a tener en muy cuenta, es que el pronunciamiento abre la puerta a posibles deliberaciones de sentencias extranjeras, que condenen a una de las partes al pago de un importe superior respecto al importe calculado para compensar el prejuicio creado a causa de un daño.

        Sin embargo, a tal fin, la Corte Suprema ha dispuesto algunas condiciones para que la sentencia extranjera pueda reconocerse. La decisión ha debido ser tomada en el ordenamiento extranjero en base a:

        1. Garantizar la tipicidad de la condena.
        2. La previsibilidad de la misma.
        3. Los límites cuantificativos.

        Los posibles efectos de la Sentencia en el ordenamiento italiano

        En primer lugar, hay que tener claro que la Sentencia no ha modificado el sistema indemnizatorio interno del ordenamiento italiano. En otras palabras, la Sentencia no permitirá a los jueces italianos condenar por daños punitivos al interno de los procedimientos italianos.

        En cambio, por lo que respecta a las sentencias extranjeras, ahora será posible obtener la indemnización por daños punitivos a través del reconocimiento y la ejecución en el sistema italiano de una decisión extranjera que prevea la condena de dicha tipología de daño, con la condición de que se respeten los mencionados presupuestos.

        Por todo lo expuesto, las empresas que hayan invertido o que realicen negocios en países en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, tendrán que tener en consideración dicho riesgo.

        Los instrumentos para tutelarse

        El empresario quien opere en mercados extranjeros en los que se prevén los daños punitivos debe considerar con atención este riesgo.

        La óptica debe ser necesariamente de prevención y los instrumentos a disposición son diversos: en primer lugar, la adopción de cláusulas contractuales que prevean la renuncia del perjudicado a este tipo de daño o, que acuerden un límite a la indemnización de los daños contractuales, por ejemplo limitándolos al valor de los productos o a los servicios ofrecidos.

        Es además fundamental, que se conozca la legislación y la jurisprudencia de los mercados en los cuales se opera, incluso indirectamente (por ejemplo, con la distribución comercial de los productos) con el fin de escoger de modo consciente la ley aplicable al contrato y la modalidad de resolución de controversias (por ejemplo, con previsión de la exclusiva jurisdiccional del foro del país que no prevea daños punitivos).

        Finalmente, este tipo de responsabilidad y riesgo puede ser objeto de valoración con pólizas aseguradoras que ofrecen una cobertura específica respecto a eventuales condenas de indemnización de daños punitivos.

        [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

        It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

        In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

        This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

        Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

        Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

        Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

        The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of «sufficient justification» and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

        As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

        The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

        It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

        To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

        Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

        One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

        On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

        Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

        Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

        How much does it tell us?

        Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

        The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

        If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

        Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

        This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

        Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

        Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

        The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

        The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

        It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

        There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

        • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
        • a frustration or a force majeure.

        There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

        The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

        What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

        The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

        A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

        If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

        • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
        • the good faith of the parties;
        • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
        • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
        • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

        What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

        The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

        The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

        • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
        • sudden;
        • unpredictable.

        To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

        • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
        • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
        • a constant increase in turnover;
        • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
        • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
        • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
        • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
        • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

        The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

        • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
        • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
        • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

        Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

        Compensation for a damage

        The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

        The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

        The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

        International law

        The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

        However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

        The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

        The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

        In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

        • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
        • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

        In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

        In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

        The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

        Karin Graf

        Áreas de práctica

        • Arbitraje
        • Contratos
        • Reclamación de deudas
        • Derecho Concursal
        • Derecho Internacional Privado
        Contáctanos Karin

        Contacta con Karin





          Lea la política de privacidad de Legalmondo.
          Este sitio está protegido por reCAPTCHA y se aplican la Política de privacidad de Google y los Términos de servicio.

          China – Dispute Resolution Methods

          24 de mayo de 2017

          • China
          • Arbitraje
          • Litigios

          It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

          At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

          One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

          Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

          No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

          The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

          Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

          The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

          Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

          The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

          Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

          The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

          In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

          From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

          What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

          Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

          The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

          With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

          Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

          From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

          It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

          By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

          In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

          State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

          Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

          “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

          “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

          The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

          One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

          “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

          As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

          Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

          There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

          A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

          The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

          In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

          The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

          The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

          The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

          The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

          In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

          Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

          Conclusions

          If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

          If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

          And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

          La cuestión del litisconsorcio necesario respecto a los beneficiarios de un trust en la acción revocatoria es objeto de amplio debate desde hace tiempo lo que ha llevado a dos corrientes contrastantes entre ellas, superadas por la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Casación n. 19376 del 3 de agosto de 2017.

          Según una primera corriente, los beneficiarios del trust no deben considerarse partes necesarias del juicio de revocatoria porqué el objeto de la demanda no es el acto con el que se constituye el trust sino el sucesivo acto dispositivo, llevado a cabo por el “settlor” con el que el nuevo ente, en la persona del trustee, viene dotado de un patrimonio, sin que sea solicitada la participación de los beneficiarios.

          Los beneficiarios no podrían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios ya que no siendo directamente titulares de los bienes otorgados en el trust no sufririan en la hipótesis de revocación del acto dispositivo de un perjuicio sino que al máximo se lesionaría un mero interés a la integridad patrimonial del ente.

          No estando dotado el trust de personalidad jurídica sino siendo un conjunto de bienes y relaciones destinadas a un fin determinado, en interés de uno o mas beneficiarios y formalmente a nombre del  «trustee», este último resultaría ser el único sujeto que además de poder disponer en via exclusiva de los derechos otorgados en el patrimonio vinculado, estaría legitimado a oponerlos en las relaciones frente a terceros, incluso defendiéndose en juicio (Tribunal de Apelación de Milán, sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2016): de hecho solo frente a dicho “trustee”  el acreedor del “settlor” podría correctamente iniciar la ejecución forzosa, una vez reconocida la ineficacia relativa del acto dispositivo a consecuencia del juicio de revocatoria.

          Según otra orientación, en cambio, los beneficiarios del trust deben considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria ya que, aun no siendo titulares del patrimonio vinculado, estarían de todas formas interesados en los efectos de la sentencia que dispone la revocació del acto por el que se otorgan los bienes al trust, siendo su posición sea jurídica que de hecho perjudicada por los efectos de dicha resolución.

          A una conclusión análoga se podría llegar incluso a través de una interpretación en sentido contrario de la jurisprudencia en materia de fondo patrimonial.

          Con referencia a dicha figura, la Casación ha, de hecho excluido la legitimación pasiva de los hijos de los que lo constituyen, en juicios análogos, en cuanto los mismos no podrían tener pretensiones judiciales directamente frente a sus padres administradores del fondo patrimonial (Casación Civil, sentencia n. 10641 de 15 mayo de 2014, Casación Civil, sentencia n. 18065 de 8 septiembre de 2004; Casación Civil, sentencia n. 5402 del 17 de marzo de 2004) .

          Los beneficiarios del trust, en cambio, pudiendo tener pretensiones sea frente al trust que frente al trustee, deberían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en todos aquellos juicios que se refirieren a cualquier aspecto del acto dispositivo (S. Bartoli, Azione revocatoria di trust e litisconsorzio necessario rispetto ai beneficiari: la prima pronunzia della Cassazione, Il Caso, 22 de Noviembre de 2017).

          A aclarar la cuestión ha intervenido recentemente el Tribunal de Casación que, con la sentencia n. 19376 del 3 de agosto 2017, ha propuesto soluciones alternativas a aquellas apenas comentadas, capaz de terminar en parte con el contraste interpretativo descrito.

          El caso examinado por los magistrados y relativo al otorgamiento de determinados bienes, antes a un “fondo patrimonial” y sucesivamente a un trust, por parte de unos conyuge que, a través de dichos instrumentos, han destinado parte del proprio patrimonio a las necesidades de vida y de estudio de los hijos.

          Los actos dispositivos han sido pero considerados perjudiciales para los propios intereses por un banco, acreedor de uno de los cónyuges, que ha por lo tanto ejercitado la revocatoria, obteniendo sea en primer que en segundo grado, la declaratoria de ineficacia, en virtud del art. 2901 c.c, del “fondo patrimonial” y del trust.

          Contra la sentencia de apelación, los cónyuges han propuesto recurso de Casación, por falta de integración del contradictorio en el juicio de apelación, no habiendo el Tribunal de Apelación ordenado la intervención en el proceso de los hijos – benericiarios y solicitando, por tanto, la nulidad de todo el proceso.

