Boycot of Israeli products and business –  Risk to be sued for damages

1 de Novembro, 2017

  • Israelita
  • Comércio internacional
  • Contencioso

It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

“…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

“…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

“Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

Conclusions

If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

With the recent sentence n° 16601/2017 the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di Cassazione”) – changing its jurisprudence – opened to the possibility of recognizing in Italy foreign judgments containing punitive damages. In this post we will see what these punitive damages are about, under which conditions they will be recognized and enforced in Italy and, above all, which countermeasures may be implemented to deal with these new risks.

Punitive damages are a monetary compensation – typical of common law legal systems – awarded to an injured party that goes beyond what is necessary to compensate the individual for losses. Normally punitive damages are imposed when the person who caused the damage acted with wilful misconduct and gross negligence.

With punitive damages, other than the compensatory function, the reimbursement of damages assumes also a sanctioning purpose, typical of criminal law, also acting like a deterrent towards other potential lawbreakers.

In the legal systems that provide for punitive damages, the recognition and the quantification of the highest compensation, most of the time, are delegated to the Judge.

In the United States of America punitive damages are a settled principle of common law, but ruled in different ways for each State. However, generally, they are applied when the conduct of person who caused the damage was intentionally directed to cause damage or is put in place without regard to the protection and safety standards. Usually they cannot be awarded for breach of contract, unless it also leads to an independent tort.

Historically, in Italy, punitive damages generally were not recognized, because the sanctioning purpose is not consistent with the civil law principles, anchored to the concept that the reimbursement of the damage is a simple restoration of financial heritage of the damaged person.

Therefore, the recognition of punitive damage established by a foreign judgment was normally denied due to a violation of the public policy (“ordre public”), so those judgments did not have access to the Italian legal system.

The sentence n° 16601/2017 of the 5 July 2017 of the Joint Sessions of Italian Supreme Court (“Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione”) however, changed the cards on the table. In this particular case, the plaintiff applied to the Venice Court of Appeal for the recognition (pursuant to art. 64, law 218/1995) of three judgments of District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida that, accepting a guarantee call submitted by an American retailer of helmets against the Italian company, condemned this latter to pay 1.436.136,87 USD (in addition to legal expenses and interests) for the damages caused by a defect in the helmet used in occasion of the accident.

The Venice Court of Appeal recognized the foreign judgment, considering the abovementioned sum merely as compensation for damages and not as punitive damages. This decision was challenged by the unsuccessful Italian party before the Italian Supreme Court, arguing the violation of the Italian ordre public by the US judgment, on the basis of a consolidated juridical opinion until that day.

The Supreme Court of Cassation confirmed the Venice Court assessment, considering the sum non-punitive and recognized the US judgment in Italy.

The Supreme Court, though, took the opportunity to address the question of the admissibility of punitive damages in Italy, changing the previous orientation (see Cass. 1781/2012).

According to the Court, the concept of civil liability as mere compensation of the damage suffered is to be considered obsolete, given the evolution of this institute through national and European legislation and case-law that introduced civil remedies intended to punish the wrongdoer. As a matter of fact, in our system, it’s possible to find several cases of damages with sanctioning function: in the matter of libel by press (art. 12 L. 47/48), copyright (art. 158 L. 633/41), industrial property (art. 125 D. Lgs. 30/2005), abuse of process (art. 96 comma 3 c.p.c. e art. 26 comma 2 c.p.a.), labour law (art. 18, comma 14), family law (art. 709-ter c.p.c.) and others.

The Supreme Court has, therefore, stated the following principle: “Under Italian law, civil liability is aimed not only to compensate for losses incurred by the injured party, but also to reform the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar. Therefore, the US legal institute of punitive damages is not incompatible with the Italian legal system”.

The important consequence is that this decision opens the door to possible recognition of foreign sentences that condemn a party to pay a sum higher than the amount sufficient to compensate the suffered injury as a result of the damage.

To that end, however, the Supreme Court has set certain conditions so that foreign sentences have validity, that is to say that the decision is made in foreign law system on a normative basis that:

  1. Clearly establish the cases in which it is possible to convict a party to pay punitive damages; and
  2. The predictability of it; and
  3. Establish quantitative limits.

It has to be clarified that the sentence has not modified the Italian system of civil liability. In other words, the sentence will not allow Italian Judges to establish punitive damages under Italian law.

As for foreign court decisions, it will be now possible to obtain a compensation for punitive damages through the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, as long as they respect the above requirements.

Extending our view beyond the Italian borders, we notice that punitive damages are alien to the legal tradition of most of  European States: there is the possibility, though, that other Courts of continental Europe might follow the decision of the Italian Supreme Court and recognize foreign judgments which grant punitive damages.

                 

How to prevent this new risk

There are several measures which businessmen can adopt to mitigate this new risk: firstly the adoption of contractual clauses that exclude this kind of damages or establish a cap on the amount of the contractual damages which can be claimed, for example by limiting the value of damages at the price of the products or services provided.

Furthermore, it’s very important to have an overall knowledge of the legislation and case law of the markets in which the enterprise operates, even indirectly (for example: with the commercial distribution of products) in order to choose consciously the applicable law to the contract and the dispute resolution methods (for example: establishing the jurisdiction in a country that does not provide for punitive damages).

Finally, this type of liability and risk may also be covered by a product liability insurance.

How to make sure that your claim can be enforced in the long run? A creditor may freeze assets that a debtor holds in Switzerland if certain conditions are fulfilled. In practice, there are two situations in which one might consider an attachment of assets: the first is where a creditor has a claim against a debtor without domicile in Switzerland; the second is where a creditor holds an enforceable judgment or award.

It is beyond doubt that the Swiss financial sector continues to play a dominant role in the financial world of today despite the regulatory pressure that it faces. The Swiss jurisdiction, therefore, is relevant for creditors who wish to enforce claims against a debtor who holds bank accounts or other assets in Switzerland. Even though practice shows that it is predominantly bank accounts that are being attached, other assets such as real estate, art works or claims against third parties are equally capable of being attached.

Upon application, the Swiss court at the seat of the bank or at the place where the assets are located will grant an ex parte freezing order to a creditor against a debtor with assets in Switzerland, if the applying creditor demonstrates on a prima facie basis that the following three prerequisites of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) are met:

  • The creditor seeking a freezing order has a mature and unsecured claim;
  • The debtor’s assets are located in Switzerland;
  • A legal ground for a freezing order exists.

As already pointed out, the most relevant grounds for a freezing order are:

  • The debtor is not resident in Switzerland and the claim itself has sufficient connection with Switzerland or is based on an acknowledgement of debt signed by the debtor (“attachment against a non-Swiss resident”);
  • The creditor has an enforceable court decision or arbitral award against the debtor (“enforceable title”).

Attachment against a non-Swiss resident: The mere fact that the assets are located in Switzerland will not suffice to establish a “sufficient connection with Switzerland” in the sense of the DEBA. The requirement of “sufficient connection with Switzerland” very much depends on the specific facts of the case which the Swiss court will review on a case-by-case basis. Swiss courts have confirmed that there was a sufficient connection in cases where the underlying contract was signed or fulfilled in Switzerland, where the underlying contract is governed by Swiss law, where the creditor lives in Switzerland or where the creditor’s claim is linked to a commercial activity in Switzerland.

Enforceable title: In order to rely on the second ground for a freezing order the creditor needs to have an enforceable title. The DEBA makes no distinction between domestic and foreign court decisions or arbitral awards. Provided that they are enforceable (either according to the Lugano Convention, the Swiss Private International Law Act or – in the case of a non-Swiss arbitral award – the New York Convention), all judgments and awards may serve as a ground for an attachment of Swiss assets.

The Swiss court will request the creditor to provide prima facie evidence on the prerequisites of an attachment as outlined above. Because the attachment itself will be granted ex parte, it will, in many instances, take the debtor by surprise. Thanks to this surprise effect and the nature of the attachment, i.e. the fact that it will prevent the debtor from further disposing of the attached assets, the attachment has a great potential for helping the creditor to secure and ultimately satisfy its claim.

[Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of “sufficient justification” and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

How much does it tell us?

Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

  • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
  • a frustration or a force majeure.

There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

  • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
  • the good faith of the parties;
  • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
  • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
  • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

  • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
  • sudden;
  • unpredictable.

To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

  • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
  • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
  • a constant increase in turnover;
  • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
  • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
  • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
  • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
  • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

  • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
  • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
  • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

Compensation for a damage

The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

International law

The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

  • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
  • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

When negotiating contracts, parties typically focus on the key commercial terms of their agreement. The clauses that govern the term of the agreement (i.e., the duration, or how long the contract remains in force), the renewal of the term, and how the agreement can be terminated, however, merit careful consideration.

Under Québec law, contracts typically have terms that are either fixed (e.g., 5 years, 10 years etc.), or are for an indeterminate period of time (i.e., no specific term is provided for). Contracts with fixed terms may also contain automatic renewal clauses. In the case of an indeterminate term contract, a party to the contract can generally, absent specific terms or a notice provision to the contrary in the contract, terminate it, without cause, by providing reasonable notice of termination (what constitutes “reasonable notice” depends on a number of factors and is decided on the facts of each case). A third category of contracts are contracts with a potentially perpetual term. An example of a potentially perpetual contract is a contract that contains a renewal clause that is entirely under the control of only one of the parties who can, effectively, unilaterally decide whether the contract will go on indefinitely. In such a contract, the other contracting party does not have a right to terminate the contract by providing reasonable notice of termination. The validity of perpetual term contracts was precisely the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada in its July 28, 2017 decision in Uniprix inc. v. Gestion Gosselin et Bérubé inc. https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16746/index.do (“Uniprix“).

In Uniprix, the pharmacy chain entered into an affiliation agreement with various members of a pharmacists’ group pursuant to which said members operated a pharmacy under the Uniprix banner. The term of the contract was for a fixed term of 5 years and the renewal clause allowed members to provide a notice within a certain period of time, failing which the contract would automatically be renewed for an additional 5 years:

Regardless of any written or verbal provisions to the contrary, this agreement shall commence on the day of its signing and shall remain in effect for a period of sixty (60) months, or for a period equal to the term of the lease for the premises where the pharmacy is located. [The member pharmacist] shall, six (6) months before the expiration of the agreement, notify [Uniprix] of its intention to leave [Uniprix] or to renew the agreement; 

Should [the member pharmacist] fail to send the prescribed notice by registered mail, the agreement shall be deemed to have been renewed in accordance with the terms and conditions then in effect, as prescribed by the board of directors, except with regard to the fee.[Translation]

The Uniprix agreement did not provide any say to Uniprix in connection with its renewal and there were no limits on the number of times that the members could renew the agreement. As such, the contract could remain in force perpetually based entirely on the members’ decision. After the contract had been renewed twice, Uniprix sent the members a notice of non-renewal and purported to terminate the agreement. The members contested Uniprix’s decision based on the fact that under the affiliation agreement, the renewal clause could only be exercised by the members and, unless the members gave notice to the contrary, the contract was automatically renewed. Uniprix argued that the effect of the members’ position, which would bind the parties in perpetuity, was contrary to public order (i.e., it violated a fundamental societal value) and unlawful and, as such, the term of the agreement should be considered to be for an indeterminate period, which would allow either party to terminate it on reasonable notice.

In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held (in upholding the decisions of the majority of the Québec Court of Appeal and of the Superior Court of Québec) that there was nothing under Québec law that prohibited a contract of affiliation from having a perpetual term and that this did not, in and of itself and in the context of corporate and commercial agreements, offend any fundamental societal values. The Court’s holding would equally apply to many other types of contracts such as, for example, franchise agreements and licensing agreements. The Court held, accordingly, that the affiliation agreement was not for an indeterminate term and, therefore, could be not be terminated by Uniprix by providing reasonable notice.

