Mediación y el Covid19 – Qué podemos aprender

13 de abril de 2020

  • España
  • Contratos
  • Litigios

Summary

The recent post-Brexit trade deal makes no provision for jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments.

Therefore, the UK dropped out of the jurisdiction of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) on 31 December 2020.

The EU has not yet approved the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, but may do in the future.

Unless the transitional provisions from the Withdrawal Agreement apply, jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments will be governed by the Hague Convention 2005 if there is an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause

If the Hague Convention of 2005 does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules.

Judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

On the first day of 2021 the UK left the EU regimes with which European lawyers are familiar. We appeared to enter “uncharted territory”. Not so. In fact, there are charts for this territory – or maps, to use a more modern word. You just need to know which maps.

Whether you are a lawyer or a businessperson, in whatever country, you need answers to two questions. Which laws govern jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU member states and the UK; and how should businesses act as a result?

What happened?

The EU and UK reached a post-Brexit trade deal, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”), on Christmas Eve 2020. The provisions of the TCA became UK law as the European Union (Future Relationship) Act on 31 December 2020. The TCA made provision for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but did not mention judicial cooperation in civil matters, or jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial proceedings.

So where do we look for law on those matters?

We look at the position immediately before Brexit. As every lawyer should know the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) governed the enforcement and recognition of judgments between EU member states.

Also, the Lugano Convention 2007 governs jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in commercial and civil matters between EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It operates in substantially the same way as Brussels (Recast) does between EU member states.

The UK was party to the Convention by virtue of its EU membership. Now that the UK is not a member of the EU, the contracting parties could agree that the UK could join the Lugano Convention as an independent contracting party, and there would be little change to the position on jurisdiction and enforcement. English jurisdiction clauses would continue to be respected and English court judgments would continue to be readily enforceable throughout EU member states and EFTA countries, and vice versa.

The problem is that the EU has not agreed to the UK joining the Lugano Convention

The UK submitted its application to accede to the Lugano Convention in its own right on 8 April 2020. But accession requires the consent of all contracting parties including the EU. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have indicated their support for the UK’s accession, but the EU’s position is still not yet clear and the TCA is silent on this matter.

While the EU still may belatedly support the UK’s accession to Lugano, it does not currently apply. In any case, a three-month time-lag applies between agreement and entry into force, unless all the contracting parties agree to waive it.

Where are we now?

If the transitional provisions provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement as explained in my previous post do not apply, the Brussels (Recast) Regulation will not apply to jurisdiction and enforcement between the EU and UK.

If they do not, then you first need to decide whether the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 is applicable. The Hague Convention 2005 applies between EU Member States, Mexico, Singapore and Montenegro. The Hague Convention first came into force for the UK when the EU acceded on 1 October 2015 and the UK re-acceded after Brexit in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021.

The Hague Convention 2005 applies if:

  • The dispute falls within the scope of the Convention as provided for by Article 2 – e.g. the Convention does not apply to employment and consumer contracts or claims for personal injury;
  • There is an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the meaning of Article 3; and
  • The exclusive jurisdiction clause is entered into after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized, and proceedings are commenced after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized within the meaning of Article 16.

There is some uncertainty as to whether EU member states will treat the Hague Convention as having been in force from 1 October 2015, or only from when the UK re-accedes on 1 January 2021. The UK’s view is that the Convention will apply to the UK from 1 October 2015; the EU’s view is that it will apply to the UK from 1 January 2021. What is not in dispute is that for exclusive English jurisdiction clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, the contracting states will respect exclusive English jurisdiction clauses and enforce the resulting judgments.

If the 2005 Hague Convention does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules to questions of jurisdiction and enforcement. In the UK, the rules will essentially be the same as the ‘common-law’ rules currently on enforcement applied to non-EU parties, for example the United States.

The Norwegian exception

The UK and Norway have reached an agreement which extends and updates an old mutual enforcement treaty, the 1961 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between the UK and Norway, which will apply if the UK does not re-accede to the Lugano Convention. The practical effect of this agreement is that judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

How should your business act now?

The applicable legal framework for each dispute will depend on the facts of each case. You should review the dispute resolution clauses in your cross-border contracts to assess how they may be affected by Brexit and to seek specialist advice where necessary. You should also seek advice on dispute resolution provisions when entering into new cross-border contracts in 2021.

This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

Novel technology in proceedings

Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

  • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
  • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
  • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
  • the matter concerns an international dispute.

The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

“All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

  • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
  • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
  • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
  • the disclosure of confidential documents
  • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
  • the manner of taking witness testimony
  • the costs of the proceedings.

Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

  • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
  • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
  • The defendant submits its defence statement.
  • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
  • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
  • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
  • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
  • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

This is a summary of the approved measures, which unfortunately for both tenants and landlords do not include any public aid or tax relief and just refer to a postponement in the payment of the rent.

Premises to which they are applied

Leased premises dedicated to activities different than residential: commercial, professional, industrial, cultural, teaching, amusement, healthcare, etc. They also apply to the lease of a whole industry (i.e. hotels, restaurants, bars, etc., which are the most usual type of businesses object of this deal).

Types of tenants

  • Individual entrepreneurs or self-employed persons who were registered before Social Security before the declaration of the state of alarm on March 14th, 2020
  • Small and medium companies, as defined by article 257.1 of the Capital Companies Act: those who fulfil during two consecutive fiscal years these figures: assets under € 4 million, turnover under € 8 million and average staff under 50 people

Types of landlords

In order to benefit from these measures, the landlord should be a housing public entity or company or a big owner, considering as such the individuals or companies who own more than 10 urban properties (excluding parking places and storage rooms) or a built surface over 1.500 sqm.

Measures approved

The payment of the rent is postponed without interest meanwhile the state of alarm is in force, but in any case, for a maximum period of four months. Once the state of alarm is overcome, and in any case in a maximum term of four months, the postponed rents should be paid along a maximum period of two years, or the duration of the lease agreement, should it be less than two years.

For landlords different to those mentioned above

The tenant could apply before the landlord for the postponement in the payment of the rent (but the landlord is not obliged to accept it), and the parties can use the guarantee that the tenant should mandatorily have provided at the beginning of any lease agreement (usually equal to two month’s rent, but could be more if agreed by the parties), in full or in part, in order to use it to pay the rent. The tenant will have to provide again the guarantee within one year’s term, or less should the lease agreement have a shorter duration.

Activities to which it is applied

Activities which have been suspended according to the Royal Decree that declared the state of alarm, dated march, 14ht, 2020, or according to the orders issued by the authorities delegated by such Royal Decree. This should be proved through a certificated issued by the tax authorities.

If the activity has not been directly suspended by the Royal Decree, the turnover during the month prior to the postponement should be less than 75% of the average monthly turnover during the same quarter last year. This should be proved through a responsible declaration by the tenant, and the landlord is authorised check the bookkeeping records.

Term to apply and procedure

The tenant should apply for these measures before the landlord within one month’s term from the publication of the Royal Decree-law, that is, from April 22nd, 2020, and the landlord (in case belongs to the groups mentioned in point c) is obliged to accept the tenant’s request, except if both parties have already agreed something different. The postponement would be applied to the following month.

As the state of alarm was declared more than one month ago (March 14th), landlords and tenants have already been reaching some agreements, for example 50% rent reduction during the state of alarm, and 50% rent postponement during the following 6 months. Tenants who do not reach an agreement with the landlord could face an eviction procedure, however court procedures are suspended during the state of alarm. We have also seen some abusive non-payment of rent by tenants.

When is becomes impossible to reach an agreement with the landlord, tenants have the legal remedy of claiming in Court for the application of the “rebus sic stantibus” principle, which was highly demanded during the 2008 financial crisis but very seldom applied by the Courts. This principle is aimed to re-balance the parties’ obligations when their situation had deeply changed because of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. This principle is not included in the Spanish Civil Code, but the Supreme Court has accepted its application, in a very restricted way, in some occasions.

Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

«Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

Escuchar es altamente eficaz

En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

«Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

«Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

«El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

Las emociones son importantes

Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

«Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

[NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

El Real Decreto-ley 8/2020, de 17 de marzo, de medidas urgentes extraordinarias para hacer frente al impacto económico y social del COVID-19, aunque afecta y produce efectos en muchos diferentes ámbitos jurídicos, no incluye ninguna referencia a los contratos de arrendamientos de inmuebles, ni viviendas, ni locales u oficinas.

El objeto de esta nota es analizar los efectos de la situación del Estado de Alarma respecto a aquellos contratos de arrendamiento de oficinas o locales que se hayan visto obligados a cerrar en aplicación del decreto; aquellos otros que permanezcan total o parcialmente abiertos y en funcionamiento, bien que con una actividad reducida o mínima, en principio no son objeto de las conclusiones que más adelante alcanzamos sin perjuicio de que existan casos individualizados a los que, pese a no existir un cierre total, razonable y lógicamente puedan serles de aplicación.

No está excluido en modo alguno que ante una prolongación de la vigencia del Estado de Alarma pudiera publicarse alguna norma que afectase a los contratos de arrendamiento, pero de momento esto no ha sucedido. Si esto llegase a acaecer, al contenido de dicha norma habrá de estarse.

En base al principio de libertad de pactos que consagra el art. 1255 del Código Civil, que permite que sean las partes firmantes del contrato las que convengan (i) qué escenarios y situaciones deben considerarse como constitutivos de supuestos de Fuerza Mayor y Caso Fortuito y (ii) cuáles deban ser las consecuencias contractuales de los tales escenarios, el primer ejercicio es comprobar si el contrato incluye una cláusula reguladora de la Fuerza mayor y sus efectos; si es así, a la tal cláusula habrá de estarse y su análisis queda al margen de esta nota.

En ausencia de regulación expresa en el contrato, aplicarían al caso las previsiones del Código Civil y en concreto el artículo 1.105.

COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor

El COVID 19 es un acontecimiento que en principio reúne los requisitos que exige el Código Civil para ser calificado como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor (art. 1105 Código Civil) ya que:

  • Se trata de un hecho ajeno y no imputable al contratante deudor de la prestación u obligación.
  • Es imprevisible, o si se reputase “previsible”, es sin duda inevitable.
  • El acontecimiento en cuestión, la pandemia, debe ser causa y tener como consecuencia el incumplimiento de la obligación, es decir debe existir un nexo causal.

Por lo tanto, cumpliéndose los tres requisitos, la primera conclusión que alcanzamos es que muy previsiblemente, los Tribunales españoles calificarán como “Fuerza Mayor” la situación causada por el COVID 19 cuando se les plantee una contienda judicial en la que tal asunto se discuta entre los litigantes. Analizaremos a continuación las consecuencias de dicha calificación.

Consecuencias de considerar COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza mayor

La generalidad de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia entienden que los efectos de calificar un supuesto como caso de Fuerza Mayor en principio son:

  • Imposibilidad total y definitiva de cumplir; liberando al deudor del cumplimiento de la obligación.
  • Imposibilidad parcial de cumplir; quedando liberado el deudor sólo en la parte que le es imposible cumplir, pero siguiendo obligado por la parte que sí puede llevar a cabo.
  • Imposibilidad temporal de cumplir; el deudor queda liberado de la responsabilidad por mora mientras persista la situación de excepcionalidad.

Ahora bien, analicemos como afectaría dicha consideración como Fuerza Mayor de la epidemia, respecto a los contratos de arrendamiento para usos distintos a la vivienda.

Respecto al pago de la renta

La pregunta a la que responder es, si la calificación de la situación pandémica actual como un caso de Fuerza Mayor, libera al arrendatario (cuyo local se ha visto obligado a cerrar por orden de la autoridad gubernamental) de la obligación del pago de la renta mientras dicha obligación de cierre persista, incluyendo en el concepto “liberación” diferentes alternativas: condonación total o parcial y/o aplazamiento total o parcial.

Nos estamos encontrando en estos días con una reacción frecuente entre algunos arrendatarios, quienes, de manera unilateral, han informado a sus arrendadores que considerando COVID 19 un supuesto de fuerza mayor y habiéndose visto obligados a cerrar el local/oficina, suspenden el pago de la renta mientras dicha situación permanezca. No resuelven el contrato, no entregan la posesión, se mantienen en ella (permaneciendo el local cerrado y no operativo) pero suspenden el pago (sin quedar claro si suspender en este caso significa auto condonarse el pago de la renta o aplazarlo para cuando desaparezca el supuesto de Fuerza Mayor).

Argumentos en contra de la liberación

Por más que pueda considerarse “entendible” esta actitud, desde la óptica del arrendatario, no desde la del arrendador, dicha consideración se topa con un obstáculo: la interpretación que de la Fuerza Mayor ha hecho el TS respecto a las obligaciones de pago pecuniario, según la STS (Civil) de 19 mayo de 2015:

“No pudiendo plantearse, pues, tratándose de deudas pecuniarias, la imposibilidad subjetiva -insolvencia- ni la objetiva o formal, concluye la doctrina que no es posible imaginar que si la imposibilidad obedece a caso fortuito pudiera tener como efecto la extinción de la obligación.

La exoneración del deudor por caso fortuito no es absoluta, tiene excepciones, conforme prevé el articulo 1.105 CC, y una de ellas, por aplicación del principio «genus nunquam perit», sería en supuestos de obligaciones de entregar cosa genérica.

En tales circunstancias el deudor pecuniario viene obligado a cumplir la prestación principal, sin que sus sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello, pues lo adeudado no es algo individualizado que ha perecido sino algo genérico como es el dinero.”

Conclusión: no parece que este criterio jurisprudencial permita defender que el cumplimiento de las obligaciones pecuniarias quede liberado, extinto o que su incumplimiento quede justificado en casos de Fuerza Mayor, de suerte que el deudor pecuniario, en este caso el arrendatario, en aplicación de este criterio, vendría obligado a cumplir la prestación principal sin que las sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello con fundamento en la Fuerza Mayor, debido a la condición genérica que tiene el dinero.

Argumentos a favor de la liberación: el art. 1.575 del Código Civil

Dicho lo anterior lo anterior, debe hacerse referencia a un artículo del Código Civil que, con certeza, será profusamente citado en los conflictos judiciales que se avecinan.

El art. 1.575, tratando del arrendamiento de fincas rústicas, reconoce el derecho del arrendatario a la rebaja de la renta en caso de pérdida de más de la mitad de los frutos (salvo pacto en contrario) en “casos fortuitos, extraordinarios e imprevistos…como incendio, guerra, peste, inundación insólita, langosta, terremoto u otro igualmente desacostumbrado que los contratantes no hayan podido racionalmente prever”.

¿Es aplicable este precepto, previsto para arrendamientos rústicos, a los arrendamientos urbanos?

El art. 4.1 CC permite la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando (i) estas no contemplen un supuesto específico y (ii) regulen otro semejante entre los que se aprecie “identidad de razón”.

La STS de 15 de enero de 2019, resolviendo un conflicto de un arrendamiento de un edificio destinado a hotel, en el que el arrendatario había pretendido la rebaja de la renta al amparo de la cláusula “rebus sic stantibus” por la crisis de 2008 y había alegado a su favor la aplicación del art.1.575, estableció:

“La argumentación de la sentencia recurrida por la que se rechaza la pretensión de rebaja del precio pactado tampoco es contraria al criterio legal que se desprende del art. 1575 CC, que es la regla que permite la rebaja de la renta en el arrendamiento de bienes productivos que no deriven de riesgos del propio negocio, exige además que la pérdida de rendimientos se origine por casos fortuitos extraordinarios e imprevistos, algo que por su misma rareza no hubiera ser podido previsto por las partes, y que la pérdida de frutos sea de más de la mitad de los frutos. En el caso no concurre ninguna de estas circunstancias. La disminución de las rentas procede de una evolución del mercado, las partes previeron la posibilidad de que en algunos ejercicios la rentabilidad del hotel no fuera positiva para la arrendataria y las pérdidas alegadas por NH en la explotación del hotel de Almería son inferiores al cincuenta por ciento, sin contar con que el resultado global del conjunto de su actividad como gestora de una cadena de hoteles es, según considera probado la Audiencia a la vista del informe de gestión consolidado, favorable”.

El TS no admite la aplicación del 1.575 pero no por considerarlo no aplicable a arrendamientos distintos a los rústicos, sino por concluir que no se dan los requisitos para ello ya que ni era imprevisible la crisis de 2008 ni las pérdidas del arrendatario son superiores al 50%.

Pero, esa interpretación del TS junto con el tenor del art. 4.1 CC permitirían avalar la pretensión del arrendatario que se encuentra sin ingreso alguno durante el Estado de Alarma, de exigir una rebaja de renta que se adecuara al principio de proporcionalidad.

Respecto a la terminación anticipada a instancias del arrendatario

Sin embargo, podemos encontrarnos con situaciones en las que el arrendatario, ante la actual situación, decida terminar anticipadamente el contrato de arrendamiento debido a la situación provocada por el COVID 19, poniendo el local a disposición del arrendador.

Son supuestos en los que se pretende la resolución anticipada del contrato, sin respetar (i) o el plazo obligatorio (ii) o el preaviso, en ambos casos bajo la hipótesis de que estén así regulados en el contrato.

En estos supuestos entendemos que sí puede resultar defendible que, debido a la situación de fuerza mayor provocada por el COVID 19 y en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, se exonere al arrendatario de la obligación:

  • De respetar un plazo de vigencia determinada del contrato de arrendamiento
  • De preavisar al arrendador en caso de resolución anticipada del contrato

En ambos casos el contrato quedaría resuelto con la entrega de la posesión del local, sin perjuicio de tener que respetar las obligaciones que prevé el contrato para la terminación y entrega siempre que las mismas no se vean igualmente afectadas por la situación de Fuerza Mayor.

Nuestra opinión es que, también en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, sería defendible ante los Tribunales la tesis de que el arrendatario quedaría liberado de cualquier obligación de resarcimiento de daños al arrendador por dicha resolución anticipada o incumplimiento de la duración obligada del contrato.

Conclusión

En conclusión, planteado ante los Tribunales el debate sobre cómo la pandemia (que no hay duda será calificada como caso de Fuerza Mayor) afectará a las obligaciones a cargo del arrendatario que se haya visto obligado a cerrar su negocio, nuestra opinión es la siguiente:

  1. Respecto a la obligación de pago de la renta, pese al criterio contrario de la sentencia que citamos de 19 de mayo de 2015, nos parece potente y defendible la remisión al art. 1575 y a su aplicación analógica con apoyo en la STS de 15 de enero de 2019, para exigir una reducción proporcional y equitativa de la renta.
  2. Respecto a la facultad del arrendatario para resolver el contrato anticipadamente, entregando la posesión del inmueble al arrendador, exonerando al arrendatario de cumplir con sus obligaciones de preaviso o de duración obligada previstas en el contrato en cuestión, y sin tener que indemnizar al arrendador por ello, entendemos que también existe fundamento para defender judicialmente esta posición.

Aplicación de la cláusula Rebus Sic Stantibus (RSS)

Analizaremos a continuación si puede ser aplicable al caso que estamos analizando la cláusula RSS y con qué consecuencias.

Requisitos de la cláusula RSS (aforismo latino que significa “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”)

La expresión RSS, opera como una cláusula intrínseca (es decir implícita, sin necesidad de pactarse expresamente) en la relación contractual, que significa que las estipulaciones establecidas en un contrato lo son habida cuenta de las circunstancias concurrentes en el momento, esto es, “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”, de forma que cualquier alteración sustancial y no prevista de las mismas podrían dar lugar a la modificación del contenido contractual.

La cláusula RSS no está regulada en ningún precepto en nuestro ordenamiento; es una construcción doctrinal que tradicionalmente la jurisprudencia ha admitido (ejemplos entre otros muchos STS de 30 de junio de 2014, 24 de febrero de 2015, 15 de enero de 2019, 18 de julio de 2019), con mucha cautela, solo en ciertos casos, y requiriendo las siguientes premisas

  • Que se haya producido una alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias del contrato, en el momento que el mismo se deba cumplir, en relación con las concurrentes al tiempo de su celebración. Para valorar si una incidencia puede determinar la mutación o alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias que dotaron sentido al contrato, debemos atenernos a lo siguiente: a) Debemos contrastar el alcance de dicha mutación o alteración respecto del sentido o finalidad del contrato y de la conmutatividad o equilibrio prestacional del mismo; y b) Debe quedar excluido el «riesgo normal» inherente o derivado del contrato.
  • Que se haya producido una desproporción exorbitante, fuera de todo cálculo, entre las prestaciones de las partes contratantes, provocando un desequilibrio entre las mismas.
  • Que lo anterior se produzca como consecuencia de circunstancias radicalmente imprevisibles.
  • Que no exista otro remedio para superar la situación.

Históricamente nuestros tribunales han sido muy reacios a aplicar RSS si bien desde la crisis económica de 2008-2012 ha tenido lugar un cierto cambio de criterio y una mayor receptividad jurisprudencial-

Consecuencias de la aplicación de la RSS

La doctrina establece que la aplicación de la RSS no tiene, en principio, efectos rescisorios, resolutorios o extintivos del contrato, sino únicamente efectos modificativos del mismo, encaminados a compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones; a su vez la doctrina establece que se aplica únicamente a los contratos a largo plazo o de tracto sucesivo y de ejecución diferida.

En aplicación de la buena fe, la reacción ante un evento de caso fortuito, fuerza mayor o en general un evento que genera una desproporción entre las partes, como la que regula la institución RSS, debe ser la modificación del contrato para reequilibrar las obligaciones entre las partes, y solo en caso de imposibilidad material de cumplimiento, la resolución de la obligación, en ambos casos sin indemnización por incumplimiento.

Por ello, en el ámbito de los contratos de arrendamiento y en el caso de cierre de los locales por mandato imperativo, entendemos que la institución RSS podrá ser:

  • alegada por los arrendatarios para solicitar o instar de los arrendadores modificaciones a las prestaciones económicas del contrato y
  • estimada por los jueces, cuando estos supuestos se debatan ante los Tribunales, a la hora de aceptar como equitativas y legítimas las tales novaciones contractuales con el fin de compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones generado por los efectos del COVID 19.

En suma, la cláusula RSS puede ser una herramienta para el arrendatario de un local que ha tenido que cerrar durante el Estado de Alarma, a la hora de negociar con el arrendador una modificación del contrato, intentando aplazar la renta mientras se prolongue el Estado de Alarma o negociando un descuento de esta.

Debe recordarse:

  • Que la RSS es de ineludible aplicación casuística, no caben generalizaciones y será necesario tener en cuenta el efecto que provoque el COVID 19 en cada relación contractual concreta (STS de 30 de junio de 2014 y 24 de febrero de 2015) y el efectivo desequilibrio de las prestaciones que haya producido, y
  • Que, como hemos dicho, los Tribunales son en general reacios a la aplicación de esta cláusula a la que solo acuden en caso de falta de cualquier otra herramienta jurídica y en situaciones en que el mantenimiento del status quo contractual revele una manifiesta “injusticia” y un patente y rotundo desequilibrio entre las prestaciones de las partes.

¿Significa lo anterior que el arrendatario podrá imponer al arrendador una modificación de las condiciones económicas del contrato al amparo de RSS (aplazamiento o condonación total o parcial)?

No lo creemos de manera tan rotunda; lo que si pensamos es que la aplicación de esta institución RSS debería,

  • Justificar una razonable solicitud del arrendatario de novar temporalmente las condiciones del contrato (aplazamiento o condonación, total o parcial) que al arrendador debe razonablemente atender.
  • En caso de negativa irrazonable del arrendador, y documentando cuanto más profusamente pueda el arrendatario su solicitud y las eventuales negociaciones o negativa a mantenerlas por la contra parte, permitirle fundamentar una suspensión del pago de la renta, total o parcial, durante la pendencia del Estado de Alarma con ánimo, no de extinción de la obligación, pero sí de su aplazamiento.

Habremos de esperar a la reacción de los tribunales cuando lleguen a su conocimiento estos conflictos, como sin duda ocurrirá; pero si nos atrevemos a adelantar que es bastante posible que la tendencia judicial sea la de conceder amparo al arrendatario con apoyo en la cláusula RSS y el principio de la preservación del negocio, a la hora de dar validez a determinados efectos modificativos respecto a las obligaciones pecuniarias a cargo del arrendatario (condonación total o parcial del pago de la renta durante la crisis pandémica, aplazamiento, aplazamiento parcial).

En todo caso será esencial acreditar que la conducta del contratante deudor que busca amparo en la cláusula RSS para novar el contrato se ha ajustado estrictamente al principio de buena fe (STS 30 de abril de 2015).

También será importante analizar caso por caso por qué se justifica el desplazamiento del riesgo derivado del “suceso excepcional e imprevisto” de un contratante al otro (STS de 15 de enero de 2015) y bien podría defenderse (STS de 18 de julio de 2019) que deben ambos contratantes repartirse y asumir entre los dos las consecuencias.

Las decisiones judiciales variarán en cada caso concreto que habrá de ser objeto de estudio individualizado.

Conclusiones y Recomendaciones

En suma, parece que al arrendatario contaría con dos instrumentos para la pretensión de suspender (signifique esto condonar o aplazar) el pago de las rentas, la cláusula RSS y el principio de Fuerza Mayor.

A nuestro modo de ver, la reposición del equilibrio contractual alterado por el suceso excepcional puede consistir o bien en una prórroga de los plazos de pago del arrendamiento o bien en la aplicación de una condonación total o parcial de la obligación de pago de rentas mientras dure el Estado de Alarma, pero entendemos que será defendible que el retraso en el pago del arrendamiento no podrá dar lugar ni a la resolución del contrato al amparo del art. 1124 Cc ni a la exigencia de daños y perjuicios art. 1105 Cc, en consecuencia, no facultará al arrendador a instar el desahucio.

Por ello los pasos a seguir en cada caso serían:

  • Realizar un examen del contrato para ver si se regulan los casos de fuerza mayor y caso fortuito y si la situación actual concuerda con lo regulado en el contrato.
  • En caso de que no se estipule nada en el contrato, y habiéndose cerrado el local u oficina, advertir de ello a la otra parte e intentar negociar una novación del contrato de arrendamiento solicitando: (i) condonación total de la renta durante el Estado de Alarma; (ii) condonación parcial compartiendo ambas partes el esfuerzo en proporción por convenir; y (iii) aplazamiento del pago de la renta hasta que se pueda reabrir el local u oficina con un plan de pagos de la deuda aplazada.
  • Si no es posible llegar a un acuerdo, es conveniente dejar constancia de que se ha actuado con buena fe intentando llegar a una solución negociada y en el extremo (desde la óptica del arrendatario) anunciar, sin esperar a recibir una comunicación o reclamación del Arrendador, la suspensión del pago de las rentas justificando la misma en el Estado de Alarma hasta la finalización del mismo y la consecuente reapertura del local/oficina.

QUICK SUMMARY: Contract negotiations do not take place in a legal vacuum. A party who negotiates contrary to the principle of good faith and then breaks off negotiations may become liable to the other party. However, the requirements for such liability are high and the enforcement of damage claims is cumbersome. At the end of the post I will share some practical tips for contract negotiations in Switzerland.

Under Swiss law, the principle of freedom of contract is of fundamental importance. It follows from the freedom of contract that, in principle, everyone is free to enter into contract negotiations and to terminate them again without incurring any liability. A termination of contract negotiations does not have to be justified either.

However, the freedom of contract is limited by the obligation to act in good faith (cf. article 2 para. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code), which is of equal fundamental importance. From the moment when parties enter into contract negotiations, they are in a special legal relationship with each other. That pre-contractual relationship involves certain reciprocal obligations. In particular, the parties must negotiate in a serious manner and in accordance with their actual intentions.

Negotiating parties must not stir up the hope of the other party, contrary to their actual intentions, that a contract will actually be concluded. Put differently, a party’s willingness to conclude a contract must not be expressed more strongly than it actually is. If a party realizes that the other party wrongly beliefs that a contract would certainly be concluded, such illusion should be dispelled in due course.

A negotiating party that terminates contract negotiations in violation of these principles, whether maliciously or negligently, may become liable to the other party based on the culpa in contrahendo doctrine. However, such liability exists in exceptional cases only.

  • The fact that contract negotiations took a long time is not sufficient for incurring such liability. The duration of negotiations is, in itself, not decisive.
  • It is not possible to derive liability from pre-existing contractual relationships between the negotiation parties, as for example in cases where parties negotiate a «mere» prolongation of an existing agreement. The decisive factor is not whether parties were already contractually bound before, but only whether the party that terminated the contract negotiations made the other party believe that a new agreement would certainly be concluded.
  • It is not decisive whether the party who terminates contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made costly investments in view of the prospective contract. In principle, anyone who makes investments already prior to the actual conclusion of a contract does so at its own risk. Even where a party to contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made (substantial) investments in the prospective agreement, a termination of the contract negotiations will, in itself, not be considered as an act of bad faith.

What does a liability for breaking off negotiations include?

If a party violates the aforementioned pre-contractual obligations, the other party may be entitled to compensation for the so-called negative interest. This means that the other party must be put in the position it would have been if the negotiations had not taken place. Damages may include, e.g., expenses in connection with the negotiation of the contract (travel costs, legal fees etc.), but also a loss of income in cases where a party was not able to do business with third parties because of the contract negotiations. However, the other party has no right to be treated as if the contract had been concluded (so-called positive interest).

Having said that, it must be kept in mind that the requirements set by Swiss court for the substantiation of damages are rather high, so that the enforcement of a liability for breaking off negotiations will often be a cumbersome process. Therefore pursuing damage claims with relatively low amounts in dispute might often require a disproportionate effort.

Practical tips – Do’s and don’ts when negotiating contracts

  • Do not overstate your willingness to conclude a contract. Be frank with your counterparty. Make it clear from the beginning of the negotiations what clauses are important to you.
  • Do not tell the other party that you are willing to sign a contract, if you still have doubts or you are even unwilling to do so. Confirm that you will sign only if you are convinced to do so.
  • Do not allow someone else (e.g., a representative, employee, branch office etc.) to negotiate on your behalf if you are not willing to enter into an agreement anyway. Keep an eye on how the negotiations are going on and intervene if necessary.
  • Do not make costly investments before a legally binding agreement is concluded. If, for time or other reasons, such investments are necessary already before the conclusion of an agreement, insist on the conclusion of an interim contract governing such investments for the event that the envisaged agreement is not concluded finally.

In 2020, an important revision of the Swiss statute of limitations enters into force. The new law provides for longer limitation periods in cases of personal injury and extends the relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law from one to three years.

Background of the revision

In June 2018, the Swiss parliament adopted an amendment to the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”) pertaining to a revision of the statute of limitations. In November 2018, the Swiss government decided that the revised statute of limitations shall enter into force on 1 January 2020.

The revision was significantly influenced by asbestos cases. Under the current law, damage claims of asbestos victims were time-barred in some cases even before asbestos-related diseases could be diagnosed. In March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held in Howald Moor and others v. Switzerland that the Swiss statute of limitations amounts in such cases to a violation of article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right of access to a court).

Having said that, the revision does not only concern cases of personal injury, but also includes numerous other important changes as described in the following.

Key changes regarding limitation periods

A. Tort law

In tort law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

With the exception of cases of personal injury, the absolute limitation period remains ten years as from the date when the conduct that caused the damages occurred or ended (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

In cases of personal injury, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable. Currently the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

The new absolute limitation period in cases of personal injury amounts to twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 60 para. 1bis CO). Under the current law, there was no special absolute limitation period for cases of personal injury, so that the ordinary 10-year period applied (Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

If conduct, which gives rise to liability under tort law, is also punishable under criminal law, the (longer) limitation period under criminal law remains applicable (cf. Art. 97 of the Swiss Criminal Code). However, where a first-instance criminal judgment is rendered before the conduct is time-barred under criminal law, the limitation periods ends not earlier than three years as from that criminal judgment (revised Art. 60 para. 2 CO). The current law does not provide for such an additional three-year limitation period.

B. Unjust enrichment law

In unjust enrichment law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years as from the date on which the injured party knows about the claim (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

The absolute limitation period is not affected by the revision and remains ten years after the date on which the claim arises (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO).

C. Contract law

With regard to contractual claims, the ordinary limitation period remains ten years from the due date (Art. 127 CO). Furthermore, the shorter limitation period of five years from the due date applicable to (amongst others) claims for rent, interest on capital and other periodic payments, (most) claims out of employment relationships etc. remains unchanged too (Art. 128 CO).

However, in cases of personal injury, the revised statute of limitations introduces a new relative limitation period of three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage, as well as a new absolute limitation period of twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 128a CO). The current law does not provide for distinct relative and absolute limitation periods for contractual claims in cases of personal injury. Instead, the ordinary ten-year limitation period (Art. 127 CO) usually applied to such cases.

D. Summary

In summary, the most important elements of the revised statute of limitations are the longer (trebled) relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law (i.e., three years instead of one year) and the new special rules for cases of personal injury, which now benefit from a 20-year absolute limitation period.

Transitional provisions / application of the revised statute of limitations to pre-existing claims

The longer limitation periods under the revised CO apply to any claims that are not yet time-barred when the revision enters into force (i.e., on 1 January 2020; revised Art. 49 para. 1, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). In other words, the limitation periods of any claims that do not become time-barred until 31 December 2019 at the latest will be prolonged. This is of particular relevance with regard to claims based on tort and unjust enrichment; the short one-year relative limitation periods under the current law will be extended by another two years.

In contrast, the current law remains applicable in case the revised statute of limitations provides for shorter limitation periods (revised Art. 49 para. 2, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). This concerns, in particular, contractual claims in cases of personal injury. The new three-year relative limitation period under the revised law might not apply to such claims, as the current statute of limitations does not provide for a relative limitation period at all.

Further changes brought by the revision

In addition to the changes of the limitation periods set out above, the revision of the statute of limitations contains numerous further modifications. Some of them are listed in the following:

  1. Limitation periods do not commence or are suspended in the event that a claim cannot be asserted for objective reasons before any court worldwide (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 6 CO). The current law provides for such non-commencement or suspension only if the claim cannot be brought before a Swiss court.
  2. Parties to a dispute may agree in writing that limitation periods shall be suspended during settlement discussions, mediation proceedings or other out-of-court settlement proceedings (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 8 CO).
  3. Once a limitation period has commenced to run, waivers of statute of limitation defenses are admissible, but must not exceed ten years (revised Art. 141 para. 1 CO). Any such waivers must be in writing (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
  4. In general terms and conditions (“GTC”), statute of limitation defenses may be waived by the party who makes use of the GTCs only. In contrast, a waiver by the party on whom the GTCs are imposed (e.g., consumers) is ineffective (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
  5. The limitation period for an actio pauliana under the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) is extended to from currently two years to three years after service of a loss certificate, the opening of bankruptcy proceedings or the confirmation of a composition agreement with an assignment of assets (whichever is applicable; revised Art. 292 DEBA).

If 2017 was the year of Initial Coin Offerings, 2018 was the year of Blockchain awareness and testing all over the world. From ICO focused guidelines and regulations respectively aimed to alarm and protect investors, we have seen the shift, especially in Europe, to distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) focused guidelines and regulations aimed at protecting citizens on one hand and promote DLT implementations on the other.

Indeed, European Union Member States and the European Parliament started looking deeper into the technology by, for instance, calling for consultations with professionals in order to understand DLT’s potentials for real-world implementations and possible risks.

In this article I am aiming to give a brief snapshot of firstly what are the most notable European initiatives and moves towards promoting Blockchain implementation and secondly current challenges faced by European law makers when dealing with the regulation of distributed ledger technologies.

Europe

Let’s start from the European Blockchain Partnership (“EBP”), a statement made by 25 EU Member States acknowledging the importance of distributed ledger technology for society, in particular when it comes to interoperability, cyber security and efficiency of digital public services. The Partnership is not only an acknowledgement, it is also a commitment from all signatory states to collaborate to build what they envision will be a distributed ledger infrastructure for the delivering of cross-border public services.

Witness of the trust given to the technology is My Health My Data, a EU-backed project that uses DLT to enable patients to efficiently control their digitally recorded health data while securing it from the threat of data breaches. Benefits the EU saw in DLT on this specific project are safety, efficiency but most notably the opportunity that DLT offers data subject to have finally control over their own data, without the need for intermediaries.

Another important initiative proving European interests in testing DLT technologies is the Horizon Prize on “Blockchains for Social Good”, a 5 million Euros worth challenge open to innovators and tech companies to develop scalable, efficient and high-impact decentralized solutions to social innovation challenges.

Moving forward, in December last year, I had the honor to be part of the “ Workshop on Blockchains & Smart Contracts Legal and Regulatory Framework” in Paris, an initiative supported by the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum (“EUBOF”), a pilot project initiated by the European Parliament. Earlier last year other three workshops were held, the aim of each was to collect knowledge on specific topics from an audience of leading DLT legal and technical professionals. With the knowledge collected, the EUBOF followed up with reports of what was discussed during the workshop and suggest a way forward.

Although not binding, these reports give a reasonably clear guideline to the industry on how existing laws at a European level apply to the technology, or at least should be interpreted, and highlight areas where new regulation is definitely needed. As an example let’s look at the Report on Blockchain & GDPR. If you missed it, the GDPR is the Regulation that protects Europeans personal data and it’s applicable to all companies globally, which are processing data from European citizens. The “right to erasure” embedded in the GDPR, doesn’t allow personal data to be stored on an immutable database, the data subject has to be able to erase data anytime when shared with a service provider and stored somewhere on a database. In the case of Blockchain, the consensus on personal data having to be stored off-chain is therefore unanimous. Storing personal data off-chain and leaving an hash to that data on-chain, is a viable solution if certain precautions are taken in order to avoid the risks of reversibility or linkability of such hash to the personal data stored off-chain, therefore making the hash on-chain personally identifiable information.

However, not all European laws apply to Member States, therefore making it hard to give a EU-wide answer to most DLT compliance challenges in Europe. Member States freedom to legislate is indeed only limited/influenced by two main instruments, Regulations, which are automatically enforceable in each Member State and Directives binding Member States to legislate on specific topics according to a set of specific rules.

Diverging national laws have a great effect on multiple aspects of innovative technologies. Let’s look for instance at the validity of “smart contracts”. When discussing the legal power of automatically enforceable digital contracts, the lack of a European wide legislation on contracts makes it impossible to find an answer applicable to all Member States. For instance, is “offer and acceptance” enough to constitute a contract? What is considered a valid “acceptance”? What is an “obligation”? “Can a digital asset be the object of a legally binding agreement”?

If we try to give a EU-wide answer to the questions such as smart contract validity and enforceability it is apparently not possible since we will need to consider 28 different answers. I, therefore, believe that the future of innovation in Europe will highly depend on the unification of laws.

An example of a unified law that has great benefits on innovation (including DLT) is the Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS) Regulation, which governs electronic identification including electronic signatures.

The race to regulating DLT in Europe

Let’s now look briefly at a couple of Member States legislations, specifically on Blockchain and cryptocurrencies last year.

EU Member States have been quite creative I would say in regulating the new technology. Let’s start from Malta, which saw a surprising increase of important projects and companies, such as Binance, landing on the beautiful Mediterranean Island thanks to its favorable (or at least felt as such) legislations on DLT. The “Blockchain Island” passed three laws in early July to regulate and supervise Blockchain projects including ICOs, crypto exchanges and DLT, specifically: The Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act regulation that aims at recognizing different technology arrangements such as DAOs, smart contracts and in future probably AI machines; The Virtual Financial Assets Act for ICOs and crypto exchanges; The Malta Digital Innovation Authority establishing a new supervisory authority.

Some think the Maltese legislation lacks a comprehensive framework, one that for instance, gives legal personality to Innovative Technology Arrangements. For this reason some are therefore accusing the Maltese lawmakers of rushing into an uncompleted regulatory framework in order to attract business to the island while others seem to positively welcome the laws as a good start for a European wide regulation on DLT and crypto assets.

In December 2018, Malta also initiated a declaration that was then signed by other six Members States, calling for collaboration for the promotion and implementation of DLT on a European level.

France was one of the signatories of such declaration, and it’s worth mentioning since the French Minister for the Economy and Finance approved in September a framework for regulating ICOs and therefore protecting investors’ rights, basically giving the AMF (French Authority for Financial Market) the empowerment to give licenses to companies wanting to raise funds through Initial Coin Offerings.

Last but not least comes Switzerland which although it is not a EU Member State, it has great degree of influence on European and national legislators when it comes to progressive regulations. At the end of December, the Swiss Federal Council released a report on DLT and the law, making a clear statement that the existing Swiss law is sufficient to regulate most matters related to DLT and Blockchain, although some adjustments have to be made. So no new laws but few amendments here and there, which will allow the integration of the specific DLT applications with existing laws in order to ensure legal certainty on certain uncovered matters. Relevant areas of Swiss law that will be amended include the transfer of rights utilizing digital registers, Anti Money Laundering rules specifically for decentralized trading platforms and bankruptcy when that proceeding involves crypto assets.

Conclusions

To summarize, from the approach taken during the past year, it is apparent that there is great interest in Europe to understand the potentials and to soon test implementations of distributed ledger technology. Lawmakers have also an understanding that the technology is in an infant state, it might involve risks, therefore making it complex to set specific rules or to give final answers on the alignment of certain technology applications with existing European or national laws.

To achieve European wide results, however, acknowledgments, guidelines and reports are not enough. The setting of standards for lawmakers applicable to all Member States or even unification of laws in crucial sectors influencing directly or indirectly new technologies, will be the only solution for any innovative technology to be adopted at a European level.

The author of this post is Alessandro Mazzi.

Ignacio Alonso

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    España – Los efectos del Covid-19 en los contratos de arrendamiento de locales y oficinas

    2 de abril de 2020

    • España
    • Contratos
    • Derecho Inmobiliario

    Summary

    The recent post-Brexit trade deal makes no provision for jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments.

    Therefore, the UK dropped out of the jurisdiction of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) on 31 December 2020.

    The EU has not yet approved the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, but may do in the future.

    Unless the transitional provisions from the Withdrawal Agreement apply, jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments will be governed by the Hague Convention 2005 if there is an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause

    If the Hague Convention of 2005 does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules.

    Judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

    On the first day of 2021 the UK left the EU regimes with which European lawyers are familiar. We appeared to enter “uncharted territory”. Not so. In fact, there are charts for this territory – or maps, to use a more modern word. You just need to know which maps.

    Whether you are a lawyer or a businessperson, in whatever country, you need answers to two questions. Which laws govern jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU member states and the UK; and how should businesses act as a result?

    What happened?

    The EU and UK reached a post-Brexit trade deal, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”), on Christmas Eve 2020. The provisions of the TCA became UK law as the European Union (Future Relationship) Act on 31 December 2020. The TCA made provision for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but did not mention judicial cooperation in civil matters, or jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial proceedings.

    So where do we look for law on those matters?

    We look at the position immediately before Brexit. As every lawyer should know the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) governed the enforcement and recognition of judgments between EU member states.

    Also, the Lugano Convention 2007 governs jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in commercial and civil matters between EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It operates in substantially the same way as Brussels (Recast) does between EU member states.

    The UK was party to the Convention by virtue of its EU membership. Now that the UK is not a member of the EU, the contracting parties could agree that the UK could join the Lugano Convention as an independent contracting party, and there would be little change to the position on jurisdiction and enforcement. English jurisdiction clauses would continue to be respected and English court judgments would continue to be readily enforceable throughout EU member states and EFTA countries, and vice versa.

    The problem is that the EU has not agreed to the UK joining the Lugano Convention

    The UK submitted its application to accede to the Lugano Convention in its own right on 8 April 2020. But accession requires the consent of all contracting parties including the EU. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have indicated their support for the UK’s accession, but the EU’s position is still not yet clear and the TCA is silent on this matter.

    While the EU still may belatedly support the UK’s accession to Lugano, it does not currently apply. In any case, a three-month time-lag applies between agreement and entry into force, unless all the contracting parties agree to waive it.

    Where are we now?

    If the transitional provisions provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement as explained in my previous post do not apply, the Brussels (Recast) Regulation will not apply to jurisdiction and enforcement between the EU and UK.

    If they do not, then you first need to decide whether the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 is applicable. The Hague Convention 2005 applies between EU Member States, Mexico, Singapore and Montenegro. The Hague Convention first came into force for the UK when the EU acceded on 1 October 2015 and the UK re-acceded after Brexit in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021.

    The Hague Convention 2005 applies if:

    • The dispute falls within the scope of the Convention as provided for by Article 2 – e.g. the Convention does not apply to employment and consumer contracts or claims for personal injury;
    • There is an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the meaning of Article 3; and
    • The exclusive jurisdiction clause is entered into after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized, and proceedings are commenced after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized within the meaning of Article 16.

    There is some uncertainty as to whether EU member states will treat the Hague Convention as having been in force from 1 October 2015, or only from when the UK re-accedes on 1 January 2021. The UK’s view is that the Convention will apply to the UK from 1 October 2015; the EU’s view is that it will apply to the UK from 1 January 2021. What is not in dispute is that for exclusive English jurisdiction clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, the contracting states will respect exclusive English jurisdiction clauses and enforce the resulting judgments.

    If the 2005 Hague Convention does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules to questions of jurisdiction and enforcement. In the UK, the rules will essentially be the same as the ‘common-law’ rules currently on enforcement applied to non-EU parties, for example the United States.

    The Norwegian exception

    The UK and Norway have reached an agreement which extends and updates an old mutual enforcement treaty, the 1961 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between the UK and Norway, which will apply if the UK does not re-accede to the Lugano Convention. The practical effect of this agreement is that judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

    How should your business act now?

    The applicable legal framework for each dispute will depend on the facts of each case. You should review the dispute resolution clauses in your cross-border contracts to assess how they may be affected by Brexit and to seek specialist advice where necessary. You should also seek advice on dispute resolution provisions when entering into new cross-border contracts in 2021.

    This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

    This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

    In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

    English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

    The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

    This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

    The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

    The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

    As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

    The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

    Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

    The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

    Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

    Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

    Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

    The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

    Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

    The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

    There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

    The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

    The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

    As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

    Novel technology in proceedings

    Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

    And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

    Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

    Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

    Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

    • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
    • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
    • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
    • the matter concerns an international dispute.

    The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

    “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

    The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

    Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

    We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

    To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

    Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

    Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

    • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
    • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
    • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
    • the disclosure of confidential documents
    • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
    • the manner of taking witness testimony
    • the costs of the proceedings.

    Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

    All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

    The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

    • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
    • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
    • The defendant submits its defence statement.
    • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
    • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
    • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
    • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
    • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

    Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

    As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

    This is a summary of the approved measures, which unfortunately for both tenants and landlords do not include any public aid or tax relief and just refer to a postponement in the payment of the rent.

    Premises to which they are applied

    Leased premises dedicated to activities different than residential: commercial, professional, industrial, cultural, teaching, amusement, healthcare, etc. They also apply to the lease of a whole industry (i.e. hotels, restaurants, bars, etc., which are the most usual type of businesses object of this deal).

    Types of tenants

    • Individual entrepreneurs or self-employed persons who were registered before Social Security before the declaration of the state of alarm on March 14th, 2020
    • Small and medium companies, as defined by article 257.1 of the Capital Companies Act: those who fulfil during two consecutive fiscal years these figures: assets under € 4 million, turnover under € 8 million and average staff under 50 people

    Types of landlords

    In order to benefit from these measures, the landlord should be a housing public entity or company or a big owner, considering as such the individuals or companies who own more than 10 urban properties (excluding parking places and storage rooms) or a built surface over 1.500 sqm.

    Measures approved

    The payment of the rent is postponed without interest meanwhile the state of alarm is in force, but in any case, for a maximum period of four months. Once the state of alarm is overcome, and in any case in a maximum term of four months, the postponed rents should be paid along a maximum period of two years, or the duration of the lease agreement, should it be less than two years.

    For landlords different to those mentioned above

    The tenant could apply before the landlord for the postponement in the payment of the rent (but the landlord is not obliged to accept it), and the parties can use the guarantee that the tenant should mandatorily have provided at the beginning of any lease agreement (usually equal to two month’s rent, but could be more if agreed by the parties), in full or in part, in order to use it to pay the rent. The tenant will have to provide again the guarantee within one year’s term, or less should the lease agreement have a shorter duration.

    Activities to which it is applied

    Activities which have been suspended according to the Royal Decree that declared the state of alarm, dated march, 14ht, 2020, or according to the orders issued by the authorities delegated by such Royal Decree. This should be proved through a certificated issued by the tax authorities.

    If the activity has not been directly suspended by the Royal Decree, the turnover during the month prior to the postponement should be less than 75% of the average monthly turnover during the same quarter last year. This should be proved through a responsible declaration by the tenant, and the landlord is authorised check the bookkeeping records.

    Term to apply and procedure

    The tenant should apply for these measures before the landlord within one month’s term from the publication of the Royal Decree-law, that is, from April 22nd, 2020, and the landlord (in case belongs to the groups mentioned in point c) is obliged to accept the tenant’s request, except if both parties have already agreed something different. The postponement would be applied to the following month.

    As the state of alarm was declared more than one month ago (March 14th), landlords and tenants have already been reaching some agreements, for example 50% rent reduction during the state of alarm, and 50% rent postponement during the following 6 months. Tenants who do not reach an agreement with the landlord could face an eviction procedure, however court procedures are suspended during the state of alarm. We have also seen some abusive non-payment of rent by tenants.

    When is becomes impossible to reach an agreement with the landlord, tenants have the legal remedy of claiming in Court for the application of the “rebus sic stantibus” principle, which was highly demanded during the 2008 financial crisis but very seldom applied by the Courts. This principle is aimed to re-balance the parties’ obligations when their situation had deeply changed because of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. This principle is not included in the Spanish Civil Code, but the Supreme Court has accepted its application, in a very restricted way, in some occasions.

    Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

    Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

    Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

    La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

    Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

    «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

    Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

    Escuchar es altamente eficaz

    En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

    Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

    «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

    Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

    En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

    «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

    Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

    La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

    En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

    «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

    Las emociones son importantes

    Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

    «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

    [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

    El Real Decreto-ley 8/2020, de 17 de marzo, de medidas urgentes extraordinarias para hacer frente al impacto económico y social del COVID-19, aunque afecta y produce efectos en muchos diferentes ámbitos jurídicos, no incluye ninguna referencia a los contratos de arrendamientos de inmuebles, ni viviendas, ni locales u oficinas.

    El objeto de esta nota es analizar los efectos de la situación del Estado de Alarma respecto a aquellos contratos de arrendamiento de oficinas o locales que se hayan visto obligados a cerrar en aplicación del decreto; aquellos otros que permanezcan total o parcialmente abiertos y en funcionamiento, bien que con una actividad reducida o mínima, en principio no son objeto de las conclusiones que más adelante alcanzamos sin perjuicio de que existan casos individualizados a los que, pese a no existir un cierre total, razonable y lógicamente puedan serles de aplicación.

    No está excluido en modo alguno que ante una prolongación de la vigencia del Estado de Alarma pudiera publicarse alguna norma que afectase a los contratos de arrendamiento, pero de momento esto no ha sucedido. Si esto llegase a acaecer, al contenido de dicha norma habrá de estarse.

    En base al principio de libertad de pactos que consagra el art. 1255 del Código Civil, que permite que sean las partes firmantes del contrato las que convengan (i) qué escenarios y situaciones deben considerarse como constitutivos de supuestos de Fuerza Mayor y Caso Fortuito y (ii) cuáles deban ser las consecuencias contractuales de los tales escenarios, el primer ejercicio es comprobar si el contrato incluye una cláusula reguladora de la Fuerza mayor y sus efectos; si es así, a la tal cláusula habrá de estarse y su análisis queda al margen de esta nota.

    En ausencia de regulación expresa en el contrato, aplicarían al caso las previsiones del Código Civil y en concreto el artículo 1.105.

    COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor

    El COVID 19 es un acontecimiento que en principio reúne los requisitos que exige el Código Civil para ser calificado como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor (art. 1105 Código Civil) ya que:

    • Se trata de un hecho ajeno y no imputable al contratante deudor de la prestación u obligación.
    • Es imprevisible, o si se reputase “previsible”, es sin duda inevitable.
    • El acontecimiento en cuestión, la pandemia, debe ser causa y tener como consecuencia el incumplimiento de la obligación, es decir debe existir un nexo causal.

    Por lo tanto, cumpliéndose los tres requisitos, la primera conclusión que alcanzamos es que muy previsiblemente, los Tribunales españoles calificarán como “Fuerza Mayor” la situación causada por el COVID 19 cuando se les plantee una contienda judicial en la que tal asunto se discuta entre los litigantes. Analizaremos a continuación las consecuencias de dicha calificación.

    Consecuencias de considerar COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza mayor

    La generalidad de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia entienden que los efectos de calificar un supuesto como caso de Fuerza Mayor en principio son:

    • Imposibilidad total y definitiva de cumplir; liberando al deudor del cumplimiento de la obligación.
    • Imposibilidad parcial de cumplir; quedando liberado el deudor sólo en la parte que le es imposible cumplir, pero siguiendo obligado por la parte que sí puede llevar a cabo.
    • Imposibilidad temporal de cumplir; el deudor queda liberado de la responsabilidad por mora mientras persista la situación de excepcionalidad.

    Ahora bien, analicemos como afectaría dicha consideración como Fuerza Mayor de la epidemia, respecto a los contratos de arrendamiento para usos distintos a la vivienda.

    Respecto al pago de la renta

    La pregunta a la que responder es, si la calificación de la situación pandémica actual como un caso de Fuerza Mayor, libera al arrendatario (cuyo local se ha visto obligado a cerrar por orden de la autoridad gubernamental) de la obligación del pago de la renta mientras dicha obligación de cierre persista, incluyendo en el concepto “liberación” diferentes alternativas: condonación total o parcial y/o aplazamiento total o parcial.

    Nos estamos encontrando en estos días con una reacción frecuente entre algunos arrendatarios, quienes, de manera unilateral, han informado a sus arrendadores que considerando COVID 19 un supuesto de fuerza mayor y habiéndose visto obligados a cerrar el local/oficina, suspenden el pago de la renta mientras dicha situación permanezca. No resuelven el contrato, no entregan la posesión, se mantienen en ella (permaneciendo el local cerrado y no operativo) pero suspenden el pago (sin quedar claro si suspender en este caso significa auto condonarse el pago de la renta o aplazarlo para cuando desaparezca el supuesto de Fuerza Mayor).

    Argumentos en contra de la liberación

    Por más que pueda considerarse “entendible” esta actitud, desde la óptica del arrendatario, no desde la del arrendador, dicha consideración se topa con un obstáculo: la interpretación que de la Fuerza Mayor ha hecho el TS respecto a las obligaciones de pago pecuniario, según la STS (Civil) de 19 mayo de 2015:

    “No pudiendo plantearse, pues, tratándose de deudas pecuniarias, la imposibilidad subjetiva -insolvencia- ni la objetiva o formal, concluye la doctrina que no es posible imaginar que si la imposibilidad obedece a caso fortuito pudiera tener como efecto la extinción de la obligación.

    La exoneración del deudor por caso fortuito no es absoluta, tiene excepciones, conforme prevé el articulo 1.105 CC, y una de ellas, por aplicación del principio «genus nunquam perit», sería en supuestos de obligaciones de entregar cosa genérica.

    En tales circunstancias el deudor pecuniario viene obligado a cumplir la prestación principal, sin que sus sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello, pues lo adeudado no es algo individualizado que ha perecido sino algo genérico como es el dinero.”

    Conclusión: no parece que este criterio jurisprudencial permita defender que el cumplimiento de las obligaciones pecuniarias quede liberado, extinto o que su incumplimiento quede justificado en casos de Fuerza Mayor, de suerte que el deudor pecuniario, en este caso el arrendatario, en aplicación de este criterio, vendría obligado a cumplir la prestación principal sin que las sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello con fundamento en la Fuerza Mayor, debido a la condición genérica que tiene el dinero.

    Argumentos a favor de la liberación: el art. 1.575 del Código Civil

    Dicho lo anterior lo anterior, debe hacerse referencia a un artículo del Código Civil que, con certeza, será profusamente citado en los conflictos judiciales que se avecinan.

    El art. 1.575, tratando del arrendamiento de fincas rústicas, reconoce el derecho del arrendatario a la rebaja de la renta en caso de pérdida de más de la mitad de los frutos (salvo pacto en contrario) en “casos fortuitos, extraordinarios e imprevistos…como incendio, guerra, peste, inundación insólita, langosta, terremoto u otro igualmente desacostumbrado que los contratantes no hayan podido racionalmente prever”.

    ¿Es aplicable este precepto, previsto para arrendamientos rústicos, a los arrendamientos urbanos?

    El art. 4.1 CC permite la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando (i) estas no contemplen un supuesto específico y (ii) regulen otro semejante entre los que se aprecie “identidad de razón”.

    La STS de 15 de enero de 2019, resolviendo un conflicto de un arrendamiento de un edificio destinado a hotel, en el que el arrendatario había pretendido la rebaja de la renta al amparo de la cláusula “rebus sic stantibus” por la crisis de 2008 y había alegado a su favor la aplicación del art.1.575, estableció:

    “La argumentación de la sentencia recurrida por la que se rechaza la pretensión de rebaja del precio pactado tampoco es contraria al criterio legal que se desprende del art. 1575 CC, que es la regla que permite la rebaja de la renta en el arrendamiento de bienes productivos que no deriven de riesgos del propio negocio, exige además que la pérdida de rendimientos se origine por casos fortuitos extraordinarios e imprevistos, algo que por su misma rareza no hubiera ser podido previsto por las partes, y que la pérdida de frutos sea de más de la mitad de los frutos. En el caso no concurre ninguna de estas circunstancias. La disminución de las rentas procede de una evolución del mercado, las partes previeron la posibilidad de que en algunos ejercicios la rentabilidad del hotel no fuera positiva para la arrendataria y las pérdidas alegadas por NH en la explotación del hotel de Almería son inferiores al cincuenta por ciento, sin contar con que el resultado global del conjunto de su actividad como gestora de una cadena de hoteles es, según considera probado la Audiencia a la vista del informe de gestión consolidado, favorable”.

    El TS no admite la aplicación del 1.575 pero no por considerarlo no aplicable a arrendamientos distintos a los rústicos, sino por concluir que no se dan los requisitos para ello ya que ni era imprevisible la crisis de 2008 ni las pérdidas del arrendatario son superiores al 50%.

    Pero, esa interpretación del TS junto con el tenor del art. 4.1 CC permitirían avalar la pretensión del arrendatario que se encuentra sin ingreso alguno durante el Estado de Alarma, de exigir una rebaja de renta que se adecuara al principio de proporcionalidad.

    Respecto a la terminación anticipada a instancias del arrendatario

    Sin embargo, podemos encontrarnos con situaciones en las que el arrendatario, ante la actual situación, decida terminar anticipadamente el contrato de arrendamiento debido a la situación provocada por el COVID 19, poniendo el local a disposición del arrendador.

    Son supuestos en los que se pretende la resolución anticipada del contrato, sin respetar (i) o el plazo obligatorio (ii) o el preaviso, en ambos casos bajo la hipótesis de que estén así regulados en el contrato.

    En estos supuestos entendemos que sí puede resultar defendible que, debido a la situación de fuerza mayor provocada por el COVID 19 y en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, se exonere al arrendatario de la obligación:

    • De respetar un plazo de vigencia determinada del contrato de arrendamiento
    • De preavisar al arrendador en caso de resolución anticipada del contrato

    En ambos casos el contrato quedaría resuelto con la entrega de la posesión del local, sin perjuicio de tener que respetar las obligaciones que prevé el contrato para la terminación y entrega siempre que las mismas no se vean igualmente afectadas por la situación de Fuerza Mayor.

    Nuestra opinión es que, también en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, sería defendible ante los Tribunales la tesis de que el arrendatario quedaría liberado de cualquier obligación de resarcimiento de daños al arrendador por dicha resolución anticipada o incumplimiento de la duración obligada del contrato.

    Conclusión

    En conclusión, planteado ante los Tribunales el debate sobre cómo la pandemia (que no hay duda será calificada como caso de Fuerza Mayor) afectará a las obligaciones a cargo del arrendatario que se haya visto obligado a cerrar su negocio, nuestra opinión es la siguiente:

    1. Respecto a la obligación de pago de la renta, pese al criterio contrario de la sentencia que citamos de 19 de mayo de 2015, nos parece potente y defendible la remisión al art. 1575 y a su aplicación analógica con apoyo en la STS de 15 de enero de 2019, para exigir una reducción proporcional y equitativa de la renta.
    2. Respecto a la facultad del arrendatario para resolver el contrato anticipadamente, entregando la posesión del inmueble al arrendador, exonerando al arrendatario de cumplir con sus obligaciones de preaviso o de duración obligada previstas en el contrato en cuestión, y sin tener que indemnizar al arrendador por ello, entendemos que también existe fundamento para defender judicialmente esta posición.

    Aplicación de la cláusula Rebus Sic Stantibus (RSS)

    Analizaremos a continuación si puede ser aplicable al caso que estamos analizando la cláusula RSS y con qué consecuencias.

    Requisitos de la cláusula RSS (aforismo latino que significa “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”)

    La expresión RSS, opera como una cláusula intrínseca (es decir implícita, sin necesidad de pactarse expresamente) en la relación contractual, que significa que las estipulaciones establecidas en un contrato lo son habida cuenta de las circunstancias concurrentes en el momento, esto es, “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”, de forma que cualquier alteración sustancial y no prevista de las mismas podrían dar lugar a la modificación del contenido contractual.

    La cláusula RSS no está regulada en ningún precepto en nuestro ordenamiento; es una construcción doctrinal que tradicionalmente la jurisprudencia ha admitido (ejemplos entre otros muchos STS de 30 de junio de 2014, 24 de febrero de 2015, 15 de enero de 2019, 18 de julio de 2019), con mucha cautela, solo en ciertos casos, y requiriendo las siguientes premisas

    • Que se haya producido una alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias del contrato, en el momento que el mismo se deba cumplir, en relación con las concurrentes al tiempo de su celebración. Para valorar si una incidencia puede determinar la mutación o alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias que dotaron sentido al contrato, debemos atenernos a lo siguiente: a) Debemos contrastar el alcance de dicha mutación o alteración respecto del sentido o finalidad del contrato y de la conmutatividad o equilibrio prestacional del mismo; y b) Debe quedar excluido el «riesgo normal» inherente o derivado del contrato.
    • Que se haya producido una desproporción exorbitante, fuera de todo cálculo, entre las prestaciones de las partes contratantes, provocando un desequilibrio entre las mismas.
    • Que lo anterior se produzca como consecuencia de circunstancias radicalmente imprevisibles.
    • Que no exista otro remedio para superar la situación.

    Históricamente nuestros tribunales han sido muy reacios a aplicar RSS si bien desde la crisis económica de 2008-2012 ha tenido lugar un cierto cambio de criterio y una mayor receptividad jurisprudencial-

    Consecuencias de la aplicación de la RSS

    La doctrina establece que la aplicación de la RSS no tiene, en principio, efectos rescisorios, resolutorios o extintivos del contrato, sino únicamente efectos modificativos del mismo, encaminados a compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones; a su vez la doctrina establece que se aplica únicamente a los contratos a largo plazo o de tracto sucesivo y de ejecución diferida.

    En aplicación de la buena fe, la reacción ante un evento de caso fortuito, fuerza mayor o en general un evento que genera una desproporción entre las partes, como la que regula la institución RSS, debe ser la modificación del contrato para reequilibrar las obligaciones entre las partes, y solo en caso de imposibilidad material de cumplimiento, la resolución de la obligación, en ambos casos sin indemnización por incumplimiento.

    Por ello, en el ámbito de los contratos de arrendamiento y en el caso de cierre de los locales por mandato imperativo, entendemos que la institución RSS podrá ser:

    • alegada por los arrendatarios para solicitar o instar de los arrendadores modificaciones a las prestaciones económicas del contrato y
    • estimada por los jueces, cuando estos supuestos se debatan ante los Tribunales, a la hora de aceptar como equitativas y legítimas las tales novaciones contractuales con el fin de compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones generado por los efectos del COVID 19.

    En suma, la cláusula RSS puede ser una herramienta para el arrendatario de un local que ha tenido que cerrar durante el Estado de Alarma, a la hora de negociar con el arrendador una modificación del contrato, intentando aplazar la renta mientras se prolongue el Estado de Alarma o negociando un descuento de esta.

    Debe recordarse:

    • Que la RSS es de ineludible aplicación casuística, no caben generalizaciones y será necesario tener en cuenta el efecto que provoque el COVID 19 en cada relación contractual concreta (STS de 30 de junio de 2014 y 24 de febrero de 2015) y el efectivo desequilibrio de las prestaciones que haya producido, y
    • Que, como hemos dicho, los Tribunales son en general reacios a la aplicación de esta cláusula a la que solo acuden en caso de falta de cualquier otra herramienta jurídica y en situaciones en que el mantenimiento del status quo contractual revele una manifiesta “injusticia” y un patente y rotundo desequilibrio entre las prestaciones de las partes.

    ¿Significa lo anterior que el arrendatario podrá imponer al arrendador una modificación de las condiciones económicas del contrato al amparo de RSS (aplazamiento o condonación total o parcial)?

    No lo creemos de manera tan rotunda; lo que si pensamos es que la aplicación de esta institución RSS debería,

    • Justificar una razonable solicitud del arrendatario de novar temporalmente las condiciones del contrato (aplazamiento o condonación, total o parcial) que al arrendador debe razonablemente atender.
    • En caso de negativa irrazonable del arrendador, y documentando cuanto más profusamente pueda el arrendatario su solicitud y las eventuales negociaciones o negativa a mantenerlas por la contra parte, permitirle fundamentar una suspensión del pago de la renta, total o parcial, durante la pendencia del Estado de Alarma con ánimo, no de extinción de la obligación, pero sí de su aplazamiento.

    Habremos de esperar a la reacción de los tribunales cuando lleguen a su conocimiento estos conflictos, como sin duda ocurrirá; pero si nos atrevemos a adelantar que es bastante posible que la tendencia judicial sea la de conceder amparo al arrendatario con apoyo en la cláusula RSS y el principio de la preservación del negocio, a la hora de dar validez a determinados efectos modificativos respecto a las obligaciones pecuniarias a cargo del arrendatario (condonación total o parcial del pago de la renta durante la crisis pandémica, aplazamiento, aplazamiento parcial).

    En todo caso será esencial acreditar que la conducta del contratante deudor que busca amparo en la cláusula RSS para novar el contrato se ha ajustado estrictamente al principio de buena fe (STS 30 de abril de 2015).

    También será importante analizar caso por caso por qué se justifica el desplazamiento del riesgo derivado del “suceso excepcional e imprevisto” de un contratante al otro (STS de 15 de enero de 2015) y bien podría defenderse (STS de 18 de julio de 2019) que deben ambos contratantes repartirse y asumir entre los dos las consecuencias.

    Las decisiones judiciales variarán en cada caso concreto que habrá de ser objeto de estudio individualizado.

    Conclusiones y Recomendaciones

    En suma, parece que al arrendatario contaría con dos instrumentos para la pretensión de suspender (signifique esto condonar o aplazar) el pago de las rentas, la cláusula RSS y el principio de Fuerza Mayor.

    A nuestro modo de ver, la reposición del equilibrio contractual alterado por el suceso excepcional puede consistir o bien en una prórroga de los plazos de pago del arrendamiento o bien en la aplicación de una condonación total o parcial de la obligación de pago de rentas mientras dure el Estado de Alarma, pero entendemos que será defendible que el retraso en el pago del arrendamiento no podrá dar lugar ni a la resolución del contrato al amparo del art. 1124 Cc ni a la exigencia de daños y perjuicios art. 1105 Cc, en consecuencia, no facultará al arrendador a instar el desahucio.

    Por ello los pasos a seguir en cada caso serían:

    • Realizar un examen del contrato para ver si se regulan los casos de fuerza mayor y caso fortuito y si la situación actual concuerda con lo regulado en el contrato.
    • En caso de que no se estipule nada en el contrato, y habiéndose cerrado el local u oficina, advertir de ello a la otra parte e intentar negociar una novación del contrato de arrendamiento solicitando: (i) condonación total de la renta durante el Estado de Alarma; (ii) condonación parcial compartiendo ambas partes el esfuerzo en proporción por convenir; y (iii) aplazamiento del pago de la renta hasta que se pueda reabrir el local u oficina con un plan de pagos de la deuda aplazada.
    • Si no es posible llegar a un acuerdo, es conveniente dejar constancia de que se ha actuado con buena fe intentando llegar a una solución negociada y en el extremo (desde la óptica del arrendatario) anunciar, sin esperar a recibir una comunicación o reclamación del Arrendador, la suspensión del pago de las rentas justificando la misma en el Estado de Alarma hasta la finalización del mismo y la consecuente reapertura del local/oficina.

    QUICK SUMMARY: Contract negotiations do not take place in a legal vacuum. A party who negotiates contrary to the principle of good faith and then breaks off negotiations may become liable to the other party. However, the requirements for such liability are high and the enforcement of damage claims is cumbersome. At the end of the post I will share some practical tips for contract negotiations in Switzerland.

    Under Swiss law, the principle of freedom of contract is of fundamental importance. It follows from the freedom of contract that, in principle, everyone is free to enter into contract negotiations and to terminate them again without incurring any liability. A termination of contract negotiations does not have to be justified either.

    However, the freedom of contract is limited by the obligation to act in good faith (cf. article 2 para. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code), which is of equal fundamental importance. From the moment when parties enter into contract negotiations, they are in a special legal relationship with each other. That pre-contractual relationship involves certain reciprocal obligations. In particular, the parties must negotiate in a serious manner and in accordance with their actual intentions.

    Negotiating parties must not stir up the hope of the other party, contrary to their actual intentions, that a contract will actually be concluded. Put differently, a party’s willingness to conclude a contract must not be expressed more strongly than it actually is. If a party realizes that the other party wrongly beliefs that a contract would certainly be concluded, such illusion should be dispelled in due course.

    A negotiating party that terminates contract negotiations in violation of these principles, whether maliciously or negligently, may become liable to the other party based on the culpa in contrahendo doctrine. However, such liability exists in exceptional cases only.

    • The fact that contract negotiations took a long time is not sufficient for incurring such liability. The duration of negotiations is, in itself, not decisive.
    • It is not possible to derive liability from pre-existing contractual relationships between the negotiation parties, as for example in cases where parties negotiate a «mere» prolongation of an existing agreement. The decisive factor is not whether parties were already contractually bound before, but only whether the party that terminated the contract negotiations made the other party believe that a new agreement would certainly be concluded.
    • It is not decisive whether the party who terminates contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made costly investments in view of the prospective contract. In principle, anyone who makes investments already prior to the actual conclusion of a contract does so at its own risk. Even where a party to contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made (substantial) investments in the prospective agreement, a termination of the contract negotiations will, in itself, not be considered as an act of bad faith.

    What does a liability for breaking off negotiations include?

    If a party violates the aforementioned pre-contractual obligations, the other party may be entitled to compensation for the so-called negative interest. This means that the other party must be put in the position it would have been if the negotiations had not taken place. Damages may include, e.g., expenses in connection with the negotiation of the contract (travel costs, legal fees etc.), but also a loss of income in cases where a party was not able to do business with third parties because of the contract negotiations. However, the other party has no right to be treated as if the contract had been concluded (so-called positive interest).

    Having said that, it must be kept in mind that the requirements set by Swiss court for the substantiation of damages are rather high, so that the enforcement of a liability for breaking off negotiations will often be a cumbersome process. Therefore pursuing damage claims with relatively low amounts in dispute might often require a disproportionate effort.

    Practical tips – Do’s and don’ts when negotiating contracts

    • Do not overstate your willingness to conclude a contract. Be frank with your counterparty. Make it clear from the beginning of the negotiations what clauses are important to you.
    • Do not tell the other party that you are willing to sign a contract, if you still have doubts or you are even unwilling to do so. Confirm that you will sign only if you are convinced to do so.
    • Do not allow someone else (e.g., a representative, employee, branch office etc.) to negotiate on your behalf if you are not willing to enter into an agreement anyway. Keep an eye on how the negotiations are going on and intervene if necessary.
    • Do not make costly investments before a legally binding agreement is concluded. If, for time or other reasons, such investments are necessary already before the conclusion of an agreement, insist on the conclusion of an interim contract governing such investments for the event that the envisaged agreement is not concluded finally.

    In 2020, an important revision of the Swiss statute of limitations enters into force. The new law provides for longer limitation periods in cases of personal injury and extends the relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law from one to three years.

    Background of the revision

    In June 2018, the Swiss parliament adopted an amendment to the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”) pertaining to a revision of the statute of limitations. In November 2018, the Swiss government decided that the revised statute of limitations shall enter into force on 1 January 2020.

    The revision was significantly influenced by asbestos cases. Under the current law, damage claims of asbestos victims were time-barred in some cases even before asbestos-related diseases could be diagnosed. In March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held in Howald Moor and others v. Switzerland that the Swiss statute of limitations amounts in such cases to a violation of article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right of access to a court).

    Having said that, the revision does not only concern cases of personal injury, but also includes numerous other important changes as described in the following.

    Key changes regarding limitation periods

    A. Tort law

    In tort law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

    With the exception of cases of personal injury, the absolute limitation period remains ten years as from the date when the conduct that caused the damages occurred or ended (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

    In cases of personal injury, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable. Currently the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

    The new absolute limitation period in cases of personal injury amounts to twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 60 para. 1bis CO). Under the current law, there was no special absolute limitation period for cases of personal injury, so that the ordinary 10-year period applied (Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

    If conduct, which gives rise to liability under tort law, is also punishable under criminal law, the (longer) limitation period under criminal law remains applicable (cf. Art. 97 of the Swiss Criminal Code). However, where a first-instance criminal judgment is rendered before the conduct is time-barred under criminal law, the limitation periods ends not earlier than three years as from that criminal judgment (revised Art. 60 para. 2 CO). The current law does not provide for such an additional three-year limitation period.

    B. Unjust enrichment law

    In unjust enrichment law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years as from the date on which the injured party knows about the claim (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

    The absolute limitation period is not affected by the revision and remains ten years after the date on which the claim arises (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO).

    C. Contract law

    With regard to contractual claims, the ordinary limitation period remains ten years from the due date (Art. 127 CO). Furthermore, the shorter limitation period of five years from the due date applicable to (amongst others) claims for rent, interest on capital and other periodic payments, (most) claims out of employment relationships etc. remains unchanged too (Art. 128 CO).

    However, in cases of personal injury, the revised statute of limitations introduces a new relative limitation period of three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage, as well as a new absolute limitation period of twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 128a CO). The current law does not provide for distinct relative and absolute limitation periods for contractual claims in cases of personal injury. Instead, the ordinary ten-year limitation period (Art. 127 CO) usually applied to such cases.

    D. Summary

    In summary, the most important elements of the revised statute of limitations are the longer (trebled) relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law (i.e., three years instead of one year) and the new special rules for cases of personal injury, which now benefit from a 20-year absolute limitation period.

    Transitional provisions / application of the revised statute of limitations to pre-existing claims

    The longer limitation periods under the revised CO apply to any claims that are not yet time-barred when the revision enters into force (i.e., on 1 January 2020; revised Art. 49 para. 1, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). In other words, the limitation periods of any claims that do not become time-barred until 31 December 2019 at the latest will be prolonged. This is of particular relevance with regard to claims based on tort and unjust enrichment; the short one-year relative limitation periods under the current law will be extended by another two years.

    In contrast, the current law remains applicable in case the revised statute of limitations provides for shorter limitation periods (revised Art. 49 para. 2, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). This concerns, in particular, contractual claims in cases of personal injury. The new three-year relative limitation period under the revised law might not apply to such claims, as the current statute of limitations does not provide for a relative limitation period at all.

    Further changes brought by the revision

    In addition to the changes of the limitation periods set out above, the revision of the statute of limitations contains numerous further modifications. Some of them are listed in the following:

    1. Limitation periods do not commence or are suspended in the event that a claim cannot be asserted for objective reasons before any court worldwide (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 6 CO). The current law provides for such non-commencement or suspension only if the claim cannot be brought before a Swiss court.
    2. Parties to a dispute may agree in writing that limitation periods shall be suspended during settlement discussions, mediation proceedings or other out-of-court settlement proceedings (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 8 CO).
    3. Once a limitation period has commenced to run, waivers of statute of limitation defenses are admissible, but must not exceed ten years (revised Art. 141 para. 1 CO). Any such waivers must be in writing (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
    4. In general terms and conditions (“GTC”), statute of limitation defenses may be waived by the party who makes use of the GTCs only. In contrast, a waiver by the party on whom the GTCs are imposed (e.g., consumers) is ineffective (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
    5. The limitation period for an actio pauliana under the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) is extended to from currently two years to three years after service of a loss certificate, the opening of bankruptcy proceedings or the confirmation of a composition agreement with an assignment of assets (whichever is applicable; revised Art. 292 DEBA).

    If 2017 was the year of Initial Coin Offerings, 2018 was the year of Blockchain awareness and testing all over the world. From ICO focused guidelines and regulations respectively aimed to alarm and protect investors, we have seen the shift, especially in Europe, to distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) focused guidelines and regulations aimed at protecting citizens on one hand and promote DLT implementations on the other.

    Indeed, European Union Member States and the European Parliament started looking deeper into the technology by, for instance, calling for consultations with professionals in order to understand DLT’s potentials for real-world implementations and possible risks.

    In this article I am aiming to give a brief snapshot of firstly what are the most notable European initiatives and moves towards promoting Blockchain implementation and secondly current challenges faced by European law makers when dealing with the regulation of distributed ledger technologies.

    Europe

    Let’s start from the European Blockchain Partnership (“EBP”), a statement made by 25 EU Member States acknowledging the importance of distributed ledger technology for society, in particular when it comes to interoperability, cyber security and efficiency of digital public services. The Partnership is not only an acknowledgement, it is also a commitment from all signatory states to collaborate to build what they envision will be a distributed ledger infrastructure for the delivering of cross-border public services.

    Witness of the trust given to the technology is My Health My Data, a EU-backed project that uses DLT to enable patients to efficiently control their digitally recorded health data while securing it from the threat of data breaches. Benefits the EU saw in DLT on this specific project are safety, efficiency but most notably the opportunity that DLT offers data subject to have finally control over their own data, without the need for intermediaries.

    Another important initiative proving European interests in testing DLT technologies is the Horizon Prize on “Blockchains for Social Good”, a 5 million Euros worth challenge open to innovators and tech companies to develop scalable, efficient and high-impact decentralized solutions to social innovation challenges.

    Moving forward, in December last year, I had the honor to be part of the “ Workshop on Blockchains & Smart Contracts Legal and Regulatory Framework” in Paris, an initiative supported by the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum (“EUBOF”), a pilot project initiated by the European Parliament. Earlier last year other three workshops were held, the aim of each was to collect knowledge on specific topics from an audience of leading DLT legal and technical professionals. With the knowledge collected, the EUBOF followed up with reports of what was discussed during the workshop and suggest a way forward.

    Although not binding, these reports give a reasonably clear guideline to the industry on how existing laws at a European level apply to the technology, or at least should be interpreted, and highlight areas where new regulation is definitely needed. As an example let’s look at the Report on Blockchain & GDPR. If you missed it, the GDPR is the Regulation that protects Europeans personal data and it’s applicable to all companies globally, which are processing data from European citizens. The “right to erasure” embedded in the GDPR, doesn’t allow personal data to be stored on an immutable database, the data subject has to be able to erase data anytime when shared with a service provider and stored somewhere on a database. In the case of Blockchain, the consensus on personal data having to be stored off-chain is therefore unanimous. Storing personal data off-chain and leaving an hash to that data on-chain, is a viable solution if certain precautions are taken in order to avoid the risks of reversibility or linkability of such hash to the personal data stored off-chain, therefore making the hash on-chain personally identifiable information.

    However, not all European laws apply to Member States, therefore making it hard to give a EU-wide answer to most DLT compliance challenges in Europe. Member States freedom to legislate is indeed only limited/influenced by two main instruments, Regulations, which are automatically enforceable in each Member State and Directives binding Member States to legislate on specific topics according to a set of specific rules.

    Diverging national laws have a great effect on multiple aspects of innovative technologies. Let’s look for instance at the validity of “smart contracts”. When discussing the legal power of automatically enforceable digital contracts, the lack of a European wide legislation on contracts makes it impossible to find an answer applicable to all Member States. For instance, is “offer and acceptance” enough to constitute a contract? What is considered a valid “acceptance”? What is an “obligation”? “Can a digital asset be the object of a legally binding agreement”?

    If we try to give a EU-wide answer to the questions such as smart contract validity and enforceability it is apparently not possible since we will need to consider 28 different answers. I, therefore, believe that the future of innovation in Europe will highly depend on the unification of laws.

    An example of a unified law that has great benefits on innovation (including DLT) is the Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS) Regulation, which governs electronic identification including electronic signatures.

    The race to regulating DLT in Europe

    Let’s now look briefly at a couple of Member States legislations, specifically on Blockchain and cryptocurrencies last year.

    EU Member States have been quite creative I would say in regulating the new technology. Let’s start from Malta, which saw a surprising increase of important projects and companies, such as Binance, landing on the beautiful Mediterranean Island thanks to its favorable (or at least felt as such) legislations on DLT. The “Blockchain Island” passed three laws in early July to regulate and supervise Blockchain projects including ICOs, crypto exchanges and DLT, specifically: The Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act regulation that aims at recognizing different technology arrangements such as DAOs, smart contracts and in future probably AI machines; The Virtual Financial Assets Act for ICOs and crypto exchanges; The Malta Digital Innovation Authority establishing a new supervisory authority.

    Some think the Maltese legislation lacks a comprehensive framework, one that for instance, gives legal personality to Innovative Technology Arrangements. For this reason some are therefore accusing the Maltese lawmakers of rushing into an uncompleted regulatory framework in order to attract business to the island while others seem to positively welcome the laws as a good start for a European wide regulation on DLT and crypto assets.

    In December 2018, Malta also initiated a declaration that was then signed by other six Members States, calling for collaboration for the promotion and implementation of DLT on a European level.

    France was one of the signatories of such declaration, and it’s worth mentioning since the French Minister for the Economy and Finance approved in September a framework for regulating ICOs and therefore protecting investors’ rights, basically giving the AMF (French Authority for Financial Market) the empowerment to give licenses to companies wanting to raise funds through Initial Coin Offerings.

    Last but not least comes Switzerland which although it is not a EU Member State, it has great degree of influence on European and national legislators when it comes to progressive regulations. At the end of December, the Swiss Federal Council released a report on DLT and the law, making a clear statement that the existing Swiss law is sufficient to regulate most matters related to DLT and Blockchain, although some adjustments have to be made. So no new laws but few amendments here and there, which will allow the integration of the specific DLT applications with existing laws in order to ensure legal certainty on certain uncovered matters. Relevant areas of Swiss law that will be amended include the transfer of rights utilizing digital registers, Anti Money Laundering rules specifically for decentralized trading platforms and bankruptcy when that proceeding involves crypto assets.

    Conclusions

    To summarize, from the approach taken during the past year, it is apparent that there is great interest in Europe to understand the potentials and to soon test implementations of distributed ledger technology. Lawmakers have also an understanding that the technology is in an infant state, it might involve risks, therefore making it complex to set specific rules or to give final answers on the alignment of certain technology applications with existing European or national laws.

    To achieve European wide results, however, acknowledgments, guidelines and reports are not enough. The setting of standards for lawmakers applicable to all Member States or even unification of laws in crucial sectors influencing directly or indirectly new technologies, will be the only solution for any innovative technology to be adopted at a European level.

    The author of this post is Alessandro Mazzi.

    Javier Gaspar Álvarez-Novoa

    Áreas de práctica

    • Arte
    • Contratos
    • Derecho Societario
    • Reclamación de deudas
    • Inversiones extranjeras
    Contáctanos Javier

    Contacta con Javier





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      Switzerland – Liability for termination of contract negotiations

      23 de diciembre de 2019

      • Suiza
      • Contratos

      Summary

      The recent post-Brexit trade deal makes no provision for jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments.

      Therefore, the UK dropped out of the jurisdiction of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) on 31 December 2020.

      The EU has not yet approved the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, but may do in the future.

      Unless the transitional provisions from the Withdrawal Agreement apply, jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments will be governed by the Hague Convention 2005 if there is an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause

      If the Hague Convention of 2005 does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules.

      Judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

      On the first day of 2021 the UK left the EU regimes with which European lawyers are familiar. We appeared to enter “uncharted territory”. Not so. In fact, there are charts for this territory – or maps, to use a more modern word. You just need to know which maps.

      Whether you are a lawyer or a businessperson, in whatever country, you need answers to two questions. Which laws govern jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU member states and the UK; and how should businesses act as a result?

      What happened?

      The EU and UK reached a post-Brexit trade deal, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”), on Christmas Eve 2020. The provisions of the TCA became UK law as the European Union (Future Relationship) Act on 31 December 2020. The TCA made provision for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but did not mention judicial cooperation in civil matters, or jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial proceedings.

      So where do we look for law on those matters?

      We look at the position immediately before Brexit. As every lawyer should know the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) governed the enforcement and recognition of judgments between EU member states.

      Also, the Lugano Convention 2007 governs jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in commercial and civil matters between EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It operates in substantially the same way as Brussels (Recast) does between EU member states.

      The UK was party to the Convention by virtue of its EU membership. Now that the UK is not a member of the EU, the contracting parties could agree that the UK could join the Lugano Convention as an independent contracting party, and there would be little change to the position on jurisdiction and enforcement. English jurisdiction clauses would continue to be respected and English court judgments would continue to be readily enforceable throughout EU member states and EFTA countries, and vice versa.

      The problem is that the EU has not agreed to the UK joining the Lugano Convention

      The UK submitted its application to accede to the Lugano Convention in its own right on 8 April 2020. But accession requires the consent of all contracting parties including the EU. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have indicated their support for the UK’s accession, but the EU’s position is still not yet clear and the TCA is silent on this matter.

      While the EU still may belatedly support the UK’s accession to Lugano, it does not currently apply. In any case, a three-month time-lag applies between agreement and entry into force, unless all the contracting parties agree to waive it.

      Where are we now?

      If the transitional provisions provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement as explained in my previous post do not apply, the Brussels (Recast) Regulation will not apply to jurisdiction and enforcement between the EU and UK.

      If they do not, then you first need to decide whether the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 is applicable. The Hague Convention 2005 applies between EU Member States, Mexico, Singapore and Montenegro. The Hague Convention first came into force for the UK when the EU acceded on 1 October 2015 and the UK re-acceded after Brexit in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021.

      The Hague Convention 2005 applies if:

      • The dispute falls within the scope of the Convention as provided for by Article 2 – e.g. the Convention does not apply to employment and consumer contracts or claims for personal injury;
      • There is an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the meaning of Article 3; and
      • The exclusive jurisdiction clause is entered into after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized, and proceedings are commenced after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized within the meaning of Article 16.

      There is some uncertainty as to whether EU member states will treat the Hague Convention as having been in force from 1 October 2015, or only from when the UK re-accedes on 1 January 2021. The UK’s view is that the Convention will apply to the UK from 1 October 2015; the EU’s view is that it will apply to the UK from 1 January 2021. What is not in dispute is that for exclusive English jurisdiction clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, the contracting states will respect exclusive English jurisdiction clauses and enforce the resulting judgments.

      If the 2005 Hague Convention does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules to questions of jurisdiction and enforcement. In the UK, the rules will essentially be the same as the ‘common-law’ rules currently on enforcement applied to non-EU parties, for example the United States.

      The Norwegian exception

      The UK and Norway have reached an agreement which extends and updates an old mutual enforcement treaty, the 1961 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between the UK and Norway, which will apply if the UK does not re-accede to the Lugano Convention. The practical effect of this agreement is that judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

      How should your business act now?

      The applicable legal framework for each dispute will depend on the facts of each case. You should review the dispute resolution clauses in your cross-border contracts to assess how they may be affected by Brexit and to seek specialist advice where necessary. You should also seek advice on dispute resolution provisions when entering into new cross-border contracts in 2021.

      This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

      This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

      In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

      English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

      The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

      This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

      The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

      The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

      As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

      The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

      Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

      The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

      Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

      Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

      Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

      The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

      Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

      The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

      There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

      The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

      The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

      As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

      Novel technology in proceedings

      Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

      And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

      Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

      Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

      Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

      • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
      • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
      • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
      • the matter concerns an international dispute.

      The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

      “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

      The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

      Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

      We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

      To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

      Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

      Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

      • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
      • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
      • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
      • the disclosure of confidential documents
      • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
      • the manner of taking witness testimony
      • the costs of the proceedings.

      Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

      All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

      The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

      • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
      • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
      • The defendant submits its defence statement.
      • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
      • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
      • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
      • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
      • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

      Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

      As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

      This is a summary of the approved measures, which unfortunately for both tenants and landlords do not include any public aid or tax relief and just refer to a postponement in the payment of the rent.

      Premises to which they are applied

      Leased premises dedicated to activities different than residential: commercial, professional, industrial, cultural, teaching, amusement, healthcare, etc. They also apply to the lease of a whole industry (i.e. hotels, restaurants, bars, etc., which are the most usual type of businesses object of this deal).

      Types of tenants

      • Individual entrepreneurs or self-employed persons who were registered before Social Security before the declaration of the state of alarm on March 14th, 2020
      • Small and medium companies, as defined by article 257.1 of the Capital Companies Act: those who fulfil during two consecutive fiscal years these figures: assets under € 4 million, turnover under € 8 million and average staff under 50 people

      Types of landlords

      In order to benefit from these measures, the landlord should be a housing public entity or company or a big owner, considering as such the individuals or companies who own more than 10 urban properties (excluding parking places and storage rooms) or a built surface over 1.500 sqm.

      Measures approved

      The payment of the rent is postponed without interest meanwhile the state of alarm is in force, but in any case, for a maximum period of four months. Once the state of alarm is overcome, and in any case in a maximum term of four months, the postponed rents should be paid along a maximum period of two years, or the duration of the lease agreement, should it be less than two years.

      For landlords different to those mentioned above

      The tenant could apply before the landlord for the postponement in the payment of the rent (but the landlord is not obliged to accept it), and the parties can use the guarantee that the tenant should mandatorily have provided at the beginning of any lease agreement (usually equal to two month’s rent, but could be more if agreed by the parties), in full or in part, in order to use it to pay the rent. The tenant will have to provide again the guarantee within one year’s term, or less should the lease agreement have a shorter duration.

      Activities to which it is applied

      Activities which have been suspended according to the Royal Decree that declared the state of alarm, dated march, 14ht, 2020, or according to the orders issued by the authorities delegated by such Royal Decree. This should be proved through a certificated issued by the tax authorities.

      If the activity has not been directly suspended by the Royal Decree, the turnover during the month prior to the postponement should be less than 75% of the average monthly turnover during the same quarter last year. This should be proved through a responsible declaration by the tenant, and the landlord is authorised check the bookkeeping records.

      Term to apply and procedure

      The tenant should apply for these measures before the landlord within one month’s term from the publication of the Royal Decree-law, that is, from April 22nd, 2020, and the landlord (in case belongs to the groups mentioned in point c) is obliged to accept the tenant’s request, except if both parties have already agreed something different. The postponement would be applied to the following month.

      As the state of alarm was declared more than one month ago (March 14th), landlords and tenants have already been reaching some agreements, for example 50% rent reduction during the state of alarm, and 50% rent postponement during the following 6 months. Tenants who do not reach an agreement with the landlord could face an eviction procedure, however court procedures are suspended during the state of alarm. We have also seen some abusive non-payment of rent by tenants.

      When is becomes impossible to reach an agreement with the landlord, tenants have the legal remedy of claiming in Court for the application of the “rebus sic stantibus” principle, which was highly demanded during the 2008 financial crisis but very seldom applied by the Courts. This principle is aimed to re-balance the parties’ obligations when their situation had deeply changed because of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. This principle is not included in the Spanish Civil Code, but the Supreme Court has accepted its application, in a very restricted way, in some occasions.

      Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

      Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

      Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

      La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

      Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

      «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

      Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

      Escuchar es altamente eficaz

      En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

      Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

      «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

      Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

      En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

      «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

      Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

      La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

      En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

      «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

      Las emociones son importantes

      Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

      «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

      [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

      El Real Decreto-ley 8/2020, de 17 de marzo, de medidas urgentes extraordinarias para hacer frente al impacto económico y social del COVID-19, aunque afecta y produce efectos en muchos diferentes ámbitos jurídicos, no incluye ninguna referencia a los contratos de arrendamientos de inmuebles, ni viviendas, ni locales u oficinas.

      El objeto de esta nota es analizar los efectos de la situación del Estado de Alarma respecto a aquellos contratos de arrendamiento de oficinas o locales que se hayan visto obligados a cerrar en aplicación del decreto; aquellos otros que permanezcan total o parcialmente abiertos y en funcionamiento, bien que con una actividad reducida o mínima, en principio no son objeto de las conclusiones que más adelante alcanzamos sin perjuicio de que existan casos individualizados a los que, pese a no existir un cierre total, razonable y lógicamente puedan serles de aplicación.

      No está excluido en modo alguno que ante una prolongación de la vigencia del Estado de Alarma pudiera publicarse alguna norma que afectase a los contratos de arrendamiento, pero de momento esto no ha sucedido. Si esto llegase a acaecer, al contenido de dicha norma habrá de estarse.

      En base al principio de libertad de pactos que consagra el art. 1255 del Código Civil, que permite que sean las partes firmantes del contrato las que convengan (i) qué escenarios y situaciones deben considerarse como constitutivos de supuestos de Fuerza Mayor y Caso Fortuito y (ii) cuáles deban ser las consecuencias contractuales de los tales escenarios, el primer ejercicio es comprobar si el contrato incluye una cláusula reguladora de la Fuerza mayor y sus efectos; si es así, a la tal cláusula habrá de estarse y su análisis queda al margen de esta nota.

      En ausencia de regulación expresa en el contrato, aplicarían al caso las previsiones del Código Civil y en concreto el artículo 1.105.

      COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor

      El COVID 19 es un acontecimiento que en principio reúne los requisitos que exige el Código Civil para ser calificado como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor (art. 1105 Código Civil) ya que:

      • Se trata de un hecho ajeno y no imputable al contratante deudor de la prestación u obligación.
      • Es imprevisible, o si se reputase “previsible”, es sin duda inevitable.
      • El acontecimiento en cuestión, la pandemia, debe ser causa y tener como consecuencia el incumplimiento de la obligación, es decir debe existir un nexo causal.

      Por lo tanto, cumpliéndose los tres requisitos, la primera conclusión que alcanzamos es que muy previsiblemente, los Tribunales españoles calificarán como “Fuerza Mayor” la situación causada por el COVID 19 cuando se les plantee una contienda judicial en la que tal asunto se discuta entre los litigantes. Analizaremos a continuación las consecuencias de dicha calificación.

      Consecuencias de considerar COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza mayor

      La generalidad de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia entienden que los efectos de calificar un supuesto como caso de Fuerza Mayor en principio son:

      • Imposibilidad total y definitiva de cumplir; liberando al deudor del cumplimiento de la obligación.
      • Imposibilidad parcial de cumplir; quedando liberado el deudor sólo en la parte que le es imposible cumplir, pero siguiendo obligado por la parte que sí puede llevar a cabo.
      • Imposibilidad temporal de cumplir; el deudor queda liberado de la responsabilidad por mora mientras persista la situación de excepcionalidad.

      Ahora bien, analicemos como afectaría dicha consideración como Fuerza Mayor de la epidemia, respecto a los contratos de arrendamiento para usos distintos a la vivienda.

      Respecto al pago de la renta

      La pregunta a la que responder es, si la calificación de la situación pandémica actual como un caso de Fuerza Mayor, libera al arrendatario (cuyo local se ha visto obligado a cerrar por orden de la autoridad gubernamental) de la obligación del pago de la renta mientras dicha obligación de cierre persista, incluyendo en el concepto “liberación” diferentes alternativas: condonación total o parcial y/o aplazamiento total o parcial.

      Nos estamos encontrando en estos días con una reacción frecuente entre algunos arrendatarios, quienes, de manera unilateral, han informado a sus arrendadores que considerando COVID 19 un supuesto de fuerza mayor y habiéndose visto obligados a cerrar el local/oficina, suspenden el pago de la renta mientras dicha situación permanezca. No resuelven el contrato, no entregan la posesión, se mantienen en ella (permaneciendo el local cerrado y no operativo) pero suspenden el pago (sin quedar claro si suspender en este caso significa auto condonarse el pago de la renta o aplazarlo para cuando desaparezca el supuesto de Fuerza Mayor).

      Argumentos en contra de la liberación

      Por más que pueda considerarse “entendible” esta actitud, desde la óptica del arrendatario, no desde la del arrendador, dicha consideración se topa con un obstáculo: la interpretación que de la Fuerza Mayor ha hecho el TS respecto a las obligaciones de pago pecuniario, según la STS (Civil) de 19 mayo de 2015:

      “No pudiendo plantearse, pues, tratándose de deudas pecuniarias, la imposibilidad subjetiva -insolvencia- ni la objetiva o formal, concluye la doctrina que no es posible imaginar que si la imposibilidad obedece a caso fortuito pudiera tener como efecto la extinción de la obligación.

      La exoneración del deudor por caso fortuito no es absoluta, tiene excepciones, conforme prevé el articulo 1.105 CC, y una de ellas, por aplicación del principio «genus nunquam perit», sería en supuestos de obligaciones de entregar cosa genérica.

      En tales circunstancias el deudor pecuniario viene obligado a cumplir la prestación principal, sin que sus sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello, pues lo adeudado no es algo individualizado que ha perecido sino algo genérico como es el dinero.”

      Conclusión: no parece que este criterio jurisprudencial permita defender que el cumplimiento de las obligaciones pecuniarias quede liberado, extinto o que su incumplimiento quede justificado en casos de Fuerza Mayor, de suerte que el deudor pecuniario, en este caso el arrendatario, en aplicación de este criterio, vendría obligado a cumplir la prestación principal sin que las sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello con fundamento en la Fuerza Mayor, debido a la condición genérica que tiene el dinero.

      Argumentos a favor de la liberación: el art. 1.575 del Código Civil

      Dicho lo anterior lo anterior, debe hacerse referencia a un artículo del Código Civil que, con certeza, será profusamente citado en los conflictos judiciales que se avecinan.

      El art. 1.575, tratando del arrendamiento de fincas rústicas, reconoce el derecho del arrendatario a la rebaja de la renta en caso de pérdida de más de la mitad de los frutos (salvo pacto en contrario) en “casos fortuitos, extraordinarios e imprevistos…como incendio, guerra, peste, inundación insólita, langosta, terremoto u otro igualmente desacostumbrado que los contratantes no hayan podido racionalmente prever”.

      ¿Es aplicable este precepto, previsto para arrendamientos rústicos, a los arrendamientos urbanos?

      El art. 4.1 CC permite la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando (i) estas no contemplen un supuesto específico y (ii) regulen otro semejante entre los que se aprecie “identidad de razón”.