          Los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación, examinado el caso, no han considerado válidos los motivos propuesto con el recurso.

          Según el Tribunal de Casación, de hecho, en la hipótesis de “fondo patrimonial”, no produciéndose ninguna mutación en la titularidad de los bienes, que siguen siendo de titularidad de padres – constituyentes del fondo y que no surgiendo ningún derecho subjetivo a favor de los hijos beneficiarios, estos no pueden ser en ningún modo considerados litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria del fondo, como es afrirmado por constante jurisprudencia sea de los Tribunales de Apelación que de Casación (véase la anteriormente citada).

          Según el Tribunal de Casación se llega a una conclusión análoga con referencia al trust.

          En relación a dicha cuestión los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación consideran no poder adherir a ninguna de las orientaciones que se han formado en jurisprudencia, y ofrecen, como anticipado, una tercera via interpretativa según la cual los beneficiarios del trust pueden ser considerados legitimarios pasivos en la revocatoria solo cuando el acto costitutivo del trust reconozca a los mismos la titularidad de derechos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al mismo.

          En ausencia de un expreso reconocimiento de dichas prerrogativas, el único legitimado pasivo en el juicio de revocatorio es el trustee.

          El trust, de hecho, se convierte en operativo, explica el Tribunal de Casación, mediante dos tipologías de actos, el primero de caracter unilateral, finalizado exclusivamente a la sua institución y el segundo (o los segundos, pudiendo el “settlor” proceder a una pluralidad de negocios distintos) de natura dispositiva, dirigido a transmitir los bienes al trustee.

          Si el acto costitutivo por si mismo no parece idóneo a determinar ningún  perjuicio a los acreedores del “settlor”, no afectando la consistencia de su patrimonio y, por tanto, su capacidad de cumplir con las propias obligaciones, no se puede decir lo mismo de los actos con los que lo bienes se transmiten al trustee, el cual convirtiéndose en el único sujeto legitimado a disponer de los mismos, se convierte en el único a poder oponerse en un juicio para tutelarse.

          Es claro dicho aspecto, los jueces del Tribunal de Casación han observado además como el eventual interés de los beneficiarios a la correcta administración del patrimonio otorgado en el trust no represente, desde un punto de vista teórico, una hipótesis de interés directo e inmediato a intervenir en el juicio de revocatoria, que justifique la participación de los beneficiarios como litisconsortes necesarios.

          El interés a la correcta administración del trust constituye una posición jurídica que se refiere exclusivamente a las relaciones entre los beneficiarios y el “trustee” y que, en ningún modo puede afectar a los acreedores del “settlor”.

          A una conclusión distinta se podría llegar cuando el regolamento del trust hubiese permitido de calificar los beneficiarios como actuales beneficiarios de la renta o como beneficiarios finales con derecho inmediato a recibir la titularidad de los bienes otorgados en trust, independientemente de cualquier valoración discrecional del “trustee “.

          Solo così, de hecho, los beneficiarios habrían podido hacer valer un interés directo e inmediato en la controversia que justificaría la necesidad de citarlos en juicio.

          Por lo tanto, en las hipótesis en que los beneficiarios no sean titulares de derechos subjetivos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al trust, además del deudor, legitimado pasivo en la acción revocatoria es solo el “trustee”, en cuanto único sujeto de referencia en las relaciones con terceros y por tanto también en las relaciones con los acreedores del “settlor”, único titular de los derechos sobre bienes sujetos a “segregación”.

          La solución ofrecida por el Tribunal de Casación es homogénea con cuanto previsto por el derecho inglés, en el que nuestro ordenamiento se ha inspirado para la figura del trust, según la cual en los juicios  iniciados por los acreedores del “settlor” frente al trust, la protección de este se encarga al trustee, en lugar o junto con los beneficiarios (Di Sapio, Muritano, “Solo il «trustee» partecipa al giudizio di revoca del trust”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 de noviembre de 2017).

          Por lo tanto, como en Italia, también en los sistemas anglosajones los beneficiarios no son parte necesaria del proceso pero pueden intervenir volontariamente en el mismo para evitar ser perjudicados por la sentencia de revocatoria.

          El autor de este artículo es Giovanni Izzo.

          ¿Cómo asegurase que a largo plazo pueda ejecutarse un crédito? En Suiza un acreedor podrá embargar los bienes de un deudor siempre que se cumplan ciertas condiciones. En la práctica, existen dos situaciones por las cuales se considera que se lleve a cabo un embargo de los activos: la primera de ellas es cuando el acreedor posee una acción contra un deudor sin residencia en Suiza, mientras que la segunda, es cuando el acreedor posee un título ejecutivo fundado en una sentencia favorable o en un laudo o resolución arbitral.

          Sin lugar a duda, el mercado financiero suizo continúa jugando un papel predominante en el mundo financiero actual, a pesar de la presión reguladora que afronta. La jurisdicción suiza, por tanto, es relevante para los acreedores que deseen obtener el embrago de bienes por parte de un deudor que posea cuentas bancarias u otros bienes en Suiza. Si bien en la práctica, el embargo de bienes se efectúa sobre cuentas bancarias, es posible utilizar la misma obligación para embargar otros bienes con el mismo efecto, por ejemplo, bienes inmuebles, obras de arte o bienes de terceros a su vez acreedores del deudor.

          A instancia de parte, el acreedor puede solicitar un embargo ex parte de bienes del deudor que se encuentren en Suiza ante el tribunal del lugar donde se encuentre la sede del banco o donde se sitúen los bienes, siempre y cuando se demuestre que existan prima facie los tres requisitos previstos por la Ley federal sobre la ejecución y sobre el concurso de acreedores (“DEBA”), es decir, que:

          • El acreedor que solicita el embargo posea un título fundado en un crédito exigible y ordinario.
          • Se den los presupuestos legales necesarios para obtener un embargo.
          • Los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza.

          Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, los presupuestos legales más relevantes para obtener el embargo de bienes son:

          • Que el deudor no sea residente en Suiza y que el crédito en sí esté lo suficientemente conectado con Suiza o que esté fundado en un reconocimiento de la deuda por parte del deudor (“embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza”).
          • Que el acreedor posea una sentencia ejecutiva favorable o un laudo arbitral contra el deudor (“Título ejecutivo”)

          Embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza: Según la DEBA, el mero hecho de que los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza no es suficiente como para establecer una “suficiente conexión con Suiza”. Dicho presupuesto depende en gran parte de los hechos específicos de la cuestión que se valorarán por parte del Juez caso por caso. La jurisprudencia suiza ha confirmado algunos criterios de conexión: que el contrato entre las partes se haya firmado o deba de ejecutarse en Suiza; que el contrato entre las partes esté regulado por la ley suiza, que el acreedor viva en Suiza o que el crédito del acreedor esté conectado a una actividad comercial desarrollada en Suiza.

          Título ejecutivo: Para poder solicitar el embargo de los bienes, el acreedor debe además, cumplir con el segundo presupuesto legal, esto es, poseer un título ejecutivo. La DEBA no realiza distinciones entre sentencias y laudos o arbitrales pronunciados tanto en una jurisdicción interna como en una jurisdicción extranjera. Simplemente deben ser ejecutivos (teniendo en consideración el Convenio de Lugano, la Ley federal sobre derecho internacional privado – en el caso de un laudo arbitral dictado por una corte arbitral no suiza – teniendo en consideración el Convención de Nueva York), todas las sentencias favorables o los laudos arbitrales podrán obtener el embargo de los bienes que se encuentren en Suiza.

          El tribunal suizo solicitará al acreedor que demuestre prime facie la existencia de los presupuestos legales para llevar a cabo el embargo, como anteriormente descrito. Debido a que el embargo se otorgará ex parte, en muchos casos, dicha acción tomará al deudor por sorpresa. Gracias a este efecto sorpresa y a la naturaleza del embargo, cuyo objetivo es que el deudor no pueda deshacerse de los activos, tal medio tiene un grande potencial para ayudar al acreedor a asegurarse y quedarse satisfecho de su crédito.

          Con la reciente sentencia 16601/2017, la Corte Suprema – después de diferentes pronunciamientos contrarios – ha abierto la posibilidad de reconocer en Italia las sentencias extranjeras que contengan daños punitivos.

          En este breve artículo veremos en qué consisten los daños punitivos, cuáles son las condiciones por las cuales podrían reconocerse y aplicarse en Italia y, sobretodo, qué medidas conviene tomar para afrontar este nuevo riesgo.

