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Assessing the US-Vietnam Framework Agreement on Trade
13.07.2025
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On 29 June 2025, the Vietnamese government introduced Decree No. 163/2025/ND-CP (Decree 163). This decree provides detailed guidance on how the updated Law on Pharmacy will be implemented.
Like the amended Law on Pharmacy, Decree 163 came into effect on 1 July 2025, replacing the previous Decree No. 54/2017/ND-CP (Decree 54). The new decree sets out comprehensive rules for key aspects of managing pharmaceuticals, including:
- Pharmacy practice certificates
- Certificates allowing pharmaceutical businesses to operate
- Import and export of medicines and drug ingredients
- Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) inspections of overseas manufacturers
- Recalling medicines and drug ingredients
- Certificates for medicine advertising content
- Medicine price management
Key Changes in Decree 163
Here are some important changes and additions introduced by Decree 163:
Destroying Specially Controlled Medicines
You no longer need to get approval from the relevant authority before destroying narcotic, psychotropic, and precursor drugs, or pharmaceutical ingredients that are narcotic or psychotropic substances or precursors used in medicines. Instead, you just need to provide notification at least seven working days in advance. This notification must include the planned destruction date and a detailed list of items to be destroyed.
E-commerce in Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical businesses that sell products online must openly display the following information to ensure transparency and consumer safety:
- Their certificate allowing them to operate as a pharmaceutical business.
- The pharmacy practice certificate of the person responsible for pharmaceutical expertise.
- Information about the medicines themselves.
Shelf-Life Rules for Imported Products
For medicines and ingredients with a total shelf life of nine months or less, at least one-third of their shelf life must remain when they clear customs. Medicines with a shelf life of 30 days or less must still be within their shelf life at the time of customs clearance.
Controlling Imported Products
All medicines with marketing authorisation (MA) are subject to import control, except for:
- Medicines needed for preventing and treating Group A infectious diseases that have been declared epidemics, as per the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases.
- Medicines with a shelf life of less than 30 days.
Importers must inform the provincial People’s Committee at least five working days before making a customs declaration. The People’s Committee can then issue a written notice of non-compliance to the customs authority within five working days of receiving this notification.
Medicine Advertising
Decree 163 adds a process that allows an approved medicine advertising certificate to be adjusted for certain changes (such as a change to the MA holder or manufacturer information). This means you don’t have to go through the entire initial registration process for medicine advertising content again, as was required under the previous rules.
Medicine Price Management
Businesses must announce or re-announce wholesale prices, similar to the medicine price declaration process under Decree 54. Some medicines are exempt from this requirement, including those provided free of charge for emergency responses, national health programmes, humanitarian aid, clinical trials, scientific research, or exhibition purposes, and medicines carried as personal luggage.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) can make recommendations if the announced or re-announced price is significantly higher than similar medicines already on the market. This includes situations where:
- The announced or re-announced wholesale price of the medicine is higher than the highest price of similar medicines.
- The price difference is more than 35% (for medicines priced under VND 1 million) or 15% (for medicines priced at VND 1 million and above) compared to winning bid prices in tenders.
- The announced or re-announced price is higher than prices in the country of origin or other markets (if there’s no similar product in Vietnam).
- When such differences are found, the MOH issues a formal recommendation to the announcing business and publishes it online for transparency and accountability.
Further Guidance in New Circular
On 1 July 2025, the MOH issued Circular No. 31/2025/TT-BYT (Circular 31), which further details how the amended Law on Pharmacy and Decree 163 should be implemented. Circular 31 officially replaces Circular No. 07/2018/TT-BYT and Decree 54 and came into effect immediately.
Key provisions of Circular 31 include:
Notification of Practising Pharmacists
Pharmaceutical businesses that are not part of a pharmacy chain must inform the relevant authority of a list of people currently working at the business who hold pharmacy practice certificates. This notification must be submitted within 15 days of the date the certificate allowing the pharmaceutical business to operate was issued, or when there are any changes to the list. This is a shorter deadline than the previous 30 days under earlier rules.
Pharmacy chains have similar notification duties and deadlines. Specifically, the chain operator must inform the provincial authority where each pharmacy in the chain is located about the list of practising pharmacists at those sites. Additionally, pharmacy chains must notify the authority if pharmacies are added or removed from the chain, and if there are any rotations of the people responsible for pharmaceutical expertise between pharmacies within the chain.
Medicine Information Activities
Under Circular 31, medicine information can still be given to healthcare professionals through information materials, seminars, and medical representatives.
However, Circular 31 introduces a significant change by removing the need to obtain a certificate for medicine information content before carrying out these activities. Under the new rules, pharmaceutical businesses, representative offices of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Vietnam, and MA holders are now responsible for creating and distributing medicine information materials. These materials must comply with the package inserts for medicines approved by the MOH, the Vietnamese National Drug Formulary, and any related documents and professional instructions issued or recognised by the MOH.
Donald Trump, never one to shy away from drama or diplomacy-via-caps-lock, has slapped a 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States. The justification? In his own delicate prose: «The treatment of former President Jair Bolsonaro is a disgrace… A witch hunt that must end IMMEDIATELY!»
And just in case anyone thought this was about trade imbalances or economic strategy, Trump made things crystal clear: «Due to Brazil’s insidious attacks on free elections…».
In short, the 50% tariff isn’t about coffee, orange juice, or flip-flops. It’s about a Supreme Court judgment, applying Brazilian law, regarding Brazilian politicians accused of conspiring in a coup d’état. In other words, this is a brazen (and frankly absurd) attempt at judicial intervention via trade war.
Trump, with his characteristic subtlety, offered a solution: manufacture in the U.S., and he’ll look kindly upon Brazil, like a mafia don offering «protection» after smashing your shop window. But what he meant was: consider Bolsonaro innocent, and we’ll talk.
The Brazilian market took the bait
Although the fishy interference in Brazilian affairs was determined from a fish out of the water, the market took the bait: in the first 48 hours after the infamous letter, at least 1500 tons of fish were already held in Brazilian ports, as US buyers suspended their contracts due to uncertainty about the costs upon arrival. The fish market is on alert, as 80% of the exports head to the US, mainly coming from small family-owned industries that distribute the catch from artisanal fishing communities.
The same effect hit other sectors, from orange, honey, and coffee to aircraft.
Brazil’s response and sorcery: don’t mess with us (or our weather)
Naturally, Brazil will not sit quietly sipping caipirinhas while its sovereignty is trampled. Reciprocity is on the table: if Washington raises tariffs, Brasília can do the same. But above all, one thing is sure: Brazil will never tolerate foreign interference in its independent judiciary.
And then, a curious coincidence: right after Trump’s speech, a tornado accompanied by lightning struck the White House grounds. Pure chance? Maybe. Or could it have been the work of Brazilian indigenous shamans, a particularly well-organized group of umbanda practitioners, or simply the fact that, as every Brazilian child knows, God is Brazilian.
Trump might want to check the weather forecast next time before penning another angry letter.
The unpredictable becoming predictable
Trade wars are rarely tidy affairs, but one thing they consistently deliver is chaos (in legal terms, disruption). And when disruption meets contracts, force majeure disputes often end up in court.
At first glance, Trump’s decision to impose a 50% tariff overnight might feel like an unpredictable thunderbolt (quite literally, given the weather at the White House). But here’s the catch: by now, unpredictable tariffs are becoming predictable. When a government with a well-documented love for impulsive economic diplomacy imposes politically motivated tariffs, can anyone claim to be surprised?
In most jurisdictions, force majeure requires that the event be extraordinary, unforeseeable, and beyond the parties’ control. A sudden 50% tariff certainly ticks a few of those boxes, but following a repetition of erratic trade policy, one might argue that businesses should expect what in past times was considered unexpected, especially when dealing with certain jurisdictions or political figures. In other words, Trump’s tariffs might not excuse performance if parties didn’t prepare for exactly this kind of volatility.
This is where good contract drafting comes into play
Savvy businesses are learning that their contracts must go beyond a vague boilerplate clause about “acts of government” or “changes in law.” Instead, they should expressly address the risk of sudden tariff changes, including
- hardship clauses that allow renegotiation when costs become commercially unreasonable;
- price adjustment mechanisms linked to tariff thresholds;
- termination rights triggered by specified levels of customs duties;
- currency fluctuation provisions (because tariffs rarely travel alone, and currency swings often accompany them).
In short, while no contract can immunize a business from every shock, smart drafting can mean the difference between a commercial headache and a catastrophic breach.
Therefore, tariffs may no longer be an unpredictable storm; they are part of the new predictable landscape. Given that your contract might wake up tomorrow facing ‘IMMEDIATE’ punitive tariffs in all caps, your contract should be ready today.
The unwitting cupid: strengthening EU-Brazil relations
While the tariffs may ruffle trade flows between Brasília and Washington, there’s an unintended silver lining: Trump is proving to be the most efficient matchmaker between Brazil and other markets, such as China and the European Union.
The EU-Brazil relationship, already a flirtation with promising prospects, with relevant progress in the EU-Mercosur Agreement, now seems destined for deeper romance. If Mr. Trump insists on isolating the US from Brazil, the old continent stands ready, with flowers and wine in hand, to pick up where the US left off. After all, Brazilian fish can pair up nicely with champagne, cava and prosecco.
So thank you, Mr. Trump. In your quest to bully Brazil into submission, you may have done more to strengthen transatlantic ties than any EU Commissioner ever could. As they say in Brasília these days: Trump is not a trade warrior. He’s a cupid in disguise.
The recent announcement of a landmark trade agreement framework, following just three months negotiations since President Trump’s tariffs announcement on 2 April 2025, signals a pivotal shift, not merely in bilateral relations, but in the broader architecture of global supply chains.
As a commercial lawyer with exposure to Vietnam since 2007, I have observed the evolving dynamics between the United States and Vietnam through the years, talking to students, entrepreneurs, veterans, diplomats, humans from all walks all life, from both nations and beyond.
You may recall that Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China, was to be the nation that would encounter the most stringent tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, reaching an astonishing 46%.
The newly forged framework outlines significant reciprocal concessions designed to foster greater trade and investment flows. Granted, pre-April 2 tariffs applied by the USA on Vietnamese goods were lower than what emerges from the framework agreement, but still, it is better than 46%),
The United States has committed to imposing a 20% tariff on most Vietnamese imports, a notable reduction from the previously mooted 46%. However, a substantial 40% tariff will apply to goods re-exported from third countries, with a particular focus on those originating from China.
Vietnam has pledged to open its market to a wide array of US products. Crucially, it has also committed to implementing stringent measures aimed at restricting the transshipment of Chinese goods through its territory, a long-standing concern for Washington.
In a significant win for American exporters, US goods will now enjoy duty-free access to the Vietnamese market, effectively granting “total access”, particularly for large-engine vehicles such as SUVs, as emphatically stated by President Trump (how SUVs are going to circulate in the narrow alleys of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, infested by swarms of mopeds, is a different story).
This agreement is expected to catalyse growth in several key sectors. Electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (especially Liquefied Natural Gas), and agriculture are poised for expansion. US firms specialising in manufacturing technology, energy solutions, and agricultural products are anticipated to be the primary beneficiaries. Furthermore, beyond immediate trade benefits, the agreement is set to reshape investment strategies, encouraging a greater localisation of supply chains within Vietnam. This strategic realignment is also expected to further solidify the already robust US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
While the potential upsides are considerable, it is imperative for businesses and investors to approach this new landscape with a clear understanding of the accompanying risks. From my vantage point, I identify several significant execution challenges and structural impediments that require close monitoring.
Enforcement of Transshipment Controls
The most immediate and perhaps formidable risk lies in the effective enforcement of transshipment controls. Vietnam has historically served as a significant assembly point for Chinese-manufactured components. Ensuring that goods originating from China are not merely re-routed through Vietnam to circumvent US tariffs will require exceptionally close monitoring and robust verification mechanisms. The legal and practical complexities of definitively determining the true country of origin for all goods will undoubtedly pose a persistent challenge. As a European citizen, witnessing how the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“EVFTA”), which poses an important stress on certificates of origin, I am particularly aware of this matter.
While Vietnam has made remarkable strides in its economic development, certain structural issues could hinder its capacity to scale up high-value manufacturing in the short to medium term. These include:
Legal framework nuances
Vietnam’s legal framework for foreign investment has seen continuous improvements, but legal and cultural complexities and inconsistencies can and do still arise. Navigating the regulatory landscape, particularly with new rules stemming from this agreement and at a time of deep administrative, governmental, digital and legal reforms in Vietnam, will demand expert legal guidance to ensure compliance and mitigate potential fines and disputes. Issues surrounding so-called sublicences for businesses, intellectual property rights enforcement and contract enforceability, whilst improving, still require careful consideration;
Education
The ambition to transform Vietnam into a high-value manufacturing hub necessitates a workforce equipped with advanced skills. While the Vietnamese government prioritises education and workforce development, a significant portion of the current labour force lacks formal training and specialised certifications, let alone a good command of the English language. Bridging this skills gap, particularly in areas like advanced manufacturing, engineering, and digital technologies is a necessity and not just in light of this framework agreement. Companies may need to factor in substantial investment in training and upskilling programmes for their Vietnamese employees.
Infrastructures
Despite considerable investment, Vietnam’s infrastructure, particularly in logistics, energy, and transportation, continues to face bottlenecks. And China – the apparent target of Trump’s tariffs – is stepping in with high-speed trains connecting it to the northern Provinces of Vietnam. An increased volume of high-value manufacturing and trade will place further strain on existing infrastructure. Inadequate port capacity, congested roads, and a reliable energy supply (including for EV charging) are critical concerns that could impact efficiency and increase operational costs for businesses.
Policy divergence
This framework agreement deepens US-Vietnam trade ties and seems to be paving the way for more US investments in Vietnam, but this second aspect seems to run counter to parallel US policy objectives aimed at reshoring manufacturing back to the United States. This potential divergence in strategic priorities could introduce yet another element of unpredictability in the long term, necessitating a flexible and adaptable investment approach. Future shifts in US policy could impact the durability and full extent of the benefits derived from this agreement.
This trade agreement, if finalised and implemented, undoubtedly represents a structural shift in global trade dynamics. It strategically positions Vietnam as an increasingly important high-value manufacturing hub and significantly deepens US engagement in Southeast Asia. We will need time, however, to assess the practical impact of the agreement, observing the efficacy of its implementation, and understanding how Vietnam’s inherent strengths and challenges will ultimately shape its role in the reconfigured global supply chain.
We will also need to see what China, if anything, will do as a countermeasure. In fact, any assessment of Vietnam’s evolving trade landscape would be incomplete without a thorough consideration of China’s influence and strategic posture. President Xi Jinping has consistently championed a vision of a “community of shared future for mankind,” a concept that, while outwardly promoting global cooperation, also subtly underscores a demand for international alignment with Beijing’s interests. In the context of escalating trade tensions, Xi has repeatedly warned that “trade wars have no winners,” advocating for unity against protectionist measures, yet simultaneously implying that nations must ultimately choose sides, either with or against China’s economic and political orbit. Vietnam, despite its historical complexities and occasional maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea (or East Sea, as it is officially called by Hanoi), remains deeply interwoven with China’s economy. China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner for many years, with significant inflows of Chinese FDI, loans, and project contractors. This economic dependency is particularly evident in various sectors, where Chinese components and materials form a substantial part of Vietnamese manufacturing supply chains. While Vietnam has actively sought to diversify its trade partners and reduce its reliance on China, the sheer scale of the bilateral economic relationship means that disentanglement is a long-term, complex endeavour. Furthermore, China’s influence extends beyond direct trade into crucial regional resources. The Mekong River, a lifeline for millions in Southeast Asia, originates in China, which has constructed numerous upstream dams.
As Vietnam navigates its enhanced trade relationship with the United States, it must simultaneously contend with the enduring economic gravity and strategic ambitions of its northern giant neighbour. Any perceived move by Vietnam to significantly shift away from China could invite retaliatory measures or heightened pressure from Beijing. Businesses investing in Vietnam must not only grasp the intricacies of the US-Vietnam agreement but also meticulously analyse how these developments will intersect with, and potentially be impacted by, the intricate, often delicate, and sometimes fraught relationship between Hanoi and Beijing. Understanding this geopolitical tightrope will be essential for sustainable success in the Vietnamese market. Prudence, informed legal counsel, and a keen eye on evolving geopolitical and economic realities will be paramount for those seeking to capitalise on this transformative new chapter.
Takeaways
- Tariffs:The US-Vietnam framework agreement marks a significant departure from previous trade dynamics, reducing US tariffs on most Vietnamese imports to 20% (from a mooted 46%) while imposing a 40% tariff on transshipped goods, especially from China.
- Vietnam’s market opening:Vietnam has committed to duty-free access for a broad range of US products and stricter controls on Chinese goods transiting its territory.
- Growth / manufacturing shift potential:The agreement is expected to fuel expansion in Vietnamese electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (LNG), and agriculture. It also encourages supply chain localisation within Vietnam (normally more of an assembly point for Chinese products).
- Execution challenges: Effectively preventing the re-routing of Chinese goods through Vietnam to avoid tariffs will be a complex and demanding task; Despite economic progress, Vietnam faces hurdles in scaling high-value manufacturing due to legal framework nuances (e.g., sublicences, IP enforcement), a skills gap in its workforce (lack of formal training, English proficiency) and infrastructure bottlenecks (logistics, energy, transportation).
- US policy divergence:The agreement’s encouragement of US investment in Vietnam appears to contradict the broader US policy objective of reshoring manufacturing.
- China:Businesses must consider China’s significant economic sway over Vietnam, including its position as Vietnam’s largest trading partner, its FDI, and its control over shared resources like the Mekong River. Any major shift by Vietnam away from China could lead to retaliatory measures from Beijing.
- Uncertainty:This is not a final agreement, so the situation might change. Prudence and informed legal counsel are crucial for businesses navigating this evolving landscape.
The Trump approach: power and dominance
In his autobiography, The Art of the Deal, Donald Trump describes negotiation as a contest of strength, determination, and dominance. His vision is clear: anyone who shows uncertainty or makes concessions too early is immediately perceived as a loser. His negotiating style is based on constant pressure, maximalist demands, and calculated threats, to obtain unilateral advantages. In this scheme, compromise is not a point of arrival, but a sign of weakness to be avoided.
Trump has always been a competitive negotiator, focused on immediate results and uninterested in balanced solutions unless they are strictly functional to his interests.
Other negotiating styles: compromising and collaborative
In contrast to this competitive approach, there are two other relevant negotiating styles:
- The compromising style aims to reach a ‘middle ground’ agreement, in which both parties give something up to achieve an acceptable solution. It is a pragmatic approach, practical in situations where time is limited or positions are too far apart for genuine collaboration.
- The collaborative style, on the other hand, aims to create win-win solutions. The parties seek to thoroughly understand each other’s interests and work together to build an outcome that maximizes the benefit for both. It requires openness, time, and trust.
In commercial negotiations, the compromising or collaborative approach can only work if the other party shares the same logic. But when dealing with an explicitly competitive actor such as Trump, adopting a compromising style risks seriously penalizing the other party, for at least three reasons:
- It conveys weakness
An accommodating gesture is seen not as a sign of openness, but as a point of pressure to be exploited. The competitive negotiator, focused on gaining an immediate advantage, interprets it as a willingness to give even more.
- It relinquishes bargaining power
The EU has a vast market and significant trade levers, especially in a context where the US is closing the door to the Chinese market. Offering concessions at the outset is tantamount to burning your cards without getting anything in return. In a competitive confrontation, the first move can set the tone for the negotiation: once a concession has been made, it is very difficult to backtrack.
- It legitimizes the negotiating imbalance
An unbalanced compromise, if accepted without resistance, risks becoming the new basis for future trade relations, systematically penalizing the EU in subsequent rounds.
Why 30%? The anchor technique
Trump often uses a negotiating technique known as the anchor technique. This consists of deliberately setting a very high target at the beginning of the negotiation (in our case, the threat of 30% tariffs).
The aim is to create a psychological perimeter for the negotiation and force the other party to reason on the basis of that figure, even though they are aware that it is arbitrary. This technique allows one to influence the scope of the discussion and obtain greater concessions, just as Trump has done.
The worst response: unilateral concessions with no return
Unfortunately, the European Union has already shown worrying signs of a compromising attitude that has not been negotiated with the Trump administration, for example:
- The waiver of the web tax* on American digital giants, without obtaining any regulation or shared tax contribution in return.
- The offer to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, made to reassure Washington, without obtaining anything in return.
- The acceptance of the increase in NATO spending to 5% of GDP, demanded by Trump, again without obtaining anything in return.
All these offers without asking for anything in return reinforce the idea that the EU is willing to concede from the outset. Trump, true to his competitive logic, sees these concessions as a starting point, not a compromise: this pushes him to raise his demands, not moderate them.
Persevering would be a fatal mistake
Continuing along this path of compromise, in the hope that accommodation will ease the pressure, would be not only ineffective but counterproductive. With a competitive negotiator, unilateral concessions do not stop escalation: they fuel it. Any sign of weakness is interpreted as additional room for maneuver.
A helpful example is China’s reaction during the trade war initiated by Trump. Faced with massive tariffs imposed by the US, Beijing responded in kind, imposing equivalent tariffs. Instead of giving in, it spoke the same language of power. The result is there for all to see: after weeks of escalation, the US had to moderate its position, opening up to a more balanced agreement.
The right strategy: speak his language
To avoid the mistakes of the past, the EU should therefore reverse its negotiating logic. Not to fuel confrontation, but to restore a credible balance. Some applicable countermeasures could be:
- Target Trump’s electoral base, particularly the agricultural sectors (soy, corn, beef), with selective tariffs or targeted restrictions.
- Put the European web tax* back on the table, even with a minimum rate, linking any exemptions to real concessions from the US.
These well-calibrated moves would strengthen the EU’s position and show that it can defend its interests by speaking a language Trump understands: that of strength and bargaining power.
Going beyond requests, seeking the other party’s interests
A fundamental principle in any negotiation is to identify the other side’s interests and find a way to allow them to achieve them without sacrificing your own. This is no easy task, given Trump’s notorious volatility and the lack of sound arguments to justify the demands made in the negotiations.
In the case of the EU-US negotiations, it must be borne in mind that Trump is playing the game with his electoral base in mind: an agreement must offer him a narrative of victory to communicate to his electorate.
Takeaway
When negotiating with a competitive player like Trump, one should abandon the accommodating approach, avoid concessions without something in return, and adopt a style that is more assertive, strategic, and symmetrical.
Only then will it be able to build an agreement that is solid, fair, and respectful of its economic and political strength.
I have often dealt with commercial distribution agreements between Italian and Chinese companies, sometimes following negotiations in the wine sector for various types of agreements: sales, distribution, franchising, establishment of joint ventures, and sales through online stores.
I am sharing some key considerations for approaching this complex but opportunity-rich market.
📌 Here are my 10 takeaways
Step Zero. Protect your IP
it is essential to protect your intellectual property before entering China. This includes trademarks (including their Chinese transliteration), labels, web domains, and social media accounts. Neglecting this aspect can have disastrous consequences, exposing you to the widespread phenomenon of trademark squatting (even famous names such as Michael Jordan, Elon Musk, and Donald Trump have fallen victim to this).
For more information, you can read this article about Intellectual property protection in China
1 — Know your enemy
trust is good, but mistrust is better. Before entering into commercial agreements, it is essential to check the credentials of potential partners through the databases of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. When it comes to wine, it is necessary to check whether the prospective distributor has a license to import and distribute wine.
2 — No copy-paste
Contracts must be tailor-made, adapting them to local specificities. In particular, it is crucial to clearly regulate promotional activities: budget, commercial actions, communication methods, and management of the producer’s trademarks. It is also best to write the contract in Chinese to ensure that there are no misunderstandings and in case it needs to be used before a judge or local administrative body, as Chinese is the only official language. (N.B.: if you think of entrusting the task to ChatGPT, this is not a good idea).
For an in-depth article, check out The commercial distribution contract in China
3 — Decide immediately how and where to litigate
It may seem counterintuitive, but it is best to avoid providing for Italian (or French, or German) jurisdiction and applicable law, which is an ineffective solution, especially in cases where urgent action is needed to stop unfair competition or counterfeiting. Consider applying Chinese law and provide for an arbitration clause at CIETAC. An effective dispute management strategy is a key element of the agreement and must be negotiated carefully. (P.S.: This applies not only to China but to all international agreements. For more information, see this article).
4 — China is big
And it is the sum of many very different internal markets. Exclusivity should be granted for good reasons, but only if the distributor has a well-developed commercial network and can achieve specific shared objectives. If granted, it should be limited to the province where the distributor is based and subject to the achievement of agreed sales volumes. Having a single distributor for the whole of China is like entrusting an Italian distributor with promoting a product throughout Europe. Or appoint a NYC-based company to promote and sell your wines in all 50 US States.
5 — China is far away
Delegating everything to the local distributor and taking no interest in what is happening on the Chinese market is never a good idea. Firstly, because you have no idea how, where, and with what results the wines are being sold. Secondly, because you cannot verify compliance with agreements, for example on non-competition or the use of trademarks. It is therefore important to schedule meetings to share commercial policies and be able to verify what is happening, including through audits and visits to warehouses and the sales network.
6 — China is expensive
Competition in the Chinese domestic market is fierce. This is also true in terms of price, as some countries that are direct competitors of Italy (Australia, Chile, New Zealand) have free trade agreements and can therefore enter the market on more favorable terms than Italian wine, which is subject to a total tax burden of around 43% after payment of duties, excise taxes, and VAT. It is necessary to position oneself in the right market segment (medium-high), and to do so, it is necessary to plan the right commercial actions together with the distributor. Selling Ex-Works and hoping that the distributor will take care of everything is not an excellent strategy for being competitive.
7 — China is dangerous
Scams are always around the corner. In the wine world in particular, for example, spontaneous expressions of interest are frequent, arriving via the company website, social media accounts, or directly via email. They sound like this: we have discovered your wines, we think they are fantastic, we want to place an order immediately. If it sounds too good and easy, it is certainly a scam. There is an easy way to check: if the next step is a request for payment of a few thousand euros, justified by the need to register the wines on the CIFER (China Imported Food Enterprise Registration) portal, or to register your trademark to prevent others from doing so, or to authenticate the signature on the sales contract… these are attempts at fraud, and the elusive order will never arrive after payment has been received. How can you check whether the person you are dealing with is a reputable company or a fraudster? 👉🏼Go back to point 1 (here is an in-depth article).
8 — E-commerce? Yes, but with method (and money)
Online wine sales continue to grow, but entering large platforms is complex, competition is fierce, and running an online store requires meticulous planning and highly efficient system implementation. The online market in China is all pay-for-play. Nothing is achieved with no money or minimal effort. If you want to sell online, you need to build an omnichannel system integrated with traditional distribution, and to do this, it is essential to involve a local partner with well-defined investments and responsibilities.
9 — China is not a market for everyone
You need to protect your brands, study the market thoroughly, know your competition (both foreign and local), find the right market channel, select a distributor motivated to invest time and money in promoting your product, and be willing to support them with the right investments. If you want to build a serious plan to enter the Chinese market, you must have a medium- to long-term perspective. There are no shortcuts (actually, there are many, but they almost always lead to wasted time and money). If you are unwilling to invest in entering the Chinese market through the front door, it is unlikely that anyone else will do it for you.
10 — Don’t do it yourself
If you have read up to point 9 and are still keen to enter the Chinese market, consider doing so professionally, involving consultants who can support your company throughout the market research, scouting, negotiation, and contract drafting processes. This is also part of the investment needed to build and develop a solid and resilient business model. This advice applies to all foreign markets, and even more so to China.
The most dangerous mistake one can make after the announcement of the (partial) suspension of U.S. duties for 90 days is to hope that everything will go well and we will return to the pre-April 2 world.
First, because very invasive tariffs remain in place: 10 percent on all countries that trade with the U.S., including the EU, 25 percent on automotive, 25 percent on steel and aluminum, 145 percent on China.
Second, because it is impossible to predict the actions of the U.S. Administration in the short and medium term: it cannot be ruled out that tariffs will remain, increase, change targets or that other factors will intervene to turn the tide in international markets, such as an escalation of the trade war with China.
The 90-day suspension is an opportunity
The U.S.’s temporary suspension of tariffs represents a valuable window that should be used not only as a truce but also as a valuable room for action: 90 days to rehash contracts, renegotiate key clauses, and insert levers of flexibility that can protect business in various future scenarios in the U.S. and other markets.
Today’s exporters cannot afford to «sit back and see what will happen»-it is time to act, and to do so professionally and strategically. Let’s look at a checklist of important points to consider.
What do contracts with customers and suppliers entail?
The first point is to survey agreements with the trade network in the U.S. and other countries that export to the U.S., as well as with upstream suppliers in the supply chain.
Is there a written contract? The worst-case scenario — unfortunately a very frequent one — is when the parties cooperate informally, only based on orders and order confirmations. This leaves undefined not only what happens in the case of imposition of duties, but also a whole range of other points, for example, limits on damages that can be claimed in the case of breach of contract, the duration of the agreement, the applicable law, and how any disputes will be resolved.
Another very problematic scenario is one in which contracts exist, but they are generic and do not include the necessary covenants to manage the risks involved in operating in a highly litigious market such as the U.S., which, moreover, has very high legal costs.
Having done this analysis, the necessary actions can be put in place, prioritizing according to the importance of business relationships and as appropriate:
- Negotiate and conclude a written contract from scratch
- Replace the existing agreement with a complete and correct contract
- Amend and integrate the existing agreement with pacts to manage tariffs and other causes of price fluctuations
Let us dwell on the last scenario, assuming that there is a complete and correct contract but one that does not regulate price and cost fluctuation as a direct or indirect consequence of the introduction of duties.
Contract Addendum
In such cases, the correct course of action is to sign an Addendum to the original contract, specifying which covenants are being waived and which covenants are being added. It is essential that the Addendum be negotiated and signed by persons with the power of representation of the parties and that it be drafted with the help of lawyers who specialize in this field. In addition to including correct clauses, it is necessary to verify that the covenants are valid according to the rules of law applicable to the contract.
Here are some clauses that can be the subject of the Addendum, to be modulated according to the specific case and possible scenarios.
Tariff Cost Sharing
By introducing this covenant, it is provided that in the event that duties are confirmed at [x]% or are reduced or increased within certain established thresholds, the Parties will share the increase equally, or according to other established percentages.
There may also be a ceiling on tariffs beyond which a party has the right to withdraw from the contract or request the suspension of certain orders for a specified period of time, after which it has the right to withdraw.
Price Adjustment
With this covenant, a discount or an increase in the product’s price is agreed upon, as the case may be, in the case of a duty greater than [x]%.
Among the use cases, in addition to that of the company exporting to the U.S. or other intermediate markets, with final destination of the products in the U.S., is that of those who purchase a product subject to import duty and resell it, processed or assembled.
Right to Cancel or Postpone Confirmed Orders
This covenant gives the right to revoke or suspend for a certain period already negotiated orders, as such binding, in case of confirmation or introduction of duties above a certain threshold, for example, if 20% taxation was confirmed for the import of wine from the EU.
The clause can be combined with previous covenants, for example, by stipulating that below the specified threshold, the contracts remain valid, and the parties share the duty or have the right to renegotiate the price.
Supply Forecast Adjustment
With this clause the Parties can modify supply programs already agreed for a specific duration (e.g., 24 months), with continuous sales and purchase obligations at a fixed price or indexable only within certain limits. The aim is to agree on the prerequisites for reshaping supply programs in the short and medium term, which can be very useful for defining the rules that will apply to relationships with key suppliers or customers for possible changes in volumes, delivery times, and prices.
Right to Source from Alternative Suppliers
This covenant serves to be authorized, if necessary, to source alternative suppliers of components or raw materials to those previously authorized in the contract with the end customer, for example, in cases where purchasing from the original suppliers has become too costly or difficult due to duties imposed at import or in previous steps in the supply chain, or other events such as currency or price fluctuation of certain commodities beyond a certain level established in the agreement.
Hardship and Force Majeure
The imposition of duties cannot be invoked as a cause of Force Majeure or hardship, respectively, to excuse contract non-performance or to renegotiate the price, even in cases of very high price increases (such as the 145% duty imposed on Chinese products). This conclusion is almost uniform under the law and jurisprudence of the major countries involved in the tariff war: U.S., China, Canada, Mexico, France and Italy: I refer to this practical guide for a timely examination of what the various rules provide.
If the contract lacks a well drafter Force Majeure and Hardship clause, or contains a generic clause, it is important to get your hands on revising it to expressly state the cases in which a party is entitled to suspend or terminate the contract, how and when to communicate the decision to invoke the exemption, and the consequences on the parties’ contractual obligations. You can go deeper on this topic here.
Conclusion
It is essential to prepare for possible future scenarios regarding duties (confirmed, increased, changed, or decreased) and to determine the consequences on trade relations with foreign clients and suppliers: moving today, at a standstill (or nearly so), allows entrepreneurs to negotiate shared and fair solutions and to avoid, as far as possible, the emergence of tensions and conflicts with the various partners along the international supply chain.
The case: A consumer bought a Ford car in Italy from an Italian car distributor. The car was manufactured by Ford WAG in Germany and supplied by Ford Italia, which belong to the same group of companies. Following an accident in December 2001 in which the airbag failed, the consumer sued the Italian distributor as well as Ford Italia for damages. Ford Italia disputed the claims for damages asserted against it, arguing that it had not manufactured the vehicle and, because it was itself only a distributor/supplier, referred to Ford WAG in Germany as the actual manufacturer.
Question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) referred the following question to the ECJ:
- the manufacturer’s liability under the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC is limited in accordance with Art 3 to cases where the supplier physically puts his name, trade mark, or other distinguishing feature on the product to create confusion between his identity and that of the actual manufacturer;
- or is the distributor liable as a “quasi-producer” even if he has not physically put his name or trademark on the product, but nevertheless «presents himself as its producer» within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive by using the distinguishing feature in his company name, which was put on the car by another person, but leading to identity with the actual car manufacturer.
ECJ judgement (European Court of Justice) of 19/12/2024, Case C-157/23
A company that does not manufacture a product itself, but only distributes it, can still be considered a «manufacturer» within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC). This is the case if the distributor puts his name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product and consequently presents itself as the manufacturer. According to the ECJ, this can give the consumer the impression that the distributor is responsible for the quality and safety of the product.
However, the ECJ emphasizes that liability does not depend on whether the distributor puts the sign on the product itself. The distributor did not do so in the specific case. However, the distributor used the corresponding distinguishing feature in its company name. According to the ECJ, the decisive factor is, therefore, whether the distributor uses this name match to gain the trust of consumers and is thus perceived as a responsible manufacturer.
The distributor is jointly and severally liable with the actual manufacturer. This means that consumers can either make a claim against the manufacturer or the dealer directly. However, the dealer has the right to ask for a regress for the damage incurred from the actual manufacturer.
Remarks
The ECJ emphasizes consumer protection. In my opinion, this argument is slightly overstretched:
- According to the ECJ, the consumer should not be burdened with the complex task of identifying the actual manufacturer of a defective product.
- A distributor that sells a product and uses its name or trademark to do so creates trust in the consumer. This trust is to be protected by the liability of the authorized distributor — regardless of whether the distributor has actively put its trademark on the product or not.
- This increases the liability risk for authorized car dealers because they must obtain appropriate insurance against such a risk. In the constellation described above, authorized dealers can be exposed to unexpectedly high claims for damages under strict product liability.
Good advice is not expensive
- It is essential that such cases are legally clarified when drawing up and formulating distribution agreements with car manufacturers and that the ECJ ruling is considered.
- In addition, authorized dealers/distributors should reconsider the use of product names from the actual producer in their company name and/or in their corporate image.
The Brazilian market has not been immune to the protectionist wave of «America First.» If such measures persist over time, they could have a lasting impact on the local economy. Still, a sour lemon can often become a sweet caipirinha in the resilient and optimistic spirit that characterizes both Brazilian society and its entrepreneurs.
As is often the case in the chessboard of global economic geopolitics, a move from one player creates room for another countermove. Brazil reacted with reciprocal trade measures, signaling clearly that it would not accept a position of commercial vulnerability.
This firmer stance — almost unthinkable in earlier years — strengthened Brazil’s image in Europe as a country ready to reposition itself with greater autonomy and pragmatism, opening new doors to international markets. In a world where global value chains are being restructured and reliable trade partners are in high demand, Brazil is increasingly seen not just as a supplier of raw materials, but as a strategic partner in critical industries.
The rapprochement with Europe has been further energized by progress in the Mercosur–European Union Agreement, whose negotiations spanned decades and now seem to be gaining momentum. While the United States embraces a more isolationist commercial posture, Europe is actively diversifying its trade relations — and Brazil, by demonstrating a commitment to clear rules, economic stability, and legal certainty, emerges as a natural candidate to fill that gap.
The Direct Impact of U.S. Tariffs
The trade measures introduced under President Trump primarily affected Brazilian producers of semi-finished steel and primary aluminum, with the removal of long-standing exemptions and quotas. In 2024, Brazil exported US$ 2.2 billion in semi-finished steel to the United States, representing nearly 60% of U.S. imports in that category. In the same year, Brazilian aluminum exports to the U.S. reached US$ 796 million, accounting for 14% of the sector’s total. Losses in exports for 2025 are estimated at around US$ 1.5 billion.
Brazil’s Response and a New Phase
In April 2025, the Brazilian Congress passed a new legal framework for trade retaliation, empowering the Executive Branch to adopt countermeasures in a faster and more technically structured way. The new legislation allows, for example, the automatic imposition of retaliatory tariffs on goods from countries that adopt unilateral measures incompatible with WTO norms; the suspension of tax or customs benefits previously granted under bilateral agreements; the creation of a list of priority sectors for trade defense and diversification of export markets.
Beyond the retaliation itself, the move marked a significant shift in posture: Brazil began positioning itself as an active player in global trade governance, aligning with mid-sized economies that advocate for predictable, balanced, and rules-based trade relations.
An Opportunity for Brazil–Europe Relations
This new stage sets Brazil as a reliable supplier to European industry — not only of raw materials but also of higher-value-added goods, particularly in processed foods, bioenergy, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure.
Moreover, as US–China tensions drive European companies to seek nearshoring or “friend-shoring” strategies with more predictable partners, Brazil, with its clean energy matrix, large domestic market, and relatively stable institutions, emerges as a strong alternative.
Legal Implications and Strategic Recommendations
This changing landscape brings new opportunities for companies and legal advisors involved in Brazil–Europe investment and trade relations. Particular attention should be paid to:
- Monitoring rules of origin in the Mercosur–EU agreement, especially in sectors requiring supply chain restructuring;
- Reviewing contractual and tax structures for import/export operations, including clauses addressing tariff instability or non-tariff barriers (e.g., environmental or sanitary standards), and clearly defining force majeure events;
- Reassessing distribution and agency agreements in light of the new commercial environment;
- Exploring joint ventures and technology transfer arrangements with Brazilian partners, particularly in bioeconomy, green hydrogen, and mineral processing.
From lemon to caipirinha
The world is becoming more fragmented and competitive, but also more open to realignment. What began as a protectionist blow from the United States has revealed new opportunities for transatlantic cooperation. For Brazil, Europe is no longer just a client: it is poised to become a long-term strategic partner. It is now up to lawyers and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to turn this opportunity into lasting, mutually beneficial relationships.
Scrivi a Federico
The importance of understanding the other side’s negotiating style
13.07.2025
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Италия
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США
- Распространение
- Налог
On 29 June 2025, the Vietnamese government introduced Decree No. 163/2025/ND-CP (Decree 163). This decree provides detailed guidance on how the updated Law on Pharmacy will be implemented.
Like the amended Law on Pharmacy, Decree 163 came into effect on 1 July 2025, replacing the previous Decree No. 54/2017/ND-CP (Decree 54). The new decree sets out comprehensive rules for key aspects of managing pharmaceuticals, including:
- Pharmacy practice certificates
- Certificates allowing pharmaceutical businesses to operate
- Import and export of medicines and drug ingredients
- Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) inspections of overseas manufacturers
- Recalling medicines and drug ingredients
- Certificates for medicine advertising content
- Medicine price management
Key Changes in Decree 163
Here are some important changes and additions introduced by Decree 163:
Destroying Specially Controlled Medicines
You no longer need to get approval from the relevant authority before destroying narcotic, psychotropic, and precursor drugs, or pharmaceutical ingredients that are narcotic or psychotropic substances or precursors used in medicines. Instead, you just need to provide notification at least seven working days in advance. This notification must include the planned destruction date and a detailed list of items to be destroyed.
E-commerce in Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical businesses that sell products online must openly display the following information to ensure transparency and consumer safety:
- Their certificate allowing them to operate as a pharmaceutical business.
- The pharmacy practice certificate of the person responsible for pharmaceutical expertise.
- Information about the medicines themselves.
Shelf-Life Rules for Imported Products
For medicines and ingredients with a total shelf life of nine months or less, at least one-third of their shelf life must remain when they clear customs. Medicines with a shelf life of 30 days or less must still be within their shelf life at the time of customs clearance.
Controlling Imported Products
All medicines with marketing authorisation (MA) are subject to import control, except for:
- Medicines needed for preventing and treating Group A infectious diseases that have been declared epidemics, as per the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases.
- Medicines with a shelf life of less than 30 days.
Importers must inform the provincial People’s Committee at least five working days before making a customs declaration. The People’s Committee can then issue a written notice of non-compliance to the customs authority within five working days of receiving this notification.
Medicine Advertising
Decree 163 adds a process that allows an approved medicine advertising certificate to be adjusted for certain changes (such as a change to the MA holder or manufacturer information). This means you don’t have to go through the entire initial registration process for medicine advertising content again, as was required under the previous rules.
Medicine Price Management
Businesses must announce or re-announce wholesale prices, similar to the medicine price declaration process under Decree 54. Some medicines are exempt from this requirement, including those provided free of charge for emergency responses, national health programmes, humanitarian aid, clinical trials, scientific research, or exhibition purposes, and medicines carried as personal luggage.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) can make recommendations if the announced or re-announced price is significantly higher than similar medicines already on the market. This includes situations where:
- The announced or re-announced wholesale price of the medicine is higher than the highest price of similar medicines.
- The price difference is more than 35% (for medicines priced under VND 1 million) or 15% (for medicines priced at VND 1 million and above) compared to winning bid prices in tenders.
- The announced or re-announced price is higher than prices in the country of origin or other markets (if there’s no similar product in Vietnam).
- When such differences are found, the MOH issues a formal recommendation to the announcing business and publishes it online for transparency and accountability.
Further Guidance in New Circular
On 1 July 2025, the MOH issued Circular No. 31/2025/TT-BYT (Circular 31), which further details how the amended Law on Pharmacy and Decree 163 should be implemented. Circular 31 officially replaces Circular No. 07/2018/TT-BYT and Decree 54 and came into effect immediately.
Key provisions of Circular 31 include:
Notification of Practising Pharmacists
Pharmaceutical businesses that are not part of a pharmacy chain must inform the relevant authority of a list of people currently working at the business who hold pharmacy practice certificates. This notification must be submitted within 15 days of the date the certificate allowing the pharmaceutical business to operate was issued, or when there are any changes to the list. This is a shorter deadline than the previous 30 days under earlier rules.
Pharmacy chains have similar notification duties and deadlines. Specifically, the chain operator must inform the provincial authority where each pharmacy in the chain is located about the list of practising pharmacists at those sites. Additionally, pharmacy chains must notify the authority if pharmacies are added or removed from the chain, and if there are any rotations of the people responsible for pharmaceutical expertise between pharmacies within the chain.
Medicine Information Activities
Under Circular 31, medicine information can still be given to healthcare professionals through information materials, seminars, and medical representatives.
However, Circular 31 introduces a significant change by removing the need to obtain a certificate for medicine information content before carrying out these activities. Under the new rules, pharmaceutical businesses, representative offices of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Vietnam, and MA holders are now responsible for creating and distributing medicine information materials. These materials must comply with the package inserts for medicines approved by the MOH, the Vietnamese National Drug Formulary, and any related documents and professional instructions issued or recognised by the MOH.
Donald Trump, never one to shy away from drama or diplomacy-via-caps-lock, has slapped a 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States. The justification? In his own delicate prose: «The treatment of former President Jair Bolsonaro is a disgrace… A witch hunt that must end IMMEDIATELY!»