      La STS de 15 de enero de 2019, resolviendo un conflicto de un arrendamiento de un edificio destinado a hotel, en el que el arrendatario había pretendido la rebaja de la renta al amparo de la cláusula “rebus sic stantibus” por la crisis de 2008 y había alegado a su favor la aplicación del art.1.575, estableció:

      “La argumentación de la sentencia recurrida por la que se rechaza la pretensión de rebaja del precio pactado tampoco es contraria al criterio legal que se desprende del art. 1575 CC, que es la regla que permite la rebaja de la renta en el arrendamiento de bienes productivos que no deriven de riesgos del propio negocio, exige además que la pérdida de rendimientos se origine por casos fortuitos extraordinarios e imprevistos, algo que por su misma rareza no hubiera ser podido previsto por las partes, y que la pérdida de frutos sea de más de la mitad de los frutos. En el caso no concurre ninguna de estas circunstancias. La disminución de las rentas procede de una evolución del mercado, las partes previeron la posibilidad de que en algunos ejercicios la rentabilidad del hotel no fuera positiva para la arrendataria y las pérdidas alegadas por NH en la explotación del hotel de Almería son inferiores al cincuenta por ciento, sin contar con que el resultado global del conjunto de su actividad como gestora de una cadena de hoteles es, según considera probado la Audiencia a la vista del informe de gestión consolidado, favorable”.

      El TS no admite la aplicación del 1.575 pero no por considerarlo no aplicable a arrendamientos distintos a los rústicos, sino por concluir que no se dan los requisitos para ello ya que ni era imprevisible la crisis de 2008 ni las pérdidas del arrendatario son superiores al 50%.

      Pero, esa interpretación del TS junto con el tenor del art. 4.1 CC permitirían avalar la pretensión del arrendatario que se encuentra sin ingreso alguno durante el Estado de Alarma, de exigir una rebaja de renta que se adecuara al principio de proporcionalidad.

      Respecto a la terminación anticipada a instancias del arrendatario

      Sin embargo, podemos encontrarnos con situaciones en las que el arrendatario, ante la actual situación, decida terminar anticipadamente el contrato de arrendamiento debido a la situación provocada por el COVID 19, poniendo el local a disposición del arrendador.

      Son supuestos en los que se pretende la resolución anticipada del contrato, sin respetar (i) o el plazo obligatorio (ii) o el preaviso, en ambos casos bajo la hipótesis de que estén así regulados en el contrato.

      En estos supuestos entendemos que sí puede resultar defendible que, debido a la situación de fuerza mayor provocada por el COVID 19 y en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, se exonere al arrendatario de la obligación:

      • De respetar un plazo de vigencia determinada del contrato de arrendamiento
      • De preavisar al arrendador en caso de resolución anticipada del contrato

      En ambos casos el contrato quedaría resuelto con la entrega de la posesión del local, sin perjuicio de tener que respetar las obligaciones que prevé el contrato para la terminación y entrega siempre que las mismas no se vean igualmente afectadas por la situación de Fuerza Mayor.

      Nuestra opinión es que, también en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, sería defendible ante los Tribunales la tesis de que el arrendatario quedaría liberado de cualquier obligación de resarcimiento de daños al arrendador por dicha resolución anticipada o incumplimiento de la duración obligada del contrato.

      Conclusión

      En conclusión, planteado ante los Tribunales el debate sobre cómo la pandemia (que no hay duda será calificada como caso de Fuerza Mayor) afectará a las obligaciones a cargo del arrendatario que se haya visto obligado a cerrar su negocio, nuestra opinión es la siguiente:

      1. Respecto a la obligación de pago de la renta, pese al criterio contrario de la sentencia que citamos de 19 de mayo de 2015, nos parece potente y defendible la remisión al art. 1575 y a su aplicación analógica con apoyo en la STS de 15 de enero de 2019, para exigir una reducción proporcional y equitativa de la renta.
      2. Respecto a la facultad del arrendatario para resolver el contrato anticipadamente, entregando la posesión del inmueble al arrendador, exonerando al arrendatario de cumplir con sus obligaciones de preaviso o de duración obligada previstas en el contrato en cuestión, y sin tener que indemnizar al arrendador por ello, entendemos que también existe fundamento para defender judicialmente esta posición.

      Aplicación de la cláusula Rebus Sic Stantibus (RSS)

      Analizaremos a continuación si puede ser aplicable al caso que estamos analizando la cláusula RSS y con qué consecuencias.

      Requisitos de la cláusula RSS (aforismo latino que significa “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”)

      La expresión RSS, opera como una cláusula intrínseca (es decir implícita, sin necesidad de pactarse expresamente) en la relación contractual, que significa que las estipulaciones establecidas en un contrato lo son habida cuenta de las circunstancias concurrentes en el momento, esto es, “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”, de forma que cualquier alteración sustancial y no prevista de las mismas podrían dar lugar a la modificación del contenido contractual.

      La cláusula RSS no está regulada en ningún precepto en nuestro ordenamiento; es una construcción doctrinal que tradicionalmente la jurisprudencia ha admitido (ejemplos entre otros muchos STS de 30 de junio de 2014, 24 de febrero de 2015, 15 de enero de 2019, 18 de julio de 2019), con mucha cautela, solo en ciertos casos, y requiriendo las siguientes premisas

      • Que se haya producido una alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias del contrato, en el momento que el mismo se deba cumplir, en relación con las concurrentes al tiempo de su celebración. Para valorar si una incidencia puede determinar la mutación o alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias que dotaron sentido al contrato, debemos atenernos a lo siguiente: a) Debemos contrastar el alcance de dicha mutación o alteración respecto del sentido o finalidad del contrato y de la conmutatividad o equilibrio prestacional del mismo; y b) Debe quedar excluido el «riesgo normal» inherente o derivado del contrato.
      • Que se haya producido una desproporción exorbitante, fuera de todo cálculo, entre las prestaciones de las partes contratantes, provocando un desequilibrio entre las mismas.
      • Que lo anterior se produzca como consecuencia de circunstancias radicalmente imprevisibles.
      • Que no exista otro remedio para superar la situación.

      Históricamente nuestros tribunales han sido muy reacios a aplicar RSS si bien desde la crisis económica de 2008-2012 ha tenido lugar un cierto cambio de criterio y una mayor receptividad jurisprudencial-

      Consecuencias de la aplicación de la RSS

      La doctrina establece que la aplicación de la RSS no tiene, en principio, efectos rescisorios, resolutorios o extintivos del contrato, sino únicamente efectos modificativos del mismo, encaminados a compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones; a su vez la doctrina establece que se aplica únicamente a los contratos a largo plazo o de tracto sucesivo y de ejecución diferida.

      En aplicación de la buena fe, la reacción ante un evento de caso fortuito, fuerza mayor o en general un evento que genera una desproporción entre las partes, como la que regula la institución RSS, debe ser la modificación del contrato para reequilibrar las obligaciones entre las partes, y solo en caso de imposibilidad material de cumplimiento, la resolución de la obligación, en ambos casos sin indemnización por incumplimiento.

      Por ello, en el ámbito de los contratos de arrendamiento y en el caso de cierre de los locales por mandato imperativo, entendemos que la institución RSS podrá ser:

      • alegada por los arrendatarios para solicitar o instar de los arrendadores modificaciones a las prestaciones económicas del contrato y
      • estimada por los jueces, cuando estos supuestos se debatan ante los Tribunales, a la hora de aceptar como equitativas y legítimas las tales novaciones contractuales con el fin de compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones generado por los efectos del COVID 19.

      En suma, la cláusula RSS puede ser una herramienta para el arrendatario de un local que ha tenido que cerrar durante el Estado de Alarma, a la hora de negociar con el arrendador una modificación del contrato, intentando aplazar la renta mientras se prolongue el Estado de Alarma o negociando un descuento de esta.

      Debe recordarse:

      • Que la RSS es de ineludible aplicación casuística, no caben generalizaciones y será necesario tener en cuenta el efecto que provoque el COVID 19 en cada relación contractual concreta (STS de 30 de junio de 2014 y 24 de febrero de 2015) y el efectivo desequilibrio de las prestaciones que haya producido, y
      • Que, como hemos dicho, los Tribunales son en general reacios a la aplicación de esta cláusula a la que solo acuden en caso de falta de cualquier otra herramienta jurídica y en situaciones en que el mantenimiento del status quo contractual revele una manifiesta “injusticia” y un patente y rotundo desequilibrio entre las prestaciones de las partes.

      ¿Significa lo anterior que el arrendatario podrá imponer al arrendador una modificación de las condiciones económicas del contrato al amparo de RSS (aplazamiento o condonación total o parcial)?

      No lo creemos de manera tan rotunda; lo que si pensamos es que la aplicación de esta institución RSS debería,

      • Justificar una razonable solicitud del arrendatario de novar temporalmente las condiciones del contrato (aplazamiento o condonación, total o parcial) que al arrendador debe razonablemente atender.
      • En caso de negativa irrazonable del arrendador, y documentando cuanto más profusamente pueda el arrendatario su solicitud y las eventuales negociaciones o negativa a mantenerlas por la contra parte, permitirle fundamentar una suspensión del pago de la renta, total o parcial, durante la pendencia del Estado de Alarma con ánimo, no de extinción de la obligación, pero sí de su aplazamiento.

      Habremos de esperar a la reacción de los tribunales cuando lleguen a su conocimiento estos conflictos, como sin duda ocurrirá; pero si nos atrevemos a adelantar que es bastante posible que la tendencia judicial sea la de conceder amparo al arrendatario con apoyo en la cláusula RSS y el principio de la preservación del negocio, a la hora de dar validez a determinados efectos modificativos respecto a las obligaciones pecuniarias a cargo del arrendatario (condonación total o parcial del pago de la renta durante la crisis pandémica, aplazamiento, aplazamiento parcial).

      En todo caso será esencial acreditar que la conducta del contratante deudor que busca amparo en la cláusula RSS para novar el contrato se ha ajustado estrictamente al principio de buena fe (STS 30 de abril de 2015).

      También será importante analizar caso por caso por qué se justifica el desplazamiento del riesgo derivado del “suceso excepcional e imprevisto” de un contratante al otro (STS de 15 de enero de 2015) y bien podría defenderse (STS de 18 de julio de 2019) que deben ambos contratantes repartirse y asumir entre los dos las consecuencias.

      Las decisiones judiciales variarán en cada caso concreto que habrá de ser objeto de estudio individualizado.

      Conclusiones y Recomendaciones

      En suma, parece que al arrendatario contaría con dos instrumentos para la pretensión de suspender (signifique esto condonar o aplazar) el pago de las rentas, la cláusula RSS y el principio de Fuerza Mayor.

      A nuestro modo de ver, la reposición del equilibrio contractual alterado por el suceso excepcional puede consistir o bien en una prórroga de los plazos de pago del arrendamiento o bien en la aplicación de una condonación total o parcial de la obligación de pago de rentas mientras dure el Estado de Alarma, pero entendemos que será defendible que el retraso en el pago del arrendamiento no podrá dar lugar ni a la resolución del contrato al amparo del art. 1124 Cc ni a la exigencia de daños y perjuicios art. 1105 Cc, en consecuencia, no facultará al arrendador a instar el desahucio.

      Por ello los pasos a seguir en cada caso serían:

      • Realizar un examen del contrato para ver si se regulan los casos de fuerza mayor y caso fortuito y si la situación actual concuerda con lo regulado en el contrato.
      • En caso de que no se estipule nada en el contrato, y habiéndose cerrado el local u oficina, advertir de ello a la otra parte e intentar negociar una novación del contrato de arrendamiento solicitando: (i) condonación total de la renta durante el Estado de Alarma; (ii) condonación parcial compartiendo ambas partes el esfuerzo en proporción por convenir; y (iii) aplazamiento del pago de la renta hasta que se pueda reabrir el local u oficina con un plan de pagos de la deuda aplazada.
      • Si no es posible llegar a un acuerdo, es conveniente dejar constancia de que se ha actuado con buena fe intentando llegar a una solución negociada y en el extremo (desde la óptica del arrendatario) anunciar, sin esperar a recibir una comunicación o reclamación del Arrendador, la suspensión del pago de las rentas justificando la misma en el Estado de Alarma hasta la finalización del mismo y la consecuente reapertura del local/oficina.

      QUICK SUMMARY: Contract negotiations do not take place in a legal vacuum. A party who negotiates contrary to the principle of good faith and then breaks off negotiations may become liable to the other party. However, the requirements for such liability are high and the enforcement of damage claims is cumbersome. At the end of the post I will share some practical tips for contract negotiations in Switzerland.

      Under Swiss law, the principle of freedom of contract is of fundamental importance. It follows from the freedom of contract that, in principle, everyone is free to enter into contract negotiations and to terminate them again without incurring any liability. A termination of contract negotiations does not have to be justified either.

      However, the freedom of contract is limited by the obligation to act in good faith (cf. article 2 para. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code), which is of equal fundamental importance. From the moment when parties enter into contract negotiations, they are in a special legal relationship with each other. That pre-contractual relationship involves certain reciprocal obligations. In particular, the parties must negotiate in a serious manner and in accordance with their actual intentions.

      Negotiating parties must not stir up the hope of the other party, contrary to their actual intentions, that a contract will actually be concluded. Put differently, a party’s willingness to conclude a contract must not be expressed more strongly than it actually is. If a party realizes that the other party wrongly beliefs that a contract would certainly be concluded, such illusion should be dispelled in due course.

      A negotiating party that terminates contract negotiations in violation of these principles, whether maliciously or negligently, may become liable to the other party based on the culpa in contrahendo doctrine. However, such liability exists in exceptional cases only.

      • The fact that contract negotiations took a long time is not sufficient for incurring such liability. The duration of negotiations is, in itself, not decisive.
      • It is not possible to derive liability from pre-existing contractual relationships between the negotiation parties, as for example in cases where parties negotiate a «mere» prolongation of an existing agreement. The decisive factor is not whether parties were already contractually bound before, but only whether the party that terminated the contract negotiations made the other party believe that a new agreement would certainly be concluded.
      • It is not decisive whether the party who terminates contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made costly investments in view of the prospective contract. In principle, anyone who makes investments already prior to the actual conclusion of a contract does so at its own risk. Even where a party to contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made (substantial) investments in the prospective agreement, a termination of the contract negotiations will, in itself, not be considered as an act of bad faith.

      What does a liability for breaking off negotiations include?

      If a party violates the aforementioned pre-contractual obligations, the other party may be entitled to compensation for the so-called negative interest. This means that the other party must be put in the position it would have been if the negotiations had not taken place. Damages may include, e.g., expenses in connection with the negotiation of the contract (travel costs, legal fees etc.), but also a loss of income in cases where a party was not able to do business with third parties because of the contract negotiations. However, the other party has no right to be treated as if the contract had been concluded (so-called positive interest).

      Having said that, it must be kept in mind that the requirements set by Swiss court for the substantiation of damages are rather high, so that the enforcement of a liability for breaking off negotiations will often be a cumbersome process. Therefore pursuing damage claims with relatively low amounts in dispute might often require a disproportionate effort.

      Practical tips – Do’s and don’ts when negotiating contracts

      • Do not overstate your willingness to conclude a contract. Be frank with your counterparty. Make it clear from the beginning of the negotiations what clauses are important to you.
      • Do not tell the other party that you are willing to sign a contract, if you still have doubts or you are even unwilling to do so. Confirm that you will sign only if you are convinced to do so.
      • Do not allow someone else (e.g., a representative, employee, branch office etc.) to negotiate on your behalf if you are not willing to enter into an agreement anyway. Keep an eye on how the negotiations are going on and intervene if necessary.
      • Do not make costly investments before a legally binding agreement is concluded. If, for time or other reasons, such investments are necessary already before the conclusion of an agreement, insist on the conclusion of an interim contract governing such investments for the event that the envisaged agreement is not concluded finally.

      In 2020, an important revision of the Swiss statute of limitations enters into force. The new law provides for longer limitation periods in cases of personal injury and extends the relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law from one to three years.

      Background of the revision

      In June 2018, the Swiss parliament adopted an amendment to the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”) pertaining to a revision of the statute of limitations. In November 2018, the Swiss government decided that the revised statute of limitations shall enter into force on 1 January 2020.

      The revision was significantly influenced by asbestos cases. Under the current law, damage claims of asbestos victims were time-barred in some cases even before asbestos-related diseases could be diagnosed. In March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held in Howald Moor and others v. Switzerland that the Swiss statute of limitations amounts in such cases to a violation of article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right of access to a court).

      Having said that, the revision does not only concern cases of personal injury, but also includes numerous other important changes as described in the following.

      Key changes regarding limitation periods

      A. Tort law

      In tort law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

      With the exception of cases of personal injury, the absolute limitation period remains ten years as from the date when the conduct that caused the damages occurred or ended (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

      In cases of personal injury, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable. Currently the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

      The new absolute limitation period in cases of personal injury amounts to twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 60 para. 1bis CO). Under the current law, there was no special absolute limitation period for cases of personal injury, so that the ordinary 10-year period applied (Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

      If conduct, which gives rise to liability under tort law, is also punishable under criminal law, the (longer) limitation period under criminal law remains applicable (cf. Art. 97 of the Swiss Criminal Code). However, where a first-instance criminal judgment is rendered before the conduct is time-barred under criminal law, the limitation periods ends not earlier than three years as from that criminal judgment (revised Art. 60 para. 2 CO). The current law does not provide for such an additional three-year limitation period.

      B. Unjust enrichment law

      In unjust enrichment law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years as from the date on which the injured party knows about the claim (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

      The absolute limitation period is not affected by the revision and remains ten years after the date on which the claim arises (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO).

      C. Contract law

      With regard to contractual claims, the ordinary limitation period remains ten years from the due date (Art. 127 CO). Furthermore, the shorter limitation period of five years from the due date applicable to (amongst others) claims for rent, interest on capital and other periodic payments, (most) claims out of employment relationships etc. remains unchanged too (Art. 128 CO).

      However, in cases of personal injury, the revised statute of limitations introduces a new relative limitation period of three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage, as well as a new absolute limitation period of twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 128a CO). The current law does not provide for distinct relative and absolute limitation periods for contractual claims in cases of personal injury. Instead, the ordinary ten-year limitation period (Art. 127 CO) usually applied to such cases.

      D. Summary

      In summary, the most important elements of the revised statute of limitations are the longer (trebled) relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law (i.e., three years instead of one year) and the new special rules for cases of personal injury, which now benefit from a 20-year absolute limitation period.

      Transitional provisions / application of the revised statute of limitations to pre-existing claims

      The longer limitation periods under the revised CO apply to any claims that are not yet time-barred when the revision enters into force (i.e., on 1 January 2020; revised Art. 49 para. 1, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). In other words, the limitation periods of any claims that do not become time-barred until 31 December 2019 at the latest will be prolonged. This is of particular relevance with regard to claims based on tort and unjust enrichment; the short one-year relative limitation periods under the current law will be extended by another two years.

      In contrast, the current law remains applicable in case the revised statute of limitations provides for shorter limitation periods (revised Art. 49 para. 2, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). This concerns, in particular, contractual claims in cases of personal injury. The new three-year relative limitation period under the revised law might not apply to such claims, as the current statute of limitations does not provide for a relative limitation period at all.

      Further changes brought by the revision

      In addition to the changes of the limitation periods set out above, the revision of the statute of limitations contains numerous further modifications. Some of them are listed in the following:

      1. Limitation periods do not commence or are suspended in the event that a claim cannot be asserted for objective reasons before any court worldwide (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 6 CO). The current law provides for such non-commencement or suspension only if the claim cannot be brought before a Swiss court.
      2. Parties to a dispute may agree in writing that limitation periods shall be suspended during settlement discussions, mediation proceedings or other out-of-court settlement proceedings (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 8 CO).
      3. Once a limitation period has commenced to run, waivers of statute of limitation defenses are admissible, but must not exceed ten years (revised Art. 141 para. 1 CO). Any such waivers must be in writing (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
      4. In general terms and conditions (“GTC”), statute of limitation defenses may be waived by the party who makes use of the GTCs only. In contrast, a waiver by the party on whom the GTCs are imposed (e.g., consumers) is ineffective (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
      5. The limitation period for an actio pauliana under the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) is extended to from currently two years to three years after service of a loss certificate, the opening of bankruptcy proceedings or the confirmation of a composition agreement with an assignment of assets (whichever is applicable; revised Art. 292 DEBA).

      If 2017 was the year of Initial Coin Offerings, 2018 was the year of Blockchain awareness and testing all over the world. From ICO focused guidelines and regulations respectively aimed to alarm and protect investors, we have seen the shift, especially in Europe, to distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) focused guidelines and regulations aimed at protecting citizens on one hand and promote DLT implementations on the other.

      Indeed, European Union Member States and the European Parliament started looking deeper into the technology by, for instance, calling for consultations with professionals in order to understand DLT’s potentials for real-world implementations and possible risks.

      In this article I am aiming to give a brief snapshot of firstly what are the most notable European initiatives and moves towards promoting Blockchain implementation and secondly current challenges faced by European law makers when dealing with the regulation of distributed ledger technologies.

      Europe

      Let’s start from the European Blockchain Partnership (“EBP”), a statement made by 25 EU Member States acknowledging the importance of distributed ledger technology for society, in particular when it comes to interoperability, cyber security and efficiency of digital public services. The Partnership is not only an acknowledgement, it is also a commitment from all signatory states to collaborate to build what they envision will be a distributed ledger infrastructure for the delivering of cross-border public services.

      Witness of the trust given to the technology is My Health My Data, a EU-backed project that uses DLT to enable patients to efficiently control their digitally recorded health data while securing it from the threat of data breaches. Benefits the EU saw in DLT on this specific project are safety, efficiency but most notably the opportunity that DLT offers data subject to have finally control over their own data, without the need for intermediaries.

      Another important initiative proving European interests in testing DLT technologies is the Horizon Prize on “Blockchains for Social Good”, a 5 million Euros worth challenge open to innovators and tech companies to develop scalable, efficient and high-impact decentralized solutions to social innovation challenges.

      Moving forward, in December last year, I had the honor to be part of the “ Workshop on Blockchains & Smart Contracts Legal and Regulatory Framework” in Paris, an initiative supported by the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum (“EUBOF”), a pilot project initiated by the European Parliament. Earlier last year other three workshops were held, the aim of each was to collect knowledge on specific topics from an audience of leading DLT legal and technical professionals. With the knowledge collected, the EUBOF followed up with reports of what was discussed during the workshop and suggest a way forward.

      Although not binding, these reports give a reasonably clear guideline to the industry on how existing laws at a European level apply to the technology, or at least should be interpreted, and highlight areas where new regulation is definitely needed. As an example let’s look at the Report on Blockchain & GDPR. If you missed it, the GDPR is the Regulation that protects Europeans personal data and it’s applicable to all companies globally, which are processing data from European citizens. The “right to erasure” embedded in the GDPR, doesn’t allow personal data to be stored on an immutable database, the data subject has to be able to erase data anytime when shared with a service provider and stored somewhere on a database. In the case of Blockchain, the consensus on personal data having to be stored off-chain is therefore unanimous. Storing personal data off-chain and leaving an hash to that data on-chain, is a viable solution if certain precautions are taken in order to avoid the risks of reversibility or linkability of such hash to the personal data stored off-chain, therefore making the hash on-chain personally identifiable information.

      However, not all European laws apply to Member States, therefore making it hard to give a EU-wide answer to most DLT compliance challenges in Europe. Member States freedom to legislate is indeed only limited/influenced by two main instruments, Regulations, which are automatically enforceable in each Member State and Directives binding Member States to legislate on specific topics according to a set of specific rules.

      Diverging national laws have a great effect on multiple aspects of innovative technologies. Let’s look for instance at the validity of “smart contracts”. When discussing the legal power of automatically enforceable digital contracts, the lack of a European wide legislation on contracts makes it impossible to find an answer applicable to all Member States. For instance, is “offer and acceptance” enough to constitute a contract? What is considered a valid “acceptance”? What is an “obligation”? “Can a digital asset be the object of a legally binding agreement”?

      If we try to give a EU-wide answer to the questions such as smart contract validity and enforceability it is apparently not possible since we will need to consider 28 different answers. I, therefore, believe that the future of innovation in Europe will highly depend on the unification of laws.

      An example of a unified law that has great benefits on innovation (including DLT) is the Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS) Regulation, which governs electronic identification including electronic signatures.

      The race to regulating DLT in Europe

      Let’s now look briefly at a couple of Member States legislations, specifically on Blockchain and cryptocurrencies last year.

      EU Member States have been quite creative I would say in regulating the new technology. Let’s start from Malta, which saw a surprising increase of important projects and companies, such as Binance, landing on the beautiful Mediterranean Island thanks to its favorable (or at least felt as such) legislations on DLT. The “Blockchain Island” passed three laws in early July to regulate and supervise Blockchain projects including ICOs, crypto exchanges and DLT, specifically: The Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act regulation that aims at recognizing different technology arrangements such as DAOs, smart contracts and in future probably AI machines; The Virtual Financial Assets Act for ICOs and crypto exchanges; The Malta Digital Innovation Authority establishing a new supervisory authority.

      Some think the Maltese legislation lacks a comprehensive framework, one that for instance, gives legal personality to Innovative Technology Arrangements. For this reason some are therefore accusing the Maltese lawmakers of rushing into an uncompleted regulatory framework in order to attract business to the island while others seem to positively welcome the laws as a good start for a European wide regulation on DLT and crypto assets.

      In December 2018, Malta also initiated a declaration that was then signed by other six Members States, calling for collaboration for the promotion and implementation of DLT on a European level.

      France was one of the signatories of such declaration, and it’s worth mentioning since the French Minister for the Economy and Finance approved in September a framework for regulating ICOs and therefore protecting investors’ rights, basically giving the AMF (French Authority for Financial Market) the empowerment to give licenses to companies wanting to raise funds through Initial Coin Offerings.

      Last but not least comes Switzerland which although it is not a EU Member State, it has great degree of influence on European and national legislators when it comes to progressive regulations. At the end of December, the Swiss Federal Council released a report on DLT and the law, making a clear statement that the existing Swiss law is sufficient to regulate most matters related to DLT and Blockchain, although some adjustments have to be made. So no new laws but few amendments here and there, which will allow the integration of the specific DLT applications with existing laws in order to ensure legal certainty on certain uncovered matters. Relevant areas of Swiss law that will be amended include the transfer of rights utilizing digital registers, Anti Money Laundering rules specifically for decentralized trading platforms and bankruptcy when that proceeding involves crypto assets.

      Conclusions

      To summarize, from the approach taken during the past year, it is apparent that there is great interest in Europe to understand the potentials and to soon test implementations of distributed ledger technology. Lawmakers have also an understanding that the technology is in an infant state, it might involve risks, therefore making it complex to set specific rules or to give final answers on the alignment of certain technology applications with existing European or national laws.

      To achieve European wide results, however, acknowledgments, guidelines and reports are not enough. The setting of standards for lawmakers applicable to all Member States or even unification of laws in crucial sectors influencing directly or indirectly new technologies, will be the only solution for any innovative technology to be adopted at a European level.

      The author of this post is Alessandro Mazzi.

      Renato Bucher

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        Switzerland – New law changes statute of limitations

        20 de noviembre de 2019

        • Suiza
        • Contratos

        Summary

        The recent post-Brexit trade deal makes no provision for jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments.

        Therefore, the UK dropped out of the jurisdiction of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) on 31 December 2020.

        The EU has not yet approved the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, but may do in the future.

        Unless the transitional provisions from the Withdrawal Agreement apply, jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments will be governed by the Hague Convention 2005 if there is an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause

        If the Hague Convention of 2005 does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules.

        Judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

        On the first day of 2021 the UK left the EU regimes with which European lawyers are familiar. We appeared to enter “uncharted territory”. Not so. In fact, there are charts for this territory – or maps, to use a more modern word. You just need to know which maps.

        Whether you are a lawyer or a businessperson, in whatever country, you need answers to two questions. Which laws govern jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU member states and the UK; and how should businesses act as a result?

        What happened?

        The EU and UK reached a post-Brexit trade deal, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”), on Christmas Eve 2020. The provisions of the TCA became UK law as the European Union (Future Relationship) Act on 31 December 2020. The TCA made provision for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but did not mention judicial cooperation in civil matters, or jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial proceedings.

        So where do we look for law on those matters?

        We look at the position immediately before Brexit. As every lawyer should know the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) governed the enforcement and recognition of judgments between EU member states.

        Also, the Lugano Convention 2007 governs jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in commercial and civil matters between EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It operates in substantially the same way as Brussels (Recast) does between EU member states.

        The UK was party to the Convention by virtue of its EU membership. Now that the UK is not a member of the EU, the contracting parties could agree that the UK could join the Lugano Convention as an independent contracting party, and there would be little change to the position on jurisdiction and enforcement. English jurisdiction clauses would continue to be respected and English court judgments would continue to be readily enforceable throughout EU member states and EFTA countries, and vice versa.

        The problem is that the EU has not agreed to the UK joining the Lugano Convention

        The UK submitted its application to accede to the Lugano Convention in its own right on 8 April 2020. But accession requires the consent of all contracting parties including the EU. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have indicated their support for the UK’s accession, but the EU’s position is still not yet clear and the TCA is silent on this matter.

        While the EU still may belatedly support the UK’s accession to Lugano, it does not currently apply. In any case, a three-month time-lag applies between agreement and entry into force, unless all the contracting parties agree to waive it.

        Where are we now?

        If the transitional provisions provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement as explained in my previous post do not apply, the Brussels (Recast) Regulation will not apply to jurisdiction and enforcement between the EU and UK.

        If they do not, then you first need to decide whether the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 is applicable. The Hague Convention 2005 applies between EU Member States, Mexico, Singapore and Montenegro. The Hague Convention first came into force for the UK when the EU acceded on 1 October 2015 and the UK re-acceded after Brexit in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021.

        The Hague Convention 2005 applies if:

        • The dispute falls within the scope of the Convention as provided for by Article 2 – e.g. the Convention does not apply to employment and consumer contracts or claims for personal injury;
        • There is an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the meaning of Article 3; and
        • The exclusive jurisdiction clause is entered into after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized, and proceedings are commenced after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized within the meaning of Article 16.

        There is some uncertainty as to whether EU member states will treat the Hague Convention as having been in force from 1 October 2015, or only from when the UK re-accedes on 1 January 2021. The UK’s view is that the Convention will apply to the UK from 1 October 2015; the EU’s view is that it will apply to the UK from 1 January 2021. What is not in dispute is that for exclusive English jurisdiction clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, the contracting states will respect exclusive English jurisdiction clauses and enforce the resulting judgments.

        If the 2005 Hague Convention does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules to questions of jurisdiction and enforcement. In the UK, the rules will essentially be the same as the ‘common-law’ rules currently on enforcement applied to non-EU parties, for example the United States.

        The Norwegian exception

        The UK and Norway have reached an agreement which extends and updates an old mutual enforcement treaty, the 1961 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between the UK and Norway, which will apply if the UK does not re-accede to the Lugano Convention. The practical effect of this agreement is that judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

        How should your business act now?

        The applicable legal framework for each dispute will depend on the facts of each case. You should review the dispute resolution clauses in your cross-border contracts to assess how they may be affected by Brexit and to seek specialist advice where necessary. You should also seek advice on dispute resolution provisions when entering into new cross-border contracts in 2021.

        This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

        This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

        In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

        English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

        The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

        This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

        The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

        The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

        As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

        The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

        Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

        The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

        Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

        Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

        Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

        The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

        Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

        The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

        There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

        The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

        The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

        As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

        Novel technology in proceedings

        Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

        And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

        Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

        Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

        Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

        • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
        • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
        • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
        • the matter concerns an international dispute.

        The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

        “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

        The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

        Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

        We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

        To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

        Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

        Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

        • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
        • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
        • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
        • the disclosure of confidential documents
        • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
        • the manner of taking witness testimony
        • the costs of the proceedings.

        Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

        All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

        The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

        • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
        • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
        • The defendant submits its defence statement.
        • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
        • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
        • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
        • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
        • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

        Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

        As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

        This is a summary of the approved measures, which unfortunately for both tenants and landlords do not include any public aid or tax relief and just refer to a postponement in the payment of the rent.

        Premises to which they are applied

        Leased premises dedicated to activities different than residential: commercial, professional, industrial, cultural, teaching, amusement, healthcare, etc. They also apply to the lease of a whole industry (i.e. hotels, restaurants, bars, etc., which are the most usual type of businesses object of this deal).

        Types of tenants

        • Individual entrepreneurs or self-employed persons who were registered before Social Security before the declaration of the state of alarm on March 14th, 2020
        • Small and medium companies, as defined by article 257.1 of the Capital Companies Act: those who fulfil during two consecutive fiscal years these figures: assets under € 4 million, turnover under € 8 million and average staff under 50 people

        Types of landlords

        In order to benefit from these measures, the landlord should be a housing public entity or company or a big owner, considering as such the individuals or companies who own more than 10 urban properties (excluding parking places and storage rooms) or a built surface over 1.500 sqm.

        Measures approved

        The payment of the rent is postponed without interest meanwhile the state of alarm is in force, but in any case, for a maximum period of four months. Once the state of alarm is overcome, and in any case in a maximum term of four months, the postponed rents should be paid along a maximum period of two years, or the duration of the lease agreement, should it be less than two years.

        For landlords different to those mentioned above

        The tenant could apply before the landlord for the postponement in the payment of the rent (but the landlord is not obliged to accept it), and the parties can use the guarantee that the tenant should mandatorily have provided at the beginning of any lease agreement (usually equal to two month’s rent, but could be more if agreed by the parties), in full or in part, in order to use it to pay the rent. The tenant will have to provide again the guarantee within one year’s term, or less should the lease agreement have a shorter duration.

        Activities to which it is applied

        Activities which have been suspended according to the Royal Decree that declared the state of alarm, dated march, 14ht, 2020, or according to the orders issued by the authorities delegated by such Royal Decree. This should be proved through a certificated issued by the tax authorities.

        If the activity has not been directly suspended by the Royal Decree, the turnover during the month prior to the postponement should be less than 75% of the average monthly turnover during the same quarter last year. This should be proved through a responsible declaration by the tenant, and the landlord is authorised check the bookkeeping records.

        Term to apply and procedure

        The tenant should apply for these measures before the landlord within one month’s term from the publication of the Royal Decree-law, that is, from April 22nd, 2020, and the landlord (in case belongs to the groups mentioned in point c) is obliged to accept the tenant’s request, except if both parties have already agreed something different. The postponement would be applied to the following month.

        As the state of alarm was declared more than one month ago (March 14th), landlords and tenants have already been reaching some agreements, for example 50% rent reduction during the state of alarm, and 50% rent postponement during the following 6 months. Tenants who do not reach an agreement with the landlord could face an eviction procedure, however court procedures are suspended during the state of alarm. We have also seen some abusive non-payment of rent by tenants.

        When is becomes impossible to reach an agreement with the landlord, tenants have the legal remedy of claiming in Court for the application of the “rebus sic stantibus” principle, which was highly demanded during the 2008 financial crisis but very seldom applied by the Courts. This principle is aimed to re-balance the parties’ obligations when their situation had deeply changed because of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. This principle is not included in the Spanish Civil Code, but the Supreme Court has accepted its application, in a very restricted way, in some occasions.

        Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

        Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

        Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

        La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

        Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

        «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

        Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

        Escuchar es altamente eficaz

        En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

        Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

        «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

        Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

        En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

        «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

        Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

        La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

        En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

        «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

        Las emociones son importantes

        Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

        «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

        [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

        El Real Decreto-ley 8/2020, de 17 de marzo, de medidas urgentes extraordinarias para hacer frente al impacto económico y social del COVID-19, aunque afecta y produce efectos en muchos diferentes ámbitos jurídicos, no incluye ninguna referencia a los contratos de arrendamientos de inmuebles, ni viviendas, ni locales u oficinas.

        El objeto de esta nota es analizar los efectos de la situación del Estado de Alarma respecto a aquellos contratos de arrendamiento de oficinas o locales que se hayan visto obligados a cerrar en aplicación del decreto; aquellos otros que permanezcan total o parcialmente abiertos y en funcionamiento, bien que con una actividad reducida o mínima, en principio no son objeto de las conclusiones que más adelante alcanzamos sin perjuicio de que existan casos individualizados a los que, pese a no existir un cierre total, razonable y lógicamente puedan serles de aplicación.

        No está excluido en modo alguno que ante una prolongación de la vigencia del Estado de Alarma pudiera publicarse alguna norma que afectase a los contratos de arrendamiento, pero de momento esto no ha sucedido. Si esto llegase a acaecer, al contenido de dicha norma habrá de estarse.

        En base al principio de libertad de pactos que consagra el art. 1255 del Código Civil, que permite que sean las partes firmantes del contrato las que convengan (i) qué escenarios y situaciones deben considerarse como constitutivos de supuestos de Fuerza Mayor y Caso Fortuito y (ii) cuáles deban ser las consecuencias contractuales de los tales escenarios, el primer ejercicio es comprobar si el contrato incluye una cláusula reguladora de la Fuerza mayor y sus efectos; si es así, a la tal cláusula habrá de estarse y su análisis queda al margen de esta nota.

        En ausencia de regulación expresa en el contrato, aplicarían al caso las previsiones del Código Civil y en concreto el artículo 1.105.

        COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor

        El COVID 19 es un acontecimiento que en principio reúne los requisitos que exige el Código Civil para ser calificado como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor (art. 1105 Código Civil) ya que:

        • Se trata de un hecho ajeno y no imputable al contratante deudor de la prestación u obligación.
        • Es imprevisible, o si se reputase “previsible”, es sin duda inevitable.
        • El acontecimiento en cuestión, la pandemia, debe ser causa y tener como consecuencia el incumplimiento de la obligación, es decir debe existir un nexo causal.

        Por lo tanto, cumpliéndose los tres requisitos, la primera conclusión que alcanzamos es que muy previsiblemente, los Tribunales españoles calificarán como “Fuerza Mayor” la situación causada por el COVID 19 cuando se les plantee una contienda judicial en la que tal asunto se discuta entre los litigantes. Analizaremos a continuación las consecuencias de dicha calificación.

        Consecuencias de considerar COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza mayor

        La generalidad de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia entienden que los efectos de calificar un supuesto como caso de Fuerza Mayor en principio son:

        • Imposibilidad total y definitiva de cumplir; liberando al deudor del cumplimiento de la obligación.
        • Imposibilidad parcial de cumplir; quedando liberado el deudor sólo en la parte que le es imposible cumplir, pero siguiendo obligado por la parte que sí puede llevar a cabo.
        • Imposibilidad temporal de cumplir; el deudor queda liberado de la responsabilidad por mora mientras persista la situación de excepcionalidad.

        Ahora bien, analicemos como afectaría dicha consideración como Fuerza Mayor de la epidemia, respecto a los contratos de arrendamiento para usos distintos a la vivienda.

        Respecto al pago de la renta

        La pregunta a la que responder es, si la calificación de la situación pandémica actual como un caso de Fuerza Mayor, libera al arrendatario (cuyo local se ha visto obligado a cerrar por orden de la autoridad gubernamental) de la obligación del pago de la renta mientras dicha obligación de cierre persista, incluyendo en el concepto “liberación” diferentes alternativas: condonación total o parcial y/o aplazamiento total o parcial.

        Nos estamos encontrando en estos días con una reacción frecuente entre algunos arrendatarios, quienes, de manera unilateral, han informado a sus arrendadores que considerando COVID 19 un supuesto de fuerza mayor y habiéndose visto obligados a cerrar el local/oficina, suspenden el pago de la renta mientras dicha situación permanezca. No resuelven el contrato, no entregan la posesión, se mantienen en ella (permaneciendo el local cerrado y no operativo) pero suspenden el pago (sin quedar claro si suspender en este caso significa auto condonarse el pago de la renta o aplazarlo para cuando desaparezca el supuesto de Fuerza Mayor).

        Argumentos en contra de la liberación

        Por más que pueda considerarse “entendible” esta actitud, desde la óptica del arrendatario, no desde la del arrendador, dicha consideración se topa con un obstáculo: la interpretación que de la Fuerza Mayor ha hecho el TS respecto a las obligaciones de pago pecuniario, según la STS (Civil) de 19 mayo de 2015:

        “No pudiendo plantearse, pues, tratándose de deudas pecuniarias, la imposibilidad subjetiva -insolvencia- ni la objetiva o formal, concluye la doctrina que no es posible imaginar que si la imposibilidad obedece a caso fortuito pudiera tener como efecto la extinción de la obligación.

        La exoneración del deudor por caso fortuito no es absoluta, tiene excepciones, conforme prevé el articulo 1.105 CC, y una de ellas, por aplicación del principio «genus nunquam perit», sería en supuestos de obligaciones de entregar cosa genérica.

        En tales circunstancias el deudor pecuniario viene obligado a cumplir la prestación principal, sin que sus sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello, pues lo adeudado no es algo individualizado que ha perecido sino algo genérico como es el dinero.”

        Conclusión: no parece que este criterio jurisprudencial permita defender que el cumplimiento de las obligaciones pecuniarias quede liberado, extinto o que su incumplimiento quede justificado en casos de Fuerza Mayor, de suerte que el deudor pecuniario, en este caso el arrendatario, en aplicación de este criterio, vendría obligado a cumplir la prestación principal sin que las sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello con fundamento en la Fuerza Mayor, debido a la condición genérica que tiene el dinero.

        Argumentos a favor de la liberación: el art. 1.575 del Código Civil

        Dicho lo anterior lo anterior, debe hacerse referencia a un artículo del Código Civil que, con certeza, será profusamente citado en los conflictos judiciales que se avecinan.

        El art. 1.575, tratando del arrendamiento de fincas rústicas, reconoce el derecho del arrendatario a la rebaja de la renta en caso de pérdida de más de la mitad de los frutos (salvo pacto en contrario) en “casos fortuitos, extraordinarios e imprevistos…como incendio, guerra, peste, inundación insólita, langosta, terremoto u otro igualmente desacostumbrado que los contratantes no hayan podido racionalmente prever”.

        ¿Es aplicable este precepto, previsto para arrendamientos rústicos, a los arrendamientos urbanos?

        El art. 4.1 CC permite la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando (i) estas no contemplen un supuesto específico y (ii) regulen otro semejante entre los que se aprecie “identidad de razón”.

        La STS de 15 de enero de 2019, resolviendo un conflicto de un arrendamiento de un edificio destinado a hotel, en el que el arrendatario había pretendido la rebaja de la renta al amparo de la cláusula “rebus sic stantibus” por la crisis de 2008 y había alegado a su favor la aplicación del art.1.575, estableció:

        “La argumentación de la sentencia recurrida por la que se rechaza la pretensión de rebaja del precio pactado tampoco es contraria al criterio legal que se desprende del art. 1575 CC, que es la regla que permite la rebaja de la renta en el arrendamiento de bienes productivos que no deriven de riesgos del propio negocio, exige además que la pérdida de rendimientos se origine por casos fortuitos extraordinarios e imprevistos, algo que por su misma rareza no hubiera ser podido previsto por las partes, y que la pérdida de frutos sea de más de la mitad de los frutos. En el caso no concurre ninguna de estas circunstancias. La disminución de las rentas procede de una evolución del mercado, las partes previeron la posibilidad de que en algunos ejercicios la rentabilidad del hotel no fuera positiva para la arrendataria y las pérdidas alegadas por NH en la explotación del hotel de Almería son inferiores al cincuenta por ciento, sin contar con que el resultado global del conjunto de su actividad como gestora de una cadena de hoteles es, según considera probado la Audiencia a la vista del informe de gestión consolidado, favorable”.

        El TS no admite la aplicación del 1.575 pero no por considerarlo no aplicable a arrendamientos distintos a los rústicos, sino por concluir que no se dan los requisitos para ello ya que ni era imprevisible la crisis de 2008 ni las pérdidas del arrendatario son superiores al 50%.

        Pero, esa interpretación del TS junto con el tenor del art. 4.1 CC permitirían avalar la pretensión del arrendatario que se encuentra sin ingreso alguno durante el Estado de Alarma, de exigir una rebaja de renta que se adecuara al principio de proporcionalidad.

        Respecto a la terminación anticipada a instancias del arrendatario

        Sin embargo, podemos encontrarnos con situaciones en las que el arrendatario, ante la actual situación, decida terminar anticipadamente el contrato de arrendamiento debido a la situación provocada por el COVID 19, poniendo el local a disposición del arrendador.

        Son supuestos en los que se pretende la resolución anticipada del contrato, sin respetar (i) o el plazo obligatorio (ii) o el preaviso, en ambos casos bajo la hipótesis de que estén así regulados en el contrato.

        En estos supuestos entendemos que sí puede resultar defendible que, debido a la situación de fuerza mayor provocada por el COVID 19 y en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, se exonere al arrendatario de la obligación:

        • De respetar un plazo de vigencia determinada del contrato de arrendamiento
        • De preavisar al arrendador en caso de resolución anticipada del contrato

        En ambos casos el contrato quedaría resuelto con la entrega de la posesión del local, sin perjuicio de tener que respetar las obligaciones que prevé el contrato para la terminación y entrega siempre que las mismas no se vean igualmente afectadas por la situación de Fuerza Mayor.

        Nuestra opinión es que, también en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, sería defendible ante los Tribunales la tesis de que el arrendatario quedaría liberado de cualquier obligación de resarcimiento de daños al arrendador por dicha resolución anticipada o incumplimiento de la duración obligada del contrato.

        Conclusión

        En conclusión, planteado ante los Tribunales el debate sobre cómo la pandemia (que no hay duda será calificada como caso de Fuerza Mayor) afectará a las obligaciones a cargo del arrendatario que se haya visto obligado a cerrar su negocio, nuestra opinión es la siguiente:

        1. Respecto a la obligación de pago de la renta, pese al criterio contrario de la sentencia que citamos de 19 de mayo de 2015, nos parece potente y defendible la remisión al art. 1575 y a su aplicación analógica con apoyo en la STS de 15 de enero de 2019, para exigir una reducción proporcional y equitativa de la renta.
        2. Respecto a la facultad del arrendatario para resolver el contrato anticipadamente, entregando la posesión del inmueble al arrendador, exonerando al arrendatario de cumplir con sus obligaciones de preaviso o de duración obligada previstas en el contrato en cuestión, y sin tener que indemnizar al arrendador por ello, entendemos que también existe fundamento para defender judicialmente esta posición.

        Aplicación de la cláusula Rebus Sic Stantibus (RSS)

        Analizaremos a continuación si puede ser aplicable al caso que estamos analizando la cláusula RSS y con qué consecuencias.

        Requisitos de la cláusula RSS (aforismo latino que significa “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”)

        La expresión RSS, opera como una cláusula intrínseca (es decir implícita, sin necesidad de pactarse expresamente) en la relación contractual, que significa que las estipulaciones establecidas en un contrato lo son habida cuenta de las circunstancias concurrentes en el momento, esto es, “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”, de forma que cualquier alteración sustancial y no prevista de las mismas podrían dar lugar a la modificación del contenido contractual.

        La cláusula RSS no está regulada en ningún precepto en nuestro ordenamiento; es una construcción doctrinal que tradicionalmente la jurisprudencia ha admitido (ejemplos entre otros muchos STS de 30 de junio de 2014, 24 de febrero de 2015, 15 de enero de 2019, 18 de julio de 2019), con mucha cautela, solo en ciertos casos, y requiriendo las siguientes premisas

        • Que se haya producido una alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias del contrato, en el momento que el mismo se deba cumplir, en relación con las concurrentes al tiempo de su celebración. Para valorar si una incidencia puede determinar la mutación o alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias que dotaron sentido al contrato, debemos atenernos a lo siguiente: a) Debemos contrastar el alcance de dicha mutación o alteración respecto del sentido o finalidad del contrato y de la conmutatividad o equilibrio prestacional del mismo; y b) Debe quedar excluido el «riesgo normal» inherente o derivado del contrato.
        • Que se haya producido una desproporción exorbitante, fuera de todo cálculo, entre las prestaciones de las partes contratantes, provocando un desequilibrio entre las mismas.
        • Que lo anterior se produzca como consecuencia de circunstancias radicalmente imprevisibles.
        • Que no exista otro remedio para superar la situación.

        Históricamente nuestros tribunales han sido muy reacios a aplicar RSS si bien desde la crisis económica de 2008-2012 ha tenido lugar un cierto cambio de criterio y una mayor receptividad jurisprudencial-

        Consecuencias de la aplicación de la RSS

        La doctrina establece que la aplicación de la RSS no tiene, en principio, efectos rescisorios, resolutorios o extintivos del contrato, sino únicamente efectos modificativos del mismo, encaminados a compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones; a su vez la doctrina establece que se aplica únicamente a los contratos a largo plazo o de tracto sucesivo y de ejecución diferida.

        En aplicación de la buena fe, la reacción ante un evento de caso fortuito, fuerza mayor o en general un evento que genera una desproporción entre las partes, como la que regula la institución RSS, debe ser la modificación del contrato para reequilibrar las obligaciones entre las partes, y solo en caso de imposibilidad material de cumplimiento, la resolución de la obligación, en ambos casos sin indemnización por incumplimiento.

        Por ello, en el ámbito de los contratos de arrendamiento y en el caso de cierre de los locales por mandato imperativo, entendemos que la institución RSS podrá ser:

        • alegada por los arrendatarios para solicitar o instar de los arrendadores modificaciones a las prestaciones económicas del contrato y
        • estimada por los jueces, cuando estos supuestos se debatan ante los Tribunales, a la hora de aceptar como equitativas y legítimas las tales novaciones contractuales con el fin de compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones generado por los efectos del COVID 19.

        En suma, la cláusula RSS puede ser una herramienta para el arrendatario de un local que ha tenido que cerrar durante el Estado de Alarma, a la hora de negociar con el arrendador una modificación del contrato, intentando aplazar la renta mientras se prolongue el Estado de Alarma o negociando un descuento de esta.