With respect to the holding in Uniprix , the following points should be kept in mind:

  1. The Supreme Court of Canada expressly noted that in certain circumstances, such as where an individual’sperson and freedom are affected (e.g., a contract of employment), a perpetual obligation could offend public order.
  2. In certain specific cases set out in the Civil Code of Québec, the legislator has provided maximum terms for certain types of contracts (e.g., a commercial lease cannot exceed 100 years, the duration of payment of an annuity is 100 years).
  3. In the case of a contract of adhesion (which is generally defined as a contract where one of the parties was unable to negotiate its terms), the adhering or vulnerable party can argue that a perpetual term is abusive and, therefore, null.
  4. The Court’s decision in Uniprixapplied to Uniprix’s ability to terminate the contract without cause. A party always retains the right to terminate a contract for cause. What constitutes “cause” is decided on a case by case basis and may also be governed by the terms of the contract.

When drafting contracts, parties are generally, subject to limitations imposed by the legislator or public order, permitted to structure their relationship as they see fit. Parties should carefully consider whether they truly intend the duration of their agreement to be entirely under the control of one of the parties to the agreement for an indefinite period of time because, as is made clear in Uniprix, perpetual commercial contracts are enforceable under Québec law.

The author of this post is David Stolow.

Benjamin Leventhal

Áreas de prática

  • Arbitragem
  • Empresa
  • Contencioso
Contato Benjamin

Scrivi a Benjamin





    Read the privacy policy of Legalmondo.
    This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

    A US Court Judgment Enforced in China – What Does it Mean for You?

    9 de Outubro, 2017

    • China
    • EUA
    • Arbitragem
    • Contencioso

    It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

    At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

    One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

    Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

    No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

    The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

    Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

    The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

    Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

    The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

    Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

    The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

    In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

    From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

    What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

    Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

    The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

    With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

    Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

    From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

    It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

    By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

    In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

    State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

    Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

    “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

    “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

    The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

    One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

    “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

    As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

    Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

    There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

    A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

    The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

    In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

    The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

    The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

    The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

    The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

    In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

    Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

    Conclusions

    If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

    If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

    And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

    With the recent sentence n° 16601/2017 the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di Cassazione”) – changing its jurisprudence – opened to the possibility of recognizing in Italy foreign judgments containing punitive damages. In this post we will see what these punitive damages are about, under which conditions they will be recognized and enforced in Italy and, above all, which countermeasures may be implemented to deal with these new risks.

    Punitive damages are a monetary compensation – typical of common law legal systems – awarded to an injured party that goes beyond what is necessary to compensate the individual for losses. Normally punitive damages are imposed when the person who caused the damage acted with wilful misconduct and gross negligence.

    With punitive damages, other than the compensatory function, the reimbursement of damages assumes also a sanctioning purpose, typical of criminal law, also acting like a deterrent towards other potential lawbreakers.

    In the legal systems that provide for punitive damages, the recognition and the quantification of the highest compensation, most of the time, are delegated to the Judge.

    In the United States of America punitive damages are a settled principle of common law, but ruled in different ways for each State. However, generally, they are applied when the conduct of person who caused the damage was intentionally directed to cause damage or is put in place without regard to the protection and safety standards. Usually they cannot be awarded for breach of contract, unless it also leads to an independent tort.

    Historically, in Italy, punitive damages generally were not recognized, because the sanctioning purpose is not consistent with the civil law principles, anchored to the concept that the reimbursement of the damage is a simple restoration of financial heritage of the damaged person.

    Therefore, the recognition of punitive damage established by a foreign judgment was normally denied due to a violation of the public policy (“ordre public”), so those judgments did not have access to the Italian legal system.

    The sentence n° 16601/2017 of the 5 July 2017 of the Joint Sessions of Italian Supreme Court (“Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione”) however, changed the cards on the table. In this particular case, the plaintiff applied to the Venice Court of Appeal for the recognition (pursuant to art. 64, law 218/1995) of three judgments of District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida that, accepting a guarantee call submitted by an American retailer of helmets against the Italian company, condemned this latter to pay 1.436.136,87 USD (in addition to legal expenses and interests) for the damages caused by a defect in the helmet used in occasion of the accident.

    The Venice Court of Appeal recognized the foreign judgment, considering the abovementioned sum merely as compensation for damages and not as punitive damages. This decision was challenged by the unsuccessful Italian party before the Italian Supreme Court, arguing the violation of the Italian ordre public by the US judgment, on the basis of a consolidated juridical opinion until that day.

    The Supreme Court of Cassation confirmed the Venice Court assessment, considering the sum non-punitive and recognized the US judgment in Italy.

    The Supreme Court, though, took the opportunity to address the question of the admissibility of punitive damages in Italy, changing the previous orientation (see Cass. 1781/2012).

    According to the Court, the concept of civil liability as mere compensation of the damage suffered is to be considered obsolete, given the evolution of this institute through national and European legislation and case-law that introduced civil remedies intended to punish the wrongdoer. As a matter of fact, in our system, it’s possible to find several cases of damages with sanctioning function: in the matter of libel by press (art. 12 L. 47/48), copyright (art. 158 L. 633/41), industrial property (art. 125 D. Lgs. 30/2005), abuse of process (art. 96 comma 3 c.p.c. e art. 26 comma 2 c.p.a.), labour law (art. 18, comma 14), family law (art. 709-ter c.p.c.) and others.

    The Supreme Court has, therefore, stated the following principle: “Under Italian law, civil liability is aimed not only to compensate for losses incurred by the injured party, but also to reform the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar. Therefore, the US legal institute of punitive damages is not incompatible with the Italian legal system”.

    The important consequence is that this decision opens the door to possible recognition of foreign sentences that condemn a party to pay a sum higher than the amount sufficient to compensate the suffered injury as a result of the damage.

    To that end, however, the Supreme Court has set certain conditions so that foreign sentences have validity, that is to say that the decision is made in foreign law system on a normative basis that:

    1. Clearly establish the cases in which it is possible to convict a party to pay punitive damages; and
    2. The predictability of it; and
    3. Establish quantitative limits.

    It has to be clarified that the sentence has not modified the Italian system of civil liability. In other words, the sentence will not allow Italian Judges to establish punitive damages under Italian law.

    As for foreign court decisions, it will be now possible to obtain a compensation for punitive damages through the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, as long as they respect the above requirements.

    Extending our view beyond the Italian borders, we notice that punitive damages are alien to the legal tradition of most of  European States: there is the possibility, though, that other Courts of continental Europe might follow the decision of the Italian Supreme Court and recognize foreign judgments which grant punitive damages.

                     

    How to prevent this new risk

    There are several measures which businessmen can adopt to mitigate this new risk: firstly the adoption of contractual clauses that exclude this kind of damages or establish a cap on the amount of the contractual damages which can be claimed, for example by limiting the value of damages at the price of the products or services provided.

    Furthermore, it’s very important to have an overall knowledge of the legislation and case law of the markets in which the enterprise operates, even indirectly (for example: with the commercial distribution of products) in order to choose consciously the applicable law to the contract and the dispute resolution methods (for example: establishing the jurisdiction in a country that does not provide for punitive damages).

    Finally, this type of liability and risk may also be covered by a product liability insurance.

    How to make sure that your claim can be enforced in the long run? A creditor may freeze assets that a debtor holds in Switzerland if certain conditions are fulfilled. In practice, there are two situations in which one might consider an attachment of assets: the first is where a creditor has a claim against a debtor without domicile in Switzerland; the second is where a creditor holds an enforceable judgment or award.

    It is beyond doubt that the Swiss financial sector continues to play a dominant role in the financial world of today despite the regulatory pressure that it faces. The Swiss jurisdiction, therefore, is relevant for creditors who wish to enforce claims against a debtor who holds bank accounts or other assets in Switzerland. Even though practice shows that it is predominantly bank accounts that are being attached, other assets such as real estate, art works or claims against third parties are equally capable of being attached.

    Upon application, the Swiss court at the seat of the bank or at the place where the assets are located will grant an ex parte freezing order to a creditor against a debtor with assets in Switzerland, if the applying creditor demonstrates on a prima facie basis that the following three prerequisites of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) are met:

    • The creditor seeking a freezing order has a mature and unsecured claim;
    • The debtor’s assets are located in Switzerland;
    • A legal ground for a freezing order exists.

    As already pointed out, the most relevant grounds for a freezing order are:

    • The debtor is not resident in Switzerland and the claim itself has sufficient connection with Switzerland or is based on an acknowledgement of debt signed by the debtor (“attachment against a non-Swiss resident”);
    • The creditor has an enforceable court decision or arbitral award against the debtor (“enforceable title”).

    Attachment against a non-Swiss resident: The mere fact that the assets are located in Switzerland will not suffice to establish a “sufficient connection with Switzerland” in the sense of the DEBA. The requirement of “sufficient connection with Switzerland” very much depends on the specific facts of the case which the Swiss court will review on a case-by-case basis. Swiss courts have confirmed that there was a sufficient connection in cases where the underlying contract was signed or fulfilled in Switzerland, where the underlying contract is governed by Swiss law, where the creditor lives in Switzerland or where the creditor’s claim is linked to a commercial activity in Switzerland.

    Enforceable title: In order to rely on the second ground for a freezing order the creditor needs to have an enforceable title. The DEBA makes no distinction between domestic and foreign court decisions or arbitral awards. Provided that they are enforceable (either according to the Lugano Convention, the Swiss Private International Law Act or – in the case of a non-Swiss arbitral award – the New York Convention), all judgments and awards may serve as a ground for an attachment of Swiss assets.

    The Swiss court will request the creditor to provide prima facie evidence on the prerequisites of an attachment as outlined above. Because the attachment itself will be granted ex parte, it will, in many instances, take the debtor by surprise. Thanks to this surprise effect and the nature of the attachment, i.e. the fact that it will prevent the debtor from further disposing of the attached assets, the attachment has a great potential for helping the creditor to secure and ultimately satisfy its claim.

    [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

    It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

    In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

    This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

    Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

    Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

    Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

    The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of “sufficient justification” and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

    As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

    The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

    It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

    To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

    Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

    One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

    On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

    Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

    Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

    How much does it tell us?

    Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

    The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

    If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

    Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

    This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

    Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

    Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

    The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

    The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

    It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

    There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

    • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
    • a frustration or a force majeure.

    There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

    The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

    What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

    The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

    A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

    If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

    • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
    • the good faith of the parties;
    • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
    • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
    • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

    What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

    The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

    The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

    • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
    • sudden;
    • unpredictable.

    To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

    • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
    • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
    • a constant increase in turnover;
    • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
    • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
    • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
    • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
    • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

    The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

    • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
    • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
    • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

    Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

    Compensation for a damage

    The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

    The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

    The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

    International law

    The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

    However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

    The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

    The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

    In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

    • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
    • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

    In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

    In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

    The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

    When negotiating contracts, parties typically focus on the key commercial terms of their agreement. The clauses that govern the term of the agreement (i.e., the duration, or how long the contract remains in force), the renewal of the term, and how the agreement can be terminated, however, merit careful consideration.