And just in case anyone thought this was about trade imbalances or economic strategy, Trump made things crystal clear: «Due to Brazil’s insidious attacks on free elections…».
In short, the 50% tariff isn’t about coffee, orange juice, or flip-flops. It’s about a Supreme Court judgment, applying Brazilian law, regarding Brazilian politicians accused of conspiring in a coup d’état. In other words, this is a brazen (and frankly absurd) attempt at judicial intervention via trade war.
Trump, with his characteristic subtlety, offered a solution: manufacture in the U.S., and he’ll look kindly upon Brazil, like a mafia don offering «protection» after smashing your shop window. But what he meant was: consider Bolsonaro innocent, and we’ll talk.
The Brazilian market took the bait
Although the fishy interference in Brazilian affairs was determined from a fish out of the water, the market took the bait: in the first 48 hours after the infamous letter, at least 1500 tons of fish were already held in Brazilian ports, as US buyers suspended their contracts due to uncertainty about the costs upon arrival. The fish market is on alert, as 80% of the exports head to the US, mainly coming from small family-owned industries that distribute the catch from artisanal fishing communities.
The same effect hit other sectors, from orange, honey, and coffee to aircraft.
Brazil’s response and sorcery: don’t mess with us (or our weather)
Naturally, Brazil will not sit quietly sipping caipirinhas while its sovereignty is trampled. Reciprocity is on the table: if Washington raises tariffs, Brasília can do the same. But above all, one thing is sure: Brazil will never tolerate foreign interference in its independent judiciary.
And then, a curious coincidence: right after Trump’s speech, a tornado accompanied by lightning struck the White House grounds. Pure chance? Maybe. Or could it have been the work of Brazilian indigenous shamans, a particularly well-organized group of umbanda practitioners, or simply the fact that, as every Brazilian child knows, God is Brazilian.
Trump might want to check the weather forecast next time before penning another angry letter.
The unpredictable becoming predictable
Trade wars are rarely tidy affairs, but one thing they consistently deliver is chaos (in legal terms, disruption). And when disruption meets contracts, force majeure disputes often end up in court.
At first glance, Trump’s decision to impose a 50% tariff overnight might feel like an unpredictable thunderbolt (quite literally, given the weather at the White House). But here’s the catch: by now, unpredictable tariffs are becoming predictable. When a government with a well-documented love for impulsive economic diplomacy imposes politically motivated tariffs, can anyone claim to be surprised?
In most jurisdictions, force majeure requires that the event be extraordinary, unforeseeable, and beyond the parties’ control. A sudden 50% tariff certainly ticks a few of those boxes, but following a repetition of erratic trade policy, one might argue that businesses should expect what in past times was considered unexpected, especially when dealing with certain jurisdictions or political figures. In other words, Trump’s tariffs might not excuse performance if parties didn’t prepare for exactly this kind of volatility.
This is where good contract drafting comes into play
Savvy businesses are learning that their contracts must go beyond a vague boilerplate clause about “acts of government” or “changes in law.” Instead, they should expressly address the risk of sudden tariff changes, including
- hardship clauses that allow renegotiation when costs become commercially unreasonable;
- price adjustment mechanisms linked to tariff thresholds;
- termination rights triggered by specified levels of customs duties;
- currency fluctuation provisions (because tariffs rarely travel alone, and currency swings often accompany them).
In short, while no contract can immunize a business from every shock, smart drafting can mean the difference between a commercial headache and a catastrophic breach.
Therefore, tariffs may no longer be an unpredictable storm; they are part of the new predictable landscape. Given that your contract might wake up tomorrow facing ‘IMMEDIATE’ punitive tariffs in all caps, your contract should be ready today.
The unwitting cupid: strengthening EU-Brazil relations
While the tariffs may ruffle trade flows between Brasília and Washington, there’s an unintended silver lining: Trump is proving to be the most efficient matchmaker between Brazil and other markets, such as China and the European Union.
The EU-Brazil relationship, already a flirtation with promising prospects, with relevant progress in the EU-Mercosur Agreement, now seems destined for deeper romance. If Mr. Trump insists on isolating the US from Brazil, the old continent stands ready, with flowers and wine in hand, to pick up where the US left off. After all, Brazilian fish can pair up nicely with champagne, cava and prosecco.
So thank you, Mr. Trump. In your quest to bully Brazil into submission, you may have done more to strengthen transatlantic ties than any EU Commissioner ever could. As they say in Brasília these days: Trump is not a trade warrior. He’s a cupid in disguise.
The recent announcement of a landmark trade agreement framework, following just three months negotiations since President Trump’s tariffs announcement on 2 April 2025, signals a pivotal shift, not merely in bilateral relations, but in the broader architecture of global supply chains.
As a commercial lawyer with exposure to Vietnam since 2007, I have observed the evolving dynamics between the United States and Vietnam through the years, talking to students, entrepreneurs, veterans, diplomats, humans from all walks all life, from both nations and beyond.
You may recall that Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China, was to be the nation that would encounter the most stringent tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, reaching an astonishing 46%.
The newly forged framework outlines significant reciprocal concessions designed to foster greater trade and investment flows. Granted, pre-April 2 tariffs applied by the USA on Vietnamese goods were lower than what emerges from the framework agreement, but still, it is better than 46%),
The United States has committed to imposing a 20% tariff on most Vietnamese imports, a notable reduction from the previously mooted 46%. However, a substantial 40% tariff will apply to goods re-exported from third countries, with a particular focus on those originating from China.
Vietnam has pledged to open its market to a wide array of US products. Crucially, it has also committed to implementing stringent measures aimed at restricting the transshipment of Chinese goods through its territory, a long-standing concern for Washington.
In a significant win for American exporters, US goods will now enjoy duty-free access to the Vietnamese market, effectively granting “total access”, particularly for large-engine vehicles such as SUVs, as emphatically stated by President Trump (how SUVs are going to circulate in the narrow alleys of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, infested by swarms of mopeds, is a different story).
This agreement is expected to catalyse growth in several key sectors. Electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (especially Liquefied Natural Gas), and agriculture are poised for expansion. US firms specialising in manufacturing technology, energy solutions, and agricultural products are anticipated to be the primary beneficiaries. Furthermore, beyond immediate trade benefits, the agreement is set to reshape investment strategies, encouraging a greater localisation of supply chains within Vietnam. This strategic realignment is also expected to further solidify the already robust US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
While the potential upsides are considerable, it is imperative for businesses and investors to approach this new landscape with a clear understanding of the accompanying risks. From my vantage point, I identify several significant execution challenges and structural impediments that require close monitoring.
Enforcement of Transshipment Controls
The most immediate and perhaps formidable risk lies in the effective enforcement of transshipment controls. Vietnam has historically served as a significant assembly point for Chinese-manufactured components. Ensuring that goods originating from China are not merely re-routed through Vietnam to circumvent US tariffs will require exceptionally close monitoring and robust verification mechanisms. The legal and practical complexities of definitively determining the true country of origin for all goods will undoubtedly pose a persistent challenge. As a European citizen, witnessing how the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“EVFTA”), which poses an important stress on certificates of origin, I am particularly aware of this matter.
While Vietnam has made remarkable strides in its economic development, certain structural issues could hinder its capacity to scale up high-value manufacturing in the short to medium term. These include:
Legal framework nuances
Vietnam’s legal framework for foreign investment has seen continuous improvements, but legal and cultural complexities and inconsistencies can and do still arise. Navigating the regulatory landscape, particularly with new rules stemming from this agreement and at a time of deep administrative, governmental, digital and legal reforms in Vietnam, will demand expert legal guidance to ensure compliance and mitigate potential fines and disputes. Issues surrounding so-called sublicences for businesses, intellectual property rights enforcement and contract enforceability, whilst improving, still require careful consideration;
Education
The ambition to transform Vietnam into a high-value manufacturing hub necessitates a workforce equipped with advanced skills. While the Vietnamese government prioritises education and workforce development, a significant portion of the current labour force lacks formal training and specialised certifications, let alone a good command of the English language. Bridging this skills gap, particularly in areas like advanced manufacturing, engineering, and digital technologies is a necessity and not just in light of this framework agreement. Companies may need to factor in substantial investment in training and upskilling programmes for their Vietnamese employees.
Infrastructures
Despite considerable investment, Vietnam’s infrastructure, particularly in logistics, energy, and transportation, continues to face bottlenecks. And China – the apparent target of Trump’s tariffs – is stepping in with high-speed trains connecting it to the northern Provinces of Vietnam. An increased volume of high-value manufacturing and trade will place further strain on existing infrastructure. Inadequate port capacity, congested roads, and a reliable energy supply (including for EV charging) are critical concerns that could impact efficiency and increase operational costs for businesses.
Policy divergence
This framework agreement deepens US-Vietnam trade ties and seems to be paving the way for more US investments in Vietnam, but this second aspect seems to run counter to parallel US policy objectives aimed at reshoring manufacturing back to the United States. This potential divergence in strategic priorities could introduce yet another element of unpredictability in the long term, necessitating a flexible and adaptable investment approach. Future shifts in US policy could impact the durability and full extent of the benefits derived from this agreement.
This trade agreement, if finalised and implemented, undoubtedly represents a structural shift in global trade dynamics. It strategically positions Vietnam as an increasingly important high-value manufacturing hub and significantly deepens US engagement in Southeast Asia. We will need time, however, to assess the practical impact of the agreement, observing the efficacy of its implementation, and understanding how Vietnam’s inherent strengths and challenges will ultimately shape its role in the reconfigured global supply chain.
We will also need to see what China, if anything, will do as a countermeasure. In fact, any assessment of Vietnam’s evolving trade landscape would be incomplete without a thorough consideration of China’s influence and strategic posture. President Xi Jinping has consistently championed a vision of a “community of shared future for mankind,” a concept that, while outwardly promoting global cooperation, also subtly underscores a demand for international alignment with Beijing’s interests. In the context of escalating trade tensions, Xi has repeatedly warned that “trade wars have no winners,” advocating for unity against protectionist measures, yet simultaneously implying that nations must ultimately choose sides, either with or against China’s economic and political orbit. Vietnam, despite its historical complexities and occasional maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea (or East Sea, as it is officially called by Hanoi), remains deeply interwoven with China’s economy. China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner for many years, with significant inflows of Chinese FDI, loans, and project contractors. This economic dependency is particularly evident in various sectors, where Chinese components and materials form a substantial part of Vietnamese manufacturing supply chains. While Vietnam has actively sought to diversify its trade partners and reduce its reliance on China, the sheer scale of the bilateral economic relationship means that disentanglement is a long-term, complex endeavour. Furthermore, China’s influence extends beyond direct trade into crucial regional resources. The Mekong River, a lifeline for millions in Southeast Asia, originates in China, which has constructed numerous upstream dams.
As Vietnam navigates its enhanced trade relationship with the United States, it must simultaneously contend with the enduring economic gravity and strategic ambitions of its northern giant neighbour. Any perceived move by Vietnam to significantly shift away from China could invite retaliatory measures or heightened pressure from Beijing. Businesses investing in Vietnam must not only grasp the intricacies of the US-Vietnam agreement but also meticulously analyse how these developments will intersect with, and potentially be impacted by, the intricate, often delicate, and sometimes fraught relationship between Hanoi and Beijing. Understanding this geopolitical tightrope will be essential for sustainable success in the Vietnamese market. Prudence, informed legal counsel, and a keen eye on evolving geopolitical and economic realities will be paramount for those seeking to capitalise on this transformative new chapter.
Takeaways
- Tariffs:The US-Vietnam framework agreement marks a significant departure from previous trade dynamics, reducing US tariffs on most Vietnamese imports to 20% (from a mooted 46%) while imposing a 40% tariff on transshipped goods, especially from China.
- Vietnam’s market opening:Vietnam has committed to duty-free access for a broad range of US products and stricter controls on Chinese goods transiting its territory.
- Growth / manufacturing shift potential:The agreement is expected to fuel expansion in Vietnamese electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (LNG), and agriculture. It also encourages supply chain localisation within Vietnam (normally more of an assembly point for Chinese products).
- Execution challenges: Effectively preventing the re-routing of Chinese goods through Vietnam to avoid tariffs will be a complex and demanding task; Despite economic progress, Vietnam faces hurdles in scaling high-value manufacturing due to legal framework nuances (e.g., sublicences, IP enforcement), a skills gap in its workforce (lack of formal training, English proficiency) and infrastructure bottlenecks (logistics, energy, transportation).
- US policy divergence:The agreement’s encouragement of US investment in Vietnam appears to contradict the broader US policy objective of reshoring manufacturing.
- China:Businesses must consider China’s significant economic sway over Vietnam, including its position as Vietnam’s largest trading partner, its FDI, and its control over shared resources like the Mekong River. Any major shift by Vietnam away from China could lead to retaliatory measures from Beijing.
- Uncertainty:This is not a final agreement, so the situation might change. Prudence and informed legal counsel are crucial for businesses navigating this evolving landscape.
The Trump approach: power and dominance
In his autobiography, The Art of the Deal, Donald Trump describes negotiation as a contest of strength, determination, and dominance. His vision is clear: anyone who shows uncertainty or makes concessions too early is immediately perceived as a loser. His negotiating style is based on constant pressure, maximalist demands, and calculated threats, to obtain unilateral advantages. In this scheme, compromise is not a point of arrival, but a sign of weakness to be avoided.
Trump has always been a competitive negotiator, focused on immediate results and uninterested in balanced solutions unless they are strictly functional to his interests.
Other negotiating styles: compromising and collaborative
In contrast to this competitive approach, there are two other relevant negotiating styles:
- The compromising style aims to reach a ‘middle ground’ agreement, in which both parties give something up to achieve an acceptable solution. It is a pragmatic approach, practical in situations where time is limited or positions are too far apart for genuine collaboration.
- The collaborative style, on the other hand, aims to create win-win solutions. The parties seek to thoroughly understand each other’s interests and work together to build an outcome that maximizes the benefit for both. It requires openness, time, and trust.
In commercial negotiations, the compromising or collaborative approach can only work if the other party shares the same logic. But when dealing with an explicitly competitive actor such as Trump, adopting a compromising style risks seriously penalizing the other party, for at least three reasons:
- It conveys weakness
An accommodating gesture is seen not as a sign of openness, but as a point of pressure to be exploited. The competitive negotiator, focused on gaining an immediate advantage, interprets it as a willingness to give even more.
- It relinquishes bargaining power
The EU has a vast market and significant trade levers, especially in a context where the US is closing the door to the Chinese market. Offering concessions at the outset is tantamount to burning your cards without getting anything in return. In a competitive confrontation, the first move can set the tone for the negotiation: once a concession has been made, it is very difficult to backtrack.
- It legitimizes the negotiating imbalance
An unbalanced compromise, if accepted without resistance, risks becoming the new basis for future trade relations, systematically penalizing the EU in subsequent rounds.
Why 30%? The anchor technique
Trump often uses a negotiating technique known as the anchor technique. This consists of deliberately setting a very high target at the beginning of the negotiation (in our case, the threat of 30% tariffs).
The aim is to create a psychological perimeter for the negotiation and force the other party to reason on the basis of that figure, even though they are aware that it is arbitrary. This technique allows one to influence the scope of the discussion and obtain greater concessions, just as Trump has done.
The worst response: unilateral concessions with no return
Unfortunately, the European Union has already shown worrying signs of a compromising attitude that has not been negotiated with the Trump administration, for example:
- The waiver of the web tax* on American digital giants, without obtaining any regulation or shared tax contribution in return.
- The offer to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, made to reassure Washington, without obtaining anything in return.
- The acceptance of the increase in NATO spending to 5% of GDP, demanded by Trump, again without obtaining anything in return.
All these offers without asking for anything in return reinforce the idea that the EU is willing to concede from the outset. Trump, true to his competitive logic, sees these concessions as a starting point, not a compromise: this pushes him to raise his demands, not moderate them.
Persevering would be a fatal mistake
Continuing along this path of compromise, in the hope that accommodation will ease the pressure, would be not only ineffective but counterproductive. With a competitive negotiator, unilateral concessions do not stop escalation: they fuel it. Any sign of weakness is interpreted as additional room for maneuver.
A helpful example is China’s reaction during the trade war initiated by Trump. Faced with massive tariffs imposed by the US, Beijing responded in kind, imposing equivalent tariffs. Instead of giving in, it spoke the same language of power. The result is there for all to see: after weeks of escalation, the US had to moderate its position, opening up to a more balanced agreement.
The right strategy: speak his language
To avoid the mistakes of the past, the EU should therefore reverse its negotiating logic. Not to fuel confrontation, but to restore a credible balance. Some applicable countermeasures could be:
- Target Trump’s electoral base, particularly the agricultural sectors (soy, corn, beef), with selective tariffs or targeted restrictions.
- Put the European web tax* back on the table, even with a minimum rate, linking any exemptions to real concessions from the US.
These well-calibrated moves would strengthen the EU’s position and show that it can defend its interests by speaking a language Trump understands: that of strength and bargaining power.
Going beyond requests, seeking the other party’s interests
A fundamental principle in any negotiation is to identify the other side’s interests and find a way to allow them to achieve them without sacrificing your own. This is no easy task, given Trump’s notorious volatility and the lack of sound arguments to justify the demands made in the negotiations.
In the case of the EU-US negotiations, it must be borne in mind that Trump is playing the game with his electoral base in mind: an agreement must offer him a narrative of victory to communicate to his electorate.
Takeaway
When negotiating with a competitive player like Trump, one should abandon the accommodating approach, avoid concessions without something in return, and adopt a style that is more assertive, strategic, and symmetrical.
Only then will it be able to build an agreement that is solid, fair, and respectful of its economic and political strength.
I have often dealt with commercial distribution agreements between Italian and Chinese companies, sometimes following negotiations in the wine sector for various types of agreements: sales, distribution, franchising, establishment of joint ventures, and sales through online stores.
I am sharing some key considerations for approaching this complex but opportunity-rich market.
📌 Here are my 10 takeaways
Step Zero. Protect your IP
it is essential to protect your intellectual property before entering China. This includes trademarks (including their Chinese transliteration), labels, web domains, and social media accounts. Neglecting this aspect can have disastrous consequences, exposing you to the widespread phenomenon of trademark squatting (even famous names such as Michael Jordan, Elon Musk, and Donald Trump have fallen victim to this).
For more information, you can read this article about Intellectual property protection in China
1 — Know your enemy
trust is good, but mistrust is better. Before entering into commercial agreements, it is essential to check the credentials of potential partners through the databases of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. When it comes to wine, it is necessary to check whether the prospective distributor has a license to import and distribute wine.
2 — No copy-paste
Contracts must be tailor-made, adapting them to local specificities. In particular, it is crucial to clearly regulate promotional activities: budget, commercial actions, communication methods, and management of the producer’s trademarks. It is also best to write the contract in Chinese to ensure that there are no misunderstandings and in case it needs to be used before a judge or local administrative body, as Chinese is the only official language. (N.B.: if you think of entrusting the task to ChatGPT, this is not a good idea).
For an in-depth article, check out The commercial distribution contract in China
3 — Decide immediately how and where to litigate
It may seem counterintuitive, but it is best to avoid providing for Italian (or French, or German) jurisdiction and applicable law, which is an ineffective solution, especially in cases where urgent action is needed to stop unfair competition or counterfeiting. Consider applying Chinese law and provide for an arbitration clause at CIETAC. An effective dispute management strategy is a key element of the agreement and must be negotiated carefully. (P.S.: This applies not only to China but to all international agreements. For more information, see this article).
4 — China is big
And it is the sum of many very different internal markets. Exclusivity should be granted for good reasons, but only if the distributor has a well-developed commercial network and can achieve specific shared objectives. If granted, it should be limited to the province where the distributor is based and subject to the achievement of agreed sales volumes. Having a single distributor for the whole of China is like entrusting an Italian distributor with promoting a product throughout Europe. Or appoint a NYC-based company to promote and sell your wines in all 50 US States.
5 — China is far away
Delegating everything to the local distributor and taking no interest in what is happening on the Chinese market is never a good idea. Firstly, because you have no idea how, where, and with what results the wines are being sold. Secondly, because you cannot verify compliance with agreements, for example on non-competition or the use of trademarks. It is therefore important to schedule meetings to share commercial policies and be able to verify what is happening, including through audits and visits to warehouses and the sales network.
6 — China is expensive
Competition in the Chinese domestic market is fierce. This is also true in terms of price, as some countries that are direct competitors of Italy (Australia, Chile, New Zealand) have free trade agreements and can therefore enter the market on more favorable terms than Italian wine, which is subject to a total tax burden of around 43% after payment of duties, excise taxes, and VAT. It is necessary to position oneself in the right market segment (medium-high), and to do so, it is necessary to plan the right commercial actions together with the distributor. Selling Ex-Works and hoping that the distributor will take care of everything is not an excellent strategy for being competitive.
7 — China is dangerous
Scams are always around the corner. In the wine world in particular, for example, spontaneous expressions of interest are frequent, arriving via the company website, social media accounts, or directly via email. They sound like this: we have discovered your wines, we think they are fantastic, we want to place an order immediately. If it sounds too good and easy, it is certainly a scam. There is an easy way to check: if the next step is a request for payment of a few thousand euros, justified by the need to register the wines on the CIFER (China Imported Food Enterprise Registration) portal, or to register your trademark to prevent others from doing so, or to authenticate the signature on the sales contract… these are attempts at fraud, and the elusive order will never arrive after payment has been received. How can you check whether the person you are dealing with is a reputable company or a fraudster? 👉🏼Go back to point 1 (here is an in-depth article).
8 — E-commerce? Yes, but with method (and money)
Online wine sales continue to grow, but entering large platforms is complex, competition is fierce, and running an online store requires meticulous planning and highly efficient system implementation. The online market in China is all pay-for-play. Nothing is achieved with no money or minimal effort. If you want to sell online, you need to build an omnichannel system integrated with traditional distribution, and to do this, it is essential to involve a local partner with well-defined investments and responsibilities.
9 — China is not a market for everyone
You need to protect your brands, study the market thoroughly, know your competition (both foreign and local), find the right market channel, select a distributor motivated to invest time and money in promoting your product, and be willing to support them with the right investments. If you want to build a serious plan to enter the Chinese market, you must have a medium- to long-term perspective. There are no shortcuts (actually, there are many, but they almost always lead to wasted time and money). If you are unwilling to invest in entering the Chinese market through the front door, it is unlikely that anyone else will do it for you.
10 — Don’t do it yourself
If you have read up to point 9 and are still keen to enter the Chinese market, consider doing so professionally, involving consultants who can support your company throughout the market research, scouting, negotiation, and contract drafting processes. This is also part of the investment needed to build and develop a solid and resilient business model. This advice applies to all foreign markets, and even more so to China.
The most dangerous mistake one can make after the announcement of the (partial) suspension of U.S. duties for 90 days is to hope that everything will go well and we will return to the pre-April 2 world.
First, because very invasive tariffs remain in place: 10 percent on all countries that trade with the U.S., including the EU, 25 percent on automotive, 25 percent on steel and aluminum, 145 percent on China.
Second, because it is impossible to predict the actions of the U.S. Administration in the short and medium term: it cannot be ruled out that tariffs will remain, increase, change targets or that other factors will intervene to turn the tide in international markets, such as an escalation of the trade war with China.
The 90-day suspension is an opportunity
The U.S.’s temporary suspension of tariffs represents a valuable window that should be used not only as a truce but also as a valuable room for action: 90 days to rehash contracts, renegotiate key clauses, and insert levers of flexibility that can protect business in various future scenarios in the U.S. and other markets.
Today’s exporters cannot afford to «sit back and see what will happen»-it is time to act, and to do so professionally and strategically. Let’s look at a checklist of important points to consider.
What do contracts with customers and suppliers entail?
The first point is to survey agreements with the trade network in the U.S. and other countries that export to the U.S., as well as with upstream suppliers in the supply chain.
Is there a written contract? The worst-case scenario — unfortunately a very frequent one — is when the parties cooperate informally, only based on orders and order confirmations. This leaves undefined not only what happens in the case of imposition of duties, but also a whole range of other points, for example, limits on damages that can be claimed in the case of breach of contract, the duration of the agreement, the applicable law, and how any disputes will be resolved.
Another very problematic scenario is one in which contracts exist, but they are generic and do not include the necessary covenants to manage the risks involved in operating in a highly litigious market such as the U.S., which, moreover, has very high legal costs.
Having done this analysis, the necessary actions can be put in place, prioritizing according to the importance of business relationships and as appropriate:
- Negotiate and conclude a written contract from scratch
- Replace the existing agreement with a complete and correct contract
- Amend and integrate the existing agreement with pacts to manage tariffs and other causes of price fluctuations
Let us dwell on the last scenario, assuming that there is a complete and correct contract but one that does not regulate price and cost fluctuation as a direct or indirect consequence of the introduction of duties.
Contract Addendum
In such cases, the correct course of action is to sign an Addendum to the original contract, specifying which covenants are being waived and which covenants are being added. It is essential that the Addendum be negotiated and signed by persons with the power of representation of the parties and that it be drafted with the help of lawyers who specialize in this field. In addition to including correct clauses, it is necessary to verify that the covenants are valid according to the rules of law applicable to the contract.
Here are some clauses that can be the subject of the Addendum, to be modulated according to the specific case and possible scenarios.
Tariff Cost Sharing
By introducing this covenant, it is provided that in the event that duties are confirmed at [x]% or are reduced or increased within certain established thresholds, the Parties will share the increase equally, or according to other established percentages.
There may also be a ceiling on tariffs beyond which a party has the right to withdraw from the contract or request the suspension of certain orders for a specified period of time, after which it has the right to withdraw.
Price Adjustment
With this covenant, a discount or an increase in the product’s price is agreed upon, as the case may be, in the case of a duty greater than [x]%.
Among the use cases, in addition to that of the company exporting to the U.S. or other intermediate markets, with final destination of the products in the U.S., is that of those who purchase a product subject to import duty and resell it, processed or assembled.
Right to Cancel or Postpone Confirmed Orders
This covenant gives the right to revoke or suspend for a certain period already negotiated orders, as such binding, in case of confirmation or introduction of duties above a certain threshold, for example, if 20% taxation was confirmed for the import of wine from the EU.
The clause can be combined with previous covenants, for example, by stipulating that below the specified threshold, the contracts remain valid, and the parties share the duty or have the right to renegotiate the price.
Supply Forecast Adjustment
With this clause the Parties can modify supply programs already agreed for a specific duration (e.g., 24 months), with continuous sales and purchase obligations at a fixed price or indexable only within certain limits. The aim is to agree on the prerequisites for reshaping supply programs in the short and medium term, which can be very useful for defining the rules that will apply to relationships with key suppliers or customers for possible changes in volumes, delivery times, and prices.
Right to Source from Alternative Suppliers
This covenant serves to be authorized, if necessary, to source alternative suppliers of components or raw materials to those previously authorized in the contract with the end customer, for example, in cases where purchasing from the original suppliers has become too costly or difficult due to duties imposed at import or in previous steps in the supply chain, or other events such as currency or price fluctuation of certain commodities beyond a certain level established in the agreement.
Hardship and Force Majeure
The imposition of duties cannot be invoked as a cause of Force Majeure or hardship, respectively, to excuse contract non-performance or to renegotiate the price, even in cases of very high price increases (such as the 145% duty imposed on Chinese products). This conclusion is almost uniform under the law and jurisprudence of the major countries involved in the tariff war: U.S., China, Canada, Mexico, France and Italy: I refer to this practical guide for a timely examination of what the various rules provide.
If the contract lacks a well drafter Force Majeure and Hardship clause, or contains a generic clause, it is important to get your hands on revising it to expressly state the cases in which a party is entitled to suspend or terminate the contract, how and when to communicate the decision to invoke the exemption, and the consequences on the parties’ contractual obligations. You can go deeper on this topic here.
Conclusion
It is essential to prepare for possible future scenarios regarding duties (confirmed, increased, changed, or decreased) and to determine the consequences on trade relations with foreign clients and suppliers: moving today, at a standstill (or nearly so), allows entrepreneurs to negotiate shared and fair solutions and to avoid, as far as possible, the emergence of tensions and conflicts with the various partners along the international supply chain.
The case: A consumer bought a Ford car in Italy from an Italian car distributor. The car was manufactured by Ford WAG in Germany and supplied by Ford Italia, which belong to the same group of companies. Following an accident in December 2001 in which the airbag failed, the consumer sued the Italian distributor as well as Ford Italia for damages. Ford Italia disputed the claims for damages asserted against it, arguing that it had not manufactured the vehicle and, because it was itself only a distributor/supplier, referred to Ford WAG in Germany as the actual manufacturer.
Question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) referred the following question to the ECJ:
- the manufacturer’s liability under the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC is limited in accordance with Art 3 to cases where the supplier physically puts his name, trade mark, or other distinguishing feature on the product to create confusion between his identity and that of the actual manufacturer;
- or is the distributor liable as a “quasi-producer” even if he has not physically put his name or trademark on the product, but nevertheless «presents himself as its producer» within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive by using the distinguishing feature in his company name, which was put on the car by another person, but leading to identity with the actual car manufacturer.
ECJ judgement (European Court of Justice) of 19/12/2024, Case C-157/23
A company that does not manufacture a product itself, but only distributes it, can still be considered a «manufacturer» within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC). This is the case if the distributor puts his name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product and consequently presents itself as the manufacturer. According to the ECJ, this can give the consumer the impression that the distributor is responsible for the quality and safety of the product.
However, the ECJ emphasizes that liability does not depend on whether the distributor puts the sign on the product itself. The distributor did not do so in the specific case. However, the distributor used the corresponding distinguishing feature in its company name. According to the ECJ, the decisive factor is, therefore, whether the distributor uses this name match to gain the trust of consumers and is thus perceived as a responsible manufacturer.
The distributor is jointly and severally liable with the actual manufacturer. This means that consumers can either make a claim against the manufacturer or the dealer directly. However, the dealer has the right to ask for a regress for the damage incurred from the actual manufacturer.
Remarks
The ECJ emphasizes consumer protection. In my opinion, this argument is slightly overstretched:
- According to the ECJ, the consumer should not be burdened with the complex task of identifying the actual manufacturer of a defective product.
- A distributor that sells a product and uses its name or trademark to do so creates trust in the consumer. This trust is to be protected by the liability of the authorized distributor — regardless of whether the distributor has actively put its trademark on the product or not.
- This increases the liability risk for authorized car dealers because they must obtain appropriate insurance against such a risk. In the constellation described above, authorized dealers can be exposed to unexpectedly high claims for damages under strict product liability.
Good advice is not expensive
- It is essential that such cases are legally clarified when drawing up and formulating distribution agreements with car manufacturers and that the ECJ ruling is considered.
- In addition, authorized dealers/distributors should reconsider the use of product names from the actual producer in their company name and/or in their corporate image.
The Brazilian market has not been immune to the protectionist wave of «America First.» If such measures persist over time, they could have a lasting impact on the local economy. Still, a sour lemon can often become a sweet caipirinha in the resilient and optimistic spirit that characterizes both Brazilian society and its entrepreneurs.
As is often the case in the chessboard of global economic geopolitics, a move from one player creates room for another countermove. Brazil reacted with reciprocal trade measures, signaling clearly that it would not accept a position of commercial vulnerability.
This firmer stance — almost unthinkable in earlier years — strengthened Brazil’s image in Europe as a country ready to reposition itself with greater autonomy and pragmatism, opening new doors to international markets. In a world where global value chains are being restructured and reliable trade partners are in high demand, Brazil is increasingly seen not just as a supplier of raw materials, but as a strategic partner in critical industries.
The rapprochement with Europe has been further energized by progress in the Mercosur–European Union Agreement, whose negotiations spanned decades and now seem to be gaining momentum. While the United States embraces a more isolationist commercial posture, Europe is actively diversifying its trade relations — and Brazil, by demonstrating a commitment to clear rules, economic stability, and legal certainty, emerges as a natural candidate to fill that gap.
The Direct Impact of U.S. Tariffs
The trade measures introduced under President Trump primarily affected Brazilian producers of semi-finished steel and primary aluminum, with the removal of long-standing exemptions and quotas. In 2024, Brazil exported US$ 2.2 billion in semi-finished steel to the United States, representing nearly 60% of U.S. imports in that category. In the same year, Brazilian aluminum exports to the U.S. reached US$ 796 million, accounting for 14% of the sector’s total. Losses in exports for 2025 are estimated at around US$ 1.5 billion.
Brazil’s Response and a New Phase
In April 2025, the Brazilian Congress passed a new legal framework for trade retaliation, empowering the Executive Branch to adopt countermeasures in a faster and more technically structured way. The new legislation allows, for example, the automatic imposition of retaliatory tariffs on goods from countries that adopt unilateral measures incompatible with WTO norms; the suspension of tax or customs benefits previously granted under bilateral agreements; the creation of a list of priority sectors for trade defense and diversification of export markets.
Beyond the retaliation itself, the move marked a significant shift in posture: Brazil began positioning itself as an active player in global trade governance, aligning with mid-sized economies that advocate for predictable, balanced, and rules-based trade relations.
An Opportunity for Brazil–Europe Relations
This new stage sets Brazil as a reliable supplier to European industry — not only of raw materials but also of higher-value-added goods, particularly in processed foods, bioenergy, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure.
Moreover, as US–China tensions drive European companies to seek nearshoring or “friend-shoring” strategies with more predictable partners, Brazil, with its clean energy matrix, large domestic market, and relatively stable institutions, emerges as a strong alternative.
Legal Implications and Strategic Recommendations
This changing landscape brings new opportunities for companies and legal advisors involved in Brazil–Europe investment and trade relations. Particular attention should be paid to:
- Monitoring rules of origin in the Mercosur–EU agreement, especially in sectors requiring supply chain restructuring;
- Reviewing contractual and tax structures for import/export operations, including clauses addressing tariff instability or non-tariff barriers (e.g., environmental or sanitary standards), and clearly defining force majeure events;
- Reassessing distribution and agency agreements in light of the new commercial environment;
- Exploring joint ventures and technology transfer arrangements with Brazilian partners, particularly in bioeconomy, green hydrogen, and mineral processing.
From lemon to caipirinha
The world is becoming more fragmented and competitive, but also more open to realignment. What began as a protectionist blow from the United States has revealed new opportunities for transatlantic cooperation. For Brazil, Europe is no longer just a client: it is poised to become a long-term strategic partner. It is now up to lawyers and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to turn this opportunity into lasting, mutually beneficial relationships.
Scrivi a Roberto
Contracts for Wine Distribution in China. 10 takeaways
04.06.2025
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On 29 June 2025, the Vietnamese government introduced Decree No. 163/2025/ND-CP (Decree 163). This decree provides detailed guidance on how the updated Law on Pharmacy will be implemented.
Like the amended Law on Pharmacy, Decree 163 came into effect on 1 July 2025, replacing the previous Decree No. 54/2017/ND-CP (Decree 54). The new decree sets out comprehensive rules for key aspects of managing pharmaceuticals, including:
- Pharmacy practice certificates
- Certificates allowing pharmaceutical businesses to operate
- Import and export of medicines and drug ingredients
- Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) inspections of overseas manufacturers
- Recalling medicines and drug ingredients
- Certificates for medicine advertising content
- Medicine price management
Key Changes in Decree 163
Here are some important changes and additions introduced by Decree 163:
Destroying Specially Controlled Medicines
You no longer need to get approval from the relevant authority before destroying narcotic, psychotropic, and precursor drugs, or pharmaceutical ingredients that are narcotic or psychotropic substances or precursors used in medicines. Instead, you just need to provide notification at least seven working days in advance. This notification must include the planned destruction date and a detailed list of items to be destroyed.
E-commerce in Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical businesses that sell products online must openly display the following information to ensure transparency and consumer safety:
- Their certificate allowing them to operate as a pharmaceutical business.
- The pharmacy practice certificate of the person responsible for pharmaceutical expertise.
- Information about the medicines themselves.
Shelf-Life Rules for Imported Products
For medicines and ingredients with a total shelf life of nine months or less, at least one-third of their shelf life must remain when they clear customs. Medicines with a shelf life of 30 days or less must still be within their shelf life at the time of customs clearance.
Controlling Imported Products
All medicines with marketing authorisation (MA) are subject to import control, except for:
- Medicines needed for preventing and treating Group A infectious diseases that have been declared epidemics, as per the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases.
- Medicines with a shelf life of less than 30 days.
Importers must inform the provincial People’s Committee at least five working days before making a customs declaration. The People’s Committee can then issue a written notice of non-compliance to the customs authority within five working days of receiving this notification.
Medicine Advertising
Decree 163 adds a process that allows an approved medicine advertising certificate to be adjusted for certain changes (such as a change to the MA holder or manufacturer information). This means you don’t have to go through the entire initial registration process for medicine advertising content again, as was required under the previous rules.
Medicine Price Management
Businesses must announce or re-announce wholesale prices, similar to the medicine price declaration process under Decree 54. Some medicines are exempt from this requirement, including those provided free of charge for emergency responses, national health programmes, humanitarian aid, clinical trials, scientific research, or exhibition purposes, and medicines carried as personal luggage.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) can make recommendations if the announced or re-announced price is significantly higher than similar medicines already on the market. This includes situations where:
- The announced or re-announced wholesale price of the medicine is higher than the highest price of similar medicines.
- The price difference is more than 35% (for medicines priced under VND 1 million) or 15% (for medicines priced at VND 1 million and above) compared to winning bid prices in tenders.
- The announced or re-announced price is higher than prices in the country of origin or other markets (if there’s no similar product in Vietnam).
- When such differences are found, the MOH issues a formal recommendation to the announcing business and publishes it online for transparency and accountability.
Further Guidance in New Circular
On 1 July 2025, the MOH issued Circular No. 31/2025/TT-BYT (Circular 31), which further details how the amended Law on Pharmacy and Decree 163 should be implemented. Circular 31 officially replaces Circular No. 07/2018/TT-BYT and Decree 54 and came into effect immediately.
Key provisions of Circular 31 include:
Notification of Practising Pharmacists
Pharmaceutical businesses that are not part of a pharmacy chain must inform the relevant authority of a list of people currently working at the business who hold pharmacy practice certificates. This notification must be submitted within 15 days of the date the certificate allowing the pharmaceutical business to operate was issued, or when there are any changes to the list. This is a shorter deadline than the previous 30 days under earlier rules.
Pharmacy chains have similar notification duties and deadlines. Specifically, the chain operator must inform the provincial authority where each pharmacy in the chain is located about the list of practising pharmacists at those sites. Additionally, pharmacy chains must notify the authority if pharmacies are added or removed from the chain, and if there are any rotations of the people responsible for pharmaceutical expertise between pharmacies within the chain.
Medicine Information Activities
Under Circular 31, medicine information can still be given to healthcare professionals through information materials, seminars, and medical representatives.
However, Circular 31 introduces a significant change by removing the need to obtain a certificate for medicine information content before carrying out these activities. Under the new rules, pharmaceutical businesses, representative offices of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Vietnam, and MA holders are now responsible for creating and distributing medicine information materials. These materials must comply with the package inserts for medicines approved by the MOH, the Vietnamese National Drug Formulary, and any related documents and professional instructions issued or recognised by the MOH.
Donald Trump, never one to shy away from drama or diplomacy-via-caps-lock, has slapped a 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States. The justification? In his own delicate prose: «The treatment of former President Jair Bolsonaro is a disgrace… A witch hunt that must end IMMEDIATELY!»
And just in case anyone thought this was about trade imbalances or economic strategy, Trump made things crystal clear: «Due to Brazil’s insidious attacks on free elections…».
In short, the 50% tariff isn’t about coffee, orange juice, or flip-flops. It’s about a Supreme Court judgment, applying Brazilian law, regarding Brazilian politicians accused of conspiring in a coup d’état. In other words, this is a brazen (and frankly absurd) attempt at judicial intervention via trade war.
Trump, with his characteristic subtlety, offered a solution: manufacture in the U.S., and he’ll look kindly upon Brazil, like a mafia don offering «protection» after smashing your shop window. But what he meant was: consider Bolsonaro innocent, and we’ll talk.
The Brazilian market took the bait
Although the fishy interference in Brazilian affairs was determined from a fish out of the water, the market took the bait: in the first 48 hours after the infamous letter, at least 1500 tons of fish were already held in Brazilian ports, as US buyers suspended their contracts due to uncertainty about the costs upon arrival. The fish market is on alert, as 80% of the exports head to the US, mainly coming from small family-owned industries that distribute the catch from artisanal fishing communities.
The same effect hit other sectors, from orange, honey, and coffee to aircraft.
Brazil’s response and sorcery: don’t mess with us (or our weather)
Naturally, Brazil will not sit quietly sipping caipirinhas while its sovereignty is trampled. Reciprocity is on the table: if Washington raises tariffs, Brasília can do the same. But above all, one thing is sure: Brazil will never tolerate foreign interference in its independent judiciary.
And then, a curious coincidence: right after Trump’s speech, a tornado accompanied by lightning struck the White House grounds. Pure chance? Maybe. Or could it have been the work of Brazilian indigenous shamans, a particularly well-organized group of umbanda practitioners, or simply the fact that, as every Brazilian child knows, God is Brazilian.
Trump might want to check the weather forecast next time before penning another angry letter.
The unpredictable becoming predictable
Trade wars are rarely tidy affairs, but one thing they consistently deliver is chaos (in legal terms, disruption). And when disruption meets contracts, force majeure disputes often end up in court.
At first glance, Trump’s decision to impose a 50% tariff overnight might feel like an unpredictable thunderbolt (quite literally, given the weather at the White House). But here’s the catch: by now, unpredictable tariffs are becoming predictable. When a government with a well-documented love for impulsive economic diplomacy imposes politically motivated tariffs, can anyone claim to be surprised?
In most jurisdictions, force majeure requires that the event be extraordinary, unforeseeable, and beyond the parties’ control. A sudden 50% tariff certainly ticks a few of those boxes, but following a repetition of erratic trade policy, one might argue that businesses should expect what in past times was considered unexpected, especially when dealing with certain jurisdictions or political figures. In other words, Trump’s tariffs might not excuse performance if parties didn’t prepare for exactly this kind of volatility.
This is where good contract drafting comes into play
Savvy businesses are learning that their contracts must go beyond a vague boilerplate clause about “acts of government” or “changes in law.” Instead, they should expressly address the risk of sudden tariff changes, including
- hardship clauses that allow renegotiation when costs become commercially unreasonable;
- price adjustment mechanisms linked to tariff thresholds;
- termination rights triggered by specified levels of customs duties;
- currency fluctuation provisions (because tariffs rarely travel alone, and currency swings often accompany them).
In short, while no contract can immunize a business from every shock, smart drafting can mean the difference between a commercial headache and a catastrophic breach.
Therefore, tariffs may no longer be an unpredictable storm; they are part of the new predictable landscape. Given that your contract might wake up tomorrow facing ‘IMMEDIATE’ punitive tariffs in all caps, your contract should be ready today.
The unwitting cupid: strengthening EU-Brazil relations
While the tariffs may ruffle trade flows between Brasília and Washington, there’s an unintended silver lining: Trump is proving to be the most efficient matchmaker between Brazil and other markets, such as China and the European Union.
The EU-Brazil relationship, already a flirtation with promising prospects, with relevant progress in the EU-Mercosur Agreement, now seems destined for deeper romance. If Mr. Trump insists on isolating the US from Brazil, the old continent stands ready, with flowers and wine in hand, to pick up where the US left off. After all, Brazilian fish can pair up nicely with champagne, cava and prosecco.
So thank you, Mr. Trump. In your quest to bully Brazil into submission, you may have done more to strengthen transatlantic ties than any EU Commissioner ever could. As they say in Brasília these days: Trump is not a trade warrior. He’s a cupid in disguise.
The recent announcement of a landmark trade agreement framework, following just three months negotiations since President Trump’s tariffs announcement on 2 April 2025, signals a pivotal shift, not merely in bilateral relations, but in the broader architecture of global supply chains.
As a commercial lawyer with exposure to Vietnam since 2007, I have observed the evolving dynamics between the United States and Vietnam through the years, talking to students, entrepreneurs, veterans, diplomats, humans from all walks all life, from both nations and beyond.
You may recall that Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China, was to be the nation that would encounter the most stringent tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, reaching an astonishing 46%.