        Debe recordarse:

        • Que la RSS es de ineludible aplicación casuística, no caben generalizaciones y será necesario tener en cuenta el efecto que provoque el COVID 19 en cada relación contractual concreta (STS de 30 de junio de 2014 y 24 de febrero de 2015) y el efectivo desequilibrio de las prestaciones que haya producido, y
        • Que, como hemos dicho, los Tribunales son en general reacios a la aplicación de esta cláusula a la que solo acuden en caso de falta de cualquier otra herramienta jurídica y en situaciones en que el mantenimiento del status quo contractual revele una manifiesta “injusticia” y un patente y rotundo desequilibrio entre las prestaciones de las partes.

        ¿Significa lo anterior que el arrendatario podrá imponer al arrendador una modificación de las condiciones económicas del contrato al amparo de RSS (aplazamiento o condonación total o parcial)?

        No lo creemos de manera tan rotunda; lo que si pensamos es que la aplicación de esta institución RSS debería,

        • Justificar una razonable solicitud del arrendatario de novar temporalmente las condiciones del contrato (aplazamiento o condonación, total o parcial) que al arrendador debe razonablemente atender.
        • En caso de negativa irrazonable del arrendador, y documentando cuanto más profusamente pueda el arrendatario su solicitud y las eventuales negociaciones o negativa a mantenerlas por la contra parte, permitirle fundamentar una suspensión del pago de la renta, total o parcial, durante la pendencia del Estado de Alarma con ánimo, no de extinción de la obligación, pero sí de su aplazamiento.

        Habremos de esperar a la reacción de los tribunales cuando lleguen a su conocimiento estos conflictos, como sin duda ocurrirá; pero si nos atrevemos a adelantar que es bastante posible que la tendencia judicial sea la de conceder amparo al arrendatario con apoyo en la cláusula RSS y el principio de la preservación del negocio, a la hora de dar validez a determinados efectos modificativos respecto a las obligaciones pecuniarias a cargo del arrendatario (condonación total o parcial del pago de la renta durante la crisis pandémica, aplazamiento, aplazamiento parcial).

        En todo caso será esencial acreditar que la conducta del contratante deudor que busca amparo en la cláusula RSS para novar el contrato se ha ajustado estrictamente al principio de buena fe (STS 30 de abril de 2015).

        También será importante analizar caso por caso por qué se justifica el desplazamiento del riesgo derivado del “suceso excepcional e imprevisto” de un contratante al otro (STS de 15 de enero de 2015) y bien podría defenderse (STS de 18 de julio de 2019) que deben ambos contratantes repartirse y asumir entre los dos las consecuencias.

        Las decisiones judiciales variarán en cada caso concreto que habrá de ser objeto de estudio individualizado.

        Conclusiones y Recomendaciones

        En suma, parece que al arrendatario contaría con dos instrumentos para la pretensión de suspender (signifique esto condonar o aplazar) el pago de las rentas, la cláusula RSS y el principio de Fuerza Mayor.

        A nuestro modo de ver, la reposición del equilibrio contractual alterado por el suceso excepcional puede consistir o bien en una prórroga de los plazos de pago del arrendamiento o bien en la aplicación de una condonación total o parcial de la obligación de pago de rentas mientras dure el Estado de Alarma, pero entendemos que será defendible que el retraso en el pago del arrendamiento no podrá dar lugar ni a la resolución del contrato al amparo del art. 1124 Cc ni a la exigencia de daños y perjuicios art. 1105 Cc, en consecuencia, no facultará al arrendador a instar el desahucio.

        Por ello los pasos a seguir en cada caso serían:

        • Realizar un examen del contrato para ver si se regulan los casos de fuerza mayor y caso fortuito y si la situación actual concuerda con lo regulado en el contrato.
        • En caso de que no se estipule nada en el contrato, y habiéndose cerrado el local u oficina, advertir de ello a la otra parte e intentar negociar una novación del contrato de arrendamiento solicitando: (i) condonación total de la renta durante el Estado de Alarma; (ii) condonación parcial compartiendo ambas partes el esfuerzo en proporción por convenir; y (iii) aplazamiento del pago de la renta hasta que se pueda reabrir el local u oficina con un plan de pagos de la deuda aplazada.
        • Si no es posible llegar a un acuerdo, es conveniente dejar constancia de que se ha actuado con buena fe intentando llegar a una solución negociada y en el extremo (desde la óptica del arrendatario) anunciar, sin esperar a recibir una comunicación o reclamación del Arrendador, la suspensión del pago de las rentas justificando la misma en el Estado de Alarma hasta la finalización del mismo y la consecuente reapertura del local/oficina.

        QUICK SUMMARY: Contract negotiations do not take place in a legal vacuum. A party who negotiates contrary to the principle of good faith and then breaks off negotiations may become liable to the other party. However, the requirements for such liability are high and the enforcement of damage claims is cumbersome. At the end of the post I will share some practical tips for contract negotiations in Switzerland.

        Under Swiss law, the principle of freedom of contract is of fundamental importance. It follows from the freedom of contract that, in principle, everyone is free to enter into contract negotiations and to terminate them again without incurring any liability. A termination of contract negotiations does not have to be justified either.

        However, the freedom of contract is limited by the obligation to act in good faith (cf. article 2 para. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code), which is of equal fundamental importance. From the moment when parties enter into contract negotiations, they are in a special legal relationship with each other. That pre-contractual relationship involves certain reciprocal obligations. In particular, the parties must negotiate in a serious manner and in accordance with their actual intentions.

        Negotiating parties must not stir up the hope of the other party, contrary to their actual intentions, that a contract will actually be concluded. Put differently, a party’s willingness to conclude a contract must not be expressed more strongly than it actually is. If a party realizes that the other party wrongly beliefs that a contract would certainly be concluded, such illusion should be dispelled in due course.

        A negotiating party that terminates contract negotiations in violation of these principles, whether maliciously or negligently, may become liable to the other party based on the culpa in contrahendo doctrine. However, such liability exists in exceptional cases only.

        • The fact that contract negotiations took a long time is not sufficient for incurring such liability. The duration of negotiations is, in itself, not decisive.
        • It is not possible to derive liability from pre-existing contractual relationships between the negotiation parties, as for example in cases where parties negotiate a «mere» prolongation of an existing agreement. The decisive factor is not whether parties were already contractually bound before, but only whether the party that terminated the contract negotiations made the other party believe that a new agreement would certainly be concluded.
        • It is not decisive whether the party who terminates contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made costly investments in view of the prospective contract. In principle, anyone who makes investments already prior to the actual conclusion of a contract does so at its own risk. Even where a party to contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made (substantial) investments in the prospective agreement, a termination of the contract negotiations will, in itself, not be considered as an act of bad faith.

        What does a liability for breaking off negotiations include?

        If a party violates the aforementioned pre-contractual obligations, the other party may be entitled to compensation for the so-called negative interest. This means that the other party must be put in the position it would have been if the negotiations had not taken place. Damages may include, e.g., expenses in connection with the negotiation of the contract (travel costs, legal fees etc.), but also a loss of income in cases where a party was not able to do business with third parties because of the contract negotiations. However, the other party has no right to be treated as if the contract had been concluded (so-called positive interest).

        Having said that, it must be kept in mind that the requirements set by Swiss court for the substantiation of damages are rather high, so that the enforcement of a liability for breaking off negotiations will often be a cumbersome process. Therefore pursuing damage claims with relatively low amounts in dispute might often require a disproportionate effort.

        Practical tips – Do’s and don’ts when negotiating contracts

        • Do not overstate your willingness to conclude a contract. Be frank with your counterparty. Make it clear from the beginning of the negotiations what clauses are important to you.
        • Do not tell the other party that you are willing to sign a contract, if you still have doubts or you are even unwilling to do so. Confirm that you will sign only if you are convinced to do so.
        • Do not allow someone else (e.g., a representative, employee, branch office etc.) to negotiate on your behalf if you are not willing to enter into an agreement anyway. Keep an eye on how the negotiations are going on and intervene if necessary.
        • Do not make costly investments before a legally binding agreement is concluded. If, for time or other reasons, such investments are necessary already before the conclusion of an agreement, insist on the conclusion of an interim contract governing such investments for the event that the envisaged agreement is not concluded finally.

        In 2020, an important revision of the Swiss statute of limitations enters into force. The new law provides for longer limitation periods in cases of personal injury and extends the relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law from one to three years.

        Background of the revision

        In June 2018, the Swiss parliament adopted an amendment to the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”) pertaining to a revision of the statute of limitations. In November 2018, the Swiss government decided that the revised statute of limitations shall enter into force on 1 January 2020.

        The revision was significantly influenced by asbestos cases. Under the current law, damage claims of asbestos victims were time-barred in some cases even before asbestos-related diseases could be diagnosed. In March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held in Howald Moor and others v. Switzerland that the Swiss statute of limitations amounts in such cases to a violation of article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right of access to a court).

        Having said that, the revision does not only concern cases of personal injury, but also includes numerous other important changes as described in the following.

        Key changes regarding limitation periods

        A. Tort law

        In tort law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

        With the exception of cases of personal injury, the absolute limitation period remains ten years as from the date when the conduct that caused the damages occurred or ended (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

        In cases of personal injury, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable. Currently the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

        The new absolute limitation period in cases of personal injury amounts to twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 60 para. 1bis CO). Under the current law, there was no special absolute limitation period for cases of personal injury, so that the ordinary 10-year period applied (Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

        If conduct, which gives rise to liability under tort law, is also punishable under criminal law, the (longer) limitation period under criminal law remains applicable (cf. Art. 97 of the Swiss Criminal Code). However, where a first-instance criminal judgment is rendered before the conduct is time-barred under criminal law, the limitation periods ends not earlier than three years as from that criminal judgment (revised Art. 60 para. 2 CO). The current law does not provide for such an additional three-year limitation period.

        B. Unjust enrichment law

        In unjust enrichment law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years as from the date on which the injured party knows about the claim (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

        The absolute limitation period is not affected by the revision and remains ten years after the date on which the claim arises (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO).

        C. Contract law

        With regard to contractual claims, the ordinary limitation period remains ten years from the due date (Art. 127 CO). Furthermore, the shorter limitation period of five years from the due date applicable to (amongst others) claims for rent, interest on capital and other periodic payments, (most) claims out of employment relationships etc. remains unchanged too (Art. 128 CO).

        However, in cases of personal injury, the revised statute of limitations introduces a new relative limitation period of three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage, as well as a new absolute limitation period of twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 128a CO). The current law does not provide for distinct relative and absolute limitation periods for contractual claims in cases of personal injury. Instead, the ordinary ten-year limitation period (Art. 127 CO) usually applied to such cases.

        D. Summary

        In summary, the most important elements of the revised statute of limitations are the longer (trebled) relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law (i.e., three years instead of one year) and the new special rules for cases of personal injury, which now benefit from a 20-year absolute limitation period.

        Transitional provisions / application of the revised statute of limitations to pre-existing claims

        The longer limitation periods under the revised CO apply to any claims that are not yet time-barred when the revision enters into force (i.e., on 1 January 2020; revised Art. 49 para. 1, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). In other words, the limitation periods of any claims that do not become time-barred until 31 December 2019 at the latest will be prolonged. This is of particular relevance with regard to claims based on tort and unjust enrichment; the short one-year relative limitation periods under the current law will be extended by another two years.

        In contrast, the current law remains applicable in case the revised statute of limitations provides for shorter limitation periods (revised Art. 49 para. 2, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). This concerns, in particular, contractual claims in cases of personal injury. The new three-year relative limitation period under the revised law might not apply to such claims, as the current statute of limitations does not provide for a relative limitation period at all.

        Further changes brought by the revision

        In addition to the changes of the limitation periods set out above, the revision of the statute of limitations contains numerous further modifications. Some of them are listed in the following:

        1. Limitation periods do not commence or are suspended in the event that a claim cannot be asserted for objective reasons before any court worldwide (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 6 CO). The current law provides for such non-commencement or suspension only if the claim cannot be brought before a Swiss court.
        2. Parties to a dispute may agree in writing that limitation periods shall be suspended during settlement discussions, mediation proceedings or other out-of-court settlement proceedings (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 8 CO).
        3. Once a limitation period has commenced to run, waivers of statute of limitation defenses are admissible, but must not exceed ten years (revised Art. 141 para. 1 CO). Any such waivers must be in writing (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
        4. In general terms and conditions (“GTC”), statute of limitation defenses may be waived by the party who makes use of the GTCs only. In contrast, a waiver by the party on whom the GTCs are imposed (e.g., consumers) is ineffective (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
        5. The limitation period for an actio pauliana under the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) is extended to from currently two years to three years after service of a loss certificate, the opening of bankruptcy proceedings or the confirmation of a composition agreement with an assignment of assets (whichever is applicable; revised Art. 292 DEBA).

        If 2017 was the year of Initial Coin Offerings, 2018 was the year of Blockchain awareness and testing all over the world. From ICO focused guidelines and regulations respectively aimed to alarm and protect investors, we have seen the shift, especially in Europe, to distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) focused guidelines and regulations aimed at protecting citizens on one hand and promote DLT implementations on the other.

        Indeed, European Union Member States and the European Parliament started looking deeper into the technology by, for instance, calling for consultations with professionals in order to understand DLT’s potentials for real-world implementations and possible risks.

        In this article I am aiming to give a brief snapshot of firstly what are the most notable European initiatives and moves towards promoting Blockchain implementation and secondly current challenges faced by European law makers when dealing with the regulation of distributed ledger technologies.

        Europe

        Let’s start from the European Blockchain Partnership (“EBP”), a statement made by 25 EU Member States acknowledging the importance of distributed ledger technology for society, in particular when it comes to interoperability, cyber security and efficiency of digital public services. The Partnership is not only an acknowledgement, it is also a commitment from all signatory states to collaborate to build what they envision will be a distributed ledger infrastructure for the delivering of cross-border public services.

        Witness of the trust given to the technology is My Health My Data, a EU-backed project that uses DLT to enable patients to efficiently control their digitally recorded health data while securing it from the threat of data breaches. Benefits the EU saw in DLT on this specific project are safety, efficiency but most notably the opportunity that DLT offers data subject to have finally control over their own data, without the need for intermediaries.

        Another important initiative proving European interests in testing DLT technologies is the Horizon Prize on “Blockchains for Social Good”, a 5 million Euros worth challenge open to innovators and tech companies to develop scalable, efficient and high-impact decentralized solutions to social innovation challenges.

        Moving forward, in December last year, I had the honor to be part of the “ Workshop on Blockchains & Smart Contracts Legal and Regulatory Framework” in Paris, an initiative supported by the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum (“EUBOF”), a pilot project initiated by the European Parliament. Earlier last year other three workshops were held, the aim of each was to collect knowledge on specific topics from an audience of leading DLT legal and technical professionals. With the knowledge collected, the EUBOF followed up with reports of what was discussed during the workshop and suggest a way forward.

        Although not binding, these reports give a reasonably clear guideline to the industry on how existing laws at a European level apply to the technology, or at least should be interpreted, and highlight areas where new regulation is definitely needed. As an example let’s look at the Report on Blockchain & GDPR. If you missed it, the GDPR is the Regulation that protects Europeans personal data and it’s applicable to all companies globally, which are processing data from European citizens. The “right to erasure” embedded in the GDPR, doesn’t allow personal data to be stored on an immutable database, the data subject has to be able to erase data anytime when shared with a service provider and stored somewhere on a database. In the case of Blockchain, the consensus on personal data having to be stored off-chain is therefore unanimous. Storing personal data off-chain and leaving an hash to that data on-chain, is a viable solution if certain precautions are taken in order to avoid the risks of reversibility or linkability of such hash to the personal data stored off-chain, therefore making the hash on-chain personally identifiable information.

        However, not all European laws apply to Member States, therefore making it hard to give a EU-wide answer to most DLT compliance challenges in Europe. Member States freedom to legislate is indeed only limited/influenced by two main instruments, Regulations, which are automatically enforceable in each Member State and Directives binding Member States to legislate on specific topics according to a set of specific rules.

        Diverging national laws have a great effect on multiple aspects of innovative technologies. Let’s look for instance at the validity of “smart contracts”. When discussing the legal power of automatically enforceable digital contracts, the lack of a European wide legislation on contracts makes it impossible to find an answer applicable to all Member States. For instance, is “offer and acceptance” enough to constitute a contract? What is considered a valid “acceptance”? What is an “obligation”? “Can a digital asset be the object of a legally binding agreement”?

        If we try to give a EU-wide answer to the questions such as smart contract validity and enforceability it is apparently not possible since we will need to consider 28 different answers. I, therefore, believe that the future of innovation in Europe will highly depend on the unification of laws.

        An example of a unified law that has great benefits on innovation (including DLT) is the Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS) Regulation, which governs electronic identification including electronic signatures.

        The race to regulating DLT in Europe

        Let’s now look briefly at a couple of Member States legislations, specifically on Blockchain and cryptocurrencies last year.

        EU Member States have been quite creative I would say in regulating the new technology. Let’s start from Malta, which saw a surprising increase of important projects and companies, such as Binance, landing on the beautiful Mediterranean Island thanks to its favorable (or at least felt as such) legislations on DLT. The “Blockchain Island” passed three laws in early July to regulate and supervise Blockchain projects including ICOs, crypto exchanges and DLT, specifically: The Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act regulation that aims at recognizing different technology arrangements such as DAOs, smart contracts and in future probably AI machines; The Virtual Financial Assets Act for ICOs and crypto exchanges; The Malta Digital Innovation Authority establishing a new supervisory authority.

        Some think the Maltese legislation lacks a comprehensive framework, one that for instance, gives legal personality to Innovative Technology Arrangements. For this reason some are therefore accusing the Maltese lawmakers of rushing into an uncompleted regulatory framework in order to attract business to the island while others seem to positively welcome the laws as a good start for a European wide regulation on DLT and crypto assets.

        In December 2018, Malta also initiated a declaration that was then signed by other six Members States, calling for collaboration for the promotion and implementation of DLT on a European level.

        France was one of the signatories of such declaration, and it’s worth mentioning since the French Minister for the Economy and Finance approved in September a framework for regulating ICOs and therefore protecting investors’ rights, basically giving the AMF (French Authority for Financial Market) the empowerment to give licenses to companies wanting to raise funds through Initial Coin Offerings.

        Last but not least comes Switzerland which although it is not a EU Member State, it has great degree of influence on European and national legislators when it comes to progressive regulations. At the end of December, the Swiss Federal Council released a report on DLT and the law, making a clear statement that the existing Swiss law is sufficient to regulate most matters related to DLT and Blockchain, although some adjustments have to be made. So no new laws but few amendments here and there, which will allow the integration of the specific DLT applications with existing laws in order to ensure legal certainty on certain uncovered matters. Relevant areas of Swiss law that will be amended include the transfer of rights utilizing digital registers, Anti Money Laundering rules specifically for decentralized trading platforms and bankruptcy when that proceeding involves crypto assets.

        Conclusions

        To summarize, from the approach taken during the past year, it is apparent that there is great interest in Europe to understand the potentials and to soon test implementations of distributed ledger technology. Lawmakers have also an understanding that the technology is in an infant state, it might involve risks, therefore making it complex to set specific rules or to give final answers on the alignment of certain technology applications with existing European or national laws.

        To achieve European wide results, however, acknowledgments, guidelines and reports are not enough. The setting of standards for lawmakers applicable to all Member States or even unification of laws in crucial sectors influencing directly or indirectly new technologies, will be the only solution for any innovative technology to be adopted at a European level.

        The author of this post is Alessandro Mazzi.

        Renato Bucher

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          EU – Distributed ledger technology – What happened in 2018

          3 de enero de 2019

          • Europa
          • Contratos
          • Tecnologías de la información

          Summary

          The recent post-Brexit trade deal makes no provision for jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments.

          Therefore, the UK dropped out of the jurisdiction of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) on 31 December 2020.

          The EU has not yet approved the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, but may do in the future.

          Unless the transitional provisions from the Withdrawal Agreement apply, jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments will be governed by the Hague Convention 2005 if there is an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause

          If the Hague Convention of 2005 does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules.

          Judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

          On the first day of 2021 the UK left the EU regimes with which European lawyers are familiar. We appeared to enter “uncharted territory”. Not so. In fact, there are charts for this territory – or maps, to use a more modern word. You just need to know which maps.

          Whether you are a lawyer or a businessperson, in whatever country, you need answers to two questions. Which laws govern jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU member states and the UK; and how should businesses act as a result?

          What happened?

          The EU and UK reached a post-Brexit trade deal, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”), on Christmas Eve 2020. The provisions of the TCA became UK law as the European Union (Future Relationship) Act on 31 December 2020. The TCA made provision for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but did not mention judicial cooperation in civil matters, or jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial proceedings.

          So where do we look for law on those matters?

          We look at the position immediately before Brexit. As every lawyer should know the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) governed the enforcement and recognition of judgments between EU member states.

          Also, the Lugano Convention 2007 governs jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in commercial and civil matters between EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It operates in substantially the same way as Brussels (Recast) does between EU member states.

          The UK was party to the Convention by virtue of its EU membership. Now that the UK is not a member of the EU, the contracting parties could agree that the UK could join the Lugano Convention as an independent contracting party, and there would be little change to the position on jurisdiction and enforcement. English jurisdiction clauses would continue to be respected and English court judgments would continue to be readily enforceable throughout EU member states and EFTA countries, and vice versa.

          The problem is that the EU has not agreed to the UK joining the Lugano Convention

          The UK submitted its application to accede to the Lugano Convention in its own right on 8 April 2020. But accession requires the consent of all contracting parties including the EU. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have indicated their support for the UK’s accession, but the EU’s position is still not yet clear and the TCA is silent on this matter.

          While the EU still may belatedly support the UK’s accession to Lugano, it does not currently apply. In any case, a three-month time-lag applies between agreement and entry into force, unless all the contracting parties agree to waive it.

          Where are we now?

          If the transitional provisions provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement as explained in my previous post do not apply, the Brussels (Recast) Regulation will not apply to jurisdiction and enforcement between the EU and UK.

          If they do not, then you first need to decide whether the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 is applicable. The Hague Convention 2005 applies between EU Member States, Mexico, Singapore and Montenegro. The Hague Convention first came into force for the UK when the EU acceded on 1 October 2015 and the UK re-acceded after Brexit in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021.

          The Hague Convention 2005 applies if:

          • The dispute falls within the scope of the Convention as provided for by Article 2 – e.g. the Convention does not apply to employment and consumer contracts or claims for personal injury;
          • There is an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the meaning of Article 3; and
          • The exclusive jurisdiction clause is entered into after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized, and proceedings are commenced after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized within the meaning of Article 16.

          There is some uncertainty as to whether EU member states will treat the Hague Convention as having been in force from 1 October 2015, or only from when the UK re-accedes on 1 January 2021. The UK’s view is that the Convention will apply to the UK from 1 October 2015; the EU’s view is that it will apply to the UK from 1 January 2021. What is not in dispute is that for exclusive English jurisdiction clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, the contracting states will respect exclusive English jurisdiction clauses and enforce the resulting judgments.

          If the 2005 Hague Convention does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules to questions of jurisdiction and enforcement. In the UK, the rules will essentially be the same as the ‘common-law’ rules currently on enforcement applied to non-EU parties, for example the United States.

          The Norwegian exception

          The UK and Norway have reached an agreement which extends and updates an old mutual enforcement treaty, the 1961 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between the UK and Norway, which will apply if the UK does not re-accede to the Lugano Convention. The practical effect of this agreement is that judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

          How should your business act now?

          The applicable legal framework for each dispute will depend on the facts of each case. You should review the dispute resolution clauses in your cross-border contracts to assess how they may be affected by Brexit and to seek specialist advice where necessary. You should also seek advice on dispute resolution provisions when entering into new cross-border contracts in 2021.

          This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

          This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

          In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

          English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

          The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

          This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

          The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

          The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

          As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

          The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

          Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

          The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

          Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

          Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

          Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

          The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

          Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

          The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

          There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

          The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

          The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

          As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

          Novel technology in proceedings

          Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

          And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

          Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

          Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

          Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

          • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
          • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
          • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
          • the matter concerns an international dispute.

          The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

          “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

          The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

          Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

          We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

          To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

          Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

          Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

          • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
          • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
          • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
          • the disclosure of confidential documents
          • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
          • the manner of taking witness testimony
          • the costs of the proceedings.

          Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

          All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

          The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

          • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
          • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
          • The defendant submits its defence statement.
          • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
          • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
          • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
          • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
          • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

          Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

          As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

          This is a summary of the approved measures, which unfortunately for both tenants and landlords do not include any public aid or tax relief and just refer to a postponement in the payment of the rent.

          Premises to which they are applied

          Leased premises dedicated to activities different than residential: commercial, professional, industrial, cultural, teaching, amusement, healthcare, etc. They also apply to the lease of a whole industry (i.e. hotels, restaurants, bars, etc., which are the most usual type of businesses object of this deal).

          Types of tenants

          • Individual entrepreneurs or self-employed persons who were registered before Social Security before the declaration of the state of alarm on March 14th, 2020
          • Small and medium companies, as defined by article 257.1 of the Capital Companies Act: those who fulfil during two consecutive fiscal years these figures: assets under € 4 million, turnover under € 8 million and average staff under 50 people

          Types of landlords

          In order to benefit from these measures, the landlord should be a housing public entity or company or a big owner, considering as such the individuals or companies who own more than 10 urban properties (excluding parking places and storage rooms) or a built surface over 1.500 sqm.

          Measures approved

          The payment of the rent is postponed without interest meanwhile the state of alarm is in force, but in any case, for a maximum period of four months. Once the state of alarm is overcome, and in any case in a maximum term of four months, the postponed rents should be paid along a maximum period of two years, or the duration of the lease agreement, should it be less than two years.

          For landlords different to those mentioned above

          The tenant could apply before the landlord for the postponement in the payment of the rent (but the landlord is not obliged to accept it), and the parties can use the guarantee that the tenant should mandatorily have provided at the beginning of any lease agreement (usually equal to two month’s rent, but could be more if agreed by the parties), in full or in part, in order to use it to pay the rent. The tenant will have to provide again the guarantee within one year’s term, or less should the lease agreement have a shorter duration.

          Activities to which it is applied

          Activities which have been suspended according to the Royal Decree that declared the state of alarm, dated march, 14ht, 2020, or according to the orders issued by the authorities delegated by such Royal Decree. This should be proved through a certificated issued by the tax authorities.

          If the activity has not been directly suspended by the Royal Decree, the turnover during the month prior to the postponement should be less than 75% of the average monthly turnover during the same quarter last year. This should be proved through a responsible declaration by the tenant, and the landlord is authorised check the bookkeeping records.

          Term to apply and procedure

          The tenant should apply for these measures before the landlord within one month’s term from the publication of the Royal Decree-law, that is, from April 22nd, 2020, and the landlord (in case belongs to the groups mentioned in point c) is obliged to accept the tenant’s request, except if both parties have already agreed something different. The postponement would be applied to the following month.

          As the state of alarm was declared more than one month ago (March 14th), landlords and tenants have already been reaching some agreements, for example 50% rent reduction during the state of alarm, and 50% rent postponement during the following 6 months. Tenants who do not reach an agreement with the landlord could face an eviction procedure, however court procedures are suspended during the state of alarm. We have also seen some abusive non-payment of rent by tenants.

          When is becomes impossible to reach an agreement with the landlord, tenants have the legal remedy of claiming in Court for the application of the “rebus sic stantibus” principle, which was highly demanded during the 2008 financial crisis but very seldom applied by the Courts. This principle is aimed to re-balance the parties’ obligations when their situation had deeply changed because of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. This principle is not included in the Spanish Civil Code, but the Supreme Court has accepted its application, in a very restricted way, in some occasions.

          Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

          Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

          Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

          La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

          Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

          «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

          Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

          Escuchar es altamente eficaz

          En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

          Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

          «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

          Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

          En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

          «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

          Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

          La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

          En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

          «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

          Las emociones son importantes

          Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

          «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

          [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

          El Real Decreto-ley 8/2020, de 17 de marzo, de medidas urgentes extraordinarias para hacer frente al impacto económico y social del COVID-19, aunque afecta y produce efectos en muchos diferentes ámbitos jurídicos, no incluye ninguna referencia a los contratos de arrendamientos de inmuebles, ni viviendas, ni locales u oficinas.

          El objeto de esta nota es analizar los efectos de la situación del Estado de Alarma respecto a aquellos contratos de arrendamiento de oficinas o locales que se hayan visto obligados a cerrar en aplicación del decreto; aquellos otros que permanezcan total o parcialmente abiertos y en funcionamiento, bien que con una actividad reducida o mínima, en principio no son objeto de las conclusiones que más adelante alcanzamos sin perjuicio de que existan casos individualizados a los que, pese a no existir un cierre total, razonable y lógicamente puedan serles de aplicación.

          No está excluido en modo alguno que ante una prolongación de la vigencia del Estado de Alarma pudiera publicarse alguna norma que afectase a los contratos de arrendamiento, pero de momento esto no ha sucedido. Si esto llegase a acaecer, al contenido de dicha norma habrá de estarse.

          En base al principio de libertad de pactos que consagra el art. 1255 del Código Civil, que permite que sean las partes firmantes del contrato las que convengan (i) qué escenarios y situaciones deben considerarse como constitutivos de supuestos de Fuerza Mayor y Caso Fortuito y (ii) cuáles deban ser las consecuencias contractuales de los tales escenarios, el primer ejercicio es comprobar si el contrato incluye una cláusula reguladora de la Fuerza mayor y sus efectos; si es así, a la tal cláusula habrá de estarse y su análisis queda al margen de esta nota.

          En ausencia de regulación expresa en el contrato, aplicarían al caso las previsiones del Código Civil y en concreto el artículo 1.105.

          COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor

          El COVID 19 es un acontecimiento que en principio reúne los requisitos que exige el Código Civil para ser calificado como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor (art. 1105 Código Civil) ya que:

          • Se trata de un hecho ajeno y no imputable al contratante deudor de la prestación u obligación.
          • Es imprevisible, o si se reputase “previsible”, es sin duda inevitable.
          • El acontecimiento en cuestión, la pandemia, debe ser causa y tener como consecuencia el incumplimiento de la obligación, es decir debe existir un nexo causal.

          Por lo tanto, cumpliéndose los tres requisitos, la primera conclusión que alcanzamos es que muy previsiblemente, los Tribunales españoles calificarán como “Fuerza Mayor” la situación causada por el COVID 19 cuando se les plantee una contienda judicial en la que tal asunto se discuta entre los litigantes. Analizaremos a continuación las consecuencias de dicha calificación.

          Consecuencias de considerar COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza mayor

          La generalidad de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia entienden que los efectos de calificar un supuesto como caso de Fuerza Mayor en principio son:

          • Imposibilidad total y definitiva de cumplir; liberando al deudor del cumplimiento de la obligación.
          • Imposibilidad parcial de cumplir; quedando liberado el deudor sólo en la parte que le es imposible cumplir, pero siguiendo obligado por la parte que sí puede llevar a cabo.
          • Imposibilidad temporal de cumplir; el deudor queda liberado de la responsabilidad por mora mientras persista la situación de excepcionalidad.

          Ahora bien, analicemos como afectaría dicha consideración como Fuerza Mayor de la epidemia, respecto a los contratos de arrendamiento para usos distintos a la vivienda.

          Respecto al pago de la renta

          La pregunta a la que responder es, si la calificación de la situación pandémica actual como un caso de Fuerza Mayor, libera al arrendatario (cuyo local se ha visto obligado a cerrar por orden de la autoridad gubernamental) de la obligación del pago de la renta mientras dicha obligación de cierre persista, incluyendo en el concepto “liberación” diferentes alternativas: condonación total o parcial y/o aplazamiento total o parcial.

          Nos estamos encontrando en estos días con una reacción frecuente entre algunos arrendatarios, quienes, de manera unilateral, han informado a sus arrendadores que considerando COVID 19 un supuesto de fuerza mayor y habiéndose visto obligados a cerrar el local/oficina, suspenden el pago de la renta mientras dicha situación permanezca. No resuelven el contrato, no entregan la posesión, se mantienen en ella (permaneciendo el local cerrado y no operativo) pero suspenden el pago (sin quedar claro si suspender en este caso significa auto condonarse el pago de la renta o aplazarlo para cuando desaparezca el supuesto de Fuerza Mayor).

          Argumentos en contra de la liberación

          Por más que pueda considerarse “entendible” esta actitud, desde la óptica del arrendatario, no desde la del arrendador, dicha consideración se topa con un obstáculo: la interpretación que de la Fuerza Mayor ha hecho el TS respecto a las obligaciones de pago pecuniario, según la STS (Civil) de 19 mayo de 2015:

          “No pudiendo plantearse, pues, tratándose de deudas pecuniarias, la imposibilidad subjetiva -insolvencia- ni la objetiva o formal, concluye la doctrina que no es posible imaginar que si la imposibilidad obedece a caso fortuito pudiera tener como efecto la extinción de la obligación.

          La exoneración del deudor por caso fortuito no es absoluta, tiene excepciones, conforme prevé el articulo 1.105 CC, y una de ellas, por aplicación del principio «genus nunquam perit», sería en supuestos de obligaciones de entregar cosa genérica.

          En tales circunstancias el deudor pecuniario viene obligado a cumplir la prestación principal, sin que sus sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello, pues lo adeudado no es algo individualizado que ha perecido sino algo genérico como es el dinero.”

          Conclusión: no parece que este criterio jurisprudencial permita defender que el cumplimiento de las obligaciones pecuniarias quede liberado, extinto o que su incumplimiento quede justificado en casos de Fuerza Mayor, de suerte que el deudor pecuniario, en este caso el arrendatario, en aplicación de este criterio, vendría obligado a cumplir la prestación principal sin que las sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello con fundamento en la Fuerza Mayor, debido a la condición genérica que tiene el dinero.

          Argumentos a favor de la liberación: el art. 1.575 del Código Civil

          Dicho lo anterior lo anterior, debe hacerse referencia a un artículo del Código Civil que, con certeza, será profusamente citado en los conflictos judiciales que se avecinan.

          El art. 1.575, tratando del arrendamiento de fincas rústicas, reconoce el derecho del arrendatario a la rebaja de la renta en caso de pérdida de más de la mitad de los frutos (salvo pacto en contrario) en “casos fortuitos, extraordinarios e imprevistos…como incendio, guerra, peste, inundación insólita, langosta, terremoto u otro igualmente desacostumbrado que los contratantes no hayan podido racionalmente prever”.

          ¿Es aplicable este precepto, previsto para arrendamientos rústicos, a los arrendamientos urbanos?

          El art. 4.1 CC permite la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando (i) estas no contemplen un supuesto específico y (ii) regulen otro semejante entre los que se aprecie “identidad de razón”.

          La STS de 15 de enero de 2019, resolviendo un conflicto de un arrendamiento de un edificio destinado a hotel, en el que el arrendatario había pretendido la rebaja de la renta al amparo de la cláusula “rebus sic stantibus” por la crisis de 2008 y había alegado a su favor la aplicación del art.1.575, estableció:

          “La argumentación de la sentencia recurrida por la que se rechaza la pretensión de rebaja del precio pactado tampoco es contraria al criterio legal que se desprende del art. 1575 CC, que es la regla que permite la rebaja de la renta en el arrendamiento de bienes productivos que no deriven de riesgos del propio negocio, exige además que la pérdida de rendimientos se origine por casos fortuitos extraordinarios e imprevistos, algo que por su misma rareza no hubiera ser podido previsto por las partes, y que la pérdida de frutos sea de más de la mitad de los frutos. En el caso no concurre ninguna de estas circunstancias. La disminución de las rentas procede de una evolución del mercado, las partes previeron la posibilidad de que en algunos ejercicios la rentabilidad del hotel no fuera positiva para la arrendataria y las pérdidas alegadas por NH en la explotación del hotel de Almería son inferiores al cincuenta por ciento, sin contar con que el resultado global del conjunto de su actividad como gestora de una cadena de hoteles es, según considera probado la Audiencia a la vista del informe de gestión consolidado, favorable”.

          El TS no admite la aplicación del 1.575 pero no por considerarlo no aplicable a arrendamientos distintos a los rústicos, sino por concluir que no se dan los requisitos para ello ya que ni era imprevisible la crisis de 2008 ni las pérdidas del arrendatario son superiores al 50%.

          Pero, esa interpretación del TS junto con el tenor del art. 4.1 CC permitirían avalar la pretensión del arrendatario que se encuentra sin ingreso alguno durante el Estado de Alarma, de exigir una rebaja de renta que se adecuara al principio de proporcionalidad.

          Respecto a la terminación anticipada a instancias del arrendatario

          Sin embargo, podemos encontrarnos con situaciones en las que el arrendatario, ante la actual situación, decida terminar anticipadamente el contrato de arrendamiento debido a la situación provocada por el COVID 19, poniendo el local a disposición del arrendador.

          Son supuestos en los que se pretende la resolución anticipada del contrato, sin respetar (i) o el plazo obligatorio (ii) o el preaviso, en ambos casos bajo la hipótesis de que estén así regulados en el contrato.

          En estos supuestos entendemos que sí puede resultar defendible que, debido a la situación de fuerza mayor provocada por el COVID 19 y en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, se exonere al arrendatario de la obligación:

          • De respetar un plazo de vigencia determinada del contrato de arrendamiento
          • De preavisar al arrendador en caso de resolución anticipada del contrato

          En ambos casos el contrato quedaría resuelto con la entrega de la posesión del local, sin perjuicio de tener que respetar las obligaciones que prevé el contrato para la terminación y entrega siempre que las mismas no se vean igualmente afectadas por la situación de Fuerza Mayor.

          Nuestra opinión es que, también en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, sería defendible ante los Tribunales la tesis de que el arrendatario quedaría liberado de cualquier obligación de resarcimiento de daños al arrendador por dicha resolución anticipada o incumplimiento de la duración obligada del contrato.

          Conclusión

          En conclusión, planteado ante los Tribunales el debate sobre cómo la pandemia (que no hay duda será calificada como caso de Fuerza Mayor) afectará a las obligaciones a cargo del arrendatario que se haya visto obligado a cerrar su negocio, nuestra opinión es la siguiente:

          1. Respecto a la obligación de pago de la renta, pese al criterio contrario de la sentencia que citamos de 19 de mayo de 2015, nos parece potente y defendible la remisión al art. 1575 y a su aplicación analógica con apoyo en la STS de 15 de enero de 2019, para exigir una reducción proporcional y equitativa de la renta.
          2. Respecto a la facultad del arrendatario para resolver el contrato anticipadamente, entregando la posesión del inmueble al arrendador, exonerando al arrendatario de cumplir con sus obligaciones de preaviso o de duración obligada previstas en el contrato en cuestión, y sin tener que indemnizar al arrendador por ello, entendemos que también existe fundamento para defender judicialmente esta posición.

          Aplicación de la cláusula Rebus Sic Stantibus (RSS)

          Analizaremos a continuación si puede ser aplicable al caso que estamos analizando la cláusula RSS y con qué consecuencias.

          Requisitos de la cláusula RSS (aforismo latino que significa “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”)

          La expresión RSS, opera como una cláusula intrínseca (es decir implícita, sin necesidad de pactarse expresamente) en la relación contractual, que significa que las estipulaciones establecidas en un contrato lo son habida cuenta de las circunstancias concurrentes en el momento, esto es, “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”, de forma que cualquier alteración sustancial y no prevista de las mismas podrían dar lugar a la modificación del contenido contractual.

          La cláusula RSS no está regulada en ningún precepto en nuestro ordenamiento; es una construcción doctrinal que tradicionalmente la jurisprudencia ha admitido (ejemplos entre otros muchos STS de 30 de junio de 2014, 24 de febrero de 2015, 15 de enero de 2019, 18 de julio de 2019), con mucha cautela, solo en ciertos casos, y requiriendo las siguientes premisas

          • Que se haya producido una alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias del contrato, en el momento que el mismo se deba cumplir, en relación con las concurrentes al tiempo de su celebración. Para valorar si una incidencia puede determinar la mutación o alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias que dotaron sentido al contrato, debemos atenernos a lo siguiente: a) Debemos contrastar el alcance de dicha mutación o alteración respecto del sentido o finalidad del contrato y de la conmutatividad o equilibrio prestacional del mismo; y b) Debe quedar excluido el «riesgo normal» inherente o derivado del contrato.
          • Que se haya producido una desproporción exorbitante, fuera de todo cálculo, entre las prestaciones de las partes contratantes, provocando un desequilibrio entre las mismas.
          • Que lo anterior se produzca como consecuencia de circunstancias radicalmente imprevisibles.
          • Que no exista otro remedio para superar la situación.

          Históricamente nuestros tribunales han sido muy reacios a aplicar RSS si bien desde la crisis económica de 2008-2012 ha tenido lugar un cierto cambio de criterio y una mayor receptividad jurisprudencial-

          Consecuencias de la aplicación de la RSS

          La doctrina establece que la aplicación de la RSS no tiene, en principio, efectos rescisorios, resolutorios o extintivos del contrato, sino únicamente efectos modificativos del mismo, encaminados a compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones; a su vez la doctrina establece que se aplica únicamente a los contratos a largo plazo o de tracto sucesivo y de ejecución diferida.

          En aplicación de la buena fe, la reacción ante un evento de caso fortuito, fuerza mayor o en general un evento que genera una desproporción entre las partes, como la que regula la institución RSS, debe ser la modificación del contrato para reequilibrar las obligaciones entre las partes, y solo en caso de imposibilidad material de cumplimiento, la resolución de la obligación, en ambos casos sin indemnización por incumplimiento.

          Por ello, en el ámbito de los contratos de arrendamiento y en el caso de cierre de los locales por mandato imperativo, entendemos que la institución RSS podrá ser:

          • alegada por los arrendatarios para solicitar o instar de los arrendadores modificaciones a las prestaciones económicas del contrato y
          • estimada por los jueces, cuando estos supuestos se debatan ante los Tribunales, a la hora de aceptar como equitativas y legítimas las tales novaciones contractuales con el fin de compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones generado por los efectos del COVID 19.

          En suma, la cláusula RSS puede ser una herramienta para el arrendatario de un local que ha tenido que cerrar durante el Estado de Alarma, a la hora de negociar con el arrendador una modificación del contrato, intentando aplazar la renta mientras se prolongue el Estado de Alarma o negociando un descuento de esta.

          Debe recordarse:

          • Que la RSS es de ineludible aplicación casuística, no caben generalizaciones y será necesario tener en cuenta el efecto que provoque el COVID 19 en cada relación contractual concreta (STS de 30 de junio de 2014 y 24 de febrero de 2015) y el efectivo desequilibrio de las prestaciones que haya producido, y
          • Que, como hemos dicho, los Tribunales son en general reacios a la aplicación de esta cláusula a la que solo acuden en caso de falta de cualquier otra herramienta jurídica y en situaciones en que el mantenimiento del status quo contractual revele una manifiesta “injusticia” y un patente y rotundo desequilibrio entre las prestaciones de las partes.

          ¿Significa lo anterior que el arrendatario podrá imponer al arrendador una modificación de las condiciones económicas del contrato al amparo de RSS (aplazamiento o condonación total o parcial)?

          No lo creemos de manera tan rotunda; lo que si pensamos es que la aplicación de esta institución RSS debería,

          • Justificar una razonable solicitud del arrendatario de novar temporalmente las condiciones del contrato (aplazamiento o condonación, total o parcial) que al arrendador debe razonablemente atender.
          • En caso de negativa irrazonable del arrendador, y documentando cuanto más profusamente pueda el arrendatario su solicitud y las eventuales negociaciones o negativa a mantenerlas por la contra parte, permitirle fundamentar una suspensión del pago de la renta, total o parcial, durante la pendencia del Estado de Alarma con ánimo, no de extinción de la obligación, pero sí de su aplazamiento.

          Habremos de esperar a la reacción de los tribunales cuando lleguen a su conocimiento estos conflictos, como sin duda ocurrirá; pero si nos atrevemos a adelantar que es bastante posible que la tendencia judicial sea la de conceder amparo al arrendatario con apoyo en la cláusula RSS y el principio de la preservación del negocio, a la hora de dar validez a determinados efectos modificativos respecto a las obligaciones pecuniarias a cargo del arrendatario (condonación total o parcial del pago de la renta durante la crisis pandémica, aplazamiento, aplazamiento parcial).

          En todo caso será esencial acreditar que la conducta del contratante deudor que busca amparo en la cláusula RSS para novar el contrato se ha ajustado estrictamente al principio de buena fe (STS 30 de abril de 2015).

          También será importante analizar caso por caso por qué se justifica el desplazamiento del riesgo derivado del “suceso excepcional e imprevisto” de un contratante al otro (STS de 15 de enero de 2015) y bien podría defenderse (STS de 18 de julio de 2019) que deben ambos contratantes repartirse y asumir entre los dos las consecuencias.

          Las decisiones judiciales variarán en cada caso concreto que habrá de ser objeto de estudio individualizado.

          Conclusiones y Recomendaciones

          En suma, parece que al arrendatario contaría con dos instrumentos para la pretensión de suspender (signifique esto condonar o aplazar) el pago de las rentas, la cláusula RSS y el principio de Fuerza Mayor.

          A nuestro modo de ver, la reposición del equilibrio contractual alterado por el suceso excepcional puede consistir o bien en una prórroga de los plazos de pago del arrendamiento o bien en la aplicación de una condonación total o parcial de la obligación de pago de rentas mientras dure el Estado de Alarma, pero entendemos que será defendible que el retraso en el pago del arrendamiento no podrá dar lugar ni a la resolución del contrato al amparo del art. 1124 Cc ni a la exigencia de daños y perjuicios art. 1105 Cc, en consecuencia, no facultará al arrendador a instar el desahucio.

          Por ello los pasos a seguir en cada caso serían:

          • Realizar un examen del contrato para ver si se regulan los casos de fuerza mayor y caso fortuito y si la situación actual concuerda con lo regulado en el contrato.
          • En caso de que no se estipule nada en el contrato, y habiéndose cerrado el local u oficina, advertir de ello a la otra parte e intentar negociar una novación del contrato de arrendamiento solicitando: (i) condonación total de la renta durante el Estado de Alarma; (ii) condonación parcial compartiendo ambas partes el esfuerzo en proporción por convenir; y (iii) aplazamiento del pago de la renta hasta que se pueda reabrir el local u oficina con un plan de pagos de la deuda aplazada.
          • Si no es posible llegar a un acuerdo, es conveniente dejar constancia de que se ha actuado con buena fe intentando llegar a una solución negociada y en el extremo (desde la óptica del arrendatario) anunciar, sin esperar a recibir una comunicación o reclamación del Arrendador, la suspensión del pago de las rentas justificando la misma en el Estado de Alarma hasta la finalización del mismo y la consecuente reapertura del local/oficina.

          QUICK SUMMARY: Contract negotiations do not take place in a legal vacuum. A party who negotiates contrary to the principle of good faith and then breaks off negotiations may become liable to the other party. However, the requirements for such liability are high and the enforcement of damage claims is cumbersome. At the end of the post I will share some practical tips for contract negotiations in Switzerland.

          Under Swiss law, the principle of freedom of contract is of fundamental importance. It follows from the freedom of contract that, in principle, everyone is free to enter into contract negotiations and to terminate them again without incurring any liability. A termination of contract negotiations does not have to be justified either.

          However, the freedom of contract is limited by the obligation to act in good faith (cf. article 2 para. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code), which is of equal fundamental importance. From the moment when parties enter into contract negotiations, they are in a special legal relationship with each other. That pre-contractual relationship involves certain reciprocal obligations. In particular, the parties must negotiate in a serious manner and in accordance with their actual intentions.

          Negotiating parties must not stir up the hope of the other party, contrary to their actual intentions, that a contract will actually be concluded. Put differently, a party’s willingness to conclude a contract must not be expressed more strongly than it actually is. If a party realizes that the other party wrongly beliefs that a contract would certainly be concluded, such illusion should be dispelled in due course.

          A negotiating party that terminates contract negotiations in violation of these principles, whether maliciously or negligently, may become liable to the other party based on the culpa in contrahendo doctrine. However, such liability exists in exceptional cases only.

          • The fact that contract negotiations took a long time is not sufficient for incurring such liability. The duration of negotiations is, in itself, not decisive.
          • It is not possible to derive liability from pre-existing contractual relationships between the negotiation parties, as for example in cases where parties negotiate a «mere» prolongation of an existing agreement. The decisive factor is not whether parties were already contractually bound before, but only whether the party that terminated the contract negotiations made the other party believe that a new agreement would certainly be concluded.
          • It is not decisive whether the party who terminates contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made costly investments in view of the prospective contract. In principle, anyone who makes investments already prior to the actual conclusion of a contract does so at its own risk. Even where a party to contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made (substantial) investments in the prospective agreement, a termination of the contract negotiations will, in itself, not be considered as an act of bad faith.

          What does a liability for breaking off negotiations include?

          If a party violates the aforementioned pre-contractual obligations, the other party may be entitled to compensation for the so-called negative interest. This means that the other party must be put in the position it would have been if the negotiations had not taken place. Damages may include, e.g., expenses in connection with the negotiation of the contract (travel costs, legal fees etc.), but also a loss of income in cases where a party was not able to do business with third parties because of the contract negotiations. However, the other party has no right to be treated as if the contract had been concluded (so-called positive interest).

          Having said that, it must be kept in mind that the requirements set by Swiss court for the substantiation of damages are rather high, so that the enforcement of a liability for breaking off negotiations will often be a cumbersome process. Therefore pursuing damage claims with relatively low amounts in dispute might often require a disproportionate effort.