          Los daños punitivos, en inglés punitive damages, son un instituto jurídico originario de los ordenamientos anglosajones que prevén la posibilidad de reconocer a la parte perjudicada una indemnización adicional respecto a la compensación del daño sufrido, en los casos en los que el causante del daño haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave (“malice” y “gross negligence”, respectivamente).

          Con los daños punitivos, además de la función compensatoria, la indemnización del daño también asume una finalidad sancionadora, típica del derecho penal, actuando como elemento de disuasión ante otros potenciales infractores.

          En los ordenamientos en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, el reconocimiento y la cuantificación de la indemnización se someten a la discrecionalidad del juez.

          En los Estados Unidos de América los daños punitivos se prevén en los principios de common law, pero se disciplinan de modo diverso en cada uno de los Estados. Sin embargo, en general, se aplican siempre que la conducta del causante del daño haya sido dirigida a causar el daño intencionadamente o, se haya llevado a cabo sin tener en cuenta las normas de seguridad preestablecidas. Por lo general, no pueden reconocerse por el incumplimiento de un contrato, salvo que no se determine como un ilícito (tort) autónomo.

          En algunos Estados se prevén límites máximos a los daños punitivos, a veces incorporados en los daños compensatorios, otras veces como cuantía máxima. Además, la Corte Suprema de los EEUU ha intervenido en diferentes casos para limitar el importe de condena.

          En los ordenamientos de civil law, entre ellos Italia, el instituto de daños punitivos tradicionalmente no se reconoce, ya que la sanción al causante del daño se considera que queda al margen de los principios del derecho civil, basándose en la concepción de que la indemnización por daños tiene como objetivo restaurar la esfera patrimonial del perjudicado.

          En consecuencia, el reconocimiento de los daños punitivos en una sentencia, se obstaculizaban por el límite de orden público y tales sentencias no tenían acceso en el espacio jurídico italiano.

          La sentencia de las Secciones Unidas núm. 16601/2017, de 5 de julio de 2017 de la Corte Suprema de Casación ha girado las cartas sobre la mesa.

          En el presente caso se solicitó a la Corte de Apelación de Venecia el reconocimiento (ex. Art. 64 de la Ley 218/1995) de tres sentencias de la District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida que, admitió una denuncia de garantía interpuesta por un revendedor americano de cascos contra la sociedad productora italiana, por la cual se había condenado a ésta última al pago de 1.436.136,87 USD (además de gastos e intereses) en base al resarcimiento de los daños causas por un defecto del casco utilizado en un accidente de tráfico.

          La Corte de Apelación de Venecia reconoció la eficacia de la sentencia del juez extranjero, considerando que el importe era meramente indemnizatorio y no punitivo. La decisión fue recurrida en Casación por la parte condenada, que sostenía la contrariedad al orden publico de la sentencia estadunidense, en base a la orientación jurisprudencial hasta ese momento.

          La Casación ha confirmado la decisión de la Corte de Apelación, considerando que el importe no es punitivo y ha declarado el reconocimiento de la sentencia estadunidense en Italia.

          Las Secciones Unidas, por su parte, han aprovechado la ocasión para afrontar la cuestión inherente a la admisibilidad de los daños punitivos en Italia, cambiando la orientación histórica de la Corte Suprema (véase Cass. 1781/2012).

          Según la Corte, la noción de responsabilidad civil entendida como mera reparación de los daños sufridos, se debe considerar como obsoleta dada la evolución del instituto a través de intervenciones legislativas y jurisprudenciales nacionales y europeas, que han introducido medidas indemnizatorias con finalidad sancionadora y disuasiva. De hecho, en el ordenamiento italiano es posible encontrar diversos casos de indemnización por daños con finalidad sancionadora: en materia de difamación en medios de comunicación (art. 12 L. 47/48), derechos de autor (art. 158 L 633/41), propiedad industrial (art. 125 D. Lgs 30/2005), abuso del proceso (art. 96.3 c.p.c. y art. 26.2 c.p.a.), derecho laboral (art. 18.14 c.p.c.), derecho de familia (art. 709-ter c.p.c.), etc.

          De este modo, la Corte de Casación ha introducido el siguiente principio de derecho: “En el vigente ordenamiento italiano, a la responsabilidad civil no solo se le asigna el deber de restaurar la esfera patrimonial del sujeto que ha sufrido la lesión, porque se consideran incluidas en el sistema la función de disuasión y la función sancionadora de la responsabilidad civil. Por tanto, no es ontológicamente incompatible con el ordenamiento italiano el instituto de origen estadunidense de la indemnización punitiva”.

          La consecuencia, a tener en muy cuenta, es que el pronunciamiento abre la puerta a posibles deliberaciones de sentencias extranjeras, que condenen a una de las partes al pago de un importe superior respecto al importe calculado para compensar el prejuicio creado a causa de un daño.

          Sin embargo, a tal fin, la Corte Suprema ha dispuesto algunas condiciones para que la sentencia extranjera pueda reconocerse. La decisión ha debido ser tomada en el ordenamiento extranjero en base a:

          1. Garantizar la tipicidad de la condena.
          2. La previsibilidad de la misma.
          3. Los límites cuantificativos.

          Los posibles efectos de la Sentencia en el ordenamiento italiano

          En primer lugar, hay que tener claro que la Sentencia no ha modificado el sistema indemnizatorio interno del ordenamiento italiano. En otras palabras, la Sentencia no permitirá a los jueces italianos condenar por daños punitivos al interno de los procedimientos italianos.

          En cambio, por lo que respecta a las sentencias extranjeras, ahora será posible obtener la indemnización por daños punitivos a través del reconocimiento y la ejecución en el sistema italiano de una decisión extranjera que prevea la condena de dicha tipología de daño, con la condición de que se respeten los mencionados presupuestos.

          Por todo lo expuesto, las empresas que hayan invertido o que realicen negocios en países en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, tendrán que tener en consideración dicho riesgo.

          Los instrumentos para tutelarse

          El empresario quien opere en mercados extranjeros en los que se prevén los daños punitivos debe considerar con atención este riesgo.

          La óptica debe ser necesariamente de prevención y los instrumentos a disposición son diversos: en primer lugar, la adopción de cláusulas contractuales que prevean la renuncia del perjudicado a este tipo de daño o, que acuerden un límite a la indemnización de los daños contractuales, por ejemplo limitándolos al valor de los productos o a los servicios ofrecidos.

          Es además fundamental, que se conozca la legislación y la jurisprudencia de los mercados en los cuales se opera, incluso indirectamente (por ejemplo, con la distribución comercial de los productos) con el fin de escoger de modo consciente la ley aplicable al contrato y la modalidad de resolución de controversias (por ejemplo, con previsión de la exclusiva jurisdiccional del foro del país que no prevea daños punitivos).

          Finalmente, este tipo de responsabilidad y riesgo puede ser objeto de valoración con pólizas aseguradoras que ofrecen una cobertura específica respecto a eventuales condenas de indemnización de daños punitivos.

          [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

          It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

          In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

          This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

          Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

          Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

          Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

          The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of «sufficient justification» and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

          As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

          The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

          It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

          To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

          Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

          One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

          On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

          Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

          Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

          How much does it tell us?

          Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

          The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

          If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

          Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

          This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

          Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

          Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

          The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

          The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

          It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

          There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

          • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
          • a frustration or a force majeure.

          There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

          The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

          What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

          The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

          A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

          If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

          • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
          • the good faith of the parties;
          • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
          • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
          • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

          What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

          The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

          The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

          • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
          • sudden;
          • unpredictable.

          To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

          • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
          • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
          • a constant increase in turnover;
          • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
          • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
          • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
          • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
          • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

          The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

          • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
          • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
          • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

          Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

          Compensation for a damage

          The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

          The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

          The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

          International law

          The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

          However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

          The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

          The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

          In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

          • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
          • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

          In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

          In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

          The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

          Inversiones extranjeras en Italia: Resolución de controversias

          13 de abril de 2017

          • Italia
          • Arbitraje
          • Litigios

          It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

          At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

          One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

          Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

          No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

          The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

          Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

          The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

          Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

          The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

          Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

          The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

          In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

          From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

          What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

          Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

          The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

          With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

          Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

          From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

          It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

          By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

          In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

          State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

          Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

          “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

          “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

          The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

          One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

          “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

          As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

          Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

          There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

          A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

          The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

          In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

          The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

          The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

          The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

          The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

          In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

          Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

          Conclusions

          If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

          If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

          And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

          La cuestión del litisconsorcio necesario respecto a los beneficiarios de un trust en la acción revocatoria es objeto de amplio debate desde hace tiempo lo que ha llevado a dos corrientes contrastantes entre ellas, superadas por la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Casación n. 19376 del 3 de agosto de 2017.