The newly forged framework outlines significant reciprocal concessions designed to foster greater trade and investment flows. Granted, pre-April 2 tariffs applied by the USA on Vietnamese goods were lower than what emerges from the framework agreement, but still, it is better than 46%),
The United States has committed to imposing a 20% tariff on most Vietnamese imports, a notable reduction from the previously mooted 46%. However, a substantial 40% tariff will apply to goods re-exported from third countries, with a particular focus on those originating from China.
Vietnam has pledged to open its market to a wide array of US products. Crucially, it has also committed to implementing stringent measures aimed at restricting the transshipment of Chinese goods through its territory, a long-standing concern for Washington.
In a significant win for American exporters, US goods will now enjoy duty-free access to the Vietnamese market, effectively granting “total access”, particularly for large-engine vehicles such as SUVs, as emphatically stated by President Trump (how SUVs are going to circulate in the narrow alleys of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, infested by swarms of mopeds, is a different story).
This agreement is expected to catalyse growth in several key sectors. Electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (especially Liquefied Natural Gas), and agriculture are poised for expansion. US firms specialising in manufacturing technology, energy solutions, and agricultural products are anticipated to be the primary beneficiaries. Furthermore, beyond immediate trade benefits, the agreement is set to reshape investment strategies, encouraging a greater localisation of supply chains within Vietnam. This strategic realignment is also expected to further solidify the already robust US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
While the potential upsides are considerable, it is imperative for businesses and investors to approach this new landscape with a clear understanding of the accompanying risks. From my vantage point, I identify several significant execution challenges and structural impediments that require close monitoring.
Enforcement of Transshipment Controls
The most immediate and perhaps formidable risk lies in the effective enforcement of transshipment controls. Vietnam has historically served as a significant assembly point for Chinese-manufactured components. Ensuring that goods originating from China are not merely re-routed through Vietnam to circumvent US tariffs will require exceptionally close monitoring and robust verification mechanisms. The legal and practical complexities of definitively determining the true country of origin for all goods will undoubtedly pose a persistent challenge. As a European citizen, witnessing how the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“EVFTA”), which poses an important stress on certificates of origin, I am particularly aware of this matter.
While Vietnam has made remarkable strides in its economic development, certain structural issues could hinder its capacity to scale up high-value manufacturing in the short to medium term. These include:
Legal framework nuances
Vietnam’s legal framework for foreign investment has seen continuous improvements, but legal and cultural complexities and inconsistencies can and do still arise. Navigating the regulatory landscape, particularly with new rules stemming from this agreement and at a time of deep administrative, governmental, digital and legal reforms in Vietnam, will demand expert legal guidance to ensure compliance and mitigate potential fines and disputes. Issues surrounding so-called sublicences for businesses, intellectual property rights enforcement and contract enforceability, whilst improving, still require careful consideration;
Education
The ambition to transform Vietnam into a high-value manufacturing hub necessitates a workforce equipped with advanced skills. While the Vietnamese government prioritises education and workforce development, a significant portion of the current labour force lacks formal training and specialised certifications, let alone a good command of the English language. Bridging this skills gap, particularly in areas like advanced manufacturing, engineering, and digital technologies is a necessity and not just in light of this framework agreement. Companies may need to factor in substantial investment in training and upskilling programmes for their Vietnamese employees.
Infrastructures
Despite considerable investment, Vietnam’s infrastructure, particularly in logistics, energy, and transportation, continues to face bottlenecks. And China – the apparent target of Trump’s tariffs – is stepping in with high-speed trains connecting it to the northern Provinces of Vietnam. An increased volume of high-value manufacturing and trade will place further strain on existing infrastructure. Inadequate port capacity, congested roads, and a reliable energy supply (including for EV charging) are critical concerns that could impact efficiency and increase operational costs for businesses.
Policy divergence
This framework agreement deepens US-Vietnam trade ties and seems to be paving the way for more US investments in Vietnam, but this second aspect seems to run counter to parallel US policy objectives aimed at reshoring manufacturing back to the United States. This potential divergence in strategic priorities could introduce yet another element of unpredictability in the long term, necessitating a flexible and adaptable investment approach. Future shifts in US policy could impact the durability and full extent of the benefits derived from this agreement.
This trade agreement, if finalised and implemented, undoubtedly represents a structural shift in global trade dynamics. It strategically positions Vietnam as an increasingly important high-value manufacturing hub and significantly deepens US engagement in Southeast Asia. We will need time, however, to assess the practical impact of the agreement, observing the efficacy of its implementation, and understanding how Vietnam’s inherent strengths and challenges will ultimately shape its role in the reconfigured global supply chain.
We will also need to see what China, if anything, will do as a countermeasure. In fact, any assessment of Vietnam’s evolving trade landscape would be incomplete without a thorough consideration of China’s influence and strategic posture. President Xi Jinping has consistently championed a vision of a “community of shared future for mankind,” a concept that, while outwardly promoting global cooperation, also subtly underscores a demand for international alignment with Beijing’s interests. In the context of escalating trade tensions, Xi has repeatedly warned that “trade wars have no winners,” advocating for unity against protectionist measures, yet simultaneously implying that nations must ultimately choose sides, either with or against China’s economic and political orbit. Vietnam, despite its historical complexities and occasional maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea (or East Sea, as it is officially called by Hanoi), remains deeply interwoven with China’s economy. China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner for many years, with significant inflows of Chinese FDI, loans, and project contractors. This economic dependency is particularly evident in various sectors, where Chinese components and materials form a substantial part of Vietnamese manufacturing supply chains. While Vietnam has actively sought to diversify its trade partners and reduce its reliance on China, the sheer scale of the bilateral economic relationship means that disentanglement is a long-term, complex endeavour. Furthermore, China’s influence extends beyond direct trade into crucial regional resources. The Mekong River, a lifeline for millions in Southeast Asia, originates in China, which has constructed numerous upstream dams.
As Vietnam navigates its enhanced trade relationship with the United States, it must simultaneously contend with the enduring economic gravity and strategic ambitions of its northern giant neighbour. Any perceived move by Vietnam to significantly shift away from China could invite retaliatory measures or heightened pressure from Beijing. Businesses investing in Vietnam must not only grasp the intricacies of the US-Vietnam agreement but also meticulously analyse how these developments will intersect with, and potentially be impacted by, the intricate, often delicate, and sometimes fraught relationship between Hanoi and Beijing. Understanding this geopolitical tightrope will be essential for sustainable success in the Vietnamese market. Prudence, informed legal counsel, and a keen eye on evolving geopolitical and economic realities will be paramount for those seeking to capitalise on this transformative new chapter.
Takeaways
- Tariffs:The US-Vietnam framework agreement marks a significant departure from previous trade dynamics, reducing US tariffs on most Vietnamese imports to 20% (from a mooted 46%) while imposing a 40% tariff on transshipped goods, especially from China.
- Vietnam’s market opening:Vietnam has committed to duty-free access for a broad range of US products and stricter controls on Chinese goods transiting its territory.
- Growth / manufacturing shift potential:The agreement is expected to fuel expansion in Vietnamese electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (LNG), and agriculture. It also encourages supply chain localisation within Vietnam (normally more of an assembly point for Chinese products).
- Execution challenges: Effectively preventing the re-routing of Chinese goods through Vietnam to avoid tariffs will be a complex and demanding task; Despite economic progress, Vietnam faces hurdles in scaling high-value manufacturing due to legal framework nuances (e.g., sublicences, IP enforcement), a skills gap in its workforce (lack of formal training, English proficiency) and infrastructure bottlenecks (logistics, energy, transportation).
- US policy divergence:The agreement’s encouragement of US investment in Vietnam appears to contradict the broader US policy objective of reshoring manufacturing.
- China:Businesses must consider China’s significant economic sway over Vietnam, including its position as Vietnam’s largest trading partner, its FDI, and its control over shared resources like the Mekong River. Any major shift by Vietnam away from China could lead to retaliatory measures from Beijing.
- Uncertainty:This is not a final agreement, so the situation might change. Prudence and informed legal counsel are crucial for businesses navigating this evolving landscape.
The Trump approach: power and dominance
In his autobiography, The Art of the Deal, Donald Trump describes negotiation as a contest of strength, determination, and dominance. His vision is clear: anyone who shows uncertainty or makes concessions too early is immediately perceived as a loser. His negotiating style is based on constant pressure, maximalist demands, and calculated threats, to obtain unilateral advantages. In this scheme, compromise is not a point of arrival, but a sign of weakness to be avoided.
Trump has always been a competitive negotiator, focused on immediate results and uninterested in balanced solutions unless they are strictly functional to his interests.
Other negotiating styles: compromising and collaborative
In contrast to this competitive approach, there are two other relevant negotiating styles:
- The compromising style aims to reach a ‘middle ground’ agreement, in which both parties give something up to achieve an acceptable solution. It is a pragmatic approach, practical in situations where time is limited or positions are too far apart for genuine collaboration.
- The collaborative style, on the other hand, aims to create win-win solutions. The parties seek to thoroughly understand each other’s interests and work together to build an outcome that maximizes the benefit for both. It requires openness, time, and trust.
In commercial negotiations, the compromising or collaborative approach can only work if the other party shares the same logic. But when dealing with an explicitly competitive actor such as Trump, adopting a compromising style risks seriously penalizing the other party, for at least three reasons:
- It conveys weakness
An accommodating gesture is seen not as a sign of openness, but as a point of pressure to be exploited. The competitive negotiator, focused on gaining an immediate advantage, interprets it as a willingness to give even more.
- It relinquishes bargaining power
The EU has a vast market and significant trade levers, especially in a context where the US is closing the door to the Chinese market. Offering concessions at the outset is tantamount to burning your cards without getting anything in return. In a competitive confrontation, the first move can set the tone for the negotiation: once a concession has been made, it is very difficult to backtrack.
- It legitimizes the negotiating imbalance
An unbalanced compromise, if accepted without resistance, risks becoming the new basis for future trade relations, systematically penalizing the EU in subsequent rounds.
Why 30%? The anchor technique
Trump often uses a negotiating technique known as the anchor technique. This consists of deliberately setting a very high target at the beginning of the negotiation (in our case, the threat of 30% tariffs).
The aim is to create a psychological perimeter for the negotiation and force the other party to reason on the basis of that figure, even though they are aware that it is arbitrary. This technique allows one to influence the scope of the discussion and obtain greater concessions, just as Trump has done.
The worst response: unilateral concessions with no return
Unfortunately, the European Union has already shown worrying signs of a compromising attitude that has not been negotiated with the Trump administration, for example:
- The waiver of the web tax* on American digital giants, without obtaining any regulation or shared tax contribution in return.
- The offer to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, made to reassure Washington, without obtaining anything in return.
- The acceptance of the increase in NATO spending to 5% of GDP, demanded by Trump, again without obtaining anything in return.
All these offers without asking for anything in return reinforce the idea that the EU is willing to concede from the outset. Trump, true to his competitive logic, sees these concessions as a starting point, not a compromise: this pushes him to raise his demands, not moderate them.
Persevering would be a fatal mistake
Continuing along this path of compromise, in the hope that accommodation will ease the pressure, would be not only ineffective but counterproductive. With a competitive negotiator, unilateral concessions do not stop escalation: they fuel it. Any sign of weakness is interpreted as additional room for maneuver.
A helpful example is China’s reaction during the trade war initiated by Trump. Faced with massive tariffs imposed by the US, Beijing responded in kind, imposing equivalent tariffs. Instead of giving in, it spoke the same language of power. The result is there for all to see: after weeks of escalation, the US had to moderate its position, opening up to a more balanced agreement.
The right strategy: speak his language
To avoid the mistakes of the past, the EU should therefore reverse its negotiating logic. Not to fuel confrontation, but to restore a credible balance. Some applicable countermeasures could be:
- Target Trump’s electoral base, particularly the agricultural sectors (soy, corn, beef), with selective tariffs or targeted restrictions.
- Put the European web tax* back on the table, even with a minimum rate, linking any exemptions to real concessions from the US.
These well-calibrated moves would strengthen the EU’s position and show that it can defend its interests by speaking a language Trump understands: that of strength and bargaining power.
Going beyond requests, seeking the other party’s interests
A fundamental principle in any negotiation is to identify the other side’s interests and find a way to allow them to achieve them without sacrificing your own. This is no easy task, given Trump’s notorious volatility and the lack of sound arguments to justify the demands made in the negotiations.
In the case of the EU-US negotiations, it must be borne in mind that Trump is playing the game with his electoral base in mind: an agreement must offer him a narrative of victory to communicate to his electorate.
Takeaway
When negotiating with a competitive player like Trump, one should abandon the accommodating approach, avoid concessions without something in return, and adopt a style that is more assertive, strategic, and symmetrical.
Only then will it be able to build an agreement that is solid, fair, and respectful of its economic and political strength.
I have often dealt with commercial distribution agreements between Italian and Chinese companies, sometimes following negotiations in the wine sector for various types of agreements: sales, distribution, franchising, establishment of joint ventures, and sales through online stores.
I am sharing some key considerations for approaching this complex but opportunity-rich market.
📌 Here are my 10 takeaways
Step Zero. Protect your IP
it is essential to protect your intellectual property before entering China. This includes trademarks (including their Chinese transliteration), labels, web domains, and social media accounts. Neglecting this aspect can have disastrous consequences, exposing you to the widespread phenomenon of trademark squatting (even famous names such as Michael Jordan, Elon Musk, and Donald Trump have fallen victim to this).
For more information, you can read this article about Intellectual property protection in China
1 — Know your enemy
trust is good, but mistrust is better. Before entering into commercial agreements, it is essential to check the credentials of potential partners through the databases of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. When it comes to wine, it is necessary to check whether the prospective distributor has a license to import and distribute wine.
2 — No copy-paste
Contracts must be tailor-made, adapting them to local specificities. In particular, it is crucial to clearly regulate promotional activities: budget, commercial actions, communication methods, and management of the producer’s trademarks. It is also best to write the contract in Chinese to ensure that there are no misunderstandings and in case it needs to be used before a judge or local administrative body, as Chinese is the only official language. (N.B.: if you think of entrusting the task to ChatGPT, this is not a good idea).
For an in-depth article, check out The commercial distribution contract in China
3 — Decide immediately how and where to litigate
It may seem counterintuitive, but it is best to avoid providing for Italian (or French, or German) jurisdiction and applicable law, which is an ineffective solution, especially in cases where urgent action is needed to stop unfair competition or counterfeiting. Consider applying Chinese law and provide for an arbitration clause at CIETAC. An effective dispute management strategy is a key element of the agreement and must be negotiated carefully. (P.S.: This applies not only to China but to all international agreements. For more information, see this article).
4 — China is big
And it is the sum of many very different internal markets. Exclusivity should be granted for good reasons, but only if the distributor has a well-developed commercial network and can achieve specific shared objectives. If granted, it should be limited to the province where the distributor is based and subject to the achievement of agreed sales volumes. Having a single distributor for the whole of China is like entrusting an Italian distributor with promoting a product throughout Europe. Or appoint a NYC-based company to promote and sell your wines in all 50 US States.
5 — China is far away
Delegating everything to the local distributor and taking no interest in what is happening on the Chinese market is never a good idea. Firstly, because you have no idea how, where, and with what results the wines are being sold. Secondly, because you cannot verify compliance with agreements, for example on non-competition or the use of trademarks. It is therefore important to schedule meetings to share commercial policies and be able to verify what is happening, including through audits and visits to warehouses and the sales network.
6 — China is expensive
Competition in the Chinese domestic market is fierce. This is also true in terms of price, as some countries that are direct competitors of Italy (Australia, Chile, New Zealand) have free trade agreements and can therefore enter the market on more favorable terms than Italian wine, which is subject to a total tax burden of around 43% after payment of duties, excise taxes, and VAT. It is necessary to position oneself in the right market segment (medium-high), and to do so, it is necessary to plan the right commercial actions together with the distributor. Selling Ex-Works and hoping that the distributor will take care of everything is not an excellent strategy for being competitive.
7 — China is dangerous
Scams are always around the corner. In the wine world in particular, for example, spontaneous expressions of interest are frequent, arriving via the company website, social media accounts, or directly via email. They sound like this: we have discovered your wines, we think they are fantastic, we want to place an order immediately. If it sounds too good and easy, it is certainly a scam. There is an easy way to check: if the next step is a request for payment of a few thousand euros, justified by the need to register the wines on the CIFER (China Imported Food Enterprise Registration) portal, or to register your trademark to prevent others from doing so, or to authenticate the signature on the sales contract… these are attempts at fraud, and the elusive order will never arrive after payment has been received. How can you check whether the person you are dealing with is a reputable company or a fraudster? 👉🏼Go back to point 1 (here is an in-depth article).
8 — E-commerce? Yes, but with method (and money)
Online wine sales continue to grow, but entering large platforms is complex, competition is fierce, and running an online store requires meticulous planning and highly efficient system implementation. The online market in China is all pay-for-play. Nothing is achieved with no money or minimal effort. If you want to sell online, you need to build an omnichannel system integrated with traditional distribution, and to do this, it is essential to involve a local partner with well-defined investments and responsibilities.
9 — China is not a market for everyone
You need to protect your brands, study the market thoroughly, know your competition (both foreign and local), find the right market channel, select a distributor motivated to invest time and money in promoting your product, and be willing to support them with the right investments. If you want to build a serious plan to enter the Chinese market, you must have a medium- to long-term perspective. There are no shortcuts (actually, there are many, but they almost always lead to wasted time and money). If you are unwilling to invest in entering the Chinese market through the front door, it is unlikely that anyone else will do it for you.
10 — Don’t do it yourself
If you have read up to point 9 and are still keen to enter the Chinese market, consider doing so professionally, involving consultants who can support your company throughout the market research, scouting, negotiation, and contract drafting processes. This is also part of the investment needed to build and develop a solid and resilient business model. This advice applies to all foreign markets, and even more so to China.
The most dangerous mistake one can make after the announcement of the (partial) suspension of U.S. duties for 90 days is to hope that everything will go well and we will return to the pre-April 2 world.
First, because very invasive tariffs remain in place: 10 percent on all countries that trade with the U.S., including the EU, 25 percent on automotive, 25 percent on steel and aluminum, 145 percent on China.
Second, because it is impossible to predict the actions of the U.S. Administration in the short and medium term: it cannot be ruled out that tariffs will remain, increase, change targets or that other factors will intervene to turn the tide in international markets, such as an escalation of the trade war with China.
The 90-day suspension is an opportunity
The U.S.’s temporary suspension of tariffs represents a valuable window that should be used not only as a truce but also as a valuable room for action: 90 days to rehash contracts, renegotiate key clauses, and insert levers of flexibility that can protect business in various future scenarios in the U.S. and other markets.
Today’s exporters cannot afford to «sit back and see what will happen»-it is time to act, and to do so professionally and strategically. Let’s look at a checklist of important points to consider.
What do contracts with customers and suppliers entail?
The first point is to survey agreements with the trade network in the U.S. and other countries that export to the U.S., as well as with upstream suppliers in the supply chain.
Is there a written contract? The worst-case scenario — unfortunately a very frequent one — is when the parties cooperate informally, only based on orders and order confirmations. This leaves undefined not only what happens in the case of imposition of duties, but also a whole range of other points, for example, limits on damages that can be claimed in the case of breach of contract, the duration of the agreement, the applicable law, and how any disputes will be resolved.
Another very problematic scenario is one in which contracts exist, but they are generic and do not include the necessary covenants to manage the risks involved in operating in a highly litigious market such as the U.S., which, moreover, has very high legal costs.
Having done this analysis, the necessary actions can be put in place, prioritizing according to the importance of business relationships and as appropriate:
- Negotiate and conclude a written contract from scratch
- Replace the existing agreement with a complete and correct contract
- Amend and integrate the existing agreement with pacts to manage tariffs and other causes of price fluctuations
Let us dwell on the last scenario, assuming that there is a complete and correct contract but one that does not regulate price and cost fluctuation as a direct or indirect consequence of the introduction of duties.
Contract Addendum
In such cases, the correct course of action is to sign an Addendum to the original contract, specifying which covenants are being waived and which covenants are being added. It is essential that the Addendum be negotiated and signed by persons with the power of representation of the parties and that it be drafted with the help of lawyers who specialize in this field. In addition to including correct clauses, it is necessary to verify that the covenants are valid according to the rules of law applicable to the contract.
Here are some clauses that can be the subject of the Addendum, to be modulated according to the specific case and possible scenarios.
Tariff Cost Sharing
By introducing this covenant, it is provided that in the event that duties are confirmed at [x]% or are reduced or increased within certain established thresholds, the Parties will share the increase equally, or according to other established percentages.
There may also be a ceiling on tariffs beyond which a party has the right to withdraw from the contract or request the suspension of certain orders for a specified period of time, after which it has the right to withdraw.
Price Adjustment
With this covenant, a discount or an increase in the product’s price is agreed upon, as the case may be, in the case of a duty greater than [x]%.
Among the use cases, in addition to that of the company exporting to the U.S. or other intermediate markets, with final destination of the products in the U.S., is that of those who purchase a product subject to import duty and resell it, processed or assembled.
Right to Cancel or Postpone Confirmed Orders
This covenant gives the right to revoke or suspend for a certain period already negotiated orders, as such binding, in case of confirmation or introduction of duties above a certain threshold, for example, if 20% taxation was confirmed for the import of wine from the EU.
The clause can be combined with previous covenants, for example, by stipulating that below the specified threshold, the contracts remain valid, and the parties share the duty or have the right to renegotiate the price.
Supply Forecast Adjustment
With this clause the Parties can modify supply programs already agreed for a specific duration (e.g., 24 months), with continuous sales and purchase obligations at a fixed price or indexable only within certain limits. The aim is to agree on the prerequisites for reshaping supply programs in the short and medium term, which can be very useful for defining the rules that will apply to relationships with key suppliers or customers for possible changes in volumes, delivery times, and prices.
Right to Source from Alternative Suppliers
This covenant serves to be authorized, if necessary, to source alternative suppliers of components or raw materials to those previously authorized in the contract with the end customer, for example, in cases where purchasing from the original suppliers has become too costly or difficult due to duties imposed at import or in previous steps in the supply chain, or other events such as currency or price fluctuation of certain commodities beyond a certain level established in the agreement.
Hardship and Force Majeure
The imposition of duties cannot be invoked as a cause of Force Majeure or hardship, respectively, to excuse contract non-performance or to renegotiate the price, even in cases of very high price increases (such as the 145% duty imposed on Chinese products). This conclusion is almost uniform under the law and jurisprudence of the major countries involved in the tariff war: U.S., China, Canada, Mexico, France and Italy: I refer to this practical guide for a timely examination of what the various rules provide.
If the contract lacks a well drafter Force Majeure and Hardship clause, or contains a generic clause, it is important to get your hands on revising it to expressly state the cases in which a party is entitled to suspend or terminate the contract, how and when to communicate the decision to invoke the exemption, and the consequences on the parties’ contractual obligations. You can go deeper on this topic here.
Conclusion
It is essential to prepare for possible future scenarios regarding duties (confirmed, increased, changed, or decreased) and to determine the consequences on trade relations with foreign clients and suppliers: moving today, at a standstill (or nearly so), allows entrepreneurs to negotiate shared and fair solutions and to avoid, as far as possible, the emergence of tensions and conflicts with the various partners along the international supply chain.
The case: A consumer bought a Ford car in Italy from an Italian car distributor. The car was manufactured by Ford WAG in Germany and supplied by Ford Italia, which belong to the same group of companies. Following an accident in December 2001 in which the airbag failed, the consumer sued the Italian distributor as well as Ford Italia for damages. Ford Italia disputed the claims for damages asserted against it, arguing that it had not manufactured the vehicle and, because it was itself only a distributor/supplier, referred to Ford WAG in Germany as the actual manufacturer.
Question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) referred the following question to the ECJ:
- the manufacturer’s liability under the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC is limited in accordance with Art 3 to cases where the supplier physically puts his name, trade mark, or other distinguishing feature on the product to create confusion between his identity and that of the actual manufacturer;
- or is the distributor liable as a “quasi-producer” even if he has not physically put his name or trademark on the product, but nevertheless «presents himself as its producer» within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive by using the distinguishing feature in his company name, which was put on the car by another person, but leading to identity with the actual car manufacturer.
ECJ judgement (European Court of Justice) of 19/12/2024, Case C-157/23
A company that does not manufacture a product itself, but only distributes it, can still be considered a «manufacturer» within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC). This is the case if the distributor puts his name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product and consequently presents itself as the manufacturer. According to the ECJ, this can give the consumer the impression that the distributor is responsible for the quality and safety of the product.
However, the ECJ emphasizes that liability does not depend on whether the distributor puts the sign on the product itself. The distributor did not do so in the specific case. However, the distributor used the corresponding distinguishing feature in its company name. According to the ECJ, the decisive factor is, therefore, whether the distributor uses this name match to gain the trust of consumers and is thus perceived as a responsible manufacturer.
The distributor is jointly and severally liable with the actual manufacturer. This means that consumers can either make a claim against the manufacturer or the dealer directly. However, the dealer has the right to ask for a regress for the damage incurred from the actual manufacturer.
Remarks
The ECJ emphasizes consumer protection. In my opinion, this argument is slightly overstretched:
- According to the ECJ, the consumer should not be burdened with the complex task of identifying the actual manufacturer of a defective product.
- A distributor that sells a product and uses its name or trademark to do so creates trust in the consumer. This trust is to be protected by the liability of the authorized distributor — regardless of whether the distributor has actively put its trademark on the product or not.
- This increases the liability risk for authorized car dealers because they must obtain appropriate insurance against such a risk. In the constellation described above, authorized dealers can be exposed to unexpectedly high claims for damages under strict product liability.
Good advice is not expensive
- It is essential that such cases are legally clarified when drawing up and formulating distribution agreements with car manufacturers and that the ECJ ruling is considered.
- In addition, authorized dealers/distributors should reconsider the use of product names from the actual producer in their company name and/or in their corporate image.
The Brazilian market has not been immune to the protectionist wave of «America First.» If such measures persist over time, they could have a lasting impact on the local economy. Still, a sour lemon can often become a sweet caipirinha in the resilient and optimistic spirit that characterizes both Brazilian society and its entrepreneurs.
As is often the case in the chessboard of global economic geopolitics, a move from one player creates room for another countermove. Brazil reacted with reciprocal trade measures, signaling clearly that it would not accept a position of commercial vulnerability.
This firmer stance — almost unthinkable in earlier years — strengthened Brazil’s image in Europe as a country ready to reposition itself with greater autonomy and pragmatism, opening new doors to international markets. In a world where global value chains are being restructured and reliable trade partners are in high demand, Brazil is increasingly seen not just as a supplier of raw materials, but as a strategic partner in critical industries.
The rapprochement with Europe has been further energized by progress in the Mercosur–European Union Agreement, whose negotiations spanned decades and now seem to be gaining momentum. While the United States embraces a more isolationist commercial posture, Europe is actively diversifying its trade relations — and Brazil, by demonstrating a commitment to clear rules, economic stability, and legal certainty, emerges as a natural candidate to fill that gap.
The Direct Impact of U.S. Tariffs
The trade measures introduced under President Trump primarily affected Brazilian producers of semi-finished steel and primary aluminum, with the removal of long-standing exemptions and quotas. In 2024, Brazil exported US$ 2.2 billion in semi-finished steel to the United States, representing nearly 60% of U.S. imports in that category. In the same year, Brazilian aluminum exports to the U.S. reached US$ 796 million, accounting for 14% of the sector’s total. Losses in exports for 2025 are estimated at around US$ 1.5 billion.
Brazil’s Response and a New Phase
In April 2025, the Brazilian Congress passed a new legal framework for trade retaliation, empowering the Executive Branch to adopt countermeasures in a faster and more technically structured way. The new legislation allows, for example, the automatic imposition of retaliatory tariffs on goods from countries that adopt unilateral measures incompatible with WTO norms; the suspension of tax or customs benefits previously granted under bilateral agreements; the creation of a list of priority sectors for trade defense and diversification of export markets.
Beyond the retaliation itself, the move marked a significant shift in posture: Brazil began positioning itself as an active player in global trade governance, aligning with mid-sized economies that advocate for predictable, balanced, and rules-based trade relations.
An Opportunity for Brazil–Europe Relations
This new stage sets Brazil as a reliable supplier to European industry — not only of raw materials but also of higher-value-added goods, particularly in processed foods, bioenergy, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure.
Moreover, as US–China tensions drive European companies to seek nearshoring or “friend-shoring” strategies with more predictable partners, Brazil, with its clean energy matrix, large domestic market, and relatively stable institutions, emerges as a strong alternative.
Legal Implications and Strategic Recommendations
This changing landscape brings new opportunities for companies and legal advisors involved in Brazil–Europe investment and trade relations. Particular attention should be paid to:
- Monitoring rules of origin in the Mercosur–EU agreement, especially in sectors requiring supply chain restructuring;
- Reviewing contractual and tax structures for import/export operations, including clauses addressing tariff instability or non-tariff barriers (e.g., environmental or sanitary standards), and clearly defining force majeure events;
- Reassessing distribution and agency agreements in light of the new commercial environment;
- Exploring joint ventures and technology transfer arrangements with Brazilian partners, particularly in bioeconomy, green hydrogen, and mineral processing.
From lemon to caipirinha
The world is becoming more fragmented and competitive, but also more open to realignment. What began as a protectionist blow from the United States has revealed new opportunities for transatlantic cooperation. For Brazil, Europe is no longer just a client: it is poised to become a long-term strategic partner. It is now up to lawyers and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to turn this opportunity into lasting, mutually beneficial relationships.
Scrivi a Roberto
US Tariffs | Commercial risk management in contracts with international clients and suppliers
14.04.2025
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США
- Распространение
- Налог
On 29 June 2025, the Vietnamese government introduced Decree No. 163/2025/ND-CP (Decree 163). This decree provides detailed guidance on how the updated Law on Pharmacy will be implemented.
Like the amended Law on Pharmacy, Decree 163 came into effect on 1 July 2025, replacing the previous Decree No. 54/2017/ND-CP (Decree 54). The new decree sets out comprehensive rules for key aspects of managing pharmaceuticals, including:
- Pharmacy practice certificates
- Certificates allowing pharmaceutical businesses to operate
- Import and export of medicines and drug ingredients
- Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) inspections of overseas manufacturers
- Recalling medicines and drug ingredients
- Certificates for medicine advertising content
- Medicine price management
Key Changes in Decree 163
Here are some important changes and additions introduced by Decree 163:
Destroying Specially Controlled Medicines
You no longer need to get approval from the relevant authority before destroying narcotic, psychotropic, and precursor drugs, or pharmaceutical ingredients that are narcotic or psychotropic substances or precursors used in medicines. Instead, you just need to provide notification at least seven working days in advance. This notification must include the planned destruction date and a detailed list of items to be destroyed.
E-commerce in Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical businesses that sell products online must openly display the following information to ensure transparency and consumer safety:
- Their certificate allowing them to operate as a pharmaceutical business.
- The pharmacy practice certificate of the person responsible for pharmaceutical expertise.
- Information about the medicines themselves.
Shelf-Life Rules for Imported Products
For medicines and ingredients with a total shelf life of nine months or less, at least one-third of their shelf life must remain when they clear customs. Medicines with a shelf life of 30 days or less must still be within their shelf life at the time of customs clearance.
Controlling Imported Products
All medicines with marketing authorisation (MA) are subject to import control, except for:
- Medicines needed for preventing and treating Group A infectious diseases that have been declared epidemics, as per the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases.
- Medicines with a shelf life of less than 30 days.
Importers must inform the provincial People’s Committee at least five working days before making a customs declaration. The People’s Committee can then issue a written notice of non-compliance to the customs authority within five working days of receiving this notification.
Medicine Advertising
Decree 163 adds a process that allows an approved medicine advertising certificate to be adjusted for certain changes (such as a change to the MA holder or manufacturer information). This means you don’t have to go through the entire initial registration process for medicine advertising content again, as was required under the previous rules.
Medicine Price Management
Businesses must announce or re-announce wholesale prices, similar to the medicine price declaration process under Decree 54. Some medicines are exempt from this requirement, including those provided free of charge for emergency responses, national health programmes, humanitarian aid, clinical trials, scientific research, or exhibition purposes, and medicines carried as personal luggage.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) can make recommendations if the announced or re-announced price is significantly higher than similar medicines already on the market. This includes situations where:
- The announced or re-announced wholesale price of the medicine is higher than the highest price of similar medicines.
- The price difference is more than 35% (for medicines priced under VND 1 million) or 15% (for medicines priced at VND 1 million and above) compared to winning bid prices in tenders.
- The announced or re-announced price is higher than prices in the country of origin or other markets (if there’s no similar product in Vietnam).
- When such differences are found, the MOH issues a formal recommendation to the announcing business and publishes it online for transparency and accountability.
Further Guidance in New Circular
On 1 July 2025, the MOH issued Circular No. 31/2025/TT-BYT (Circular 31), which further details how the amended Law on Pharmacy and Decree 163 should be implemented. Circular 31 officially replaces Circular No. 07/2018/TT-BYT and Decree 54 and came into effect immediately.
Key provisions of Circular 31 include:
Notification of Practising Pharmacists
Pharmaceutical businesses that are not part of a pharmacy chain must inform the relevant authority of a list of people currently working at the business who hold pharmacy practice certificates. This notification must be submitted within 15 days of the date the certificate allowing the pharmaceutical business to operate was issued, or when there are any changes to the list. This is a shorter deadline than the previous 30 days under earlier rules.
Pharmacy chains have similar notification duties and deadlines. Specifically, the chain operator must inform the provincial authority where each pharmacy in the chain is located about the list of practising pharmacists at those sites. Additionally, pharmacy chains must notify the authority if pharmacies are added or removed from the chain, and if there are any rotations of the people responsible for pharmaceutical expertise between pharmacies within the chain.
Medicine Information Activities
Under Circular 31, medicine information can still be given to healthcare professionals through information materials, seminars, and medical representatives.
However, Circular 31 introduces a significant change by removing the need to obtain a certificate for medicine information content before carrying out these activities. Under the new rules, pharmaceutical businesses, representative offices of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Vietnam, and MA holders are now responsible for creating and distributing medicine information materials. These materials must comply with the package inserts for medicines approved by the MOH, the Vietnamese National Drug Formulary, and any related documents and professional instructions issued or recognised by the MOH.
Donald Trump, never one to shy away from drama or diplomacy-via-caps-lock, has slapped a 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States. The justification? In his own delicate prose: «The treatment of former President Jair Bolsonaro is a disgrace… A witch hunt that must end IMMEDIATELY!»
And just in case anyone thought this was about trade imbalances or economic strategy, Trump made things crystal clear: «Due to Brazil’s insidious attacks on free elections…».
In short, the 50% tariff isn’t about coffee, orange juice, or flip-flops. It’s about a Supreme Court judgment, applying Brazilian law, regarding Brazilian politicians accused of conspiring in a coup d’état. In other words, this is a brazen (and frankly absurd) attempt at judicial intervention via trade war.
Trump, with his characteristic subtlety, offered a solution: manufacture in the U.S., and he’ll look kindly upon Brazil, like a mafia don offering «protection» after smashing your shop window. But what he meant was: consider Bolsonaro innocent, and we’ll talk.
The Brazilian market took the bait
Although the fishy interference in Brazilian affairs was determined from a fish out of the water, the market took the bait: in the first 48 hours after the infamous letter, at least 1500 tons of fish were already held in Brazilian ports, as US buyers suspended their contracts due to uncertainty about the costs upon arrival. The fish market is on alert, as 80% of the exports head to the US, mainly coming from small family-owned industries that distribute the catch from artisanal fishing communities.
The same effect hit other sectors, from orange, honey, and coffee to aircraft.
Brazil’s response and sorcery: don’t mess with us (or our weather)
Naturally, Brazil will not sit quietly sipping caipirinhas while its sovereignty is trampled. Reciprocity is on the table: if Washington raises tariffs, Brasília can do the same. But above all, one thing is sure: Brazil will never tolerate foreign interference in its independent judiciary.
And then, a curious coincidence: right after Trump’s speech, a tornado accompanied by lightning struck the White House grounds. Pure chance? Maybe. Or could it have been the work of Brazilian indigenous shamans, a particularly well-organized group of umbanda practitioners, or simply the fact that, as every Brazilian child knows, God is Brazilian.
Trump might want to check the weather forecast next time before penning another angry letter.
The unpredictable becoming predictable
Trade wars are rarely tidy affairs, but one thing they consistently deliver is chaos (in legal terms, disruption). And when disruption meets contracts, force majeure disputes often end up in court.
At first glance, Trump’s decision to impose a 50% tariff overnight might feel like an unpredictable thunderbolt (quite literally, given the weather at the White House). But here’s the catch: by now, unpredictable tariffs are becoming predictable. When a government with a well-documented love for impulsive economic diplomacy imposes politically motivated tariffs, can anyone claim to be surprised?
In most jurisdictions, force majeure requires that the event be extraordinary, unforeseeable, and beyond the parties’ control. A sudden 50% tariff certainly ticks a few of those boxes, but following a repetition of erratic trade policy, one might argue that businesses should expect what in past times was considered unexpected, especially when dealing with certain jurisdictions or political figures. In other words, Trump’s tariffs might not excuse performance if parties didn’t prepare for exactly this kind of volatility.
This is where good contract drafting comes into play
Savvy businesses are learning that their contracts must go beyond a vague boilerplate clause about “acts of government” or “changes in law.” Instead, they should expressly address the risk of sudden tariff changes, including
- hardship clauses that allow renegotiation when costs become commercially unreasonable;
- price adjustment mechanisms linked to tariff thresholds;
- termination rights triggered by specified levels of customs duties;
- currency fluctuation provisions (because tariffs rarely travel alone, and currency swings often accompany them).
In short, while no contract can immunize a business from every shock, smart drafting can mean the difference between a commercial headache and a catastrophic breach.
Therefore, tariffs may no longer be an unpredictable storm; they are part of the new predictable landscape. Given that your contract might wake up tomorrow facing ‘IMMEDIATE’ punitive tariffs in all caps, your contract should be ready today.
The unwitting cupid: strengthening EU-Brazil relations
While the tariffs may ruffle trade flows between Brasília and Washington, there’s an unintended silver lining: Trump is proving to be the most efficient matchmaker between Brazil and other markets, such as China and the European Union.
The EU-Brazil relationship, already a flirtation with promising prospects, with relevant progress in the EU-Mercosur Agreement, now seems destined for deeper romance. If Mr. Trump insists on isolating the US from Brazil, the old continent stands ready, with flowers and wine in hand, to pick up where the US left off. After all, Brazilian fish can pair up nicely with champagne, cava and prosecco.
So thank you, Mr. Trump. In your quest to bully Brazil into submission, you may have done more to strengthen transatlantic ties than any EU Commissioner ever could. As they say in Brasília these days: Trump is not a trade warrior. He’s a cupid in disguise.
The recent announcement of a landmark trade agreement framework, following just three months negotiations since President Trump’s tariffs announcement on 2 April 2025, signals a pivotal shift, not merely in bilateral relations, but in the broader architecture of global supply chains.
As a commercial lawyer with exposure to Vietnam since 2007, I have observed the evolving dynamics between the United States and Vietnam through the years, talking to students, entrepreneurs, veterans, diplomats, humans from all walks all life, from both nations and beyond.
You may recall that Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China, was to be the nation that would encounter the most stringent tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, reaching an astonishing 46%.
The newly forged framework outlines significant reciprocal concessions designed to foster greater trade and investment flows. Granted, pre-April 2 tariffs applied by the USA on Vietnamese goods were lower than what emerges from the framework agreement, but still, it is better than 46%),
The United States has committed to imposing a 20% tariff on most Vietnamese imports, a notable reduction from the previously mooted 46%. However, a substantial 40% tariff will apply to goods re-exported from third countries, with a particular focus on those originating from China.
Vietnam has pledged to open its market to a wide array of US products. Crucially, it has also committed to implementing stringent measures aimed at restricting the transshipment of Chinese goods through its territory, a long-standing concern for Washington.
In a significant win for American exporters, US goods will now enjoy duty-free access to the Vietnamese market, effectively granting “total access”, particularly for large-engine vehicles such as SUVs, as emphatically stated by President Trump (how SUVs are going to circulate in the narrow alleys of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, infested by swarms of mopeds, is a different story).
This agreement is expected to catalyse growth in several key sectors. Electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (especially Liquefied Natural Gas), and agriculture are poised for expansion. US firms specialising in manufacturing technology, energy solutions, and agricultural products are anticipated to be the primary beneficiaries. Furthermore, beyond immediate trade benefits, the agreement is set to reshape investment strategies, encouraging a greater localisation of supply chains within Vietnam. This strategic realignment is also expected to further solidify the already robust US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
While the potential upsides are considerable, it is imperative for businesses and investors to approach this new landscape with a clear understanding of the accompanying risks. From my vantage point, I identify several significant execution challenges and structural impediments that require close monitoring.
Enforcement of Transshipment Controls
The most immediate and perhaps formidable risk lies in the effective enforcement of transshipment controls. Vietnam has historically served as a significant assembly point for Chinese-manufactured components. Ensuring that goods originating from China are not merely re-routed through Vietnam to circumvent US tariffs will require exceptionally close monitoring and robust verification mechanisms. The legal and practical complexities of definitively determining the true country of origin for all goods will undoubtedly pose a persistent challenge. As a European citizen, witnessing how the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“EVFTA”), which poses an important stress on certificates of origin, I am particularly aware of this matter.
While Vietnam has made remarkable strides in its economic development, certain structural issues could hinder its capacity to scale up high-value manufacturing in the short to medium term. These include:
Legal framework nuances
Vietnam’s legal framework for foreign investment has seen continuous improvements, but legal and cultural complexities and inconsistencies can and do still arise. Navigating the regulatory landscape, particularly with new rules stemming from this agreement and at a time of deep administrative, governmental, digital and legal reforms in Vietnam, will demand expert legal guidance to ensure compliance and mitigate potential fines and disputes. Issues surrounding so-called sublicences for businesses, intellectual property rights enforcement and contract enforceability, whilst improving, still require careful consideration;
Education
The ambition to transform Vietnam into a high-value manufacturing hub necessitates a workforce equipped with advanced skills. While the Vietnamese government prioritises education and workforce development, a significant portion of the current labour force lacks formal training and specialised certifications, let alone a good command of the English language. Bridging this skills gap, particularly in areas like advanced manufacturing, engineering, and digital technologies is a necessity and not just in light of this framework agreement. Companies may need to factor in substantial investment in training and upskilling programmes for their Vietnamese employees.
Infrastructures
Despite considerable investment, Vietnam’s infrastructure, particularly in logistics, energy, and transportation, continues to face bottlenecks. And China – the apparent target of Trump’s tariffs – is stepping in with high-speed trains connecting it to the northern Provinces of Vietnam. An increased volume of high-value manufacturing and trade will place further strain on existing infrastructure. Inadequate port capacity, congested roads, and a reliable energy supply (including for EV charging) are critical concerns that could impact efficiency and increase operational costs for businesses.
Policy divergence
This framework agreement deepens US-Vietnam trade ties and seems to be paving the way for more US investments in Vietnam, but this second aspect seems to run counter to parallel US policy objectives aimed at reshoring manufacturing back to the United States. This potential divergence in strategic priorities could introduce yet another element of unpredictability in the long term, necessitating a flexible and adaptable investment approach. Future shifts in US policy could impact the durability and full extent of the benefits derived from this agreement.
This trade agreement, if finalised and implemented, undoubtedly represents a structural shift in global trade dynamics. It strategically positions Vietnam as an increasingly important high-value manufacturing hub and significantly deepens US engagement in Southeast Asia. We will need time, however, to assess the practical impact of the agreement, observing the efficacy of its implementation, and understanding how Vietnam’s inherent strengths and challenges will ultimately shape its role in the reconfigured global supply chain.
We will also need to see what China, if anything, will do as a countermeasure. In fact, any assessment of Vietnam’s evolving trade landscape would be incomplete without a thorough consideration of China’s influence and strategic posture. President Xi Jinping has consistently championed a vision of a “community of shared future for mankind,” a concept that, while outwardly promoting global cooperation, also subtly underscores a demand for international alignment with Beijing’s interests. In the context of escalating trade tensions, Xi has repeatedly warned that “trade wars have no winners,” advocating for unity against protectionist measures, yet simultaneously implying that nations must ultimately choose sides, either with or against China’s economic and political orbit. Vietnam, despite its historical complexities and occasional maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea (or East Sea, as it is officially called by Hanoi), remains deeply interwoven with China’s economy. China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner for many years, with significant inflows of Chinese FDI, loans, and project contractors. This economic dependency is particularly evident in various sectors, where Chinese components and materials form a substantial part of Vietnamese manufacturing supply chains. While Vietnam has actively sought to diversify its trade partners and reduce its reliance on China, the sheer scale of the bilateral economic relationship means that disentanglement is a long-term, complex endeavour. Furthermore, China’s influence extends beyond direct trade into crucial regional resources. The Mekong River, a lifeline for millions in Southeast Asia, originates in China, which has constructed numerous upstream dams.