          Practical tips – Do’s and don’ts when negotiating contracts

          • Do not overstate your willingness to conclude a contract. Be frank with your counterparty. Make it clear from the beginning of the negotiations what clauses are important to you.
          • Do not tell the other party that you are willing to sign a contract, if you still have doubts or you are even unwilling to do so. Confirm that you will sign only if you are convinced to do so.
          • Do not allow someone else (e.g., a representative, employee, branch office etc.) to negotiate on your behalf if you are not willing to enter into an agreement anyway. Keep an eye on how the negotiations are going on and intervene if necessary.
          • Do not make costly investments before a legally binding agreement is concluded. If, for time or other reasons, such investments are necessary already before the conclusion of an agreement, insist on the conclusion of an interim contract governing such investments for the event that the envisaged agreement is not concluded finally.

          In 2020, an important revision of the Swiss statute of limitations enters into force. The new law provides for longer limitation periods in cases of personal injury and extends the relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law from one to three years.

          Background of the revision

          In June 2018, the Swiss parliament adopted an amendment to the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”) pertaining to a revision of the statute of limitations. In November 2018, the Swiss government decided that the revised statute of limitations shall enter into force on 1 January 2020.

          The revision was significantly influenced by asbestos cases. Under the current law, damage claims of asbestos victims were time-barred in some cases even before asbestos-related diseases could be diagnosed. In March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held in Howald Moor and others v. Switzerland that the Swiss statute of limitations amounts in such cases to a violation of article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right of access to a court).

          Having said that, the revision does not only concern cases of personal injury, but also includes numerous other important changes as described in the following.

          Key changes regarding limitation periods

          A. Tort law

          In tort law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

          With the exception of cases of personal injury, the absolute limitation period remains ten years as from the date when the conduct that caused the damages occurred or ended (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

          In cases of personal injury, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable. Currently the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

          The new absolute limitation period in cases of personal injury amounts to twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 60 para. 1bis CO). Under the current law, there was no special absolute limitation period for cases of personal injury, so that the ordinary 10-year period applied (Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

          If conduct, which gives rise to liability under tort law, is also punishable under criminal law, the (longer) limitation period under criminal law remains applicable (cf. Art. 97 of the Swiss Criminal Code). However, where a first-instance criminal judgment is rendered before the conduct is time-barred under criminal law, the limitation periods ends not earlier than three years as from that criminal judgment (revised Art. 60 para. 2 CO). The current law does not provide for such an additional three-year limitation period.

          B. Unjust enrichment law

          In unjust enrichment law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years as from the date on which the injured party knows about the claim (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

          The absolute limitation period is not affected by the revision and remains ten years after the date on which the claim arises (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO).

          C. Contract law

          With regard to contractual claims, the ordinary limitation period remains ten years from the due date (Art. 127 CO). Furthermore, the shorter limitation period of five years from the due date applicable to (amongst others) claims for rent, interest on capital and other periodic payments, (most) claims out of employment relationships etc. remains unchanged too (Art. 128 CO).

          However, in cases of personal injury, the revised statute of limitations introduces a new relative limitation period of three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage, as well as a new absolute limitation period of twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 128a CO). The current law does not provide for distinct relative and absolute limitation periods for contractual claims in cases of personal injury. Instead, the ordinary ten-year limitation period (Art. 127 CO) usually applied to such cases.

          D. Summary

          In summary, the most important elements of the revised statute of limitations are the longer (trebled) relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law (i.e., three years instead of one year) and the new special rules for cases of personal injury, which now benefit from a 20-year absolute limitation period.

          Transitional provisions / application of the revised statute of limitations to pre-existing claims

          The longer limitation periods under the revised CO apply to any claims that are not yet time-barred when the revision enters into force (i.e., on 1 January 2020; revised Art. 49 para. 1, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). In other words, the limitation periods of any claims that do not become time-barred until 31 December 2019 at the latest will be prolonged. This is of particular relevance with regard to claims based on tort and unjust enrichment; the short one-year relative limitation periods under the current law will be extended by another two years.

          In contrast, the current law remains applicable in case the revised statute of limitations provides for shorter limitation periods (revised Art. 49 para. 2, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). This concerns, in particular, contractual claims in cases of personal injury. The new three-year relative limitation period under the revised law might not apply to such claims, as the current statute of limitations does not provide for a relative limitation period at all.

          Further changes brought by the revision

          In addition to the changes of the limitation periods set out above, the revision of the statute of limitations contains numerous further modifications. Some of them are listed in the following:

          1. Limitation periods do not commence or are suspended in the event that a claim cannot be asserted for objective reasons before any court worldwide (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 6 CO). The current law provides for such non-commencement or suspension only if the claim cannot be brought before a Swiss court.
          2. Parties to a dispute may agree in writing that limitation periods shall be suspended during settlement discussions, mediation proceedings or other out-of-court settlement proceedings (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 8 CO).
          3. Once a limitation period has commenced to run, waivers of statute of limitation defenses are admissible, but must not exceed ten years (revised Art. 141 para. 1 CO). Any such waivers must be in writing (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
          4. In general terms and conditions (“GTC”), statute of limitation defenses may be waived by the party who makes use of the GTCs only. In contrast, a waiver by the party on whom the GTCs are imposed (e.g., consumers) is ineffective (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
          5. The limitation period for an actio pauliana under the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) is extended to from currently two years to three years after service of a loss certificate, the opening of bankruptcy proceedings or the confirmation of a composition agreement with an assignment of assets (whichever is applicable; revised Art. 292 DEBA).

          If 2017 was the year of Initial Coin Offerings, 2018 was the year of Blockchain awareness and testing all over the world. From ICO focused guidelines and regulations respectively aimed to alarm and protect investors, we have seen the shift, especially in Europe, to distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) focused guidelines and regulations aimed at protecting citizens on one hand and promote DLT implementations on the other.

          Indeed, European Union Member States and the European Parliament started looking deeper into the technology by, for instance, calling for consultations with professionals in order to understand DLT’s potentials for real-world implementations and possible risks.

          In this article I am aiming to give a brief snapshot of firstly what are the most notable European initiatives and moves towards promoting Blockchain implementation and secondly current challenges faced by European law makers when dealing with the regulation of distributed ledger technologies.

          Europe

          Let’s start from the European Blockchain Partnership (“EBP”), a statement made by 25 EU Member States acknowledging the importance of distributed ledger technology for society, in particular when it comes to interoperability, cyber security and efficiency of digital public services. The Partnership is not only an acknowledgement, it is also a commitment from all signatory states to collaborate to build what they envision will be a distributed ledger infrastructure for the delivering of cross-border public services.

          Witness of the trust given to the technology is My Health My Data, a EU-backed project that uses DLT to enable patients to efficiently control their digitally recorded health data while securing it from the threat of data breaches. Benefits the EU saw in DLT on this specific project are safety, efficiency but most notably the opportunity that DLT offers data subject to have finally control over their own data, without the need for intermediaries.

          Another important initiative proving European interests in testing DLT technologies is the Horizon Prize on “Blockchains for Social Good”, a 5 million Euros worth challenge open to innovators and tech companies to develop scalable, efficient and high-impact decentralized solutions to social innovation challenges.

          Moving forward, in December last year, I had the honor to be part of the “ Workshop on Blockchains & Smart Contracts Legal and Regulatory Framework” in Paris, an initiative supported by the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum (“EUBOF”), a pilot project initiated by the European Parliament. Earlier last year other three workshops were held, the aim of each was to collect knowledge on specific topics from an audience of leading DLT legal and technical professionals. With the knowledge collected, the EUBOF followed up with reports of what was discussed during the workshop and suggest a way forward.

          Although not binding, these reports give a reasonably clear guideline to the industry on how existing laws at a European level apply to the technology, or at least should be interpreted, and highlight areas where new regulation is definitely needed. As an example let’s look at the Report on Blockchain & GDPR. If you missed it, the GDPR is the Regulation that protects Europeans personal data and it’s applicable to all companies globally, which are processing data from European citizens. The “right to erasure” embedded in the GDPR, doesn’t allow personal data to be stored on an immutable database, the data subject has to be able to erase data anytime when shared with a service provider and stored somewhere on a database. In the case of Blockchain, the consensus on personal data having to be stored off-chain is therefore unanimous. Storing personal data off-chain and leaving an hash to that data on-chain, is a viable solution if certain precautions are taken in order to avoid the risks of reversibility or linkability of such hash to the personal data stored off-chain, therefore making the hash on-chain personally identifiable information.

          However, not all European laws apply to Member States, therefore making it hard to give a EU-wide answer to most DLT compliance challenges in Europe. Member States freedom to legislate is indeed only limited/influenced by two main instruments, Regulations, which are automatically enforceable in each Member State and Directives binding Member States to legislate on specific topics according to a set of specific rules.

          Diverging national laws have a great effect on multiple aspects of innovative technologies. Let’s look for instance at the validity of “smart contracts”. When discussing the legal power of automatically enforceable digital contracts, the lack of a European wide legislation on contracts makes it impossible to find an answer applicable to all Member States. For instance, is “offer and acceptance” enough to constitute a contract? What is considered a valid “acceptance”? What is an “obligation”? “Can a digital asset be the object of a legally binding agreement”?

          If we try to give a EU-wide answer to the questions such as smart contract validity and enforceability it is apparently not possible since we will need to consider 28 different answers. I, therefore, believe that the future of innovation in Europe will highly depend on the unification of laws.

          An example of a unified law that has great benefits on innovation (including DLT) is the Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS) Regulation, which governs electronic identification including electronic signatures.

          The race to regulating DLT in Europe

          Let’s now look briefly at a couple of Member States legislations, specifically on Blockchain and cryptocurrencies last year.

          EU Member States have been quite creative I would say in regulating the new technology. Let’s start from Malta, which saw a surprising increase of important projects and companies, such as Binance, landing on the beautiful Mediterranean Island thanks to its favorable (or at least felt as such) legislations on DLT. The “Blockchain Island” passed three laws in early July to regulate and supervise Blockchain projects including ICOs, crypto exchanges and DLT, specifically: The Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act regulation that aims at recognizing different technology arrangements such as DAOs, smart contracts and in future probably AI machines; The Virtual Financial Assets Act for ICOs and crypto exchanges; The Malta Digital Innovation Authority establishing a new supervisory authority.

          Some think the Maltese legislation lacks a comprehensive framework, one that for instance, gives legal personality to Innovative Technology Arrangements. For this reason some are therefore accusing the Maltese lawmakers of rushing into an uncompleted regulatory framework in order to attract business to the island while others seem to positively welcome the laws as a good start for a European wide regulation on DLT and crypto assets.

          In December 2018, Malta also initiated a declaration that was then signed by other six Members States, calling for collaboration for the promotion and implementation of DLT on a European level.

          France was one of the signatories of such declaration, and it’s worth mentioning since the French Minister for the Economy and Finance approved in September a framework for regulating ICOs and therefore protecting investors’ rights, basically giving the AMF (French Authority for Financial Market) the empowerment to give licenses to companies wanting to raise funds through Initial Coin Offerings.

          Last but not least comes Switzerland which although it is not a EU Member State, it has great degree of influence on European and national legislators when it comes to progressive regulations. At the end of December, the Swiss Federal Council released a report on DLT and the law, making a clear statement that the existing Swiss law is sufficient to regulate most matters related to DLT and Blockchain, although some adjustments have to be made. So no new laws but few amendments here and there, which will allow the integration of the specific DLT applications with existing laws in order to ensure legal certainty on certain uncovered matters. Relevant areas of Swiss law that will be amended include the transfer of rights utilizing digital registers, Anti Money Laundering rules specifically for decentralized trading platforms and bankruptcy when that proceeding involves crypto assets.

          Conclusions

          To summarize, from the approach taken during the past year, it is apparent that there is great interest in Europe to understand the potentials and to soon test implementations of distributed ledger technology. Lawmakers have also an understanding that the technology is in an infant state, it might involve risks, therefore making it complex to set specific rules or to give final answers on the alignment of certain technology applications with existing European or national laws.

          To achieve European wide results, however, acknowledgments, guidelines and reports are not enough. The setting of standards for lawmakers applicable to all Member States or even unification of laws in crucial sectors influencing directly or indirectly new technologies, will be the only solution for any innovative technology to be adopted at a European level.

          The author of this post is Alessandro Mazzi.

          Influencer Marketing project

          28 de mayo de 2018

          • Italia
          • Contratos
          • Medios de comunicación

          Summary

          The recent post-Brexit trade deal makes no provision for jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments.

          Therefore, the UK dropped out of the jurisdiction of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) on 31 December 2020.

          The EU has not yet approved the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, but may do in the future.

          Unless the transitional provisions from the Withdrawal Agreement apply, jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments will be governed by the Hague Convention 2005 if there is an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause

          If the Hague Convention of 2005 does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules.

          Judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

          On the first day of 2021 the UK left the EU regimes with which European lawyers are familiar. We appeared to enter “uncharted territory”. Not so. In fact, there are charts for this territory – or maps, to use a more modern word. You just need to know which maps.

          Whether you are a lawyer or a businessperson, in whatever country, you need answers to two questions. Which laws govern jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU member states and the UK; and how should businesses act as a result?

          What happened?

          The EU and UK reached a post-Brexit trade deal, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”), on Christmas Eve 2020. The provisions of the TCA became UK law as the European Union (Future Relationship) Act on 31 December 2020. The TCA made provision for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but did not mention judicial cooperation in civil matters, or jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial proceedings.

          So where do we look for law on those matters?

          We look at the position immediately before Brexit. As every lawyer should know the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) governed the enforcement and recognition of judgments between EU member states.

          Also, the Lugano Convention 2007 governs jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in commercial and civil matters between EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It operates in substantially the same way as Brussels (Recast) does between EU member states.

          The UK was party to the Convention by virtue of its EU membership. Now that the UK is not a member of the EU, the contracting parties could agree that the UK could join the Lugano Convention as an independent contracting party, and there would be little change to the position on jurisdiction and enforcement. English jurisdiction clauses would continue to be respected and English court judgments would continue to be readily enforceable throughout EU member states and EFTA countries, and vice versa.

          The problem is that the EU has not agreed to the UK joining the Lugano Convention

          The UK submitted its application to accede to the Lugano Convention in its own right on 8 April 2020. But accession requires the consent of all contracting parties including the EU. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have indicated their support for the UK’s accession, but the EU’s position is still not yet clear and the TCA is silent on this matter.

          While the EU still may belatedly support the UK’s accession to Lugano, it does not currently apply. In any case, a three-month time-lag applies between agreement and entry into force, unless all the contracting parties agree to waive it.

          Where are we now?

          If the transitional provisions provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement as explained in my previous post do not apply, the Brussels (Recast) Regulation will not apply to jurisdiction and enforcement between the EU and UK.

          If they do not, then you first need to decide whether the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 is applicable. The Hague Convention 2005 applies between EU Member States, Mexico, Singapore and Montenegro. The Hague Convention first came into force for the UK when the EU acceded on 1 October 2015 and the UK re-acceded after Brexit in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021.

          The Hague Convention 2005 applies if:

          • The dispute falls within the scope of the Convention as provided for by Article 2 – e.g. the Convention does not apply to employment and consumer contracts or claims for personal injury;
          • There is an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the meaning of Article 3; and
          • The exclusive jurisdiction clause is entered into after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized, and proceedings are commenced after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized within the meaning of Article 16.

          There is some uncertainty as to whether EU member states will treat the Hague Convention as having been in force from 1 October 2015, or only from when the UK re-accedes on 1 January 2021. The UK’s view is that the Convention will apply to the UK from 1 October 2015; the EU’s view is that it will apply to the UK from 1 January 2021. What is not in dispute is that for exclusive English jurisdiction clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, the contracting states will respect exclusive English jurisdiction clauses and enforce the resulting judgments.

          If the 2005 Hague Convention does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules to questions of jurisdiction and enforcement. In the UK, the rules will essentially be the same as the ‘common-law’ rules currently on enforcement applied to non-EU parties, for example the United States.

          The Norwegian exception

          The UK and Norway have reached an agreement which extends and updates an old mutual enforcement treaty, the 1961 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between the UK and Norway, which will apply if the UK does not re-accede to the Lugano Convention. The practical effect of this agreement is that judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

          How should your business act now?

          The applicable legal framework for each dispute will depend on the facts of each case. You should review the dispute resolution clauses in your cross-border contracts to assess how they may be affected by Brexit and to seek specialist advice where necessary. You should also seek advice on dispute resolution provisions when entering into new cross-border contracts in 2021.

          This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

          This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

          In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

          English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

          The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

          This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

          The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

          The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

          As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

          The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

          Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

          The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

          Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

          Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

          Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

          The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

          Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

          The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

          There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

          The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

          The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

          As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

          Novel technology in proceedings

          Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

          And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

          Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

          Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

          Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

          • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
          • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
          • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
          • the matter concerns an international dispute.

          The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

          “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

          The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

          Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

          We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

          To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

          Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

          Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

          • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
          • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
          • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
          • the disclosure of confidential documents
          • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
          • the manner of taking witness testimony
          • the costs of the proceedings.

          Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

          All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

          The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

          • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
          • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
          • The defendant submits its defence statement.
          • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
          • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
          • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
          • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
          • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

          Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

          As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

          This is a summary of the approved measures, which unfortunately for both tenants and landlords do not include any public aid or tax relief and just refer to a postponement in the payment of the rent.

          Premises to which they are applied

          Leased premises dedicated to activities different than residential: commercial, professional, industrial, cultural, teaching, amusement, healthcare, etc. They also apply to the lease of a whole industry (i.e. hotels, restaurants, bars, etc., which are the most usual type of businesses object of this deal).

          Types of tenants

          • Individual entrepreneurs or self-employed persons who were registered before Social Security before the declaration of the state of alarm on March 14th, 2020
          • Small and medium companies, as defined by article 257.1 of the Capital Companies Act: those who fulfil during two consecutive fiscal years these figures: assets under € 4 million, turnover under € 8 million and average staff under 50 people

          Types of landlords

          In order to benefit from these measures, the landlord should be a housing public entity or company or a big owner, considering as such the individuals or companies who own more than 10 urban properties (excluding parking places and storage rooms) or a built surface over 1.500 sqm.

          Measures approved

          The payment of the rent is postponed without interest meanwhile the state of alarm is in force, but in any case, for a maximum period of four months. Once the state of alarm is overcome, and in any case in a maximum term of four months, the postponed rents should be paid along a maximum period of two years, or the duration of the lease agreement, should it be less than two years.

          For landlords different to those mentioned above

          The tenant could apply before the landlord for the postponement in the payment of the rent (but the landlord is not obliged to accept it), and the parties can use the guarantee that the tenant should mandatorily have provided at the beginning of any lease agreement (usually equal to two month’s rent, but could be more if agreed by the parties), in full or in part, in order to use it to pay the rent. The tenant will have to provide again the guarantee within one year’s term, or less should the lease agreement have a shorter duration.

          Activities to which it is applied

          Activities which have been suspended according to the Royal Decree that declared the state of alarm, dated march, 14ht, 2020, or according to the orders issued by the authorities delegated by such Royal Decree. This should be proved through a certificated issued by the tax authorities.

          If the activity has not been directly suspended by the Royal Decree, the turnover during the month prior to the postponement should be less than 75% of the average monthly turnover during the same quarter last year. This should be proved through a responsible declaration by the tenant, and the landlord is authorised check the bookkeeping records.

          Term to apply and procedure

          The tenant should apply for these measures before the landlord within one month’s term from the publication of the Royal Decree-law, that is, from April 22nd, 2020, and the landlord (in case belongs to the groups mentioned in point c) is obliged to accept the tenant’s request, except if both parties have already agreed something different. The postponement would be applied to the following month.

          As the state of alarm was declared more than one month ago (March 14th), landlords and tenants have already been reaching some agreements, for example 50% rent reduction during the state of alarm, and 50% rent postponement during the following 6 months. Tenants who do not reach an agreement with the landlord could face an eviction procedure, however court procedures are suspended during the state of alarm. We have also seen some abusive non-payment of rent by tenants.

          When is becomes impossible to reach an agreement with the landlord, tenants have the legal remedy of claiming in Court for the application of the “rebus sic stantibus” principle, which was highly demanded during the 2008 financial crisis but very seldom applied by the Courts. This principle is aimed to re-balance the parties’ obligations when their situation had deeply changed because of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. This principle is not included in the Spanish Civil Code, but the Supreme Court has accepted its application, in a very restricted way, in some occasions.

          Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

          Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

          Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

          La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

          Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

          «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

          Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

          Escuchar es altamente eficaz

          En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

          Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

          «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

          Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

          En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

          «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

          Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

          La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

          En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

          «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

          Las emociones son importantes

          Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

          «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

          [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

          El Real Decreto-ley 8/2020, de 17 de marzo, de medidas urgentes extraordinarias para hacer frente al impacto económico y social del COVID-19, aunque afecta y produce efectos en muchos diferentes ámbitos jurídicos, no incluye ninguna referencia a los contratos de arrendamientos de inmuebles, ni viviendas, ni locales u oficinas.

          El objeto de esta nota es analizar los efectos de la situación del Estado de Alarma respecto a aquellos contratos de arrendamiento de oficinas o locales que se hayan visto obligados a cerrar en aplicación del decreto; aquellos otros que permanezcan total o parcialmente abiertos y en funcionamiento, bien que con una actividad reducida o mínima, en principio no son objeto de las conclusiones que más adelante alcanzamos sin perjuicio de que existan casos individualizados a los que, pese a no existir un cierre total, razonable y lógicamente puedan serles de aplicación.

          No está excluido en modo alguno que ante una prolongación de la vigencia del Estado de Alarma pudiera publicarse alguna norma que afectase a los contratos de arrendamiento, pero de momento esto no ha sucedido. Si esto llegase a acaecer, al contenido de dicha norma habrá de estarse.

          En base al principio de libertad de pactos que consagra el art. 1255 del Código Civil, que permite que sean las partes firmantes del contrato las que convengan (i) qué escenarios y situaciones deben considerarse como constitutivos de supuestos de Fuerza Mayor y Caso Fortuito y (ii) cuáles deban ser las consecuencias contractuales de los tales escenarios, el primer ejercicio es comprobar si el contrato incluye una cláusula reguladora de la Fuerza mayor y sus efectos; si es así, a la tal cláusula habrá de estarse y su análisis queda al margen de esta nota.

          En ausencia de regulación expresa en el contrato, aplicarían al caso las previsiones del Código Civil y en concreto el artículo 1.105.

          COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor

          El COVID 19 es un acontecimiento que en principio reúne los requisitos que exige el Código Civil para ser calificado como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor (art. 1105 Código Civil) ya que:

          • Se trata de un hecho ajeno y no imputable al contratante deudor de la prestación u obligación.
          • Es imprevisible, o si se reputase “previsible”, es sin duda inevitable.
          • El acontecimiento en cuestión, la pandemia, debe ser causa y tener como consecuencia el incumplimiento de la obligación, es decir debe existir un nexo causal.

          Por lo tanto, cumpliéndose los tres requisitos, la primera conclusión que alcanzamos es que muy previsiblemente, los Tribunales españoles calificarán como “Fuerza Mayor” la situación causada por el COVID 19 cuando se les plantee una contienda judicial en la que tal asunto se discuta entre los litigantes. Analizaremos a continuación las consecuencias de dicha calificación.

          Consecuencias de considerar COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza mayor

          La generalidad de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia entienden que los efectos de calificar un supuesto como caso de Fuerza Mayor en principio son:

          • Imposibilidad total y definitiva de cumplir; liberando al deudor del cumplimiento de la obligación.
          • Imposibilidad parcial de cumplir; quedando liberado el deudor sólo en la parte que le es imposible cumplir, pero siguiendo obligado por la parte que sí puede llevar a cabo.
          • Imposibilidad temporal de cumplir; el deudor queda liberado de la responsabilidad por mora mientras persista la situación de excepcionalidad.

          Ahora bien, analicemos como afectaría dicha consideración como Fuerza Mayor de la epidemia, respecto a los contratos de arrendamiento para usos distintos a la vivienda.

          Respecto al pago de la renta

          La pregunta a la que responder es, si la calificación de la situación pandémica actual como un caso de Fuerza Mayor, libera al arrendatario (cuyo local se ha visto obligado a cerrar por orden de la autoridad gubernamental) de la obligación del pago de la renta mientras dicha obligación de cierre persista, incluyendo en el concepto “liberación” diferentes alternativas: condonación total o parcial y/o aplazamiento total o parcial.

          Nos estamos encontrando en estos días con una reacción frecuente entre algunos arrendatarios, quienes, de manera unilateral, han informado a sus arrendadores que considerando COVID 19 un supuesto de fuerza mayor y habiéndose visto obligados a cerrar el local/oficina, suspenden el pago de la renta mientras dicha situación permanezca. No resuelven el contrato, no entregan la posesión, se mantienen en ella (permaneciendo el local cerrado y no operativo) pero suspenden el pago (sin quedar claro si suspender en este caso significa auto condonarse el pago de la renta o aplazarlo para cuando desaparezca el supuesto de Fuerza Mayor).

          Argumentos en contra de la liberación

          Por más que pueda considerarse “entendible” esta actitud, desde la óptica del arrendatario, no desde la del arrendador, dicha consideración se topa con un obstáculo: la interpretación que de la Fuerza Mayor ha hecho el TS respecto a las obligaciones de pago pecuniario, según la STS (Civil) de 19 mayo de 2015:

          “No pudiendo plantearse, pues, tratándose de deudas pecuniarias, la imposibilidad subjetiva -insolvencia- ni la objetiva o formal, concluye la doctrina que no es posible imaginar que si la imposibilidad obedece a caso fortuito pudiera tener como efecto la extinción de la obligación.

          La exoneración del deudor por caso fortuito no es absoluta, tiene excepciones, conforme prevé el articulo 1.105 CC, y una de ellas, por aplicación del principio «genus nunquam perit», sería en supuestos de obligaciones de entregar cosa genérica.

          En tales circunstancias el deudor pecuniario viene obligado a cumplir la prestación principal, sin que sus sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello, pues lo adeudado no es algo individualizado que ha perecido sino algo genérico como es el dinero.”

          Conclusión: no parece que este criterio jurisprudencial permita defender que el cumplimiento de las obligaciones pecuniarias quede liberado, extinto o que su incumplimiento quede justificado en casos de Fuerza Mayor, de suerte que el deudor pecuniario, en este caso el arrendatario, en aplicación de este criterio, vendría obligado a cumplir la prestación principal sin que las sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello con fundamento en la Fuerza Mayor, debido a la condición genérica que tiene el dinero.

          Argumentos a favor de la liberación: el art. 1.575 del Código Civil

          Dicho lo anterior lo anterior, debe hacerse referencia a un artículo del Código Civil que, con certeza, será profusamente citado en los conflictos judiciales que se avecinan.

          El art. 1.575, tratando del arrendamiento de fincas rústicas, reconoce el derecho del arrendatario a la rebaja de la renta en caso de pérdida de más de la mitad de los frutos (salvo pacto en contrario) en “casos fortuitos, extraordinarios e imprevistos…como incendio, guerra, peste, inundación insólita, langosta, terremoto u otro igualmente desacostumbrado que los contratantes no hayan podido racionalmente prever”.

          ¿Es aplicable este precepto, previsto para arrendamientos rústicos, a los arrendamientos urbanos?

          El art. 4.1 CC permite la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando (i) estas no contemplen un supuesto específico y (ii) regulen otro semejante entre los que se aprecie “identidad de razón”.

          La STS de 15 de enero de 2019, resolviendo un conflicto de un arrendamiento de un edificio destinado a hotel, en el que el arrendatario había pretendido la rebaja de la renta al amparo de la cláusula “rebus sic stantibus” por la crisis de 2008 y había alegado a su favor la aplicación del art.1.575, estableció:

          “La argumentación de la sentencia recurrida por la que se rechaza la pretensión de rebaja del precio pactado tampoco es contraria al criterio legal que se desprende del art. 1575 CC, que es la regla que permite la rebaja de la renta en el arrendamiento de bienes productivos que no deriven de riesgos del propio negocio, exige además que la pérdida de rendimientos se origine por casos fortuitos extraordinarios e imprevistos, algo que por su misma rareza no hubiera ser podido previsto por las partes, y que la pérdida de frutos sea de más de la mitad de los frutos. En el caso no concurre ninguna de estas circunstancias. La disminución de las rentas procede de una evolución del mercado, las partes previeron la posibilidad de que en algunos ejercicios la rentabilidad del hotel no fuera positiva para la arrendataria y las pérdidas alegadas por NH en la explotación del hotel de Almería son inferiores al cincuenta por ciento, sin contar con que el resultado global del conjunto de su actividad como gestora de una cadena de hoteles es, según considera probado la Audiencia a la vista del informe de gestión consolidado, favorable”.

          El TS no admite la aplicación del 1.575 pero no por considerarlo no aplicable a arrendamientos distintos a los rústicos, sino por concluir que no se dan los requisitos para ello ya que ni era imprevisible la crisis de 2008 ni las pérdidas del arrendatario son superiores al 50%.

          Pero, esa interpretación del TS junto con el tenor del art. 4.1 CC permitirían avalar la pretensión del arrendatario que se encuentra sin ingreso alguno durante el Estado de Alarma, de exigir una rebaja de renta que se adecuara al principio de proporcionalidad.

          Respecto a la terminación anticipada a instancias del arrendatario

          Sin embargo, podemos encontrarnos con situaciones en las que el arrendatario, ante la actual situación, decida terminar anticipadamente el contrato de arrendamiento debido a la situación provocada por el COVID 19, poniendo el local a disposición del arrendador.

          Son supuestos en los que se pretende la resolución anticipada del contrato, sin respetar (i) o el plazo obligatorio (ii) o el preaviso, en ambos casos bajo la hipótesis de que estén así regulados en el contrato.

          En estos supuestos entendemos que sí puede resultar defendible que, debido a la situación de fuerza mayor provocada por el COVID 19 y en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, se exonere al arrendatario de la obligación:

          • De respetar un plazo de vigencia determinada del contrato de arrendamiento
          • De preavisar al arrendador en caso de resolución anticipada del contrato

          En ambos casos el contrato quedaría resuelto con la entrega de la posesión del local, sin perjuicio de tener que respetar las obligaciones que prevé el contrato para la terminación y entrega siempre que las mismas no se vean igualmente afectadas por la situación de Fuerza Mayor.

          Nuestra opinión es que, también en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, sería defendible ante los Tribunales la tesis de que el arrendatario quedaría liberado de cualquier obligación de resarcimiento de daños al arrendador por dicha resolución anticipada o incumplimiento de la duración obligada del contrato.

          Conclusión

          En conclusión, planteado ante los Tribunales el debate sobre cómo la pandemia (que no hay duda será calificada como caso de Fuerza Mayor) afectará a las obligaciones a cargo del arrendatario que se haya visto obligado a cerrar su negocio, nuestra opinión es la siguiente:

          1. Respecto a la obligación de pago de la renta, pese al criterio contrario de la sentencia que citamos de 19 de mayo de 2015, nos parece potente y defendible la remisión al art. 1575 y a su aplicación analógica con apoyo en la STS de 15 de enero de 2019, para exigir una reducción proporcional y equitativa de la renta.
          2. Respecto a la facultad del arrendatario para resolver el contrato anticipadamente, entregando la posesión del inmueble al arrendador, exonerando al arrendatario de cumplir con sus obligaciones de preaviso o de duración obligada previstas en el contrato en cuestión, y sin tener que indemnizar al arrendador por ello, entendemos que también existe fundamento para defender judicialmente esta posición.

          Aplicación de la cláusula Rebus Sic Stantibus (RSS)

          Analizaremos a continuación si puede ser aplicable al caso que estamos analizando la cláusula RSS y con qué consecuencias.

          Requisitos de la cláusula RSS (aforismo latino que significa “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”)

          La expresión RSS, opera como una cláusula intrínseca (es decir implícita, sin necesidad de pactarse expresamente) en la relación contractual, que significa que las estipulaciones establecidas en un contrato lo son habida cuenta de las circunstancias concurrentes en el momento, esto es, “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”, de forma que cualquier alteración sustancial y no prevista de las mismas podrían dar lugar a la modificación del contenido contractual.

          La cláusula RSS no está regulada en ningún precepto en nuestro ordenamiento; es una construcción doctrinal que tradicionalmente la jurisprudencia ha admitido (ejemplos entre otros muchos STS de 30 de junio de 2014, 24 de febrero de 2015, 15 de enero de 2019, 18 de julio de 2019), con mucha cautela, solo en ciertos casos, y requiriendo las siguientes premisas

          • Que se haya producido una alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias del contrato, en el momento que el mismo se deba cumplir, en relación con las concurrentes al tiempo de su celebración. Para valorar si una incidencia puede determinar la mutación o alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias que dotaron sentido al contrato, debemos atenernos a lo siguiente: a) Debemos contrastar el alcance de dicha mutación o alteración respecto del sentido o finalidad del contrato y de la conmutatividad o equilibrio prestacional del mismo; y b) Debe quedar excluido el «riesgo normal» inherente o derivado del contrato.
          • Que se haya producido una desproporción exorbitante, fuera de todo cálculo, entre las prestaciones de las partes contratantes, provocando un desequilibrio entre las mismas.
          • Que lo anterior se produzca como consecuencia de circunstancias radicalmente imprevisibles.
          • Que no exista otro remedio para superar la situación.

          Históricamente nuestros tribunales han sido muy reacios a aplicar RSS si bien desde la crisis económica de 2008-2012 ha tenido lugar un cierto cambio de criterio y una mayor receptividad jurisprudencial-

          Consecuencias de la aplicación de la RSS

          La doctrina establece que la aplicación de la RSS no tiene, en principio, efectos rescisorios, resolutorios o extintivos del contrato, sino únicamente efectos modificativos del mismo, encaminados a compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones; a su vez la doctrina establece que se aplica únicamente a los contratos a largo plazo o de tracto sucesivo y de ejecución diferida.

          En aplicación de la buena fe, la reacción ante un evento de caso fortuito, fuerza mayor o en general un evento que genera una desproporción entre las partes, como la que regula la institución RSS, debe ser la modificación del contrato para reequilibrar las obligaciones entre las partes, y solo en caso de imposibilidad material de cumplimiento, la resolución de la obligación, en ambos casos sin indemnización por incumplimiento.

          Por ello, en el ámbito de los contratos de arrendamiento y en el caso de cierre de los locales por mandato imperativo, entendemos que la institución RSS podrá ser:

          • alegada por los arrendatarios para solicitar o instar de los arrendadores modificaciones a las prestaciones económicas del contrato y
          • estimada por los jueces, cuando estos supuestos se debatan ante los Tribunales, a la hora de aceptar como equitativas y legítimas las tales novaciones contractuales con el fin de compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones generado por los efectos del COVID 19.

          En suma, la cláusula RSS puede ser una herramienta para el arrendatario de un local que ha tenido que cerrar durante el Estado de Alarma, a la hora de negociar con el arrendador una modificación del contrato, intentando aplazar la renta mientras se prolongue el Estado de Alarma o negociando un descuento de esta.

          Debe recordarse:

          • Que la RSS es de ineludible aplicación casuística, no caben generalizaciones y será necesario tener en cuenta el efecto que provoque el COVID 19 en cada relación contractual concreta (STS de 30 de junio de 2014 y 24 de febrero de 2015) y el efectivo desequilibrio de las prestaciones que haya producido, y
          • Que, como hemos dicho, los Tribunales son en general reacios a la aplicación de esta cláusula a la que solo acuden en caso de falta de cualquier otra herramienta jurídica y en situaciones en que el mantenimiento del status quo contractual revele una manifiesta “injusticia” y un patente y rotundo desequilibrio entre las prestaciones de las partes.

          ¿Significa lo anterior que el arrendatario podrá imponer al arrendador una modificación de las condiciones económicas del contrato al amparo de RSS (aplazamiento o condonación total o parcial)?

          No lo creemos de manera tan rotunda; lo que si pensamos es que la aplicación de esta institución RSS debería,

          • Justificar una razonable solicitud del arrendatario de novar temporalmente las condiciones del contrato (aplazamiento o condonación, total o parcial) que al arrendador debe razonablemente atender.
          • En caso de negativa irrazonable del arrendador, y documentando cuanto más profusamente pueda el arrendatario su solicitud y las eventuales negociaciones o negativa a mantenerlas por la contra parte, permitirle fundamentar una suspensión del pago de la renta, total o parcial, durante la pendencia del Estado de Alarma con ánimo, no de extinción de la obligación, pero sí de su aplazamiento.

          Habremos de esperar a la reacción de los tribunales cuando lleguen a su conocimiento estos conflictos, como sin duda ocurrirá; pero si nos atrevemos a adelantar que es bastante posible que la tendencia judicial sea la de conceder amparo al arrendatario con apoyo en la cláusula RSS y el principio de la preservación del negocio, a la hora de dar validez a determinados efectos modificativos respecto a las obligaciones pecuniarias a cargo del arrendatario (condonación total o parcial del pago de la renta durante la crisis pandémica, aplazamiento, aplazamiento parcial).

          En todo caso será esencial acreditar que la conducta del contratante deudor que busca amparo en la cláusula RSS para novar el contrato se ha ajustado estrictamente al principio de buena fe (STS 30 de abril de 2015).

          También será importante analizar caso por caso por qué se justifica el desplazamiento del riesgo derivado del “suceso excepcional e imprevisto” de un contratante al otro (STS de 15 de enero de 2015) y bien podría defenderse (STS de 18 de julio de 2019) que deben ambos contratantes repartirse y asumir entre los dos las consecuencias.

          Las decisiones judiciales variarán en cada caso concreto que habrá de ser objeto de estudio individualizado.

          Conclusiones y Recomendaciones

          En suma, parece que al arrendatario contaría con dos instrumentos para la pretensión de suspender (signifique esto condonar o aplazar) el pago de las rentas, la cláusula RSS y el principio de Fuerza Mayor.

          A nuestro modo de ver, la reposición del equilibrio contractual alterado por el suceso excepcional puede consistir o bien en una prórroga de los plazos de pago del arrendamiento o bien en la aplicación de una condonación total o parcial de la obligación de pago de rentas mientras dure el Estado de Alarma, pero entendemos que será defendible que el retraso en el pago del arrendamiento no podrá dar lugar ni a la resolución del contrato al amparo del art. 1124 Cc ni a la exigencia de daños y perjuicios art. 1105 Cc, en consecuencia, no facultará al arrendador a instar el desahucio.

          Por ello los pasos a seguir en cada caso serían:

          • Realizar un examen del contrato para ver si se regulan los casos de fuerza mayor y caso fortuito y si la situación actual concuerda con lo regulado en el contrato.
          • En caso de que no se estipule nada en el contrato, y habiéndose cerrado el local u oficina, advertir de ello a la otra parte e intentar negociar una novación del contrato de arrendamiento solicitando: (i) condonación total de la renta durante el Estado de Alarma; (ii) condonación parcial compartiendo ambas partes el esfuerzo en proporción por convenir; y (iii) aplazamiento del pago de la renta hasta que se pueda reabrir el local u oficina con un plan de pagos de la deuda aplazada.
          • Si no es posible llegar a un acuerdo, es conveniente dejar constancia de que se ha actuado con buena fe intentando llegar a una solución negociada y en el extremo (desde la óptica del arrendatario) anunciar, sin esperar a recibir una comunicación o reclamación del Arrendador, la suspensión del pago de las rentas justificando la misma en el Estado de Alarma hasta la finalización del mismo y la consecuente reapertura del local/oficina.

          QUICK SUMMARY: Contract negotiations do not take place in a legal vacuum. A party who negotiates contrary to the principle of good faith and then breaks off negotiations may become liable to the other party. However, the requirements for such liability are high and the enforcement of damage claims is cumbersome. At the end of the post I will share some practical tips for contract negotiations in Switzerland.

          Under Swiss law, the principle of freedom of contract is of fundamental importance. It follows from the freedom of contract that, in principle, everyone is free to enter into contract negotiations and to terminate them again without incurring any liability. A termination of contract negotiations does not have to be justified either.

          However, the freedom of contract is limited by the obligation to act in good faith (cf. article 2 para. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code), which is of equal fundamental importance. From the moment when parties enter into contract negotiations, they are in a special legal relationship with each other. That pre-contractual relationship involves certain reciprocal obligations. In particular, the parties must negotiate in a serious manner and in accordance with their actual intentions.

          Negotiating parties must not stir up the hope of the other party, contrary to their actual intentions, that a contract will actually be concluded. Put differently, a party’s willingness to conclude a contract must not be expressed more strongly than it actually is. If a party realizes that the other party wrongly beliefs that a contract would certainly be concluded, such illusion should be dispelled in due course.

          A negotiating party that terminates contract negotiations in violation of these principles, whether maliciously or negligently, may become liable to the other party based on the culpa in contrahendo doctrine. However, such liability exists in exceptional cases only.

          • The fact that contract negotiations took a long time is not sufficient for incurring such liability. The duration of negotiations is, in itself, not decisive.
          • It is not possible to derive liability from pre-existing contractual relationships between the negotiation parties, as for example in cases where parties negotiate a «mere» prolongation of an existing agreement. The decisive factor is not whether parties were already contractually bound before, but only whether the party that terminated the contract negotiations made the other party believe that a new agreement would certainly be concluded.
          • It is not decisive whether the party who terminates contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made costly investments in view of the prospective contract. In principle, anyone who makes investments already prior to the actual conclusion of a contract does so at its own risk. Even where a party to contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made (substantial) investments in the prospective agreement, a termination of the contract negotiations will, in itself, not be considered as an act of bad faith.

          What does a liability for breaking off negotiations include?

          If a party violates the aforementioned pre-contractual obligations, the other party may be entitled to compensation for the so-called negative interest. This means that the other party must be put in the position it would have been if the negotiations had not taken place. Damages may include, e.g., expenses in connection with the negotiation of the contract (travel costs, legal fees etc.), but also a loss of income in cases where a party was not able to do business with third parties because of the contract negotiations. However, the other party has no right to be treated as if the contract had been concluded (so-called positive interest).

          Having said that, it must be kept in mind that the requirements set by Swiss court for the substantiation of damages are rather high, so that the enforcement of a liability for breaking off negotiations will often be a cumbersome process. Therefore pursuing damage claims with relatively low amounts in dispute might often require a disproportionate effort.

          Practical tips – Do’s and don’ts when negotiating contracts

          • Do not overstate your willingness to conclude a contract. Be frank with your counterparty. Make it clear from the beginning of the negotiations what clauses are important to you.
          • Do not tell the other party that you are willing to sign a contract, if you still have doubts or you are even unwilling to do so. Confirm that you will sign only if you are convinced to do so.
          • Do not allow someone else (e.g., a representative, employee, branch office etc.) to negotiate on your behalf if you are not willing to enter into an agreement anyway. Keep an eye on how the negotiations are going on and intervene if necessary.
          • Do not make costly investments before a legally binding agreement is concluded. If, for time or other reasons, such investments are necessary already before the conclusion of an agreement, insist on the conclusion of an interim contract governing such investments for the event that the envisaged agreement is not concluded finally.

          In 2020, an important revision of the Swiss statute of limitations enters into force. The new law provides for longer limitation periods in cases of personal injury and extends the relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law from one to three years.

          Background of the revision

          In June 2018, the Swiss parliament adopted an amendment to the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”) pertaining to a revision of the statute of limitations. In November 2018, the Swiss government decided that the revised statute of limitations shall enter into force on 1 January 2020.

          The revision was significantly influenced by asbestos cases. Under the current law, damage claims of asbestos victims were time-barred in some cases even before asbestos-related diseases could be diagnosed. In March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held in Howald Moor and others v. Switzerland that the Swiss statute of limitations amounts in such cases to a violation of article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right of access to a court).

          Having said that, the revision does not only concern cases of personal injury, but also includes numerous other important changes as described in the following.

          Key changes regarding limitation periods

          A. Tort law

          In tort law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

          With the exception of cases of personal injury, the absolute limitation period remains ten years as from the date when the conduct that caused the damages occurred or ended (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

          In cases of personal injury, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable. Currently the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

          The new absolute limitation period in cases of personal injury amounts to twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 60 para. 1bis CO). Under the current law, there was no special absolute limitation period for cases of personal injury, so that the ordinary 10-year period applied (Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

          If conduct, which gives rise to liability under tort law, is also punishable under criminal law, the (longer) limitation period under criminal law remains applicable (cf. Art. 97 of the Swiss Criminal Code). However, where a first-instance criminal judgment is rendered before the conduct is time-barred under criminal law, the limitation periods ends not earlier than three years as from that criminal judgment (revised Art. 60 para. 2 CO). The current law does not provide for such an additional three-year limitation period.

          B. Unjust enrichment law

          In unjust enrichment law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years as from the date on which the injured party knows about the claim (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

          The absolute limitation period is not affected by the revision and remains ten years after the date on which the claim arises (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO).

          C. Contract law

          With regard to contractual claims, the ordinary limitation period remains ten years from the due date (Art. 127 CO). Furthermore, the shorter limitation period of five years from the due date applicable to (amongst others) claims for rent, interest on capital and other periodic payments, (most) claims out of employment relationships etc. remains unchanged too (Art. 128 CO).

          However, in cases of personal injury, the revised statute of limitations introduces a new relative limitation period of three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage, as well as a new absolute limitation period of twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 128a CO). The current law does not provide for distinct relative and absolute limitation periods for contractual claims in cases of personal injury. Instead, the ordinary ten-year limitation period (Art. 127 CO) usually applied to such cases.

          D. Summary

          In summary, the most important elements of the revised statute of limitations are the longer (trebled) relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law (i.e., three years instead of one year) and the new special rules for cases of personal injury, which now benefit from a 20-year absolute limitation period.

          Transitional provisions / application of the revised statute of limitations to pre-existing claims

          The longer limitation periods under the revised CO apply to any claims that are not yet time-barred when the revision enters into force (i.e., on 1 January 2020; revised Art. 49 para. 1, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). In other words, the limitation periods of any claims that do not become time-barred until 31 December 2019 at the latest will be prolonged. This is of particular relevance with regard to claims based on tort and unjust enrichment; the short one-year relative limitation periods under the current law will be extended by another two years.

          In contrast, the current law remains applicable in case the revised statute of limitations provides for shorter limitation periods (revised Art. 49 para. 2, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). This concerns, in particular, contractual claims in cases of personal injury. The new three-year relative limitation period under the revised law might not apply to such claims, as the current statute of limitations does not provide for a relative limitation period at all.

          Further changes brought by the revision

          In addition to the changes of the limitation periods set out above, the revision of the statute of limitations contains numerous further modifications. Some of them are listed in the following:

          1. Limitation periods do not commence or are suspended in the event that a claim cannot be asserted for objective reasons before any court worldwide (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 6 CO). The current law provides for such non-commencement or suspension only if the claim cannot be brought before a Swiss court.
          2. Parties to a dispute may agree in writing that limitation periods shall be suspended during settlement discussions, mediation proceedings or other out-of-court settlement proceedings (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 8 CO).
          3. Once a limitation period has commenced to run, waivers of statute of limitation defenses are admissible, but must not exceed ten years (revised Art. 141 para. 1 CO). Any such waivers must be in writing (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
          4. In general terms and conditions (“GTC”), statute of limitation defenses may be waived by the party who makes use of the GTCs only. In contrast, a waiver by the party on whom the GTCs are imposed (e.g., consumers) is ineffective (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
          5. The limitation period for an actio pauliana under the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) is extended to from currently two years to three years after service of a loss certificate, the opening of bankruptcy proceedings or the confirmation of a composition agreement with an assignment of assets (whichever is applicable; revised Art. 292 DEBA).

          If 2017 was the year of Initial Coin Offerings, 2018 was the year of Blockchain awareness and testing all over the world. From ICO focused guidelines and regulations respectively aimed to alarm and protect investors, we have seen the shift, especially in Europe, to distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) focused guidelines and regulations aimed at protecting citizens on one hand and promote DLT implementations on the other.

          Indeed, European Union Member States and the European Parliament started looking deeper into the technology by, for instance, calling for consultations with professionals in order to understand DLT’s potentials for real-world implementations and possible risks.

          In this article I am aiming to give a brief snapshot of firstly what are the most notable European initiatives and moves towards promoting Blockchain implementation and secondly current challenges faced by European law makers when dealing with the regulation of distributed ledger technologies.

          Europe

          Let’s start from the European Blockchain Partnership (“EBP”), a statement made by 25 EU Member States acknowledging the importance of distributed ledger technology for society, in particular when it comes to interoperability, cyber security and efficiency of digital public services. The Partnership is not only an acknowledgement, it is also a commitment from all signatory states to collaborate to build what they envision will be a distributed ledger infrastructure for the delivering of cross-border public services.

          Witness of the trust given to the technology is My Health My Data, a EU-backed project that uses DLT to enable patients to efficiently control their digitally recorded health data while securing it from the threat of data breaches. Benefits the EU saw in DLT on this specific project are safety, efficiency but most notably the opportunity that DLT offers data subject to have finally control over their own data, without the need for intermediaries.

          Another important initiative proving European interests in testing DLT technologies is the Horizon Prize on “Blockchains for Social Good”, a 5 million Euros worth challenge open to innovators and tech companies to develop scalable, efficient and high-impact decentralized solutions to social innovation challenges.

          Moving forward, in December last year, I had the honor to be part of the “ Workshop on Blockchains & Smart Contracts Legal and Regulatory Framework” in Paris, an initiative supported by the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum (“EUBOF”), a pilot project initiated by the European Parliament. Earlier last year other three workshops were held, the aim of each was to collect knowledge on specific topics from an audience of leading DLT legal and technical professionals. With the knowledge collected, the EUBOF followed up with reports of what was discussed during the workshop and suggest a way forward.