    Under Québec law, contracts typically have terms that are either fixed (e.g., 5 years, 10 years etc.), or are for an indeterminate period of time (i.e., no specific term is provided for). Contracts with fixed terms may also contain automatic renewal clauses. In the case of an indeterminate term contract, a party to the contract can generally, absent specific terms or a notice provision to the contrary in the contract, terminate it, without cause, by providing reasonable notice of termination (what constitutes “reasonable notice” depends on a number of factors and is decided on the facts of each case). A third category of contracts are contracts with a potentially perpetual term. An example of a potentially perpetual contract is a contract that contains a renewal clause that is entirely under the control of only one of the parties who can, effectively, unilaterally decide whether the contract will go on indefinitely. In such a contract, the other contracting party does not have a right to terminate the contract by providing reasonable notice of termination. The validity of perpetual term contracts was precisely the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada in its July 28, 2017 decision in Uniprix inc. v. Gestion Gosselin et Bérubé inc. https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16746/index.do (“Uniprix“).

    In Uniprix, the pharmacy chain entered into an affiliation agreement with various members of a pharmacists’ group pursuant to which said members operated a pharmacy under the Uniprix banner. The term of the contract was for a fixed term of 5 years and the renewal clause allowed members to provide a notice within a certain period of time, failing which the contract would automatically be renewed for an additional 5 years:

    Regardless of any written or verbal provisions to the contrary, this agreement shall commence on the day of its signing and shall remain in effect for a period of sixty (60) months, or for a period equal to the term of the lease for the premises where the pharmacy is located. [The member pharmacist] shall, six (6) months before the expiration of the agreement, notify [Uniprix] of its intention to leave [Uniprix] or to renew the agreement; 

    Should [the member pharmacist] fail to send the prescribed notice by registered mail, the agreement shall be deemed to have been renewed in accordance with the terms and conditions then in effect, as prescribed by the board of directors, except with regard to the fee.[Translation]

    The Uniprix agreement did not provide any say to Uniprix in connection with its renewal and there were no limits on the number of times that the members could renew the agreement. As such, the contract could remain in force perpetually based entirely on the members’ decision. After the contract had been renewed twice, Uniprix sent the members a notice of non-renewal and purported to terminate the agreement. The members contested Uniprix’s decision based on the fact that under the affiliation agreement, the renewal clause could only be exercised by the members and, unless the members gave notice to the contrary, the contract was automatically renewed. Uniprix argued that the effect of the members’ position, which would bind the parties in perpetuity, was contrary to public order (i.e., it violated a fundamental societal value) and unlawful and, as such, the term of the agreement should be considered to be for an indeterminate period, which would allow either party to terminate it on reasonable notice.

    In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held (in upholding the decisions of the majority of the Québec Court of Appeal and of the Superior Court of Québec) that there was nothing under Québec law that prohibited a contract of affiliation from having a perpetual term and that this did not, in and of itself and in the context of corporate and commercial agreements, offend any fundamental societal values. The Court’s holding would equally apply to many other types of contracts such as, for example, franchise agreements and licensing agreements. The Court held, accordingly, that the affiliation agreement was not for an indeterminate term and, therefore, could be not be terminated by Uniprix by providing reasonable notice.

    With respect to the holding in Uniprix , the following points should be kept in mind:

    1. The Supreme Court of Canada expressly noted that in certain circumstances, such as where an individual’sperson and freedom are affected (e.g., a contract of employment), a perpetual obligation could offend public order.
    2. In certain specific cases set out in the Civil Code of Québec, the legislator has provided maximum terms for certain types of contracts (e.g., a commercial lease cannot exceed 100 years, the duration of payment of an annuity is 100 years).
    3. In the case of a contract of adhesion (which is generally defined as a contract where one of the parties was unable to negotiate its terms), the adhering or vulnerable party can argue that a perpetual term is abusive and, therefore, null.
    4. The Court’s decision in Uniprixapplied to Uniprix’s ability to terminate the contract without cause. A party always retains the right to terminate a contract for cause. What constitutes “cause” is decided on a case by case basis and may also be governed by the terms of the contract.

    When drafting contracts, parties are generally, subject to limitations imposed by the legislator or public order, permitted to structure their relationship as they see fit. Parties should carefully consider whether they truly intend the duration of their agreement to be entirely under the control of one of the parties to the agreement for an indefinite period of time because, as is made clear in Uniprix, perpetual commercial contracts are enforceable under Québec law.

    The author of this post is David Stolow.

    France – Abrupt termination of contract

    26 de Setembro, 2017

    • França
    • Contratos
    • Distribuição
    • Contencioso

    It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

    At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

    One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

    Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

    No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

    The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

    Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

    The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

    Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

    The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

    Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

    The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

    In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

    From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

    What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

    Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

    The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

    With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

    Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

    From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

    It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

    By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

    In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

    State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

    Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

    “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

    “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

    The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

    One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

    “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

    As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

    Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

    There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

    A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

    The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

    In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

    The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

    The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

    The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

    The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

    In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

    Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

    Conclusions

    If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

    If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

    And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

    With the recent sentence n° 16601/2017 the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di Cassazione”) – changing its jurisprudence – opened to the possibility of recognizing in Italy foreign judgments containing punitive damages. In this post we will see what these punitive damages are about, under which conditions they will be recognized and enforced in Italy and, above all, which countermeasures may be implemented to deal with these new risks.

    Punitive damages are a monetary compensation – typical of common law legal systems – awarded to an injured party that goes beyond what is necessary to compensate the individual for losses. Normally punitive damages are imposed when the person who caused the damage acted with wilful misconduct and gross negligence.

    With punitive damages, other than the compensatory function, the reimbursement of damages assumes also a sanctioning purpose, typical of criminal law, also acting like a deterrent towards other potential lawbreakers.

    In the legal systems that provide for punitive damages, the recognition and the quantification of the highest compensation, most of the time, are delegated to the Judge.

    In the United States of America punitive damages are a settled principle of common law, but ruled in different ways for each State. However, generally, they are applied when the conduct of person who caused the damage was intentionally directed to cause damage or is put in place without regard to the protection and safety standards. Usually they cannot be awarded for breach of contract, unless it also leads to an independent tort.

    Historically, in Italy, punitive damages generally were not recognized, because the sanctioning purpose is not consistent with the civil law principles, anchored to the concept that the reimbursement of the damage is a simple restoration of financial heritage of the damaged person.

    Therefore, the recognition of punitive damage established by a foreign judgment was normally denied due to a violation of the public policy (“ordre public”), so those judgments did not have access to the Italian legal system.

    The sentence n° 16601/2017 of the 5 July 2017 of the Joint Sessions of Italian Supreme Court (“Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione”) however, changed the cards on the table. In this particular case, the plaintiff applied to the Venice Court of Appeal for the recognition (pursuant to art. 64, law 218/1995) of three judgments of District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida that, accepting a guarantee call submitted by an American retailer of helmets against the Italian company, condemned this latter to pay 1.436.136,87 USD (in addition to legal expenses and interests) for the damages caused by a defect in the helmet used in occasion of the accident.

    The Venice Court of Appeal recognized the foreign judgment, considering the abovementioned sum merely as compensation for damages and not as punitive damages. This decision was challenged by the unsuccessful Italian party before the Italian Supreme Court, arguing the violation of the Italian ordre public by the US judgment, on the basis of a consolidated juridical opinion until that day.

    The Supreme Court of Cassation confirmed the Venice Court assessment, considering the sum non-punitive and recognized the US judgment in Italy.

    The Supreme Court, though, took the opportunity to address the question of the admissibility of punitive damages in Italy, changing the previous orientation (see Cass. 1781/2012).

    According to the Court, the concept of civil liability as mere compensation of the damage suffered is to be considered obsolete, given the evolution of this institute through national and European legislation and case-law that introduced civil remedies intended to punish the wrongdoer. As a matter of fact, in our system, it’s possible to find several cases of damages with sanctioning function: in the matter of libel by press (art. 12 L. 47/48), copyright (art. 158 L. 633/41), industrial property (art. 125 D. Lgs. 30/2005), abuse of process (art. 96 comma 3 c.p.c. e art. 26 comma 2 c.p.a.), labour law (art. 18, comma 14), family law (art. 709-ter c.p.c.) and others.

    The Supreme Court has, therefore, stated the following principle: “Under Italian law, civil liability is aimed not only to compensate for losses incurred by the injured party, but also to reform the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar. Therefore, the US legal institute of punitive damages is not incompatible with the Italian legal system”.

    The important consequence is that this decision opens the door to possible recognition of foreign sentences that condemn a party to pay a sum higher than the amount sufficient to compensate the suffered injury as a result of the damage.

    To that end, however, the Supreme Court has set certain conditions so that foreign sentences have validity, that is to say that the decision is made in foreign law system on a normative basis that:

    1. Clearly establish the cases in which it is possible to convict a party to pay punitive damages; and
    2. The predictability of it; and
    3. Establish quantitative limits.

    It has to be clarified that the sentence has not modified the Italian system of civil liability. In other words, the sentence will not allow Italian Judges to establish punitive damages under Italian law.

    As for foreign court decisions, it will be now possible to obtain a compensation for punitive damages through the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, as long as they respect the above requirements.

    Extending our view beyond the Italian borders, we notice that punitive damages are alien to the legal tradition of most of  European States: there is the possibility, though, that other Courts of continental Europe might follow the decision of the Italian Supreme Court and recognize foreign judgments which grant punitive damages.

                     

    How to prevent this new risk

    There are several measures which businessmen can adopt to mitigate this new risk: firstly the adoption of contractual clauses that exclude this kind of damages or establish a cap on the amount of the contractual damages which can be claimed, for example by limiting the value of damages at the price of the products or services provided.

    Furthermore, it’s very important to have an overall knowledge of the legislation and case law of the markets in which the enterprise operates, even indirectly (for example: with the commercial distribution of products) in order to choose consciously the applicable law to the contract and the dispute resolution methods (for example: establishing the jurisdiction in a country that does not provide for punitive damages).

    Finally, this type of liability and risk may also be covered by a product liability insurance.

    How to make sure that your claim can be enforced in the long run? A creditor may freeze assets that a debtor holds in Switzerland if certain conditions are fulfilled. In practice, there are two situations in which one might consider an attachment of assets: the first is where a creditor has a claim against a debtor without domicile in Switzerland; the second is where a creditor holds an enforceable judgment or award.

    It is beyond doubt that the Swiss financial sector continues to play a dominant role in the financial world of today despite the regulatory pressure that it faces. The Swiss jurisdiction, therefore, is relevant for creditors who wish to enforce claims against a debtor who holds bank accounts or other assets in Switzerland. Even though practice shows that it is predominantly bank accounts that are being attached, other assets such as real estate, art works or claims against third parties are equally capable of being attached.

    Upon application, the Swiss court at the seat of the bank or at the place where the assets are located will grant an ex parte freezing order to a creditor against a debtor with assets in Switzerland, if the applying creditor demonstrates on a prima facie basis that the following three prerequisites of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) are met:

    • The creditor seeking a freezing order has a mature and unsecured claim;
    • The debtor’s assets are located in Switzerland;
    • A legal ground for a freezing order exists.

    As already pointed out, the most relevant grounds for a freezing order are:

    • The debtor is not resident in Switzerland and the claim itself has sufficient connection with Switzerland or is based on an acknowledgement of debt signed by the debtor (“attachment against a non-Swiss resident”);
    • The creditor has an enforceable court decision or arbitral award against the debtor (“enforceable title”).

    Attachment against a non-Swiss resident: The mere fact that the assets are located in Switzerland will not suffice to establish a “sufficient connection with Switzerland” in the sense of the DEBA. The requirement of “sufficient connection with Switzerland” very much depends on the specific facts of the case which the Swiss court will review on a case-by-case basis. Swiss courts have confirmed that there was a sufficient connection in cases where the underlying contract was signed or fulfilled in Switzerland, where the underlying contract is governed by Swiss law, where the creditor lives in Switzerland or where the creditor’s claim is linked to a commercial activity in Switzerland.