As Vietnam navigates its enhanced trade relationship with the United States, it must simultaneously contend with the enduring economic gravity and strategic ambitions of its northern giant neighbour. Any perceived move by Vietnam to significantly shift away from China could invite retaliatory measures or heightened pressure from Beijing. Businesses investing in Vietnam must not only grasp the intricacies of the US-Vietnam agreement but also meticulously analyse how these developments will intersect with, and potentially be impacted by, the intricate, often delicate, and sometimes fraught relationship between Hanoi and Beijing. Understanding this geopolitical tightrope will be essential for sustainable success in the Vietnamese market. Prudence, informed legal counsel, and a keen eye on evolving geopolitical and economic realities will be paramount for those seeking to capitalise on this transformative new chapter.
Takeaways
- Tariffs:The US-Vietnam framework agreement marks a significant departure from previous trade dynamics, reducing US tariffs on most Vietnamese imports to 20% (from a mooted 46%) while imposing a 40% tariff on transshipped goods, especially from China.
- Vietnam’s market opening:Vietnam has committed to duty-free access for a broad range of US products and stricter controls on Chinese goods transiting its territory.
- Growth / manufacturing shift potential:The agreement is expected to fuel expansion in Vietnamese electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (LNG), and agriculture. It also encourages supply chain localisation within Vietnam (normally more of an assembly point for Chinese products).
- Execution challenges: Effectively preventing the re-routing of Chinese goods through Vietnam to avoid tariffs will be a complex and demanding task; Despite economic progress, Vietnam faces hurdles in scaling high-value manufacturing due to legal framework nuances (e.g., sublicences, IP enforcement), a skills gap in its workforce (lack of formal training, English proficiency) and infrastructure bottlenecks (logistics, energy, transportation).
- US policy divergence:The agreement’s encouragement of US investment in Vietnam appears to contradict the broader US policy objective of reshoring manufacturing.
- China:Businesses must consider China’s significant economic sway over Vietnam, including its position as Vietnam’s largest trading partner, its FDI, and its control over shared resources like the Mekong River. Any major shift by Vietnam away from China could lead to retaliatory measures from Beijing.
- Uncertainty:This is not a final agreement, so the situation might change. Prudence and informed legal counsel are crucial for businesses navigating this evolving landscape.
The Trump approach: power and dominance
In his autobiography, The Art of the Deal, Donald Trump describes negotiation as a contest of strength, determination, and dominance. His vision is clear: anyone who shows uncertainty or makes concessions too early is immediately perceived as a loser. His negotiating style is based on constant pressure, maximalist demands, and calculated threats, to obtain unilateral advantages. In this scheme, compromise is not a point of arrival, but a sign of weakness to be avoided.
Trump has always been a competitive negotiator, focused on immediate results and uninterested in balanced solutions unless they are strictly functional to his interests.
Other negotiating styles: compromising and collaborative
In contrast to this competitive approach, there are two other relevant negotiating styles:
- The compromising style aims to reach a ‘middle ground’ agreement, in which both parties give something up to achieve an acceptable solution. It is a pragmatic approach, practical in situations where time is limited or positions are too far apart for genuine collaboration.
- The collaborative style, on the other hand, aims to create win-win solutions. The parties seek to thoroughly understand each other’s interests and work together to build an outcome that maximizes the benefit for both. It requires openness, time, and trust.
In commercial negotiations, the compromising or collaborative approach can only work if the other party shares the same logic. But when dealing with an explicitly competitive actor such as Trump, adopting a compromising style risks seriously penalizing the other party, for at least three reasons:
- It conveys weakness
An accommodating gesture is seen not as a sign of openness, but as a point of pressure to be exploited. The competitive negotiator, focused on gaining an immediate advantage, interprets it as a willingness to give even more.
- It relinquishes bargaining power
The EU has a vast market and significant trade levers, especially in a context where the US is closing the door to the Chinese market. Offering concessions at the outset is tantamount to burning your cards without getting anything in return. In a competitive confrontation, the first move can set the tone for the negotiation: once a concession has been made, it is very difficult to backtrack.
- It legitimizes the negotiating imbalance
An unbalanced compromise, if accepted without resistance, risks becoming the new basis for future trade relations, systematically penalizing the EU in subsequent rounds.
Why 30%? The anchor technique
Trump often uses a negotiating technique known as the anchor technique. This consists of deliberately setting a very high target at the beginning of the negotiation (in our case, the threat of 30% tariffs).
The aim is to create a psychological perimeter for the negotiation and force the other party to reason on the basis of that figure, even though they are aware that it is arbitrary. This technique allows one to influence the scope of the discussion and obtain greater concessions, just as Trump has done.
The worst response: unilateral concessions with no return
Unfortunately, the European Union has already shown worrying signs of a compromising attitude that has not been negotiated with the Trump administration, for example:
- The waiver of the web tax* on American digital giants, without obtaining any regulation or shared tax contribution in return.
- The offer to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, made to reassure Washington, without obtaining anything in return.
- The acceptance of the increase in NATO spending to 5% of GDP, demanded by Trump, again without obtaining anything in return.
All these offers without asking for anything in return reinforce the idea that the EU is willing to concede from the outset. Trump, true to his competitive logic, sees these concessions as a starting point, not a compromise: this pushes him to raise his demands, not moderate them.
Persevering would be a fatal mistake
Continuing along this path of compromise, in the hope that accommodation will ease the pressure, would be not only ineffective but counterproductive. With a competitive negotiator, unilateral concessions do not stop escalation: they fuel it. Any sign of weakness is interpreted as additional room for maneuver.
A helpful example is China’s reaction during the trade war initiated by Trump. Faced with massive tariffs imposed by the US, Beijing responded in kind, imposing equivalent tariffs. Instead of giving in, it spoke the same language of power. The result is there for all to see: after weeks of escalation, the US had to moderate its position, opening up to a more balanced agreement.
The right strategy: speak his language
To avoid the mistakes of the past, the EU should therefore reverse its negotiating logic. Not to fuel confrontation, but to restore a credible balance. Some applicable countermeasures could be:
- Target Trump’s electoral base, particularly the agricultural sectors (soy, corn, beef), with selective tariffs or targeted restrictions.
- Put the European web tax* back on the table, even with a minimum rate, linking any exemptions to real concessions from the US.
These well-calibrated moves would strengthen the EU’s position and show that it can defend its interests by speaking a language Trump understands: that of strength and bargaining power.
Going beyond requests, seeking the other party’s interests
A fundamental principle in any negotiation is to identify the other side’s interests and find a way to allow them to achieve them without sacrificing your own. This is no easy task, given Trump’s notorious volatility and the lack of sound arguments to justify the demands made in the negotiations.
In the case of the EU-US negotiations, it must be borne in mind that Trump is playing the game with his electoral base in mind: an agreement must offer him a narrative of victory to communicate to his electorate.
Takeaway
When negotiating with a competitive player like Trump, one should abandon the accommodating approach, avoid concessions without something in return, and adopt a style that is more assertive, strategic, and symmetrical.
Only then will it be able to build an agreement that is solid, fair, and respectful of its economic and political strength.
I have often dealt with commercial distribution agreements between Italian and Chinese companies, sometimes following negotiations in the wine sector for various types of agreements: sales, distribution, franchising, establishment of joint ventures, and sales through online stores.
I am sharing some key considerations for approaching this complex but opportunity-rich market.
📌 Here are my 10 takeaways
Step Zero. Protect your IP
it is essential to protect your intellectual property before entering China. This includes trademarks (including their Chinese transliteration), labels, web domains, and social media accounts. Neglecting this aspect can have disastrous consequences, exposing you to the widespread phenomenon of trademark squatting (even famous names such as Michael Jordan, Elon Musk, and Donald Trump have fallen victim to this).
For more information, you can read this article about Intellectual property protection in China
1 — Know your enemy
trust is good, but mistrust is better. Before entering into commercial agreements, it is essential to check the credentials of potential partners through the databases of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. When it comes to wine, it is necessary to check whether the prospective distributor has a license to import and distribute wine.
2 — No copy-paste
Contracts must be tailor-made, adapting them to local specificities. In particular, it is crucial to clearly regulate promotional activities: budget, commercial actions, communication methods, and management of the producer’s trademarks. It is also best to write the contract in Chinese to ensure that there are no misunderstandings and in case it needs to be used before a judge or local administrative body, as Chinese is the only official language. (N.B.: if you think of entrusting the task to ChatGPT, this is not a good idea).
For an in-depth article, check out The commercial distribution contract in China
3 — Decide immediately how and where to litigate
It may seem counterintuitive, but it is best to avoid providing for Italian (or French, or German) jurisdiction and applicable law, which is an ineffective solution, especially in cases where urgent action is needed to stop unfair competition or counterfeiting. Consider applying Chinese law and provide for an arbitration clause at CIETAC. An effective dispute management strategy is a key element of the agreement and must be negotiated carefully. (P.S.: This applies not only to China but to all international agreements. For more information, see this article).
4 — China is big
And it is the sum of many very different internal markets. Exclusivity should be granted for good reasons, but only if the distributor has a well-developed commercial network and can achieve specific shared objectives. If granted, it should be limited to the province where the distributor is based and subject to the achievement of agreed sales volumes. Having a single distributor for the whole of China is like entrusting an Italian distributor with promoting a product throughout Europe. Or appoint a NYC-based company to promote and sell your wines in all 50 US States.
5 — China is far away
Delegating everything to the local distributor and taking no interest in what is happening on the Chinese market is never a good idea. Firstly, because you have no idea how, where, and with what results the wines are being sold. Secondly, because you cannot verify compliance with agreements, for example on non-competition or the use of trademarks. It is therefore important to schedule meetings to share commercial policies and be able to verify what is happening, including through audits and visits to warehouses and the sales network.
6 — China is expensive
Competition in the Chinese domestic market is fierce. This is also true in terms of price, as some countries that are direct competitors of Italy (Australia, Chile, New Zealand) have free trade agreements and can therefore enter the market on more favorable terms than Italian wine, which is subject to a total tax burden of around 43% after payment of duties, excise taxes, and VAT. It is necessary to position oneself in the right market segment (medium-high), and to do so, it is necessary to plan the right commercial actions together with the distributor. Selling Ex-Works and hoping that the distributor will take care of everything is not an excellent strategy for being competitive.
7 — China is dangerous
Scams are always around the corner. In the wine world in particular, for example, spontaneous expressions of interest are frequent, arriving via the company website, social media accounts, or directly via email. They sound like this: we have discovered your wines, we think they are fantastic, we want to place an order immediately. If it sounds too good and easy, it is certainly a scam. There is an easy way to check: if the next step is a request for payment of a few thousand euros, justified by the need to register the wines on the CIFER (China Imported Food Enterprise Registration) portal, or to register your trademark to prevent others from doing so, or to authenticate the signature on the sales contract… these are attempts at fraud, and the elusive order will never arrive after payment has been received. How can you check whether the person you are dealing with is a reputable company or a fraudster? 👉🏼Go back to point 1 (here is an in-depth article).
8 — E-commerce? Yes, but with method (and money)
Online wine sales continue to grow, but entering large platforms is complex, competition is fierce, and running an online store requires meticulous planning and highly efficient system implementation. The online market in China is all pay-for-play. Nothing is achieved with no money or minimal effort. If you want to sell online, you need to build an omnichannel system integrated with traditional distribution, and to do this, it is essential to involve a local partner with well-defined investments and responsibilities.
9 — China is not a market for everyone
You need to protect your brands, study the market thoroughly, know your competition (both foreign and local), find the right market channel, select a distributor motivated to invest time and money in promoting your product, and be willing to support them with the right investments. If you want to build a serious plan to enter the Chinese market, you must have a medium- to long-term perspective. There are no shortcuts (actually, there are many, but they almost always lead to wasted time and money). If you are unwilling to invest in entering the Chinese market through the front door, it is unlikely that anyone else will do it for you.
10 — Don’t do it yourself
If you have read up to point 9 and are still keen to enter the Chinese market, consider doing so professionally, involving consultants who can support your company throughout the market research, scouting, negotiation, and contract drafting processes. This is also part of the investment needed to build and develop a solid and resilient business model. This advice applies to all foreign markets, and even more so to China.
The most dangerous mistake one can make after the announcement of the (partial) suspension of U.S. duties for 90 days is to hope that everything will go well and we will return to the pre-April 2 world.
First, because very invasive tariffs remain in place: 10 percent on all countries that trade with the U.S., including the EU, 25 percent on automotive, 25 percent on steel and aluminum, 145 percent on China.
Second, because it is impossible to predict the actions of the U.S. Administration in the short and medium term: it cannot be ruled out that tariffs will remain, increase, change targets or that other factors will intervene to turn the tide in international markets, such as an escalation of the trade war with China.
The 90-day suspension is an opportunity
The U.S.’s temporary suspension of tariffs represents a valuable window that should be used not only as a truce but also as a valuable room for action: 90 days to rehash contracts, renegotiate key clauses, and insert levers of flexibility that can protect business in various future scenarios in the U.S. and other markets.
Today’s exporters cannot afford to «sit back and see what will happen»-it is time to act, and to do so professionally and strategically. Let’s look at a checklist of important points to consider.
What do contracts with customers and suppliers entail?
The first point is to survey agreements with the trade network in the U.S. and other countries that export to the U.S., as well as with upstream suppliers in the supply chain.
Is there a written contract? The worst-case scenario — unfortunately a very frequent one — is when the parties cooperate informally, only based on orders and order confirmations. This leaves undefined not only what happens in the case of imposition of duties, but also a whole range of other points, for example, limits on damages that can be claimed in the case of breach of contract, the duration of the agreement, the applicable law, and how any disputes will be resolved.
Another very problematic scenario is one in which contracts exist, but they are generic and do not include the necessary covenants to manage the risks involved in operating in a highly litigious market such as the U.S., which, moreover, has very high legal costs.
Having done this analysis, the necessary actions can be put in place, prioritizing according to the importance of business relationships and as appropriate:
- Negotiate and conclude a written contract from scratch
- Replace the existing agreement with a complete and correct contract
- Amend and integrate the existing agreement with pacts to manage tariffs and other causes of price fluctuations
Let us dwell on the last scenario, assuming that there is a complete and correct contract but one that does not regulate price and cost fluctuation as a direct or indirect consequence of the introduction of duties.
Contract Addendum
In such cases, the correct course of action is to sign an Addendum to the original contract, specifying which covenants are being waived and which covenants are being added. It is essential that the Addendum be negotiated and signed by persons with the power of representation of the parties and that it be drafted with the help of lawyers who specialize in this field. In addition to including correct clauses, it is necessary to verify that the covenants are valid according to the rules of law applicable to the contract.
Here are some clauses that can be the subject of the Addendum, to be modulated according to the specific case and possible scenarios.
Tariff Cost Sharing
By introducing this covenant, it is provided that in the event that duties are confirmed at [x]% or are reduced or increased within certain established thresholds, the Parties will share the increase equally, or according to other established percentages.
There may also be a ceiling on tariffs beyond which a party has the right to withdraw from the contract or request the suspension of certain orders for a specified period of time, after which it has the right to withdraw.
Price Adjustment
With this covenant, a discount or an increase in the product’s price is agreed upon, as the case may be, in the case of a duty greater than [x]%.
Among the use cases, in addition to that of the company exporting to the U.S. or other intermediate markets, with final destination of the products in the U.S., is that of those who purchase a product subject to import duty and resell it, processed or assembled.
Right to Cancel or Postpone Confirmed Orders
This covenant gives the right to revoke or suspend for a certain period already negotiated orders, as such binding, in case of confirmation or introduction of duties above a certain threshold, for example, if 20% taxation was confirmed for the import of wine from the EU.
The clause can be combined with previous covenants, for example, by stipulating that below the specified threshold, the contracts remain valid, and the parties share the duty or have the right to renegotiate the price.
Supply Forecast Adjustment
With this clause the Parties can modify supply programs already agreed for a specific duration (e.g., 24 months), with continuous sales and purchase obligations at a fixed price or indexable only within certain limits. The aim is to agree on the prerequisites for reshaping supply programs in the short and medium term, which can be very useful for defining the rules that will apply to relationships with key suppliers or customers for possible changes in volumes, delivery times, and prices.
Right to Source from Alternative Suppliers
This covenant serves to be authorized, if necessary, to source alternative suppliers of components or raw materials to those previously authorized in the contract with the end customer, for example, in cases where purchasing from the original suppliers has become too costly or difficult due to duties imposed at import or in previous steps in the supply chain, or other events such as currency or price fluctuation of certain commodities beyond a certain level established in the agreement.
Hardship and Force Majeure
The imposition of duties cannot be invoked as a cause of Force Majeure or hardship, respectively, to excuse contract non-performance or to renegotiate the price, even in cases of very high price increases (such as the 145% duty imposed on Chinese products). This conclusion is almost uniform under the law and jurisprudence of the major countries involved in the tariff war: U.S., China, Canada, Mexico, France and Italy: I refer to this practical guide for a timely examination of what the various rules provide.
If the contract lacks a well drafter Force Majeure and Hardship clause, or contains a generic clause, it is important to get your hands on revising it to expressly state the cases in which a party is entitled to suspend or terminate the contract, how and when to communicate the decision to invoke the exemption, and the consequences on the parties’ contractual obligations. You can go deeper on this topic here.
Conclusion
It is essential to prepare for possible future scenarios regarding duties (confirmed, increased, changed, or decreased) and to determine the consequences on trade relations with foreign clients and suppliers: moving today, at a standstill (or nearly so), allows entrepreneurs to negotiate shared and fair solutions and to avoid, as far as possible, the emergence of tensions and conflicts with the various partners along the international supply chain.
The case: A consumer bought a Ford car in Italy from an Italian car distributor. The car was manufactured by Ford WAG in Germany and supplied by Ford Italia, which belong to the same group of companies. Following an accident in December 2001 in which the airbag failed, the consumer sued the Italian distributor as well as Ford Italia for damages. Ford Italia disputed the claims for damages asserted against it, arguing that it had not manufactured the vehicle and, because it was itself only a distributor/supplier, referred to Ford WAG in Germany as the actual manufacturer.
Question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) referred the following question to the ECJ:
- the manufacturer’s liability under the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC is limited in accordance with Art 3 to cases where the supplier physically puts his name, trade mark, or other distinguishing feature on the product to create confusion between his identity and that of the actual manufacturer;
- or is the distributor liable as a “quasi-producer” even if he has not physically put his name or trademark on the product, but nevertheless «presents himself as its producer» within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive by using the distinguishing feature in his company name, which was put on the car by another person, but leading to identity with the actual car manufacturer.
ECJ judgement (European Court of Justice) of 19/12/2024, Case C-157/23
A company that does not manufacture a product itself, but only distributes it, can still be considered a «manufacturer» within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC). This is the case if the distributor puts his name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product and consequently presents itself as the manufacturer. According to the ECJ, this can give the consumer the impression that the distributor is responsible for the quality and safety of the product.
However, the ECJ emphasizes that liability does not depend on whether the distributor puts the sign on the product itself. The distributor did not do so in the specific case. However, the distributor used the corresponding distinguishing feature in its company name. According to the ECJ, the decisive factor is, therefore, whether the distributor uses this name match to gain the trust of consumers and is thus perceived as a responsible manufacturer.
The distributor is jointly and severally liable with the actual manufacturer. This means that consumers can either make a claim against the manufacturer or the dealer directly. However, the dealer has the right to ask for a regress for the damage incurred from the actual manufacturer.
Remarks
The ECJ emphasizes consumer protection. In my opinion, this argument is slightly overstretched:
- According to the ECJ, the consumer should not be burdened with the complex task of identifying the actual manufacturer of a defective product.
- A distributor that sells a product and uses its name or trademark to do so creates trust in the consumer. This trust is to be protected by the liability of the authorized distributor — regardless of whether the distributor has actively put its trademark on the product or not.
- This increases the liability risk for authorized car dealers because they must obtain appropriate insurance against such a risk. In the constellation described above, authorized dealers can be exposed to unexpectedly high claims for damages under strict product liability.
Good advice is not expensive
- It is essential that such cases are legally clarified when drawing up and formulating distribution agreements with car manufacturers and that the ECJ ruling is considered.
- In addition, authorized dealers/distributors should reconsider the use of product names from the actual producer in their company name and/or in their corporate image.
The Brazilian market has not been immune to the protectionist wave of «America First.» If such measures persist over time, they could have a lasting impact on the local economy. Still, a sour lemon can often become a sweet caipirinha in the resilient and optimistic spirit that characterizes both Brazilian society and its entrepreneurs.
As is often the case in the chessboard of global economic geopolitics, a move from one player creates room for another countermove. Brazil reacted with reciprocal trade measures, signaling clearly that it would not accept a position of commercial vulnerability.
This firmer stance — almost unthinkable in earlier years — strengthened Brazil’s image in Europe as a country ready to reposition itself with greater autonomy and pragmatism, opening new doors to international markets. In a world where global value chains are being restructured and reliable trade partners are in high demand, Brazil is increasingly seen not just as a supplier of raw materials, but as a strategic partner in critical industries.
The rapprochement with Europe has been further energized by progress in the Mercosur–European Union Agreement, whose negotiations spanned decades and now seem to be gaining momentum. While the United States embraces a more isolationist commercial posture, Europe is actively diversifying its trade relations — and Brazil, by demonstrating a commitment to clear rules, economic stability, and legal certainty, emerges as a natural candidate to fill that gap.
The Direct Impact of U.S. Tariffs
The trade measures introduced under President Trump primarily affected Brazilian producers of semi-finished steel and primary aluminum, with the removal of long-standing exemptions and quotas. In 2024, Brazil exported US$ 2.2 billion in semi-finished steel to the United States, representing nearly 60% of U.S. imports in that category. In the same year, Brazilian aluminum exports to the U.S. reached US$ 796 million, accounting for 14% of the sector’s total. Losses in exports for 2025 are estimated at around US$ 1.5 billion.
Brazil’s Response and a New Phase
In April 2025, the Brazilian Congress passed a new legal framework for trade retaliation, empowering the Executive Branch to adopt countermeasures in a faster and more technically structured way. The new legislation allows, for example, the automatic imposition of retaliatory tariffs on goods from countries that adopt unilateral measures incompatible with WTO norms; the suspension of tax or customs benefits previously granted under bilateral agreements; the creation of a list of priority sectors for trade defense and diversification of export markets.
Beyond the retaliation itself, the move marked a significant shift in posture: Brazil began positioning itself as an active player in global trade governance, aligning with mid-sized economies that advocate for predictable, balanced, and rules-based trade relations.
An Opportunity for Brazil–Europe Relations
This new stage sets Brazil as a reliable supplier to European industry — not only of raw materials but also of higher-value-added goods, particularly in processed foods, bioenergy, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure.
Moreover, as US–China tensions drive European companies to seek nearshoring or “friend-shoring” strategies with more predictable partners, Brazil, with its clean energy matrix, large domestic market, and relatively stable institutions, emerges as a strong alternative.
Legal Implications and Strategic Recommendations
This changing landscape brings new opportunities for companies and legal advisors involved in Brazil–Europe investment and trade relations. Particular attention should be paid to:
- Monitoring rules of origin in the Mercosur–EU agreement, especially in sectors requiring supply chain restructuring;
- Reviewing contractual and tax structures for import/export operations, including clauses addressing tariff instability or non-tariff barriers (e.g., environmental or sanitary standards), and clearly defining force majeure events;
- Reassessing distribution and agency agreements in light of the new commercial environment;
- Exploring joint ventures and technology transfer arrangements with Brazilian partners, particularly in bioeconomy, green hydrogen, and mineral processing.
From lemon to caipirinha
The world is becoming more fragmented and competitive, but also more open to realignment. What began as a protectionist blow from the United States has revealed new opportunities for transatlantic cooperation. For Brazil, Europe is no longer just a client: it is poised to become a long-term strategic partner. It is now up to lawyers and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to turn this opportunity into lasting, mutually beneficial relationships.
Scrivi a Roberto
Car dealers can be held liable as a quasi-manufacturer for damages caused by the vehicle
11.04.2025
- Распространение
On 29 June 2025, the Vietnamese government introduced Decree No. 163/2025/ND-CP (Decree 163). This decree provides detailed guidance on how the updated Law on Pharmacy will be implemented.
Like the amended Law on Pharmacy, Decree 163 came into effect on 1 July 2025, replacing the previous Decree No. 54/2017/ND-CP (Decree 54). The new decree sets out comprehensive rules for key aspects of managing pharmaceuticals, including:
- Pharmacy practice certificates
- Certificates allowing pharmaceutical businesses to operate
- Import and export of medicines and drug ingredients
- Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) inspections of overseas manufacturers
- Recalling medicines and drug ingredients
- Certificates for medicine advertising content
- Medicine price management
Key Changes in Decree 163
Here are some important changes and additions introduced by Decree 163:
Destroying Specially Controlled Medicines
You no longer need to get approval from the relevant authority before destroying narcotic, psychotropic, and precursor drugs, or pharmaceutical ingredients that are narcotic or psychotropic substances or precursors used in medicines. Instead, you just need to provide notification at least seven working days in advance. This notification must include the planned destruction date and a detailed list of items to be destroyed.
E-commerce in Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical businesses that sell products online must openly display the following information to ensure transparency and consumer safety:
- Their certificate allowing them to operate as a pharmaceutical business.
- The pharmacy practice certificate of the person responsible for pharmaceutical expertise.
- Information about the medicines themselves.
Shelf-Life Rules for Imported Products
For medicines and ingredients with a total shelf life of nine months or less, at least one-third of their shelf life must remain when they clear customs. Medicines with a shelf life of 30 days or less must still be within their shelf life at the time of customs clearance.
Controlling Imported Products
All medicines with marketing authorisation (MA) are subject to import control, except for:
- Medicines needed for preventing and treating Group A infectious diseases that have been declared epidemics, as per the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases.
- Medicines with a shelf life of less than 30 days.
Importers must inform the provincial People’s Committee at least five working days before making a customs declaration. The People’s Committee can then issue a written notice of non-compliance to the customs authority within five working days of receiving this notification.
Medicine Advertising
Decree 163 adds a process that allows an approved medicine advertising certificate to be adjusted for certain changes (such as a change to the MA holder or manufacturer information). This means you don’t have to go through the entire initial registration process for medicine advertising content again, as was required under the previous rules.
Medicine Price Management
Businesses must announce or re-announce wholesale prices, similar to the medicine price declaration process under Decree 54. Some medicines are exempt from this requirement, including those provided free of charge for emergency responses, national health programmes, humanitarian aid, clinical trials, scientific research, or exhibition purposes, and medicines carried as personal luggage.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) can make recommendations if the announced or re-announced price is significantly higher than similar medicines already on the market. This includes situations where:
- The announced or re-announced wholesale price of the medicine is higher than the highest price of similar medicines.
- The price difference is more than 35% (for medicines priced under VND 1 million) or 15% (for medicines priced at VND 1 million and above) compared to winning bid prices in tenders.
- The announced or re-announced price is higher than prices in the country of origin or other markets (if there’s no similar product in Vietnam).
- When such differences are found, the MOH issues a formal recommendation to the announcing business and publishes it online for transparency and accountability.
Further Guidance in New Circular
On 1 July 2025, the MOH issued Circular No. 31/2025/TT-BYT (Circular 31), which further details how the amended Law on Pharmacy and Decree 163 should be implemented. Circular 31 officially replaces Circular No. 07/2018/TT-BYT and Decree 54 and came into effect immediately.
Key provisions of Circular 31 include:
Notification of Practising Pharmacists
Pharmaceutical businesses that are not part of a pharmacy chain must inform the relevant authority of a list of people currently working at the business who hold pharmacy practice certificates. This notification must be submitted within 15 days of the date the certificate allowing the pharmaceutical business to operate was issued, or when there are any changes to the list. This is a shorter deadline than the previous 30 days under earlier rules.
Pharmacy chains have similar notification duties and deadlines. Specifically, the chain operator must inform the provincial authority where each pharmacy in the chain is located about the list of practising pharmacists at those sites. Additionally, pharmacy chains must notify the authority if pharmacies are added or removed from the chain, and if there are any rotations of the people responsible for pharmaceutical expertise between pharmacies within the chain.
Medicine Information Activities
Under Circular 31, medicine information can still be given to healthcare professionals through information materials, seminars, and medical representatives.
However, Circular 31 introduces a significant change by removing the need to obtain a certificate for medicine information content before carrying out these activities. Under the new rules, pharmaceutical businesses, representative offices of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Vietnam, and MA holders are now responsible for creating and distributing medicine information materials. These materials must comply with the package inserts for medicines approved by the MOH, the Vietnamese National Drug Formulary, and any related documents and professional instructions issued or recognised by the MOH.
Donald Trump, never one to shy away from drama or diplomacy-via-caps-lock, has slapped a 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States. The justification? In his own delicate prose: «The treatment of former President Jair Bolsonaro is a disgrace… A witch hunt that must end IMMEDIATELY!»
And just in case anyone thought this was about trade imbalances or economic strategy, Trump made things crystal clear: «Due to Brazil’s insidious attacks on free elections…».
In short, the 50% tariff isn’t about coffee, orange juice, or flip-flops. It’s about a Supreme Court judgment, applying Brazilian law, regarding Brazilian politicians accused of conspiring in a coup d’état. In other words, this is a brazen (and frankly absurd) attempt at judicial intervention via trade war.
Trump, with his characteristic subtlety, offered a solution: manufacture in the U.S., and he’ll look kindly upon Brazil, like a mafia don offering «protection» after smashing your shop window. But what he meant was: consider Bolsonaro innocent, and we’ll talk.
The Brazilian market took the bait
Although the fishy interference in Brazilian affairs was determined from a fish out of the water, the market took the bait: in the first 48 hours after the infamous letter, at least 1500 tons of fish were already held in Brazilian ports, as US buyers suspended their contracts due to uncertainty about the costs upon arrival. The fish market is on alert, as 80% of the exports head to the US, mainly coming from small family-owned industries that distribute the catch from artisanal fishing communities.
The same effect hit other sectors, from orange, honey, and coffee to aircraft.
Brazil’s response and sorcery: don’t mess with us (or our weather)
Naturally, Brazil will not sit quietly sipping caipirinhas while its sovereignty is trampled. Reciprocity is on the table: if Washington raises tariffs, Brasília can do the same. But above all, one thing is sure: Brazil will never tolerate foreign interference in its independent judiciary.
And then, a curious coincidence: right after Trump’s speech, a tornado accompanied by lightning struck the White House grounds. Pure chance? Maybe. Or could it have been the work of Brazilian indigenous shamans, a particularly well-organized group of umbanda practitioners, or simply the fact that, as every Brazilian child knows, God is Brazilian.
Trump might want to check the weather forecast next time before penning another angry letter.
The unpredictable becoming predictable
Trade wars are rarely tidy affairs, but one thing they consistently deliver is chaos (in legal terms, disruption). And when disruption meets contracts, force majeure disputes often end up in court.
At first glance, Trump’s decision to impose a 50% tariff overnight might feel like an unpredictable thunderbolt (quite literally, given the weather at the White House). But here’s the catch: by now, unpredictable tariffs are becoming predictable. When a government with a well-documented love for impulsive economic diplomacy imposes politically motivated tariffs, can anyone claim to be surprised?
In most jurisdictions, force majeure requires that the event be extraordinary, unforeseeable, and beyond the parties’ control. A sudden 50% tariff certainly ticks a few of those boxes, but following a repetition of erratic trade policy, one might argue that businesses should expect what in past times was considered unexpected, especially when dealing with certain jurisdictions or political figures. In other words, Trump’s tariffs might not excuse performance if parties didn’t prepare for exactly this kind of volatility.
This is where good contract drafting comes into play
Savvy businesses are learning that their contracts must go beyond a vague boilerplate clause about “acts of government” or “changes in law.” Instead, they should expressly address the risk of sudden tariff changes, including
- hardship clauses that allow renegotiation when costs become commercially unreasonable;
- price adjustment mechanisms linked to tariff thresholds;
- termination rights triggered by specified levels of customs duties;
- currency fluctuation provisions (because tariffs rarely travel alone, and currency swings often accompany them).
In short, while no contract can immunize a business from every shock, smart drafting can mean the difference between a commercial headache and a catastrophic breach.
Therefore, tariffs may no longer be an unpredictable storm; they are part of the new predictable landscape. Given that your contract might wake up tomorrow facing ‘IMMEDIATE’ punitive tariffs in all caps, your contract should be ready today.
The unwitting cupid: strengthening EU-Brazil relations
While the tariffs may ruffle trade flows between Brasília and Washington, there’s an unintended silver lining: Trump is proving to be the most efficient matchmaker between Brazil and other markets, such as China and the European Union.
The EU-Brazil relationship, already a flirtation with promising prospects, with relevant progress in the EU-Mercosur Agreement, now seems destined for deeper romance. If Mr. Trump insists on isolating the US from Brazil, the old continent stands ready, with flowers and wine in hand, to pick up where the US left off. After all, Brazilian fish can pair up nicely with champagne, cava and prosecco.
So thank you, Mr. Trump. In your quest to bully Brazil into submission, you may have done more to strengthen transatlantic ties than any EU Commissioner ever could. As they say in Brasília these days: Trump is not a trade warrior. He’s a cupid in disguise.
The recent announcement of a landmark trade agreement framework, following just three months negotiations since President Trump’s tariffs announcement on 2 April 2025, signals a pivotal shift, not merely in bilateral relations, but in the broader architecture of global supply chains.
As a commercial lawyer with exposure to Vietnam since 2007, I have observed the evolving dynamics between the United States and Vietnam through the years, talking to students, entrepreneurs, veterans, diplomats, humans from all walks all life, from both nations and beyond.
You may recall that Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China, was to be the nation that would encounter the most stringent tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, reaching an astonishing 46%.
The newly forged framework outlines significant reciprocal concessions designed to foster greater trade and investment flows. Granted, pre-April 2 tariffs applied by the USA on Vietnamese goods were lower than what emerges from the framework agreement, but still, it is better than 46%),
The United States has committed to imposing a 20% tariff on most Vietnamese imports, a notable reduction from the previously mooted 46%. However, a substantial 40% tariff will apply to goods re-exported from third countries, with a particular focus on those originating from China.
Vietnam has pledged to open its market to a wide array of US products. Crucially, it has also committed to implementing stringent measures aimed at restricting the transshipment of Chinese goods through its territory, a long-standing concern for Washington.
In a significant win for American exporters, US goods will now enjoy duty-free access to the Vietnamese market, effectively granting “total access”, particularly for large-engine vehicles such as SUVs, as emphatically stated by President Trump (how SUVs are going to circulate in the narrow alleys of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, infested by swarms of mopeds, is a different story).
This agreement is expected to catalyse growth in several key sectors. Electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (especially Liquefied Natural Gas), and agriculture are poised for expansion. US firms specialising in manufacturing technology, energy solutions, and agricultural products are anticipated to be the primary beneficiaries. Furthermore, beyond immediate trade benefits, the agreement is set to reshape investment strategies, encouraging a greater localisation of supply chains within Vietnam. This strategic realignment is also expected to further solidify the already robust US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
While the potential upsides are considerable, it is imperative for businesses and investors to approach this new landscape with a clear understanding of the accompanying risks. From my vantage point, I identify several significant execution challenges and structural impediments that require close monitoring.
Enforcement of Transshipment Controls
The most immediate and perhaps formidable risk lies in the effective enforcement of transshipment controls. Vietnam has historically served as a significant assembly point for Chinese-manufactured components. Ensuring that goods originating from China are not merely re-routed through Vietnam to circumvent US tariffs will require exceptionally close monitoring and robust verification mechanisms. The legal and practical complexities of definitively determining the true country of origin for all goods will undoubtedly pose a persistent challenge. As a European citizen, witnessing how the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“EVFTA”), which poses an important stress on certificates of origin, I am particularly aware of this matter.
While Vietnam has made remarkable strides in its economic development, certain structural issues could hinder its capacity to scale up high-value manufacturing in the short to medium term. These include:
Legal framework nuances
Vietnam’s legal framework for foreign investment has seen continuous improvements, but legal and cultural complexities and inconsistencies can and do still arise. Navigating the regulatory landscape, particularly with new rules stemming from this agreement and at a time of deep administrative, governmental, digital and legal reforms in Vietnam, will demand expert legal guidance to ensure compliance and mitigate potential fines and disputes. Issues surrounding so-called sublicences for businesses, intellectual property rights enforcement and contract enforceability, whilst improving, still require careful consideration;
Education
The ambition to transform Vietnam into a high-value manufacturing hub necessitates a workforce equipped with advanced skills. While the Vietnamese government prioritises education and workforce development, a significant portion of the current labour force lacks formal training and specialised certifications, let alone a good command of the English language. Bridging this skills gap, particularly in areas like advanced manufacturing, engineering, and digital technologies is a necessity and not just in light of this framework agreement. Companies may need to factor in substantial investment in training and upskilling programmes for their Vietnamese employees.
Infrastructures
Despite considerable investment, Vietnam’s infrastructure, particularly in logistics, energy, and transportation, continues to face bottlenecks. And China – the apparent target of Trump’s tariffs – is stepping in with high-speed trains connecting it to the northern Provinces of Vietnam. An increased volume of high-value manufacturing and trade will place further strain on existing infrastructure. Inadequate port capacity, congested roads, and a reliable energy supply (including for EV charging) are critical concerns that could impact efficiency and increase operational costs for businesses.
Policy divergence
This framework agreement deepens US-Vietnam trade ties and seems to be paving the way for more US investments in Vietnam, but this second aspect seems to run counter to parallel US policy objectives aimed at reshoring manufacturing back to the United States. This potential divergence in strategic priorities could introduce yet another element of unpredictability in the long term, necessitating a flexible and adaptable investment approach. Future shifts in US policy could impact the durability and full extent of the benefits derived from this agreement.
This trade agreement, if finalised and implemented, undoubtedly represents a structural shift in global trade dynamics. It strategically positions Vietnam as an increasingly important high-value manufacturing hub and significantly deepens US engagement in Southeast Asia. We will need time, however, to assess the practical impact of the agreement, observing the efficacy of its implementation, and understanding how Vietnam’s inherent strengths and challenges will ultimately shape its role in the reconfigured global supply chain.
We will also need to see what China, if anything, will do as a countermeasure. In fact, any assessment of Vietnam’s evolving trade landscape would be incomplete without a thorough consideration of China’s influence and strategic posture. President Xi Jinping has consistently championed a vision of a “community of shared future for mankind,” a concept that, while outwardly promoting global cooperation, also subtly underscores a demand for international alignment with Beijing’s interests. In the context of escalating trade tensions, Xi has repeatedly warned that “trade wars have no winners,” advocating for unity against protectionist measures, yet simultaneously implying that nations must ultimately choose sides, either with or against China’s economic and political orbit. Vietnam, despite its historical complexities and occasional maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea (or East Sea, as it is officially called by Hanoi), remains deeply interwoven with China’s economy. China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner for many years, with significant inflows of Chinese FDI, loans, and project contractors. This economic dependency is particularly evident in various sectors, where Chinese components and materials form a substantial part of Vietnamese manufacturing supply chains. While Vietnam has actively sought to diversify its trade partners and reduce its reliance on China, the sheer scale of the bilateral economic relationship means that disentanglement is a long-term, complex endeavour. Furthermore, China’s influence extends beyond direct trade into crucial regional resources. The Mekong River, a lifeline for millions in Southeast Asia, originates in China, which has constructed numerous upstream dams.
As Vietnam navigates its enhanced trade relationship with the United States, it must simultaneously contend with the enduring economic gravity and strategic ambitions of its northern giant neighbour. Any perceived move by Vietnam to significantly shift away from China could invite retaliatory measures or heightened pressure from Beijing. Businesses investing in Vietnam must not only grasp the intricacies of the US-Vietnam agreement but also meticulously analyse how these developments will intersect with, and potentially be impacted by, the intricate, often delicate, and sometimes fraught relationship between Hanoi and Beijing. Understanding this geopolitical tightrope will be essential for sustainable success in the Vietnamese market. Prudence, informed legal counsel, and a keen eye on evolving geopolitical and economic realities will be paramount for those seeking to capitalise on this transformative new chapter.
Takeaways
- Tariffs:The US-Vietnam framework agreement marks a significant departure from previous trade dynamics, reducing US tariffs on most Vietnamese imports to 20% (from a mooted 46%) while imposing a 40% tariff on transshipped goods, especially from China.
- Vietnam’s market opening:Vietnam has committed to duty-free access for a broad range of US products and stricter controls on Chinese goods transiting its territory.
- Growth / manufacturing shift potential:The agreement is expected to fuel expansion in Vietnamese electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (LNG), and agriculture. It also encourages supply chain localisation within Vietnam (normally more of an assembly point for Chinese products).
- Execution challenges: Effectively preventing the re-routing of Chinese goods through Vietnam to avoid tariffs will be a complex and demanding task; Despite economic progress, Vietnam faces hurdles in scaling high-value manufacturing due to legal framework nuances (e.g., sublicences, IP enforcement), a skills gap in its workforce (lack of formal training, English proficiency) and infrastructure bottlenecks (logistics, energy, transportation).
- US policy divergence:The agreement’s encouragement of US investment in Vietnam appears to contradict the broader US policy objective of reshoring manufacturing.
- China:Businesses must consider China’s significant economic sway over Vietnam, including its position as Vietnam’s largest trading partner, its FDI, and its control over shared resources like the Mekong River. Any major shift by Vietnam away from China could lead to retaliatory measures from Beijing.
- Uncertainty:This is not a final agreement, so the situation might change. Prudence and informed legal counsel are crucial for businesses navigating this evolving landscape.
The Trump approach: power and dominance
In his autobiography, The Art of the Deal, Donald Trump describes negotiation as a contest of strength, determination, and dominance. His vision is clear: anyone who shows uncertainty or makes concessions too early is immediately perceived as a loser. His negotiating style is based on constant pressure, maximalist demands, and calculated threats, to obtain unilateral advantages. In this scheme, compromise is not a point of arrival, but a sign of weakness to be avoided.
Trump has always been a competitive negotiator, focused on immediate results and uninterested in balanced solutions unless they are strictly functional to his interests.
Other negotiating styles: compromising and collaborative
In contrast to this competitive approach, there are two other relevant negotiating styles:
- The compromising style aims to reach a ‘middle ground’ agreement, in which both parties give something up to achieve an acceptable solution. It is a pragmatic approach, practical in situations where time is limited or positions are too far apart for genuine collaboration.
- The collaborative style, on the other hand, aims to create win-win solutions. The parties seek to thoroughly understand each other’s interests and work together to build an outcome that maximizes the benefit for both. It requires openness, time, and trust.
In commercial negotiations, the compromising or collaborative approach can only work if the other party shares the same logic. But when dealing with an explicitly competitive actor such as Trump, adopting a compromising style risks seriously penalizing the other party, for at least three reasons:
- It conveys weakness
An accommodating gesture is seen not as a sign of openness, but as a point of pressure to be exploited. The competitive negotiator, focused on gaining an immediate advantage, interprets it as a willingness to give even more.
- It relinquishes bargaining power
The EU has a vast market and significant trade levers, especially in a context where the US is closing the door to the Chinese market. Offering concessions at the outset is tantamount to burning your cards without getting anything in return. In a competitive confrontation, the first move can set the tone for the negotiation: once a concession has been made, it is very difficult to backtrack.
- It legitimizes the negotiating imbalance
An unbalanced compromise, if accepted without resistance, risks becoming the new basis for future trade relations, systematically penalizing the EU in subsequent rounds.
Why 30%? The anchor technique
Trump often uses a negotiating technique known as the anchor technique. This consists of deliberately setting a very high target at the beginning of the negotiation (in our case, the threat of 30% tariffs).