          Although not binding, these reports give a reasonably clear guideline to the industry on how existing laws at a European level apply to the technology, or at least should be interpreted, and highlight areas where new regulation is definitely needed. As an example let’s look at the Report on Blockchain & GDPR. If you missed it, the GDPR is the Regulation that protects Europeans personal data and it’s applicable to all companies globally, which are processing data from European citizens. The “right to erasure” embedded in the GDPR, doesn’t allow personal data to be stored on an immutable database, the data subject has to be able to erase data anytime when shared with a service provider and stored somewhere on a database. In the case of Blockchain, the consensus on personal data having to be stored off-chain is therefore unanimous. Storing personal data off-chain and leaving an hash to that data on-chain, is a viable solution if certain precautions are taken in order to avoid the risks of reversibility or linkability of such hash to the personal data stored off-chain, therefore making the hash on-chain personally identifiable information.

          However, not all European laws apply to Member States, therefore making it hard to give a EU-wide answer to most DLT compliance challenges in Europe. Member States freedom to legislate is indeed only limited/influenced by two main instruments, Regulations, which are automatically enforceable in each Member State and Directives binding Member States to legislate on specific topics according to a set of specific rules.

          Diverging national laws have a great effect on multiple aspects of innovative technologies. Let’s look for instance at the validity of “smart contracts”. When discussing the legal power of automatically enforceable digital contracts, the lack of a European wide legislation on contracts makes it impossible to find an answer applicable to all Member States. For instance, is “offer and acceptance” enough to constitute a contract? What is considered a valid “acceptance”? What is an “obligation”? “Can a digital asset be the object of a legally binding agreement”?

          If we try to give a EU-wide answer to the questions such as smart contract validity and enforceability it is apparently not possible since we will need to consider 28 different answers. I, therefore, believe that the future of innovation in Europe will highly depend on the unification of laws.

          An example of a unified law that has great benefits on innovation (including DLT) is the Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS) Regulation, which governs electronic identification including electronic signatures.

          The race to regulating DLT in Europe

          Let’s now look briefly at a couple of Member States legislations, specifically on Blockchain and cryptocurrencies last year.

          EU Member States have been quite creative I would say in regulating the new technology. Let’s start from Malta, which saw a surprising increase of important projects and companies, such as Binance, landing on the beautiful Mediterranean Island thanks to its favorable (or at least felt as such) legislations on DLT. The “Blockchain Island” passed three laws in early July to regulate and supervise Blockchain projects including ICOs, crypto exchanges and DLT, specifically: The Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act regulation that aims at recognizing different technology arrangements such as DAOs, smart contracts and in future probably AI machines; The Virtual Financial Assets Act for ICOs and crypto exchanges; The Malta Digital Innovation Authority establishing a new supervisory authority.

          Some think the Maltese legislation lacks a comprehensive framework, one that for instance, gives legal personality to Innovative Technology Arrangements. For this reason some are therefore accusing the Maltese lawmakers of rushing into an uncompleted regulatory framework in order to attract business to the island while others seem to positively welcome the laws as a good start for a European wide regulation on DLT and crypto assets.

          In December 2018, Malta also initiated a declaration that was then signed by other six Members States, calling for collaboration for the promotion and implementation of DLT on a European level.

          France was one of the signatories of such declaration, and it’s worth mentioning since the French Minister for the Economy and Finance approved in September a framework for regulating ICOs and therefore protecting investors’ rights, basically giving the AMF (French Authority for Financial Market) the empowerment to give licenses to companies wanting to raise funds through Initial Coin Offerings.

          Last but not least comes Switzerland which although it is not a EU Member State, it has great degree of influence on European and national legislators when it comes to progressive regulations. At the end of December, the Swiss Federal Council released a report on DLT and the law, making a clear statement that the existing Swiss law is sufficient to regulate most matters related to DLT and Blockchain, although some adjustments have to be made. So no new laws but few amendments here and there, which will allow the integration of the specific DLT applications with existing laws in order to ensure legal certainty on certain uncovered matters. Relevant areas of Swiss law that will be amended include the transfer of rights utilizing digital registers, Anti Money Laundering rules specifically for decentralized trading platforms and bankruptcy when that proceeding involves crypto assets.

          Conclusions

          To summarize, from the approach taken during the past year, it is apparent that there is great interest in Europe to understand the potentials and to soon test implementations of distributed ledger technology. Lawmakers have also an understanding that the technology is in an infant state, it might involve risks, therefore making it complex to set specific rules or to give final answers on the alignment of certain technology applications with existing European or national laws.

          To achieve European wide results, however, acknowledgments, guidelines and reports are not enough. The setting of standards for lawmakers applicable to all Member States or even unification of laws in crucial sectors influencing directly or indirectly new technologies, will be the only solution for any innovative technology to be adopted at a European level.

          The author of this post is Alessandro Mazzi.

          Poland – IP and Copyright clauses you need to get right in your contract

          25 de enero de 2018

          • Polonia
          • Contratos
          • Tecnologías de la información
          • Propiedad Industrial e Intelectual

          Summary

          The recent post-Brexit trade deal makes no provision for jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments.

          Therefore, the UK dropped out of the jurisdiction of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) on 31 December 2020.

          The EU has not yet approved the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, but may do in the future.

          Unless the transitional provisions from the Withdrawal Agreement apply, jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments will be governed by the Hague Convention 2005 if there is an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause

          If the Hague Convention of 2005 does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules.

          Judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

          On the first day of 2021 the UK left the EU regimes with which European lawyers are familiar. We appeared to enter “uncharted territory”. Not so. In fact, there are charts for this territory – or maps, to use a more modern word. You just need to know which maps.

          Whether you are a lawyer or a businessperson, in whatever country, you need answers to two questions. Which laws govern jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU member states and the UK; and how should businesses act as a result?

          What happened?

          The EU and UK reached a post-Brexit trade deal, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”), on Christmas Eve 2020. The provisions of the TCA became UK law as the European Union (Future Relationship) Act on 31 December 2020. The TCA made provision for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but did not mention judicial cooperation in civil matters, or jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial proceedings.

          So where do we look for law on those matters?

          We look at the position immediately before Brexit. As every lawyer should know the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) governed the enforcement and recognition of judgments between EU member states.

          Also, the Lugano Convention 2007 governs jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in commercial and civil matters between EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It operates in substantially the same way as Brussels (Recast) does between EU member states.

          The UK was party to the Convention by virtue of its EU membership. Now that the UK is not a member of the EU, the contracting parties could agree that the UK could join the Lugano Convention as an independent contracting party, and there would be little change to the position on jurisdiction and enforcement. English jurisdiction clauses would continue to be respected and English court judgments would continue to be readily enforceable throughout EU member states and EFTA countries, and vice versa.

          The problem is that the EU has not agreed to the UK joining the Lugano Convention

          The UK submitted its application to accede to the Lugano Convention in its own right on 8 April 2020. But accession requires the consent of all contracting parties including the EU. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have indicated their support for the UK’s accession, but the EU’s position is still not yet clear and the TCA is silent on this matter.

          While the EU still may belatedly support the UK’s accession to Lugano, it does not currently apply. In any case, a three-month time-lag applies between agreement and entry into force, unless all the contracting parties agree to waive it.

          Where are we now?

          If the transitional provisions provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement as explained in my previous post do not apply, the Brussels (Recast) Regulation will not apply to jurisdiction and enforcement between the EU and UK.

          If they do not, then you first need to decide whether the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 is applicable. The Hague Convention 2005 applies between EU Member States, Mexico, Singapore and Montenegro. The Hague Convention first came into force for the UK when the EU acceded on 1 October 2015 and the UK re-acceded after Brexit in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021.

          The Hague Convention 2005 applies if:

          • The dispute falls within the scope of the Convention as provided for by Article 2 – e.g. the Convention does not apply to employment and consumer contracts or claims for personal injury;
          • There is an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the meaning of Article 3; and
          • The exclusive jurisdiction clause is entered into after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized, and proceedings are commenced after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized within the meaning of Article 16.

          There is some uncertainty as to whether EU member states will treat the Hague Convention as having been in force from 1 October 2015, or only from when the UK re-accedes on 1 January 2021. The UK’s view is that the Convention will apply to the UK from 1 October 2015; the EU’s view is that it will apply to the UK from 1 January 2021. What is not in dispute is that for exclusive English jurisdiction clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, the contracting states will respect exclusive English jurisdiction clauses and enforce the resulting judgments.

          If the 2005 Hague Convention does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules to questions of jurisdiction and enforcement. In the UK, the rules will essentially be the same as the ‘common-law’ rules currently on enforcement applied to non-EU parties, for example the United States.

          The Norwegian exception

          The UK and Norway have reached an agreement which extends and updates an old mutual enforcement treaty, the 1961 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between the UK and Norway, which will apply if the UK does not re-accede to the Lugano Convention. The practical effect of this agreement is that judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

          How should your business act now?

          The applicable legal framework for each dispute will depend on the facts of each case. You should review the dispute resolution clauses in your cross-border contracts to assess how they may be affected by Brexit and to seek specialist advice where necessary. You should also seek advice on dispute resolution provisions when entering into new cross-border contracts in 2021.

          This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

          This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

          In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

          English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

          The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

          This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

          The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

          The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

          As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

          The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

          Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

          The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

          Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

          Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

          Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

          The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

          Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

          The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

          There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

          The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

          The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

          As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

          Novel technology in proceedings

          Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

          And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

          Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

          Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

          Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

          • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
          • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
          • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
          • the matter concerns an international dispute.

          The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

          “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

          The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

          Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

          We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

          To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

          Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

          Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

          • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
          • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
          • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
          • the disclosure of confidential documents
          • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
          • the manner of taking witness testimony
          • the costs of the proceedings.

          Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

          All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

          The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

          • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
          • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
          • The defendant submits its defence statement.
          • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
          • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
          • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
          • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
          • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

          Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

          As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

          This is a summary of the approved measures, which unfortunately for both tenants and landlords do not include any public aid or tax relief and just refer to a postponement in the payment of the rent.

          Premises to which they are applied

          Leased premises dedicated to activities different than residential: commercial, professional, industrial, cultural, teaching, amusement, healthcare, etc. They also apply to the lease of a whole industry (i.e. hotels, restaurants, bars, etc., which are the most usual type of businesses object of this deal).

          Types of tenants

          • Individual entrepreneurs or self-employed persons who were registered before Social Security before the declaration of the state of alarm on March 14th, 2020
          • Small and medium companies, as defined by article 257.1 of the Capital Companies Act: those who fulfil during two consecutive fiscal years these figures: assets under € 4 million, turnover under € 8 million and average staff under 50 people

          Types of landlords

          In order to benefit from these measures, the landlord should be a housing public entity or company or a big owner, considering as such the individuals or companies who own more than 10 urban properties (excluding parking places and storage rooms) or a built surface over 1.500 sqm.

          Measures approved

          The payment of the rent is postponed without interest meanwhile the state of alarm is in force, but in any case, for a maximum period of four months. Once the state of alarm is overcome, and in any case in a maximum term of four months, the postponed rents should be paid along a maximum period of two years, or the duration of the lease agreement, should it be less than two years.

          For landlords different to those mentioned above

          The tenant could apply before the landlord for the postponement in the payment of the rent (but the landlord is not obliged to accept it), and the parties can use the guarantee that the tenant should mandatorily have provided at the beginning of any lease agreement (usually equal to two month’s rent, but could be more if agreed by the parties), in full or in part, in order to use it to pay the rent. The tenant will have to provide again the guarantee within one year’s term, or less should the lease agreement have a shorter duration.

          Activities to which it is applied

          Activities which have been suspended according to the Royal Decree that declared the state of alarm, dated march, 14ht, 2020, or according to the orders issued by the authorities delegated by such Royal Decree. This should be proved through a certificated issued by the tax authorities.

          If the activity has not been directly suspended by the Royal Decree, the turnover during the month prior to the postponement should be less than 75% of the average monthly turnover during the same quarter last year. This should be proved through a responsible declaration by the tenant, and the landlord is authorised check the bookkeeping records.

          Term to apply and procedure

          The tenant should apply for these measures before the landlord within one month’s term from the publication of the Royal Decree-law, that is, from April 22nd, 2020, and the landlord (in case belongs to the groups mentioned in point c) is obliged to accept the tenant’s request, except if both parties have already agreed something different. The postponement would be applied to the following month.

          As the state of alarm was declared more than one month ago (March 14th), landlords and tenants have already been reaching some agreements, for example 50% rent reduction during the state of alarm, and 50% rent postponement during the following 6 months. Tenants who do not reach an agreement with the landlord could face an eviction procedure, however court procedures are suspended during the state of alarm. We have also seen some abusive non-payment of rent by tenants.

          When is becomes impossible to reach an agreement with the landlord, tenants have the legal remedy of claiming in Court for the application of the “rebus sic stantibus” principle, which was highly demanded during the 2008 financial crisis but very seldom applied by the Courts. This principle is aimed to re-balance the parties’ obligations when their situation had deeply changed because of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. This principle is not included in the Spanish Civil Code, but the Supreme Court has accepted its application, in a very restricted way, in some occasions.

          Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

          Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

          Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

          La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

          Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

          «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

          Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

          Escuchar es altamente eficaz

          En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

          Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

          «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

          Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

          En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

          «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

          Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

          La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

          En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

          «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

          Las emociones son importantes

          Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

          «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

          [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

          El Real Decreto-ley 8/2020, de 17 de marzo, de medidas urgentes extraordinarias para hacer frente al impacto económico y social del COVID-19, aunque afecta y produce efectos en muchos diferentes ámbitos jurídicos, no incluye ninguna referencia a los contratos de arrendamientos de inmuebles, ni viviendas, ni locales u oficinas.

          El objeto de esta nota es analizar los efectos de la situación del Estado de Alarma respecto a aquellos contratos de arrendamiento de oficinas o locales que se hayan visto obligados a cerrar en aplicación del decreto; aquellos otros que permanezcan total o parcialmente abiertos y en funcionamiento, bien que con una actividad reducida o mínima, en principio no son objeto de las conclusiones que más adelante alcanzamos sin perjuicio de que existan casos individualizados a los que, pese a no existir un cierre total, razonable y lógicamente puedan serles de aplicación.

          No está excluido en modo alguno que ante una prolongación de la vigencia del Estado de Alarma pudiera publicarse alguna norma que afectase a los contratos de arrendamiento, pero de momento esto no ha sucedido. Si esto llegase a acaecer, al contenido de dicha norma habrá de estarse.

          En base al principio de libertad de pactos que consagra el art. 1255 del Código Civil, que permite que sean las partes firmantes del contrato las que convengan (i) qué escenarios y situaciones deben considerarse como constitutivos de supuestos de Fuerza Mayor y Caso Fortuito y (ii) cuáles deban ser las consecuencias contractuales de los tales escenarios, el primer ejercicio es comprobar si el contrato incluye una cláusula reguladora de la Fuerza mayor y sus efectos; si es así, a la tal cláusula habrá de estarse y su análisis queda al margen de esta nota.

          En ausencia de regulación expresa en el contrato, aplicarían al caso las previsiones del Código Civil y en concreto el artículo 1.105.

          COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor

          El COVID 19 es un acontecimiento que en principio reúne los requisitos que exige el Código Civil para ser calificado como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor (art. 1105 Código Civil) ya que:

          • Se trata de un hecho ajeno y no imputable al contratante deudor de la prestación u obligación.
          • Es imprevisible, o si se reputase “previsible”, es sin duda inevitable.
          • El acontecimiento en cuestión, la pandemia, debe ser causa y tener como consecuencia el incumplimiento de la obligación, es decir debe existir un nexo causal.

          Por lo tanto, cumpliéndose los tres requisitos, la primera conclusión que alcanzamos es que muy previsiblemente, los Tribunales españoles calificarán como “Fuerza Mayor” la situación causada por el COVID 19 cuando se les plantee una contienda judicial en la que tal asunto se discuta entre los litigantes. Analizaremos a continuación las consecuencias de dicha calificación.

          Consecuencias de considerar COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza mayor

          La generalidad de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia entienden que los efectos de calificar un supuesto como caso de Fuerza Mayor en principio son:

          • Imposibilidad total y definitiva de cumplir; liberando al deudor del cumplimiento de la obligación.
          • Imposibilidad parcial de cumplir; quedando liberado el deudor sólo en la parte que le es imposible cumplir, pero siguiendo obligado por la parte que sí puede llevar a cabo.
          • Imposibilidad temporal de cumplir; el deudor queda liberado de la responsabilidad por mora mientras persista la situación de excepcionalidad.

          Ahora bien, analicemos como afectaría dicha consideración como Fuerza Mayor de la epidemia, respecto a los contratos de arrendamiento para usos distintos a la vivienda.

          Respecto al pago de la renta

          La pregunta a la que responder es, si la calificación de la situación pandémica actual como un caso de Fuerza Mayor, libera al arrendatario (cuyo local se ha visto obligado a cerrar por orden de la autoridad gubernamental) de la obligación del pago de la renta mientras dicha obligación de cierre persista, incluyendo en el concepto “liberación” diferentes alternativas: condonación total o parcial y/o aplazamiento total o parcial.

          Nos estamos encontrando en estos días con una reacción frecuente entre algunos arrendatarios, quienes, de manera unilateral, han informado a sus arrendadores que considerando COVID 19 un supuesto de fuerza mayor y habiéndose visto obligados a cerrar el local/oficina, suspenden el pago de la renta mientras dicha situación permanezca. No resuelven el contrato, no entregan la posesión, se mantienen en ella (permaneciendo el local cerrado y no operativo) pero suspenden el pago (sin quedar claro si suspender en este caso significa auto condonarse el pago de la renta o aplazarlo para cuando desaparezca el supuesto de Fuerza Mayor).

          Argumentos en contra de la liberación

          Por más que pueda considerarse “entendible” esta actitud, desde la óptica del arrendatario, no desde la del arrendador, dicha consideración se topa con un obstáculo: la interpretación que de la Fuerza Mayor ha hecho el TS respecto a las obligaciones de pago pecuniario, según la STS (Civil) de 19 mayo de 2015:

          “No pudiendo plantearse, pues, tratándose de deudas pecuniarias, la imposibilidad subjetiva -insolvencia- ni la objetiva o formal, concluye la doctrina que no es posible imaginar que si la imposibilidad obedece a caso fortuito pudiera tener como efecto la extinción de la obligación.

          La exoneración del deudor por caso fortuito no es absoluta, tiene excepciones, conforme prevé el articulo 1.105 CC, y una de ellas, por aplicación del principio «genus nunquam perit», sería en supuestos de obligaciones de entregar cosa genérica.

          En tales circunstancias el deudor pecuniario viene obligado a cumplir la prestación principal, sin que sus sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello, pues lo adeudado no es algo individualizado que ha perecido sino algo genérico como es el dinero.”

          Conclusión: no parece que este criterio jurisprudencial permita defender que el cumplimiento de las obligaciones pecuniarias quede liberado, extinto o que su incumplimiento quede justificado en casos de Fuerza Mayor, de suerte que el deudor pecuniario, en este caso el arrendatario, en aplicación de este criterio, vendría obligado a cumplir la prestación principal sin que las sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello con fundamento en la Fuerza Mayor, debido a la condición genérica que tiene el dinero.

          Argumentos a favor de la liberación: el art. 1.575 del Código Civil

          Dicho lo anterior lo anterior, debe hacerse referencia a un artículo del Código Civil que, con certeza, será profusamente citado en los conflictos judiciales que se avecinan.

          El art. 1.575, tratando del arrendamiento de fincas rústicas, reconoce el derecho del arrendatario a la rebaja de la renta en caso de pérdida de más de la mitad de los frutos (salvo pacto en contrario) en “casos fortuitos, extraordinarios e imprevistos…como incendio, guerra, peste, inundación insólita, langosta, terremoto u otro igualmente desacostumbrado que los contratantes no hayan podido racionalmente prever”.

          ¿Es aplicable este precepto, previsto para arrendamientos rústicos, a los arrendamientos urbanos?

          El art. 4.1 CC permite la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando (i) estas no contemplen un supuesto específico y (ii) regulen otro semejante entre los que se aprecie “identidad de razón”.

          La STS de 15 de enero de 2019, resolviendo un conflicto de un arrendamiento de un edificio destinado a hotel, en el que el arrendatario había pretendido la rebaja de la renta al amparo de la cláusula “rebus sic stantibus” por la crisis de 2008 y había alegado a su favor la aplicación del art.1.575, estableció:

          “La argumentación de la sentencia recurrida por la que se rechaza la pretensión de rebaja del precio pactado tampoco es contraria al criterio legal que se desprende del art. 1575 CC, que es la regla que permite la rebaja de la renta en el arrendamiento de bienes productivos que no deriven de riesgos del propio negocio, exige además que la pérdida de rendimientos se origine por casos fortuitos extraordinarios e imprevistos, algo que por su misma rareza no hubiera ser podido previsto por las partes, y que la pérdida de frutos sea de más de la mitad de los frutos. En el caso no concurre ninguna de estas circunstancias. La disminución de las rentas procede de una evolución del mercado, las partes previeron la posibilidad de que en algunos ejercicios la rentabilidad del hotel no fuera positiva para la arrendataria y las pérdidas alegadas por NH en la explotación del hotel de Almería son inferiores al cincuenta por ciento, sin contar con que el resultado global del conjunto de su actividad como gestora de una cadena de hoteles es, según considera probado la Audiencia a la vista del informe de gestión consolidado, favorable”.

          El TS no admite la aplicación del 1.575 pero no por considerarlo no aplicable a arrendamientos distintos a los rústicos, sino por concluir que no se dan los requisitos para ello ya que ni era imprevisible la crisis de 2008 ni las pérdidas del arrendatario son superiores al 50%.

          Pero, esa interpretación del TS junto con el tenor del art. 4.1 CC permitirían avalar la pretensión del arrendatario que se encuentra sin ingreso alguno durante el Estado de Alarma, de exigir una rebaja de renta que se adecuara al principio de proporcionalidad.

          Respecto a la terminación anticipada a instancias del arrendatario

          Sin embargo, podemos encontrarnos con situaciones en las que el arrendatario, ante la actual situación, decida terminar anticipadamente el contrato de arrendamiento debido a la situación provocada por el COVID 19, poniendo el local a disposición del arrendador.

          Son supuestos en los que se pretende la resolución anticipada del contrato, sin respetar (i) o el plazo obligatorio (ii) o el preaviso, en ambos casos bajo la hipótesis de que estén así regulados en el contrato.

          En estos supuestos entendemos que sí puede resultar defendible que, debido a la situación de fuerza mayor provocada por el COVID 19 y en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, se exonere al arrendatario de la obligación:

          • De respetar un plazo de vigencia determinada del contrato de arrendamiento
          • De preavisar al arrendador en caso de resolución anticipada del contrato

          En ambos casos el contrato quedaría resuelto con la entrega de la posesión del local, sin perjuicio de tener que respetar las obligaciones que prevé el contrato para la terminación y entrega siempre que las mismas no se vean igualmente afectadas por la situación de Fuerza Mayor.

          Nuestra opinión es que, también en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, sería defendible ante los Tribunales la tesis de que el arrendatario quedaría liberado de cualquier obligación de resarcimiento de daños al arrendador por dicha resolución anticipada o incumplimiento de la duración obligada del contrato.

          Conclusión

          En conclusión, planteado ante los Tribunales el debate sobre cómo la pandemia (que no hay duda será calificada como caso de Fuerza Mayor) afectará a las obligaciones a cargo del arrendatario que se haya visto obligado a cerrar su negocio, nuestra opinión es la siguiente:

          1. Respecto a la obligación de pago de la renta, pese al criterio contrario de la sentencia que citamos de 19 de mayo de 2015, nos parece potente y defendible la remisión al art. 1575 y a su aplicación analógica con apoyo en la STS de 15 de enero de 2019, para exigir una reducción proporcional y equitativa de la renta.
          2. Respecto a la facultad del arrendatario para resolver el contrato anticipadamente, entregando la posesión del inmueble al arrendador, exonerando al arrendatario de cumplir con sus obligaciones de preaviso o de duración obligada previstas en el contrato en cuestión, y sin tener que indemnizar al arrendador por ello, entendemos que también existe fundamento para defender judicialmente esta posición.

          Aplicación de la cláusula Rebus Sic Stantibus (RSS)

          Analizaremos a continuación si puede ser aplicable al caso que estamos analizando la cláusula RSS y con qué consecuencias.

          Requisitos de la cláusula RSS (aforismo latino que significa “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”)

          La expresión RSS, opera como una cláusula intrínseca (es decir implícita, sin necesidad de pactarse expresamente) en la relación contractual, que significa que las estipulaciones establecidas en un contrato lo son habida cuenta de las circunstancias concurrentes en el momento, esto es, “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”, de forma que cualquier alteración sustancial y no prevista de las mismas podrían dar lugar a la modificación del contenido contractual.

          La cláusula RSS no está regulada en ningún precepto en nuestro ordenamiento; es una construcción doctrinal que tradicionalmente la jurisprudencia ha admitido (ejemplos entre otros muchos STS de 30 de junio de 2014, 24 de febrero de 2015, 15 de enero de 2019, 18 de julio de 2019), con mucha cautela, solo en ciertos casos, y requiriendo las siguientes premisas

          • Que se haya producido una alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias del contrato, en el momento que el mismo se deba cumplir, en relación con las concurrentes al tiempo de su celebración. Para valorar si una incidencia puede determinar la mutación o alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias que dotaron sentido al contrato, debemos atenernos a lo siguiente: a) Debemos contrastar el alcance de dicha mutación o alteración respecto del sentido o finalidad del contrato y de la conmutatividad o equilibrio prestacional del mismo; y b) Debe quedar excluido el «riesgo normal» inherente o derivado del contrato.
          • Que se haya producido una desproporción exorbitante, fuera de todo cálculo, entre las prestaciones de las partes contratantes, provocando un desequilibrio entre las mismas.
          • Que lo anterior se produzca como consecuencia de circunstancias radicalmente imprevisibles.
          • Que no exista otro remedio para superar la situación.

          Históricamente nuestros tribunales han sido muy reacios a aplicar RSS si bien desde la crisis económica de 2008-2012 ha tenido lugar un cierto cambio de criterio y una mayor receptividad jurisprudencial-

          Consecuencias de la aplicación de la RSS

          La doctrina establece que la aplicación de la RSS no tiene, en principio, efectos rescisorios, resolutorios o extintivos del contrato, sino únicamente efectos modificativos del mismo, encaminados a compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones; a su vez la doctrina establece que se aplica únicamente a los contratos a largo plazo o de tracto sucesivo y de ejecución diferida.

          En aplicación de la buena fe, la reacción ante un evento de caso fortuito, fuerza mayor o en general un evento que genera una desproporción entre las partes, como la que regula la institución RSS, debe ser la modificación del contrato para reequilibrar las obligaciones entre las partes, y solo en caso de imposibilidad material de cumplimiento, la resolución de la obligación, en ambos casos sin indemnización por incumplimiento.

          Por ello, en el ámbito de los contratos de arrendamiento y en el caso de cierre de los locales por mandato imperativo, entendemos que la institución RSS podrá ser:

          • alegada por los arrendatarios para solicitar o instar de los arrendadores modificaciones a las prestaciones económicas del contrato y
          • estimada por los jueces, cuando estos supuestos se debatan ante los Tribunales, a la hora de aceptar como equitativas y legítimas las tales novaciones contractuales con el fin de compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones generado por los efectos del COVID 19.

          En suma, la cláusula RSS puede ser una herramienta para el arrendatario de un local que ha tenido que cerrar durante el Estado de Alarma, a la hora de negociar con el arrendador una modificación del contrato, intentando aplazar la renta mientras se prolongue el Estado de Alarma o negociando un descuento de esta.

          Debe recordarse:

          • Que la RSS es de ineludible aplicación casuística, no caben generalizaciones y será necesario tener en cuenta el efecto que provoque el COVID 19 en cada relación contractual concreta (STS de 30 de junio de 2014 y 24 de febrero de 2015) y el efectivo desequilibrio de las prestaciones que haya producido, y
          • Que, como hemos dicho, los Tribunales son en general reacios a la aplicación de esta cláusula a la que solo acuden en caso de falta de cualquier otra herramienta jurídica y en situaciones en que el mantenimiento del status quo contractual revele una manifiesta “injusticia” y un patente y rotundo desequilibrio entre las prestaciones de las partes.

          ¿Significa lo anterior que el arrendatario podrá imponer al arrendador una modificación de las condiciones económicas del contrato al amparo de RSS (aplazamiento o condonación total o parcial)?

          No lo creemos de manera tan rotunda; lo que si pensamos es que la aplicación de esta institución RSS debería,

          • Justificar una razonable solicitud del arrendatario de novar temporalmente las condiciones del contrato (aplazamiento o condonación, total o parcial) que al arrendador debe razonablemente atender.
          • En caso de negativa irrazonable del arrendador, y documentando cuanto más profusamente pueda el arrendatario su solicitud y las eventuales negociaciones o negativa a mantenerlas por la contra parte, permitirle fundamentar una suspensión del pago de la renta, total o parcial, durante la pendencia del Estado de Alarma con ánimo, no de extinción de la obligación, pero sí de su aplazamiento.

          Habremos de esperar a la reacción de los tribunales cuando lleguen a su conocimiento estos conflictos, como sin duda ocurrirá; pero si nos atrevemos a adelantar que es bastante posible que la tendencia judicial sea la de conceder amparo al arrendatario con apoyo en la cláusula RSS y el principio de la preservación del negocio, a la hora de dar validez a determinados efectos modificativos respecto a las obligaciones pecuniarias a cargo del arrendatario (condonación total o parcial del pago de la renta durante la crisis pandémica, aplazamiento, aplazamiento parcial).

          En todo caso será esencial acreditar que la conducta del contratante deudor que busca amparo en la cláusula RSS para novar el contrato se ha ajustado estrictamente al principio de buena fe (STS 30 de abril de 2015).

          También será importante analizar caso por caso por qué se justifica el desplazamiento del riesgo derivado del “suceso excepcional e imprevisto” de un contratante al otro (STS de 15 de enero de 2015) y bien podría defenderse (STS de 18 de julio de 2019) que deben ambos contratantes repartirse y asumir entre los dos las consecuencias.

          Las decisiones judiciales variarán en cada caso concreto que habrá de ser objeto de estudio individualizado.

          Conclusiones y Recomendaciones

          En suma, parece que al arrendatario contaría con dos instrumentos para la pretensión de suspender (signifique esto condonar o aplazar) el pago de las rentas, la cláusula RSS y el principio de Fuerza Mayor.

          A nuestro modo de ver, la reposición del equilibrio contractual alterado por el suceso excepcional puede consistir o bien en una prórroga de los plazos de pago del arrendamiento o bien en la aplicación de una condonación total o parcial de la obligación de pago de rentas mientras dure el Estado de Alarma, pero entendemos que será defendible que el retraso en el pago del arrendamiento no podrá dar lugar ni a la resolución del contrato al amparo del art. 1124 Cc ni a la exigencia de daños y perjuicios art. 1105 Cc, en consecuencia, no facultará al arrendador a instar el desahucio.

          Por ello los pasos a seguir en cada caso serían:

          • Realizar un examen del contrato para ver si se regulan los casos de fuerza mayor y caso fortuito y si la situación actual concuerda con lo regulado en el contrato.
          • En caso de que no se estipule nada en el contrato, y habiéndose cerrado el local u oficina, advertir de ello a la otra parte e intentar negociar una novación del contrato de arrendamiento solicitando: (i) condonación total de la renta durante el Estado de Alarma; (ii) condonación parcial compartiendo ambas partes el esfuerzo en proporción por convenir; y (iii) aplazamiento del pago de la renta hasta que se pueda reabrir el local u oficina con un plan de pagos de la deuda aplazada.
          • Si no es posible llegar a un acuerdo, es conveniente dejar constancia de que se ha actuado con buena fe intentando llegar a una solución negociada y en el extremo (desde la óptica del arrendatario) anunciar, sin esperar a recibir una comunicación o reclamación del Arrendador, la suspensión del pago de las rentas justificando la misma en el Estado de Alarma hasta la finalización del mismo y la consecuente reapertura del local/oficina.

          QUICK SUMMARY: Contract negotiations do not take place in a legal vacuum. A party who negotiates contrary to the principle of good faith and then breaks off negotiations may become liable to the other party. However, the requirements for such liability are high and the enforcement of damage claims is cumbersome. At the end of the post I will share some practical tips for contract negotiations in Switzerland.

          Under Swiss law, the principle of freedom of contract is of fundamental importance. It follows from the freedom of contract that, in principle, everyone is free to enter into contract negotiations and to terminate them again without incurring any liability. A termination of contract negotiations does not have to be justified either.

          However, the freedom of contract is limited by the obligation to act in good faith (cf. article 2 para. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code), which is of equal fundamental importance. From the moment when parties enter into contract negotiations, they are in a special legal relationship with each other. That pre-contractual relationship involves certain reciprocal obligations. In particular, the parties must negotiate in a serious manner and in accordance with their actual intentions.

          Negotiating parties must not stir up the hope of the other party, contrary to their actual intentions, that a contract will actually be concluded. Put differently, a party’s willingness to conclude a contract must not be expressed more strongly than it actually is. If a party realizes that the other party wrongly beliefs that a contract would certainly be concluded, such illusion should be dispelled in due course.

          A negotiating party that terminates contract negotiations in violation of these principles, whether maliciously or negligently, may become liable to the other party based on the culpa in contrahendo doctrine. However, such liability exists in exceptional cases only.

          • The fact that contract negotiations took a long time is not sufficient for incurring such liability. The duration of negotiations is, in itself, not decisive.
          • It is not possible to derive liability from pre-existing contractual relationships between the negotiation parties, as for example in cases where parties negotiate a «mere» prolongation of an existing agreement. The decisive factor is not whether parties were already contractually bound before, but only whether the party that terminated the contract negotiations made the other party believe that a new agreement would certainly be concluded.
          • It is not decisive whether the party who terminates contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made costly investments in view of the prospective contract. In principle, anyone who makes investments already prior to the actual conclusion of a contract does so at its own risk. Even where a party to contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made (substantial) investments in the prospective agreement, a termination of the contract negotiations will, in itself, not be considered as an act of bad faith.

          What does a liability for breaking off negotiations include?

          If a party violates the aforementioned pre-contractual obligations, the other party may be entitled to compensation for the so-called negative interest. This means that the other party must be put in the position it would have been if the negotiations had not taken place. Damages may include, e.g., expenses in connection with the negotiation of the contract (travel costs, legal fees etc.), but also a loss of income in cases where a party was not able to do business with third parties because of the contract negotiations. However, the other party has no right to be treated as if the contract had been concluded (so-called positive interest).

          Having said that, it must be kept in mind that the requirements set by Swiss court for the substantiation of damages are rather high, so that the enforcement of a liability for breaking off negotiations will often be a cumbersome process. Therefore pursuing damage claims with relatively low amounts in dispute might often require a disproportionate effort.

          Practical tips – Do’s and don’ts when negotiating contracts

          • Do not overstate your willingness to conclude a contract. Be frank with your counterparty. Make it clear from the beginning of the negotiations what clauses are important to you.
          • Do not tell the other party that you are willing to sign a contract, if you still have doubts or you are even unwilling to do so. Confirm that you will sign only if you are convinced to do so.
          • Do not allow someone else (e.g., a representative, employee, branch office etc.) to negotiate on your behalf if you are not willing to enter into an agreement anyway. Keep an eye on how the negotiations are going on and intervene if necessary.
          • Do not make costly investments before a legally binding agreement is concluded. If, for time or other reasons, such investments are necessary already before the conclusion of an agreement, insist on the conclusion of an interim contract governing such investments for the event that the envisaged agreement is not concluded finally.

          In 2020, an important revision of the Swiss statute of limitations enters into force. The new law provides for longer limitation periods in cases of personal injury and extends the relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law from one to three years.

          Background of the revision

          In June 2018, the Swiss parliament adopted an amendment to the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”) pertaining to a revision of the statute of limitations. In November 2018, the Swiss government decided that the revised statute of limitations shall enter into force on 1 January 2020.

          The revision was significantly influenced by asbestos cases. Under the current law, damage claims of asbestos victims were time-barred in some cases even before asbestos-related diseases could be diagnosed. In March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held in Howald Moor and others v. Switzerland that the Swiss statute of limitations amounts in such cases to a violation of article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right of access to a court).

          Having said that, the revision does not only concern cases of personal injury, but also includes numerous other important changes as described in the following.

          Key changes regarding limitation periods

          A. Tort law

          In tort law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

          With the exception of cases of personal injury, the absolute limitation period remains ten years as from the date when the conduct that caused the damages occurred or ended (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

          In cases of personal injury, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable. Currently the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

          The new absolute limitation period in cases of personal injury amounts to twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 60 para. 1bis CO). Under the current law, there was no special absolute limitation period for cases of personal injury, so that the ordinary 10-year period applied (Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

          If conduct, which gives rise to liability under tort law, is also punishable under criminal law, the (longer) limitation period under criminal law remains applicable (cf. Art. 97 of the Swiss Criminal Code). However, where a first-instance criminal judgment is rendered before the conduct is time-barred under criminal law, the limitation periods ends not earlier than three years as from that criminal judgment (revised Art. 60 para. 2 CO). The current law does not provide for such an additional three-year limitation period.

          B. Unjust enrichment law

          In unjust enrichment law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years as from the date on which the injured party knows about the claim (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

          The absolute limitation period is not affected by the revision and remains ten years after the date on which the claim arises (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO).

          C. Contract law

          With regard to contractual claims, the ordinary limitation period remains ten years from the due date (Art. 127 CO). Furthermore, the shorter limitation period of five years from the due date applicable to (amongst others) claims for rent, interest on capital and other periodic payments, (most) claims out of employment relationships etc. remains unchanged too (Art. 128 CO).

          However, in cases of personal injury, the revised statute of limitations introduces a new relative limitation period of three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage, as well as a new absolute limitation period of twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 128a CO). The current law does not provide for distinct relative and absolute limitation periods for contractual claims in cases of personal injury. Instead, the ordinary ten-year limitation period (Art. 127 CO) usually applied to such cases.

          D. Summary

          In summary, the most important elements of the revised statute of limitations are the longer (trebled) relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law (i.e., three years instead of one year) and the new special rules for cases of personal injury, which now benefit from a 20-year absolute limitation period.

          Transitional provisions / application of the revised statute of limitations to pre-existing claims

          The longer limitation periods under the revised CO apply to any claims that are not yet time-barred when the revision enters into force (i.e., on 1 January 2020; revised Art. 49 para. 1, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). In other words, the limitation periods of any claims that do not become time-barred until 31 December 2019 at the latest will be prolonged. This is of particular relevance with regard to claims based on tort and unjust enrichment; the short one-year relative limitation periods under the current law will be extended by another two years.

          In contrast, the current law remains applicable in case the revised statute of limitations provides for shorter limitation periods (revised Art. 49 para. 2, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). This concerns, in particular, contractual claims in cases of personal injury. The new three-year relative limitation period under the revised law might not apply to such claims, as the current statute of limitations does not provide for a relative limitation period at all.

          Further changes brought by the revision

          In addition to the changes of the limitation periods set out above, the revision of the statute of limitations contains numerous further modifications. Some of them are listed in the following:

          1. Limitation periods do not commence or are suspended in the event that a claim cannot be asserted for objective reasons before any court worldwide (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 6 CO). The current law provides for such non-commencement or suspension only if the claim cannot be brought before a Swiss court.
          2. Parties to a dispute may agree in writing that limitation periods shall be suspended during settlement discussions, mediation proceedings or other out-of-court settlement proceedings (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 8 CO).
          3. Once a limitation period has commenced to run, waivers of statute of limitation defenses are admissible, but must not exceed ten years (revised Art. 141 para. 1 CO). Any such waivers must be in writing (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
          4. In general terms and conditions (“GTC”), statute of limitation defenses may be waived by the party who makes use of the GTCs only. In contrast, a waiver by the party on whom the GTCs are imposed (e.g., consumers) is ineffective (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
          5. The limitation period for an actio pauliana under the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) is extended to from currently two years to three years after service of a loss certificate, the opening of bankruptcy proceedings or the confirmation of a composition agreement with an assignment of assets (whichever is applicable; revised Art. 292 DEBA).

          If 2017 was the year of Initial Coin Offerings, 2018 was the year of Blockchain awareness and testing all over the world. From ICO focused guidelines and regulations respectively aimed to alarm and protect investors, we have seen the shift, especially in Europe, to distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) focused guidelines and regulations aimed at protecting citizens on one hand and promote DLT implementations on the other.

          Indeed, European Union Member States and the European Parliament started looking deeper into the technology by, for instance, calling for consultations with professionals in order to understand DLT’s potentials for real-world implementations and possible risks.

          In this article I am aiming to give a brief snapshot of firstly what are the most notable European initiatives and moves towards promoting Blockchain implementation and secondly current challenges faced by European law makers when dealing with the regulation of distributed ledger technologies.

          Europe

          Let’s start from the European Blockchain Partnership (“EBP”), a statement made by 25 EU Member States acknowledging the importance of distributed ledger technology for society, in particular when it comes to interoperability, cyber security and efficiency of digital public services. The Partnership is not only an acknowledgement, it is also a commitment from all signatory states to collaborate to build what they envision will be a distributed ledger infrastructure for the delivering of cross-border public services.

          Witness of the trust given to the technology is My Health My Data, a EU-backed project that uses DLT to enable patients to efficiently control their digitally recorded health data while securing it from the threat of data breaches. Benefits the EU saw in DLT on this specific project are safety, efficiency but most notably the opportunity that DLT offers data subject to have finally control over their own data, without the need for intermediaries.

          Another important initiative proving European interests in testing DLT technologies is the Horizon Prize on “Blockchains for Social Good”, a 5 million Euros worth challenge open to innovators and tech companies to develop scalable, efficient and high-impact decentralized solutions to social innovation challenges.

          Moving forward, in December last year, I had the honor to be part of the “ Workshop on Blockchains & Smart Contracts Legal and Regulatory Framework” in Paris, an initiative supported by the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum (“EUBOF”), a pilot project initiated by the European Parliament. Earlier last year other three workshops were held, the aim of each was to collect knowledge on specific topics from an audience of leading DLT legal and technical professionals. With the knowledge collected, the EUBOF followed up with reports of what was discussed during the workshop and suggest a way forward.

          Although not binding, these reports give a reasonably clear guideline to the industry on how existing laws at a European level apply to the technology, or at least should be interpreted, and highlight areas where new regulation is definitely needed. As an example let’s look at the Report on Blockchain & GDPR. If you missed it, the GDPR is the Regulation that protects Europeans personal data and it’s applicable to all companies globally, which are processing data from European citizens. The “right to erasure” embedded in the GDPR, doesn’t allow personal data to be stored on an immutable database, the data subject has to be able to erase data anytime when shared with a service provider and stored somewhere on a database. In the case of Blockchain, the consensus on personal data having to be stored off-chain is therefore unanimous. Storing personal data off-chain and leaving an hash to that data on-chain, is a viable solution if certain precautions are taken in order to avoid the risks of reversibility or linkability of such hash to the personal data stored off-chain, therefore making the hash on-chain personally identifiable information.

          However, not all European laws apply to Member States, therefore making it hard to give a EU-wide answer to most DLT compliance challenges in Europe. Member States freedom to legislate is indeed only limited/influenced by two main instruments, Regulations, which are automatically enforceable in each Member State and Directives binding Member States to legislate on specific topics according to a set of specific rules.

          Diverging national laws have a great effect on multiple aspects of innovative technologies. Let’s look for instance at the validity of “smart contracts”. When discussing the legal power of automatically enforceable digital contracts, the lack of a European wide legislation on contracts makes it impossible to find an answer applicable to all Member States. For instance, is “offer and acceptance” enough to constitute a contract? What is considered a valid “acceptance”? What is an “obligation”? “Can a digital asset be the object of a legally binding agreement”?

          If we try to give a EU-wide answer to the questions such as smart contract validity and enforceability it is apparently not possible since we will need to consider 28 different answers. I, therefore, believe that the future of innovation in Europe will highly depend on the unification of laws.

          An example of a unified law that has great benefits on innovation (including DLT) is the Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS) Regulation, which governs electronic identification including electronic signatures.

          The race to regulating DLT in Europe

          Let’s now look briefly at a couple of Member States legislations, specifically on Blockchain and cryptocurrencies last year.

          EU Member States have been quite creative I would say in regulating the new technology. Let’s start from Malta, which saw a surprising increase of important projects and companies, such as Binance, landing on the beautiful Mediterranean Island thanks to its favorable (or at least felt as such) legislations on DLT. The “Blockchain Island” passed three laws in early July to regulate and supervise Blockchain projects including ICOs, crypto exchanges and DLT, specifically: The Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act regulation that aims at recognizing different technology arrangements such as DAOs, smart contracts and in future probably AI machines; The Virtual Financial Assets Act for ICOs and crypto exchanges; The Malta Digital Innovation Authority establishing a new supervisory authority.

          Some think the Maltese legislation lacks a comprehensive framework, one that for instance, gives legal personality to Innovative Technology Arrangements. For this reason some are therefore accusing the Maltese lawmakers of rushing into an uncompleted regulatory framework in order to attract business to the island while others seem to positively welcome the laws as a good start for a European wide regulation on DLT and crypto assets.

          In December 2018, Malta also initiated a declaration that was then signed by other six Members States, calling for collaboration for the promotion and implementation of DLT on a European level.

          France was one of the signatories of such declaration, and it’s worth mentioning since the French Minister for the Economy and Finance approved in September a framework for regulating ICOs and therefore protecting investors’ rights, basically giving the AMF (French Authority for Financial Market) the empowerment to give licenses to companies wanting to raise funds through Initial Coin Offerings.

          Last but not least comes Switzerland which although it is not a EU Member State, it has great degree of influence on European and national legislators when it comes to progressive regulations. At the end of December, the Swiss Federal Council released a report on DLT and the law, making a clear statement that the existing Swiss law is sufficient to regulate most matters related to DLT and Blockchain, although some adjustments have to be made. So no new laws but few amendments here and there, which will allow the integration of the specific DLT applications with existing laws in order to ensure legal certainty on certain uncovered matters. Relevant areas of Swiss law that will be amended include the transfer of rights utilizing digital registers, Anti Money Laundering rules specifically for decentralized trading platforms and bankruptcy when that proceeding involves crypto assets.

          Conclusions

          To summarize, from the approach taken during the past year, it is apparent that there is great interest in Europe to understand the potentials and to soon test implementations of distributed ledger technology. Lawmakers have also an understanding that the technology is in an infant state, it might involve risks, therefore making it complex to set specific rules or to give final answers on the alignment of certain technology applications with existing European or national laws.

          To achieve European wide results, however, acknowledgments, guidelines and reports are not enough. The setting of standards for lawmakers applicable to all Member States or even unification of laws in crucial sectors influencing directly or indirectly new technologies, will be the only solution for any innovative technology to be adopted at a European level.

          The author of this post is Alessandro Mazzi.

          Agata Adamczyk

          Áreas de práctica

          • Contratos
          • Derecho Societario
          • Derecho Internacional Privado
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            Daños punitivos – En Italia la Corte de Casación abre la puerta

            6 de diciembre de 2017

            • Italia
            • Comercio internacional
            • Contratos
            • Derecho internacional
            • Litigios
            • Reclamación de deudas

            Summary

            The recent post-Brexit trade deal makes no provision for jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments.

            Therefore, the UK dropped out of the jurisdiction of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) on 31 December 2020.

            The EU has not yet approved the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, but may do in the future.

            Unless the transitional provisions from the Withdrawal Agreement apply, jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments will be governed by the Hague Convention 2005 if there is an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause

            If the Hague Convention of 2005 does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules.

            Judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

            On the first day of 2021 the UK left the EU regimes with which European lawyers are familiar. We appeared to enter “uncharted territory”. Not so. In fact, there are charts for this territory – or maps, to use a more modern word. You just need to know which maps.

            Whether you are a lawyer or a businessperson, in whatever country, you need answers to two questions. Which laws govern jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU member states and the UK; and how should businesses act as a result?

            What happened?

            The EU and UK reached a post-Brexit trade deal, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”), on Christmas Eve 2020. The provisions of the TCA became UK law as the European Union (Future Relationship) Act on 31 December 2020. The TCA made provision for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but did not mention judicial cooperation in civil matters, or jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial proceedings.

            So where do we look for law on those matters?

            We look at the position immediately before Brexit. As every lawyer should know the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) governed the enforcement and recognition of judgments between EU member states.

            Also, the Lugano Convention 2007 governs jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in commercial and civil matters between EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It operates in substantially the same way as Brussels (Recast) does between EU member states.

            The UK was party to the Convention by virtue of its EU membership. Now that the UK is not a member of the EU, the contracting parties could agree that the UK could join the Lugano Convention as an independent contracting party, and there would be little change to the position on jurisdiction and enforcement. English jurisdiction clauses would continue to be respected and English court judgments would continue to be readily enforceable throughout EU member states and EFTA countries, and vice versa.

            The problem is that the EU has not agreed to the UK joining the Lugano Convention

            The UK submitted its application to accede to the Lugano Convention in its own right on 8 April 2020. But accession requires the consent of all contracting parties including the EU. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have indicated their support for the UK’s accession, but the EU’s position is still not yet clear and the TCA is silent on this matter.

            While the EU still may belatedly support the UK’s accession to Lugano, it does not currently apply. In any case, a three-month time-lag applies between agreement and entry into force, unless all the contracting parties agree to waive it.

            Where are we now?

            If the transitional provisions provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement as explained in my previous post do not apply, the Brussels (Recast) Regulation will not apply to jurisdiction and enforcement between the EU and UK.