          Según una primera corriente, los beneficiarios del trust no deben considerarse partes necesarias del juicio de revocatoria porqué el objeto de la demanda no es el acto con el que se constituye el trust sino el sucesivo acto dispositivo, llevado a cabo por el “settlor” con el que el nuevo ente, en la persona del trustee, viene dotado de un patrimonio, sin que sea solicitada la participación de los beneficiarios.

          Los beneficiarios no podrían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios ya que no siendo directamente titulares de los bienes otorgados en el trust no sufririan en la hipótesis de revocación del acto dispositivo de un perjuicio sino que al máximo se lesionaría un mero interés a la integridad patrimonial del ente.

          No estando dotado el trust de personalidad jurídica sino siendo un conjunto de bienes y relaciones destinadas a un fin determinado, en interés de uno o mas beneficiarios y formalmente a nombre del  «trustee», este último resultaría ser el único sujeto que además de poder disponer en via exclusiva de los derechos otorgados en el patrimonio vinculado, estaría legitimado a oponerlos en las relaciones frente a terceros, incluso defendiéndose en juicio (Tribunal de Apelación de Milán, sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2016): de hecho solo frente a dicho “trustee”  el acreedor del “settlor” podría correctamente iniciar la ejecución forzosa, una vez reconocida la ineficacia relativa del acto dispositivo a consecuencia del juicio de revocatoria.

          Según otra orientación, en cambio, los beneficiarios del trust deben considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria ya que, aun no siendo titulares del patrimonio vinculado, estarían de todas formas interesados en los efectos de la sentencia que dispone la revocació del acto por el que se otorgan los bienes al trust, siendo su posición sea jurídica que de hecho perjudicada por los efectos de dicha resolución.

          A una conclusión análoga se podría llegar incluso a través de una interpretación en sentido contrario de la jurisprudencia en materia de fondo patrimonial.

          Con referencia a dicha figura, la Casación ha, de hecho excluido la legitimación pasiva de los hijos de los que lo constituyen, en juicios análogos, en cuanto los mismos no podrían tener pretensiones judiciales directamente frente a sus padres administradores del fondo patrimonial (Casación Civil, sentencia n. 10641 de 15 mayo de 2014, Casación Civil, sentencia n. 18065 de 8 septiembre de 2004; Casación Civil, sentencia n. 5402 del 17 de marzo de 2004) .

          Los beneficiarios del trust, en cambio, pudiendo tener pretensiones sea frente al trust que frente al trustee, deberían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en todos aquellos juicios que se refirieren a cualquier aspecto del acto dispositivo (S. Bartoli, Azione revocatoria di trust e litisconsorzio necessario rispetto ai beneficiari: la prima pronunzia della Cassazione, Il Caso, 22 de Noviembre de 2017).

          A aclarar la cuestión ha intervenido recentemente el Tribunal de Casación que, con la sentencia n. 19376 del 3 de agosto 2017, ha propuesto soluciones alternativas a aquellas apenas comentadas, capaz de terminar en parte con el contraste interpretativo descrito.

          El caso examinado por los magistrados y relativo al otorgamiento de determinados bienes, antes a un “fondo patrimonial” y sucesivamente a un trust, por parte de unos conyuge que, a través de dichos instrumentos, han destinado parte del proprio patrimonio a las necesidades de vida y de estudio de los hijos.

          Los actos dispositivos han sido pero considerados perjudiciales para los propios intereses por un banco, acreedor de uno de los cónyuges, que ha por lo tanto ejercitado la revocatoria, obteniendo sea en primer que en segundo grado, la declaratoria de ineficacia, en virtud del art. 2901 c.c, del “fondo patrimonial” y del trust.

          Contra la sentencia de apelación, los cónyuges han propuesto recurso de Casación, por falta de integración del contradictorio en el juicio de apelación, no habiendo el Tribunal de Apelación ordenado la intervención en el proceso de los hijos – benericiarios y solicitando, por tanto, la nulidad de todo el proceso.

          Los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación, examinado el caso, no han considerado válidos los motivos propuesto con el recurso.

          Según el Tribunal de Casación, de hecho, en la hipótesis de “fondo patrimonial”, no produciéndose ninguna mutación en la titularidad de los bienes, que siguen siendo de titularidad de padres – constituyentes del fondo y que no surgiendo ningún derecho subjetivo a favor de los hijos beneficiarios, estos no pueden ser en ningún modo considerados litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria del fondo, como es afrirmado por constante jurisprudencia sea de los Tribunales de Apelación que de Casación (véase la anteriormente citada).

          Según el Tribunal de Casación se llega a una conclusión análoga con referencia al trust.

          En relación a dicha cuestión los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación consideran no poder adherir a ninguna de las orientaciones que se han formado en jurisprudencia, y ofrecen, como anticipado, una tercera via interpretativa según la cual los beneficiarios del trust pueden ser considerados legitimarios pasivos en la revocatoria solo cuando el acto costitutivo del trust reconozca a los mismos la titularidad de derechos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al mismo.

          En ausencia de un expreso reconocimiento de dichas prerrogativas, el único legitimado pasivo en el juicio de revocatorio es el trustee.

          El trust, de hecho, se convierte en operativo, explica el Tribunal de Casación, mediante dos tipologías de actos, el primero de caracter unilateral, finalizado exclusivamente a la sua institución y el segundo (o los segundos, pudiendo el “settlor” proceder a una pluralidad de negocios distintos) de natura dispositiva, dirigido a transmitir los bienes al trustee.

          Si el acto costitutivo por si mismo no parece idóneo a determinar ningún  perjuicio a los acreedores del “settlor”, no afectando la consistencia de su patrimonio y, por tanto, su capacidad de cumplir con las propias obligaciones, no se puede decir lo mismo de los actos con los que lo bienes se transmiten al trustee, el cual convirtiéndose en el único sujeto legitimado a disponer de los mismos, se convierte en el único a poder oponerse en un juicio para tutelarse.

          Es claro dicho aspecto, los jueces del Tribunal de Casación han observado además como el eventual interés de los beneficiarios a la correcta administración del patrimonio otorgado en el trust no represente, desde un punto de vista teórico, una hipótesis de interés directo e inmediato a intervenir en el juicio de revocatoria, que justifique la participación de los beneficiarios como litisconsortes necesarios.

          El interés a la correcta administración del trust constituye una posición jurídica que se refiere exclusivamente a las relaciones entre los beneficiarios y el “trustee” y que, en ningún modo puede afectar a los acreedores del “settlor”.

          A una conclusión distinta se podría llegar cuando el regolamento del trust hubiese permitido de calificar los beneficiarios como actuales beneficiarios de la renta o como beneficiarios finales con derecho inmediato a recibir la titularidad de los bienes otorgados en trust, independientemente de cualquier valoración discrecional del “trustee “.

          Solo così, de hecho, los beneficiarios habrían podido hacer valer un interés directo e inmediato en la controversia que justificaría la necesidad de citarlos en juicio.

          Por lo tanto, en las hipótesis en que los beneficiarios no sean titulares de derechos subjetivos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al trust, además del deudor, legitimado pasivo en la acción revocatoria es solo el “trustee”, en cuanto único sujeto de referencia en las relaciones con terceros y por tanto también en las relaciones con los acreedores del “settlor”, único titular de los derechos sobre bienes sujetos a “segregación”.

          La solución ofrecida por el Tribunal de Casación es homogénea con cuanto previsto por el derecho inglés, en el que nuestro ordenamiento se ha inspirado para la figura del trust, según la cual en los juicios  iniciados por los acreedores del “settlor” frente al trust, la protección de este se encarga al trustee, en lugar o junto con los beneficiarios (Di Sapio, Muritano, “Solo il «trustee» partecipa al giudizio di revoca del trust”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 de noviembre de 2017).

          Por lo tanto, como en Italia, también en los sistemas anglosajones los beneficiarios no son parte necesaria del proceso pero pueden intervenir volontariamente en el mismo para evitar ser perjudicados por la sentencia de revocatoria.

          El autor de este artículo es Giovanni Izzo.