The aim is to create a psychological perimeter for the negotiation and force the other party to reason on the basis of that figure, even though they are aware that it is arbitrary. This technique allows one to influence the scope of the discussion and obtain greater concessions, just as Trump has done.
The worst response: unilateral concessions with no return
Unfortunately, the European Union has already shown worrying signs of a compromising attitude that has not been negotiated with the Trump administration, for example:
- The waiver of the web tax* on American digital giants, without obtaining any regulation or shared tax contribution in return.
- The offer to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, made to reassure Washington, without obtaining anything in return.
- The acceptance of the increase in NATO spending to 5% of GDP, demanded by Trump, again without obtaining anything in return.
All these offers without asking for anything in return reinforce the idea that the EU is willing to concede from the outset. Trump, true to his competitive logic, sees these concessions as a starting point, not a compromise: this pushes him to raise his demands, not moderate them.
Persevering would be a fatal mistake
Continuing along this path of compromise, in the hope that accommodation will ease the pressure, would be not only ineffective but counterproductive. With a competitive negotiator, unilateral concessions do not stop escalation: they fuel it. Any sign of weakness is interpreted as additional room for maneuver.
A helpful example is China’s reaction during the trade war initiated by Trump. Faced with massive tariffs imposed by the US, Beijing responded in kind, imposing equivalent tariffs. Instead of giving in, it spoke the same language of power. The result is there for all to see: after weeks of escalation, the US had to moderate its position, opening up to a more balanced agreement.
The right strategy: speak his language
To avoid the mistakes of the past, the EU should therefore reverse its negotiating logic. Not to fuel confrontation, but to restore a credible balance. Some applicable countermeasures could be:
- Target Trump’s electoral base, particularly the agricultural sectors (soy, corn, beef), with selective tariffs or targeted restrictions.
- Put the European web tax* back on the table, even with a minimum rate, linking any exemptions to real concessions from the US.
These well-calibrated moves would strengthen the EU’s position and show that it can defend its interests by speaking a language Trump understands: that of strength and bargaining power.
Going beyond requests, seeking the other party’s interests
A fundamental principle in any negotiation is to identify the other side’s interests and find a way to allow them to achieve them without sacrificing your own. This is no easy task, given Trump’s notorious volatility and the lack of sound arguments to justify the demands made in the negotiations.
In the case of the EU-US negotiations, it must be borne in mind that Trump is playing the game with his electoral base in mind: an agreement must offer him a narrative of victory to communicate to his electorate.
Takeaway
When negotiating with a competitive player like Trump, one should abandon the accommodating approach, avoid concessions without something in return, and adopt a style that is more assertive, strategic, and symmetrical.
Only then will it be able to build an agreement that is solid, fair, and respectful of its economic and political strength.
I have often dealt with commercial distribution agreements between Italian and Chinese companies, sometimes following negotiations in the wine sector for various types of agreements: sales, distribution, franchising, establishment of joint ventures, and sales through online stores.
I am sharing some key considerations for approaching this complex but opportunity-rich market.
📌 Here are my 10 takeaways
Step Zero. Protect your IP
it is essential to protect your intellectual property before entering China. This includes trademarks (including their Chinese transliteration), labels, web domains, and social media accounts. Neglecting this aspect can have disastrous consequences, exposing you to the widespread phenomenon of trademark squatting (even famous names such as Michael Jordan, Elon Musk, and Donald Trump have fallen victim to this).
For more information, you can read this article about Intellectual property protection in China
1 — Know your enemy
trust is good, but mistrust is better. Before entering into commercial agreements, it is essential to check the credentials of potential partners through the databases of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. When it comes to wine, it is necessary to check whether the prospective distributor has a license to import and distribute wine.
2 — No copy-paste
Contracts must be tailor-made, adapting them to local specificities. In particular, it is crucial to clearly regulate promotional activities: budget, commercial actions, communication methods, and management of the producer’s trademarks. It is also best to write the contract in Chinese to ensure that there are no misunderstandings and in case it needs to be used before a judge or local administrative body, as Chinese is the only official language. (N.B.: if you think of entrusting the task to ChatGPT, this is not a good idea).
For an in-depth article, check out The commercial distribution contract in China
3 — Decide immediately how and where to litigate
It may seem counterintuitive, but it is best to avoid providing for Italian (or French, or German) jurisdiction and applicable law, which is an ineffective solution, especially in cases where urgent action is needed to stop unfair competition or counterfeiting. Consider applying Chinese law and provide for an arbitration clause at CIETAC. An effective dispute management strategy is a key element of the agreement and must be negotiated carefully. (P.S.: This applies not only to China but to all international agreements. For more information, see this article).
4 — China is big
And it is the sum of many very different internal markets. Exclusivity should be granted for good reasons, but only if the distributor has a well-developed commercial network and can achieve specific shared objectives. If granted, it should be limited to the province where the distributor is based and subject to the achievement of agreed sales volumes. Having a single distributor for the whole of China is like entrusting an Italian distributor with promoting a product throughout Europe. Or appoint a NYC-based company to promote and sell your wines in all 50 US States.
5 — China is far away
Delegating everything to the local distributor and taking no interest in what is happening on the Chinese market is never a good idea. Firstly, because you have no idea how, where, and with what results the wines are being sold. Secondly, because you cannot verify compliance with agreements, for example on non-competition or the use of trademarks. It is therefore important to schedule meetings to share commercial policies and be able to verify what is happening, including through audits and visits to warehouses and the sales network.
6 — China is expensive
Competition in the Chinese domestic market is fierce. This is also true in terms of price, as some countries that are direct competitors of Italy (Australia, Chile, New Zealand) have free trade agreements and can therefore enter the market on more favorable terms than Italian wine, which is subject to a total tax burden of around 43% after payment of duties, excise taxes, and VAT. It is necessary to position oneself in the right market segment (medium-high), and to do so, it is necessary to plan the right commercial actions together with the distributor. Selling Ex-Works and hoping that the distributor will take care of everything is not an excellent strategy for being competitive.
7 — China is dangerous
Scams are always around the corner. In the wine world in particular, for example, spontaneous expressions of interest are frequent, arriving via the company website, social media accounts, or directly via email. They sound like this: we have discovered your wines, we think they are fantastic, we want to place an order immediately. If it sounds too good and easy, it is certainly a scam. There is an easy way to check: if the next step is a request for payment of a few thousand euros, justified by the need to register the wines on the CIFER (China Imported Food Enterprise Registration) portal, or to register your trademark to prevent others from doing so, or to authenticate the signature on the sales contract… these are attempts at fraud, and the elusive order will never arrive after payment has been received. How can you check whether the person you are dealing with is a reputable company or a fraudster? 👉🏼Go back to point 1 (here is an in-depth article).
8 — E-commerce? Yes, but with method (and money)
Online wine sales continue to grow, but entering large platforms is complex, competition is fierce, and running an online store requires meticulous planning and highly efficient system implementation. The online market in China is all pay-for-play. Nothing is achieved with no money or minimal effort. If you want to sell online, you need to build an omnichannel system integrated with traditional distribution, and to do this, it is essential to involve a local partner with well-defined investments and responsibilities.
9 — China is not a market for everyone
You need to protect your brands, study the market thoroughly, know your competition (both foreign and local), find the right market channel, select a distributor motivated to invest time and money in promoting your product, and be willing to support them with the right investments. If you want to build a serious plan to enter the Chinese market, you must have a medium- to long-term perspective. There are no shortcuts (actually, there are many, but they almost always lead to wasted time and money). If you are unwilling to invest in entering the Chinese market through the front door, it is unlikely that anyone else will do it for you.
10 — Don’t do it yourself
If you have read up to point 9 and are still keen to enter the Chinese market, consider doing so professionally, involving consultants who can support your company throughout the market research, scouting, negotiation, and contract drafting processes. This is also part of the investment needed to build and develop a solid and resilient business model. This advice applies to all foreign markets, and even more so to China.
The most dangerous mistake one can make after the announcement of the (partial) suspension of U.S. duties for 90 days is to hope that everything will go well and we will return to the pre-April 2 world.
First, because very invasive tariffs remain in place: 10 percent on all countries that trade with the U.S., including the EU, 25 percent on automotive, 25 percent on steel and aluminum, 145 percent on China.
Second, because it is impossible to predict the actions of the U.S. Administration in the short and medium term: it cannot be ruled out that tariffs will remain, increase, change targets or that other factors will intervene to turn the tide in international markets, such as an escalation of the trade war with China.
The 90-day suspension is an opportunity
The U.S.’s temporary suspension of tariffs represents a valuable window that should be used not only as a truce but also as a valuable room for action: 90 days to rehash contracts, renegotiate key clauses, and insert levers of flexibility that can protect business in various future scenarios in the U.S. and other markets.
Today’s exporters cannot afford to «sit back and see what will happen»-it is time to act, and to do so professionally and strategically. Let’s look at a checklist of important points to consider.
What do contracts with customers and suppliers entail?
The first point is to survey agreements with the trade network in the U.S. and other countries that export to the U.S., as well as with upstream suppliers in the supply chain.
Is there a written contract? The worst-case scenario — unfortunately a very frequent one — is when the parties cooperate informally, only based on orders and order confirmations. This leaves undefined not only what happens in the case of imposition of duties, but also a whole range of other points, for example, limits on damages that can be claimed in the case of breach of contract, the duration of the agreement, the applicable law, and how any disputes will be resolved.
Another very problematic scenario is one in which contracts exist, but they are generic and do not include the necessary covenants to manage the risks involved in operating in a highly litigious market such as the U.S., which, moreover, has very high legal costs.
Having done this analysis, the necessary actions can be put in place, prioritizing according to the importance of business relationships and as appropriate:
- Negotiate and conclude a written contract from scratch
- Replace the existing agreement with a complete and correct contract
- Amend and integrate the existing agreement with pacts to manage tariffs and other causes of price fluctuations
Let us dwell on the last scenario, assuming that there is a complete and correct contract but one that does not regulate price and cost fluctuation as a direct or indirect consequence of the introduction of duties.
Contract Addendum
In such cases, the correct course of action is to sign an Addendum to the original contract, specifying which covenants are being waived and which covenants are being added. It is essential that the Addendum be negotiated and signed by persons with the power of representation of the parties and that it be drafted with the help of lawyers who specialize in this field. In addition to including correct clauses, it is necessary to verify that the covenants are valid according to the rules of law applicable to the contract.
Here are some clauses that can be the subject of the Addendum, to be modulated according to the specific case and possible scenarios.
Tariff Cost Sharing
By introducing this covenant, it is provided that in the event that duties are confirmed at [x]% or are reduced or increased within certain established thresholds, the Parties will share the increase equally, or according to other established percentages.
There may also be a ceiling on tariffs beyond which a party has the right to withdraw from the contract or request the suspension of certain orders for a specified period of time, after which it has the right to withdraw.
Price Adjustment
With this covenant, a discount or an increase in the product’s price is agreed upon, as the case may be, in the case of a duty greater than [x]%.
Among the use cases, in addition to that of the company exporting to the U.S. or other intermediate markets, with final destination of the products in the U.S., is that of those who purchase a product subject to import duty and resell it, processed or assembled.
Right to Cancel or Postpone Confirmed Orders
This covenant gives the right to revoke or suspend for a certain period already negotiated orders, as such binding, in case of confirmation or introduction of duties above a certain threshold, for example, if 20% taxation was confirmed for the import of wine from the EU.
The clause can be combined with previous covenants, for example, by stipulating that below the specified threshold, the contracts remain valid, and the parties share the duty or have the right to renegotiate the price.
Supply Forecast Adjustment
With this clause the Parties can modify supply programs already agreed for a specific duration (e.g., 24 months), with continuous sales and purchase obligations at a fixed price or indexable only within certain limits. The aim is to agree on the prerequisites for reshaping supply programs in the short and medium term, which can be very useful for defining the rules that will apply to relationships with key suppliers or customers for possible changes in volumes, delivery times, and prices.
Right to Source from Alternative Suppliers
This covenant serves to be authorized, if necessary, to source alternative suppliers of components or raw materials to those previously authorized in the contract with the end customer, for example, in cases where purchasing from the original suppliers has become too costly or difficult due to duties imposed at import or in previous steps in the supply chain, or other events such as currency or price fluctuation of certain commodities beyond a certain level established in the agreement.
Hardship and Force Majeure
The imposition of duties cannot be invoked as a cause of Force Majeure or hardship, respectively, to excuse contract non-performance or to renegotiate the price, even in cases of very high price increases (such as the 145% duty imposed on Chinese products). This conclusion is almost uniform under the law and jurisprudence of the major countries involved in the tariff war: U.S., China, Canada, Mexico, France and Italy: I refer to this practical guide for a timely examination of what the various rules provide.
If the contract lacks a well drafter Force Majeure and Hardship clause, or contains a generic clause, it is important to get your hands on revising it to expressly state the cases in which a party is entitled to suspend or terminate the contract, how and when to communicate the decision to invoke the exemption, and the consequences on the parties’ contractual obligations. You can go deeper on this topic here.
Conclusion
It is essential to prepare for possible future scenarios regarding duties (confirmed, increased, changed, or decreased) and to determine the consequences on trade relations with foreign clients and suppliers: moving today, at a standstill (or nearly so), allows entrepreneurs to negotiate shared and fair solutions and to avoid, as far as possible, the emergence of tensions and conflicts with the various partners along the international supply chain.
The case: A consumer bought a Ford car in Italy from an Italian car distributor. The car was manufactured by Ford WAG in Germany and supplied by Ford Italia, which belong to the same group of companies. Following an accident in December 2001 in which the airbag failed, the consumer sued the Italian distributor as well as Ford Italia for damages. Ford Italia disputed the claims for damages asserted against it, arguing that it had not manufactured the vehicle and, because it was itself only a distributor/supplier, referred to Ford WAG in Germany as the actual manufacturer.
Question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) referred the following question to the ECJ:
- the manufacturer’s liability under the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC is limited in accordance with Art 3 to cases where the supplier physically puts his name, trade mark, or other distinguishing feature on the product to create confusion between his identity and that of the actual manufacturer;
- or is the distributor liable as a “quasi-producer” even if he has not physically put his name or trademark on the product, but nevertheless «presents himself as its producer» within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive by using the distinguishing feature in his company name, which was put on the car by another person, but leading to identity with the actual car manufacturer.
ECJ judgement (European Court of Justice) of 19/12/2024, Case C-157/23
A company that does not manufacture a product itself, but only distributes it, can still be considered a «manufacturer» within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC). This is the case if the distributor puts his name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product and consequently presents itself as the manufacturer. According to the ECJ, this can give the consumer the impression that the distributor is responsible for the quality and safety of the product.
However, the ECJ emphasizes that liability does not depend on whether the distributor puts the sign on the product itself. The distributor did not do so in the specific case. However, the distributor used the corresponding distinguishing feature in its company name. According to the ECJ, the decisive factor is, therefore, whether the distributor uses this name match to gain the trust of consumers and is thus perceived as a responsible manufacturer.
The distributor is jointly and severally liable with the actual manufacturer. This means that consumers can either make a claim against the manufacturer or the dealer directly. However, the dealer has the right to ask for a regress for the damage incurred from the actual manufacturer.
Remarks
The ECJ emphasizes consumer protection. In my opinion, this argument is slightly overstretched:
- According to the ECJ, the consumer should not be burdened with the complex task of identifying the actual manufacturer of a defective product.
- A distributor that sells a product and uses its name or trademark to do so creates trust in the consumer. This trust is to be protected by the liability of the authorized distributor — regardless of whether the distributor has actively put its trademark on the product or not.
- This increases the liability risk for authorized car dealers because they must obtain appropriate insurance against such a risk. In the constellation described above, authorized dealers can be exposed to unexpectedly high claims for damages under strict product liability.
Good advice is not expensive
- It is essential that such cases are legally clarified when drawing up and formulating distribution agreements with car manufacturers and that the ECJ ruling is considered.
- In addition, authorized dealers/distributors should reconsider the use of product names from the actual producer in their company name and/or in their corporate image.
The Brazilian market has not been immune to the protectionist wave of «America First.» If such measures persist over time, they could have a lasting impact on the local economy. Still, a sour lemon can often become a sweet caipirinha in the resilient and optimistic spirit that characterizes both Brazilian society and its entrepreneurs.
As is often the case in the chessboard of global economic geopolitics, a move from one player creates room for another countermove. Brazil reacted with reciprocal trade measures, signaling clearly that it would not accept a position of commercial vulnerability.
This firmer stance — almost unthinkable in earlier years — strengthened Brazil’s image in Europe as a country ready to reposition itself with greater autonomy and pragmatism, opening new doors to international markets. In a world where global value chains are being restructured and reliable trade partners are in high demand, Brazil is increasingly seen not just as a supplier of raw materials, but as a strategic partner in critical industries.
The rapprochement with Europe has been further energized by progress in the Mercosur–European Union Agreement, whose negotiations spanned decades and now seem to be gaining momentum. While the United States embraces a more isolationist commercial posture, Europe is actively diversifying its trade relations — and Brazil, by demonstrating a commitment to clear rules, economic stability, and legal certainty, emerges as a natural candidate to fill that gap.
The Direct Impact of U.S. Tariffs
The trade measures introduced under President Trump primarily affected Brazilian producers of semi-finished steel and primary aluminum, with the removal of long-standing exemptions and quotas. In 2024, Brazil exported US$ 2.2 billion in semi-finished steel to the United States, representing nearly 60% of U.S. imports in that category. In the same year, Brazilian aluminum exports to the U.S. reached US$ 796 million, accounting for 14% of the sector’s total. Losses in exports for 2025 are estimated at around US$ 1.5 billion.
Brazil’s Response and a New Phase
In April 2025, the Brazilian Congress passed a new legal framework for trade retaliation, empowering the Executive Branch to adopt countermeasures in a faster and more technically structured way. The new legislation allows, for example, the automatic imposition of retaliatory tariffs on goods from countries that adopt unilateral measures incompatible with WTO norms; the suspension of tax or customs benefits previously granted under bilateral agreements; the creation of a list of priority sectors for trade defense and diversification of export markets.
Beyond the retaliation itself, the move marked a significant shift in posture: Brazil began positioning itself as an active player in global trade governance, aligning with mid-sized economies that advocate for predictable, balanced, and rules-based trade relations.
An Opportunity for Brazil–Europe Relations
This new stage sets Brazil as a reliable supplier to European industry — not only of raw materials but also of higher-value-added goods, particularly in processed foods, bioenergy, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure.
Moreover, as US–China tensions drive European companies to seek nearshoring or “friend-shoring” strategies with more predictable partners, Brazil, with its clean energy matrix, large domestic market, and relatively stable institutions, emerges as a strong alternative.
Legal Implications and Strategic Recommendations
This changing landscape brings new opportunities for companies and legal advisors involved in Brazil–Europe investment and trade relations. Particular attention should be paid to:
- Monitoring rules of origin in the Mercosur–EU agreement, especially in sectors requiring supply chain restructuring;
- Reviewing contractual and tax structures for import/export operations, including clauses addressing tariff instability or non-tariff barriers (e.g., environmental or sanitary standards), and clearly defining force majeure events;
- Reassessing distribution and agency agreements in light of the new commercial environment;
- Exploring joint ventures and technology transfer arrangements with Brazilian partners, particularly in bioeconomy, green hydrogen, and mineral processing.
From lemon to caipirinha
The world is becoming more fragmented and competitive, but also more open to realignment. What began as a protectionist blow from the United States has revealed new opportunities for transatlantic cooperation. For Brazil, Europe is no longer just a client: it is poised to become a long-term strategic partner. It is now up to lawyers and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to turn this opportunity into lasting, mutually beneficial relationships.
Scrivi a Andreas
When Life Gives You Tariffs… Make New Allies: Brazil, Europe and a New Trade Chapter
03.04.2025
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Бразилия
- Распространение
- Налог
On 29 June 2025, the Vietnamese government introduced Decree No. 163/2025/ND-CP (Decree 163). This decree provides detailed guidance on how the updated Law on Pharmacy will be implemented.
Like the amended Law on Pharmacy, Decree 163 came into effect on 1 July 2025, replacing the previous Decree No. 54/2017/ND-CP (Decree 54). The new decree sets out comprehensive rules for key aspects of managing pharmaceuticals, including:
- Pharmacy practice certificates
- Certificates allowing pharmaceutical businesses to operate
- Import and export of medicines and drug ingredients
- Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) inspections of overseas manufacturers
- Recalling medicines and drug ingredients
- Certificates for medicine advertising content
- Medicine price management
Key Changes in Decree 163
Here are some important changes and additions introduced by Decree 163:
Destroying Specially Controlled Medicines
You no longer need to get approval from the relevant authority before destroying narcotic, psychotropic, and precursor drugs, or pharmaceutical ingredients that are narcotic or psychotropic substances or precursors used in medicines. Instead, you just need to provide notification at least seven working days in advance. This notification must include the planned destruction date and a detailed list of items to be destroyed.
E-commerce in Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical businesses that sell products online must openly display the following information to ensure transparency and consumer safety:
- Their certificate allowing them to operate as a pharmaceutical business.
- The pharmacy practice certificate of the person responsible for pharmaceutical expertise.
- Information about the medicines themselves.
Shelf-Life Rules for Imported Products
For medicines and ingredients with a total shelf life of nine months or less, at least one-third of their shelf life must remain when they clear customs. Medicines with a shelf life of 30 days or less must still be within their shelf life at the time of customs clearance.
Controlling Imported Products
All medicines with marketing authorisation (MA) are subject to import control, except for:
- Medicines needed for preventing and treating Group A infectious diseases that have been declared epidemics, as per the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases.
- Medicines with a shelf life of less than 30 days.
Importers must inform the provincial People’s Committee at least five working days before making a customs declaration. The People’s Committee can then issue a written notice of non-compliance to the customs authority within five working days of receiving this notification.
Medicine Advertising
Decree 163 adds a process that allows an approved medicine advertising certificate to be adjusted for certain changes (such as a change to the MA holder or manufacturer information). This means you don’t have to go through the entire initial registration process for medicine advertising content again, as was required under the previous rules.
Medicine Price Management
Businesses must announce or re-announce wholesale prices, similar to the medicine price declaration process under Decree 54. Some medicines are exempt from this requirement, including those provided free of charge for emergency responses, national health programmes, humanitarian aid, clinical trials, scientific research, or exhibition purposes, and medicines carried as personal luggage.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) can make recommendations if the announced or re-announced price is significantly higher than similar medicines already on the market. This includes situations where:
- The announced or re-announced wholesale price of the medicine is higher than the highest price of similar medicines.
- The price difference is more than 35% (for medicines priced under VND 1 million) or 15% (for medicines priced at VND 1 million and above) compared to winning bid prices in tenders.
- The announced or re-announced price is higher than prices in the country of origin or other markets (if there’s no similar product in Vietnam).
- When such differences are found, the MOH issues a formal recommendation to the announcing business and publishes it online for transparency and accountability.
Further Guidance in New Circular
On 1 July 2025, the MOH issued Circular No. 31/2025/TT-BYT (Circular 31), which further details how the amended Law on Pharmacy and Decree 163 should be implemented. Circular 31 officially replaces Circular No. 07/2018/TT-BYT and Decree 54 and came into effect immediately.
Key provisions of Circular 31 include:
Notification of Practising Pharmacists
Pharmaceutical businesses that are not part of a pharmacy chain must inform the relevant authority of a list of people currently working at the business who hold pharmacy practice certificates. This notification must be submitted within 15 days of the date the certificate allowing the pharmaceutical business to operate was issued, or when there are any changes to the list. This is a shorter deadline than the previous 30 days under earlier rules.
Pharmacy chains have similar notification duties and deadlines. Specifically, the chain operator must inform the provincial authority where each pharmacy in the chain is located about the list of practising pharmacists at those sites. Additionally, pharmacy chains must notify the authority if pharmacies are added or removed from the chain, and if there are any rotations of the people responsible for pharmaceutical expertise between pharmacies within the chain.
Medicine Information Activities
Under Circular 31, medicine information can still be given to healthcare professionals through information materials, seminars, and medical representatives.
However, Circular 31 introduces a significant change by removing the need to obtain a certificate for medicine information content before carrying out these activities. Under the new rules, pharmaceutical businesses, representative offices of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Vietnam, and MA holders are now responsible for creating and distributing medicine information materials. These materials must comply with the package inserts for medicines approved by the MOH, the Vietnamese National Drug Formulary, and any related documents and professional instructions issued or recognised by the MOH.
Donald Trump, never one to shy away from drama or diplomacy-via-caps-lock, has slapped a 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States. The justification? In his own delicate prose: «The treatment of former President Jair Bolsonaro is a disgrace… A witch hunt that must end IMMEDIATELY!»
And just in case anyone thought this was about trade imbalances or economic strategy, Trump made things crystal clear: «Due to Brazil’s insidious attacks on free elections…».
In short, the 50% tariff isn’t about coffee, orange juice, or flip-flops. It’s about a Supreme Court judgment, applying Brazilian law, regarding Brazilian politicians accused of conspiring in a coup d’état. In other words, this is a brazen (and frankly absurd) attempt at judicial intervention via trade war.
Trump, with his characteristic subtlety, offered a solution: manufacture in the U.S., and he’ll look kindly upon Brazil, like a mafia don offering «protection» after smashing your shop window. But what he meant was: consider Bolsonaro innocent, and we’ll talk.
The Brazilian market took the bait
Although the fishy interference in Brazilian affairs was determined from a fish out of the water, the market took the bait: in the first 48 hours after the infamous letter, at least 1500 tons of fish were already held in Brazilian ports, as US buyers suspended their contracts due to uncertainty about the costs upon arrival. The fish market is on alert, as 80% of the exports head to the US, mainly coming from small family-owned industries that distribute the catch from artisanal fishing communities.
The same effect hit other sectors, from orange, honey, and coffee to aircraft.
Brazil’s response and sorcery: don’t mess with us (or our weather)
Naturally, Brazil will not sit quietly sipping caipirinhas while its sovereignty is trampled. Reciprocity is on the table: if Washington raises tariffs, Brasília can do the same. But above all, one thing is sure: Brazil will never tolerate foreign interference in its independent judiciary.
And then, a curious coincidence: right after Trump’s speech, a tornado accompanied by lightning struck the White House grounds. Pure chance? Maybe. Or could it have been the work of Brazilian indigenous shamans, a particularly well-organized group of umbanda practitioners, or simply the fact that, as every Brazilian child knows, God is Brazilian.
Trump might want to check the weather forecast next time before penning another angry letter.
The unpredictable becoming predictable
Trade wars are rarely tidy affairs, but one thing they consistently deliver is chaos (in legal terms, disruption). And when disruption meets contracts, force majeure disputes often end up in court.
At first glance, Trump’s decision to impose a 50% tariff overnight might feel like an unpredictable thunderbolt (quite literally, given the weather at the White House). But here’s the catch: by now, unpredictable tariffs are becoming predictable. When a government with a well-documented love for impulsive economic diplomacy imposes politically motivated tariffs, can anyone claim to be surprised?
In most jurisdictions, force majeure requires that the event be extraordinary, unforeseeable, and beyond the parties’ control. A sudden 50% tariff certainly ticks a few of those boxes, but following a repetition of erratic trade policy, one might argue that businesses should expect what in past times was considered unexpected, especially when dealing with certain jurisdictions or political figures. In other words, Trump’s tariffs might not excuse performance if parties didn’t prepare for exactly this kind of volatility.
This is where good contract drafting comes into play
Savvy businesses are learning that their contracts must go beyond a vague boilerplate clause about “acts of government” or “changes in law.” Instead, they should expressly address the risk of sudden tariff changes, including
- hardship clauses that allow renegotiation when costs become commercially unreasonable;
- price adjustment mechanisms linked to tariff thresholds;
- termination rights triggered by specified levels of customs duties;
- currency fluctuation provisions (because tariffs rarely travel alone, and currency swings often accompany them).
In short, while no contract can immunize a business from every shock, smart drafting can mean the difference between a commercial headache and a catastrophic breach.
Therefore, tariffs may no longer be an unpredictable storm; they are part of the new predictable landscape. Given that your contract might wake up tomorrow facing ‘IMMEDIATE’ punitive tariffs in all caps, your contract should be ready today.
The unwitting cupid: strengthening EU-Brazil relations
While the tariffs may ruffle trade flows between Brasília and Washington, there’s an unintended silver lining: Trump is proving to be the most efficient matchmaker between Brazil and other markets, such as China and the European Union.
The EU-Brazil relationship, already a flirtation with promising prospects, with relevant progress in the EU-Mercosur Agreement, now seems destined for deeper romance. If Mr. Trump insists on isolating the US from Brazil, the old continent stands ready, with flowers and wine in hand, to pick up where the US left off. After all, Brazilian fish can pair up nicely with champagne, cava and prosecco.
So thank you, Mr. Trump. In your quest to bully Brazil into submission, you may have done more to strengthen transatlantic ties than any EU Commissioner ever could. As they say in Brasília these days: Trump is not a trade warrior. He’s a cupid in disguise.
The recent announcement of a landmark trade agreement framework, following just three months negotiations since President Trump’s tariffs announcement on 2 April 2025, signals a pivotal shift, not merely in bilateral relations, but in the broader architecture of global supply chains.
As a commercial lawyer with exposure to Vietnam since 2007, I have observed the evolving dynamics between the United States and Vietnam through the years, talking to students, entrepreneurs, veterans, diplomats, humans from all walks all life, from both nations and beyond.
You may recall that Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China, was to be the nation that would encounter the most stringent tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, reaching an astonishing 46%.
The newly forged framework outlines significant reciprocal concessions designed to foster greater trade and investment flows. Granted, pre-April 2 tariffs applied by the USA on Vietnamese goods were lower than what emerges from the framework agreement, but still, it is better than 46%),
The United States has committed to imposing a 20% tariff on most Vietnamese imports, a notable reduction from the previously mooted 46%. However, a substantial 40% tariff will apply to goods re-exported from third countries, with a particular focus on those originating from China.
Vietnam has pledged to open its market to a wide array of US products. Crucially, it has also committed to implementing stringent measures aimed at restricting the transshipment of Chinese goods through its territory, a long-standing concern for Washington.
In a significant win for American exporters, US goods will now enjoy duty-free access to the Vietnamese market, effectively granting “total access”, particularly for large-engine vehicles such as SUVs, as emphatically stated by President Trump (how SUVs are going to circulate in the narrow alleys of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, infested by swarms of mopeds, is a different story).
This agreement is expected to catalyse growth in several key sectors. Electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (especially Liquefied Natural Gas), and agriculture are poised for expansion. US firms specialising in manufacturing technology, energy solutions, and agricultural products are anticipated to be the primary beneficiaries. Furthermore, beyond immediate trade benefits, the agreement is set to reshape investment strategies, encouraging a greater localisation of supply chains within Vietnam. This strategic realignment is also expected to further solidify the already robust US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
While the potential upsides are considerable, it is imperative for businesses and investors to approach this new landscape with a clear understanding of the accompanying risks. From my vantage point, I identify several significant execution challenges and structural impediments that require close monitoring.
Enforcement of Transshipment Controls
The most immediate and perhaps formidable risk lies in the effective enforcement of transshipment controls. Vietnam has historically served as a significant assembly point for Chinese-manufactured components. Ensuring that goods originating from China are not merely re-routed through Vietnam to circumvent US tariffs will require exceptionally close monitoring and robust verification mechanisms. The legal and practical complexities of definitively determining the true country of origin for all goods will undoubtedly pose a persistent challenge. As a European citizen, witnessing how the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“EVFTA”), which poses an important stress on certificates of origin, I am particularly aware of this matter.
While Vietnam has made remarkable strides in its economic development, certain structural issues could hinder its capacity to scale up high-value manufacturing in the short to medium term. These include:
Legal framework nuances
Vietnam’s legal framework for foreign investment has seen continuous improvements, but legal and cultural complexities and inconsistencies can and do still arise. Navigating the regulatory landscape, particularly with new rules stemming from this agreement and at a time of deep administrative, governmental, digital and legal reforms in Vietnam, will demand expert legal guidance to ensure compliance and mitigate potential fines and disputes. Issues surrounding so-called sublicences for businesses, intellectual property rights enforcement and contract enforceability, whilst improving, still require careful consideration;
Education
The ambition to transform Vietnam into a high-value manufacturing hub necessitates a workforce equipped with advanced skills. While the Vietnamese government prioritises education and workforce development, a significant portion of the current labour force lacks formal training and specialised certifications, let alone a good command of the English language. Bridging this skills gap, particularly in areas like advanced manufacturing, engineering, and digital technologies is a necessity and not just in light of this framework agreement. Companies may need to factor in substantial investment in training and upskilling programmes for their Vietnamese employees.
Infrastructures
Despite considerable investment, Vietnam’s infrastructure, particularly in logistics, energy, and transportation, continues to face bottlenecks. And China – the apparent target of Trump’s tariffs – is stepping in with high-speed trains connecting it to the northern Provinces of Vietnam. An increased volume of high-value manufacturing and trade will place further strain on existing infrastructure. Inadequate port capacity, congested roads, and a reliable energy supply (including for EV charging) are critical concerns that could impact efficiency and increase operational costs for businesses.
Policy divergence
This framework agreement deepens US-Vietnam trade ties and seems to be paving the way for more US investments in Vietnam, but this second aspect seems to run counter to parallel US policy objectives aimed at reshoring manufacturing back to the United States. This potential divergence in strategic priorities could introduce yet another element of unpredictability in the long term, necessitating a flexible and adaptable investment approach. Future shifts in US policy could impact the durability and full extent of the benefits derived from this agreement.
This trade agreement, if finalised and implemented, undoubtedly represents a structural shift in global trade dynamics. It strategically positions Vietnam as an increasingly important high-value manufacturing hub and significantly deepens US engagement in Southeast Asia. We will need time, however, to assess the practical impact of the agreement, observing the efficacy of its implementation, and understanding how Vietnam’s inherent strengths and challenges will ultimately shape its role in the reconfigured global supply chain.
We will also need to see what China, if anything, will do as a countermeasure. In fact, any assessment of Vietnam’s evolving trade landscape would be incomplete without a thorough consideration of China’s influence and strategic posture. President Xi Jinping has consistently championed a vision of a “community of shared future for mankind,” a concept that, while outwardly promoting global cooperation, also subtly underscores a demand for international alignment with Beijing’s interests. In the context of escalating trade tensions, Xi has repeatedly warned that “trade wars have no winners,” advocating for unity against protectionist measures, yet simultaneously implying that nations must ultimately choose sides, either with or against China’s economic and political orbit. Vietnam, despite its historical complexities and occasional maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea (or East Sea, as it is officially called by Hanoi), remains deeply interwoven with China’s economy. China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner for many years, with significant inflows of Chinese FDI, loans, and project contractors. This economic dependency is particularly evident in various sectors, where Chinese components and materials form a substantial part of Vietnamese manufacturing supply chains. While Vietnam has actively sought to diversify its trade partners and reduce its reliance on China, the sheer scale of the bilateral economic relationship means that disentanglement is a long-term, complex endeavour. Furthermore, China’s influence extends beyond direct trade into crucial regional resources. The Mekong River, a lifeline for millions in Southeast Asia, originates in China, which has constructed numerous upstream dams.
As Vietnam navigates its enhanced trade relationship with the United States, it must simultaneously contend with the enduring economic gravity and strategic ambitions of its northern giant neighbour. Any perceived move by Vietnam to significantly shift away from China could invite retaliatory measures or heightened pressure from Beijing. Businesses investing in Vietnam must not only grasp the intricacies of the US-Vietnam agreement but also meticulously analyse how these developments will intersect with, and potentially be impacted by, the intricate, often delicate, and sometimes fraught relationship between Hanoi and Beijing. Understanding this geopolitical tightrope will be essential for sustainable success in the Vietnamese market. Prudence, informed legal counsel, and a keen eye on evolving geopolitical and economic realities will be paramount for those seeking to capitalise on this transformative new chapter.
Takeaways
- Tariffs:The US-Vietnam framework agreement marks a significant departure from previous trade dynamics, reducing US tariffs on most Vietnamese imports to 20% (from a mooted 46%) while imposing a 40% tariff on transshipped goods, especially from China.
- Vietnam’s market opening:Vietnam has committed to duty-free access for a broad range of US products and stricter controls on Chinese goods transiting its territory.
- Growth / manufacturing shift potential:The agreement is expected to fuel expansion in Vietnamese electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (LNG), and agriculture. It also encourages supply chain localisation within Vietnam (normally more of an assembly point for Chinese products).
- Execution challenges: Effectively preventing the re-routing of Chinese goods through Vietnam to avoid tariffs will be a complex and demanding task; Despite economic progress, Vietnam faces hurdles in scaling high-value manufacturing due to legal framework nuances (e.g., sublicences, IP enforcement), a skills gap in its workforce (lack of formal training, English proficiency) and infrastructure bottlenecks (logistics, energy, transportation).
- US policy divergence:The agreement’s encouragement of US investment in Vietnam appears to contradict the broader US policy objective of reshoring manufacturing.
- China:Businesses must consider China’s significant economic sway over Vietnam, including its position as Vietnam’s largest trading partner, its FDI, and its control over shared resources like the Mekong River. Any major shift by Vietnam away from China could lead to retaliatory measures from Beijing.
- Uncertainty:This is not a final agreement, so the situation might change. Prudence and informed legal counsel are crucial for businesses navigating this evolving landscape.
The Trump approach: power and dominance
In his autobiography, The Art of the Deal, Donald Trump describes negotiation as a contest of strength, determination, and dominance. His vision is clear: anyone who shows uncertainty or makes concessions too early is immediately perceived as a loser. His negotiating style is based on constant pressure, maximalist demands, and calculated threats, to obtain unilateral advantages. In this scheme, compromise is not a point of arrival, but a sign of weakness to be avoided.
Trump has always been a competitive negotiator, focused on immediate results and uninterested in balanced solutions unless they are strictly functional to his interests.
Other negotiating styles: compromising and collaborative
In contrast to this competitive approach, there are two other relevant negotiating styles:
- The compromising style aims to reach a ‘middle ground’ agreement, in which both parties give something up to achieve an acceptable solution. It is a pragmatic approach, practical in situations where time is limited or positions are too far apart for genuine collaboration.
- The collaborative style, on the other hand, aims to create win-win solutions. The parties seek to thoroughly understand each other’s interests and work together to build an outcome that maximizes the benefit for both. It requires openness, time, and trust.
In commercial negotiations, the compromising or collaborative approach can only work if the other party shares the same logic. But when dealing with an explicitly competitive actor such as Trump, adopting a compromising style risks seriously penalizing the other party, for at least three reasons:
- It conveys weakness
An accommodating gesture is seen not as a sign of openness, but as a point of pressure to be exploited. The competitive negotiator, focused on gaining an immediate advantage, interprets it as a willingness to give even more.
- It relinquishes bargaining power
The EU has a vast market and significant trade levers, especially in a context where the US is closing the door to the Chinese market. Offering concessions at the outset is tantamount to burning your cards without getting anything in return. In a competitive confrontation, the first move can set the tone for the negotiation: once a concession has been made, it is very difficult to backtrack.
- It legitimizes the negotiating imbalance
An unbalanced compromise, if accepted without resistance, risks becoming the new basis for future trade relations, systematically penalizing the EU in subsequent rounds.
Why 30%? The anchor technique
Trump often uses a negotiating technique known as the anchor technique. This consists of deliberately setting a very high target at the beginning of the negotiation (in our case, the threat of 30% tariffs).
The aim is to create a psychological perimeter for the negotiation and force the other party to reason on the basis of that figure, even though they are aware that it is arbitrary. This technique allows one to influence the scope of the discussion and obtain greater concessions, just as Trump has done.
The worst response: unilateral concessions with no return
Unfortunately, the European Union has already shown worrying signs of a compromising attitude that has not been negotiated with the Trump administration, for example:
- The waiver of the web tax* on American digital giants, without obtaining any regulation or shared tax contribution in return.
- The offer to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, made to reassure Washington, without obtaining anything in return.
- The acceptance of the increase in NATO spending to 5% of GDP, demanded by Trump, again without obtaining anything in return.
All these offers without asking for anything in return reinforce the idea that the EU is willing to concede from the outset. Trump, true to his competitive logic, sees these concessions as a starting point, not a compromise: this pushes him to raise his demands, not moderate them.
Persevering would be a fatal mistake
Continuing along this path of compromise, in the hope that accommodation will ease the pressure, would be not only ineffective but counterproductive. With a competitive negotiator, unilateral concessions do not stop escalation: they fuel it. Any sign of weakness is interpreted as additional room for maneuver.
A helpful example is China’s reaction during the trade war initiated by Trump. Faced with massive tariffs imposed by the US, Beijing responded in kind, imposing equivalent tariffs. Instead of giving in, it spoke the same language of power. The result is there for all to see: after weeks of escalation, the US had to moderate its position, opening up to a more balanced agreement.
The right strategy: speak his language
To avoid the mistakes of the past, the EU should therefore reverse its negotiating logic. Not to fuel confrontation, but to restore a credible balance. Some applicable countermeasures could be:
- Target Trump’s electoral base, particularly the agricultural sectors (soy, corn, beef), with selective tariffs or targeted restrictions.
- Put the European web tax* back on the table, even with a minimum rate, linking any exemptions to real concessions from the US.
These well-calibrated moves would strengthen the EU’s position and show that it can defend its interests by speaking a language Trump understands: that of strength and bargaining power.
Going beyond requests, seeking the other party’s interests
A fundamental principle in any negotiation is to identify the other side’s interests and find a way to allow them to achieve them without sacrificing your own. This is no easy task, given Trump’s notorious volatility and the lack of sound arguments to justify the demands made in the negotiations.
In the case of the EU-US negotiations, it must be borne in mind that Trump is playing the game with his electoral base in mind: an agreement must offer him a narrative of victory to communicate to his electorate.
Takeaway
When negotiating with a competitive player like Trump, one should abandon the accommodating approach, avoid concessions without something in return, and adopt a style that is more assertive, strategic, and symmetrical.
Only then will it be able to build an agreement that is solid, fair, and respectful of its economic and political strength.
I have often dealt with commercial distribution agreements between Italian and Chinese companies, sometimes following negotiations in the wine sector for various types of agreements: sales, distribution, franchising, establishment of joint ventures, and sales through online stores.
I am sharing some key considerations for approaching this complex but opportunity-rich market.
📌 Here are my 10 takeaways
Step Zero. Protect your IP
it is essential to protect your intellectual property before entering China. This includes trademarks (including their Chinese transliteration), labels, web domains, and social media accounts. Neglecting this aspect can have disastrous consequences, exposing you to the widespread phenomenon of trademark squatting (even famous names such as Michael Jordan, Elon Musk, and Donald Trump have fallen victim to this).
For more information, you can read this article about Intellectual property protection in China
1 — Know your enemy
trust is good, but mistrust is better. Before entering into commercial agreements, it is essential to check the credentials of potential partners through the databases of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. When it comes to wine, it is necessary to check whether the prospective distributor has a license to import and distribute wine.
2 — No copy-paste
Contracts must be tailor-made, adapting them to local specificities. In particular, it is crucial to clearly regulate promotional activities: budget, commercial actions, communication methods, and management of the producer’s trademarks. It is also best to write the contract in Chinese to ensure that there are no misunderstandings and in case it needs to be used before a judge or local administrative body, as Chinese is the only official language. (N.B.: if you think of entrusting the task to ChatGPT, this is not a good idea).
For an in-depth article, check out The commercial distribution contract in China
3 — Decide immediately how and where to litigate
It may seem counterintuitive, but it is best to avoid providing for Italian (or French, or German) jurisdiction and applicable law, which is an ineffective solution, especially in cases where urgent action is needed to stop unfair competition or counterfeiting. Consider applying Chinese law and provide for an arbitration clause at CIETAC. An effective dispute management strategy is a key element of the agreement and must be negotiated carefully. (P.S.: This applies not only to China but to all international agreements. For more information, see this article).
4 — China is big
And it is the sum of many very different internal markets. Exclusivity should be granted for good reasons, but only if the distributor has a well-developed commercial network and can achieve specific shared objectives. If granted, it should be limited to the province where the distributor is based and subject to the achievement of agreed sales volumes. Having a single distributor for the whole of China is like entrusting an Italian distributor with promoting a product throughout Europe. Or appoint a NYC-based company to promote and sell your wines in all 50 US States.