    Enforceable title: In order to rely on the second ground for a freezing order the creditor needs to have an enforceable title. The DEBA makes no distinction between domestic and foreign court decisions or arbitral awards. Provided that they are enforceable (either according to the Lugano Convention, the Swiss Private International Law Act or – in the case of a non-Swiss arbitral award – the New York Convention), all judgments and awards may serve as a ground for an attachment of Swiss assets.

    The Swiss court will request the creditor to provide prima facie evidence on the prerequisites of an attachment as outlined above. Because the attachment itself will be granted ex parte, it will, in many instances, take the debtor by surprise. Thanks to this surprise effect and the nature of the attachment, i.e. the fact that it will prevent the debtor from further disposing of the attached assets, the attachment has a great potential for helping the creditor to secure and ultimately satisfy its claim.

    [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

    It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

    In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

    This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

    Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

    Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

    Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

    The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of “sufficient justification” and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

    As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

    The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

    It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

    To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

    Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

    One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

    On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

    Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

    Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

    How much does it tell us?

    Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

    The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

    If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

    Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

    This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

    Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

    Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

    The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

    The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

    It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

    There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

    • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
    • a frustration or a force majeure.

    There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

    The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

    What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

    The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

    A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

    If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

    • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
    • the good faith of the parties;
    • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
    • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
    • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

    What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

    The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

    The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

    • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
    • sudden;
    • unpredictable.

    To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

    • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
    • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
    • a constant increase in turnover;
    • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
    • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
    • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
    • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
    • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

    The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

    • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
    • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
    • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

    Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

    Compensation for a damage

    The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

    The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

    The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

    International law

    The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

    However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

    The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

    The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

    In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

    • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
    • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

    In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

    In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

    The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

    When negotiating contracts, parties typically focus on the key commercial terms of their agreement. The clauses that govern the term of the agreement (i.e., the duration, or how long the contract remains in force), the renewal of the term, and how the agreement can be terminated, however, merit careful consideration.

    Under Québec law, contracts typically have terms that are either fixed (e.g., 5 years, 10 years etc.), or are for an indeterminate period of time (i.e., no specific term is provided for). Contracts with fixed terms may also contain automatic renewal clauses. In the case of an indeterminate term contract, a party to the contract can generally, absent specific terms or a notice provision to the contrary in the contract, terminate it, without cause, by providing reasonable notice of termination (what constitutes “reasonable notice” depends on a number of factors and is decided on the facts of each case). A third category of contracts are contracts with a potentially perpetual term. An example of a potentially perpetual contract is a contract that contains a renewal clause that is entirely under the control of only one of the parties who can, effectively, unilaterally decide whether the contract will go on indefinitely. In such a contract, the other contracting party does not have a right to terminate the contract by providing reasonable notice of termination. The validity of perpetual term contracts was precisely the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada in its July 28, 2017 decision in Uniprix inc. v. Gestion Gosselin et Bérubé inc. https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16746/index.do (“Uniprix“).

    In Uniprix, the pharmacy chain entered into an affiliation agreement with various members of a pharmacists’ group pursuant to which said members operated a pharmacy under the Uniprix banner. The term of the contract was for a fixed term of 5 years and the renewal clause allowed members to provide a notice within a certain period of time, failing which the contract would automatically be renewed for an additional 5 years:

    Regardless of any written or verbal provisions to the contrary, this agreement shall commence on the day of its signing and shall remain in effect for a period of sixty (60) months, or for a period equal to the term of the lease for the premises where the pharmacy is located. [The member pharmacist] shall, six (6) months before the expiration of the agreement, notify [Uniprix] of its intention to leave [Uniprix] or to renew the agreement; 

    Should [the member pharmacist] fail to send the prescribed notice by registered mail, the agreement shall be deemed to have been renewed in accordance with the terms and conditions then in effect, as prescribed by the board of directors, except with regard to the fee.[Translation]

    The Uniprix agreement did not provide any say to Uniprix in connection with its renewal and there were no limits on the number of times that the members could renew the agreement. As such, the contract could remain in force perpetually based entirely on the members’ decision. After the contract had been renewed twice, Uniprix sent the members a notice of non-renewal and purported to terminate the agreement. The members contested Uniprix’s decision based on the fact that under the affiliation agreement, the renewal clause could only be exercised by the members and, unless the members gave notice to the contrary, the contract was automatically renewed. Uniprix argued that the effect of the members’ position, which would bind the parties in perpetuity, was contrary to public order (i.e., it violated a fundamental societal value) and unlawful and, as such, the term of the agreement should be considered to be for an indeterminate period, which would allow either party to terminate it on reasonable notice.

    In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held (in upholding the decisions of the majority of the Québec Court of Appeal and of the Superior Court of Québec) that there was nothing under Québec law that prohibited a contract of affiliation from having a perpetual term and that this did not, in and of itself and in the context of corporate and commercial agreements, offend any fundamental societal values. The Court’s holding would equally apply to many other types of contracts such as, for example, franchise agreements and licensing agreements. The Court held, accordingly, that the affiliation agreement was not for an indeterminate term and, therefore, could be not be terminated by Uniprix by providing reasonable notice.

    With respect to the holding in Uniprix , the following points should be kept in mind:

    1. The Supreme Court of Canada expressly noted that in certain circumstances, such as where an individual’sperson and freedom are affected (e.g., a contract of employment), a perpetual obligation could offend public order.
    2. In certain specific cases set out in the Civil Code of Québec, the legislator has provided maximum terms for certain types of contracts (e.g., a commercial lease cannot exceed 100 years, the duration of payment of an annuity is 100 years).
    3. In the case of a contract of adhesion (which is generally defined as a contract where one of the parties was unable to negotiate its terms), the adhering or vulnerable party can argue that a perpetual term is abusive and, therefore, null.
    4. The Court’s decision in Uniprixapplied to Uniprix’s ability to terminate the contract without cause. A party always retains the right to terminate a contract for cause. What constitutes “cause” is decided on a case by case basis and may also be governed by the terms of the contract.

    When drafting contracts, parties are generally, subject to limitations imposed by the legislator or public order, permitted to structure their relationship as they see fit. Parties should carefully consider whether they truly intend the duration of their agreement to be entirely under the control of one of the parties to the agreement for an indefinite period of time because, as is made clear in Uniprix, perpetual commercial contracts are enforceable under Québec law.

    The author of this post is David Stolow.

    Marika Devaux

    Áreas de prática

    • Arbitragem
    • Contratos
    • Cobrança de créditos
    • Distribuição
    • Contencioso
    Contato Marika

    Scrivi a Marika





      Read the privacy policy of Legalmondo.
      This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

      To infinity and beyond – Perpetual contracts under Québec law

      9 de Agosto, 2017

      • Canadá
      • Contratos
      • Contencioso

      It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

      At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

      One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

      Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

      No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

      The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

      Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

      The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

      Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

      The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

      Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

      The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

      In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

      From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

      What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

      Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

      The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

      With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

      Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

      From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

      It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

      By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

      In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

      State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

      Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

      “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

      “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

      The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

      One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

      “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

      As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

      Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

      There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

      A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

      The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

      In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

      The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

      The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

      The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

      The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

      In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

      Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

      Conclusions

      If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

      If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

      And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

      With the recent sentence n° 16601/2017 the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di Cassazione”) – changing its jurisprudence – opened to the possibility of recognizing in Italy foreign judgments containing punitive damages. In this post we will see what these punitive damages are about, under which conditions they will be recognized and enforced in Italy and, above all, which countermeasures may be implemented to deal with these new risks.

      Punitive damages are a monetary compensation – typical of common law legal systems – awarded to an injured party that goes beyond what is necessary to compensate the individual for losses. Normally punitive damages are imposed when the person who caused the damage acted with wilful misconduct and gross negligence.

      With punitive damages, other than the compensatory function, the reimbursement of damages assumes also a sanctioning purpose, typical of criminal law, also acting like a deterrent towards other potential lawbreakers.

      In the legal systems that provide for punitive damages, the recognition and the quantification of the highest compensation, most of the time, are delegated to the Judge.

      In the United States of America punitive damages are a settled principle of common law, but ruled in different ways for each State. However, generally, they are applied when the conduct of person who caused the damage was intentionally directed to cause damage or is put in place without regard to the protection and safety standards. Usually they cannot be awarded for breach of contract, unless it also leads to an independent tort.

      Historically, in Italy, punitive damages generally were not recognized, because the sanctioning purpose is not consistent with the civil law principles, anchored to the concept that the reimbursement of the damage is a simple restoration of financial heritage of the damaged person.

      Therefore, the recognition of punitive damage established by a foreign judgment was normally denied due to a violation of the public policy (“ordre public”), so those judgments did not have access to the Italian legal system.

      The sentence n° 16601/2017 of the 5 July 2017 of the Joint Sessions of Italian Supreme Court (“Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione”) however, changed the cards on the table. In this particular case, the plaintiff applied to the Venice Court of Appeal for the recognition (pursuant to art. 64, law 218/1995) of three judgments of District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida that, accepting a guarantee call submitted by an American retailer of helmets against the Italian company, condemned this latter to pay 1.436.136,87 USD (in addition to legal expenses and interests) for the damages caused by a defect in the helmet used in occasion of the accident.

      The Venice Court of Appeal recognized the foreign judgment, considering the abovementioned sum merely as compensation for damages and not as punitive damages. This decision was challenged by the unsuccessful Italian party before the Italian Supreme Court, arguing the violation of the Italian ordre public by the US judgment, on the basis of a consolidated juridical opinion until that day.

      The Supreme Court of Cassation confirmed the Venice Court assessment, considering the sum non-punitive and recognized the US judgment in Italy.

      The Supreme Court, though, took the opportunity to address the question of the admissibility of punitive damages in Italy, changing the previous orientation (see Cass. 1781/2012).

      According to the Court, the concept of civil liability as mere compensation of the damage suffered is to be considered obsolete, given the evolution of this institute through national and European legislation and case-law that introduced civil remedies intended to punish the wrongdoer. As a matter of fact, in our system, it’s possible to find several cases of damages with sanctioning function: in the matter of libel by press (art. 12 L. 47/48), copyright (art. 158 L. 633/41), industrial property (art. 125 D. Lgs. 30/2005), abuse of process (art. 96 comma 3 c.p.c. e art. 26 comma 2 c.p.a.), labour law (art. 18, comma 14), family law (art. 709-ter c.p.c.) and others.

      The Supreme Court has, therefore, stated the following principle: “Under Italian law, civil liability is aimed not only to compensate for losses incurred by the injured party, but also to reform the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar. Therefore, the US legal institute of punitive damages is not incompatible with the Italian legal system”.

      The important consequence is that this decision opens the door to possible recognition of foreign sentences that condemn a party to pay a sum higher than the amount sufficient to compensate the suffered injury as a result of the damage.

      To that end, however, the Supreme Court has set certain conditions so that foreign sentences have validity, that is to say that the decision is made in foreign law system on a normative basis that:

      1. Clearly establish the cases in which it is possible to convict a party to pay punitive damages; and
      2. The predictability of it; and
      3. Establish quantitative limits.

      It has to be clarified that the sentence has not modified the Italian system of civil liability. In other words, the sentence will not allow Italian Judges to establish punitive damages under Italian law.

      As for foreign court decisions, it will be now possible to obtain a compensation for punitive damages through the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, as long as they respect the above requirements.

      Extending our view beyond the Italian borders, we notice that punitive damages are alien to the legal tradition of most of  European States: there is the possibility, though, that other Courts of continental Europe might follow the decision of the Italian Supreme Court and recognize foreign judgments which grant punitive damages.