            If they do not, then you first need to decide whether the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 is applicable. The Hague Convention 2005 applies between EU Member States, Mexico, Singapore and Montenegro. The Hague Convention first came into force for the UK when the EU acceded on 1 October 2015 and the UK re-acceded after Brexit in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021.

            The Hague Convention 2005 applies if:

            • The dispute falls within the scope of the Convention as provided for by Article 2 – e.g. the Convention does not apply to employment and consumer contracts or claims for personal injury;
            • There is an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the meaning of Article 3; and
            • The exclusive jurisdiction clause is entered into after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized, and proceedings are commenced after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized within the meaning of Article 16.

            There is some uncertainty as to whether EU member states will treat the Hague Convention as having been in force from 1 October 2015, or only from when the UK re-accedes on 1 January 2021. The UK’s view is that the Convention will apply to the UK from 1 October 2015; the EU’s view is that it will apply to the UK from 1 January 2021. What is not in dispute is that for exclusive English jurisdiction clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, the contracting states will respect exclusive English jurisdiction clauses and enforce the resulting judgments.

            If the 2005 Hague Convention does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules to questions of jurisdiction and enforcement. In the UK, the rules will essentially be the same as the ‘common-law’ rules currently on enforcement applied to non-EU parties, for example the United States.

            The Norwegian exception

            The UK and Norway have reached an agreement which extends and updates an old mutual enforcement treaty, the 1961 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between the UK and Norway, which will apply if the UK does not re-accede to the Lugano Convention. The practical effect of this agreement is that judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

            How should your business act now?

            The applicable legal framework for each dispute will depend on the facts of each case. You should review the dispute resolution clauses in your cross-border contracts to assess how they may be affected by Brexit and to seek specialist advice where necessary. You should also seek advice on dispute resolution provisions when entering into new cross-border contracts in 2021.

            This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

            This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

            In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

            English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

            The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

            This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

            The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

            The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

            As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

            The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

            Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

            The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

            Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

            Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

            Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

            The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

            Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

            The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

            There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

            The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

            The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

            As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

            Novel technology in proceedings

            Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

            And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

            Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

            Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

            Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

            • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
            • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
            • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
            • the matter concerns an international dispute.

            The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

            “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

            The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

            Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

            We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

            To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

            Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

            Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

            • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
            • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
            • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
            • the disclosure of confidential documents
            • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
            • the manner of taking witness testimony
            • the costs of the proceedings.

            Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

            All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

            The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

            • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
            • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
            • The defendant submits its defence statement.
            • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
            • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
            • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
            • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
            • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

            Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

            As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

            This is a summary of the approved measures, which unfortunately for both tenants and landlords do not include any public aid or tax relief and just refer to a postponement in the payment of the rent.

            Premises to which they are applied

            Leased premises dedicated to activities different than residential: commercial, professional, industrial, cultural, teaching, amusement, healthcare, etc. They also apply to the lease of a whole industry (i.e. hotels, restaurants, bars, etc., which are the most usual type of businesses object of this deal).

            Types of tenants

            • Individual entrepreneurs or self-employed persons who were registered before Social Security before the declaration of the state of alarm on March 14th, 2020
            • Small and medium companies, as defined by article 257.1 of the Capital Companies Act: those who fulfil during two consecutive fiscal years these figures: assets under € 4 million, turnover under € 8 million and average staff under 50 people

            Types of landlords

            In order to benefit from these measures, the landlord should be a housing public entity or company or a big owner, considering as such the individuals or companies who own more than 10 urban properties (excluding parking places and storage rooms) or a built surface over 1.500 sqm.

            Measures approved

            The payment of the rent is postponed without interest meanwhile the state of alarm is in force, but in any case, for a maximum period of four months. Once the state of alarm is overcome, and in any case in a maximum term of four months, the postponed rents should be paid along a maximum period of two years, or the duration of the lease agreement, should it be less than two years.

            For landlords different to those mentioned above

            The tenant could apply before the landlord for the postponement in the payment of the rent (but the landlord is not obliged to accept it), and the parties can use the guarantee that the tenant should mandatorily have provided at the beginning of any lease agreement (usually equal to two month’s rent, but could be more if agreed by the parties), in full or in part, in order to use it to pay the rent. The tenant will have to provide again the guarantee within one year’s term, or less should the lease agreement have a shorter duration.

            Activities to which it is applied

            Activities which have been suspended according to the Royal Decree that declared the state of alarm, dated march, 14ht, 2020, or according to the orders issued by the authorities delegated by such Royal Decree. This should be proved through a certificated issued by the tax authorities.

            If the activity has not been directly suspended by the Royal Decree, the turnover during the month prior to the postponement should be less than 75% of the average monthly turnover during the same quarter last year. This should be proved through a responsible declaration by the tenant, and the landlord is authorised check the bookkeeping records.

            Term to apply and procedure

            The tenant should apply for these measures before the landlord within one month’s term from the publication of the Royal Decree-law, that is, from April 22nd, 2020, and the landlord (in case belongs to the groups mentioned in point c) is obliged to accept the tenant’s request, except if both parties have already agreed something different. The postponement would be applied to the following month.

            As the state of alarm was declared more than one month ago (March 14th), landlords and tenants have already been reaching some agreements, for example 50% rent reduction during the state of alarm, and 50% rent postponement during the following 6 months. Tenants who do not reach an agreement with the landlord could face an eviction procedure, however court procedures are suspended during the state of alarm. We have also seen some abusive non-payment of rent by tenants.

            When is becomes impossible to reach an agreement with the landlord, tenants have the legal remedy of claiming in Court for the application of the “rebus sic stantibus” principle, which was highly demanded during the 2008 financial crisis but very seldom applied by the Courts. This principle is aimed to re-balance the parties’ obligations when their situation had deeply changed because of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. This principle is not included in the Spanish Civil Code, but the Supreme Court has accepted its application, in a very restricted way, in some occasions.

            Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

            Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

            Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

            La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

            Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

            «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

            Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

            Escuchar es altamente eficaz

            En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

            Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

            «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

            Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

            En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

            «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

            Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

            La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

            En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

            «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

            Las emociones son importantes

            Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

            «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

            [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

            El Real Decreto-ley 8/2020, de 17 de marzo, de medidas urgentes extraordinarias para hacer frente al impacto económico y social del COVID-19, aunque afecta y produce efectos en muchos diferentes ámbitos jurídicos, no incluye ninguna referencia a los contratos de arrendamientos de inmuebles, ni viviendas, ni locales u oficinas.

            El objeto de esta nota es analizar los efectos de la situación del Estado de Alarma respecto a aquellos contratos de arrendamiento de oficinas o locales que se hayan visto obligados a cerrar en aplicación del decreto; aquellos otros que permanezcan total o parcialmente abiertos y en funcionamiento, bien que con una actividad reducida o mínima, en principio no son objeto de las conclusiones que más adelante alcanzamos sin perjuicio de que existan casos individualizados a los que, pese a no existir un cierre total, razonable y lógicamente puedan serles de aplicación.

            No está excluido en modo alguno que ante una prolongación de la vigencia del Estado de Alarma pudiera publicarse alguna norma que afectase a los contratos de arrendamiento, pero de momento esto no ha sucedido. Si esto llegase a acaecer, al contenido de dicha norma habrá de estarse.

            En base al principio de libertad de pactos que consagra el art. 1255 del Código Civil, que permite que sean las partes firmantes del contrato las que convengan (i) qué escenarios y situaciones deben considerarse como constitutivos de supuestos de Fuerza Mayor y Caso Fortuito y (ii) cuáles deban ser las consecuencias contractuales de los tales escenarios, el primer ejercicio es comprobar si el contrato incluye una cláusula reguladora de la Fuerza mayor y sus efectos; si es así, a la tal cláusula habrá de estarse y su análisis queda al margen de esta nota.

            En ausencia de regulación expresa en el contrato, aplicarían al caso las previsiones del Código Civil y en concreto el artículo 1.105.

            COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor

            El COVID 19 es un acontecimiento que en principio reúne los requisitos que exige el Código Civil para ser calificado como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor (art. 1105 Código Civil) ya que:

            • Se trata de un hecho ajeno y no imputable al contratante deudor de la prestación u obligación.
            • Es imprevisible, o si se reputase “previsible”, es sin duda inevitable.
            • El acontecimiento en cuestión, la pandemia, debe ser causa y tener como consecuencia el incumplimiento de la obligación, es decir debe existir un nexo causal.

            Por lo tanto, cumpliéndose los tres requisitos, la primera conclusión que alcanzamos es que muy previsiblemente, los Tribunales españoles calificarán como “Fuerza Mayor” la situación causada por el COVID 19 cuando se les plantee una contienda judicial en la que tal asunto se discuta entre los litigantes. Analizaremos a continuación las consecuencias de dicha calificación.

            Consecuencias de considerar COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza mayor

            La generalidad de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia entienden que los efectos de calificar un supuesto como caso de Fuerza Mayor en principio son:

            • Imposibilidad total y definitiva de cumplir; liberando al deudor del cumplimiento de la obligación.
            • Imposibilidad parcial de cumplir; quedando liberado el deudor sólo en la parte que le es imposible cumplir, pero siguiendo obligado por la parte que sí puede llevar a cabo.
            • Imposibilidad temporal de cumplir; el deudor queda liberado de la responsabilidad por mora mientras persista la situación de excepcionalidad.

            Ahora bien, analicemos como afectaría dicha consideración como Fuerza Mayor de la epidemia, respecto a los contratos de arrendamiento para usos distintos a la vivienda.

            Respecto al pago de la renta

            La pregunta a la que responder es, si la calificación de la situación pandémica actual como un caso de Fuerza Mayor, libera al arrendatario (cuyo local se ha visto obligado a cerrar por orden de la autoridad gubernamental) de la obligación del pago de la renta mientras dicha obligación de cierre persista, incluyendo en el concepto “liberación” diferentes alternativas: condonación total o parcial y/o aplazamiento total o parcial.

            Nos estamos encontrando en estos días con una reacción frecuente entre algunos arrendatarios, quienes, de manera unilateral, han informado a sus arrendadores que considerando COVID 19 un supuesto de fuerza mayor y habiéndose visto obligados a cerrar el local/oficina, suspenden el pago de la renta mientras dicha situación permanezca. No resuelven el contrato, no entregan la posesión, se mantienen en ella (permaneciendo el local cerrado y no operativo) pero suspenden el pago (sin quedar claro si suspender en este caso significa auto condonarse el pago de la renta o aplazarlo para cuando desaparezca el supuesto de Fuerza Mayor).

            Argumentos en contra de la liberación

            Por más que pueda considerarse “entendible” esta actitud, desde la óptica del arrendatario, no desde la del arrendador, dicha consideración se topa con un obstáculo: la interpretación que de la Fuerza Mayor ha hecho el TS respecto a las obligaciones de pago pecuniario, según la STS (Civil) de 19 mayo de 2015:

            “No pudiendo plantearse, pues, tratándose de deudas pecuniarias, la imposibilidad subjetiva -insolvencia- ni la objetiva o formal, concluye la doctrina que no es posible imaginar que si la imposibilidad obedece a caso fortuito pudiera tener como efecto la extinción de la obligación.

            La exoneración del deudor por caso fortuito no es absoluta, tiene excepciones, conforme prevé el articulo 1.105 CC, y una de ellas, por aplicación del principio «genus nunquam perit», sería en supuestos de obligaciones de entregar cosa genérica.

            En tales circunstancias el deudor pecuniario viene obligado a cumplir la prestación principal, sin que sus sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello, pues lo adeudado no es algo individualizado que ha perecido sino algo genérico como es el dinero.”

            Conclusión: no parece que este criterio jurisprudencial permita defender que el cumplimiento de las obligaciones pecuniarias quede liberado, extinto o que su incumplimiento quede justificado en casos de Fuerza Mayor, de suerte que el deudor pecuniario, en este caso el arrendatario, en aplicación de este criterio, vendría obligado a cumplir la prestación principal sin que las sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello con fundamento en la Fuerza Mayor, debido a la condición genérica que tiene el dinero.

            Argumentos a favor de la liberación: el art. 1.575 del Código Civil

            Dicho lo anterior lo anterior, debe hacerse referencia a un artículo del Código Civil que, con certeza, será profusamente citado en los conflictos judiciales que se avecinan.

            El art. 1.575, tratando del arrendamiento de fincas rústicas, reconoce el derecho del arrendatario a la rebaja de la renta en caso de pérdida de más de la mitad de los frutos (salvo pacto en contrario) en “casos fortuitos, extraordinarios e imprevistos…como incendio, guerra, peste, inundación insólita, langosta, terremoto u otro igualmente desacostumbrado que los contratantes no hayan podido racionalmente prever”.

            ¿Es aplicable este precepto, previsto para arrendamientos rústicos, a los arrendamientos urbanos?

            El art. 4.1 CC permite la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando (i) estas no contemplen un supuesto específico y (ii) regulen otro semejante entre los que se aprecie “identidad de razón”.

            La STS de 15 de enero de 2019, resolviendo un conflicto de un arrendamiento de un edificio destinado a hotel, en el que el arrendatario había pretendido la rebaja de la renta al amparo de la cláusula “rebus sic stantibus” por la crisis de 2008 y había alegado a su favor la aplicación del art.1.575, estableció:

            “La argumentación de la sentencia recurrida por la que se rechaza la pretensión de rebaja del precio pactado tampoco es contraria al criterio legal que se desprende del art. 1575 CC, que es la regla que permite la rebaja de la renta en el arrendamiento de bienes productivos que no deriven de riesgos del propio negocio, exige además que la pérdida de rendimientos se origine por casos fortuitos extraordinarios e imprevistos, algo que por su misma rareza no hubiera ser podido previsto por las partes, y que la pérdida de frutos sea de más de la mitad de los frutos. En el caso no concurre ninguna de estas circunstancias. La disminución de las rentas procede de una evolución del mercado, las partes previeron la posibilidad de que en algunos ejercicios la rentabilidad del hotel no fuera positiva para la arrendataria y las pérdidas alegadas por NH en la explotación del hotel de Almería son inferiores al cincuenta por ciento, sin contar con que el resultado global del conjunto de su actividad como gestora de una cadena de hoteles es, según considera probado la Audiencia a la vista del informe de gestión consolidado, favorable”.

            El TS no admite la aplicación del 1.575 pero no por considerarlo no aplicable a arrendamientos distintos a los rústicos, sino por concluir que no se dan los requisitos para ello ya que ni era imprevisible la crisis de 2008 ni las pérdidas del arrendatario son superiores al 50%.

            Pero, esa interpretación del TS junto con el tenor del art. 4.1 CC permitirían avalar la pretensión del arrendatario que se encuentra sin ingreso alguno durante el Estado de Alarma, de exigir una rebaja de renta que se adecuara al principio de proporcionalidad.

            Respecto a la terminación anticipada a instancias del arrendatario

            Sin embargo, podemos encontrarnos con situaciones en las que el arrendatario, ante la actual situación, decida terminar anticipadamente el contrato de arrendamiento debido a la situación provocada por el COVID 19, poniendo el local a disposición del arrendador.

            Son supuestos en los que se pretende la resolución anticipada del contrato, sin respetar (i) o el plazo obligatorio (ii) o el preaviso, en ambos casos bajo la hipótesis de que estén así regulados en el contrato.

            En estos supuestos entendemos que sí puede resultar defendible que, debido a la situación de fuerza mayor provocada por el COVID 19 y en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, se exonere al arrendatario de la obligación:

            • De respetar un plazo de vigencia determinada del contrato de arrendamiento
            • De preavisar al arrendador en caso de resolución anticipada del contrato

            En ambos casos el contrato quedaría resuelto con la entrega de la posesión del local, sin perjuicio de tener que respetar las obligaciones que prevé el contrato para la terminación y entrega siempre que las mismas no se vean igualmente afectadas por la situación de Fuerza Mayor.

            Nuestra opinión es que, también en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, sería defendible ante los Tribunales la tesis de que el arrendatario quedaría liberado de cualquier obligación de resarcimiento de daños al arrendador por dicha resolución anticipada o incumplimiento de la duración obligada del contrato.

            Conclusión

            En conclusión, planteado ante los Tribunales el debate sobre cómo la pandemia (que no hay duda será calificada como caso de Fuerza Mayor) afectará a las obligaciones a cargo del arrendatario que se haya visto obligado a cerrar su negocio, nuestra opinión es la siguiente:

            1. Respecto a la obligación de pago de la renta, pese al criterio contrario de la sentencia que citamos de 19 de mayo de 2015, nos parece potente y defendible la remisión al art. 1575 y a su aplicación analógica con apoyo en la STS de 15 de enero de 2019, para exigir una reducción proporcional y equitativa de la renta.
            2. Respecto a la facultad del arrendatario para resolver el contrato anticipadamente, entregando la posesión del inmueble al arrendador, exonerando al arrendatario de cumplir con sus obligaciones de preaviso o de duración obligada previstas en el contrato en cuestión, y sin tener que indemnizar al arrendador por ello, entendemos que también existe fundamento para defender judicialmente esta posición.

            Aplicación de la cláusula Rebus Sic Stantibus (RSS)

            Analizaremos a continuación si puede ser aplicable al caso que estamos analizando la cláusula RSS y con qué consecuencias.

            Requisitos de la cláusula RSS (aforismo latino que significa “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”)

            La expresión RSS, opera como una cláusula intrínseca (es decir implícita, sin necesidad de pactarse expresamente) en la relación contractual, que significa que las estipulaciones establecidas en un contrato lo son habida cuenta de las circunstancias concurrentes en el momento, esto es, “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”, de forma que cualquier alteración sustancial y no prevista de las mismas podrían dar lugar a la modificación del contenido contractual.

            La cláusula RSS no está regulada en ningún precepto en nuestro ordenamiento; es una construcción doctrinal que tradicionalmente la jurisprudencia ha admitido (ejemplos entre otros muchos STS de 30 de junio de 2014, 24 de febrero de 2015, 15 de enero de 2019, 18 de julio de 2019), con mucha cautela, solo en ciertos casos, y requiriendo las siguientes premisas

            • Que se haya producido una alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias del contrato, en el momento que el mismo se deba cumplir, en relación con las concurrentes al tiempo de su celebración. Para valorar si una incidencia puede determinar la mutación o alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias que dotaron sentido al contrato, debemos atenernos a lo siguiente: a) Debemos contrastar el alcance de dicha mutación o alteración respecto del sentido o finalidad del contrato y de la conmutatividad o equilibrio prestacional del mismo; y b) Debe quedar excluido el «riesgo normal» inherente o derivado del contrato.
            • Que se haya producido una desproporción exorbitante, fuera de todo cálculo, entre las prestaciones de las partes contratantes, provocando un desequilibrio entre las mismas.
            • Que lo anterior se produzca como consecuencia de circunstancias radicalmente imprevisibles.
            • Que no exista otro remedio para superar la situación.

            Históricamente nuestros tribunales han sido muy reacios a aplicar RSS si bien desde la crisis económica de 2008-2012 ha tenido lugar un cierto cambio de criterio y una mayor receptividad jurisprudencial-

            Consecuencias de la aplicación de la RSS

            La doctrina establece que la aplicación de la RSS no tiene, en principio, efectos rescisorios, resolutorios o extintivos del contrato, sino únicamente efectos modificativos del mismo, encaminados a compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones; a su vez la doctrina establece que se aplica únicamente a los contratos a largo plazo o de tracto sucesivo y de ejecución diferida.

            En aplicación de la buena fe, la reacción ante un evento de caso fortuito, fuerza mayor o en general un evento que genera una desproporción entre las partes, como la que regula la institución RSS, debe ser la modificación del contrato para reequilibrar las obligaciones entre las partes, y solo en caso de imposibilidad material de cumplimiento, la resolución de la obligación, en ambos casos sin indemnización por incumplimiento.

            Por ello, en el ámbito de los contratos de arrendamiento y en el caso de cierre de los locales por mandato imperativo, entendemos que la institución RSS podrá ser:

            • alegada por los arrendatarios para solicitar o instar de los arrendadores modificaciones a las prestaciones económicas del contrato y
            • estimada por los jueces, cuando estos supuestos se debatan ante los Tribunales, a la hora de aceptar como equitativas y legítimas las tales novaciones contractuales con el fin de compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones generado por los efectos del COVID 19.

            En suma, la cláusula RSS puede ser una herramienta para el arrendatario de un local que ha tenido que cerrar durante el Estado de Alarma, a la hora de negociar con el arrendador una modificación del contrato, intentando aplazar la renta mientras se prolongue el Estado de Alarma o negociando un descuento de esta.

            Debe recordarse:

            • Que la RSS es de ineludible aplicación casuística, no caben generalizaciones y será necesario tener en cuenta el efecto que provoque el COVID 19 en cada relación contractual concreta (STS de 30 de junio de 2014 y 24 de febrero de 2015) y el efectivo desequilibrio de las prestaciones que haya producido, y
            • Que, como hemos dicho, los Tribunales son en general reacios a la aplicación de esta cláusula a la que solo acuden en caso de falta de cualquier otra herramienta jurídica y en situaciones en que el mantenimiento del status quo contractual revele una manifiesta “injusticia” y un patente y rotundo desequilibrio entre las prestaciones de las partes.

            ¿Significa lo anterior que el arrendatario podrá imponer al arrendador una modificación de las condiciones económicas del contrato al amparo de RSS (aplazamiento o condonación total o parcial)?

            No lo creemos de manera tan rotunda; lo que si pensamos es que la aplicación de esta institución RSS debería,

            • Justificar una razonable solicitud del arrendatario de novar temporalmente las condiciones del contrato (aplazamiento o condonación, total o parcial) que al arrendador debe razonablemente atender.
            • En caso de negativa irrazonable del arrendador, y documentando cuanto más profusamente pueda el arrendatario su solicitud y las eventuales negociaciones o negativa a mantenerlas por la contra parte, permitirle fundamentar una suspensión del pago de la renta, total o parcial, durante la pendencia del Estado de Alarma con ánimo, no de extinción de la obligación, pero sí de su aplazamiento.

            Habremos de esperar a la reacción de los tribunales cuando lleguen a su conocimiento estos conflictos, como sin duda ocurrirá; pero si nos atrevemos a adelantar que es bastante posible que la tendencia judicial sea la de conceder amparo al arrendatario con apoyo en la cláusula RSS y el principio de la preservación del negocio, a la hora de dar validez a determinados efectos modificativos respecto a las obligaciones pecuniarias a cargo del arrendatario (condonación total o parcial del pago de la renta durante la crisis pandémica, aplazamiento, aplazamiento parcial).

            En todo caso será esencial acreditar que la conducta del contratante deudor que busca amparo en la cláusula RSS para novar el contrato se ha ajustado estrictamente al principio de buena fe (STS 30 de abril de 2015).

            También será importante analizar caso por caso por qué se justifica el desplazamiento del riesgo derivado del “suceso excepcional e imprevisto” de un contratante al otro (STS de 15 de enero de 2015) y bien podría defenderse (STS de 18 de julio de 2019) que deben ambos contratantes repartirse y asumir entre los dos las consecuencias.

            Las decisiones judiciales variarán en cada caso concreto que habrá de ser objeto de estudio individualizado.

            Conclusiones y Recomendaciones

            En suma, parece que al arrendatario contaría con dos instrumentos para la pretensión de suspender (signifique esto condonar o aplazar) el pago de las rentas, la cláusula RSS y el principio de Fuerza Mayor.

            A nuestro modo de ver, la reposición del equilibrio contractual alterado por el suceso excepcional puede consistir o bien en una prórroga de los plazos de pago del arrendamiento o bien en la aplicación de una condonación total o parcial de la obligación de pago de rentas mientras dure el Estado de Alarma, pero entendemos que será defendible que el retraso en el pago del arrendamiento no podrá dar lugar ni a la resolución del contrato al amparo del art. 1124 Cc ni a la exigencia de daños y perjuicios art. 1105 Cc, en consecuencia, no facultará al arrendador a instar el desahucio.

            Por ello los pasos a seguir en cada caso serían:

            • Realizar un examen del contrato para ver si se regulan los casos de fuerza mayor y caso fortuito y si la situación actual concuerda con lo regulado en el contrato.
            • En caso de que no se estipule nada en el contrato, y habiéndose cerrado el local u oficina, advertir de ello a la otra parte e intentar negociar una novación del contrato de arrendamiento solicitando: (i) condonación total de la renta durante el Estado de Alarma; (ii) condonación parcial compartiendo ambas partes el esfuerzo en proporción por convenir; y (iii) aplazamiento del pago de la renta hasta que se pueda reabrir el local u oficina con un plan de pagos de la deuda aplazada.
            • Si no es posible llegar a un acuerdo, es conveniente dejar constancia de que se ha actuado con buena fe intentando llegar a una solución negociada y en el extremo (desde la óptica del arrendatario) anunciar, sin esperar a recibir una comunicación o reclamación del Arrendador, la suspensión del pago de las rentas justificando la misma en el Estado de Alarma hasta la finalización del mismo y la consecuente reapertura del local/oficina.

            QUICK SUMMARY: Contract negotiations do not take place in a legal vacuum. A party who negotiates contrary to the principle of good faith and then breaks off negotiations may become liable to the other party. However, the requirements for such liability are high and the enforcement of damage claims is cumbersome. At the end of the post I will share some practical tips for contract negotiations in Switzerland.

            Under Swiss law, the principle of freedom of contract is of fundamental importance. It follows from the freedom of contract that, in principle, everyone is free to enter into contract negotiations and to terminate them again without incurring any liability. A termination of contract negotiations does not have to be justified either.

            However, the freedom of contract is limited by the obligation to act in good faith (cf. article 2 para. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code), which is of equal fundamental importance. From the moment when parties enter into contract negotiations, they are in a special legal relationship with each other. That pre-contractual relationship involves certain reciprocal obligations. In particular, the parties must negotiate in a serious manner and in accordance with their actual intentions.

            Negotiating parties must not stir up the hope of the other party, contrary to their actual intentions, that a contract will actually be concluded. Put differently, a party’s willingness to conclude a contract must not be expressed more strongly than it actually is. If a party realizes that the other party wrongly beliefs that a contract would certainly be concluded, such illusion should be dispelled in due course.

            A negotiating party that terminates contract negotiations in violation of these principles, whether maliciously or negligently, may become liable to the other party based on the culpa in contrahendo doctrine. However, such liability exists in exceptional cases only.

            • The fact that contract negotiations took a long time is not sufficient for incurring such liability. The duration of negotiations is, in itself, not decisive.
            • It is not possible to derive liability from pre-existing contractual relationships between the negotiation parties, as for example in cases where parties negotiate a «mere» prolongation of an existing agreement. The decisive factor is not whether parties were already contractually bound before, but only whether the party that terminated the contract negotiations made the other party believe that a new agreement would certainly be concluded.
            • It is not decisive whether the party who terminates contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made costly investments in view of the prospective contract. In principle, anyone who makes investments already prior to the actual conclusion of a contract does so at its own risk. Even where a party to contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made (substantial) investments in the prospective agreement, a termination of the contract negotiations will, in itself, not be considered as an act of bad faith.

            What does a liability for breaking off negotiations include?

            If a party violates the aforementioned pre-contractual obligations, the other party may be entitled to compensation for the so-called negative interest. This means that the other party must be put in the position it would have been if the negotiations had not taken place. Damages may include, e.g., expenses in connection with the negotiation of the contract (travel costs, legal fees etc.), but also a loss of income in cases where a party was not able to do business with third parties because of the contract negotiations. However, the other party has no right to be treated as if the contract had been concluded (so-called positive interest).

            Having said that, it must be kept in mind that the requirements set by Swiss court for the substantiation of damages are rather high, so that the enforcement of a liability for breaking off negotiations will often be a cumbersome process. Therefore pursuing damage claims with relatively low amounts in dispute might often require a disproportionate effort.

            Practical tips – Do’s and don’ts when negotiating contracts

            • Do not overstate your willingness to conclude a contract. Be frank with your counterparty. Make it clear from the beginning of the negotiations what clauses are important to you.
            • Do not tell the other party that you are willing to sign a contract, if you still have doubts or you are even unwilling to do so. Confirm that you will sign only if you are convinced to do so.
            • Do not allow someone else (e.g., a representative, employee, branch office etc.) to negotiate on your behalf if you are not willing to enter into an agreement anyway. Keep an eye on how the negotiations are going on and intervene if necessary.
            • Do not make costly investments before a legally binding agreement is concluded. If, for time or other reasons, such investments are necessary already before the conclusion of an agreement, insist on the conclusion of an interim contract governing such investments for the event that the envisaged agreement is not concluded finally.

            In 2020, an important revision of the Swiss statute of limitations enters into force. The new law provides for longer limitation periods in cases of personal injury and extends the relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law from one to three years.

            Background of the revision

            In June 2018, the Swiss parliament adopted an amendment to the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”) pertaining to a revision of the statute of limitations. In November 2018, the Swiss government decided that the revised statute of limitations shall enter into force on 1 January 2020.

            The revision was significantly influenced by asbestos cases. Under the current law, damage claims of asbestos victims were time-barred in some cases even before asbestos-related diseases could be diagnosed. In March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held in Howald Moor and others v. Switzerland that the Swiss statute of limitations amounts in such cases to a violation of article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right of access to a court).

            Having said that, the revision does not only concern cases of personal injury, but also includes numerous other important changes as described in the following.

            Key changes regarding limitation periods

            A. Tort law

            In tort law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

            With the exception of cases of personal injury, the absolute limitation period remains ten years as from the date when the conduct that caused the damages occurred or ended (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

            In cases of personal injury, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable. Currently the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

            The new absolute limitation period in cases of personal injury amounts to twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 60 para. 1bis CO). Under the current law, there was no special absolute limitation period for cases of personal injury, so that the ordinary 10-year period applied (Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

            If conduct, which gives rise to liability under tort law, is also punishable under criminal law, the (longer) limitation period under criminal law remains applicable (cf. Art. 97 of the Swiss Criminal Code). However, where a first-instance criminal judgment is rendered before the conduct is time-barred under criminal law, the limitation periods ends not earlier than three years as from that criminal judgment (revised Art. 60 para. 2 CO). The current law does not provide for such an additional three-year limitation period.

            B. Unjust enrichment law

            In unjust enrichment law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years as from the date on which the injured party knows about the claim (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

            The absolute limitation period is not affected by the revision and remains ten years after the date on which the claim arises (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO).

            C. Contract law

            With regard to contractual claims, the ordinary limitation period remains ten years from the due date (Art. 127 CO). Furthermore, the shorter limitation period of five years from the due date applicable to (amongst others) claims for rent, interest on capital and other periodic payments, (most) claims out of employment relationships etc. remains unchanged too (Art. 128 CO).

            However, in cases of personal injury, the revised statute of limitations introduces a new relative limitation period of three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage, as well as a new absolute limitation period of twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 128a CO). The current law does not provide for distinct relative and absolute limitation periods for contractual claims in cases of personal injury. Instead, the ordinary ten-year limitation period (Art. 127 CO) usually applied to such cases.

            D. Summary

            In summary, the most important elements of the revised statute of limitations are the longer (trebled) relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law (i.e., three years instead of one year) and the new special rules for cases of personal injury, which now benefit from a 20-year absolute limitation period.

            Transitional provisions / application of the revised statute of limitations to pre-existing claims

            The longer limitation periods under the revised CO apply to any claims that are not yet time-barred when the revision enters into force (i.e., on 1 January 2020; revised Art. 49 para. 1, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). In other words, the limitation periods of any claims that do not become time-barred until 31 December 2019 at the latest will be prolonged. This is of particular relevance with regard to claims based on tort and unjust enrichment; the short one-year relative limitation periods under the current law will be extended by another two years.

            In contrast, the current law remains applicable in case the revised statute of limitations provides for shorter limitation periods (revised Art. 49 para. 2, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). This concerns, in particular, contractual claims in cases of personal injury. The new three-year relative limitation period under the revised law might not apply to such claims, as the current statute of limitations does not provide for a relative limitation period at all.

            Further changes brought by the revision

            In addition to the changes of the limitation periods set out above, the revision of the statute of limitations contains numerous further modifications. Some of them are listed in the following:

            1. Limitation periods do not commence or are suspended in the event that a claim cannot be asserted for objective reasons before any court worldwide (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 6 CO). The current law provides for such non-commencement or suspension only if the claim cannot be brought before a Swiss court.
            2. Parties to a dispute may agree in writing that limitation periods shall be suspended during settlement discussions, mediation proceedings or other out-of-court settlement proceedings (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 8 CO).
            3. Once a limitation period has commenced to run, waivers of statute of limitation defenses are admissible, but must not exceed ten years (revised Art. 141 para. 1 CO). Any such waivers must be in writing (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
            4. In general terms and conditions (“GTC”), statute of limitation defenses may be waived by the party who makes use of the GTCs only. In contrast, a waiver by the party on whom the GTCs are imposed (e.g., consumers) is ineffective (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
            5. The limitation period for an actio pauliana under the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) is extended to from currently two years to three years after service of a loss certificate, the opening of bankruptcy proceedings or the confirmation of a composition agreement with an assignment of assets (whichever is applicable; revised Art. 292 DEBA).

            If 2017 was the year of Initial Coin Offerings, 2018 was the year of Blockchain awareness and testing all over the world. From ICO focused guidelines and regulations respectively aimed to alarm and protect investors, we have seen the shift, especially in Europe, to distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) focused guidelines and regulations aimed at protecting citizens on one hand and promote DLT implementations on the other.

            Indeed, European Union Member States and the European Parliament started looking deeper into the technology by, for instance, calling for consultations with professionals in order to understand DLT’s potentials for real-world implementations and possible risks.

            In this article I am aiming to give a brief snapshot of firstly what are the most notable European initiatives and moves towards promoting Blockchain implementation and secondly current challenges faced by European law makers when dealing with the regulation of distributed ledger technologies.

            Europe

            Let’s start from the European Blockchain Partnership (“EBP”), a statement made by 25 EU Member States acknowledging the importance of distributed ledger technology for society, in particular when it comes to interoperability, cyber security and efficiency of digital public services. The Partnership is not only an acknowledgement, it is also a commitment from all signatory states to collaborate to build what they envision will be a distributed ledger infrastructure for the delivering of cross-border public services.

            Witness of the trust given to the technology is My Health My Data, a EU-backed project that uses DLT to enable patients to efficiently control their digitally recorded health data while securing it from the threat of data breaches. Benefits the EU saw in DLT on this specific project are safety, efficiency but most notably the opportunity that DLT offers data subject to have finally control over their own data, without the need for intermediaries.

            Another important initiative proving European interests in testing DLT technologies is the Horizon Prize on “Blockchains for Social Good”, a 5 million Euros worth challenge open to innovators and tech companies to develop scalable, efficient and high-impact decentralized solutions to social innovation challenges.

            Moving forward, in December last year, I had the honor to be part of the “ Workshop on Blockchains & Smart Contracts Legal and Regulatory Framework” in Paris, an initiative supported by the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum (“EUBOF”), a pilot project initiated by the European Parliament. Earlier last year other three workshops were held, the aim of each was to collect knowledge on specific topics from an audience of leading DLT legal and technical professionals. With the knowledge collected, the EUBOF followed up with reports of what was discussed during the workshop and suggest a way forward.

            Although not binding, these reports give a reasonably clear guideline to the industry on how existing laws at a European level apply to the technology, or at least should be interpreted, and highlight areas where new regulation is definitely needed. As an example let’s look at the Report on Blockchain & GDPR. If you missed it, the GDPR is the Regulation that protects Europeans personal data and it’s applicable to all companies globally, which are processing data from European citizens. The “right to erasure” embedded in the GDPR, doesn’t allow personal data to be stored on an immutable database, the data subject has to be able to erase data anytime when shared with a service provider and stored somewhere on a database. In the case of Blockchain, the consensus on personal data having to be stored off-chain is therefore unanimous. Storing personal data off-chain and leaving an hash to that data on-chain, is a viable solution if certain precautions are taken in order to avoid the risks of reversibility or linkability of such hash to the personal data stored off-chain, therefore making the hash on-chain personally identifiable information.

            However, not all European laws apply to Member States, therefore making it hard to give a EU-wide answer to most DLT compliance challenges in Europe. Member States freedom to legislate is indeed only limited/influenced by two main instruments, Regulations, which are automatically enforceable in each Member State and Directives binding Member States to legislate on specific topics according to a set of specific rules.

            Diverging national laws have a great effect on multiple aspects of innovative technologies. Let’s look for instance at the validity of “smart contracts”. When discussing the legal power of automatically enforceable digital contracts, the lack of a European wide legislation on contracts makes it impossible to find an answer applicable to all Member States. For instance, is “offer and acceptance” enough to constitute a contract? What is considered a valid “acceptance”? What is an “obligation”? “Can a digital asset be the object of a legally binding agreement”?

            If we try to give a EU-wide answer to the questions such as smart contract validity and enforceability it is apparently not possible since we will need to consider 28 different answers. I, therefore, believe that the future of innovation in Europe will highly depend on the unification of laws.

            An example of a unified law that has great benefits on innovation (including DLT) is the Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS) Regulation, which governs electronic identification including electronic signatures.

            The race to regulating DLT in Europe

            Let’s now look briefly at a couple of Member States legislations, specifically on Blockchain and cryptocurrencies last year.

            EU Member States have been quite creative I would say in regulating the new technology. Let’s start from Malta, which saw a surprising increase of important projects and companies, such as Binance, landing on the beautiful Mediterranean Island thanks to its favorable (or at least felt as such) legislations on DLT. The “Blockchain Island” passed three laws in early July to regulate and supervise Blockchain projects including ICOs, crypto exchanges and DLT, specifically: The Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act regulation that aims at recognizing different technology arrangements such as DAOs, smart contracts and in future probably AI machines; The Virtual Financial Assets Act for ICOs and crypto exchanges; The Malta Digital Innovation Authority establishing a new supervisory authority.

            Some think the Maltese legislation lacks a comprehensive framework, one that for instance, gives legal personality to Innovative Technology Arrangements. For this reason some are therefore accusing the Maltese lawmakers of rushing into an uncompleted regulatory framework in order to attract business to the island while others seem to positively welcome the laws as a good start for a European wide regulation on DLT and crypto assets.

            In December 2018, Malta also initiated a declaration that was then signed by other six Members States, calling for collaboration for the promotion and implementation of DLT on a European level.

            France was one of the signatories of such declaration, and it’s worth mentioning since the French Minister for the Economy and Finance approved in September a framework for regulating ICOs and therefore protecting investors’ rights, basically giving the AMF (French Authority for Financial Market) the empowerment to give licenses to companies wanting to raise funds through Initial Coin Offerings.

            Last but not least comes Switzerland which although it is not a EU Member State, it has great degree of influence on European and national legislators when it comes to progressive regulations. At the end of December, the Swiss Federal Council released a report on DLT and the law, making a clear statement that the existing Swiss law is sufficient to regulate most matters related to DLT and Blockchain, although some adjustments have to be made. So no new laws but few amendments here and there, which will allow the integration of the specific DLT applications with existing laws in order to ensure legal certainty on certain uncovered matters. Relevant areas of Swiss law that will be amended include the transfer of rights utilizing digital registers, Anti Money Laundering rules specifically for decentralized trading platforms and bankruptcy when that proceeding involves crypto assets.

            Conclusions

            To summarize, from the approach taken during the past year, it is apparent that there is great interest in Europe to understand the potentials and to soon test implementations of distributed ledger technology. Lawmakers have also an understanding that the technology is in an infant state, it might involve risks, therefore making it complex to set specific rules or to give final answers on the alignment of certain technology applications with existing European or national laws.

            To achieve European wide results, however, acknowledgments, guidelines and reports are not enough. The setting of standards for lawmakers applicable to all Member States or even unification of laws in crucial sectors influencing directly or indirectly new technologies, will be the only solution for any innovative technology to be adopted at a European level.

            The author of this post is Alessandro Mazzi.

            Roberto Luzi Crivellini

            Áreas de práctica

            • Arbitraje
            • Contratos de distribución
            • Comercio internacional
            • Derecho Internacional Privado
            • Derecho Inmobiliario
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              Contratos de distribución comercial – Seis cuestiones clave a considerar

              30 de noviembre de 2017

              • España
              • Agencia
              • Comercio internacional
              • Contratos
              • Contratos de distribución

              Summary

              The recent post-Brexit trade deal makes no provision for jurisdiction or the enforcement of judgments.

              Therefore, the UK dropped out of the jurisdiction of the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) on 31 December 2020.

              The EU has not yet approved the UK’s accession to the Lugano Convention, but may do in the future.

              Unless the transitional provisions from the Withdrawal Agreement apply, jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments will be governed by the Hague Convention 2005 if there is an applicable exclusive jurisdiction clause

              If the Hague Convention of 2005 does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules.

              Judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

              On the first day of 2021 the UK left the EU regimes with which European lawyers are familiar. We appeared to enter “uncharted territory”. Not so. In fact, there are charts for this territory – or maps, to use a more modern word. You just need to know which maps.

              Whether you are a lawyer or a businessperson, in whatever country, you need answers to two questions. Which laws govern jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between EU member states and the UK; and how should businesses act as a result?

              What happened?

              The EU and UK reached a post-Brexit trade deal, the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (“TCA”), on Christmas Eve 2020. The provisions of the TCA became UK law as the European Union (Future Relationship) Act on 31 December 2020. The TCA made provision for judicial cooperation in criminal matters, but did not mention judicial cooperation in civil matters, or jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial proceedings.

              So where do we look for law on those matters?

              We look at the position immediately before Brexit. As every lawyer should know the Brussels (Recast) Regulation (No. 1215/2012) governed the enforcement and recognition of judgments between EU member states.

              Also, the Lugano Convention 2007 governs jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments in commercial and civil matters between EU member states and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. It operates in substantially the same way as Brussels (Recast) does between EU member states.

              The UK was party to the Convention by virtue of its EU membership. Now that the UK is not a member of the EU, the contracting parties could agree that the UK could join the Lugano Convention as an independent contracting party, and there would be little change to the position on jurisdiction and enforcement. English jurisdiction clauses would continue to be respected and English court judgments would continue to be readily enforceable throughout EU member states and EFTA countries, and vice versa.

              The problem is that the EU has not agreed to the UK joining the Lugano Convention

              The UK submitted its application to accede to the Lugano Convention in its own right on 8 April 2020. But accession requires the consent of all contracting parties including the EU. Iceland, Norway and Switzerland have indicated their support for the UK’s accession, but the EU’s position is still not yet clear and the TCA is silent on this matter.

              While the EU still may belatedly support the UK’s accession to Lugano, it does not currently apply. In any case, a three-month time-lag applies between agreement and entry into force, unless all the contracting parties agree to waive it.

              Where are we now?

              If the transitional provisions provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement as explained in my previous post do not apply, the Brussels (Recast) Regulation will not apply to jurisdiction and enforcement between the EU and UK.

              If they do not, then you first need to decide whether the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 is applicable. The Hague Convention 2005 applies between EU Member States, Mexico, Singapore and Montenegro. The Hague Convention first came into force for the UK when the EU acceded on 1 October 2015 and the UK re-acceded after Brexit in its own right with effect from 1 January 2021.

              The Hague Convention 2005 applies if:

              • The dispute falls within the scope of the Convention as provided for by Article 2 – e.g. the Convention does not apply to employment and consumer contracts or claims for personal injury;
              • There is an exclusive jurisdiction clause within the meaning of Article 3; and
              • The exclusive jurisdiction clause is entered into after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized, and proceedings are commenced after the Convention came into force for the country whose courts are seized within the meaning of Article 16.

              There is some uncertainty as to whether EU member states will treat the Hague Convention as having been in force from 1 October 2015, or only from when the UK re-accedes on 1 January 2021. The UK’s view is that the Convention will apply to the UK from 1 October 2015; the EU’s view is that it will apply to the UK from 1 January 2021. What is not in dispute is that for exclusive English jurisdiction clauses agreed on or after 1 January 2021, the contracting states will respect exclusive English jurisdiction clauses and enforce the resulting judgments.

              If the 2005 Hague Convention does not apply, then the UK and EU courts will apply their own national rules to questions of jurisdiction and enforcement. In the UK, the rules will essentially be the same as the ‘common-law’ rules currently on enforcement applied to non-EU parties, for example the United States.

              The Norwegian exception

              The UK and Norway have reached an agreement which extends and updates an old mutual enforcement treaty, the 1961 Convention for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between the UK and Norway, which will apply if the UK does not re-accede to the Lugano Convention. The practical effect of this agreement is that judgments will continue to be reciprocally enforceable between the UK and Norway from 1 January 2021.

              How should your business act now?

              The applicable legal framework for each dispute will depend on the facts of each case. You should review the dispute resolution clauses in your cross-border contracts to assess how they may be affected by Brexit and to seek specialist advice where necessary. You should also seek advice on dispute resolution provisions when entering into new cross-border contracts in 2021.

              This week the Interim Injunction Judge of the Netherlands Commercial Court ruled in summary proceedings, following a video hearing, in a case on a EUR 169 million transaction where the plaintiff argued that the final transaction had been concluded and the defendant should proceed with the deal.

              This in an – intended – transaction where the letter of intent stipulates that a EUR 30 million break fee is due when no final agreement is signed.

              In addition to ruling on this question of construction of an agreement under Dutch law, the judge also had to rule on the break fee if no agreement was concluded and whether it should be amended or reduced because of the current Coronavirus / Covid-19 crisis.

              English Language proceedings in a Dutch state court, the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC)

              The case is not just interesting because of the way contract formation is construed under Dutch law and application of concepts of force majeure, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of agreements under the concepts of reasonableness and fairness as well as mitigation of contractual penalties, but also interesting because it was ruled on by a judge of the English language chamber of the Netherlands Commercial Court (NCC).

              This new (2019) Dutch state court offers a relatively fast and cost-effective alternative for international commercial litigation, and in particular arbitration, in a neutral jurisdiction with professional judges selected for both their experience in international disputes and their command of English.

              The dispute regarding the construction of an M&A agreement under Dutch law in an international setting

              The facts are straightforward. Parties (located in New York, USA and the Netherlands) dispute whether final agreement on the EUR 169 million transaction has been reached but do agree a break fee of €30 million in case of non-signature of the final agreement was agreed. However, in addition to claiming there is no final agreement, the defendant also argues that the break fee – due when there is no final agreement – should be reduced or changed due to the coronavirus crisis.

              As to contract formation it must be noted that Dutch law allows broad leeway on how to communicate what may or may not be an offer or acceptance. The standard is what a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have understood their communications to mean.  Here, the critical fact is that the defendant did not sign the so-called “Transaction Agreement”. The letter of intent’s binary mechanism (either execute and deliver the paperwork for the Transaction Agreement by the agreed date or pay a EUR 30 million fee) may not have been an absolute requirement for contract formation (under Dutch law) but has significant evidentiary weight. In M&A practice – also under Dutch law – with which these parties are thoroughly familiar with, this sets a very high bar for  concluding a contract was agreed other than by explicit written agreement. So, parties may generally comfortably rely on what they have agreed on in writing with the assistance of their advisors.

              The communications relied on by claimant in this case did not clear the very high bar to assume that despite the mechanism of the letter of intent and the lack of a signed Transaction Agreement there still was a binding agreement. In particular attributing the other party’s advisers’ statements and/or conduct to the contracting party they represent did not work for the claimant in this case as per the verdict nothing suggested that the advisers would be handling everything, including entering into the agreement.

              Court order for actual performance of a – deemed – agreement on an M&A deal?

              The Interim Injunction Judge finds that there is not a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits so as to justify an interim measure ordering the defendant to actually perform its obligations under the disputed Transaction Agreement (payment of EUR 169 million and take the claimant’s 50% stake in an equestrian show-jumping business).

              Enforcement of the break fee despite “Coronavirus”?

              Failing the conclusion of an agreement, there was still another question to answer as the letter of intent mechanism re the break fee as such was not disputed. Should the Court enforce the full EUR 30 million fee in the current COVID-19 circumstances? Or should the fee’s effects be modified, mitigated or reduced in some way, or  the fee agreement should even be dissolved?

              Unforeseen circumstances, reasonableness and fairness

              The Interim Injunction Judge rules that the coronavirus crisis may be an unforeseen circumstance, but it is not of such a nature that, according to standards of reasonableness and fairness, the plaintiff cannot expect the break fee obligation to remain unchanged. The purpose of the break fee is to encourage parties to enter into the transaction and attribute / share risks between them. As such the fee limits the exposure of the parties. Payment of the fee is a quick way out of the obligation to pay the purchase price of EUR 169 million and the risks of keeping the target company financially afloat. If financially the coronavirus crisis turns out less disastrous than expected, the fee of EUR 30 million may seem high, but that is what the parties already considered reasonable when they waived their right to invoke the unreasonableness of the fee. The claim for payment of the EUR 30 million break fee is therefore upheld by the Interim Injunction Judge.

              Applicable law and the actual practice of it by the courts

              The relevant three articles are in this case articles 6:94, 6:248 and 6:258 of the Dutch Civil Code. They relate to the mitigation of contractual penalties, unforeseen circumstances and amendment of the agreement under the tenets of reasonableness and fairness. Under Dutch law the courts must with all three exercise caution. Contracts must generally be enforced as agreed. The parties’ autonomy is deemed paramount and the courts’ attitude is deferential. All three articles use language stating, essentially, that interference by the courts in the contract’s operation is allowed only to avoid an “unacceptable” impact, as assessed under standards of reasonableness and fairness.

              There is at this moment of course no well- established case law on COVID-19. However, commentators have provided guidance that is very helpful to think through the issues. Recently a “share the pain” approach has been advocated by a renowned law Professor, Tjittes, who focuses on preserving the parties’ contractual equilibrium in the current circumstances. This is, in the Court’s analysis, the right way to look at the agreement here. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the parties contemplated or discussed the full and exceptional impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The crisis may or may not be unprovided for.  However, the court rules in the current case there is no need to rule on this issue. Even if the crisis is unprovided for, there is no support in the record for the proposition that the crisis makes it unacceptable for the claimant to demand strict performance by the defendant. The reasons are straightforward.