          ¿Cómo asegurase que a largo plazo pueda ejecutarse un crédito? En Suiza un acreedor podrá embargar los bienes de un deudor siempre que se cumplan ciertas condiciones. En la práctica, existen dos situaciones por las cuales se considera que se lleve a cabo un embargo de los activos: la primera de ellas es cuando el acreedor posee una acción contra un deudor sin residencia en Suiza, mientras que la segunda, es cuando el acreedor posee un título ejecutivo fundado en una sentencia favorable o en un laudo o resolución arbitral.

          Sin lugar a duda, el mercado financiero suizo continúa jugando un papel predominante en el mundo financiero actual, a pesar de la presión reguladora que afronta. La jurisdicción suiza, por tanto, es relevante para los acreedores que deseen obtener el embrago de bienes por parte de un deudor que posea cuentas bancarias u otros bienes en Suiza. Si bien en la práctica, el embargo de bienes se efectúa sobre cuentas bancarias, es posible utilizar la misma obligación para embargar otros bienes con el mismo efecto, por ejemplo, bienes inmuebles, obras de arte o bienes de terceros a su vez acreedores del deudor.

          A instancia de parte, el acreedor puede solicitar un embargo ex parte de bienes del deudor que se encuentren en Suiza ante el tribunal del lugar donde se encuentre la sede del banco o donde se sitúen los bienes, siempre y cuando se demuestre que existan prima facie los tres requisitos previstos por la Ley federal sobre la ejecución y sobre el concurso de acreedores (“DEBA”), es decir, que:

          • El acreedor que solicita el embargo posea un título fundado en un crédito exigible y ordinario.
          • Se den los presupuestos legales necesarios para obtener un embargo.
          • Los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza.

          Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, los presupuestos legales más relevantes para obtener el embargo de bienes son:

          • Que el deudor no sea residente en Suiza y que el crédito en sí esté lo suficientemente conectado con Suiza o que esté fundado en un reconocimiento de la deuda por parte del deudor (“embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza”).
          • Que el acreedor posea una sentencia ejecutiva favorable o un laudo arbitral contra el deudor (“Título ejecutivo”)

          Embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza: Según la DEBA, el mero hecho de que los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza no es suficiente como para establecer una “suficiente conexión con Suiza”. Dicho presupuesto depende en gran parte de los hechos específicos de la cuestión que se valorarán por parte del Juez caso por caso. La jurisprudencia suiza ha confirmado algunos criterios de conexión: que el contrato entre las partes se haya firmado o deba de ejecutarse en Suiza; que el contrato entre las partes esté regulado por la ley suiza, que el acreedor viva en Suiza o que el crédito del acreedor esté conectado a una actividad comercial desarrollada en Suiza.

          Título ejecutivo: Para poder solicitar el embargo de los bienes, el acreedor debe además, cumplir con el segundo presupuesto legal, esto es, poseer un título ejecutivo. La DEBA no realiza distinciones entre sentencias y laudos o arbitrales pronunciados tanto en una jurisdicción interna como en una jurisdicción extranjera. Simplemente deben ser ejecutivos (teniendo en consideración el Convenio de Lugano, la Ley federal sobre derecho internacional privado – en el caso de un laudo arbitral dictado por una corte arbitral no suiza – teniendo en consideración el Convención de Nueva York), todas las sentencias favorables o los laudos arbitrales podrán obtener el embargo de los bienes que se encuentren en Suiza.

          El tribunal suizo solicitará al acreedor que demuestre prime facie la existencia de los presupuestos legales para llevar a cabo el embargo, como anteriormente descrito. Debido a que el embargo se otorgará ex parte, en muchos casos, dicha acción tomará al deudor por sorpresa. Gracias a este efecto sorpresa y a la naturaleza del embargo, cuyo objetivo es que el deudor no pueda deshacerse de los activos, tal medio tiene un grande potencial para ayudar al acreedor a asegurarse y quedarse satisfecho de su crédito.

          Con la reciente sentencia 16601/2017, la Corte Suprema – después de diferentes pronunciamientos contrarios – ha abierto la posibilidad de reconocer en Italia las sentencias extranjeras que contengan daños punitivos.

          En este breve artículo veremos en qué consisten los daños punitivos, cuáles son las condiciones por las cuales podrían reconocerse y aplicarse en Italia y, sobretodo, qué medidas conviene tomar para afrontar este nuevo riesgo.

          Los daños punitivos, en inglés punitive damages, son un instituto jurídico originario de los ordenamientos anglosajones que prevén la posibilidad de reconocer a la parte perjudicada una indemnización adicional respecto a la compensación del daño sufrido, en los casos en los que el causante del daño haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave (“malice” y “gross negligence”, respectivamente).

          Con los daños punitivos, además de la función compensatoria, la indemnización del daño también asume una finalidad sancionadora, típica del derecho penal, actuando como elemento de disuasión ante otros potenciales infractores.

          En los ordenamientos en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, el reconocimiento y la cuantificación de la indemnización se someten a la discrecionalidad del juez.

          En los Estados Unidos de América los daños punitivos se prevén en los principios de common law, pero se disciplinan de modo diverso en cada uno de los Estados. Sin embargo, en general, se aplican siempre que la conducta del causante del daño haya sido dirigida a causar el daño intencionadamente o, se haya llevado a cabo sin tener en cuenta las normas de seguridad preestablecidas. Por lo general, no pueden reconocerse por el incumplimiento de un contrato, salvo que no se determine como un ilícito (tort) autónomo.

          En algunos Estados se prevén límites máximos a los daños punitivos, a veces incorporados en los daños compensatorios, otras veces como cuantía máxima. Además, la Corte Suprema de los EEUU ha intervenido en diferentes casos para limitar el importe de condena.

          En los ordenamientos de civil law, entre ellos Italia, el instituto de daños punitivos tradicionalmente no se reconoce, ya que la sanción al causante del daño se considera que queda al margen de los principios del derecho civil, basándose en la concepción de que la indemnización por daños tiene como objetivo restaurar la esfera patrimonial del perjudicado.

          En consecuencia, el reconocimiento de los daños punitivos en una sentencia, se obstaculizaban por el límite de orden público y tales sentencias no tenían acceso en el espacio jurídico italiano.

          La sentencia de las Secciones Unidas núm. 16601/2017, de 5 de julio de 2017 de la Corte Suprema de Casación ha girado las cartas sobre la mesa.

          En el presente caso se solicitó a la Corte de Apelación de Venecia el reconocimiento (ex. Art. 64 de la Ley 218/1995) de tres sentencias de la District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida que, admitió una denuncia de garantía interpuesta por un revendedor americano de cascos contra la sociedad productora italiana, por la cual se había condenado a ésta última al pago de 1.436.136,87 USD (además de gastos e intereses) en base al resarcimiento de los daños causas por un defecto del casco utilizado en un accidente de tráfico.

          La Corte de Apelación de Venecia reconoció la eficacia de la sentencia del juez extranjero, considerando que el importe era meramente indemnizatorio y no punitivo. La decisión fue recurrida en Casación por la parte condenada, que sostenía la contrariedad al orden publico de la sentencia estadunidense, en base a la orientación jurisprudencial hasta ese momento.

          La Casación ha confirmado la decisión de la Corte de Apelación, considerando que el importe no es punitivo y ha declarado el reconocimiento de la sentencia estadunidense en Italia.

          Las Secciones Unidas, por su parte, han aprovechado la ocasión para afrontar la cuestión inherente a la admisibilidad de los daños punitivos en Italia, cambiando la orientación histórica de la Corte Suprema (véase Cass. 1781/2012).

          Según la Corte, la noción de responsabilidad civil entendida como mera reparación de los daños sufridos, se debe considerar como obsoleta dada la evolución del instituto a través de intervenciones legislativas y jurisprudenciales nacionales y europeas, que han introducido medidas indemnizatorias con finalidad sancionadora y disuasiva. De hecho, en el ordenamiento italiano es posible encontrar diversos casos de indemnización por daños con finalidad sancionadora: en materia de difamación en medios de comunicación (art. 12 L. 47/48), derechos de autor (art. 158 L 633/41), propiedad industrial (art. 125 D. Lgs 30/2005), abuso del proceso (art. 96.3 c.p.c. y art. 26.2 c.p.a.), derecho laboral (art. 18.14 c.p.c.), derecho de familia (art. 709-ter c.p.c.), etc.

          De este modo, la Corte de Casación ha introducido el siguiente principio de derecho: “En el vigente ordenamiento italiano, a la responsabilidad civil no solo se le asigna el deber de restaurar la esfera patrimonial del sujeto que ha sufrido la lesión, porque se consideran incluidas en el sistema la función de disuasión y la función sancionadora de la responsabilidad civil. Por tanto, no es ontológicamente incompatible con el ordenamiento italiano el instituto de origen estadunidense de la indemnización punitiva”.