                       

      How to prevent this new risk

      There are several measures which businessmen can adopt to mitigate this new risk: firstly the adoption of contractual clauses that exclude this kind of damages or establish a cap on the amount of the contractual damages which can be claimed, for example by limiting the value of damages at the price of the products or services provided.

      Furthermore, it’s very important to have an overall knowledge of the legislation and case law of the markets in which the enterprise operates, even indirectly (for example: with the commercial distribution of products) in order to choose consciously the applicable law to the contract and the dispute resolution methods (for example: establishing the jurisdiction in a country that does not provide for punitive damages).

      Finally, this type of liability and risk may also be covered by a product liability insurance.

      How to make sure that your claim can be enforced in the long run? A creditor may freeze assets that a debtor holds in Switzerland if certain conditions are fulfilled. In practice, there are two situations in which one might consider an attachment of assets: the first is where a creditor has a claim against a debtor without domicile in Switzerland; the second is where a creditor holds an enforceable judgment or award.

      It is beyond doubt that the Swiss financial sector continues to play a dominant role in the financial world of today despite the regulatory pressure that it faces. The Swiss jurisdiction, therefore, is relevant for creditors who wish to enforce claims against a debtor who holds bank accounts or other assets in Switzerland. Even though practice shows that it is predominantly bank accounts that are being attached, other assets such as real estate, art works or claims against third parties are equally capable of being attached.

      Upon application, the Swiss court at the seat of the bank or at the place where the assets are located will grant an ex parte freezing order to a creditor against a debtor with assets in Switzerland, if the applying creditor demonstrates on a prima facie basis that the following three prerequisites of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) are met:

      • The creditor seeking a freezing order has a mature and unsecured claim;
      • The debtor’s assets are located in Switzerland;
      • A legal ground for a freezing order exists.

      As already pointed out, the most relevant grounds for a freezing order are:

      • The debtor is not resident in Switzerland and the claim itself has sufficient connection with Switzerland or is based on an acknowledgement of debt signed by the debtor (“attachment against a non-Swiss resident”);
      • The creditor has an enforceable court decision or arbitral award against the debtor (“enforceable title”).

      Attachment against a non-Swiss resident: The mere fact that the assets are located in Switzerland will not suffice to establish a “sufficient connection with Switzerland” in the sense of the DEBA. The requirement of “sufficient connection with Switzerland” very much depends on the specific facts of the case which the Swiss court will review on a case-by-case basis. Swiss courts have confirmed that there was a sufficient connection in cases where the underlying contract was signed or fulfilled in Switzerland, where the underlying contract is governed by Swiss law, where the creditor lives in Switzerland or where the creditor’s claim is linked to a commercial activity in Switzerland.

      Enforceable title: In order to rely on the second ground for a freezing order the creditor needs to have an enforceable title. The DEBA makes no distinction between domestic and foreign court decisions or arbitral awards. Provided that they are enforceable (either according to the Lugano Convention, the Swiss Private International Law Act or – in the case of a non-Swiss arbitral award – the New York Convention), all judgments and awards may serve as a ground for an attachment of Swiss assets.

      The Swiss court will request the creditor to provide prima facie evidence on the prerequisites of an attachment as outlined above. Because the attachment itself will be granted ex parte, it will, in many instances, take the debtor by surprise. Thanks to this surprise effect and the nature of the attachment, i.e. the fact that it will prevent the debtor from further disposing of the attached assets, the attachment has a great potential for helping the creditor to secure and ultimately satisfy its claim.

      [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

      It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

      In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

      This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

      Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

      Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

      Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

      The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of “sufficient justification” and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

      As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

      The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

      It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

      To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

      Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

      One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

      On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

      Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

      Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

      How much does it tell us?

      Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

      The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

      If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

      Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

      This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

      Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

      Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

      The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

      The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

      It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

      There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

      • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
      • a frustration or a force majeure.

      There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

      The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

      What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

      The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

      A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

      If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

      • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
      • the good faith of the parties;
      • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
      • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
      • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

      What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

      The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

      The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

      • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
      • sudden;
      • unpredictable.

      To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

      • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
      • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
      • a constant increase in turnover;
      • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
      • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
      • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
      • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
      • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

      The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

      • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
      • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
      • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

      Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

      Compensation for a damage

      The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

      The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

      The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

      International law

      The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

      However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

      The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

      The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

      In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

      • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
      • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

      In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

      In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

      The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

      When negotiating contracts, parties typically focus on the key commercial terms of their agreement. The clauses that govern the term of the agreement (i.e., the duration, or how long the contract remains in force), the renewal of the term, and how the agreement can be terminated, however, merit careful consideration.

      Under Québec law, contracts typically have terms that are either fixed (e.g., 5 years, 10 years etc.), or are for an indeterminate period of time (i.e., no specific term is provided for). Contracts with fixed terms may also contain automatic renewal clauses. In the case of an indeterminate term contract, a party to the contract can generally, absent specific terms or a notice provision to the contrary in the contract, terminate it, without cause, by providing reasonable notice of termination (what constitutes “reasonable notice” depends on a number of factors and is decided on the facts of each case). A third category of contracts are contracts with a potentially perpetual term. An example of a potentially perpetual contract is a contract that contains a renewal clause that is entirely under the control of only one of the parties who can, effectively, unilaterally decide whether the contract will go on indefinitely. In such a contract, the other contracting party does not have a right to terminate the contract by providing reasonable notice of termination. The validity of perpetual term contracts was precisely the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada in its July 28, 2017 decision in Uniprix inc. v. Gestion Gosselin et Bérubé inc. https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16746/index.do (“Uniprix“).

      In Uniprix, the pharmacy chain entered into an affiliation agreement with various members of a pharmacists’ group pursuant to which said members operated a pharmacy under the Uniprix banner. The term of the contract was for a fixed term of 5 years and the renewal clause allowed members to provide a notice within a certain period of time, failing which the contract would automatically be renewed for an additional 5 years:

      Regardless of any written or verbal provisions to the contrary, this agreement shall commence on the day of its signing and shall remain in effect for a period of sixty (60) months, or for a period equal to the term of the lease for the premises where the pharmacy is located. [The member pharmacist] shall, six (6) months before the expiration of the agreement, notify [Uniprix] of its intention to leave [Uniprix] or to renew the agreement; 

      Should [the member pharmacist] fail to send the prescribed notice by registered mail, the agreement shall be deemed to have been renewed in accordance with the terms and conditions then in effect, as prescribed by the board of directors, except with regard to the fee.[Translation]

      The Uniprix agreement did not provide any say to Uniprix in connection with its renewal and there were no limits on the number of times that the members could renew the agreement. As such, the contract could remain in force perpetually based entirely on the members’ decision. After the contract had been renewed twice, Uniprix sent the members a notice of non-renewal and purported to terminate the agreement. The members contested Uniprix’s decision based on the fact that under the affiliation agreement, the renewal clause could only be exercised by the members and, unless the members gave notice to the contrary, the contract was automatically renewed. Uniprix argued that the effect of the members’ position, which would bind the parties in perpetuity, was contrary to public order (i.e., it violated a fundamental societal value) and unlawful and, as such, the term of the agreement should be considered to be for an indeterminate period, which would allow either party to terminate it on reasonable notice.

      In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held (in upholding the decisions of the majority of the Québec Court of Appeal and of the Superior Court of Québec) that there was nothing under Québec law that prohibited a contract of affiliation from having a perpetual term and that this did not, in and of itself and in the context of corporate and commercial agreements, offend any fundamental societal values. The Court’s holding would equally apply to many other types of contracts such as, for example, franchise agreements and licensing agreements. The Court held, accordingly, that the affiliation agreement was not for an indeterminate term and, therefore, could be not be terminated by Uniprix by providing reasonable notice.

      With respect to the holding in Uniprix , the following points should be kept in mind:

      1. The Supreme Court of Canada expressly noted that in certain circumstances, such as where an individual’sperson and freedom are affected (e.g., a contract of employment), a perpetual obligation could offend public order.
      2. In certain specific cases set out in the Civil Code of Québec, the legislator has provided maximum terms for certain types of contracts (e.g., a commercial lease cannot exceed 100 years, the duration of payment of an annuity is 100 years).
      3. In the case of a contract of adhesion (which is generally defined as a contract where one of the parties was unable to negotiate its terms), the adhering or vulnerable party can argue that a perpetual term is abusive and, therefore, null.
      4. The Court’s decision in Uniprixapplied to Uniprix’s ability to terminate the contract without cause. A party always retains the right to terminate a contract for cause. What constitutes “cause” is decided on a case by case basis and may also be governed by the terms of the contract.

      When drafting contracts, parties are generally, subject to limitations imposed by the legislator or public order, permitted to structure their relationship as they see fit. Parties should carefully consider whether they truly intend the duration of their agreement to be entirely under the control of one of the parties to the agreement for an indefinite period of time because, as is made clear in Uniprix, perpetual commercial contracts are enforceable under Québec law.

      The author of this post is David Stolow.

      Switzerland – An excellent choice for arbitration

      17 de Julho, 2017

      • Suíça
      • Arbitragem
      • Contencioso

      It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

      At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

      One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

      Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

      No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

      The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

      Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

      The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

      Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

      The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

      Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

      The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

      In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

      From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

      What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

      Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

      The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

      With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

      Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

      From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

      It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

      By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

      In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

      State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

      Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

      “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

      “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

      The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

      One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

      “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

      As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

      Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

      There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

      A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

      The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

      In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

      The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

      The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

      The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

      The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

      In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

      Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

      Conclusions

      If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

      If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

      And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

      With the recent sentence n° 16601/2017 the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di Cassazione”) – changing its jurisprudence – opened to the possibility of recognizing in Italy foreign judgments containing punitive damages. In this post we will see what these punitive damages are about, under which conditions they will be recognized and enforced in Italy and, above all, which countermeasures may be implemented to deal with these new risks.

      Punitive damages are a monetary compensation – typical of common law legal systems – awarded to an injured party that goes beyond what is necessary to compensate the individual for losses. Normally punitive damages are imposed when the person who caused the damage acted with wilful misconduct and gross negligence.

      With punitive damages, other than the compensatory function, the reimbursement of damages assumes also a sanctioning purpose, typical of criminal law, also acting like a deterrent towards other potential lawbreakers.

      In the legal systems that provide for punitive damages, the recognition and the quantification of the highest compensation, most of the time, are delegated to the Judge.

      In the United States of America punitive damages are a settled principle of common law, but ruled in different ways for each State. However, generally, they are applied when the conduct of person who caused the damage was intentionally directed to cause damage or is put in place without regard to the protection and safety standards. Usually they cannot be awarded for breach of contract, unless it also leads to an independent tort.

      Historically, in Italy, punitive damages generally were not recognized, because the sanctioning purpose is not consistent with the civil law principles, anchored to the concept that the reimbursement of the damage is a simple restoration of financial heritage of the damaged person.

      Therefore, the recognition of punitive damage established by a foreign judgment was normally denied due to a violation of the public policy (“ordre public”), so those judgments did not have access to the Italian legal system.

      The sentence n° 16601/2017 of the 5 July 2017 of the Joint Sessions of Italian Supreme Court (“Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione”) however, changed the cards on the table. In this particular case, the plaintiff applied to the Venice Court of Appeal for the recognition (pursuant to art. 64, law 218/1995) of three judgments of District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida that, accepting a guarantee call submitted by an American retailer of helmets against the Italian company, condemned this latter to pay 1.436.136,87 USD (in addition to legal expenses and interests) for the damages caused by a defect in the helmet used in occasion of the accident.