5 — China is far away
Delegating everything to the local distributor and taking no interest in what is happening on the Chinese market is never a good idea. Firstly, because you have no idea how, where, and with what results the wines are being sold. Secondly, because you cannot verify compliance with agreements, for example on non-competition or the use of trademarks. It is therefore important to schedule meetings to share commercial policies and be able to verify what is happening, including through audits and visits to warehouses and the sales network.
6 — China is expensive
Competition in the Chinese domestic market is fierce. This is also true in terms of price, as some countries that are direct competitors of Italy (Australia, Chile, New Zealand) have free trade agreements and can therefore enter the market on more favorable terms than Italian wine, which is subject to a total tax burden of around 43% after payment of duties, excise taxes, and VAT. It is necessary to position oneself in the right market segment (medium-high), and to do so, it is necessary to plan the right commercial actions together with the distributor. Selling Ex-Works and hoping that the distributor will take care of everything is not an excellent strategy for being competitive.
7 — China is dangerous
Scams are always around the corner. In the wine world in particular, for example, spontaneous expressions of interest are frequent, arriving via the company website, social media accounts, or directly via email. They sound like this: we have discovered your wines, we think they are fantastic, we want to place an order immediately. If it sounds too good and easy, it is certainly a scam. There is an easy way to check: if the next step is a request for payment of a few thousand euros, justified by the need to register the wines on the CIFER (China Imported Food Enterprise Registration) portal, or to register your trademark to prevent others from doing so, or to authenticate the signature on the sales contract… these are attempts at fraud, and the elusive order will never arrive after payment has been received. How can you check whether the person you are dealing with is a reputable company or a fraudster? 👉🏼Go back to point 1 (here is an in-depth article).
8 — E-commerce? Yes, but with method (and money)
Online wine sales continue to grow, but entering large platforms is complex, competition is fierce, and running an online store requires meticulous planning and highly efficient system implementation. The online market in China is all pay-for-play. Nothing is achieved with no money or minimal effort. If you want to sell online, you need to build an omnichannel system integrated with traditional distribution, and to do this, it is essential to involve a local partner with well-defined investments and responsibilities.
9 — China is not a market for everyone
You need to protect your brands, study the market thoroughly, know your competition (both foreign and local), find the right market channel, select a distributor motivated to invest time and money in promoting your product, and be willing to support them with the right investments. If you want to build a serious plan to enter the Chinese market, you must have a medium- to long-term perspective. There are no shortcuts (actually, there are many, but they almost always lead to wasted time and money). If you are unwilling to invest in entering the Chinese market through the front door, it is unlikely that anyone else will do it for you.
10 — Don’t do it yourself
If you have read up to point 9 and are still keen to enter the Chinese market, consider doing so professionally, involving consultants who can support your company throughout the market research, scouting, negotiation, and contract drafting processes. This is also part of the investment needed to build and develop a solid and resilient business model. This advice applies to all foreign markets, and even more so to China.
The most dangerous mistake one can make after the announcement of the (partial) suspension of U.S. duties for 90 days is to hope that everything will go well and we will return to the pre-April 2 world.
First, because very invasive tariffs remain in place: 10 percent on all countries that trade with the U.S., including the EU, 25 percent on automotive, 25 percent on steel and aluminum, 145 percent on China.
Second, because it is impossible to predict the actions of the U.S. Administration in the short and medium term: it cannot be ruled out that tariffs will remain, increase, change targets or that other factors will intervene to turn the tide in international markets, such as an escalation of the trade war with China.
The 90-day suspension is an opportunity
The U.S.’s temporary suspension of tariffs represents a valuable window that should be used not only as a truce but also as a valuable room for action: 90 days to rehash contracts, renegotiate key clauses, and insert levers of flexibility that can protect business in various future scenarios in the U.S. and other markets.
Today’s exporters cannot afford to «sit back and see what will happen»-it is time to act, and to do so professionally and strategically. Let’s look at a checklist of important points to consider.
What do contracts with customers and suppliers entail?
The first point is to survey agreements with the trade network in the U.S. and other countries that export to the U.S., as well as with upstream suppliers in the supply chain.
Is there a written contract? The worst-case scenario — unfortunately a very frequent one — is when the parties cooperate informally, only based on orders and order confirmations. This leaves undefined not only what happens in the case of imposition of duties, but also a whole range of other points, for example, limits on damages that can be claimed in the case of breach of contract, the duration of the agreement, the applicable law, and how any disputes will be resolved.
Another very problematic scenario is one in which contracts exist, but they are generic and do not include the necessary covenants to manage the risks involved in operating in a highly litigious market such as the U.S., which, moreover, has very high legal costs.
Having done this analysis, the necessary actions can be put in place, prioritizing according to the importance of business relationships and as appropriate:
- Negotiate and conclude a written contract from scratch
- Replace the existing agreement with a complete and correct contract
- Amend and integrate the existing agreement with pacts to manage tariffs and other causes of price fluctuations
Let us dwell on the last scenario, assuming that there is a complete and correct contract but one that does not regulate price and cost fluctuation as a direct or indirect consequence of the introduction of duties.
Contract Addendum
In such cases, the correct course of action is to sign an Addendum to the original contract, specifying which covenants are being waived and which covenants are being added. It is essential that the Addendum be negotiated and signed by persons with the power of representation of the parties and that it be drafted with the help of lawyers who specialize in this field. In addition to including correct clauses, it is necessary to verify that the covenants are valid according to the rules of law applicable to the contract.
Here are some clauses that can be the subject of the Addendum, to be modulated according to the specific case and possible scenarios.
Tariff Cost Sharing
By introducing this covenant, it is provided that in the event that duties are confirmed at [x]% or are reduced or increased within certain established thresholds, the Parties will share the increase equally, or according to other established percentages.
There may also be a ceiling on tariffs beyond which a party has the right to withdraw from the contract or request the suspension of certain orders for a specified period of time, after which it has the right to withdraw.
Price Adjustment
With this covenant, a discount or an increase in the product’s price is agreed upon, as the case may be, in the case of a duty greater than [x]%.
Among the use cases, in addition to that of the company exporting to the U.S. or other intermediate markets, with final destination of the products in the U.S., is that of those who purchase a product subject to import duty and resell it, processed or assembled.
Right to Cancel or Postpone Confirmed Orders
This covenant gives the right to revoke or suspend for a certain period already negotiated orders, as such binding, in case of confirmation or introduction of duties above a certain threshold, for example, if 20% taxation was confirmed for the import of wine from the EU.
The clause can be combined with previous covenants, for example, by stipulating that below the specified threshold, the contracts remain valid, and the parties share the duty or have the right to renegotiate the price.
Supply Forecast Adjustment
With this clause the Parties can modify supply programs already agreed for a specific duration (e.g., 24 months), with continuous sales and purchase obligations at a fixed price or indexable only within certain limits. The aim is to agree on the prerequisites for reshaping supply programs in the short and medium term, which can be very useful for defining the rules that will apply to relationships with key suppliers or customers for possible changes in volumes, delivery times, and prices.
Right to Source from Alternative Suppliers
This covenant serves to be authorized, if necessary, to source alternative suppliers of components or raw materials to those previously authorized in the contract with the end customer, for example, in cases where purchasing from the original suppliers has become too costly or difficult due to duties imposed at import or in previous steps in the supply chain, or other events such as currency or price fluctuation of certain commodities beyond a certain level established in the agreement.
Hardship and Force Majeure
The imposition of duties cannot be invoked as a cause of Force Majeure or hardship, respectively, to excuse contract non-performance or to renegotiate the price, even in cases of very high price increases (such as the 145% duty imposed on Chinese products). This conclusion is almost uniform under the law and jurisprudence of the major countries involved in the tariff war: U.S., China, Canada, Mexico, France and Italy: I refer to this practical guide for a timely examination of what the various rules provide.
If the contract lacks a well drafter Force Majeure and Hardship clause, or contains a generic clause, it is important to get your hands on revising it to expressly state the cases in which a party is entitled to suspend or terminate the contract, how and when to communicate the decision to invoke the exemption, and the consequences on the parties’ contractual obligations. You can go deeper on this topic here.
Conclusion
It is essential to prepare for possible future scenarios regarding duties (confirmed, increased, changed, or decreased) and to determine the consequences on trade relations with foreign clients and suppliers: moving today, at a standstill (or nearly so), allows entrepreneurs to negotiate shared and fair solutions and to avoid, as far as possible, the emergence of tensions and conflicts with the various partners along the international supply chain.
The case: A consumer bought a Ford car in Italy from an Italian car distributor. The car was manufactured by Ford WAG in Germany and supplied by Ford Italia, which belong to the same group of companies. Following an accident in December 2001 in which the airbag failed, the consumer sued the Italian distributor as well as Ford Italia for damages. Ford Italia disputed the claims for damages asserted against it, arguing that it had not manufactured the vehicle and, because it was itself only a distributor/supplier, referred to Ford WAG in Germany as the actual manufacturer.
Question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) referred the following question to the ECJ:
- the manufacturer’s liability under the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC is limited in accordance with Art 3 to cases where the supplier physically puts his name, trade mark, or other distinguishing feature on the product to create confusion between his identity and that of the actual manufacturer;
- or is the distributor liable as a “quasi-producer” even if he has not physically put his name or trademark on the product, but nevertheless «presents himself as its producer» within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive by using the distinguishing feature in his company name, which was put on the car by another person, but leading to identity with the actual car manufacturer.
ECJ judgement (European Court of Justice) of 19/12/2024, Case C-157/23
A company that does not manufacture a product itself, but only distributes it, can still be considered a «manufacturer» within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC). This is the case if the distributor puts his name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product and consequently presents itself as the manufacturer. According to the ECJ, this can give the consumer the impression that the distributor is responsible for the quality and safety of the product.
However, the ECJ emphasizes that liability does not depend on whether the distributor puts the sign on the product itself. The distributor did not do so in the specific case. However, the distributor used the corresponding distinguishing feature in its company name. According to the ECJ, the decisive factor is, therefore, whether the distributor uses this name match to gain the trust of consumers and is thus perceived as a responsible manufacturer.
The distributor is jointly and severally liable with the actual manufacturer. This means that consumers can either make a claim against the manufacturer or the dealer directly. However, the dealer has the right to ask for a regress for the damage incurred from the actual manufacturer.
Remarks
The ECJ emphasizes consumer protection. In my opinion, this argument is slightly overstretched:
- According to the ECJ, the consumer should not be burdened with the complex task of identifying the actual manufacturer of a defective product.
- A distributor that sells a product and uses its name or trademark to do so creates trust in the consumer. This trust is to be protected by the liability of the authorized distributor — regardless of whether the distributor has actively put its trademark on the product or not.
- This increases the liability risk for authorized car dealers because they must obtain appropriate insurance against such a risk. In the constellation described above, authorized dealers can be exposed to unexpectedly high claims for damages under strict product liability.
Good advice is not expensive
- It is essential that such cases are legally clarified when drawing up and formulating distribution agreements with car manufacturers and that the ECJ ruling is considered.
- In addition, authorized dealers/distributors should reconsider the use of product names from the actual producer in their company name and/or in their corporate image.
The Brazilian market has not been immune to the protectionist wave of «America First.» If such measures persist over time, they could have a lasting impact on the local economy. Still, a sour lemon can often become a sweet caipirinha in the resilient and optimistic spirit that characterizes both Brazilian society and its entrepreneurs.
As is often the case in the chessboard of global economic geopolitics, a move from one player creates room for another countermove. Brazil reacted with reciprocal trade measures, signaling clearly that it would not accept a position of commercial vulnerability.
This firmer stance — almost unthinkable in earlier years — strengthened Brazil’s image in Europe as a country ready to reposition itself with greater autonomy and pragmatism, opening new doors to international markets. In a world where global value chains are being restructured and reliable trade partners are in high demand, Brazil is increasingly seen not just as a supplier of raw materials, but as a strategic partner in critical industries.
The rapprochement with Europe has been further energized by progress in the Mercosur–European Union Agreement, whose negotiations spanned decades and now seem to be gaining momentum. While the United States embraces a more isolationist commercial posture, Europe is actively diversifying its trade relations — and Brazil, by demonstrating a commitment to clear rules, economic stability, and legal certainty, emerges as a natural candidate to fill that gap.
The Direct Impact of U.S. Tariffs
The trade measures introduced under President Trump primarily affected Brazilian producers of semi-finished steel and primary aluminum, with the removal of long-standing exemptions and quotas. In 2024, Brazil exported US$ 2.2 billion in semi-finished steel to the United States, representing nearly 60% of U.S. imports in that category. In the same year, Brazilian aluminum exports to the U.S. reached US$ 796 million, accounting for 14% of the sector’s total. Losses in exports for 2025 are estimated at around US$ 1.5 billion.
Brazil’s Response and a New Phase
In April 2025, the Brazilian Congress passed a new legal framework for trade retaliation, empowering the Executive Branch to adopt countermeasures in a faster and more technically structured way. The new legislation allows, for example, the automatic imposition of retaliatory tariffs on goods from countries that adopt unilateral measures incompatible with WTO norms; the suspension of tax or customs benefits previously granted under bilateral agreements; the creation of a list of priority sectors for trade defense and diversification of export markets.
Beyond the retaliation itself, the move marked a significant shift in posture: Brazil began positioning itself as an active player in global trade governance, aligning with mid-sized economies that advocate for predictable, balanced, and rules-based trade relations.
An Opportunity for Brazil–Europe Relations
This new stage sets Brazil as a reliable supplier to European industry — not only of raw materials but also of higher-value-added goods, particularly in processed foods, bioenergy, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure.
Moreover, as US–China tensions drive European companies to seek nearshoring or “friend-shoring” strategies with more predictable partners, Brazil, with its clean energy matrix, large domestic market, and relatively stable institutions, emerges as a strong alternative.
Legal Implications and Strategic Recommendations
This changing landscape brings new opportunities for companies and legal advisors involved in Brazil–Europe investment and trade relations. Particular attention should be paid to:
- Monitoring rules of origin in the Mercosur–EU agreement, especially in sectors requiring supply chain restructuring;
- Reviewing contractual and tax structures for import/export operations, including clauses addressing tariff instability or non-tariff barriers (e.g., environmental or sanitary standards), and clearly defining force majeure events;
- Reassessing distribution and agency agreements in light of the new commercial environment;
- Exploring joint ventures and technology transfer arrangements with Brazilian partners, particularly in bioeconomy, green hydrogen, and mineral processing.
From lemon to caipirinha
The world is becoming more fragmented and competitive, but also more open to realignment. What began as a protectionist blow from the United States has revealed new opportunities for transatlantic cooperation. For Brazil, Europe is no longer just a client: it is poised to become a long-term strategic partner. It is now up to lawyers and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to turn this opportunity into lasting, mutually beneficial relationships.
Scrivi a Geraldo
US TARIFFS | Contractual clauses for managing price increases
14.03.2025
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Европа
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США
- Распространение
- Налог
On 29 June 2025, the Vietnamese government introduced Decree No. 163/2025/ND-CP (Decree 163). This decree provides detailed guidance on how the updated Law on Pharmacy will be implemented.
Like the amended Law on Pharmacy, Decree 163 came into effect on 1 July 2025, replacing the previous Decree No. 54/2017/ND-CP (Decree 54). The new decree sets out comprehensive rules for key aspects of managing pharmaceuticals, including:
- Pharmacy practice certificates
- Certificates allowing pharmaceutical businesses to operate
- Import and export of medicines and drug ingredients
- Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) inspections of overseas manufacturers
- Recalling medicines and drug ingredients
- Certificates for medicine advertising content
- Medicine price management
Key Changes in Decree 163
Here are some important changes and additions introduced by Decree 163:
Destroying Specially Controlled Medicines
You no longer need to get approval from the relevant authority before destroying narcotic, psychotropic, and precursor drugs, or pharmaceutical ingredients that are narcotic or psychotropic substances or precursors used in medicines. Instead, you just need to provide notification at least seven working days in advance. This notification must include the planned destruction date and a detailed list of items to be destroyed.
E-commerce in Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical businesses that sell products online must openly display the following information to ensure transparency and consumer safety:
- Their certificate allowing them to operate as a pharmaceutical business.
- The pharmacy practice certificate of the person responsible for pharmaceutical expertise.
- Information about the medicines themselves.
Shelf-Life Rules for Imported Products
For medicines and ingredients with a total shelf life of nine months or less, at least one-third of their shelf life must remain when they clear customs. Medicines with a shelf life of 30 days or less must still be within their shelf life at the time of customs clearance.
Controlling Imported Products
All medicines with marketing authorisation (MA) are subject to import control, except for:
- Medicines needed for preventing and treating Group A infectious diseases that have been declared epidemics, as per the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases.
- Medicines with a shelf life of less than 30 days.
Importers must inform the provincial People’s Committee at least five working days before making a customs declaration. The People’s Committee can then issue a written notice of non-compliance to the customs authority within five working days of receiving this notification.
Medicine Advertising
Decree 163 adds a process that allows an approved medicine advertising certificate to be adjusted for certain changes (such as a change to the MA holder or manufacturer information). This means you don’t have to go through the entire initial registration process for medicine advertising content again, as was required under the previous rules.
Medicine Price Management
Businesses must announce or re-announce wholesale prices, similar to the medicine price declaration process under Decree 54. Some medicines are exempt from this requirement, including those provided free of charge for emergency responses, national health programmes, humanitarian aid, clinical trials, scientific research, or exhibition purposes, and medicines carried as personal luggage.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) can make recommendations if the announced or re-announced price is significantly higher than similar medicines already on the market. This includes situations where:
- The announced or re-announced wholesale price of the medicine is higher than the highest price of similar medicines.
- The price difference is more than 35% (for medicines priced under VND 1 million) or 15% (for medicines priced at VND 1 million and above) compared to winning bid prices in tenders.
- The announced or re-announced price is higher than prices in the country of origin or other markets (if there’s no similar product in Vietnam).
- When such differences are found, the MOH issues a formal recommendation to the announcing business and publishes it online for transparency and accountability.
Further Guidance in New Circular
On 1 July 2025, the MOH issued Circular No. 31/2025/TT-BYT (Circular 31), which further details how the amended Law on Pharmacy and Decree 163 should be implemented. Circular 31 officially replaces Circular No. 07/2018/TT-BYT and Decree 54 and came into effect immediately.
Key provisions of Circular 31 include:
Notification of Practising Pharmacists
Pharmaceutical businesses that are not part of a pharmacy chain must inform the relevant authority of a list of people currently working at the business who hold pharmacy practice certificates. This notification must be submitted within 15 days of the date the certificate allowing the pharmaceutical business to operate was issued, or when there are any changes to the list. This is a shorter deadline than the previous 30 days under earlier rules.
Pharmacy chains have similar notification duties and deadlines. Specifically, the chain operator must inform the provincial authority where each pharmacy in the chain is located about the list of practising pharmacists at those sites. Additionally, pharmacy chains must notify the authority if pharmacies are added or removed from the chain, and if there are any rotations of the people responsible for pharmaceutical expertise between pharmacies within the chain.
Medicine Information Activities
Under Circular 31, medicine information can still be given to healthcare professionals through information materials, seminars, and medical representatives.
However, Circular 31 introduces a significant change by removing the need to obtain a certificate for medicine information content before carrying out these activities. Under the new rules, pharmaceutical businesses, representative offices of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Vietnam, and MA holders are now responsible for creating and distributing medicine information materials. These materials must comply with the package inserts for medicines approved by the MOH, the Vietnamese National Drug Formulary, and any related documents and professional instructions issued or recognised by the MOH.
Donald Trump, never one to shy away from drama or diplomacy-via-caps-lock, has slapped a 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States. The justification? In his own delicate prose: «The treatment of former President Jair Bolsonaro is a disgrace… A witch hunt that must end IMMEDIATELY!»
And just in case anyone thought this was about trade imbalances or economic strategy, Trump made things crystal clear: «Due to Brazil’s insidious attacks on free elections…».
In short, the 50% tariff isn’t about coffee, orange juice, or flip-flops. It’s about a Supreme Court judgment, applying Brazilian law, regarding Brazilian politicians accused of conspiring in a coup d’état. In other words, this is a brazen (and frankly absurd) attempt at judicial intervention via trade war.
Trump, with his characteristic subtlety, offered a solution: manufacture in the U.S., and he’ll look kindly upon Brazil, like a mafia don offering «protection» after smashing your shop window. But what he meant was: consider Bolsonaro innocent, and we’ll talk.
The Brazilian market took the bait
Although the fishy interference in Brazilian affairs was determined from a fish out of the water, the market took the bait: in the first 48 hours after the infamous letter, at least 1500 tons of fish were already held in Brazilian ports, as US buyers suspended their contracts due to uncertainty about the costs upon arrival. The fish market is on alert, as 80% of the exports head to the US, mainly coming from small family-owned industries that distribute the catch from artisanal fishing communities.
The same effect hit other sectors, from orange, honey, and coffee to aircraft.
Brazil’s response and sorcery: don’t mess with us (or our weather)
Naturally, Brazil will not sit quietly sipping caipirinhas while its sovereignty is trampled. Reciprocity is on the table: if Washington raises tariffs, Brasília can do the same. But above all, one thing is sure: Brazil will never tolerate foreign interference in its independent judiciary.
And then, a curious coincidence: right after Trump’s speech, a tornado accompanied by lightning struck the White House grounds. Pure chance? Maybe. Or could it have been the work of Brazilian indigenous shamans, a particularly well-organized group of umbanda practitioners, or simply the fact that, as every Brazilian child knows, God is Brazilian.
Trump might want to check the weather forecast next time before penning another angry letter.
The unpredictable becoming predictable
Trade wars are rarely tidy affairs, but one thing they consistently deliver is chaos (in legal terms, disruption). And when disruption meets contracts, force majeure disputes often end up in court.
At first glance, Trump’s decision to impose a 50% tariff overnight might feel like an unpredictable thunderbolt (quite literally, given the weather at the White House). But here’s the catch: by now, unpredictable tariffs are becoming predictable. When a government with a well-documented love for impulsive economic diplomacy imposes politically motivated tariffs, can anyone claim to be surprised?
In most jurisdictions, force majeure requires that the event be extraordinary, unforeseeable, and beyond the parties’ control. A sudden 50% tariff certainly ticks a few of those boxes, but following a repetition of erratic trade policy, one might argue that businesses should expect what in past times was considered unexpected, especially when dealing with certain jurisdictions or political figures. In other words, Trump’s tariffs might not excuse performance if parties didn’t prepare for exactly this kind of volatility.
This is where good contract drafting comes into play
Savvy businesses are learning that their contracts must go beyond a vague boilerplate clause about “acts of government” or “changes in law.” Instead, they should expressly address the risk of sudden tariff changes, including
- hardship clauses that allow renegotiation when costs become commercially unreasonable;
- price adjustment mechanisms linked to tariff thresholds;
- termination rights triggered by specified levels of customs duties;
- currency fluctuation provisions (because tariffs rarely travel alone, and currency swings often accompany them).
In short, while no contract can immunize a business from every shock, smart drafting can mean the difference between a commercial headache and a catastrophic breach.
Therefore, tariffs may no longer be an unpredictable storm; they are part of the new predictable landscape. Given that your contract might wake up tomorrow facing ‘IMMEDIATE’ punitive tariffs in all caps, your contract should be ready today.
The unwitting cupid: strengthening EU-Brazil relations
While the tariffs may ruffle trade flows between Brasília and Washington, there’s an unintended silver lining: Trump is proving to be the most efficient matchmaker between Brazil and other markets, such as China and the European Union.
The EU-Brazil relationship, already a flirtation with promising prospects, with relevant progress in the EU-Mercosur Agreement, now seems destined for deeper romance. If Mr. Trump insists on isolating the US from Brazil, the old continent stands ready, with flowers and wine in hand, to pick up where the US left off. After all, Brazilian fish can pair up nicely with champagne, cava and prosecco.
So thank you, Mr. Trump. In your quest to bully Brazil into submission, you may have done more to strengthen transatlantic ties than any EU Commissioner ever could. As they say in Brasília these days: Trump is not a trade warrior. He’s a cupid in disguise.
The recent announcement of a landmark trade agreement framework, following just three months negotiations since President Trump’s tariffs announcement on 2 April 2025, signals a pivotal shift, not merely in bilateral relations, but in the broader architecture of global supply chains.
As a commercial lawyer with exposure to Vietnam since 2007, I have observed the evolving dynamics between the United States and Vietnam through the years, talking to students, entrepreneurs, veterans, diplomats, humans from all walks all life, from both nations and beyond.
You may recall that Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China, was to be the nation that would encounter the most stringent tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, reaching an astonishing 46%.
The newly forged framework outlines significant reciprocal concessions designed to foster greater trade and investment flows. Granted, pre-April 2 tariffs applied by the USA on Vietnamese goods were lower than what emerges from the framework agreement, but still, it is better than 46%),
The United States has committed to imposing a 20% tariff on most Vietnamese imports, a notable reduction from the previously mooted 46%. However, a substantial 40% tariff will apply to goods re-exported from third countries, with a particular focus on those originating from China.
Vietnam has pledged to open its market to a wide array of US products. Crucially, it has also committed to implementing stringent measures aimed at restricting the transshipment of Chinese goods through its territory, a long-standing concern for Washington.
In a significant win for American exporters, US goods will now enjoy duty-free access to the Vietnamese market, effectively granting “total access”, particularly for large-engine vehicles such as SUVs, as emphatically stated by President Trump (how SUVs are going to circulate in the narrow alleys of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, infested by swarms of mopeds, is a different story).
This agreement is expected to catalyse growth in several key sectors. Electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (especially Liquefied Natural Gas), and agriculture are poised for expansion. US firms specialising in manufacturing technology, energy solutions, and agricultural products are anticipated to be the primary beneficiaries. Furthermore, beyond immediate trade benefits, the agreement is set to reshape investment strategies, encouraging a greater localisation of supply chains within Vietnam. This strategic realignment is also expected to further solidify the already robust US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
While the potential upsides are considerable, it is imperative for businesses and investors to approach this new landscape with a clear understanding of the accompanying risks. From my vantage point, I identify several significant execution challenges and structural impediments that require close monitoring.
Enforcement of Transshipment Controls
The most immediate and perhaps formidable risk lies in the effective enforcement of transshipment controls. Vietnam has historically served as a significant assembly point for Chinese-manufactured components. Ensuring that goods originating from China are not merely re-routed through Vietnam to circumvent US tariffs will require exceptionally close monitoring and robust verification mechanisms. The legal and practical complexities of definitively determining the true country of origin for all goods will undoubtedly pose a persistent challenge. As a European citizen, witnessing how the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“EVFTA”), which poses an important stress on certificates of origin, I am particularly aware of this matter.
While Vietnam has made remarkable strides in its economic development, certain structural issues could hinder its capacity to scale up high-value manufacturing in the short to medium term. These include:
Legal framework nuances
Vietnam’s legal framework for foreign investment has seen continuous improvements, but legal and cultural complexities and inconsistencies can and do still arise. Navigating the regulatory landscape, particularly with new rules stemming from this agreement and at a time of deep administrative, governmental, digital and legal reforms in Vietnam, will demand expert legal guidance to ensure compliance and mitigate potential fines and disputes. Issues surrounding so-called sublicences for businesses, intellectual property rights enforcement and contract enforceability, whilst improving, still require careful consideration;
Education
The ambition to transform Vietnam into a high-value manufacturing hub necessitates a workforce equipped with advanced skills. While the Vietnamese government prioritises education and workforce development, a significant portion of the current labour force lacks formal training and specialised certifications, let alone a good command of the English language. Bridging this skills gap, particularly in areas like advanced manufacturing, engineering, and digital technologies is a necessity and not just in light of this framework agreement. Companies may need to factor in substantial investment in training and upskilling programmes for their Vietnamese employees.
Infrastructures
Despite considerable investment, Vietnam’s infrastructure, particularly in logistics, energy, and transportation, continues to face bottlenecks. And China – the apparent target of Trump’s tariffs – is stepping in with high-speed trains connecting it to the northern Provinces of Vietnam. An increased volume of high-value manufacturing and trade will place further strain on existing infrastructure. Inadequate port capacity, congested roads, and a reliable energy supply (including for EV charging) are critical concerns that could impact efficiency and increase operational costs for businesses.
Policy divergence
This framework agreement deepens US-Vietnam trade ties and seems to be paving the way for more US investments in Vietnam, but this second aspect seems to run counter to parallel US policy objectives aimed at reshoring manufacturing back to the United States. This potential divergence in strategic priorities could introduce yet another element of unpredictability in the long term, necessitating a flexible and adaptable investment approach. Future shifts in US policy could impact the durability and full extent of the benefits derived from this agreement.
This trade agreement, if finalised and implemented, undoubtedly represents a structural shift in global trade dynamics. It strategically positions Vietnam as an increasingly important high-value manufacturing hub and significantly deepens US engagement in Southeast Asia. We will need time, however, to assess the practical impact of the agreement, observing the efficacy of its implementation, and understanding how Vietnam’s inherent strengths and challenges will ultimately shape its role in the reconfigured global supply chain.
We will also need to see what China, if anything, will do as a countermeasure. In fact, any assessment of Vietnam’s evolving trade landscape would be incomplete without a thorough consideration of China’s influence and strategic posture. President Xi Jinping has consistently championed a vision of a “community of shared future for mankind,” a concept that, while outwardly promoting global cooperation, also subtly underscores a demand for international alignment with Beijing’s interests. In the context of escalating trade tensions, Xi has repeatedly warned that “trade wars have no winners,” advocating for unity against protectionist measures, yet simultaneously implying that nations must ultimately choose sides, either with or against China’s economic and political orbit. Vietnam, despite its historical complexities and occasional maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea (or East Sea, as it is officially called by Hanoi), remains deeply interwoven with China’s economy. China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner for many years, with significant inflows of Chinese FDI, loans, and project contractors. This economic dependency is particularly evident in various sectors, where Chinese components and materials form a substantial part of Vietnamese manufacturing supply chains. While Vietnam has actively sought to diversify its trade partners and reduce its reliance on China, the sheer scale of the bilateral economic relationship means that disentanglement is a long-term, complex endeavour. Furthermore, China’s influence extends beyond direct trade into crucial regional resources. The Mekong River, a lifeline for millions in Southeast Asia, originates in China, which has constructed numerous upstream dams.
As Vietnam navigates its enhanced trade relationship with the United States, it must simultaneously contend with the enduring economic gravity and strategic ambitions of its northern giant neighbour. Any perceived move by Vietnam to significantly shift away from China could invite retaliatory measures or heightened pressure from Beijing. Businesses investing in Vietnam must not only grasp the intricacies of the US-Vietnam agreement but also meticulously analyse how these developments will intersect with, and potentially be impacted by, the intricate, often delicate, and sometimes fraught relationship between Hanoi and Beijing. Understanding this geopolitical tightrope will be essential for sustainable success in the Vietnamese market. Prudence, informed legal counsel, and a keen eye on evolving geopolitical and economic realities will be paramount for those seeking to capitalise on this transformative new chapter.
Takeaways
- Tariffs:The US-Vietnam framework agreement marks a significant departure from previous trade dynamics, reducing US tariffs on most Vietnamese imports to 20% (from a mooted 46%) while imposing a 40% tariff on transshipped goods, especially from China.
- Vietnam’s market opening:Vietnam has committed to duty-free access for a broad range of US products and stricter controls on Chinese goods transiting its territory.
- Growth / manufacturing shift potential:The agreement is expected to fuel expansion in Vietnamese electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (LNG), and agriculture. It also encourages supply chain localisation within Vietnam (normally more of an assembly point for Chinese products).
- Execution challenges: Effectively preventing the re-routing of Chinese goods through Vietnam to avoid tariffs will be a complex and demanding task; Despite economic progress, Vietnam faces hurdles in scaling high-value manufacturing due to legal framework nuances (e.g., sublicences, IP enforcement), a skills gap in its workforce (lack of formal training, English proficiency) and infrastructure bottlenecks (logistics, energy, transportation).
- US policy divergence:The agreement’s encouragement of US investment in Vietnam appears to contradict the broader US policy objective of reshoring manufacturing.
- China:Businesses must consider China’s significant economic sway over Vietnam, including its position as Vietnam’s largest trading partner, its FDI, and its control over shared resources like the Mekong River. Any major shift by Vietnam away from China could lead to retaliatory measures from Beijing.
- Uncertainty:This is not a final agreement, so the situation might change. Prudence and informed legal counsel are crucial for businesses navigating this evolving landscape.
The Trump approach: power and dominance
In his autobiography, The Art of the Deal, Donald Trump describes negotiation as a contest of strength, determination, and dominance. His vision is clear: anyone who shows uncertainty or makes concessions too early is immediately perceived as a loser. His negotiating style is based on constant pressure, maximalist demands, and calculated threats, to obtain unilateral advantages. In this scheme, compromise is not a point of arrival, but a sign of weakness to be avoided.
Trump has always been a competitive negotiator, focused on immediate results and uninterested in balanced solutions unless they are strictly functional to his interests.
Other negotiating styles: compromising and collaborative
In contrast to this competitive approach, there are two other relevant negotiating styles:
- The compromising style aims to reach a ‘middle ground’ agreement, in which both parties give something up to achieve an acceptable solution. It is a pragmatic approach, practical in situations where time is limited or positions are too far apart for genuine collaboration.
- The collaborative style, on the other hand, aims to create win-win solutions. The parties seek to thoroughly understand each other’s interests and work together to build an outcome that maximizes the benefit for both. It requires openness, time, and trust.
In commercial negotiations, the compromising or collaborative approach can only work if the other party shares the same logic. But when dealing with an explicitly competitive actor such as Trump, adopting a compromising style risks seriously penalizing the other party, for at least three reasons:
- It conveys weakness
An accommodating gesture is seen not as a sign of openness, but as a point of pressure to be exploited. The competitive negotiator, focused on gaining an immediate advantage, interprets it as a willingness to give even more.
- It relinquishes bargaining power
The EU has a vast market and significant trade levers, especially in a context where the US is closing the door to the Chinese market. Offering concessions at the outset is tantamount to burning your cards without getting anything in return. In a competitive confrontation, the first move can set the tone for the negotiation: once a concession has been made, it is very difficult to backtrack.
- It legitimizes the negotiating imbalance
An unbalanced compromise, if accepted without resistance, risks becoming the new basis for future trade relations, systematically penalizing the EU in subsequent rounds.
Why 30%? The anchor technique
Trump often uses a negotiating technique known as the anchor technique. This consists of deliberately setting a very high target at the beginning of the negotiation (in our case, the threat of 30% tariffs).
The aim is to create a psychological perimeter for the negotiation and force the other party to reason on the basis of that figure, even though they are aware that it is arbitrary. This technique allows one to influence the scope of the discussion and obtain greater concessions, just as Trump has done.
The worst response: unilateral concessions with no return
Unfortunately, the European Union has already shown worrying signs of a compromising attitude that has not been negotiated with the Trump administration, for example:
- The waiver of the web tax* on American digital giants, without obtaining any regulation or shared tax contribution in return.
- The offer to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, made to reassure Washington, without obtaining anything in return.
- The acceptance of the increase in NATO spending to 5% of GDP, demanded by Trump, again without obtaining anything in return.
All these offers without asking for anything in return reinforce the idea that the EU is willing to concede from the outset. Trump, true to his competitive logic, sees these concessions as a starting point, not a compromise: this pushes him to raise his demands, not moderate them.
Persevering would be a fatal mistake
Continuing along this path of compromise, in the hope that accommodation will ease the pressure, would be not only ineffective but counterproductive. With a competitive negotiator, unilateral concessions do not stop escalation: they fuel it. Any sign of weakness is interpreted as additional room for maneuver.
A helpful example is China’s reaction during the trade war initiated by Trump. Faced with massive tariffs imposed by the US, Beijing responded in kind, imposing equivalent tariffs. Instead of giving in, it spoke the same language of power. The result is there for all to see: after weeks of escalation, the US had to moderate its position, opening up to a more balanced agreement.
The right strategy: speak his language
To avoid the mistakes of the past, the EU should therefore reverse its negotiating logic. Not to fuel confrontation, but to restore a credible balance. Some applicable countermeasures could be:
- Target Trump’s electoral base, particularly the agricultural sectors (soy, corn, beef), with selective tariffs or targeted restrictions.
- Put the European web tax* back on the table, even with a minimum rate, linking any exemptions to real concessions from the US.
These well-calibrated moves would strengthen the EU’s position and show that it can defend its interests by speaking a language Trump understands: that of strength and bargaining power.
Going beyond requests, seeking the other party’s interests
A fundamental principle in any negotiation is to identify the other side’s interests and find a way to allow them to achieve them without sacrificing your own. This is no easy task, given Trump’s notorious volatility and the lack of sound arguments to justify the demands made in the negotiations.
In the case of the EU-US negotiations, it must be borne in mind that Trump is playing the game with his electoral base in mind: an agreement must offer him a narrative of victory to communicate to his electorate.
Takeaway
When negotiating with a competitive player like Trump, one should abandon the accommodating approach, avoid concessions without something in return, and adopt a style that is more assertive, strategic, and symmetrical.
Only then will it be able to build an agreement that is solid, fair, and respectful of its economic and political strength.
I have often dealt with commercial distribution agreements between Italian and Chinese companies, sometimes following negotiations in the wine sector for various types of agreements: sales, distribution, franchising, establishment of joint ventures, and sales through online stores.
I am sharing some key considerations for approaching this complex but opportunity-rich market.
📌 Here are my 10 takeaways
Step Zero. Protect your IP
it is essential to protect your intellectual property before entering China. This includes trademarks (including their Chinese transliteration), labels, web domains, and social media accounts. Neglecting this aspect can have disastrous consequences, exposing you to the widespread phenomenon of trademark squatting (even famous names such as Michael Jordan, Elon Musk, and Donald Trump have fallen victim to this).
For more information, you can read this article about Intellectual property protection in China
1 — Know your enemy
trust is good, but mistrust is better. Before entering into commercial agreements, it is essential to check the credentials of potential partners through the databases of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. When it comes to wine, it is necessary to check whether the prospective distributor has a license to import and distribute wine.
2 — No copy-paste
Contracts must be tailor-made, adapting them to local specificities. In particular, it is crucial to clearly regulate promotional activities: budget, commercial actions, communication methods, and management of the producer’s trademarks. It is also best to write the contract in Chinese to ensure that there are no misunderstandings and in case it needs to be used before a judge or local administrative body, as Chinese is the only official language. (N.B.: if you think of entrusting the task to ChatGPT, this is not a good idea).
For an in-depth article, check out The commercial distribution contract in China
3 — Decide immediately how and where to litigate
It may seem counterintuitive, but it is best to avoid providing for Italian (or French, or German) jurisdiction and applicable law, which is an ineffective solution, especially in cases where urgent action is needed to stop unfair competition or counterfeiting. Consider applying Chinese law and provide for an arbitration clause at CIETAC. An effective dispute management strategy is a key element of the agreement and must be negotiated carefully. (P.S.: This applies not only to China but to all international agreements. For more information, see this article).
4 — China is big
And it is the sum of many very different internal markets. Exclusivity should be granted for good reasons, but only if the distributor has a well-developed commercial network and can achieve specific shared objectives. If granted, it should be limited to the province where the distributor is based and subject to the achievement of agreed sales volumes. Having a single distributor for the whole of China is like entrusting an Italian distributor with promoting a product throughout Europe. Or appoint a NYC-based company to promote and sell your wines in all 50 US States.
5 — China is far away
Delegating everything to the local distributor and taking no interest in what is happening on the Chinese market is never a good idea. Firstly, because you have no idea how, where, and with what results the wines are being sold. Secondly, because you cannot verify compliance with agreements, for example on non-competition or the use of trademarks. It is therefore important to schedule meetings to share commercial policies and be able to verify what is happening, including through audits and visits to warehouses and the sales network.
6 — China is expensive
Competition in the Chinese domestic market is fierce. This is also true in terms of price, as some countries that are direct competitors of Italy (Australia, Chile, New Zealand) have free trade agreements and can therefore enter the market on more favorable terms than Italian wine, which is subject to a total tax burden of around 43% after payment of duties, excise taxes, and VAT. It is necessary to position oneself in the right market segment (medium-high), and to do so, it is necessary to plan the right commercial actions together with the distributor. Selling Ex-Works and hoping that the distributor will take care of everything is not an excellent strategy for being competitive.
7 — China is dangerous
Scams are always around the corner. In the wine world in particular, for example, spontaneous expressions of interest are frequent, arriving via the company website, social media accounts, or directly via email. They sound like this: we have discovered your wines, we think they are fantastic, we want to place an order immediately. If it sounds too good and easy, it is certainly a scam. There is an easy way to check: if the next step is a request for payment of a few thousand euros, justified by the need to register the wines on the CIFER (China Imported Food Enterprise Registration) portal, or to register your trademark to prevent others from doing so, or to authenticate the signature on the sales contract… these are attempts at fraud, and the elusive order will never arrive after payment has been received. How can you check whether the person you are dealing with is a reputable company or a fraudster? 👉🏼Go back to point 1 (here is an in-depth article).
8 — E-commerce? Yes, but with method (and money)
Online wine sales continue to grow, but entering large platforms is complex, competition is fierce, and running an online store requires meticulous planning and highly efficient system implementation. The online market in China is all pay-for-play. Nothing is achieved with no money or minimal effort. If you want to sell online, you need to build an omnichannel system integrated with traditional distribution, and to do this, it is essential to involve a local partner with well-defined investments and responsibilities.
9 — China is not a market for everyone
You need to protect your brands, study the market thoroughly, know your competition (both foreign and local), find the right market channel, select a distributor motivated to invest time and money in promoting your product, and be willing to support them with the right investments. If you want to build a serious plan to enter the Chinese market, you must have a medium- to long-term perspective. There are no shortcuts (actually, there are many, but they almost always lead to wasted time and money). If you are unwilling to invest in entering the Chinese market through the front door, it is unlikely that anyone else will do it for you.
10 — Don’t do it yourself
If you have read up to point 9 and are still keen to enter the Chinese market, consider doing so professionally, involving consultants who can support your company throughout the market research, scouting, negotiation, and contract drafting processes. This is also part of the investment needed to build and develop a solid and resilient business model. This advice applies to all foreign markets, and even more so to China.
The most dangerous mistake one can make after the announcement of the (partial) suspension of U.S. duties for 90 days is to hope that everything will go well and we will return to the pre-April 2 world.
First, because very invasive tariffs remain in place: 10 percent on all countries that trade with the U.S., including the EU, 25 percent on automotive, 25 percent on steel and aluminum, 145 percent on China.
Second, because it is impossible to predict the actions of the U.S. Administration in the short and medium term: it cannot be ruled out that tariffs will remain, increase, change targets or that other factors will intervene to turn the tide in international markets, such as an escalation of the trade war with China.
The 90-day suspension is an opportunity
The U.S.’s temporary suspension of tariffs represents a valuable window that should be used not only as a truce but also as a valuable room for action: 90 days to rehash contracts, renegotiate key clauses, and insert levers of flexibility that can protect business in various future scenarios in the U.S. and other markets.
Today’s exporters cannot afford to «sit back and see what will happen»-it is time to act, and to do so professionally and strategically. Let’s look at a checklist of important points to consider.
What do contracts with customers and suppliers entail?
The first point is to survey agreements with the trade network in the U.S. and other countries that export to the U.S., as well as with upstream suppliers in the supply chain.
Is there a written contract? The worst-case scenario — unfortunately a very frequent one — is when the parties cooperate informally, only based on orders and order confirmations. This leaves undefined not only what happens in the case of imposition of duties, but also a whole range of other points, for example, limits on damages that can be claimed in the case of breach of contract, the duration of the agreement, the applicable law, and how any disputes will be resolved.
Another very problematic scenario is one in which contracts exist, but they are generic and do not include the necessary covenants to manage the risks involved in operating in a highly litigious market such as the U.S., which, moreover, has very high legal costs.
Having done this analysis, the necessary actions can be put in place, prioritizing according to the importance of business relationships and as appropriate:
- Negotiate and conclude a written contract from scratch
- Replace the existing agreement with a complete and correct contract
- Amend and integrate the existing agreement with pacts to manage tariffs and other causes of price fluctuations
Let us dwell on the last scenario, assuming that there is a complete and correct contract but one that does not regulate price and cost fluctuation as a direct or indirect consequence of the introduction of duties.