          La consecuencia, a tener en muy cuenta, es que el pronunciamiento abre la puerta a posibles deliberaciones de sentencias extranjeras, que condenen a una de las partes al pago de un importe superior respecto al importe calculado para compensar el prejuicio creado a causa de un daño.

          Sin embargo, a tal fin, la Corte Suprema ha dispuesto algunas condiciones para que la sentencia extranjera pueda reconocerse. La decisión ha debido ser tomada en el ordenamiento extranjero en base a:

          1. Garantizar la tipicidad de la condena.
          2. La previsibilidad de la misma.
          3. Los límites cuantificativos.

          Los posibles efectos de la Sentencia en el ordenamiento italiano

          En primer lugar, hay que tener claro que la Sentencia no ha modificado el sistema indemnizatorio interno del ordenamiento italiano. En otras palabras, la Sentencia no permitirá a los jueces italianos condenar por daños punitivos al interno de los procedimientos italianos.

          En cambio, por lo que respecta a las sentencias extranjeras, ahora será posible obtener la indemnización por daños punitivos a través del reconocimiento y la ejecución en el sistema italiano de una decisión extranjera que prevea la condena de dicha tipología de daño, con la condición de que se respeten los mencionados presupuestos.

          Por todo lo expuesto, las empresas que hayan invertido o que realicen negocios en países en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, tendrán que tener en consideración dicho riesgo.

          Los instrumentos para tutelarse

          El empresario quien opere en mercados extranjeros en los que se prevén los daños punitivos debe considerar con atención este riesgo.

          La óptica debe ser necesariamente de prevención y los instrumentos a disposición son diversos: en primer lugar, la adopción de cláusulas contractuales que prevean la renuncia del perjudicado a este tipo de daño o, que acuerden un límite a la indemnización de los daños contractuales, por ejemplo limitándolos al valor de los productos o a los servicios ofrecidos.

          Es además fundamental, que se conozca la legislación y la jurisprudencia de los mercados en los cuales se opera, incluso indirectamente (por ejemplo, con la distribución comercial de los productos) con el fin de escoger de modo consciente la ley aplicable al contrato y la modalidad de resolución de controversias (por ejemplo, con previsión de la exclusiva jurisdiccional del foro del país que no prevea daños punitivos).

          Finalmente, este tipo de responsabilidad y riesgo puede ser objeto de valoración con pólizas aseguradoras que ofrecen una cobertura específica respecto a eventuales condenas de indemnización de daños punitivos.

          [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

          It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

          In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

          This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

          Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

          Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

          Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

          The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of «sufficient justification» and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

          As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

          The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

          It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

          To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

          Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

          One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

          On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

          Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

          Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

          How much does it tell us?

          Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

          The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

          If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

          Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

          This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

          Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

          Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

          The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

          The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

          It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

          There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

          • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
          • a frustration or a force majeure.

          There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

          The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

          What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

          The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

          A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

          If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

          • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
          • the good faith of the parties;
          • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
          • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
          • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

          What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

          The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

          The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

          • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
          • sudden;
          • unpredictable.

          To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

          • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
          • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
          • a constant increase in turnover;
          • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
          • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
          • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
          • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
          • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

          The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

          • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
          • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
          • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

          Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

          Compensation for a damage

          The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

          The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

          The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

          International law

          The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

          However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

          The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

          The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

          In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

          • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
          • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

          In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

          In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

          The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

          Roberto Luzi Crivellini

          Áreas de práctica

          • Arbitraje
          • Contratos de distribución
          • Comercio internacional
          • Derecho Internacional Privado
          • Derecho Inmobiliario
          Contáctanos Roberto

          Contacta con Roberto





            Lea la política de privacidad de Legalmondo.
            Este sitio está protegido por reCAPTCHA y se aplican la Política de privacidad de Google y los Términos de servicio.

            Enforcement of foreign decisions and arbitral awards in Venezuela

            21 de marzo de 2017

            • Venezuela
            • Arbitraje
            • Contratos
            • Litigios

            It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

            At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

            One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

            Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

            No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

            The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

            Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

            The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

            Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

            The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

            Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

            The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

            In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

            From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

            What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

            Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

            The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

            With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

            Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

            From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

            It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

            By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

            In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

            State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

            Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

            “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

            “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

            The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

            One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

            “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

            As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

            Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

            There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

            A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

            The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

            In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

            The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

            The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

            The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

            The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

            In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

            Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

            Conclusions

            If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

            If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

            And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

            La cuestión del litisconsorcio necesario respecto a los beneficiarios de un trust en la acción revocatoria es objeto de amplio debate desde hace tiempo lo que ha llevado a dos corrientes contrastantes entre ellas, superadas por la reciente sentencia del Tribunal de Casación n. 19376 del 3 de agosto de 2017.

            Según una primera corriente, los beneficiarios del trust no deben considerarse partes necesarias del juicio de revocatoria porqué el objeto de la demanda no es el acto con el que se constituye el trust sino el sucesivo acto dispositivo, llevado a cabo por el “settlor” con el que el nuevo ente, en la persona del trustee, viene dotado de un patrimonio, sin que sea solicitada la participación de los beneficiarios.

            Los beneficiarios no podrían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios ya que no siendo directamente titulares de los bienes otorgados en el trust no sufririan en la hipótesis de revocación del acto dispositivo de un perjuicio sino que al máximo se lesionaría un mero interés a la integridad patrimonial del ente.

            No estando dotado el trust de personalidad jurídica sino siendo un conjunto de bienes y relaciones destinadas a un fin determinado, en interés de uno o mas beneficiarios y formalmente a nombre del  «trustee», este último resultaría ser el único sujeto que además de poder disponer en via exclusiva de los derechos otorgados en el patrimonio vinculado, estaría legitimado a oponerlos en las relaciones frente a terceros, incluso defendiéndose en juicio (Tribunal de Apelación de Milán, sentencia de 25 de noviembre de 2016): de hecho solo frente a dicho “trustee”  el acreedor del “settlor” podría correctamente iniciar la ejecución forzosa, una vez reconocida la ineficacia relativa del acto dispositivo a consecuencia del juicio de revocatoria.

            Según otra orientación, en cambio, los beneficiarios del trust deben considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria ya que, aun no siendo titulares del patrimonio vinculado, estarían de todas formas interesados en los efectos de la sentencia que dispone la revocació del acto por el que se otorgan los bienes al trust, siendo su posición sea jurídica que de hecho perjudicada por los efectos de dicha resolución.

            A una conclusión análoga se podría llegar incluso a través de una interpretación en sentido contrario de la jurisprudencia en materia de fondo patrimonial.

            Con referencia a dicha figura, la Casación ha, de hecho excluido la legitimación pasiva de los hijos de los que lo constituyen, en juicios análogos, en cuanto los mismos no podrían tener pretensiones judiciales directamente frente a sus padres administradores del fondo patrimonial (Casación Civil, sentencia n. 10641 de 15 mayo de 2014, Casación Civil, sentencia n. 18065 de 8 septiembre de 2004; Casación Civil, sentencia n. 5402 del 17 de marzo de 2004) .

            Los beneficiarios del trust, en cambio, pudiendo tener pretensiones sea frente al trust que frente al trustee, deberían considerarse litisconsortes necesarios en todos aquellos juicios que se refirieren a cualquier aspecto del acto dispositivo (S. Bartoli, Azione revocatoria di trust e litisconsorzio necessario rispetto ai beneficiari: la prima pronunzia della Cassazione, Il Caso, 22 de Noviembre de 2017).

            A aclarar la cuestión ha intervenido recentemente el Tribunal de Casación que, con la sentencia n. 19376 del 3 de agosto 2017, ha propuesto soluciones alternativas a aquellas apenas comentadas, capaz de terminar en parte con el contraste interpretativo descrito.

            El caso examinado por los magistrados y relativo al otorgamiento de determinados bienes, antes a un “fondo patrimonial” y sucesivamente a un trust, por parte de unos conyuge que, a través de dichos instrumentos, han destinado parte del proprio patrimonio a las necesidades de vida y de estudio de los hijos.

            Los actos dispositivos han sido pero considerados perjudiciales para los propios intereses por un banco, acreedor de uno de los cónyuges, que ha por lo tanto ejercitado la revocatoria, obteniendo sea en primer que en segundo grado, la declaratoria de ineficacia, en virtud del art. 2901 c.c, del “fondo patrimonial” y del trust.