      The Venice Court of Appeal recognized the foreign judgment, considering the abovementioned sum merely as compensation for damages and not as punitive damages. This decision was challenged by the unsuccessful Italian party before the Italian Supreme Court, arguing the violation of the Italian ordre public by the US judgment, on the basis of a consolidated juridical opinion until that day.

      The Supreme Court of Cassation confirmed the Venice Court assessment, considering the sum non-punitive and recognized the US judgment in Italy.

      The Supreme Court, though, took the opportunity to address the question of the admissibility of punitive damages in Italy, changing the previous orientation (see Cass. 1781/2012).

      According to the Court, the concept of civil liability as mere compensation of the damage suffered is to be considered obsolete, given the evolution of this institute through national and European legislation and case-law that introduced civil remedies intended to punish the wrongdoer. As a matter of fact, in our system, it’s possible to find several cases of damages with sanctioning function: in the matter of libel by press (art. 12 L. 47/48), copyright (art. 158 L. 633/41), industrial property (art. 125 D. Lgs. 30/2005), abuse of process (art. 96 comma 3 c.p.c. e art. 26 comma 2 c.p.a.), labour law (art. 18, comma 14), family law (art. 709-ter c.p.c.) and others.

      The Supreme Court has, therefore, stated the following principle: “Under Italian law, civil liability is aimed not only to compensate for losses incurred by the injured party, but also to reform the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar. Therefore, the US legal institute of punitive damages is not incompatible with the Italian legal system”.

      The important consequence is that this decision opens the door to possible recognition of foreign sentences that condemn a party to pay a sum higher than the amount sufficient to compensate the suffered injury as a result of the damage.

      To that end, however, the Supreme Court has set certain conditions so that foreign sentences have validity, that is to say that the decision is made in foreign law system on a normative basis that:

      1. Clearly establish the cases in which it is possible to convict a party to pay punitive damages; and
      2. The predictability of it; and
      3. Establish quantitative limits.

      It has to be clarified that the sentence has not modified the Italian system of civil liability. In other words, the sentence will not allow Italian Judges to establish punitive damages under Italian law.

      As for foreign court decisions, it will be now possible to obtain a compensation for punitive damages through the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, as long as they respect the above requirements.

      Extending our view beyond the Italian borders, we notice that punitive damages are alien to the legal tradition of most of  European States: there is the possibility, though, that other Courts of continental Europe might follow the decision of the Italian Supreme Court and recognize foreign judgments which grant punitive damages.

                       

      How to prevent this new risk

      There are several measures which businessmen can adopt to mitigate this new risk: firstly the adoption of contractual clauses that exclude this kind of damages or establish a cap on the amount of the contractual damages which can be claimed, for example by limiting the value of damages at the price of the products or services provided.

      Furthermore, it’s very important to have an overall knowledge of the legislation and case law of the markets in which the enterprise operates, even indirectly (for example: with the commercial distribution of products) in order to choose consciously the applicable law to the contract and the dispute resolution methods (for example: establishing the jurisdiction in a country that does not provide for punitive damages).

      Finally, this type of liability and risk may also be covered by a product liability insurance.

      How to make sure that your claim can be enforced in the long run? A creditor may freeze assets that a debtor holds in Switzerland if certain conditions are fulfilled. In practice, there are two situations in which one might consider an attachment of assets: the first is where a creditor has a claim against a debtor without domicile in Switzerland; the second is where a creditor holds an enforceable judgment or award.

      It is beyond doubt that the Swiss financial sector continues to play a dominant role in the financial world of today despite the regulatory pressure that it faces. The Swiss jurisdiction, therefore, is relevant for creditors who wish to enforce claims against a debtor who holds bank accounts or other assets in Switzerland. Even though practice shows that it is predominantly bank accounts that are being attached, other assets such as real estate, art works or claims against third parties are equally capable of being attached.

      Upon application, the Swiss court at the seat of the bank or at the place where the assets are located will grant an ex parte freezing order to a creditor against a debtor with assets in Switzerland, if the applying creditor demonstrates on a prima facie basis that the following three prerequisites of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) are met:

      • The creditor seeking a freezing order has a mature and unsecured claim;
      • The debtor’s assets are located in Switzerland;
      • A legal ground for a freezing order exists.

      As already pointed out, the most relevant grounds for a freezing order are:

      • The debtor is not resident in Switzerland and the claim itself has sufficient connection with Switzerland or is based on an acknowledgement of debt signed by the debtor (“attachment against a non-Swiss resident”);
      • The creditor has an enforceable court decision or arbitral award against the debtor (“enforceable title”).

      Attachment against a non-Swiss resident: The mere fact that the assets are located in Switzerland will not suffice to establish a “sufficient connection with Switzerland” in the sense of the DEBA. The requirement of “sufficient connection with Switzerland” very much depends on the specific facts of the case which the Swiss court will review on a case-by-case basis. Swiss courts have confirmed that there was a sufficient connection in cases where the underlying contract was signed or fulfilled in Switzerland, where the underlying contract is governed by Swiss law, where the creditor lives in Switzerland or where the creditor’s claim is linked to a commercial activity in Switzerland.

      Enforceable title: In order to rely on the second ground for a freezing order the creditor needs to have an enforceable title. The DEBA makes no distinction between domestic and foreign court decisions or arbitral awards. Provided that they are enforceable (either according to the Lugano Convention, the Swiss Private International Law Act or – in the case of a non-Swiss arbitral award – the New York Convention), all judgments and awards may serve as a ground for an attachment of Swiss assets.

      The Swiss court will request the creditor to provide prima facie evidence on the prerequisites of an attachment as outlined above. Because the attachment itself will be granted ex parte, it will, in many instances, take the debtor by surprise. Thanks to this surprise effect and the nature of the attachment, i.e. the fact that it will prevent the debtor from further disposing of the attached assets, the attachment has a great potential for helping the creditor to secure and ultimately satisfy its claim.

      [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

      It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

      In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

      This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

      Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

      Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

      Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

      The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of “sufficient justification” and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

      As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

      The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

      It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

      To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

      Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

      One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

      On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

      Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

      Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

      How much does it tell us?

      Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

      The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

      If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

      Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

      This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

      Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

      Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

      The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

      The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

      It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

      There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

      • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
      • a frustration or a force majeure.

      There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

      The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

      What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

      The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

      A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

      If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

      • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
      • the good faith of the parties;
      • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
      • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
      • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

      What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

      The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

      The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

      • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
      • sudden;
      • unpredictable.

      To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

      • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
      • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
      • a constant increase in turnover;
      • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
      • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
      • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
      • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
      • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

      The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

      • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
      • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
      • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

      Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

      Compensation for a damage

      The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

      The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

      The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

      International law

      The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

      However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

      The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

      The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

      In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

      • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
      • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

      In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

      In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

      The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

      When negotiating contracts, parties typically focus on the key commercial terms of their agreement. The clauses that govern the term of the agreement (i.e., the duration, or how long the contract remains in force), the renewal of the term, and how the agreement can be terminated, however, merit careful consideration.

      Under Québec law, contracts typically have terms that are either fixed (e.g., 5 years, 10 years etc.), or are for an indeterminate period of time (i.e., no specific term is provided for). Contracts with fixed terms may also contain automatic renewal clauses. In the case of an indeterminate term contract, a party to the contract can generally, absent specific terms or a notice provision to the contrary in the contract, terminate it, without cause, by providing reasonable notice of termination (what constitutes “reasonable notice” depends on a number of factors and is decided on the facts of each case). A third category of contracts are contracts with a potentially perpetual term. An example of a potentially perpetual contract is a contract that contains a renewal clause that is entirely under the control of only one of the parties who can, effectively, unilaterally decide whether the contract will go on indefinitely. In such a contract, the other contracting party does not have a right to terminate the contract by providing reasonable notice of termination. The validity of perpetual term contracts was precisely the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada in its July 28, 2017 decision in Uniprix inc. v. Gestion Gosselin et Bérubé inc. https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16746/index.do (“Uniprix“).

      In Uniprix, the pharmacy chain entered into an affiliation agreement with various members of a pharmacists’ group pursuant to which said members operated a pharmacy under the Uniprix banner. The term of the contract was for a fixed term of 5 years and the renewal clause allowed members to provide a notice within a certain period of time, failing which the contract would automatically be renewed for an additional 5 years:

      Regardless of any written or verbal provisions to the contrary, this agreement shall commence on the day of its signing and shall remain in effect for a period of sixty (60) months, or for a period equal to the term of the lease for the premises where the pharmacy is located. [The member pharmacist] shall, six (6) months before the expiration of the agreement, notify [Uniprix] of its intention to leave [Uniprix] or to renew the agreement; 

      Should [the member pharmacist] fail to send the prescribed notice by registered mail, the agreement shall be deemed to have been renewed in accordance with the terms and conditions then in effect, as prescribed by the board of directors, except with regard to the fee.[Translation]

      The Uniprix agreement did not provide any say to Uniprix in connection with its renewal and there were no limits on the number of times that the members could renew the agreement. As such, the contract could remain in force perpetually based entirely on the members’ decision. After the contract had been renewed twice, Uniprix sent the members a notice of non-renewal and purported to terminate the agreement. The members contested Uniprix’s decision based on the fact that under the affiliation agreement, the renewal clause could only be exercised by the members and, unless the members gave notice to the contrary, the contract was automatically renewed. Uniprix argued that the effect of the members’ position, which would bind the parties in perpetuity, was contrary to public order (i.e., it violated a fundamental societal value) and unlawful and, as such, the term of the agreement should be considered to be for an indeterminate period, which would allow either party to terminate it on reasonable notice.

      In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held (in upholding the decisions of the majority of the Québec Court of Appeal and of the Superior Court of Québec) that there was nothing under Québec law that prohibited a contract of affiliation from having a perpetual term and that this did not, in and of itself and in the context of corporate and commercial agreements, offend any fundamental societal values. The Court’s holding would equally apply to many other types of contracts such as, for example, franchise agreements and licensing agreements. The Court held, accordingly, that the affiliation agreement was not for an indeterminate term and, therefore, could be not be terminated by Uniprix by providing reasonable notice.

      With respect to the holding in Uniprix , the following points should be kept in mind:

      1. The Supreme Court of Canada expressly noted that in certain circumstances, such as where an individual’sperson and freedom are affected (e.g., a contract of employment), a perpetual obligation could offend public order.
      2. In certain specific cases set out in the Civil Code of Québec, the legislator has provided maximum terms for certain types of contracts (e.g., a commercial lease cannot exceed 100 years, the duration of payment of an annuity is 100 years).
      3. In the case of a contract of adhesion (which is generally defined as a contract where one of the parties was unable to negotiate its terms), the adhering or vulnerable party can argue that a perpetual term is abusive and, therefore, null.
      4. The Court’s decision in Uniprixapplied to Uniprix’s ability to terminate the contract without cause. A party always retains the right to terminate a contract for cause. What constitutes “cause” is decided on a case by case basis and may also be governed by the terms of the contract.

      When drafting contracts, parties are generally, subject to limitations imposed by the legislator or public order, permitted to structure their relationship as they see fit. Parties should carefully consider whether they truly intend the duration of their agreement to be entirely under the control of one of the parties to the agreement for an indefinite period of time because, as is made clear in Uniprix, perpetual commercial contracts are enforceable under Québec law.

      The author of this post is David Stolow.