Contract Addendum
In such cases, the correct course of action is to sign an Addendum to the original contract, specifying which covenants are being waived and which covenants are being added. It is essential that the Addendum be negotiated and signed by persons with the power of representation of the parties and that it be drafted with the help of lawyers who specialize in this field. In addition to including correct clauses, it is necessary to verify that the covenants are valid according to the rules of law applicable to the contract.
Here are some clauses that can be the subject of the Addendum, to be modulated according to the specific case and possible scenarios.
Tariff Cost Sharing
By introducing this covenant, it is provided that in the event that duties are confirmed at [x]% or are reduced or increased within certain established thresholds, the Parties will share the increase equally, or according to other established percentages.
There may also be a ceiling on tariffs beyond which a party has the right to withdraw from the contract or request the suspension of certain orders for a specified period of time, after which it has the right to withdraw.
Price Adjustment
With this covenant, a discount or an increase in the product’s price is agreed upon, as the case may be, in the case of a duty greater than [x]%.
Among the use cases, in addition to that of the company exporting to the U.S. or other intermediate markets, with final destination of the products in the U.S., is that of those who purchase a product subject to import duty and resell it, processed or assembled.
Right to Cancel or Postpone Confirmed Orders
This covenant gives the right to revoke or suspend for a certain period already negotiated orders, as such binding, in case of confirmation or introduction of duties above a certain threshold, for example, if 20% taxation was confirmed for the import of wine from the EU.
The clause can be combined with previous covenants, for example, by stipulating that below the specified threshold, the contracts remain valid, and the parties share the duty or have the right to renegotiate the price.
Supply Forecast Adjustment
With this clause the Parties can modify supply programs already agreed for a specific duration (e.g., 24 months), with continuous sales and purchase obligations at a fixed price or indexable only within certain limits. The aim is to agree on the prerequisites for reshaping supply programs in the short and medium term, which can be very useful for defining the rules that will apply to relationships with key suppliers or customers for possible changes in volumes, delivery times, and prices.
Right to Source from Alternative Suppliers
This covenant serves to be authorized, if necessary, to source alternative suppliers of components or raw materials to those previously authorized in the contract with the end customer, for example, in cases where purchasing from the original suppliers has become too costly or difficult due to duties imposed at import or in previous steps in the supply chain, or other events such as currency or price fluctuation of certain commodities beyond a certain level established in the agreement.
Hardship and Force Majeure
The imposition of duties cannot be invoked as a cause of Force Majeure or hardship, respectively, to excuse contract non-performance or to renegotiate the price, even in cases of very high price increases (such as the 145% duty imposed on Chinese products). This conclusion is almost uniform under the law and jurisprudence of the major countries involved in the tariff war: U.S., China, Canada, Mexico, France and Italy: I refer to this practical guide for a timely examination of what the various rules provide.
If the contract lacks a well drafter Force Majeure and Hardship clause, or contains a generic clause, it is important to get your hands on revising it to expressly state the cases in which a party is entitled to suspend or terminate the contract, how and when to communicate the decision to invoke the exemption, and the consequences on the parties’ contractual obligations. You can go deeper on this topic here.
Conclusion
It is essential to prepare for possible future scenarios regarding duties (confirmed, increased, changed, or decreased) and to determine the consequences on trade relations with foreign clients and suppliers: moving today, at a standstill (or nearly so), allows entrepreneurs to negotiate shared and fair solutions and to avoid, as far as possible, the emergence of tensions and conflicts with the various partners along the international supply chain.
The case: A consumer bought a Ford car in Italy from an Italian car distributor. The car was manufactured by Ford WAG in Germany and supplied by Ford Italia, which belong to the same group of companies. Following an accident in December 2001 in which the airbag failed, the consumer sued the Italian distributor as well as Ford Italia for damages. Ford Italia disputed the claims for damages asserted against it, arguing that it had not manufactured the vehicle and, because it was itself only a distributor/supplier, referred to Ford WAG in Germany as the actual manufacturer.
Question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) referred the following question to the ECJ:
- the manufacturer’s liability under the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC is limited in accordance with Art 3 to cases where the supplier physically puts his name, trade mark, or other distinguishing feature on the product to create confusion between his identity and that of the actual manufacturer;
- or is the distributor liable as a “quasi-producer” even if he has not physically put his name or trademark on the product, but nevertheless «presents himself as its producer» within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive by using the distinguishing feature in his company name, which was put on the car by another person, but leading to identity with the actual car manufacturer.
ECJ judgement (European Court of Justice) of 19/12/2024, Case C-157/23
A company that does not manufacture a product itself, but only distributes it, can still be considered a «manufacturer» within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC). This is the case if the distributor puts his name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product and consequently presents itself as the manufacturer. According to the ECJ, this can give the consumer the impression that the distributor is responsible for the quality and safety of the product.
However, the ECJ emphasizes that liability does not depend on whether the distributor puts the sign on the product itself. The distributor did not do so in the specific case. However, the distributor used the corresponding distinguishing feature in its company name. According to the ECJ, the decisive factor is, therefore, whether the distributor uses this name match to gain the trust of consumers and is thus perceived as a responsible manufacturer.
The distributor is jointly and severally liable with the actual manufacturer. This means that consumers can either make a claim against the manufacturer or the dealer directly. However, the dealer has the right to ask for a regress for the damage incurred from the actual manufacturer.
Remarks
The ECJ emphasizes consumer protection. In my opinion, this argument is slightly overstretched:
- According to the ECJ, the consumer should not be burdened with the complex task of identifying the actual manufacturer of a defective product.
- A distributor that sells a product and uses its name or trademark to do so creates trust in the consumer. This trust is to be protected by the liability of the authorized distributor — regardless of whether the distributor has actively put its trademark on the product or not.
- This increases the liability risk for authorized car dealers because they must obtain appropriate insurance against such a risk. In the constellation described above, authorized dealers can be exposed to unexpectedly high claims for damages under strict product liability.
Good advice is not expensive
- It is essential that such cases are legally clarified when drawing up and formulating distribution agreements with car manufacturers and that the ECJ ruling is considered.
- In addition, authorized dealers/distributors should reconsider the use of product names from the actual producer in their company name and/or in their corporate image.
The Brazilian market has not been immune to the protectionist wave of «America First.» If such measures persist over time, they could have a lasting impact on the local economy. Still, a sour lemon can often become a sweet caipirinha in the resilient and optimistic spirit that characterizes both Brazilian society and its entrepreneurs.
As is often the case in the chessboard of global economic geopolitics, a move from one player creates room for another countermove. Brazil reacted with reciprocal trade measures, signaling clearly that it would not accept a position of commercial vulnerability.
This firmer stance — almost unthinkable in earlier years — strengthened Brazil’s image in Europe as a country ready to reposition itself with greater autonomy and pragmatism, opening new doors to international markets. In a world where global value chains are being restructured and reliable trade partners are in high demand, Brazil is increasingly seen not just as a supplier of raw materials, but as a strategic partner in critical industries.
The rapprochement with Europe has been further energized by progress in the Mercosur–European Union Agreement, whose negotiations spanned decades and now seem to be gaining momentum. While the United States embraces a more isolationist commercial posture, Europe is actively diversifying its trade relations — and Brazil, by demonstrating a commitment to clear rules, economic stability, and legal certainty, emerges as a natural candidate to fill that gap.
The Direct Impact of U.S. Tariffs
The trade measures introduced under President Trump primarily affected Brazilian producers of semi-finished steel and primary aluminum, with the removal of long-standing exemptions and quotas. In 2024, Brazil exported US$ 2.2 billion in semi-finished steel to the United States, representing nearly 60% of U.S. imports in that category. In the same year, Brazilian aluminum exports to the U.S. reached US$ 796 million, accounting for 14% of the sector’s total. Losses in exports for 2025 are estimated at around US$ 1.5 billion.
Brazil’s Response and a New Phase
In April 2025, the Brazilian Congress passed a new legal framework for trade retaliation, empowering the Executive Branch to adopt countermeasures in a faster and more technically structured way. The new legislation allows, for example, the automatic imposition of retaliatory tariffs on goods from countries that adopt unilateral measures incompatible with WTO norms; the suspension of tax or customs benefits previously granted under bilateral agreements; the creation of a list of priority sectors for trade defense and diversification of export markets.
Beyond the retaliation itself, the move marked a significant shift in posture: Brazil began positioning itself as an active player in global trade governance, aligning with mid-sized economies that advocate for predictable, balanced, and rules-based trade relations.
An Opportunity for Brazil–Europe Relations
This new stage sets Brazil as a reliable supplier to European industry — not only of raw materials but also of higher-value-added goods, particularly in processed foods, bioenergy, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure.
Moreover, as US–China tensions drive European companies to seek nearshoring or “friend-shoring” strategies with more predictable partners, Brazil, with its clean energy matrix, large domestic market, and relatively stable institutions, emerges as a strong alternative.
Legal Implications and Strategic Recommendations
This changing landscape brings new opportunities for companies and legal advisors involved in Brazil–Europe investment and trade relations. Particular attention should be paid to:
- Monitoring rules of origin in the Mercosur–EU agreement, especially in sectors requiring supply chain restructuring;
- Reviewing contractual and tax structures for import/export operations, including clauses addressing tariff instability or non-tariff barriers (e.g., environmental or sanitary standards), and clearly defining force majeure events;
- Reassessing distribution and agency agreements in light of the new commercial environment;
- Exploring joint ventures and technology transfer arrangements with Brazilian partners, particularly in bioeconomy, green hydrogen, and mineral processing.
From lemon to caipirinha
The world is becoming more fragmented and competitive, but also more open to realignment. What began as a protectionist blow from the United States has revealed new opportunities for transatlantic cooperation. For Brazil, Europe is no longer just a client: it is poised to become a long-term strategic partner. It is now up to lawyers and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to turn this opportunity into lasting, mutually beneficial relationships.
Scrivi a Roberto
How to manage the impact of tariffs on the international supply chain
09.02.2025
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Италия
- Распространение
On 29 June 2025, the Vietnamese government introduced Decree No. 163/2025/ND-CP (Decree 163). This decree provides detailed guidance on how the updated Law on Pharmacy will be implemented.
Like the amended Law on Pharmacy, Decree 163 came into effect on 1 July 2025, replacing the previous Decree No. 54/2017/ND-CP (Decree 54). The new decree sets out comprehensive rules for key aspects of managing pharmaceuticals, including:
- Pharmacy practice certificates
- Certificates allowing pharmaceutical businesses to operate
- Import and export of medicines and drug ingredients
- Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) inspections of overseas manufacturers
- Recalling medicines and drug ingredients
- Certificates for medicine advertising content
- Medicine price management
Key Changes in Decree 163
Here are some important changes and additions introduced by Decree 163:
Destroying Specially Controlled Medicines
You no longer need to get approval from the relevant authority before destroying narcotic, psychotropic, and precursor drugs, or pharmaceutical ingredients that are narcotic or psychotropic substances or precursors used in medicines. Instead, you just need to provide notification at least seven working days in advance. This notification must include the planned destruction date and a detailed list of items to be destroyed.
E-commerce in Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical businesses that sell products online must openly display the following information to ensure transparency and consumer safety:
- Their certificate allowing them to operate as a pharmaceutical business.
- The pharmacy practice certificate of the person responsible for pharmaceutical expertise.
- Information about the medicines themselves.
Shelf-Life Rules for Imported Products
For medicines and ingredients with a total shelf life of nine months or less, at least one-third of their shelf life must remain when they clear customs. Medicines with a shelf life of 30 days or less must still be within their shelf life at the time of customs clearance.
Controlling Imported Products
All medicines with marketing authorisation (MA) are subject to import control, except for:
- Medicines needed for preventing and treating Group A infectious diseases that have been declared epidemics, as per the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases.
- Medicines with a shelf life of less than 30 days.
Importers must inform the provincial People’s Committee at least five working days before making a customs declaration. The People’s Committee can then issue a written notice of non-compliance to the customs authority within five working days of receiving this notification.
Medicine Advertising
Decree 163 adds a process that allows an approved medicine advertising certificate to be adjusted for certain changes (such as a change to the MA holder or manufacturer information). This means you don’t have to go through the entire initial registration process for medicine advertising content again, as was required under the previous rules.
Medicine Price Management
Businesses must announce or re-announce wholesale prices, similar to the medicine price declaration process under Decree 54. Some medicines are exempt from this requirement, including those provided free of charge for emergency responses, national health programmes, humanitarian aid, clinical trials, scientific research, or exhibition purposes, and medicines carried as personal luggage.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) can make recommendations if the announced or re-announced price is significantly higher than similar medicines already on the market. This includes situations where:
- The announced or re-announced wholesale price of the medicine is higher than the highest price of similar medicines.
- The price difference is more than 35% (for medicines priced under VND 1 million) or 15% (for medicines priced at VND 1 million and above) compared to winning bid prices in tenders.
- The announced or re-announced price is higher than prices in the country of origin or other markets (if there’s no similar product in Vietnam).
- When such differences are found, the MOH issues a formal recommendation to the announcing business and publishes it online for transparency and accountability.
Further Guidance in New Circular
On 1 July 2025, the MOH issued Circular No. 31/2025/TT-BYT (Circular 31), which further details how the amended Law on Pharmacy and Decree 163 should be implemented. Circular 31 officially replaces Circular No. 07/2018/TT-BYT and Decree 54 and came into effect immediately.
Key provisions of Circular 31 include:
Notification of Practising Pharmacists
Pharmaceutical businesses that are not part of a pharmacy chain must inform the relevant authority of a list of people currently working at the business who hold pharmacy practice certificates. This notification must be submitted within 15 days of the date the certificate allowing the pharmaceutical business to operate was issued, or when there are any changes to the list. This is a shorter deadline than the previous 30 days under earlier rules.
Pharmacy chains have similar notification duties and deadlines. Specifically, the chain operator must inform the provincial authority where each pharmacy in the chain is located about the list of practising pharmacists at those sites. Additionally, pharmacy chains must notify the authority if pharmacies are added or removed from the chain, and if there are any rotations of the people responsible for pharmaceutical expertise between pharmacies within the chain.
Medicine Information Activities
Under Circular 31, medicine information can still be given to healthcare professionals through information materials, seminars, and medical representatives.
However, Circular 31 introduces a significant change by removing the need to obtain a certificate for medicine information content before carrying out these activities. Under the new rules, pharmaceutical businesses, representative offices of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Vietnam, and MA holders are now responsible for creating and distributing medicine information materials. These materials must comply with the package inserts for medicines approved by the MOH, the Vietnamese National Drug Formulary, and any related documents and professional instructions issued or recognised by the MOH.
Donald Trump, never one to shy away from drama or diplomacy-via-caps-lock, has slapped a 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States. The justification? In his own delicate prose: «The treatment of former President Jair Bolsonaro is a disgrace… A witch hunt that must end IMMEDIATELY!»
And just in case anyone thought this was about trade imbalances or economic strategy, Trump made things crystal clear: «Due to Brazil’s insidious attacks on free elections…».
In short, the 50% tariff isn’t about coffee, orange juice, or flip-flops. It’s about a Supreme Court judgment, applying Brazilian law, regarding Brazilian politicians accused of conspiring in a coup d’état. In other words, this is a brazen (and frankly absurd) attempt at judicial intervention via trade war.
Trump, with his characteristic subtlety, offered a solution: manufacture in the U.S., and he’ll look kindly upon Brazil, like a mafia don offering «protection» after smashing your shop window. But what he meant was: consider Bolsonaro innocent, and we’ll talk.
The Brazilian market took the bait
Although the fishy interference in Brazilian affairs was determined from a fish out of the water, the market took the bait: in the first 48 hours after the infamous letter, at least 1500 tons of fish were already held in Brazilian ports, as US buyers suspended their contracts due to uncertainty about the costs upon arrival. The fish market is on alert, as 80% of the exports head to the US, mainly coming from small family-owned industries that distribute the catch from artisanal fishing communities.
The same effect hit other sectors, from orange, honey, and coffee to aircraft.
Brazil’s response and sorcery: don’t mess with us (or our weather)
Naturally, Brazil will not sit quietly sipping caipirinhas while its sovereignty is trampled. Reciprocity is on the table: if Washington raises tariffs, Brasília can do the same. But above all, one thing is sure: Brazil will never tolerate foreign interference in its independent judiciary.
And then, a curious coincidence: right after Trump’s speech, a tornado accompanied by lightning struck the White House grounds. Pure chance? Maybe. Or could it have been the work of Brazilian indigenous shamans, a particularly well-organized group of umbanda practitioners, or simply the fact that, as every Brazilian child knows, God is Brazilian.
Trump might want to check the weather forecast next time before penning another angry letter.
The unpredictable becoming predictable
Trade wars are rarely tidy affairs, but one thing they consistently deliver is chaos (in legal terms, disruption). And when disruption meets contracts, force majeure disputes often end up in court.
At first glance, Trump’s decision to impose a 50% tariff overnight might feel like an unpredictable thunderbolt (quite literally, given the weather at the White House). But here’s the catch: by now, unpredictable tariffs are becoming predictable. When a government with a well-documented love for impulsive economic diplomacy imposes politically motivated tariffs, can anyone claim to be surprised?
In most jurisdictions, force majeure requires that the event be extraordinary, unforeseeable, and beyond the parties’ control. A sudden 50% tariff certainly ticks a few of those boxes, but following a repetition of erratic trade policy, one might argue that businesses should expect what in past times was considered unexpected, especially when dealing with certain jurisdictions or political figures. In other words, Trump’s tariffs might not excuse performance if parties didn’t prepare for exactly this kind of volatility.
This is where good contract drafting comes into play
Savvy businesses are learning that their contracts must go beyond a vague boilerplate clause about “acts of government” or “changes in law.” Instead, they should expressly address the risk of sudden tariff changes, including
- hardship clauses that allow renegotiation when costs become commercially unreasonable;
- price adjustment mechanisms linked to tariff thresholds;
- termination rights triggered by specified levels of customs duties;
- currency fluctuation provisions (because tariffs rarely travel alone, and currency swings often accompany them).
In short, while no contract can immunize a business from every shock, smart drafting can mean the difference between a commercial headache and a catastrophic breach.
Therefore, tariffs may no longer be an unpredictable storm; they are part of the new predictable landscape. Given that your contract might wake up tomorrow facing ‘IMMEDIATE’ punitive tariffs in all caps, your contract should be ready today.
The unwitting cupid: strengthening EU-Brazil relations
While the tariffs may ruffle trade flows between Brasília and Washington, there’s an unintended silver lining: Trump is proving to be the most efficient matchmaker between Brazil and other markets, such as China and the European Union.
The EU-Brazil relationship, already a flirtation with promising prospects, with relevant progress in the EU-Mercosur Agreement, now seems destined for deeper romance. If Mr. Trump insists on isolating the US from Brazil, the old continent stands ready, with flowers and wine in hand, to pick up where the US left off. After all, Brazilian fish can pair up nicely with champagne, cava and prosecco.
So thank you, Mr. Trump. In your quest to bully Brazil into submission, you may have done more to strengthen transatlantic ties than any EU Commissioner ever could. As they say in Brasília these days: Trump is not a trade warrior. He’s a cupid in disguise.
The recent announcement of a landmark trade agreement framework, following just three months negotiations since President Trump’s tariffs announcement on 2 April 2025, signals a pivotal shift, not merely in bilateral relations, but in the broader architecture of global supply chains.
As a commercial lawyer with exposure to Vietnam since 2007, I have observed the evolving dynamics between the United States and Vietnam through the years, talking to students, entrepreneurs, veterans, diplomats, humans from all walks all life, from both nations and beyond.
You may recall that Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China, was to be the nation that would encounter the most stringent tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, reaching an astonishing 46%.
The newly forged framework outlines significant reciprocal concessions designed to foster greater trade and investment flows. Granted, pre-April 2 tariffs applied by the USA on Vietnamese goods were lower than what emerges from the framework agreement, but still, it is better than 46%),
The United States has committed to imposing a 20% tariff on most Vietnamese imports, a notable reduction from the previously mooted 46%. However, a substantial 40% tariff will apply to goods re-exported from third countries, with a particular focus on those originating from China.
Vietnam has pledged to open its market to a wide array of US products. Crucially, it has also committed to implementing stringent measures aimed at restricting the transshipment of Chinese goods through its territory, a long-standing concern for Washington.
In a significant win for American exporters, US goods will now enjoy duty-free access to the Vietnamese market, effectively granting “total access”, particularly for large-engine vehicles such as SUVs, as emphatically stated by President Trump (how SUVs are going to circulate in the narrow alleys of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, infested by swarms of mopeds, is a different story).
This agreement is expected to catalyse growth in several key sectors. Electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (especially Liquefied Natural Gas), and agriculture are poised for expansion. US firms specialising in manufacturing technology, energy solutions, and agricultural products are anticipated to be the primary beneficiaries. Furthermore, beyond immediate trade benefits, the agreement is set to reshape investment strategies, encouraging a greater localisation of supply chains within Vietnam. This strategic realignment is also expected to further solidify the already robust US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
While the potential upsides are considerable, it is imperative for businesses and investors to approach this new landscape with a clear understanding of the accompanying risks. From my vantage point, I identify several significant execution challenges and structural impediments that require close monitoring.
Enforcement of Transshipment Controls
The most immediate and perhaps formidable risk lies in the effective enforcement of transshipment controls. Vietnam has historically served as a significant assembly point for Chinese-manufactured components. Ensuring that goods originating from China are not merely re-routed through Vietnam to circumvent US tariffs will require exceptionally close monitoring and robust verification mechanisms. The legal and practical complexities of definitively determining the true country of origin for all goods will undoubtedly pose a persistent challenge. As a European citizen, witnessing how the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“EVFTA”), which poses an important stress on certificates of origin, I am particularly aware of this matter.
While Vietnam has made remarkable strides in its economic development, certain structural issues could hinder its capacity to scale up high-value manufacturing in the short to medium term. These include:
Legal framework nuances
Vietnam’s legal framework for foreign investment has seen continuous improvements, but legal and cultural complexities and inconsistencies can and do still arise. Navigating the regulatory landscape, particularly with new rules stemming from this agreement and at a time of deep administrative, governmental, digital and legal reforms in Vietnam, will demand expert legal guidance to ensure compliance and mitigate potential fines and disputes. Issues surrounding so-called sublicences for businesses, intellectual property rights enforcement and contract enforceability, whilst improving, still require careful consideration;
Education
The ambition to transform Vietnam into a high-value manufacturing hub necessitates a workforce equipped with advanced skills. While the Vietnamese government prioritises education and workforce development, a significant portion of the current labour force lacks formal training and specialised certifications, let alone a good command of the English language. Bridging this skills gap, particularly in areas like advanced manufacturing, engineering, and digital technologies is a necessity and not just in light of this framework agreement. Companies may need to factor in substantial investment in training and upskilling programmes for their Vietnamese employees.
Infrastructures
Despite considerable investment, Vietnam’s infrastructure, particularly in logistics, energy, and transportation, continues to face bottlenecks. And China – the apparent target of Trump’s tariffs – is stepping in with high-speed trains connecting it to the northern Provinces of Vietnam. An increased volume of high-value manufacturing and trade will place further strain on existing infrastructure. Inadequate port capacity, congested roads, and a reliable energy supply (including for EV charging) are critical concerns that could impact efficiency and increase operational costs for businesses.
Policy divergence
This framework agreement deepens US-Vietnam trade ties and seems to be paving the way for more US investments in Vietnam, but this second aspect seems to run counter to parallel US policy objectives aimed at reshoring manufacturing back to the United States. This potential divergence in strategic priorities could introduce yet another element of unpredictability in the long term, necessitating a flexible and adaptable investment approach. Future shifts in US policy could impact the durability and full extent of the benefits derived from this agreement.
This trade agreement, if finalised and implemented, undoubtedly represents a structural shift in global trade dynamics. It strategically positions Vietnam as an increasingly important high-value manufacturing hub and significantly deepens US engagement in Southeast Asia. We will need time, however, to assess the practical impact of the agreement, observing the efficacy of its implementation, and understanding how Vietnam’s inherent strengths and challenges will ultimately shape its role in the reconfigured global supply chain.
We will also need to see what China, if anything, will do as a countermeasure. In fact, any assessment of Vietnam’s evolving trade landscape would be incomplete without a thorough consideration of China’s influence and strategic posture. President Xi Jinping has consistently championed a vision of a “community of shared future for mankind,” a concept that, while outwardly promoting global cooperation, also subtly underscores a demand for international alignment with Beijing’s interests. In the context of escalating trade tensions, Xi has repeatedly warned that “trade wars have no winners,” advocating for unity against protectionist measures, yet simultaneously implying that nations must ultimately choose sides, either with or against China’s economic and political orbit. Vietnam, despite its historical complexities and occasional maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea (or East Sea, as it is officially called by Hanoi), remains deeply interwoven with China’s economy. China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner for many years, with significant inflows of Chinese FDI, loans, and project contractors. This economic dependency is particularly evident in various sectors, where Chinese components and materials form a substantial part of Vietnamese manufacturing supply chains. While Vietnam has actively sought to diversify its trade partners and reduce its reliance on China, the sheer scale of the bilateral economic relationship means that disentanglement is a long-term, complex endeavour. Furthermore, China’s influence extends beyond direct trade into crucial regional resources. The Mekong River, a lifeline for millions in Southeast Asia, originates in China, which has constructed numerous upstream dams.
As Vietnam navigates its enhanced trade relationship with the United States, it must simultaneously contend with the enduring economic gravity and strategic ambitions of its northern giant neighbour. Any perceived move by Vietnam to significantly shift away from China could invite retaliatory measures or heightened pressure from Beijing. Businesses investing in Vietnam must not only grasp the intricacies of the US-Vietnam agreement but also meticulously analyse how these developments will intersect with, and potentially be impacted by, the intricate, often delicate, and sometimes fraught relationship between Hanoi and Beijing. Understanding this geopolitical tightrope will be essential for sustainable success in the Vietnamese market. Prudence, informed legal counsel, and a keen eye on evolving geopolitical and economic realities will be paramount for those seeking to capitalise on this transformative new chapter.
Takeaways
- Tariffs:The US-Vietnam framework agreement marks a significant departure from previous trade dynamics, reducing US tariffs on most Vietnamese imports to 20% (from a mooted 46%) while imposing a 40% tariff on transshipped goods, especially from China.
- Vietnam’s market opening:Vietnam has committed to duty-free access for a broad range of US products and stricter controls on Chinese goods transiting its territory.
- Growth / manufacturing shift potential:The agreement is expected to fuel expansion in Vietnamese electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (LNG), and agriculture. It also encourages supply chain localisation within Vietnam (normally more of an assembly point for Chinese products).
- Execution challenges: Effectively preventing the re-routing of Chinese goods through Vietnam to avoid tariffs will be a complex and demanding task; Despite economic progress, Vietnam faces hurdles in scaling high-value manufacturing due to legal framework nuances (e.g., sublicences, IP enforcement), a skills gap in its workforce (lack of formal training, English proficiency) and infrastructure bottlenecks (logistics, energy, transportation).
- US policy divergence:The agreement’s encouragement of US investment in Vietnam appears to contradict the broader US policy objective of reshoring manufacturing.
- China:Businesses must consider China’s significant economic sway over Vietnam, including its position as Vietnam’s largest trading partner, its FDI, and its control over shared resources like the Mekong River. Any major shift by Vietnam away from China could lead to retaliatory measures from Beijing.
- Uncertainty:This is not a final agreement, so the situation might change. Prudence and informed legal counsel are crucial for businesses navigating this evolving landscape.
The Trump approach: power and dominance
In his autobiography, The Art of the Deal, Donald Trump describes negotiation as a contest of strength, determination, and dominance. His vision is clear: anyone who shows uncertainty or makes concessions too early is immediately perceived as a loser. His negotiating style is based on constant pressure, maximalist demands, and calculated threats, to obtain unilateral advantages. In this scheme, compromise is not a point of arrival, but a sign of weakness to be avoided.
Trump has always been a competitive negotiator, focused on immediate results and uninterested in balanced solutions unless they are strictly functional to his interests.
Other negotiating styles: compromising and collaborative
In contrast to this competitive approach, there are two other relevant negotiating styles:
- The compromising style aims to reach a ‘middle ground’ agreement, in which both parties give something up to achieve an acceptable solution. It is a pragmatic approach, practical in situations where time is limited or positions are too far apart for genuine collaboration.
- The collaborative style, on the other hand, aims to create win-win solutions. The parties seek to thoroughly understand each other’s interests and work together to build an outcome that maximizes the benefit for both. It requires openness, time, and trust.
In commercial negotiations, the compromising or collaborative approach can only work if the other party shares the same logic. But when dealing with an explicitly competitive actor such as Trump, adopting a compromising style risks seriously penalizing the other party, for at least three reasons:
- It conveys weakness
An accommodating gesture is seen not as a sign of openness, but as a point of pressure to be exploited. The competitive negotiator, focused on gaining an immediate advantage, interprets it as a willingness to give even more.
- It relinquishes bargaining power
The EU has a vast market and significant trade levers, especially in a context where the US is closing the door to the Chinese market. Offering concessions at the outset is tantamount to burning your cards without getting anything in return. In a competitive confrontation, the first move can set the tone for the negotiation: once a concession has been made, it is very difficult to backtrack.
- It legitimizes the negotiating imbalance
An unbalanced compromise, if accepted without resistance, risks becoming the new basis for future trade relations, systematically penalizing the EU in subsequent rounds.
Why 30%? The anchor technique
Trump often uses a negotiating technique known as the anchor technique. This consists of deliberately setting a very high target at the beginning of the negotiation (in our case, the threat of 30% tariffs).
The aim is to create a psychological perimeter for the negotiation and force the other party to reason on the basis of that figure, even though they are aware that it is arbitrary. This technique allows one to influence the scope of the discussion and obtain greater concessions, just as Trump has done.
The worst response: unilateral concessions with no return
Unfortunately, the European Union has already shown worrying signs of a compromising attitude that has not been negotiated with the Trump administration, for example:
- The waiver of the web tax* on American digital giants, without obtaining any regulation or shared tax contribution in return.
- The offer to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, made to reassure Washington, without obtaining anything in return.
- The acceptance of the increase in NATO spending to 5% of GDP, demanded by Trump, again without obtaining anything in return.
All these offers without asking for anything in return reinforce the idea that the EU is willing to concede from the outset. Trump, true to his competitive logic, sees these concessions as a starting point, not a compromise: this pushes him to raise his demands, not moderate them.
Persevering would be a fatal mistake
Continuing along this path of compromise, in the hope that accommodation will ease the pressure, would be not only ineffective but counterproductive. With a competitive negotiator, unilateral concessions do not stop escalation: they fuel it. Any sign of weakness is interpreted as additional room for maneuver.
A helpful example is China’s reaction during the trade war initiated by Trump. Faced with massive tariffs imposed by the US, Beijing responded in kind, imposing equivalent tariffs. Instead of giving in, it spoke the same language of power. The result is there for all to see: after weeks of escalation, the US had to moderate its position, opening up to a more balanced agreement.
The right strategy: speak his language
To avoid the mistakes of the past, the EU should therefore reverse its negotiating logic. Not to fuel confrontation, but to restore a credible balance. Some applicable countermeasures could be:
- Target Trump’s electoral base, particularly the agricultural sectors (soy, corn, beef), with selective tariffs or targeted restrictions.
- Put the European web tax* back on the table, even with a minimum rate, linking any exemptions to real concessions from the US.
These well-calibrated moves would strengthen the EU’s position and show that it can defend its interests by speaking a language Trump understands: that of strength and bargaining power.
Going beyond requests, seeking the other party’s interests
A fundamental principle in any negotiation is to identify the other side’s interests and find a way to allow them to achieve them without sacrificing your own. This is no easy task, given Trump’s notorious volatility and the lack of sound arguments to justify the demands made in the negotiations.
In the case of the EU-US negotiations, it must be borne in mind that Trump is playing the game with his electoral base in mind: an agreement must offer him a narrative of victory to communicate to his electorate.
Takeaway
When negotiating with a competitive player like Trump, one should abandon the accommodating approach, avoid concessions without something in return, and adopt a style that is more assertive, strategic, and symmetrical.
Only then will it be able to build an agreement that is solid, fair, and respectful of its economic and political strength.
I have often dealt with commercial distribution agreements between Italian and Chinese companies, sometimes following negotiations in the wine sector for various types of agreements: sales, distribution, franchising, establishment of joint ventures, and sales through online stores.
I am sharing some key considerations for approaching this complex but opportunity-rich market.
📌 Here are my 10 takeaways
Step Zero. Protect your IP
it is essential to protect your intellectual property before entering China. This includes trademarks (including their Chinese transliteration), labels, web domains, and social media accounts. Neglecting this aspect can have disastrous consequences, exposing you to the widespread phenomenon of trademark squatting (even famous names such as Michael Jordan, Elon Musk, and Donald Trump have fallen victim to this).
For more information, you can read this article about Intellectual property protection in China
1 — Know your enemy
trust is good, but mistrust is better. Before entering into commercial agreements, it is essential to check the credentials of potential partners through the databases of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. When it comes to wine, it is necessary to check whether the prospective distributor has a license to import and distribute wine.
2 — No copy-paste
Contracts must be tailor-made, adapting them to local specificities. In particular, it is crucial to clearly regulate promotional activities: budget, commercial actions, communication methods, and management of the producer’s trademarks. It is also best to write the contract in Chinese to ensure that there are no misunderstandings and in case it needs to be used before a judge or local administrative body, as Chinese is the only official language. (N.B.: if you think of entrusting the task to ChatGPT, this is not a good idea).
For an in-depth article, check out The commercial distribution contract in China
3 — Decide immediately how and where to litigate
It may seem counterintuitive, but it is best to avoid providing for Italian (or French, or German) jurisdiction and applicable law, which is an ineffective solution, especially in cases where urgent action is needed to stop unfair competition or counterfeiting. Consider applying Chinese law and provide for an arbitration clause at CIETAC. An effective dispute management strategy is a key element of the agreement and must be negotiated carefully. (P.S.: This applies not only to China but to all international agreements. For more information, see this article).
4 — China is big
And it is the sum of many very different internal markets. Exclusivity should be granted for good reasons, but only if the distributor has a well-developed commercial network and can achieve specific shared objectives. If granted, it should be limited to the province where the distributor is based and subject to the achievement of agreed sales volumes. Having a single distributor for the whole of China is like entrusting an Italian distributor with promoting a product throughout Europe. Or appoint a NYC-based company to promote and sell your wines in all 50 US States.
5 — China is far away
Delegating everything to the local distributor and taking no interest in what is happening on the Chinese market is never a good idea. Firstly, because you have no idea how, where, and with what results the wines are being sold. Secondly, because you cannot verify compliance with agreements, for example on non-competition or the use of trademarks. It is therefore important to schedule meetings to share commercial policies and be able to verify what is happening, including through audits and visits to warehouses and the sales network.
6 — China is expensive
Competition in the Chinese domestic market is fierce. This is also true in terms of price, as some countries that are direct competitors of Italy (Australia, Chile, New Zealand) have free trade agreements and can therefore enter the market on more favorable terms than Italian wine, which is subject to a total tax burden of around 43% after payment of duties, excise taxes, and VAT. It is necessary to position oneself in the right market segment (medium-high), and to do so, it is necessary to plan the right commercial actions together with the distributor. Selling Ex-Works and hoping that the distributor will take care of everything is not an excellent strategy for being competitive.
7 — China is dangerous
Scams are always around the corner. In the wine world in particular, for example, spontaneous expressions of interest are frequent, arriving via the company website, social media accounts, or directly via email. They sound like this: we have discovered your wines, we think they are fantastic, we want to place an order immediately. If it sounds too good and easy, it is certainly a scam. There is an easy way to check: if the next step is a request for payment of a few thousand euros, justified by the need to register the wines on the CIFER (China Imported Food Enterprise Registration) portal, or to register your trademark to prevent others from doing so, or to authenticate the signature on the sales contract… these are attempts at fraud, and the elusive order will never arrive after payment has been received. How can you check whether the person you are dealing with is a reputable company or a fraudster? 👉🏼Go back to point 1 (here is an in-depth article).
8 — E-commerce? Yes, but with method (and money)
Online wine sales continue to grow, but entering large platforms is complex, competition is fierce, and running an online store requires meticulous planning and highly efficient system implementation. The online market in China is all pay-for-play. Nothing is achieved with no money or minimal effort. If you want to sell online, you need to build an omnichannel system integrated with traditional distribution, and to do this, it is essential to involve a local partner with well-defined investments and responsibilities.
9 — China is not a market for everyone
You need to protect your brands, study the market thoroughly, know your competition (both foreign and local), find the right market channel, select a distributor motivated to invest time and money in promoting your product, and be willing to support them with the right investments. If you want to build a serious plan to enter the Chinese market, you must have a medium- to long-term perspective. There are no shortcuts (actually, there are many, but they almost always lead to wasted time and money). If you are unwilling to invest in entering the Chinese market through the front door, it is unlikely that anyone else will do it for you.
10 — Don’t do it yourself
If you have read up to point 9 and are still keen to enter the Chinese market, consider doing so professionally, involving consultants who can support your company throughout the market research, scouting, negotiation, and contract drafting processes. This is also part of the investment needed to build and develop a solid and resilient business model. This advice applies to all foreign markets, and even more so to China.
The most dangerous mistake one can make after the announcement of the (partial) suspension of U.S. duties for 90 days is to hope that everything will go well and we will return to the pre-April 2 world.
First, because very invasive tariffs remain in place: 10 percent on all countries that trade with the U.S., including the EU, 25 percent on automotive, 25 percent on steel and aluminum, 145 percent on China.
Second, because it is impossible to predict the actions of the U.S. Administration in the short and medium term: it cannot be ruled out that tariffs will remain, increase, change targets or that other factors will intervene to turn the tide in international markets, such as an escalation of the trade war with China.
The 90-day suspension is an opportunity
The U.S.’s temporary suspension of tariffs represents a valuable window that should be used not only as a truce but also as a valuable room for action: 90 days to rehash contracts, renegotiate key clauses, and insert levers of flexibility that can protect business in various future scenarios in the U.S. and other markets.
Today’s exporters cannot afford to «sit back and see what will happen»-it is time to act, and to do so professionally and strategically. Let’s look at a checklist of important points to consider.
What do contracts with customers and suppliers entail?
The first point is to survey agreements with the trade network in the U.S. and other countries that export to the U.S., as well as with upstream suppliers in the supply chain.
Is there a written contract? The worst-case scenario — unfortunately a very frequent one — is when the parties cooperate informally, only based on orders and order confirmations. This leaves undefined not only what happens in the case of imposition of duties, but also a whole range of other points, for example, limits on damages that can be claimed in the case of breach of contract, the duration of the agreement, the applicable law, and how any disputes will be resolved.
Another very problematic scenario is one in which contracts exist, but they are generic and do not include the necessary covenants to manage the risks involved in operating in a highly litigious market such as the U.S., which, moreover, has very high legal costs.
Having done this analysis, the necessary actions can be put in place, prioritizing according to the importance of business relationships and as appropriate:
- Negotiate and conclude a written contract from scratch
- Replace the existing agreement with a complete and correct contract
- Amend and integrate the existing agreement with pacts to manage tariffs and other causes of price fluctuations
Let us dwell on the last scenario, assuming that there is a complete and correct contract but one that does not regulate price and cost fluctuation as a direct or indirect consequence of the introduction of duties.
Contract Addendum
In such cases, the correct course of action is to sign an Addendum to the original contract, specifying which covenants are being waived and which covenants are being added. It is essential that the Addendum be negotiated and signed by persons with the power of representation of the parties and that it be drafted with the help of lawyers who specialize in this field. In addition to including correct clauses, it is necessary to verify that the covenants are valid according to the rules of law applicable to the contract.
Here are some clauses that can be the subject of the Addendum, to be modulated according to the specific case and possible scenarios.
Tariff Cost Sharing
By introducing this covenant, it is provided that in the event that duties are confirmed at [x]% or are reduced or increased within certain established thresholds, the Parties will share the increase equally, or according to other established percentages.
There may also be a ceiling on tariffs beyond which a party has the right to withdraw from the contract or request the suspension of certain orders for a specified period of time, after which it has the right to withdraw.
Price Adjustment
With this covenant, a discount or an increase in the product’s price is agreed upon, as the case may be, in the case of a duty greater than [x]%.
Among the use cases, in addition to that of the company exporting to the U.S. or other intermediate markets, with final destination of the products in the U.S., is that of those who purchase a product subject to import duty and resell it, processed or assembled.
Right to Cancel or Postpone Confirmed Orders
This covenant gives the right to revoke or suspend for a certain period already negotiated orders, as such binding, in case of confirmation or introduction of duties above a certain threshold, for example, if 20% taxation was confirmed for the import of wine from the EU.
The clause can be combined with previous covenants, for example, by stipulating that below the specified threshold, the contracts remain valid, and the parties share the duty or have the right to renegotiate the price.
Supply Forecast Adjustment
With this clause the Parties can modify supply programs already agreed for a specific duration (e.g., 24 months), with continuous sales and purchase obligations at a fixed price or indexable only within certain limits. The aim is to agree on the prerequisites for reshaping supply programs in the short and medium term, which can be very useful for defining the rules that will apply to relationships with key suppliers or customers for possible changes in volumes, delivery times, and prices.
Right to Source from Alternative Suppliers
This covenant serves to be authorized, if necessary, to source alternative suppliers of components or raw materials to those previously authorized in the contract with the end customer, for example, in cases where purchasing from the original suppliers has become too costly or difficult due to duties imposed at import or in previous steps in the supply chain, or other events such as currency or price fluctuation of certain commodities beyond a certain level established in the agreement.
Hardship and Force Majeure
The imposition of duties cannot be invoked as a cause of Force Majeure or hardship, respectively, to excuse contract non-performance or to renegotiate the price, even in cases of very high price increases (such as the 145% duty imposed on Chinese products). This conclusion is almost uniform under the law and jurisprudence of the major countries involved in the tariff war: U.S., China, Canada, Mexico, France and Italy: I refer to this practical guide for a timely examination of what the various rules provide.
If the contract lacks a well drafter Force Majeure and Hardship clause, or contains a generic clause, it is important to get your hands on revising it to expressly state the cases in which a party is entitled to suspend or terminate the contract, how and when to communicate the decision to invoke the exemption, and the consequences on the parties’ contractual obligations. You can go deeper on this topic here.
Conclusion
It is essential to prepare for possible future scenarios regarding duties (confirmed, increased, changed, or decreased) and to determine the consequences on trade relations with foreign clients and suppliers: moving today, at a standstill (or nearly so), allows entrepreneurs to negotiate shared and fair solutions and to avoid, as far as possible, the emergence of tensions and conflicts with the various partners along the international supply chain.
The case: A consumer bought a Ford car in Italy from an Italian car distributor. The car was manufactured by Ford WAG in Germany and supplied by Ford Italia, which belong to the same group of companies. Following an accident in December 2001 in which the airbag failed, the consumer sued the Italian distributor as well as Ford Italia for damages. Ford Italia disputed the claims for damages asserted against it, arguing that it had not manufactured the vehicle and, because it was itself only a distributor/supplier, referred to Ford WAG in Germany as the actual manufacturer.
Question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) referred the following question to the ECJ:
- the manufacturer’s liability under the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC is limited in accordance with Art 3 to cases where the supplier physically puts his name, trade mark, or other distinguishing feature on the product to create confusion between his identity and that of the actual manufacturer;
- or is the distributor liable as a “quasi-producer” even if he has not physically put his name or trademark on the product, but nevertheless «presents himself as its producer» within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive by using the distinguishing feature in his company name, which was put on the car by another person, but leading to identity with the actual car manufacturer.
ECJ judgement (European Court of Justice) of 19/12/2024, Case C-157/23
A company that does not manufacture a product itself, but only distributes it, can still be considered a «manufacturer» within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC). This is the case if the distributor puts his name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product and consequently presents itself as the manufacturer. According to the ECJ, this can give the consumer the impression that the distributor is responsible for the quality and safety of the product.
However, the ECJ emphasizes that liability does not depend on whether the distributor puts the sign on the product itself. The distributor did not do so in the specific case. However, the distributor used the corresponding distinguishing feature in its company name. According to the ECJ, the decisive factor is, therefore, whether the distributor uses this name match to gain the trust of consumers and is thus perceived as a responsible manufacturer.
The distributor is jointly and severally liable with the actual manufacturer. This means that consumers can either make a claim against the manufacturer or the dealer directly. However, the dealer has the right to ask for a regress for the damage incurred from the actual manufacturer.