            Contra la sentencia de apelación, los cónyuges han propuesto recurso de Casación, por falta de integración del contradictorio en el juicio de apelación, no habiendo el Tribunal de Apelación ordenado la intervención en el proceso de los hijos – benericiarios y solicitando, por tanto, la nulidad de todo el proceso.

            Los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación, examinado el caso, no han considerado válidos los motivos propuesto con el recurso.

            Según el Tribunal de Casación, de hecho, en la hipótesis de “fondo patrimonial”, no produciéndose ninguna mutación en la titularidad de los bienes, que siguen siendo de titularidad de padres – constituyentes del fondo y que no surgiendo ningún derecho subjetivo a favor de los hijos beneficiarios, estos no pueden ser en ningún modo considerados litisconsortes necesarios en el juicio de revocatoria del fondo, como es afrirmado por constante jurisprudencia sea de los Tribunales de Apelación que de Casación (véase la anteriormente citada).

            Según el Tribunal de Casación se llega a una conclusión análoga con referencia al trust.

            En relación a dicha cuestión los magistrados del Tribunal de Casación consideran no poder adherir a ninguna de las orientaciones que se han formado en jurisprudencia, y ofrecen, como anticipado, una tercera via interpretativa según la cual los beneficiarios del trust pueden ser considerados legitimarios pasivos en la revocatoria solo cuando el acto costitutivo del trust reconozca a los mismos la titularidad de derechos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al mismo.

            En ausencia de un expreso reconocimiento de dichas prerrogativas, el único legitimado pasivo en el juicio de revocatorio es el trustee.

            El trust, de hecho, se convierte en operativo, explica el Tribunal de Casación, mediante dos tipologías de actos, el primero de caracter unilateral, finalizado exclusivamente a la sua institución y el segundo (o los segundos, pudiendo el “settlor” proceder a una pluralidad de negocios distintos) de natura dispositiva, dirigido a transmitir los bienes al trustee.

            Si el acto costitutivo por si mismo no parece idóneo a determinar ningún  perjuicio a los acreedores del “settlor”, no afectando la consistencia de su patrimonio y, por tanto, su capacidad de cumplir con las propias obligaciones, no se puede decir lo mismo de los actos con los que lo bienes se transmiten al trustee, el cual convirtiéndose en el único sujeto legitimado a disponer de los mismos, se convierte en el único a poder oponerse en un juicio para tutelarse.

            Es claro dicho aspecto, los jueces del Tribunal de Casación han observado además como el eventual interés de los beneficiarios a la correcta administración del patrimonio otorgado en el trust no represente, desde un punto de vista teórico, una hipótesis de interés directo e inmediato a intervenir en el juicio de revocatoria, que justifique la participación de los beneficiarios como litisconsortes necesarios.

            El interés a la correcta administración del trust constituye una posición jurídica que se refiere exclusivamente a las relaciones entre los beneficiarios y el “trustee” y que, en ningún modo puede afectar a los acreedores del “settlor”.

            A una conclusión distinta se podría llegar cuando el regolamento del trust hubiese permitido de calificar los beneficiarios como actuales beneficiarios de la renta o como beneficiarios finales con derecho inmediato a recibir la titularidad de los bienes otorgados en trust, independientemente de cualquier valoración discrecional del “trustee “.

            Solo così, de hecho, los beneficiarios habrían podido hacer valer un interés directo e inmediato en la controversia que justificaría la necesidad de citarlos en juicio.

            Por lo tanto, en las hipótesis en que los beneficiarios no sean titulares de derechos subjetivos actuales sobre bienes otorgados al trust, además del deudor, legitimado pasivo en la acción revocatoria es solo el “trustee”, en cuanto único sujeto de referencia en las relaciones con terceros y por tanto también en las relaciones con los acreedores del “settlor”, único titular de los derechos sobre bienes sujetos a “segregación”.

            La solución ofrecida por el Tribunal de Casación es homogénea con cuanto previsto por el derecho inglés, en el que nuestro ordenamiento se ha inspirado para la figura del trust, según la cual en los juicios  iniciados por los acreedores del “settlor” frente al trust, la protección de este se encarga al trustee, en lugar o junto con los beneficiarios (Di Sapio, Muritano, “Solo il «trustee» partecipa al giudizio di revoca del trust”, Il Sole 24 Ore, 9 de noviembre de 2017).

            Por lo tanto, como en Italia, también en los sistemas anglosajones los beneficiarios no son parte necesaria del proceso pero pueden intervenir volontariamente en el mismo para evitar ser perjudicados por la sentencia de revocatoria.

            El autor de este artículo es Giovanni Izzo.

            ¿Cómo asegurase que a largo plazo pueda ejecutarse un crédito? En Suiza un acreedor podrá embargar los bienes de un deudor siempre que se cumplan ciertas condiciones. En la práctica, existen dos situaciones por las cuales se considera que se lleve a cabo un embargo de los activos: la primera de ellas es cuando el acreedor posee una acción contra un deudor sin residencia en Suiza, mientras que la segunda, es cuando el acreedor posee un título ejecutivo fundado en una sentencia favorable o en un laudo o resolución arbitral.

            Sin lugar a duda, el mercado financiero suizo continúa jugando un papel predominante en el mundo financiero actual, a pesar de la presión reguladora que afronta. La jurisdicción suiza, por tanto, es relevante para los acreedores que deseen obtener el embrago de bienes por parte de un deudor que posea cuentas bancarias u otros bienes en Suiza. Si bien en la práctica, el embargo de bienes se efectúa sobre cuentas bancarias, es posible utilizar la misma obligación para embargar otros bienes con el mismo efecto, por ejemplo, bienes inmuebles, obras de arte o bienes de terceros a su vez acreedores del deudor.

            A instancia de parte, el acreedor puede solicitar un embargo ex parte de bienes del deudor que se encuentren en Suiza ante el tribunal del lugar donde se encuentre la sede del banco o donde se sitúen los bienes, siempre y cuando se demuestre que existan prima facie los tres requisitos previstos por la Ley federal sobre la ejecución y sobre el concurso de acreedores (“DEBA”), es decir, que:

            • El acreedor que solicita el embargo posea un título fundado en un crédito exigible y ordinario.
            • Se den los presupuestos legales necesarios para obtener un embargo.
            • Los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza.

            Como ya se ha mencionado anteriormente, los presupuestos legales más relevantes para obtener el embargo de bienes son:

            • Que el deudor no sea residente en Suiza y que el crédito en sí esté lo suficientemente conectado con Suiza o que esté fundado en un reconocimiento de la deuda por parte del deudor (“embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza”).
            • Que el acreedor posea una sentencia ejecutiva favorable o un laudo arbitral contra el deudor (“Título ejecutivo”)

            Embargo contra un sujeto no residente en Suiza: Según la DEBA, el mero hecho de que los bienes del deudor se encuentren en Suiza no es suficiente como para establecer una “suficiente conexión con Suiza”. Dicho presupuesto depende en gran parte de los hechos específicos de la cuestión que se valorarán por parte del Juez caso por caso. La jurisprudencia suiza ha confirmado algunos criterios de conexión: que el contrato entre las partes se haya firmado o deba de ejecutarse en Suiza; que el contrato entre las partes esté regulado por la ley suiza, que el acreedor viva en Suiza o que el crédito del acreedor esté conectado a una actividad comercial desarrollada en Suiza.

            Título ejecutivo: Para poder solicitar el embargo de los bienes, el acreedor debe además, cumplir con el segundo presupuesto legal, esto es, poseer un título ejecutivo. La DEBA no realiza distinciones entre sentencias y laudos o arbitrales pronunciados tanto en una jurisdicción interna como en una jurisdicción extranjera. Simplemente deben ser ejecutivos (teniendo en consideración el Convenio de Lugano, la Ley federal sobre derecho internacional privado – en el caso de un laudo arbitral dictado por una corte arbitral no suiza – teniendo en consideración el Convención de Nueva York), todas las sentencias favorables o los laudos arbitrales podrán obtener el embargo de los bienes que se encuentren en Suiza.

            El tribunal suizo solicitará al acreedor que demuestre prime facie la existencia de los presupuestos legales para llevar a cabo el embargo, como anteriormente descrito. Debido a que el embargo se otorgará ex parte, en muchos casos, dicha acción tomará al deudor por sorpresa. Gracias a este efecto sorpresa y a la naturaleza del embargo, cuyo objetivo es que el deudor no pueda deshacerse de los activos, tal medio tiene un grande potencial para ayudar al acreedor a asegurarse y quedarse satisfecho de su crédito.