      Karin Graf

      Áreas de prática

      • Arbitragem
      • Contratos
      • Cobrança de créditos
      • Insolvência
      • Contencioso
      Contato Karin

      Scrivi a Karin





        Read the privacy policy of Legalmondo.
        This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

        China – Dispute Resolution Methods

        24 de Maio, 2017

        • China
        • Arbitragem
        • Contencioso

        It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

        At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

        One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

        Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

        No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

        The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

        Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

        The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

        Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

        The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

        Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

        The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

        In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

        From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

        What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

        Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

        The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

        With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

        Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

        From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

        It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

        By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

        In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

        State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

        Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

        “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

        “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

        The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

        One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

        “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

        As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

        Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

        There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

        A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

        The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

        In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

        The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

        The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

        The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

        The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

        In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

        Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

        Conclusions

        If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

        If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

        And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

        With the recent sentence n° 16601/2017 the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di Cassazione”) – changing its jurisprudence – opened to the possibility of recognizing in Italy foreign judgments containing punitive damages. In this post we will see what these punitive damages are about, under which conditions they will be recognized and enforced in Italy and, above all, which countermeasures may be implemented to deal with these new risks.

        Punitive damages are a monetary compensation – typical of common law legal systems – awarded to an injured party that goes beyond what is necessary to compensate the individual for losses. Normally punitive damages are imposed when the person who caused the damage acted with wilful misconduct and gross negligence.

        With punitive damages, other than the compensatory function, the reimbursement of damages assumes also a sanctioning purpose, typical of criminal law, also acting like a deterrent towards other potential lawbreakers.

        In the legal systems that provide for punitive damages, the recognition and the quantification of the highest compensation, most of the time, are delegated to the Judge.

        In the United States of America punitive damages are a settled principle of common law, but ruled in different ways for each State. However, generally, they are applied when the conduct of person who caused the damage was intentionally directed to cause damage or is put in place without regard to the protection and safety standards. Usually they cannot be awarded for breach of contract, unless it also leads to an independent tort.

        Historically, in Italy, punitive damages generally were not recognized, because the sanctioning purpose is not consistent with the civil law principles, anchored to the concept that the reimbursement of the damage is a simple restoration of financial heritage of the damaged person.

        Therefore, the recognition of punitive damage established by a foreign judgment was normally denied due to a violation of the public policy (“ordre public”), so those judgments did not have access to the Italian legal system.

        The sentence n° 16601/2017 of the 5 July 2017 of the Joint Sessions of Italian Supreme Court (“Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione”) however, changed the cards on the table. In this particular case, the plaintiff applied to the Venice Court of Appeal for the recognition (pursuant to art. 64, law 218/1995) of three judgments of District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida that, accepting a guarantee call submitted by an American retailer of helmets against the Italian company, condemned this latter to pay 1.436.136,87 USD (in addition to legal expenses and interests) for the damages caused by a defect in the helmet used in occasion of the accident.

        The Venice Court of Appeal recognized the foreign judgment, considering the abovementioned sum merely as compensation for damages and not as punitive damages. This decision was challenged by the unsuccessful Italian party before the Italian Supreme Court, arguing the violation of the Italian ordre public by the US judgment, on the basis of a consolidated juridical opinion until that day.

        The Supreme Court of Cassation confirmed the Venice Court assessment, considering the sum non-punitive and recognized the US judgment in Italy.

        The Supreme Court, though, took the opportunity to address the question of the admissibility of punitive damages in Italy, changing the previous orientation (see Cass. 1781/2012).

        According to the Court, the concept of civil liability as mere compensation of the damage suffered is to be considered obsolete, given the evolution of this institute through national and European legislation and case-law that introduced civil remedies intended to punish the wrongdoer. As a matter of fact, in our system, it’s possible to find several cases of damages with sanctioning function: in the matter of libel by press (art. 12 L. 47/48), copyright (art. 158 L. 633/41), industrial property (art. 125 D. Lgs. 30/2005), abuse of process (art. 96 comma 3 c.p.c. e art. 26 comma 2 c.p.a.), labour law (art. 18, comma 14), family law (art. 709-ter c.p.c.) and others.

        The Supreme Court has, therefore, stated the following principle: “Under Italian law, civil liability is aimed not only to compensate for losses incurred by the injured party, but also to reform the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar. Therefore, the US legal institute of punitive damages is not incompatible with the Italian legal system”.

        The important consequence is that this decision opens the door to possible recognition of foreign sentences that condemn a party to pay a sum higher than the amount sufficient to compensate the suffered injury as a result of the damage.

        To that end, however, the Supreme Court has set certain conditions so that foreign sentences have validity, that is to say that the decision is made in foreign law system on a normative basis that:

        1. Clearly establish the cases in which it is possible to convict a party to pay punitive damages; and
        2. The predictability of it; and
        3. Establish quantitative limits.

        It has to be clarified that the sentence has not modified the Italian system of civil liability. In other words, the sentence will not allow Italian Judges to establish punitive damages under Italian law.

        As for foreign court decisions, it will be now possible to obtain a compensation for punitive damages through the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, as long as they respect the above requirements.

        Extending our view beyond the Italian borders, we notice that punitive damages are alien to the legal tradition of most of  European States: there is the possibility, though, that other Courts of continental Europe might follow the decision of the Italian Supreme Court and recognize foreign judgments which grant punitive damages.

                         

        How to prevent this new risk

        There are several measures which businessmen can adopt to mitigate this new risk: firstly the adoption of contractual clauses that exclude this kind of damages or establish a cap on the amount of the contractual damages which can be claimed, for example by limiting the value of damages at the price of the products or services provided.

        Furthermore, it’s very important to have an overall knowledge of the legislation and case law of the markets in which the enterprise operates, even indirectly (for example: with the commercial distribution of products) in order to choose consciously the applicable law to the contract and the dispute resolution methods (for example: establishing the jurisdiction in a country that does not provide for punitive damages).

        Finally, this type of liability and risk may also be covered by a product liability insurance.

        How to make sure that your claim can be enforced in the long run? A creditor may freeze assets that a debtor holds in Switzerland if certain conditions are fulfilled. In practice, there are two situations in which one might consider an attachment of assets: the first is where a creditor has a claim against a debtor without domicile in Switzerland; the second is where a creditor holds an enforceable judgment or award.

        It is beyond doubt that the Swiss financial sector continues to play a dominant role in the financial world of today despite the regulatory pressure that it faces. The Swiss jurisdiction, therefore, is relevant for creditors who wish to enforce claims against a debtor who holds bank accounts or other assets in Switzerland. Even though practice shows that it is predominantly bank accounts that are being attached, other assets such as real estate, art works or claims against third parties are equally capable of being attached.

        Upon application, the Swiss court at the seat of the bank or at the place where the assets are located will grant an ex parte freezing order to a creditor against a debtor with assets in Switzerland, if the applying creditor demonstrates on a prima facie basis that the following three prerequisites of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) are met:

        • The creditor seeking a freezing order has a mature and unsecured claim;
        • The debtor’s assets are located in Switzerland;
        • A legal ground for a freezing order exists.

        As already pointed out, the most relevant grounds for a freezing order are:

        • The debtor is not resident in Switzerland and the claim itself has sufficient connection with Switzerland or is based on an acknowledgement of debt signed by the debtor (“attachment against a non-Swiss resident”);
        • The creditor has an enforceable court decision or arbitral award against the debtor (“enforceable title”).

        Attachment against a non-Swiss resident: The mere fact that the assets are located in Switzerland will not suffice to establish a “sufficient connection with Switzerland” in the sense of the DEBA. The requirement of “sufficient connection with Switzerland” very much depends on the specific facts of the case which the Swiss court will review on a case-by-case basis. Swiss courts have confirmed that there was a sufficient connection in cases where the underlying contract was signed or fulfilled in Switzerland, where the underlying contract is governed by Swiss law, where the creditor lives in Switzerland or where the creditor’s claim is linked to a commercial activity in Switzerland.

        Enforceable title: In order to rely on the second ground for a freezing order the creditor needs to have an enforceable title. The DEBA makes no distinction between domestic and foreign court decisions or arbitral awards. Provided that they are enforceable (either according to the Lugano Convention, the Swiss Private International Law Act or – in the case of a non-Swiss arbitral award – the New York Convention), all judgments and awards may serve as a ground for an attachment of Swiss assets.

        The Swiss court will request the creditor to provide prima facie evidence on the prerequisites of an attachment as outlined above. Because the attachment itself will be granted ex parte, it will, in many instances, take the debtor by surprise. Thanks to this surprise effect and the nature of the attachment, i.e. the fact that it will prevent the debtor from further disposing of the attached assets, the attachment has a great potential for helping the creditor to secure and ultimately satisfy its claim.

        [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

        It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

        In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

        This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

        Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

        Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

        Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

        The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of “sufficient justification” and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

        As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

        The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

        It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

        To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

        Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

        One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

        On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

        Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

        Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

        How much does it tell us?

        Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

        The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

        If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

        Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

        This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

        Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

        Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

        The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

        The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

        It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

        There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

        • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
        • a frustration or a force majeure.

        There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

        The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

        What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

        The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

        A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

        If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

        • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
        • the good faith of the parties;
        • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
        • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
        • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

        What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

        The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

        The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

        • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
        • sudden;
        • unpredictable.

        To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

        • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
        • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
        • a constant increase in turnover;
        • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
        • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
        • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
        • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
        • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

        The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

        • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
        • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
        • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

        Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

        Compensation for a damage

        The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

        The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

        The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

        International law

        The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

        However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

        The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

        The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

        In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

        • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
        • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

        In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

        In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

        The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

        When negotiating contracts, parties typically focus on the key commercial terms of their agreement. The clauses that govern the term of the agreement (i.e., the duration, or how long the contract remains in force), the renewal of the term, and how the agreement can be terminated, however, merit careful consideration.

        Under Québec law, contracts typically have terms that are either fixed (e.g., 5 years, 10 years etc.), or are for an indeterminate period of time (i.e., no specific term is provided for). Contracts with fixed terms may also contain automatic renewal clauses. In the case of an indeterminate term contract, a party to the contract can generally, absent specific terms or a notice provision to the contrary in the contract, terminate it, without cause, by providing reasonable notice of termination (what constitutes “reasonable notice” depends on a number of factors and is decided on the facts of each case). A third category of contracts are contracts with a potentially perpetual term. An example of a potentially perpetual contract is a contract that contains a renewal clause that is entirely under the control of only one of the parties who can, effectively, unilaterally decide whether the contract will go on indefinitely. In such a contract, the other contracting party does not have a right to terminate the contract by providing reasonable notice of termination. The validity of perpetual term contracts was precisely the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada in its July 28, 2017 decision in Uniprix inc. v. Gestion Gosselin et Bérubé inc. https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16746/index.do (“Uniprix“).

        In Uniprix, the pharmacy chain entered into an affiliation agreement with various members of a pharmacists’ group pursuant to which said members operated a pharmacy under the Uniprix banner. The term of the contract was for a fixed term of 5 years and the renewal clause allowed members to provide a notice within a certain period of time, failing which the contract would automatically be renewed for an additional 5 years:

        Regardless of any written or verbal provisions to the contrary, this agreement shall commence on the day of its signing and shall remain in effect for a period of sixty (60) months, or for a period equal to the term of the lease for the premises where the pharmacy is located. [The member pharmacist] shall, six (6) months before the expiration of the agreement, notify [Uniprix] of its intention to leave [Uniprix] or to renew the agreement; 

        Should [the member pharmacist] fail to send the prescribed notice by registered mail, the agreement shall be deemed to have been renewed in accordance with the terms and conditions then in effect, as prescribed by the board of directors, except with regard to the fee.[Translation]

        The Uniprix agreement did not provide any say to Uniprix in connection with its renewal and there were no limits on the number of times that the members could renew the agreement. As such, the contract could remain in force perpetually based entirely on the members’ decision. After the contract had been renewed twice, Uniprix sent the members a notice of non-renewal and purported to terminate the agreement. The members contested Uniprix’s decision based on the fact that under the affiliation agreement, the renewal clause could only be exercised by the members and, unless the members gave notice to the contrary, the contract was automatically renewed. Uniprix argued that the effect of the members’ position, which would bind the parties in perpetuity, was contrary to public order (i.e., it violated a fundamental societal value) and unlawful and, as such, the term of the agreement should be considered to be for an indeterminate period, which would allow either party to terminate it on reasonable notice.