Remarks
The ECJ emphasizes consumer protection. In my opinion, this argument is slightly overstretched:
- According to the ECJ, the consumer should not be burdened with the complex task of identifying the actual manufacturer of a defective product.
- A distributor that sells a product and uses its name or trademark to do so creates trust in the consumer. This trust is to be protected by the liability of the authorized distributor — regardless of whether the distributor has actively put its trademark on the product or not.
- This increases the liability risk for authorized car dealers because they must obtain appropriate insurance against such a risk. In the constellation described above, authorized dealers can be exposed to unexpectedly high claims for damages under strict product liability.
Good advice is not expensive
- It is essential that such cases are legally clarified when drawing up and formulating distribution agreements with car manufacturers and that the ECJ ruling is considered.
- In addition, authorized dealers/distributors should reconsider the use of product names from the actual producer in their company name and/or in their corporate image.
The Brazilian market has not been immune to the protectionist wave of «America First.» If such measures persist over time, they could have a lasting impact on the local economy. Still, a sour lemon can often become a sweet caipirinha in the resilient and optimistic spirit that characterizes both Brazilian society and its entrepreneurs.
As is often the case in the chessboard of global economic geopolitics, a move from one player creates room for another countermove. Brazil reacted with reciprocal trade measures, signaling clearly that it would not accept a position of commercial vulnerability.
This firmer stance — almost unthinkable in earlier years — strengthened Brazil’s image in Europe as a country ready to reposition itself with greater autonomy and pragmatism, opening new doors to international markets. In a world where global value chains are being restructured and reliable trade partners are in high demand, Brazil is increasingly seen not just as a supplier of raw materials, but as a strategic partner in critical industries.
The rapprochement with Europe has been further energized by progress in the Mercosur–European Union Agreement, whose negotiations spanned decades and now seem to be gaining momentum. While the United States embraces a more isolationist commercial posture, Europe is actively diversifying its trade relations — and Brazil, by demonstrating a commitment to clear rules, economic stability, and legal certainty, emerges as a natural candidate to fill that gap.
The Direct Impact of U.S. Tariffs
The trade measures introduced under President Trump primarily affected Brazilian producers of semi-finished steel and primary aluminum, with the removal of long-standing exemptions and quotas. In 2024, Brazil exported US$ 2.2 billion in semi-finished steel to the United States, representing nearly 60% of U.S. imports in that category. In the same year, Brazilian aluminum exports to the U.S. reached US$ 796 million, accounting for 14% of the sector’s total. Losses in exports for 2025 are estimated at around US$ 1.5 billion.
Brazil’s Response and a New Phase
In April 2025, the Brazilian Congress passed a new legal framework for trade retaliation, empowering the Executive Branch to adopt countermeasures in a faster and more technically structured way. The new legislation allows, for example, the automatic imposition of retaliatory tariffs on goods from countries that adopt unilateral measures incompatible with WTO norms; the suspension of tax or customs benefits previously granted under bilateral agreements; the creation of a list of priority sectors for trade defense and diversification of export markets.
Beyond the retaliation itself, the move marked a significant shift in posture: Brazil began positioning itself as an active player in global trade governance, aligning with mid-sized economies that advocate for predictable, balanced, and rules-based trade relations.
An Opportunity for Brazil–Europe Relations
This new stage sets Brazil as a reliable supplier to European industry — not only of raw materials but also of higher-value-added goods, particularly in processed foods, bioenergy, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure.
Moreover, as US–China tensions drive European companies to seek nearshoring or “friend-shoring” strategies with more predictable partners, Brazil, with its clean energy matrix, large domestic market, and relatively stable institutions, emerges as a strong alternative.
Legal Implications and Strategic Recommendations
This changing landscape brings new opportunities for companies and legal advisors involved in Brazil–Europe investment and trade relations. Particular attention should be paid to:
- Monitoring rules of origin in the Mercosur–EU agreement, especially in sectors requiring supply chain restructuring;
- Reviewing contractual and tax structures for import/export operations, including clauses addressing tariff instability or non-tariff barriers (e.g., environmental or sanitary standards), and clearly defining force majeure events;
- Reassessing distribution and agency agreements in light of the new commercial environment;
- Exploring joint ventures and technology transfer arrangements with Brazilian partners, particularly in bioeconomy, green hydrogen, and mineral processing.
From lemon to caipirinha
The world is becoming more fragmented and competitive, but also more open to realignment. What began as a protectionist blow from the United States has revealed new opportunities for transatlantic cooperation. For Brazil, Europe is no longer just a client: it is poised to become a long-term strategic partner. It is now up to lawyers and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to turn this opportunity into lasting, mutually beneficial relationships.
Scrivi a Roberto
The Milestone EU-Mercosur Trade Deal
09.12.2024
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Аргентина
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Бразилия
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Италия
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Уругвай
- Распространение
- Иностранные инвестиции
- Налог
On 29 June 2025, the Vietnamese government introduced Decree No. 163/2025/ND-CP (Decree 163). This decree provides detailed guidance on how the updated Law on Pharmacy will be implemented.
Like the amended Law on Pharmacy, Decree 163 came into effect on 1 July 2025, replacing the previous Decree No. 54/2017/ND-CP (Decree 54). The new decree sets out comprehensive rules for key aspects of managing pharmaceuticals, including:
- Pharmacy practice certificates
- Certificates allowing pharmaceutical businesses to operate
- Import and export of medicines and drug ingredients
- Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) inspections of overseas manufacturers
- Recalling medicines and drug ingredients
- Certificates for medicine advertising content
- Medicine price management
Key Changes in Decree 163
Here are some important changes and additions introduced by Decree 163:
Destroying Specially Controlled Medicines
You no longer need to get approval from the relevant authority before destroying narcotic, psychotropic, and precursor drugs, or pharmaceutical ingredients that are narcotic or psychotropic substances or precursors used in medicines. Instead, you just need to provide notification at least seven working days in advance. This notification must include the planned destruction date and a detailed list of items to be destroyed.
E-commerce in Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical businesses that sell products online must openly display the following information to ensure transparency and consumer safety:
- Their certificate allowing them to operate as a pharmaceutical business.
- The pharmacy practice certificate of the person responsible for pharmaceutical expertise.
- Information about the medicines themselves.
Shelf-Life Rules for Imported Products
For medicines and ingredients with a total shelf life of nine months or less, at least one-third of their shelf life must remain when they clear customs. Medicines with a shelf life of 30 days or less must still be within their shelf life at the time of customs clearance.
Controlling Imported Products
All medicines with marketing authorisation (MA) are subject to import control, except for:
- Medicines needed for preventing and treating Group A infectious diseases that have been declared epidemics, as per the Law on Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases.
- Medicines with a shelf life of less than 30 days.
Importers must inform the provincial People’s Committee at least five working days before making a customs declaration. The People’s Committee can then issue a written notice of non-compliance to the customs authority within five working days of receiving this notification.
Medicine Advertising
Decree 163 adds a process that allows an approved medicine advertising certificate to be adjusted for certain changes (such as a change to the MA holder or manufacturer information). This means you don’t have to go through the entire initial registration process for medicine advertising content again, as was required under the previous rules.
Medicine Price Management
Businesses must announce or re-announce wholesale prices, similar to the medicine price declaration process under Decree 54. Some medicines are exempt from this requirement, including those provided free of charge for emergency responses, national health programmes, humanitarian aid, clinical trials, scientific research, or exhibition purposes, and medicines carried as personal luggage.
The Ministry of Health (MOH) can make recommendations if the announced or re-announced price is significantly higher than similar medicines already on the market. This includes situations where:
- The announced or re-announced wholesale price of the medicine is higher than the highest price of similar medicines.
- The price difference is more than 35% (for medicines priced under VND 1 million) or 15% (for medicines priced at VND 1 million and above) compared to winning bid prices in tenders.
- The announced or re-announced price is higher than prices in the country of origin or other markets (if there’s no similar product in Vietnam).
- When such differences are found, the MOH issues a formal recommendation to the announcing business and publishes it online for transparency and accountability.
Further Guidance in New Circular
On 1 July 2025, the MOH issued Circular No. 31/2025/TT-BYT (Circular 31), which further details how the amended Law on Pharmacy and Decree 163 should be implemented. Circular 31 officially replaces Circular No. 07/2018/TT-BYT and Decree 54 and came into effect immediately.
Key provisions of Circular 31 include:
Notification of Practising Pharmacists
Pharmaceutical businesses that are not part of a pharmacy chain must inform the relevant authority of a list of people currently working at the business who hold pharmacy practice certificates. This notification must be submitted within 15 days of the date the certificate allowing the pharmaceutical business to operate was issued, or when there are any changes to the list. This is a shorter deadline than the previous 30 days under earlier rules.
Pharmacy chains have similar notification duties and deadlines. Specifically, the chain operator must inform the provincial authority where each pharmacy in the chain is located about the list of practising pharmacists at those sites. Additionally, pharmacy chains must notify the authority if pharmacies are added or removed from the chain, and if there are any rotations of the people responsible for pharmaceutical expertise between pharmacies within the chain.
Medicine Information Activities
Under Circular 31, medicine information can still be given to healthcare professionals through information materials, seminars, and medical representatives.
However, Circular 31 introduces a significant change by removing the need to obtain a certificate for medicine information content before carrying out these activities. Under the new rules, pharmaceutical businesses, representative offices of foreign pharmaceutical companies in Vietnam, and MA holders are now responsible for creating and distributing medicine information materials. These materials must comply with the package inserts for medicines approved by the MOH, the Vietnamese National Drug Formulary, and any related documents and professional instructions issued or recognised by the MOH.
Donald Trump, never one to shy away from drama or diplomacy-via-caps-lock, has slapped a 50% tariff on all Brazilian exports to the United States. The justification? In his own delicate prose: «The treatment of former President Jair Bolsonaro is a disgrace… A witch hunt that must end IMMEDIATELY!»
And just in case anyone thought this was about trade imbalances or economic strategy, Trump made things crystal clear: «Due to Brazil’s insidious attacks on free elections…».
In short, the 50% tariff isn’t about coffee, orange juice, or flip-flops. It’s about a Supreme Court judgment, applying Brazilian law, regarding Brazilian politicians accused of conspiring in a coup d’état. In other words, this is a brazen (and frankly absurd) attempt at judicial intervention via trade war.
Trump, with his characteristic subtlety, offered a solution: manufacture in the U.S., and he’ll look kindly upon Brazil, like a mafia don offering «protection» after smashing your shop window. But what he meant was: consider Bolsonaro innocent, and we’ll talk.
The Brazilian market took the bait
Although the fishy interference in Brazilian affairs was determined from a fish out of the water, the market took the bait: in the first 48 hours after the infamous letter, at least 1500 tons of fish were already held in Brazilian ports, as US buyers suspended their contracts due to uncertainty about the costs upon arrival. The fish market is on alert, as 80% of the exports head to the US, mainly coming from small family-owned industries that distribute the catch from artisanal fishing communities.
The same effect hit other sectors, from orange, honey, and coffee to aircraft.
Brazil’s response and sorcery: don’t mess with us (or our weather)
Naturally, Brazil will not sit quietly sipping caipirinhas while its sovereignty is trampled. Reciprocity is on the table: if Washington raises tariffs, Brasília can do the same. But above all, one thing is sure: Brazil will never tolerate foreign interference in its independent judiciary.
And then, a curious coincidence: right after Trump’s speech, a tornado accompanied by lightning struck the White House grounds. Pure chance? Maybe. Or could it have been the work of Brazilian indigenous shamans, a particularly well-organized group of umbanda practitioners, or simply the fact that, as every Brazilian child knows, God is Brazilian.
Trump might want to check the weather forecast next time before penning another angry letter.
The unpredictable becoming predictable
Trade wars are rarely tidy affairs, but one thing they consistently deliver is chaos (in legal terms, disruption). And when disruption meets contracts, force majeure disputes often end up in court.
At first glance, Trump’s decision to impose a 50% tariff overnight might feel like an unpredictable thunderbolt (quite literally, given the weather at the White House). But here’s the catch: by now, unpredictable tariffs are becoming predictable. When a government with a well-documented love for impulsive economic diplomacy imposes politically motivated tariffs, can anyone claim to be surprised?
In most jurisdictions, force majeure requires that the event be extraordinary, unforeseeable, and beyond the parties’ control. A sudden 50% tariff certainly ticks a few of those boxes, but following a repetition of erratic trade policy, one might argue that businesses should expect what in past times was considered unexpected, especially when dealing with certain jurisdictions or political figures. In other words, Trump’s tariffs might not excuse performance if parties didn’t prepare for exactly this kind of volatility.
This is where good contract drafting comes into play
Savvy businesses are learning that their contracts must go beyond a vague boilerplate clause about “acts of government” or “changes in law.” Instead, they should expressly address the risk of sudden tariff changes, including
- hardship clauses that allow renegotiation when costs become commercially unreasonable;
- price adjustment mechanisms linked to tariff thresholds;
- termination rights triggered by specified levels of customs duties;
- currency fluctuation provisions (because tariffs rarely travel alone, and currency swings often accompany them).
In short, while no contract can immunize a business from every shock, smart drafting can mean the difference between a commercial headache and a catastrophic breach.
Therefore, tariffs may no longer be an unpredictable storm; they are part of the new predictable landscape. Given that your contract might wake up tomorrow facing ‘IMMEDIATE’ punitive tariffs in all caps, your contract should be ready today.
The unwitting cupid: strengthening EU-Brazil relations
While the tariffs may ruffle trade flows between Brasília and Washington, there’s an unintended silver lining: Trump is proving to be the most efficient matchmaker between Brazil and other markets, such as China and the European Union.
The EU-Brazil relationship, already a flirtation with promising prospects, with relevant progress in the EU-Mercosur Agreement, now seems destined for deeper romance. If Mr. Trump insists on isolating the US from Brazil, the old continent stands ready, with flowers and wine in hand, to pick up where the US left off. After all, Brazilian fish can pair up nicely with champagne, cava and prosecco.
So thank you, Mr. Trump. In your quest to bully Brazil into submission, you may have done more to strengthen transatlantic ties than any EU Commissioner ever could. As they say in Brasília these days: Trump is not a trade warrior. He’s a cupid in disguise.
The recent announcement of a landmark trade agreement framework, following just three months negotiations since President Trump’s tariffs announcement on 2 April 2025, signals a pivotal shift, not merely in bilateral relations, but in the broader architecture of global supply chains.
As a commercial lawyer with exposure to Vietnam since 2007, I have observed the evolving dynamics between the United States and Vietnam through the years, talking to students, entrepreneurs, veterans, diplomats, humans from all walks all life, from both nations and beyond.
You may recall that Vietnam, with the notable exclusion of China, was to be the nation that would encounter the most stringent tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, reaching an astonishing 46%.
The newly forged framework outlines significant reciprocal concessions designed to foster greater trade and investment flows. Granted, pre-April 2 tariffs applied by the USA on Vietnamese goods were lower than what emerges from the framework agreement, but still, it is better than 46%),
The United States has committed to imposing a 20% tariff on most Vietnamese imports, a notable reduction from the previously mooted 46%. However, a substantial 40% tariff will apply to goods re-exported from third countries, with a particular focus on those originating from China.
Vietnam has pledged to open its market to a wide array of US products. Crucially, it has also committed to implementing stringent measures aimed at restricting the transshipment of Chinese goods through its territory, a long-standing concern for Washington.
In a significant win for American exporters, US goods will now enjoy duty-free access to the Vietnamese market, effectively granting “total access”, particularly for large-engine vehicles such as SUVs, as emphatically stated by President Trump (how SUVs are going to circulate in the narrow alleys of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, infested by swarms of mopeds, is a different story).
This agreement is expected to catalyse growth in several key sectors. Electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (especially Liquefied Natural Gas), and agriculture are poised for expansion. US firms specialising in manufacturing technology, energy solutions, and agricultural products are anticipated to be the primary beneficiaries. Furthermore, beyond immediate trade benefits, the agreement is set to reshape investment strategies, encouraging a greater localisation of supply chains within Vietnam. This strategic realignment is also expected to further solidify the already robust US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.
While the potential upsides are considerable, it is imperative for businesses and investors to approach this new landscape with a clear understanding of the accompanying risks. From my vantage point, I identify several significant execution challenges and structural impediments that require close monitoring.
Enforcement of Transshipment Controls
The most immediate and perhaps formidable risk lies in the effective enforcement of transshipment controls. Vietnam has historically served as a significant assembly point for Chinese-manufactured components. Ensuring that goods originating from China are not merely re-routed through Vietnam to circumvent US tariffs will require exceptionally close monitoring and robust verification mechanisms. The legal and practical complexities of definitively determining the true country of origin for all goods will undoubtedly pose a persistent challenge. As a European citizen, witnessing how the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (“EVFTA”), which poses an important stress on certificates of origin, I am particularly aware of this matter.
While Vietnam has made remarkable strides in its economic development, certain structural issues could hinder its capacity to scale up high-value manufacturing in the short to medium term. These include:
Legal framework nuances
Vietnam’s legal framework for foreign investment has seen continuous improvements, but legal and cultural complexities and inconsistencies can and do still arise. Navigating the regulatory landscape, particularly with new rules stemming from this agreement and at a time of deep administrative, governmental, digital and legal reforms in Vietnam, will demand expert legal guidance to ensure compliance and mitigate potential fines and disputes. Issues surrounding so-called sublicences for businesses, intellectual property rights enforcement and contract enforceability, whilst improving, still require careful consideration;
Education
The ambition to transform Vietnam into a high-value manufacturing hub necessitates a workforce equipped with advanced skills. While the Vietnamese government prioritises education and workforce development, a significant portion of the current labour force lacks formal training and specialised certifications, let alone a good command of the English language. Bridging this skills gap, particularly in areas like advanced manufacturing, engineering, and digital technologies is a necessity and not just in light of this framework agreement. Companies may need to factor in substantial investment in training and upskilling programmes for their Vietnamese employees.
Infrastructures
Despite considerable investment, Vietnam’s infrastructure, particularly in logistics, energy, and transportation, continues to face bottlenecks. And China – the apparent target of Trump’s tariffs – is stepping in with high-speed trains connecting it to the northern Provinces of Vietnam. An increased volume of high-value manufacturing and trade will place further strain on existing infrastructure. Inadequate port capacity, congested roads, and a reliable energy supply (including for EV charging) are critical concerns that could impact efficiency and increase operational costs for businesses.
Policy divergence
This framework agreement deepens US-Vietnam trade ties and seems to be paving the way for more US investments in Vietnam, but this second aspect seems to run counter to parallel US policy objectives aimed at reshoring manufacturing back to the United States. This potential divergence in strategic priorities could introduce yet another element of unpredictability in the long term, necessitating a flexible and adaptable investment approach. Future shifts in US policy could impact the durability and full extent of the benefits derived from this agreement.
This trade agreement, if finalised and implemented, undoubtedly represents a structural shift in global trade dynamics. It strategically positions Vietnam as an increasingly important high-value manufacturing hub and significantly deepens US engagement in Southeast Asia. We will need time, however, to assess the practical impact of the agreement, observing the efficacy of its implementation, and understanding how Vietnam’s inherent strengths and challenges will ultimately shape its role in the reconfigured global supply chain.
We will also need to see what China, if anything, will do as a countermeasure. In fact, any assessment of Vietnam’s evolving trade landscape would be incomplete without a thorough consideration of China’s influence and strategic posture. President Xi Jinping has consistently championed a vision of a “community of shared future for mankind,” a concept that, while outwardly promoting global cooperation, also subtly underscores a demand for international alignment with Beijing’s interests. In the context of escalating trade tensions, Xi has repeatedly warned that “trade wars have no winners,” advocating for unity against protectionist measures, yet simultaneously implying that nations must ultimately choose sides, either with or against China’s economic and political orbit. Vietnam, despite its historical complexities and occasional maritime disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea (or East Sea, as it is officially called by Hanoi), remains deeply interwoven with China’s economy. China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner for many years, with significant inflows of Chinese FDI, loans, and project contractors. This economic dependency is particularly evident in various sectors, where Chinese components and materials form a substantial part of Vietnamese manufacturing supply chains. While Vietnam has actively sought to diversify its trade partners and reduce its reliance on China, the sheer scale of the bilateral economic relationship means that disentanglement is a long-term, complex endeavour. Furthermore, China’s influence extends beyond direct trade into crucial regional resources. The Mekong River, a lifeline for millions in Southeast Asia, originates in China, which has constructed numerous upstream dams.
As Vietnam navigates its enhanced trade relationship with the United States, it must simultaneously contend with the enduring economic gravity and strategic ambitions of its northern giant neighbour. Any perceived move by Vietnam to significantly shift away from China could invite retaliatory measures or heightened pressure from Beijing. Businesses investing in Vietnam must not only grasp the intricacies of the US-Vietnam agreement but also meticulously analyse how these developments will intersect with, and potentially be impacted by, the intricate, often delicate, and sometimes fraught relationship between Hanoi and Beijing. Understanding this geopolitical tightrope will be essential for sustainable success in the Vietnamese market. Prudence, informed legal counsel, and a keen eye on evolving geopolitical and economic realities will be paramount for those seeking to capitalise on this transformative new chapter.
Takeaways
- Tariffs:The US-Vietnam framework agreement marks a significant departure from previous trade dynamics, reducing US tariffs on most Vietnamese imports to 20% (from a mooted 46%) while imposing a 40% tariff on transshipped goods, especially from China.
- Vietnam’s market opening:Vietnam has committed to duty-free access for a broad range of US products and stricter controls on Chinese goods transiting its territory.
- Growth / manufacturing shift potential:The agreement is expected to fuel expansion in Vietnamese electronics, textiles, furniture, energy (LNG), and agriculture. It also encourages supply chain localisation within Vietnam (normally more of an assembly point for Chinese products).
- Execution challenges: Effectively preventing the re-routing of Chinese goods through Vietnam to avoid tariffs will be a complex and demanding task; Despite economic progress, Vietnam faces hurdles in scaling high-value manufacturing due to legal framework nuances (e.g., sublicences, IP enforcement), a skills gap in its workforce (lack of formal training, English proficiency) and infrastructure bottlenecks (logistics, energy, transportation).
- US policy divergence:The agreement’s encouragement of US investment in Vietnam appears to contradict the broader US policy objective of reshoring manufacturing.
- China:Businesses must consider China’s significant economic sway over Vietnam, including its position as Vietnam’s largest trading partner, its FDI, and its control over shared resources like the Mekong River. Any major shift by Vietnam away from China could lead to retaliatory measures from Beijing.
- Uncertainty:This is not a final agreement, so the situation might change. Prudence and informed legal counsel are crucial for businesses navigating this evolving landscape.
The Trump approach: power and dominance
In his autobiography, The Art of the Deal, Donald Trump describes negotiation as a contest of strength, determination, and dominance. His vision is clear: anyone who shows uncertainty or makes concessions too early is immediately perceived as a loser. His negotiating style is based on constant pressure, maximalist demands, and calculated threats, to obtain unilateral advantages. In this scheme, compromise is not a point of arrival, but a sign of weakness to be avoided.
Trump has always been a competitive negotiator, focused on immediate results and uninterested in balanced solutions unless they are strictly functional to his interests.
Other negotiating styles: compromising and collaborative
In contrast to this competitive approach, there are two other relevant negotiating styles:
- The compromising style aims to reach a ‘middle ground’ agreement, in which both parties give something up to achieve an acceptable solution. It is a pragmatic approach, practical in situations where time is limited or positions are too far apart for genuine collaboration.
- The collaborative style, on the other hand, aims to create win-win solutions. The parties seek to thoroughly understand each other’s interests and work together to build an outcome that maximizes the benefit for both. It requires openness, time, and trust.
In commercial negotiations, the compromising or collaborative approach can only work if the other party shares the same logic. But when dealing with an explicitly competitive actor such as Trump, adopting a compromising style risks seriously penalizing the other party, for at least three reasons:
- It conveys weakness
An accommodating gesture is seen not as a sign of openness, but as a point of pressure to be exploited. The competitive negotiator, focused on gaining an immediate advantage, interprets it as a willingness to give even more.
- It relinquishes bargaining power
The EU has a vast market and significant trade levers, especially in a context where the US is closing the door to the Chinese market. Offering concessions at the outset is tantamount to burning your cards without getting anything in return. In a competitive confrontation, the first move can set the tone for the negotiation: once a concession has been made, it is very difficult to backtrack.
- It legitimizes the negotiating imbalance
An unbalanced compromise, if accepted without resistance, risks becoming the new basis for future trade relations, systematically penalizing the EU in subsequent rounds.
Why 30%? The anchor technique
Trump often uses a negotiating technique known as the anchor technique. This consists of deliberately setting a very high target at the beginning of the negotiation (in our case, the threat of 30% tariffs).
The aim is to create a psychological perimeter for the negotiation and force the other party to reason on the basis of that figure, even though they are aware that it is arbitrary. This technique allows one to influence the scope of the discussion and obtain greater concessions, just as Trump has done.
The worst response: unilateral concessions with no return
Unfortunately, the European Union has already shown worrying signs of a compromising attitude that has not been negotiated with the Trump administration, for example:
- The waiver of the web tax* on American digital giants, without obtaining any regulation or shared tax contribution in return.
- The offer to increase imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US, made to reassure Washington, without obtaining anything in return.
- The acceptance of the increase in NATO spending to 5% of GDP, demanded by Trump, again without obtaining anything in return.
All these offers without asking for anything in return reinforce the idea that the EU is willing to concede from the outset. Trump, true to his competitive logic, sees these concessions as a starting point, not a compromise: this pushes him to raise his demands, not moderate them.
Persevering would be a fatal mistake
Continuing along this path of compromise, in the hope that accommodation will ease the pressure, would be not only ineffective but counterproductive. With a competitive negotiator, unilateral concessions do not stop escalation: they fuel it. Any sign of weakness is interpreted as additional room for maneuver.
A helpful example is China’s reaction during the trade war initiated by Trump. Faced with massive tariffs imposed by the US, Beijing responded in kind, imposing equivalent tariffs. Instead of giving in, it spoke the same language of power. The result is there for all to see: after weeks of escalation, the US had to moderate its position, opening up to a more balanced agreement.
The right strategy: speak his language
To avoid the mistakes of the past, the EU should therefore reverse its negotiating logic. Not to fuel confrontation, but to restore a credible balance. Some applicable countermeasures could be:
- Target Trump’s electoral base, particularly the agricultural sectors (soy, corn, beef), with selective tariffs or targeted restrictions.
- Put the European web tax* back on the table, even with a minimum rate, linking any exemptions to real concessions from the US.
These well-calibrated moves would strengthen the EU’s position and show that it can defend its interests by speaking a language Trump understands: that of strength and bargaining power.
Going beyond requests, seeking the other party’s interests
A fundamental principle in any negotiation is to identify the other side’s interests and find a way to allow them to achieve them without sacrificing your own. This is no easy task, given Trump’s notorious volatility and the lack of sound arguments to justify the demands made in the negotiations.
In the case of the EU-US negotiations, it must be borne in mind that Trump is playing the game with his electoral base in mind: an agreement must offer him a narrative of victory to communicate to his electorate.
Takeaway
When negotiating with a competitive player like Trump, one should abandon the accommodating approach, avoid concessions without something in return, and adopt a style that is more assertive, strategic, and symmetrical.
Only then will it be able to build an agreement that is solid, fair, and respectful of its economic and political strength.
I have often dealt with commercial distribution agreements between Italian and Chinese companies, sometimes following negotiations in the wine sector for various types of agreements: sales, distribution, franchising, establishment of joint ventures, and sales through online stores.
I am sharing some key considerations for approaching this complex but opportunity-rich market.
📌 Here are my 10 takeaways
Step Zero. Protect your IP
it is essential to protect your intellectual property before entering China. This includes trademarks (including their Chinese transliteration), labels, web domains, and social media accounts. Neglecting this aspect can have disastrous consequences, exposing you to the widespread phenomenon of trademark squatting (even famous names such as Michael Jordan, Elon Musk, and Donald Trump have fallen victim to this).
For more information, you can read this article about Intellectual property protection in China
1 — Know your enemy
trust is good, but mistrust is better. Before entering into commercial agreements, it is essential to check the credentials of potential partners through the databases of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce. When it comes to wine, it is necessary to check whether the prospective distributor has a license to import and distribute wine.
2 — No copy-paste
Contracts must be tailor-made, adapting them to local specificities. In particular, it is crucial to clearly regulate promotional activities: budget, commercial actions, communication methods, and management of the producer’s trademarks. It is also best to write the contract in Chinese to ensure that there are no misunderstandings and in case it needs to be used before a judge or local administrative body, as Chinese is the only official language. (N.B.: if you think of entrusting the task to ChatGPT, this is not a good idea).
For an in-depth article, check out The commercial distribution contract in China
3 — Decide immediately how and where to litigate
It may seem counterintuitive, but it is best to avoid providing for Italian (or French, or German) jurisdiction and applicable law, which is an ineffective solution, especially in cases where urgent action is needed to stop unfair competition or counterfeiting. Consider applying Chinese law and provide for an arbitration clause at CIETAC. An effective dispute management strategy is a key element of the agreement and must be negotiated carefully. (P.S.: This applies not only to China but to all international agreements. For more information, see this article).
4 — China is big
And it is the sum of many very different internal markets. Exclusivity should be granted for good reasons, but only if the distributor has a well-developed commercial network and can achieve specific shared objectives. If granted, it should be limited to the province where the distributor is based and subject to the achievement of agreed sales volumes. Having a single distributor for the whole of China is like entrusting an Italian distributor with promoting a product throughout Europe. Or appoint a NYC-based company to promote and sell your wines in all 50 US States.
5 — China is far away
Delegating everything to the local distributor and taking no interest in what is happening on the Chinese market is never a good idea. Firstly, because you have no idea how, where, and with what results the wines are being sold. Secondly, because you cannot verify compliance with agreements, for example on non-competition or the use of trademarks. It is therefore important to schedule meetings to share commercial policies and be able to verify what is happening, including through audits and visits to warehouses and the sales network.
6 — China is expensive
Competition in the Chinese domestic market is fierce. This is also true in terms of price, as some countries that are direct competitors of Italy (Australia, Chile, New Zealand) have free trade agreements and can therefore enter the market on more favorable terms than Italian wine, which is subject to a total tax burden of around 43% after payment of duties, excise taxes, and VAT. It is necessary to position oneself in the right market segment (medium-high), and to do so, it is necessary to plan the right commercial actions together with the distributor. Selling Ex-Works and hoping that the distributor will take care of everything is not an excellent strategy for being competitive.
7 — China is dangerous
Scams are always around the corner. In the wine world in particular, for example, spontaneous expressions of interest are frequent, arriving via the company website, social media accounts, or directly via email. They sound like this: we have discovered your wines, we think they are fantastic, we want to place an order immediately. If it sounds too good and easy, it is certainly a scam. There is an easy way to check: if the next step is a request for payment of a few thousand euros, justified by the need to register the wines on the CIFER (China Imported Food Enterprise Registration) portal, or to register your trademark to prevent others from doing so, or to authenticate the signature on the sales contract… these are attempts at fraud, and the elusive order will never arrive after payment has been received. How can you check whether the person you are dealing with is a reputable company or a fraudster? 👉🏼Go back to point 1 (here is an in-depth article).
8 — E-commerce? Yes, but with method (and money)
Online wine sales continue to grow, but entering large platforms is complex, competition is fierce, and running an online store requires meticulous planning and highly efficient system implementation. The online market in China is all pay-for-play. Nothing is achieved with no money or minimal effort. If you want to sell online, you need to build an omnichannel system integrated with traditional distribution, and to do this, it is essential to involve a local partner with well-defined investments and responsibilities.
9 — China is not a market for everyone
You need to protect your brands, study the market thoroughly, know your competition (both foreign and local), find the right market channel, select a distributor motivated to invest time and money in promoting your product, and be willing to support them with the right investments. If you want to build a serious plan to enter the Chinese market, you must have a medium- to long-term perspective. There are no shortcuts (actually, there are many, but they almost always lead to wasted time and money). If you are unwilling to invest in entering the Chinese market through the front door, it is unlikely that anyone else will do it for you.
10 — Don’t do it yourself
If you have read up to point 9 and are still keen to enter the Chinese market, consider doing so professionally, involving consultants who can support your company throughout the market research, scouting, negotiation, and contract drafting processes. This is also part of the investment needed to build and develop a solid and resilient business model. This advice applies to all foreign markets, and even more so to China.
The most dangerous mistake one can make after the announcement of the (partial) suspension of U.S. duties for 90 days is to hope that everything will go well and we will return to the pre-April 2 world.
First, because very invasive tariffs remain in place: 10 percent on all countries that trade with the U.S., including the EU, 25 percent on automotive, 25 percent on steel and aluminum, 145 percent on China.
Second, because it is impossible to predict the actions of the U.S. Administration in the short and medium term: it cannot be ruled out that tariffs will remain, increase, change targets or that other factors will intervene to turn the tide in international markets, such as an escalation of the trade war with China.
The 90-day suspension is an opportunity
The U.S.’s temporary suspension of tariffs represents a valuable window that should be used not only as a truce but also as a valuable room for action: 90 days to rehash contracts, renegotiate key clauses, and insert levers of flexibility that can protect business in various future scenarios in the U.S. and other markets.
Today’s exporters cannot afford to «sit back and see what will happen»-it is time to act, and to do so professionally and strategically. Let’s look at a checklist of important points to consider.
What do contracts with customers and suppliers entail?
The first point is to survey agreements with the trade network in the U.S. and other countries that export to the U.S., as well as with upstream suppliers in the supply chain.
Is there a written contract? The worst-case scenario — unfortunately a very frequent one — is when the parties cooperate informally, only based on orders and order confirmations. This leaves undefined not only what happens in the case of imposition of duties, but also a whole range of other points, for example, limits on damages that can be claimed in the case of breach of contract, the duration of the agreement, the applicable law, and how any disputes will be resolved.
Another very problematic scenario is one in which contracts exist, but they are generic and do not include the necessary covenants to manage the risks involved in operating in a highly litigious market such as the U.S., which, moreover, has very high legal costs.
Having done this analysis, the necessary actions can be put in place, prioritizing according to the importance of business relationships and as appropriate:
- Negotiate and conclude a written contract from scratch
- Replace the existing agreement with a complete and correct contract
- Amend and integrate the existing agreement with pacts to manage tariffs and other causes of price fluctuations
Let us dwell on the last scenario, assuming that there is a complete and correct contract but one that does not regulate price and cost fluctuation as a direct or indirect consequence of the introduction of duties.
Contract Addendum
In such cases, the correct course of action is to sign an Addendum to the original contract, specifying which covenants are being waived and which covenants are being added. It is essential that the Addendum be negotiated and signed by persons with the power of representation of the parties and that it be drafted with the help of lawyers who specialize in this field. In addition to including correct clauses, it is necessary to verify that the covenants are valid according to the rules of law applicable to the contract.
Here are some clauses that can be the subject of the Addendum, to be modulated according to the specific case and possible scenarios.
Tariff Cost Sharing
By introducing this covenant, it is provided that in the event that duties are confirmed at [x]% or are reduced or increased within certain established thresholds, the Parties will share the increase equally, or according to other established percentages.
There may also be a ceiling on tariffs beyond which a party has the right to withdraw from the contract or request the suspension of certain orders for a specified period of time, after which it has the right to withdraw.
Price Adjustment
With this covenant, a discount or an increase in the product’s price is agreed upon, as the case may be, in the case of a duty greater than [x]%.
Among the use cases, in addition to that of the company exporting to the U.S. or other intermediate markets, with final destination of the products in the U.S., is that of those who purchase a product subject to import duty and resell it, processed or assembled.
Right to Cancel or Postpone Confirmed Orders
This covenant gives the right to revoke or suspend for a certain period already negotiated orders, as such binding, in case of confirmation or introduction of duties above a certain threshold, for example, if 20% taxation was confirmed for the import of wine from the EU.
The clause can be combined with previous covenants, for example, by stipulating that below the specified threshold, the contracts remain valid, and the parties share the duty or have the right to renegotiate the price.
Supply Forecast Adjustment
With this clause the Parties can modify supply programs already agreed for a specific duration (e.g., 24 months), with continuous sales and purchase obligations at a fixed price or indexable only within certain limits. The aim is to agree on the prerequisites for reshaping supply programs in the short and medium term, which can be very useful for defining the rules that will apply to relationships with key suppliers or customers for possible changes in volumes, delivery times, and prices.
Right to Source from Alternative Suppliers
This covenant serves to be authorized, if necessary, to source alternative suppliers of components or raw materials to those previously authorized in the contract with the end customer, for example, in cases where purchasing from the original suppliers has become too costly or difficult due to duties imposed at import or in previous steps in the supply chain, or other events such as currency or price fluctuation of certain commodities beyond a certain level established in the agreement.
Hardship and Force Majeure
The imposition of duties cannot be invoked as a cause of Force Majeure or hardship, respectively, to excuse contract non-performance or to renegotiate the price, even in cases of very high price increases (such as the 145% duty imposed on Chinese products). This conclusion is almost uniform under the law and jurisprudence of the major countries involved in the tariff war: U.S., China, Canada, Mexico, France and Italy: I refer to this practical guide for a timely examination of what the various rules provide.
If the contract lacks a well drafter Force Majeure and Hardship clause, or contains a generic clause, it is important to get your hands on revising it to expressly state the cases in which a party is entitled to suspend or terminate the contract, how and when to communicate the decision to invoke the exemption, and the consequences on the parties’ contractual obligations. You can go deeper on this topic here.
Conclusion
It is essential to prepare for possible future scenarios regarding duties (confirmed, increased, changed, or decreased) and to determine the consequences on trade relations with foreign clients and suppliers: moving today, at a standstill (or nearly so), allows entrepreneurs to negotiate shared and fair solutions and to avoid, as far as possible, the emergence of tensions and conflicts with the various partners along the international supply chain.
The case: A consumer bought a Ford car in Italy from an Italian car distributor. The car was manufactured by Ford WAG in Germany and supplied by Ford Italia, which belong to the same group of companies. Following an accident in December 2001 in which the airbag failed, the consumer sued the Italian distributor as well as Ford Italia for damages. Ford Italia disputed the claims for damages asserted against it, arguing that it had not manufactured the vehicle and, because it was itself only a distributor/supplier, referred to Ford WAG in Germany as the actual manufacturer.
Question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
The Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) referred the following question to the ECJ:
- the manufacturer’s liability under the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC is limited in accordance with Art 3 to cases where the supplier physically puts his name, trade mark, or other distinguishing feature on the product to create confusion between his identity and that of the actual manufacturer;
- or is the distributor liable as a “quasi-producer” even if he has not physically put his name or trademark on the product, but nevertheless «presents himself as its producer» within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the Directive by using the distinguishing feature in his company name, which was put on the car by another person, but leading to identity with the actual car manufacturer.
ECJ judgement (European Court of Justice) of 19/12/2024, Case C-157/23
A company that does not manufacture a product itself, but only distributes it, can still be considered a «manufacturer» within the meaning of the Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC). This is the case if the distributor puts his name, trademark or other distinguishing feature on the product and consequently presents itself as the manufacturer. According to the ECJ, this can give the consumer the impression that the distributor is responsible for the quality and safety of the product.
However, the ECJ emphasizes that liability does not depend on whether the distributor puts the sign on the product itself. The distributor did not do so in the specific case. However, the distributor used the corresponding distinguishing feature in its company name. According to the ECJ, the decisive factor is, therefore, whether the distributor uses this name match to gain the trust of consumers and is thus perceived as a responsible manufacturer.
The distributor is jointly and severally liable with the actual manufacturer. This means that consumers can either make a claim against the manufacturer or the dealer directly. However, the dealer has the right to ask for a regress for the damage incurred from the actual manufacturer.
Remarks
The ECJ emphasizes consumer protection. In my opinion, this argument is slightly overstretched:
- According to the ECJ, the consumer should not be burdened with the complex task of identifying the actual manufacturer of a defective product.
- A distributor that sells a product and uses its name or trademark to do so creates trust in the consumer. This trust is to be protected by the liability of the authorized distributor — regardless of whether the distributor has actively put its trademark on the product or not.
- This increases the liability risk for authorized car dealers because they must obtain appropriate insurance against such a risk. In the constellation described above, authorized dealers can be exposed to unexpectedly high claims for damages under strict product liability.
Good advice is not expensive
- It is essential that such cases are legally clarified when drawing up and formulating distribution agreements with car manufacturers and that the ECJ ruling is considered.
- In addition, authorized dealers/distributors should reconsider the use of product names from the actual producer in their company name and/or in their corporate image.
The Brazilian market has not been immune to the protectionist wave of «America First.» If such measures persist over time, they could have a lasting impact on the local economy. Still, a sour lemon can often become a sweet caipirinha in the resilient and optimistic spirit that characterizes both Brazilian society and its entrepreneurs.
As is often the case in the chessboard of global economic geopolitics, a move from one player creates room for another countermove. Brazil reacted with reciprocal trade measures, signaling clearly that it would not accept a position of commercial vulnerability.
This firmer stance — almost unthinkable in earlier years — strengthened Brazil’s image in Europe as a country ready to reposition itself with greater autonomy and pragmatism, opening new doors to international markets. In a world where global value chains are being restructured and reliable trade partners are in high demand, Brazil is increasingly seen not just as a supplier of raw materials, but as a strategic partner in critical industries.
The rapprochement with Europe has been further energized by progress in the Mercosur–European Union Agreement, whose negotiations spanned decades and now seem to be gaining momentum. While the United States embraces a more isolationist commercial posture, Europe is actively diversifying its trade relations — and Brazil, by demonstrating a commitment to clear rules, economic stability, and legal certainty, emerges as a natural candidate to fill that gap.
The Direct Impact of U.S. Tariffs
The trade measures introduced under President Trump primarily affected Brazilian producers of semi-finished steel and primary aluminum, with the removal of long-standing exemptions and quotas. In 2024, Brazil exported US$ 2.2 billion in semi-finished steel to the United States, representing nearly 60% of U.S. imports in that category. In the same year, Brazilian aluminum exports to the U.S. reached US$ 796 million, accounting for 14% of the sector’s total. Losses in exports for 2025 are estimated at around US$ 1.5 billion.
Brazil’s Response and a New Phase
In April 2025, the Brazilian Congress passed a new legal framework for trade retaliation, empowering the Executive Branch to adopt countermeasures in a faster and more technically structured way. The new legislation allows, for example, the automatic imposition of retaliatory tariffs on goods from countries that adopt unilateral measures incompatible with WTO norms; the suspension of tax or customs benefits previously granted under bilateral agreements; the creation of a list of priority sectors for trade defense and diversification of export markets.
Beyond the retaliation itself, the move marked a significant shift in posture: Brazil began positioning itself as an active player in global trade governance, aligning with mid-sized economies that advocate for predictable, balanced, and rules-based trade relations.
An Opportunity for Brazil–Europe Relations
This new stage sets Brazil as a reliable supplier to European industry — not only of raw materials but also of higher-value-added goods, particularly in processed foods, bioenergy, critical minerals, pharmaceuticals, and infrastructure.
Moreover, as US–China tensions drive European companies to seek nearshoring or “friend-shoring” strategies with more predictable partners, Brazil, with its clean energy matrix, large domestic market, and relatively stable institutions, emerges as a strong alternative.
Legal Implications and Strategic Recommendations
This changing landscape brings new opportunities for companies and legal advisors involved in Brazil–Europe investment and trade relations. Particular attention should be paid to:
- Monitoring rules of origin in the Mercosur–EU agreement, especially in sectors requiring supply chain restructuring;
- Reviewing contractual and tax structures for import/export operations, including clauses addressing tariff instability or non-tariff barriers (e.g., environmental or sanitary standards), and clearly defining force majeure events;
- Reassessing distribution and agency agreements in light of the new commercial environment;
- Exploring joint ventures and technology transfer arrangements with Brazilian partners, particularly in bioeconomy, green hydrogen, and mineral processing.
From lemon to caipirinha
The world is becoming more fragmented and competitive, but also more open to realignment. What began as a protectionist blow from the United States has revealed new opportunities for transatlantic cooperation. For Brazil, Europe is no longer just a client: it is poised to become a long-term strategic partner. It is now up to lawyers and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic to turn this opportunity into lasting, mutually beneficial relationships.