            Con la reciente sentencia 16601/2017, la Corte Suprema – después de diferentes pronunciamientos contrarios – ha abierto la posibilidad de reconocer en Italia las sentencias extranjeras que contengan daños punitivos.

            En este breve artículo veremos en qué consisten los daños punitivos, cuáles son las condiciones por las cuales podrían reconocerse y aplicarse en Italia y, sobretodo, qué medidas conviene tomar para afrontar este nuevo riesgo.

            Los daños punitivos, en inglés punitive damages, son un instituto jurídico originario de los ordenamientos anglosajones que prevén la posibilidad de reconocer a la parte perjudicada una indemnización adicional respecto a la compensación del daño sufrido, en los casos en los que el causante del daño haya actuado con dolo o culpa grave (“malice” y “gross negligence”, respectivamente).

            Con los daños punitivos, además de la función compensatoria, la indemnización del daño también asume una finalidad sancionadora, típica del derecho penal, actuando como elemento de disuasión ante otros potenciales infractores.

            En los ordenamientos en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, el reconocimiento y la cuantificación de la indemnización se someten a la discrecionalidad del juez.

            En los Estados Unidos de América los daños punitivos se prevén en los principios de common law, pero se disciplinan de modo diverso en cada uno de los Estados. Sin embargo, en general, se aplican siempre que la conducta del causante del daño haya sido dirigida a causar el daño intencionadamente o, se haya llevado a cabo sin tener en cuenta las normas de seguridad preestablecidas. Por lo general, no pueden reconocerse por el incumplimiento de un contrato, salvo que no se determine como un ilícito (tort) autónomo.

            En algunos Estados se prevén límites máximos a los daños punitivos, a veces incorporados en los daños compensatorios, otras veces como cuantía máxima. Además, la Corte Suprema de los EEUU ha intervenido en diferentes casos para limitar el importe de condena.

            En los ordenamientos de civil law, entre ellos Italia, el instituto de daños punitivos tradicionalmente no se reconoce, ya que la sanción al causante del daño se considera que queda al margen de los principios del derecho civil, basándose en la concepción de que la indemnización por daños tiene como objetivo restaurar la esfera patrimonial del perjudicado.

            En consecuencia, el reconocimiento de los daños punitivos en una sentencia, se obstaculizaban por el límite de orden público y tales sentencias no tenían acceso en el espacio jurídico italiano.

            La sentencia de las Secciones Unidas núm. 16601/2017, de 5 de julio de 2017 de la Corte Suprema de Casación ha girado las cartas sobre la mesa.

            En el presente caso se solicitó a la Corte de Apelación de Venecia el reconocimiento (ex. Art. 64 de la Ley 218/1995) de tres sentencias de la District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida que, admitió una denuncia de garantía interpuesta por un revendedor americano de cascos contra la sociedad productora italiana, por la cual se había condenado a ésta última al pago de 1.436.136,87 USD (además de gastos e intereses) en base al resarcimiento de los daños causas por un defecto del casco utilizado en un accidente de tráfico.

            La Corte de Apelación de Venecia reconoció la eficacia de la sentencia del juez extranjero, considerando que el importe era meramente indemnizatorio y no punitivo. La decisión fue recurrida en Casación por la parte condenada, que sostenía la contrariedad al orden publico de la sentencia estadunidense, en base a la orientación jurisprudencial hasta ese momento.

            La Casación ha confirmado la decisión de la Corte de Apelación, considerando que el importe no es punitivo y ha declarado el reconocimiento de la sentencia estadunidense en Italia.

            Las Secciones Unidas, por su parte, han aprovechado la ocasión para afrontar la cuestión inherente a la admisibilidad de los daños punitivos en Italia, cambiando la orientación histórica de la Corte Suprema (véase Cass. 1781/2012).

            Según la Corte, la noción de responsabilidad civil entendida como mera reparación de los daños sufridos, se debe considerar como obsoleta dada la evolución del instituto a través de intervenciones legislativas y jurisprudenciales nacionales y europeas, que han introducido medidas indemnizatorias con finalidad sancionadora y disuasiva. De hecho, en el ordenamiento italiano es posible encontrar diversos casos de indemnización por daños con finalidad sancionadora: en materia de difamación en medios de comunicación (art. 12 L. 47/48), derechos de autor (art. 158 L 633/41), propiedad industrial (art. 125 D. Lgs 30/2005), abuso del proceso (art. 96.3 c.p.c. y art. 26.2 c.p.a.), derecho laboral (art. 18.14 c.p.c.), derecho de familia (art. 709-ter c.p.c.), etc.

            De este modo, la Corte de Casación ha introducido el siguiente principio de derecho: “En el vigente ordenamiento italiano, a la responsabilidad civil no solo se le asigna el deber de restaurar la esfera patrimonial del sujeto que ha sufrido la lesión, porque se consideran incluidas en el sistema la función de disuasión y la función sancionadora de la responsabilidad civil. Por tanto, no es ontológicamente incompatible con el ordenamiento italiano el instituto de origen estadunidense de la indemnización punitiva”.

            La consecuencia, a tener en muy cuenta, es que el pronunciamiento abre la puerta a posibles deliberaciones de sentencias extranjeras, que condenen a una de las partes al pago de un importe superior respecto al importe calculado para compensar el prejuicio creado a causa de un daño.

            Sin embargo, a tal fin, la Corte Suprema ha dispuesto algunas condiciones para que la sentencia extranjera pueda reconocerse. La decisión ha debido ser tomada en el ordenamiento extranjero en base a:

            1. Garantizar la tipicidad de la condena.
            2. La previsibilidad de la misma.
            3. Los límites cuantificativos.

            Los posibles efectos de la Sentencia en el ordenamiento italiano

            En primer lugar, hay que tener claro que la Sentencia no ha modificado el sistema indemnizatorio interno del ordenamiento italiano. En otras palabras, la Sentencia no permitirá a los jueces italianos condenar por daños punitivos al interno de los procedimientos italianos.

            En cambio, por lo que respecta a las sentencias extranjeras, ahora será posible obtener la indemnización por daños punitivos a través del reconocimiento y la ejecución en el sistema italiano de una decisión extranjera que prevea la condena de dicha tipología de daño, con la condición de que se respeten los mencionados presupuestos.

            Por todo lo expuesto, las empresas que hayan invertido o que realicen negocios en países en los que se prevén los daños punitivos, tendrán que tener en consideración dicho riesgo.

            Los instrumentos para tutelarse

            El empresario quien opere en mercados extranjeros en los que se prevén los daños punitivos debe considerar con atención este riesgo.

            La óptica debe ser necesariamente de prevención y los instrumentos a disposición son diversos: en primer lugar, la adopción de cláusulas contractuales que prevean la renuncia del perjudicado a este tipo de daño o, que acuerden un límite a la indemnización de los daños contractuales, por ejemplo limitándolos al valor de los productos o a los servicios ofrecidos.

            Es además fundamental, que se conozca la legislación y la jurisprudencia de los mercados en los cuales se opera, incluso indirectamente (por ejemplo, con la distribución comercial de los productos) con el fin de escoger de modo consciente la ley aplicable al contrato y la modalidad de resolución de controversias (por ejemplo, con previsión de la exclusiva jurisdiccional del foro del país que no prevea daños punitivos).

            Finalmente, este tipo de responsabilidad y riesgo puede ser objeto de valoración con pólizas aseguradoras que ofrecen una cobertura específica respecto a eventuales condenas de indemnización de daños punitivos.

            [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

            It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

            In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

            This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

            Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

            Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

            Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

            The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of «sufficient justification» and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

            As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

            The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

            It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

            To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

            Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

            One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

            On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

            Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

            Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

            How much does it tell us?

            Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

            The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

            If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

            Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

            This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

            Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

            Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

            The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

            The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

            It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

            There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

            • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
            • a frustration or a force majeure.

            There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

            The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

            What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

            The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

            A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

            If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

            • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
            • the good faith of the parties;
            • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
            • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
            • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

            What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

            The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

            The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

            • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
            • sudden;
            • unpredictable.

            To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

            • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
            • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
            • a constant increase in turnover;
            • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
            • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
            • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
            • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
            • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

            The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

            • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
            • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
            • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

            Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

            Compensation for a damage

            The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

            The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

            The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

            International law

            The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

            However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

            The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

            The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

            In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

            • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
            • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

            In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

            In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

            The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.