              The break fee allocates risk and expresses commitment and caps exposure. The harm to the business may be substantial and structural, or it may be short-term and minimal. Either way, the best “share the pain” solution, to preserve the contractual equilibrium in the agreement, is for the defendant to pay the fee as written in the letter of intent. This allocates a defined risk to one party, and actual or potential risks to the other party. Reducing the break fee in any business downturn, the fee’s express purpose – comfort and confidence to get the deal done – would not be accomplished and be derived in precisely the circumstances in which it should be robust. As a result, the Court therefore orders to pay the full EUR 30 million fee. So the break fee stipulation works under the circumstances without mitigation because of the Corona outbreak.

              The Netherlands Commercial Court, continued

              As already indicated above, the case is interesting because the verdict has been rendered by a Dutch state court in English and the proceedings where also in English. Not because of a special privilege granted in a specific case but based on an agreement between parties with a proper choice of forum clause for this court. In addition to the benefit to of having an English forum without mandatorily relying on either arbitration or choosing an anglophone court, it also has the benefit of it being a state court with the application of the regular Dutch civil procedure law, which is well known by it’s practitioners and reduces the risk of surprises of a procedural nature.  As it is as such also a “normal” state court, there is the right to appeal and particularly effective under Dutch law access to expedited proceeding as was also the case in the example referred to above. This means a regular procedure with full application of all evidentiary rules may still follow, overturning or confirming this preliminary verdict in summary proceedings.

              Novel technology in proceedings

              Another first or at least a novel application is that all submissions were made in eNCC, a document upload procedure for the NCC. Where the introduction of electronic communication and litigation in the Dutch court system has failed spectacularly, the innovations are now all following in quick order and quite effective. As a consequence of the Coronavirus outbreak several steps have been quickly tried in practice and thereafter formally set up. At present this – finally – includes a secure email-correspondence system between attorneys and the courts.

              And, also by special order of the Court in this present case, given the current COVID-19 restrictions the matter was dealt with at a public videoconference hearing on 22 April 2020 and the case was set for judgment on 29 April 2020 and published on 30 April 2020.

              Even though it is a novel application, it is highly likely that similar arrangements will continue even after expiry of current emergency measures. In several Dutch courts videoconference hearings are applied on a voluntary basis and is expected that the arrangements will be formalized.

              Eligibility of cases for the Netherlands Commercial Court

              Of more general interest are the requirements for matters that may be submitted to NCC:

              • the Amsterdam District Court or Amsterdam Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
              • the parties have expressly agreed in writing that proceedings will be in English before the NCC (the ‘NCC agreement’)
              • the action is a civil or commercial matter within the parties’ autonomy
              • the matter concerns an international dispute.

              The NCC agreement can be recorded in a clause, either before or after the dispute arises. The Court even recommends specific wording:

              “All disputes arising out of or in connection with this agreement will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or “NCC District Court”), to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. An action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law may be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCCA”).”

              The phrase “to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts” is included in light of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. It is not mandatory to include it of course and parties may decide not to exclude the jurisdiction of other courts or make other arrangements they consider appropriate. The only requirement being that such arrangements comply with the rules of jurisdiction and contract. Please note that choice of court agreements are exclusive unless the parties have “expressly provided” or “agreed” otherwise (as per the Hague Convention and Recast Brussels I Regulation).

              Parties in a pending case before another Dutch court or chamber may request that their case be referred to NCC District Court or NCC Court of Appeal. One of the requirements is to agree on a clause that takes the case to the NCC and makes English the language of the proceedings. The NCC recommends using this language:

              We hereby agree that all disputes in connection with the case [name parties], which is currently pending at the *** District Court (case number ***), will be resolved by the Amsterdam District Court following proceedings in English before the Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court” or ”NCC District Court). Any action for interim measures, including protective measures, available under Dutch law will be brought in the NCC’s Court in Summary Proceedings (CSP) in proceedings in English. Any appeals against NCC or CSP judgments will be submitted to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal’s Chamber for International Commercial Matters (“Netherlands Commercial Court of Appeal” or “NCC Court of Appeal”).

              To request a referral, a motion must be made before the other chamber or court where the action is pending, stating the request and contesting jurisdiction (if the case is not in Amsterdam) on the basis of a choice-of-court agreement (see before).

              Additional arrangements in the proceedings before the Netherlands Commercial Court

              Before or during the proceedings, parties can also agree special arrangements in a customized NCC clause or in another appropriate manner. Such arrangements may include matters such as the following:

              • the law applicable to the substantive dispute
              • the appointment of a court reporter for preparing records of hearings and the costs of preparing those records
              • an agreement on evidence that departs from the general rules
              • the disclosure of confidential documents
              • the submission of a written witness statement prior to the witness examination
              • the manner of taking witness testimony
              • the costs of the proceedings.

              Visiting lawyers and typical course of the procedure

              All acts of process are in principle carried out by a member of the Dutch Bar. Member of the Bar in an EU or EEA Member State or Switzerland may work in accordance with Article 16e of the Advocates Act (in conjunction with a member of the Dutch Bar). Other visiting lawyers may be allowed to speak at any hearing.

              The proceedings will typically follow the below steps:

              • Submitting the initiating document by the plaintiff (summons or request as per Dutch law)
              • Assigned to three judges and a senior law clerk.
              • The defendant submits its defence statement.
              • Case management conference or motion hearing (e.g. also in respect of preliminary issues such as competence, applicable law etc.) where parties may present their arguments.
              • Judgment on motions: the court rules on the motions. Testimony, expert appointment, either at this stage or earlier or later.
              • The court may allow the parties to submit further written statements.
              • Hearing: the court interviews the parties and allows them to present their arguments. The court may enquire whether the dispute could be resolved amicably and, where appropriate, assist the parties in a settlement process. If appropriate, the court may discuss with the parties whether it would be advisable to submit part or all of the dispute to a mediator. At the end of the hearing, the court will discuss with the parties what the next steps should be.
              • Verdict: this may be a final judgment on the claims or an interim judgment ordering one or more parties to produce evidence, allowing the parties to submit written submissions on certain aspects of the case, appointing one or more experts or taking other steps.

              Continuous updates, online resources Netherlands Commercial Court

              As a final note the English language website of the Netherlands Commercial Court provides ample information on procedure and practical issues and is updated with a high frequence. Under current circumstance even at a higher pace. In particular for practitioners it’s recommended to regularly consult the website. https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/Pages/default.aspx

              This is a summary of the approved measures, which unfortunately for both tenants and landlords do not include any public aid or tax relief and just refer to a postponement in the payment of the rent.

              Premises to which they are applied

              Leased premises dedicated to activities different than residential: commercial, professional, industrial, cultural, teaching, amusement, healthcare, etc. They also apply to the lease of a whole industry (i.e. hotels, restaurants, bars, etc., which are the most usual type of businesses object of this deal).

              Types of tenants

              • Individual entrepreneurs or self-employed persons who were registered before Social Security before the declaration of the state of alarm on March 14th, 2020
              • Small and medium companies, as defined by article 257.1 of the Capital Companies Act: those who fulfil during two consecutive fiscal years these figures: assets under € 4 million, turnover under € 8 million and average staff under 50 people

              Types of landlords

              In order to benefit from these measures, the landlord should be a housing public entity or company or a big owner, considering as such the individuals or companies who own more than 10 urban properties (excluding parking places and storage rooms) or a built surface over 1.500 sqm.

              Measures approved

              The payment of the rent is postponed without interest meanwhile the state of alarm is in force, but in any case, for a maximum period of four months. Once the state of alarm is overcome, and in any case in a maximum term of four months, the postponed rents should be paid along a maximum period of two years, or the duration of the lease agreement, should it be less than two years.

              For landlords different to those mentioned above

              The tenant could apply before the landlord for the postponement in the payment of the rent (but the landlord is not obliged to accept it), and the parties can use the guarantee that the tenant should mandatorily have provided at the beginning of any lease agreement (usually equal to two month’s rent, but could be more if agreed by the parties), in full or in part, in order to use it to pay the rent. The tenant will have to provide again the guarantee within one year’s term, or less should the lease agreement have a shorter duration.

              Activities to which it is applied

              Activities which have been suspended according to the Royal Decree that declared the state of alarm, dated march, 14ht, 2020, or according to the orders issued by the authorities delegated by such Royal Decree. This should be proved through a certificated issued by the tax authorities.

              If the activity has not been directly suspended by the Royal Decree, the turnover during the month prior to the postponement should be less than 75% of the average monthly turnover during the same quarter last year. This should be proved through a responsible declaration by the tenant, and the landlord is authorised check the bookkeeping records.

              Term to apply and procedure

              The tenant should apply for these measures before the landlord within one month’s term from the publication of the Royal Decree-law, that is, from April 22nd, 2020, and the landlord (in case belongs to the groups mentioned in point c) is obliged to accept the tenant’s request, except if both parties have already agreed something different. The postponement would be applied to the following month.

              As the state of alarm was declared more than one month ago (March 14th), landlords and tenants have already been reaching some agreements, for example 50% rent reduction during the state of alarm, and 50% rent postponement during the following 6 months. Tenants who do not reach an agreement with the landlord could face an eviction procedure, however court procedures are suspended during the state of alarm. We have also seen some abusive non-payment of rent by tenants.

              When is becomes impossible to reach an agreement with the landlord, tenants have the legal remedy of claiming in Court for the application of the “rebus sic stantibus” principle, which was highly demanded during the 2008 financial crisis but very seldom applied by the Courts. This principle is aimed to re-balance the parties’ obligations when their situation had deeply changed because of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. This principle is not included in the Spanish Civil Code, but the Supreme Court has accepted its application, in a very restricted way, in some occasions.

              Resumen – ¿Qué podemos aprender en el tiempo de Covid-19 que se pueda usar en la mediación? ¿Y qué podemos aprender de la mediación para utilizarlo en esta crisis?

              Como saben, la mediación es una forma de resolver conflictos en los que las partes mantienen en sus manos la posible solución. No necesitan acudir a un tercero (juez o árbitro) que les imponga la respuesta. Las partes pueden imaginar más libremente lo que necesitan y cómo resolver sus diferencias.

              Algunos de los elementos y técnicas que usan los mediadores en una mediación también se pueden usar y aprender del tiempo actual de Covid-19. Y esta crisis también nos ayuda a comprender por qué son tan importantes en la mediación.

              La cooperación para obtener la solución es mejor que las decisiones unilaterales e impuestas

              Por lo general, tendemos a pensar que la cooperación es un signo de debilidad y recurrimos a ella solo si no podemos imponer nuestro parecer o ganar nuestro caso. Sin embargo, como en esta época del Covid-19, donde los países, los científicos y las personas debemos luchar juntos, cuando nos enfrentamos a un conflicto, la cooperación y el ir más allá de las propias posiciones nos ofrece la posibilidad de explorar soluciones que, de lo contrario, permanecerían ocultas.

              «Ahora se reconoce cada vez más que existen formas cooperativas de negociar nuestras diferencias y que incluso si no se puede encontrar una solución “ganar-ganar”, a menudo se puede llegar a un acuerdo inteligente que es mejor para ambas partes que la alternativa. […]

              Vale la pena recordar tres puntos sobre intereses compartidos. Primero, los intereses compartidos permanecen latentes en cada negociación. Puede que no sean inmediatamente obvios. Segundo, los intereses compartidos son oportunidades, no regalos del cielo. Tercero, enfatizar los intereses compartidos puede hacer que la negociación sea más fluida y amigable.» [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. «Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in»].

              Escuchar es altamente eficaz

              En el tiempo del Covid-19 tendemos a aceptar mejor una información que confirma nuestras creencias y aceptamos mejores indicaciones que están de acuerdo con nuestras preferencias y creencias. Sin embargo, también en este momento, escuchar es de una enorme importancia para comprender las causas y las soluciones.

              Un mediador siempre escuchará a las partes y les ayudará a hacer lo mismo. Escuchar los argumentos del otro, su explicación de los hechos, intereses y necesidades, las razones de sus decisiones … tiene también una importancia crucial para encontrar una solución conjunta.

              «Ya sea que usted sea un tercero neutral (facilitador profesional, amigo o gerente) o uno de los participantes, a medida que escucha todas las historias, comienza a sentir la mejor solución.» [Levine, Stewart. «Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration».]

              Una solución para mí también puede ser una solución para ti

              En la época del Covid-19 nos parece claro a todos que una solución común va a ser la única posible. Una vacuna salvará al mundo entero. En la mediación, el principal beneficio es comprender que, a diferencia de una sentencia judicial o un laudo arbitral, una solución conjunta (no impuesta) es posible y un beneficio para mí no implica un daño o una pérdida para mi oponente.

              «Un mediador trabaja para comprender la perspectiva de cada parte en el conflicto y buscar el valor en ella. En este rol, se abstiene de juzgar qué lado está bien o mal. En cambio, intenta ver el mérito en la perspectiva de cada lado.» [Shapiro, Daniel. «Building Agreement»].

              Dominamos la solución y creamos el acuerdo en un entorno seguro

              La solución a la crisis actual no solo depende de las autoridades y de los profesionales de la salud. Una gran parte de la solución se basa en la participación de todos, lavarse las manos, respetar la distancia social, mantenerse a salvo en casa evitando el contagio y el colapso de los hospitales.

              En el tribunal dejamos la decisión del conflicto en manos de un tercero –el juez, el árbitro–. En una mediación, por el contrario, la solución permanece en nuestras manos. Sabemos cuáles son nuestros intereses, creamos nuestro acuerdo. Nuestra imaginación es nuestra aliada para encontrar la solución junto con la contraparte y la asistencia y experiencia del mediador que no la impone, pero ayuda a las partes a encontrarla. Muy a menudo, lo que las partes podrían obtener en la mediación va mucho más allá de lo que un juez podría haber otorgado. Y esto en un ambiente confidencial.

              «El sabio es modesto y escaso de palabras. Cuando se ha cumplido su tarea y las cosas se han completado, todas las personas dicen: «¡Nosotros mismos lo hemos logrado!«» [Lao Tzu]

              Las emociones son importantes

              Las emociones, buenas y malas, son inevitables. En especial en períodos de incertidumbre, crisis y pérdida de control, todos nos enfrentamos a fuertes emociones. Esto es cierto en situaciones como en esta del Covid-19 y en todos los conflictos, y no solo en los personales. Los egos, las envidias, los miedos, las ansiedades … también son parte de nuestra vida cotidiana, trabajo y negocios, pero rara vez se tienen en cuenta en los tribunales cuando se resuelven los conflictos. Un mediador ayudará a tenerlos en cuenta en un entorno seguro y como parte del conflicto mismo.

              «Resolver problemas parece más fácil que hablar de emociones. El problema es que cuando los sentimientos están en el corazón de lo que está sucediendo, son el negocio en cuestión e ignorarlos es casi imposible.» [Stone, Douglas. «Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most»].

              [NOTA: Los pasajes reproducidas en los puntos 1, 2, 3 y 5 son traducciones libres del autor]

              El Real Decreto-ley 8/2020, de 17 de marzo, de medidas urgentes extraordinarias para hacer frente al impacto económico y social del COVID-19, aunque afecta y produce efectos en muchos diferentes ámbitos jurídicos, no incluye ninguna referencia a los contratos de arrendamientos de inmuebles, ni viviendas, ni locales u oficinas.

              El objeto de esta nota es analizar los efectos de la situación del Estado de Alarma respecto a aquellos contratos de arrendamiento de oficinas o locales que se hayan visto obligados a cerrar en aplicación del decreto; aquellos otros que permanezcan total o parcialmente abiertos y en funcionamiento, bien que con una actividad reducida o mínima, en principio no son objeto de las conclusiones que más adelante alcanzamos sin perjuicio de que existan casos individualizados a los que, pese a no existir un cierre total, razonable y lógicamente puedan serles de aplicación.

              No está excluido en modo alguno que ante una prolongación de la vigencia del Estado de Alarma pudiera publicarse alguna norma que afectase a los contratos de arrendamiento, pero de momento esto no ha sucedido. Si esto llegase a acaecer, al contenido de dicha norma habrá de estarse.

              En base al principio de libertad de pactos que consagra el art. 1255 del Código Civil, que permite que sean las partes firmantes del contrato las que convengan (i) qué escenarios y situaciones deben considerarse como constitutivos de supuestos de Fuerza Mayor y Caso Fortuito y (ii) cuáles deban ser las consecuencias contractuales de los tales escenarios, el primer ejercicio es comprobar si el contrato incluye una cláusula reguladora de la Fuerza mayor y sus efectos; si es así, a la tal cláusula habrá de estarse y su análisis queda al margen de esta nota.

              En ausencia de regulación expresa en el contrato, aplicarían al caso las previsiones del Código Civil y en concreto el artículo 1.105.

              COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor

              El COVID 19 es un acontecimiento que en principio reúne los requisitos que exige el Código Civil para ser calificado como supuesto de Fuerza Mayor (art. 1105 Código Civil) ya que:

              • Se trata de un hecho ajeno y no imputable al contratante deudor de la prestación u obligación.
              • Es imprevisible, o si se reputase “previsible”, es sin duda inevitable.
              • El acontecimiento en cuestión, la pandemia, debe ser causa y tener como consecuencia el incumplimiento de la obligación, es decir debe existir un nexo causal.

              Por lo tanto, cumpliéndose los tres requisitos, la primera conclusión que alcanzamos es que muy previsiblemente, los Tribunales españoles calificarán como “Fuerza Mayor” la situación causada por el COVID 19 cuando se les plantee una contienda judicial en la que tal asunto se discuta entre los litigantes. Analizaremos a continuación las consecuencias de dicha calificación.

              Consecuencias de considerar COVID 19 como supuesto de Fuerza mayor

              La generalidad de la doctrina y la jurisprudencia entienden que los efectos de calificar un supuesto como caso de Fuerza Mayor en principio son:

              • Imposibilidad total y definitiva de cumplir; liberando al deudor del cumplimiento de la obligación.
              • Imposibilidad parcial de cumplir; quedando liberado el deudor sólo en la parte que le es imposible cumplir, pero siguiendo obligado por la parte que sí puede llevar a cabo.
              • Imposibilidad temporal de cumplir; el deudor queda liberado de la responsabilidad por mora mientras persista la situación de excepcionalidad.

              Ahora bien, analicemos como afectaría dicha consideración como Fuerza Mayor de la epidemia, respecto a los contratos de arrendamiento para usos distintos a la vivienda.

              Respecto al pago de la renta

              La pregunta a la que responder es, si la calificación de la situación pandémica actual como un caso de Fuerza Mayor, libera al arrendatario (cuyo local se ha visto obligado a cerrar por orden de la autoridad gubernamental) de la obligación del pago de la renta mientras dicha obligación de cierre persista, incluyendo en el concepto “liberación” diferentes alternativas: condonación total o parcial y/o aplazamiento total o parcial.

              Nos estamos encontrando en estos días con una reacción frecuente entre algunos arrendatarios, quienes, de manera unilateral, han informado a sus arrendadores que considerando COVID 19 un supuesto de fuerza mayor y habiéndose visto obligados a cerrar el local/oficina, suspenden el pago de la renta mientras dicha situación permanezca. No resuelven el contrato, no entregan la posesión, se mantienen en ella (permaneciendo el local cerrado y no operativo) pero suspenden el pago (sin quedar claro si suspender en este caso significa auto condonarse el pago de la renta o aplazarlo para cuando desaparezca el supuesto de Fuerza Mayor).

              Argumentos en contra de la liberación

              Por más que pueda considerarse “entendible” esta actitud, desde la óptica del arrendatario, no desde la del arrendador, dicha consideración se topa con un obstáculo: la interpretación que de la Fuerza Mayor ha hecho el TS respecto a las obligaciones de pago pecuniario, según la STS (Civil) de 19 mayo de 2015:

              “No pudiendo plantearse, pues, tratándose de deudas pecuniarias, la imposibilidad subjetiva -insolvencia- ni la objetiva o formal, concluye la doctrina que no es posible imaginar que si la imposibilidad obedece a caso fortuito pudiera tener como efecto la extinción de la obligación.

              La exoneración del deudor por caso fortuito no es absoluta, tiene excepciones, conforme prevé el articulo 1.105 CC, y una de ellas, por aplicación del principio «genus nunquam perit», sería en supuestos de obligaciones de entregar cosa genérica.

              En tales circunstancias el deudor pecuniario viene obligado a cumplir la prestación principal, sin que sus sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello, pues lo adeudado no es algo individualizado que ha perecido sino algo genérico como es el dinero.”

              Conclusión: no parece que este criterio jurisprudencial permita defender que el cumplimiento de las obligaciones pecuniarias quede liberado, extinto o que su incumplimiento quede justificado en casos de Fuerza Mayor, de suerte que el deudor pecuniario, en este caso el arrendatario, en aplicación de este criterio, vendría obligado a cumplir la prestación principal sin que las sobrevenidas adversidades económicas le liberen de ello con fundamento en la Fuerza Mayor, debido a la condición genérica que tiene el dinero.

              Argumentos a favor de la liberación: el art. 1.575 del Código Civil

              Dicho lo anterior lo anterior, debe hacerse referencia a un artículo del Código Civil que, con certeza, será profusamente citado en los conflictos judiciales que se avecinan.

              El art. 1.575, tratando del arrendamiento de fincas rústicas, reconoce el derecho del arrendatario a la rebaja de la renta en caso de pérdida de más de la mitad de los frutos (salvo pacto en contrario) en “casos fortuitos, extraordinarios e imprevistos…como incendio, guerra, peste, inundación insólita, langosta, terremoto u otro igualmente desacostumbrado que los contratantes no hayan podido racionalmente prever”.

              ¿Es aplicable este precepto, previsto para arrendamientos rústicos, a los arrendamientos urbanos?

              El art. 4.1 CC permite la aplicación analógica de las normas cuando (i) estas no contemplen un supuesto específico y (ii) regulen otro semejante entre los que se aprecie “identidad de razón”.

              La STS de 15 de enero de 2019, resolviendo un conflicto de un arrendamiento de un edificio destinado a hotel, en el que el arrendatario había pretendido la rebaja de la renta al amparo de la cláusula “rebus sic stantibus” por la crisis de 2008 y había alegado a su favor la aplicación del art.1.575, estableció:

              “La argumentación de la sentencia recurrida por la que se rechaza la pretensión de rebaja del precio pactado tampoco es contraria al criterio legal que se desprende del art. 1575 CC, que es la regla que permite la rebaja de la renta en el arrendamiento de bienes productivos que no deriven de riesgos del propio negocio, exige además que la pérdida de rendimientos se origine por casos fortuitos extraordinarios e imprevistos, algo que por su misma rareza no hubiera ser podido previsto por las partes, y que la pérdida de frutos sea de más de la mitad de los frutos. En el caso no concurre ninguna de estas circunstancias. La disminución de las rentas procede de una evolución del mercado, las partes previeron la posibilidad de que en algunos ejercicios la rentabilidad del hotel no fuera positiva para la arrendataria y las pérdidas alegadas por NH en la explotación del hotel de Almería son inferiores al cincuenta por ciento, sin contar con que el resultado global del conjunto de su actividad como gestora de una cadena de hoteles es, según considera probado la Audiencia a la vista del informe de gestión consolidado, favorable”.

              El TS no admite la aplicación del 1.575 pero no por considerarlo no aplicable a arrendamientos distintos a los rústicos, sino por concluir que no se dan los requisitos para ello ya que ni era imprevisible la crisis de 2008 ni las pérdidas del arrendatario son superiores al 50%.

              Pero, esa interpretación del TS junto con el tenor del art. 4.1 CC permitirían avalar la pretensión del arrendatario que se encuentra sin ingreso alguno durante el Estado de Alarma, de exigir una rebaja de renta que se adecuara al principio de proporcionalidad.

              Respecto a la terminación anticipada a instancias del arrendatario

              Sin embargo, podemos encontrarnos con situaciones en las que el arrendatario, ante la actual situación, decida terminar anticipadamente el contrato de arrendamiento debido a la situación provocada por el COVID 19, poniendo el local a disposición del arrendador.

              Son supuestos en los que se pretende la resolución anticipada del contrato, sin respetar (i) o el plazo obligatorio (ii) o el preaviso, en ambos casos bajo la hipótesis de que estén así regulados en el contrato.

              En estos supuestos entendemos que sí puede resultar defendible que, debido a la situación de fuerza mayor provocada por el COVID 19 y en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, se exonere al arrendatario de la obligación:

              • De respetar un plazo de vigencia determinada del contrato de arrendamiento
              • De preavisar al arrendador en caso de resolución anticipada del contrato

              En ambos casos el contrato quedaría resuelto con la entrega de la posesión del local, sin perjuicio de tener que respetar las obligaciones que prevé el contrato para la terminación y entrega siempre que las mismas no se vean igualmente afectadas por la situación de Fuerza Mayor.

              Nuestra opinión es que, también en aplicación del artículo 1.105 del CC, sería defendible ante los Tribunales la tesis de que el arrendatario quedaría liberado de cualquier obligación de resarcimiento de daños al arrendador por dicha resolución anticipada o incumplimiento de la duración obligada del contrato.

              Conclusión

              En conclusión, planteado ante los Tribunales el debate sobre cómo la pandemia (que no hay duda será calificada como caso de Fuerza Mayor) afectará a las obligaciones a cargo del arrendatario que se haya visto obligado a cerrar su negocio, nuestra opinión es la siguiente:

              1. Respecto a la obligación de pago de la renta, pese al criterio contrario de la sentencia que citamos de 19 de mayo de 2015, nos parece potente y defendible la remisión al art. 1575 y a su aplicación analógica con apoyo en la STS de 15 de enero de 2019, para exigir una reducción proporcional y equitativa de la renta.
              2. Respecto a la facultad del arrendatario para resolver el contrato anticipadamente, entregando la posesión del inmueble al arrendador, exonerando al arrendatario de cumplir con sus obligaciones de preaviso o de duración obligada previstas en el contrato en cuestión, y sin tener que indemnizar al arrendador por ello, entendemos que también existe fundamento para defender judicialmente esta posición.

              Aplicación de la cláusula Rebus Sic Stantibus (RSS)

              Analizaremos a continuación si puede ser aplicable al caso que estamos analizando la cláusula RSS y con qué consecuencias.

              Requisitos de la cláusula RSS (aforismo latino que significa “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”)

              La expresión RSS, opera como una cláusula intrínseca (es decir implícita, sin necesidad de pactarse expresamente) en la relación contractual, que significa que las estipulaciones establecidas en un contrato lo son habida cuenta de las circunstancias concurrentes en el momento, esto es, “mientras las cosas permanezcan así”, de forma que cualquier alteración sustancial y no prevista de las mismas podrían dar lugar a la modificación del contenido contractual.

              La cláusula RSS no está regulada en ningún precepto en nuestro ordenamiento; es una construcción doctrinal que tradicionalmente la jurisprudencia ha admitido (ejemplos entre otros muchos STS de 30 de junio de 2014, 24 de febrero de 2015, 15 de enero de 2019, 18 de julio de 2019), con mucha cautela, solo en ciertos casos, y requiriendo las siguientes premisas

              • Que se haya producido una alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias del contrato, en el momento que el mismo se deba cumplir, en relación con las concurrentes al tiempo de su celebración. Para valorar si una incidencia puede determinar la mutación o alteración extraordinaria de las circunstancias que dotaron sentido al contrato, debemos atenernos a lo siguiente: a) Debemos contrastar el alcance de dicha mutación o alteración respecto del sentido o finalidad del contrato y de la conmutatividad o equilibrio prestacional del mismo; y b) Debe quedar excluido el «riesgo normal» inherente o derivado del contrato.
              • Que se haya producido una desproporción exorbitante, fuera de todo cálculo, entre las prestaciones de las partes contratantes, provocando un desequilibrio entre las mismas.
              • Que lo anterior se produzca como consecuencia de circunstancias radicalmente imprevisibles.
              • Que no exista otro remedio para superar la situación.

              Históricamente nuestros tribunales han sido muy reacios a aplicar RSS si bien desde la crisis económica de 2008-2012 ha tenido lugar un cierto cambio de criterio y una mayor receptividad jurisprudencial-

              Consecuencias de la aplicación de la RSS

              La doctrina establece que la aplicación de la RSS no tiene, en principio, efectos rescisorios, resolutorios o extintivos del contrato, sino únicamente efectos modificativos del mismo, encaminados a compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones; a su vez la doctrina establece que se aplica únicamente a los contratos a largo plazo o de tracto sucesivo y de ejecución diferida.

              En aplicación de la buena fe, la reacción ante un evento de caso fortuito, fuerza mayor o en general un evento que genera una desproporción entre las partes, como la que regula la institución RSS, debe ser la modificación del contrato para reequilibrar las obligaciones entre las partes, y solo en caso de imposibilidad material de cumplimiento, la resolución de la obligación, en ambos casos sin indemnización por incumplimiento.

              Por ello, en el ámbito de los contratos de arrendamiento y en el caso de cierre de los locales por mandato imperativo, entendemos que la institución RSS podrá ser:

              • alegada por los arrendatarios para solicitar o instar de los arrendadores modificaciones a las prestaciones económicas del contrato y
              • estimada por los jueces, cuando estos supuestos se debatan ante los Tribunales, a la hora de aceptar como equitativas y legítimas las tales novaciones contractuales con el fin de compensar el desequilibrio de las prestaciones generado por los efectos del COVID 19.

              En suma, la cláusula RSS puede ser una herramienta para el arrendatario de un local que ha tenido que cerrar durante el Estado de Alarma, a la hora de negociar con el arrendador una modificación del contrato, intentando aplazar la renta mientras se prolongue el Estado de Alarma o negociando un descuento de esta.

              Debe recordarse:

              • Que la RSS es de ineludible aplicación casuística, no caben generalizaciones y será necesario tener en cuenta el efecto que provoque el COVID 19 en cada relación contractual concreta (STS de 30 de junio de 2014 y 24 de febrero de 2015) y el efectivo desequilibrio de las prestaciones que haya producido, y
              • Que, como hemos dicho, los Tribunales son en general reacios a la aplicación de esta cláusula a la que solo acuden en caso de falta de cualquier otra herramienta jurídica y en situaciones en que el mantenimiento del status quo contractual revele una manifiesta “injusticia” y un patente y rotundo desequilibrio entre las prestaciones de las partes.

              ¿Significa lo anterior que el arrendatario podrá imponer al arrendador una modificación de las condiciones económicas del contrato al amparo de RSS (aplazamiento o condonación total o parcial)?

              No lo creemos de manera tan rotunda; lo que si pensamos es que la aplicación de esta institución RSS debería,

              • Justificar una razonable solicitud del arrendatario de novar temporalmente las condiciones del contrato (aplazamiento o condonación, total o parcial) que al arrendador debe razonablemente atender.
              • En caso de negativa irrazonable del arrendador, y documentando cuanto más profusamente pueda el arrendatario su solicitud y las eventuales negociaciones o negativa a mantenerlas por la contra parte, permitirle fundamentar una suspensión del pago de la renta, total o parcial, durante la pendencia del Estado de Alarma con ánimo, no de extinción de la obligación, pero sí de su aplazamiento.

              Habremos de esperar a la reacción de los tribunales cuando lleguen a su conocimiento estos conflictos, como sin duda ocurrirá; pero si nos atrevemos a adelantar que es bastante posible que la tendencia judicial sea la de conceder amparo al arrendatario con apoyo en la cláusula RSS y el principio de la preservación del negocio, a la hora de dar validez a determinados efectos modificativos respecto a las obligaciones pecuniarias a cargo del arrendatario (condonación total o parcial del pago de la renta durante la crisis pandémica, aplazamiento, aplazamiento parcial).

              En todo caso será esencial acreditar que la conducta del contratante deudor que busca amparo en la cláusula RSS para novar el contrato se ha ajustado estrictamente al principio de buena fe (STS 30 de abril de 2015).

              También será importante analizar caso por caso por qué se justifica el desplazamiento del riesgo derivado del “suceso excepcional e imprevisto” de un contratante al otro (STS de 15 de enero de 2015) y bien podría defenderse (STS de 18 de julio de 2019) que deben ambos contratantes repartirse y asumir entre los dos las consecuencias.

              Las decisiones judiciales variarán en cada caso concreto que habrá de ser objeto de estudio individualizado.

              Conclusiones y Recomendaciones

              En suma, parece que al arrendatario contaría con dos instrumentos para la pretensión de suspender (signifique esto condonar o aplazar) el pago de las rentas, la cláusula RSS y el principio de Fuerza Mayor.

              A nuestro modo de ver, la reposición del equilibrio contractual alterado por el suceso excepcional puede consistir o bien en una prórroga de los plazos de pago del arrendamiento o bien en la aplicación de una condonación total o parcial de la obligación de pago de rentas mientras dure el Estado de Alarma, pero entendemos que será defendible que el retraso en el pago del arrendamiento no podrá dar lugar ni a la resolución del contrato al amparo del art. 1124 Cc ni a la exigencia de daños y perjuicios art. 1105 Cc, en consecuencia, no facultará al arrendador a instar el desahucio.

              Por ello los pasos a seguir en cada caso serían:

              • Realizar un examen del contrato para ver si se regulan los casos de fuerza mayor y caso fortuito y si la situación actual concuerda con lo regulado en el contrato.
              • En caso de que no se estipule nada en el contrato, y habiéndose cerrado el local u oficina, advertir de ello a la otra parte e intentar negociar una novación del contrato de arrendamiento solicitando: (i) condonación total de la renta durante el Estado de Alarma; (ii) condonación parcial compartiendo ambas partes el esfuerzo en proporción por convenir; y (iii) aplazamiento del pago de la renta hasta que se pueda reabrir el local u oficina con un plan de pagos de la deuda aplazada.
              • Si no es posible llegar a un acuerdo, es conveniente dejar constancia de que se ha actuado con buena fe intentando llegar a una solución negociada y en el extremo (desde la óptica del arrendatario) anunciar, sin esperar a recibir una comunicación o reclamación del Arrendador, la suspensión del pago de las rentas justificando la misma en el Estado de Alarma hasta la finalización del mismo y la consecuente reapertura del local/oficina.

              QUICK SUMMARY: Contract negotiations do not take place in a legal vacuum. A party who negotiates contrary to the principle of good faith and then breaks off negotiations may become liable to the other party. However, the requirements for such liability are high and the enforcement of damage claims is cumbersome. At the end of the post I will share some practical tips for contract negotiations in Switzerland.

              Under Swiss law, the principle of freedom of contract is of fundamental importance. It follows from the freedom of contract that, in principle, everyone is free to enter into contract negotiations and to terminate them again without incurring any liability. A termination of contract negotiations does not have to be justified either.

              However, the freedom of contract is limited by the obligation to act in good faith (cf. article 2 para. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code), which is of equal fundamental importance. From the moment when parties enter into contract negotiations, they are in a special legal relationship with each other. That pre-contractual relationship involves certain reciprocal obligations. In particular, the parties must negotiate in a serious manner and in accordance with their actual intentions.

              Negotiating parties must not stir up the hope of the other party, contrary to their actual intentions, that a contract will actually be concluded. Put differently, a party’s willingness to conclude a contract must not be expressed more strongly than it actually is. If a party realizes that the other party wrongly beliefs that a contract would certainly be concluded, such illusion should be dispelled in due course.

              A negotiating party that terminates contract negotiations in violation of these principles, whether maliciously or negligently, may become liable to the other party based on the culpa in contrahendo doctrine. However, such liability exists in exceptional cases only.

              • The fact that contract negotiations took a long time is not sufficient for incurring such liability. The duration of negotiations is, in itself, not decisive.
              • It is not possible to derive liability from pre-existing contractual relationships between the negotiation parties, as for example in cases where parties negotiate a «mere» prolongation of an existing agreement. The decisive factor is not whether parties were already contractually bound before, but only whether the party that terminated the contract negotiations made the other party believe that a new agreement would certainly be concluded.
              • It is not decisive whether the party who terminates contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made costly investments in view of the prospective contract. In principle, anyone who makes investments already prior to the actual conclusion of a contract does so at its own risk. Even where a party to contract negotiations knows that the other party has already made (substantial) investments in the prospective agreement, a termination of the contract negotiations will, in itself, not be considered as an act of bad faith.

              What does a liability for breaking off negotiations include?

              If a party violates the aforementioned pre-contractual obligations, the other party may be entitled to compensation for the so-called negative interest. This means that the other party must be put in the position it would have been if the negotiations had not taken place. Damages may include, e.g., expenses in connection with the negotiation of the contract (travel costs, legal fees etc.), but also a loss of income in cases where a party was not able to do business with third parties because of the contract negotiations. However, the other party has no right to be treated as if the contract had been concluded (so-called positive interest).

              Having said that, it must be kept in mind that the requirements set by Swiss court for the substantiation of damages are rather high, so that the enforcement of a liability for breaking off negotiations will often be a cumbersome process. Therefore pursuing damage claims with relatively low amounts in dispute might often require a disproportionate effort.

              Practical tips – Do’s and don’ts when negotiating contracts

              • Do not overstate your willingness to conclude a contract. Be frank with your counterparty. Make it clear from the beginning of the negotiations what clauses are important to you.
              • Do not tell the other party that you are willing to sign a contract, if you still have doubts or you are even unwilling to do so. Confirm that you will sign only if you are convinced to do so.
              • Do not allow someone else (e.g., a representative, employee, branch office etc.) to negotiate on your behalf if you are not willing to enter into an agreement anyway. Keep an eye on how the negotiations are going on and intervene if necessary.
              • Do not make costly investments before a legally binding agreement is concluded. If, for time or other reasons, such investments are necessary already before the conclusion of an agreement, insist on the conclusion of an interim contract governing such investments for the event that the envisaged agreement is not concluded finally.

              In 2020, an important revision of the Swiss statute of limitations enters into force. The new law provides for longer limitation periods in cases of personal injury and extends the relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law from one to three years.

              Background of the revision

              In June 2018, the Swiss parliament adopted an amendment to the Swiss Code of Obligations (“CO”) pertaining to a revision of the statute of limitations. In November 2018, the Swiss government decided that the revised statute of limitations shall enter into force on 1 January 2020.

              The revision was significantly influenced by asbestos cases. Under the current law, damage claims of asbestos victims were time-barred in some cases even before asbestos-related diseases could be diagnosed. In March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held in Howald Moor and others v. Switzerland that the Swiss statute of limitations amounts in such cases to a violation of article 6 paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right of access to a court).

              Having said that, the revision does not only concern cases of personal injury, but also includes numerous other important changes as described in the following.

              Key changes regarding limitation periods

              A. Tort law

              In tort law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

              With the exception of cases of personal injury, the absolute limitation period remains ten years as from the date when the conduct that caused the damages occurred or ended (revised Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

              In cases of personal injury, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage and of the identity of the person liable. Currently the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

              The new absolute limitation period in cases of personal injury amounts to twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 60 para. 1bis CO). Under the current law, there was no special absolute limitation period for cases of personal injury, so that the ordinary 10-year period applied (Art. 60 para. 1 CO).

              If conduct, which gives rise to liability under tort law, is also punishable under criminal law, the (longer) limitation period under criminal law remains applicable (cf. Art. 97 of the Swiss Criminal Code). However, where a first-instance criminal judgment is rendered before the conduct is time-barred under criminal law, the limitation periods ends not earlier than three years as from that criminal judgment (revised Art. 60 para. 2 CO). The current law does not provide for such an additional three-year limitation period.

              B. Unjust enrichment law

              In unjust enrichment law, the new relative limitation period amounts to three years as from the date on which the injured party knows about the claim (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO). Under the current law, the relative limitation period amounts to one year only.

              The absolute limitation period is not affected by the revision and remains ten years after the date on which the claim arises (revised Art. 67 para. 1 CO).

              C. Contract law

              With regard to contractual claims, the ordinary limitation period remains ten years from the due date (Art. 127 CO). Furthermore, the shorter limitation period of five years from the due date applicable to (amongst others) claims for rent, interest on capital and other periodic payments, (most) claims out of employment relationships etc. remains unchanged too (Art. 128 CO).

              However, in cases of personal injury, the revised statute of limitations introduces a new relative limitation period of three years from the date on which the injured party became aware of the damage, as well as a new absolute limitation period of twenty years after the date when the conduct which caused the damages occurred or ended (new Art. 128a CO). The current law does not provide for distinct relative and absolute limitation periods for contractual claims in cases of personal injury. Instead, the ordinary ten-year limitation period (Art. 127 CO) usually applied to such cases.

              D. Summary

              In summary, the most important elements of the revised statute of limitations are the longer (trebled) relative limitation periods in tort and unjust enrichment law (i.e., three years instead of one year) and the new special rules for cases of personal injury, which now benefit from a 20-year absolute limitation period.

              Transitional provisions / application of the revised statute of limitations to pre-existing claims

              The longer limitation periods under the revised CO apply to any claims that are not yet time-barred when the revision enters into force (i.e., on 1 January 2020; revised Art. 49 para. 1, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). In other words, the limitation periods of any claims that do not become time-barred until 31 December 2019 at the latest will be prolonged. This is of particular relevance with regard to claims based on tort and unjust enrichment; the short one-year relative limitation periods under the current law will be extended by another two years.

              In contrast, the current law remains applicable in case the revised statute of limitations provides for shorter limitation periods (revised Art. 49 para. 2, Final Title of the Swiss Civil Code). This concerns, in particular, contractual claims in cases of personal injury. The new three-year relative limitation period under the revised law might not apply to such claims, as the current statute of limitations does not provide for a relative limitation period at all.

              Further changes brought by the revision

              In addition to the changes of the limitation periods set out above, the revision of the statute of limitations contains numerous further modifications. Some of them are listed in the following:

              1. Limitation periods do not commence or are suspended in the event that a claim cannot be asserted for objective reasons before any court worldwide (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 6 CO). The current law provides for such non-commencement or suspension only if the claim cannot be brought before a Swiss court.
              2. Parties to a dispute may agree in writing that limitation periods shall be suspended during settlement discussions, mediation proceedings or other out-of-court settlement proceedings (revised Art. 134 para. 1 no. 8 CO).
              3. Once a limitation period has commenced to run, waivers of statute of limitation defenses are admissible, but must not exceed ten years (revised Art. 141 para. 1 CO). Any such waivers must be in writing (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
              4. In general terms and conditions (“GTC”), statute of limitation defenses may be waived by the party who makes use of the GTCs only. In contrast, a waiver by the party on whom the GTCs are imposed (e.g., consumers) is ineffective (new Art. 141 para. 1bis CO).
              5. The limitation period for an actio pauliana under the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) is extended to from currently two years to three years after service of a loss certificate, the opening of bankruptcy proceedings or the confirmation of a composition agreement with an assignment of assets (whichever is applicable; revised Art. 292 DEBA).

              If 2017 was the year of Initial Coin Offerings, 2018 was the year of Blockchain awareness and testing all over the world. From ICO focused guidelines and regulations respectively aimed to alarm and protect investors, we have seen the shift, especially in Europe, to distributed ledger technology (“DLT”) focused guidelines and regulations aimed at protecting citizens on one hand and promote DLT implementations on the other.

              Indeed, European Union Member States and the European Parliament started looking deeper into the technology by, for instance, calling for consultations with professionals in order to understand DLT’s potentials for real-world implementations and possible risks.

              In this article I am aiming to give a brief snapshot of firstly what are the most notable European initiatives and moves towards promoting Blockchain implementation and secondly current challenges faced by European law makers when dealing with the regulation of distributed ledger technologies.

              Europe

              Let’s start from the European Blockchain Partnership (“EBP”), a statement made by 25 EU Member States acknowledging the importance of distributed ledger technology for society, in particular when it comes to interoperability, cyber security and efficiency of digital public services. The Partnership is not only an acknowledgement, it is also a commitment from all signatory states to collaborate to build what they envision will be a distributed ledger infrastructure for the delivering of cross-border public services.

              Witness of the trust given to the technology is My Health My Data, a EU-backed project that uses DLT to enable patients to efficiently control their digitally recorded health data while securing it from the threat of data breaches. Benefits the EU saw in DLT on this specific project are safety, efficiency but most notably the opportunity that DLT offers data subject to have finally control over their own data, without the need for intermediaries.

              Another important initiative proving European interests in testing DLT technologies is the Horizon Prize on “Blockchains for Social Good”, a 5 million Euros worth challenge open to innovators and tech companies to develop scalable, efficient and high-impact decentralized solutions to social innovation challenges.

              Moving forward, in December last year, I had the honor to be part of the “ Workshop on Blockchains & Smart Contracts Legal and Regulatory Framework” in Paris, an initiative supported by the EU Blockchain Observatory and Forum (“EUBOF”), a pilot project initiated by the European Parliament. Earlier last year other three workshops were held, the aim of each was to collect knowledge on specific topics from an audience of leading DLT legal and technical professionals. With the knowledge collected, the EUBOF followed up with reports of what was discussed during the workshop and suggest a way forward.

              Although not binding, these reports give a reasonably clear guideline to the industry on how existing laws at a European level apply to the technology, or at least should be interpreted, and highlight areas where new regulation is definitely needed. As an example let’s look at the Report on Blockchain & GDPR. If you missed it, the GDPR is the Regulation that protects Europeans personal data and it’s applicable to all companies globally, which are processing data from European citizens. The “right to erasure” embedded in the GDPR, doesn’t allow personal data to be stored on an immutable database, the data subject has to be able to erase data anytime when shared with a service provider and stored somewhere on a database. In the case of Blockchain, the consensus on personal data having to be stored off-chain is therefore unanimous. Storing personal data off-chain and leaving an hash to that data on-chain, is a viable solution if certain precautions are taken in order to avoid the risks of reversibility or linkability of such hash to the personal data stored off-chain, therefore making the hash on-chain personally identifiable information.

              However, not all European laws apply to Member States, therefore making it hard to give a EU-wide answer to most DLT compliance challenges in Europe. Member States freedom to legislate is indeed only limited/influenced by two main instruments, Regulations, which are automatically enforceable in each Member State and Directives binding Member States to legislate on specific topics according to a set of specific rules.

              Diverging national laws have a great effect on multiple aspects of innovative technologies. Let’s look for instance at the validity of “smart contracts”. When discussing the legal power of automatically enforceable digital contracts, the lack of a European wide legislation on contracts makes it impossible to find an answer applicable to all Member States. For instance, is “offer and acceptance” enough to constitute a contract? What is considered a valid “acceptance”? What is an “obligation”? “Can a digital asset be the object of a legally binding agreement”?

              If we try to give a EU-wide answer to the questions such as smart contract validity and enforceability it is apparently not possible since we will need to consider 28 different answers. I, therefore, believe that the future of innovation in Europe will highly depend on the unification of laws.

              An example of a unified law that has great benefits on innovation (including DLT) is the Electronic Identification and Trust Services (eIDAS) Regulation, which governs electronic identification including electronic signatures.

              The race to regulating DLT in Europe

              Let’s now look briefly at a couple of Member States legislations, specifically on Blockchain and cryptocurrencies last year.

              EU Member States have been quite creative I would say in regulating the new technology. Let’s start from Malta, which saw a surprising increase of important projects and companies, such as Binance, landing on the beautiful Mediterranean Island thanks to its favorable (or at least felt as such) legislations on DLT. The “Blockchain Island” passed three laws in early July to regulate and supervise Blockchain projects including ICOs, crypto exchanges and DLT, specifically: The Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Act regulation that aims at recognizing different technology arrangements such as DAOs, smart contracts and in future probably AI machines; The Virtual Financial Assets Act for ICOs and crypto exchanges; The Malta Digital Innovation Authority establishing a new supervisory authority.

              Some think the Maltese legislation lacks a comprehensive framework, one that for instance, gives legal personality to Innovative Technology Arrangements. For this reason some are therefore accusing the Maltese lawmakers of rushing into an uncompleted regulatory framework in order to attract business to the island while others seem to positively welcome the laws as a good start for a European wide regulation on DLT and crypto assets.

              In December 2018, Malta also initiated a declaration that was then signed by other six Members States, calling for collaboration for the promotion and implementation of DLT on a European level.

              France was one of the signatories of such declaration, and it’s worth mentioning since the French Minister for the Economy and Finance approved in September a framework for regulating ICOs and therefore protecting investors’ rights, basically giving the AMF (French Authority for Financial Market) the empowerment to give licenses to companies wanting to raise funds through Initial Coin Offerings.

              Last but not least comes Switzerland which although it is not a EU Member State, it has great degree of influence on European and national legislators when it comes to progressive regulations. At the end of December, the Swiss Federal Council released a report on DLT and the law, making a clear statement that the existing Swiss law is sufficient to regulate most matters related to DLT and Blockchain, although some adjustments have to be made. So no new laws but few amendments here and there, which will allow the integration of the specific DLT applications with existing laws in order to ensure legal certainty on certain uncovered matters. Relevant areas of Swiss law that will be amended include the transfer of rights utilizing digital registers, Anti Money Laundering rules specifically for decentralized trading platforms and bankruptcy when that proceeding involves crypto assets.

              Conclusions

              To summarize, from the approach taken during the past year, it is apparent that there is great interest in Europe to understand the potentials and to soon test implementations of distributed ledger technology. Lawmakers have also an understanding that the technology is in an infant state, it might involve risks, therefore making it complex to set specific rules or to give final answers on the alignment of certain technology applications with existing European or national laws.

              To achieve European wide results, however, acknowledgments, guidelines and reports are not enough. The setting of standards for lawmakers applicable to all Member States or even unification of laws in crucial sectors influencing directly or indirectly new technologies, will be the only solution for any innovative technology to be adopted at a European level.

              The author of this post is Alessandro Mazzi.

              Ignacio Alonso

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