        In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held (in upholding the decisions of the majority of the Québec Court of Appeal and of the Superior Court of Québec) that there was nothing under Québec law that prohibited a contract of affiliation from having a perpetual term and that this did not, in and of itself and in the context of corporate and commercial agreements, offend any fundamental societal values. The Court’s holding would equally apply to many other types of contracts such as, for example, franchise agreements and licensing agreements. The Court held, accordingly, that the affiliation agreement was not for an indeterminate term and, therefore, could be not be terminated by Uniprix by providing reasonable notice.

        With respect to the holding in Uniprix , the following points should be kept in mind:

        1. The Supreme Court of Canada expressly noted that in certain circumstances, such as where an individual’sperson and freedom are affected (e.g., a contract of employment), a perpetual obligation could offend public order.
        2. In certain specific cases set out in the Civil Code of Québec, the legislator has provided maximum terms for certain types of contracts (e.g., a commercial lease cannot exceed 100 years, the duration of payment of an annuity is 100 years).
        3. In the case of a contract of adhesion (which is generally defined as a contract where one of the parties was unable to negotiate its terms), the adhering or vulnerable party can argue that a perpetual term is abusive and, therefore, null.
        4. The Court’s decision in Uniprixapplied to Uniprix’s ability to terminate the contract without cause. A party always retains the right to terminate a contract for cause. What constitutes “cause” is decided on a case by case basis and may also be governed by the terms of the contract.

        When drafting contracts, parties are generally, subject to limitations imposed by the legislator or public order, permitted to structure their relationship as they see fit. Parties should carefully consider whether they truly intend the duration of their agreement to be entirely under the control of one of the parties to the agreement for an indefinite period of time because, as is made clear in Uniprix, perpetual commercial contracts are enforceable under Québec law.

        The author of this post is David Stolow.

        Enforcement of foreign decisions and arbitral awards in Venezuela

        21 de Março, 2017

        • Venezuela
        • Arbitragem
        • Contratos
        • Contencioso

        It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

        At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

        One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

        Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

        No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

        The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

        Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

        The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

        Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

        The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

        Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

        The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

        In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

        From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

        What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

        Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

        The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

        With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

        Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

        From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

        It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

        By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

        In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

        State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

        Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

        “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

        “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

        The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

        One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

        “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

        As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

        Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

        There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

        A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

        The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

        In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

        The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

        The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

        The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

        The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

        In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

        Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

        Conclusions

        If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

        If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

        And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

        With the recent sentence n° 16601/2017 the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di Cassazione”) – changing its jurisprudence – opened to the possibility of recognizing in Italy foreign judgments containing punitive damages. In this post we will see what these punitive damages are about, under which conditions they will be recognized and enforced in Italy and, above all, which countermeasures may be implemented to deal with these new risks.

        Punitive damages are a monetary compensation – typical of common law legal systems – awarded to an injured party that goes beyond what is necessary to compensate the individual for losses. Normally punitive damages are imposed when the person who caused the damage acted with wilful misconduct and gross negligence.

        With punitive damages, other than the compensatory function, the reimbursement of damages assumes also a sanctioning purpose, typical of criminal law, also acting like a deterrent towards other potential lawbreakers.

        In the legal systems that provide for punitive damages, the recognition and the quantification of the highest compensation, most of the time, are delegated to the Judge.

        In the United States of America punitive damages are a settled principle of common law, but ruled in different ways for each State. However, generally, they are applied when the conduct of person who caused the damage was intentionally directed to cause damage or is put in place without regard to the protection and safety standards. Usually they cannot be awarded for breach of contract, unless it also leads to an independent tort.

        Historically, in Italy, punitive damages generally were not recognized, because the sanctioning purpose is not consistent with the civil law principles, anchored to the concept that the reimbursement of the damage is a simple restoration of financial heritage of the damaged person.

        Therefore, the recognition of punitive damage established by a foreign judgment was normally denied due to a violation of the public policy (“ordre public”), so those judgments did not have access to the Italian legal system.

        The sentence n° 16601/2017 of the 5 July 2017 of the Joint Sessions of Italian Supreme Court (“Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione”) however, changed the cards on the table. In this particular case, the plaintiff applied to the Venice Court of Appeal for the recognition (pursuant to art. 64, law 218/1995) of three judgments of District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida that, accepting a guarantee call submitted by an American retailer of helmets against the Italian company, condemned this latter to pay 1.436.136,87 USD (in addition to legal expenses and interests) for the damages caused by a defect in the helmet used in occasion of the accident.

        The Venice Court of Appeal recognized the foreign judgment, considering the abovementioned sum merely as compensation for damages and not as punitive damages. This decision was challenged by the unsuccessful Italian party before the Italian Supreme Court, arguing the violation of the Italian ordre public by the US judgment, on the basis of a consolidated juridical opinion until that day.

        The Supreme Court of Cassation confirmed the Venice Court assessment, considering the sum non-punitive and recognized the US judgment in Italy.

        The Supreme Court, though, took the opportunity to address the question of the admissibility of punitive damages in Italy, changing the previous orientation (see Cass. 1781/2012).

        According to the Court, the concept of civil liability as mere compensation of the damage suffered is to be considered obsolete, given the evolution of this institute through national and European legislation and case-law that introduced civil remedies intended to punish the wrongdoer. As a matter of fact, in our system, it’s possible to find several cases of damages with sanctioning function: in the matter of libel by press (art. 12 L. 47/48), copyright (art. 158 L. 633/41), industrial property (art. 125 D. Lgs. 30/2005), abuse of process (art. 96 comma 3 c.p.c. e art. 26 comma 2 c.p.a.), labour law (art. 18, comma 14), family law (art. 709-ter c.p.c.) and others.

        The Supreme Court has, therefore, stated the following principle: “Under Italian law, civil liability is aimed not only to compensate for losses incurred by the injured party, but also to reform the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar. Therefore, the US legal institute of punitive damages is not incompatible with the Italian legal system”.

        The important consequence is that this decision opens the door to possible recognition of foreign sentences that condemn a party to pay a sum higher than the amount sufficient to compensate the suffered injury as a result of the damage.

        To that end, however, the Supreme Court has set certain conditions so that foreign sentences have validity, that is to say that the decision is made in foreign law system on a normative basis that:

        1. Clearly establish the cases in which it is possible to convict a party to pay punitive damages; and
        2. The predictability of it; and
        3. Establish quantitative limits.

        It has to be clarified that the sentence has not modified the Italian system of civil liability. In other words, the sentence will not allow Italian Judges to establish punitive damages under Italian law.

        As for foreign court decisions, it will be now possible to obtain a compensation for punitive damages through the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, as long as they respect the above requirements.

        Extending our view beyond the Italian borders, we notice that punitive damages are alien to the legal tradition of most of  European States: there is the possibility, though, that other Courts of continental Europe might follow the decision of the Italian Supreme Court and recognize foreign judgments which grant punitive damages.

                         

        How to prevent this new risk

        There are several measures which businessmen can adopt to mitigate this new risk: firstly the adoption of contractual clauses that exclude this kind of damages or establish a cap on the amount of the contractual damages which can be claimed, for example by limiting the value of damages at the price of the products or services provided.

        Furthermore, it’s very important to have an overall knowledge of the legislation and case law of the markets in which the enterprise operates, even indirectly (for example: with the commercial distribution of products) in order to choose consciously the applicable law to the contract and the dispute resolution methods (for example: establishing the jurisdiction in a country that does not provide for punitive damages).

        Finally, this type of liability and risk may also be covered by a product liability insurance.

        How to make sure that your claim can be enforced in the long run? A creditor may freeze assets that a debtor holds in Switzerland if certain conditions are fulfilled. In practice, there are two situations in which one might consider an attachment of assets: the first is where a creditor has a claim against a debtor without domicile in Switzerland; the second is where a creditor holds an enforceable judgment or award.

        It is beyond doubt that the Swiss financial sector continues to play a dominant role in the financial world of today despite the regulatory pressure that it faces. The Swiss jurisdiction, therefore, is relevant for creditors who wish to enforce claims against a debtor who holds bank accounts or other assets in Switzerland. Even though practice shows that it is predominantly bank accounts that are being attached, other assets such as real estate, art works or claims against third parties are equally capable of being attached.

        Upon application, the Swiss court at the seat of the bank or at the place where the assets are located will grant an ex parte freezing order to a creditor against a debtor with assets in Switzerland, if the applying creditor demonstrates on a prima facie basis that the following three prerequisites of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) are met:

        • The creditor seeking a freezing order has a mature and unsecured claim;
        • The debtor’s assets are located in Switzerland;
        • A legal ground for a freezing order exists.

        As already pointed out, the most relevant grounds for a freezing order are:

        • The debtor is not resident in Switzerland and the claim itself has sufficient connection with Switzerland or is based on an acknowledgement of debt signed by the debtor (“attachment against a non-Swiss resident”);
        • The creditor has an enforceable court decision or arbitral award against the debtor (“enforceable title”).

        Attachment against a non-Swiss resident: The mere fact that the assets are located in Switzerland will not suffice to establish a “sufficient connection with Switzerland” in the sense of the DEBA. The requirement of “sufficient connection with Switzerland” very much depends on the specific facts of the case which the Swiss court will review on a case-by-case basis. Swiss courts have confirmed that there was a sufficient connection in cases where the underlying contract was signed or fulfilled in Switzerland, where the underlying contract is governed by Swiss law, where the creditor lives in Switzerland or where the creditor’s claim is linked to a commercial activity in Switzerland.

        Enforceable title: In order to rely on the second ground for a freezing order the creditor needs to have an enforceable title. The DEBA makes no distinction between domestic and foreign court decisions or arbitral awards. Provided that they are enforceable (either according to the Lugano Convention, the Swiss Private International Law Act or – in the case of a non-Swiss arbitral award – the New York Convention), all judgments and awards may serve as a ground for an attachment of Swiss assets.

        The Swiss court will request the creditor to provide prima facie evidence on the prerequisites of an attachment as outlined above. Because the attachment itself will be granted ex parte, it will, in many instances, take the debtor by surprise. Thanks to this surprise effect and the nature of the attachment, i.e. the fact that it will prevent the debtor from further disposing of the attached assets, the attachment has a great potential for helping the creditor to secure and ultimately satisfy its claim.

        [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

        It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

        In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

        This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

        Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

        Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

        Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

        The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of “sufficient justification” and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

        As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

        The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

        It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

        To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

        Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

        One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

        On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

        Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

        Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

        How much does it tell us?

        Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

        The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

        If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

        Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

        This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

        Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

        Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

        The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

        The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

        It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

        There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

        • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
        • a frustration or a force majeure.

        There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

        The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

        What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

        The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

        A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

        If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

        • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
        • the good faith of the parties;
        • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
        • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
        • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

        What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

        The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

        The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

        • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
        • sudden;
        • unpredictable.

        To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

        • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
        • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
        • a constant increase in turnover;
        • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
        • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
        • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
        • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
        • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

        The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

        • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
        • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
        • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

        Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

        Compensation for a damage

        The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

        The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

        The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

        International law

        The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

        However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

        The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

        The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

        In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

        • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
        • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

        In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

        In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

        The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

        When negotiating contracts, parties typically focus on the key commercial terms of their agreement. The clauses that govern the term of the agreement (i.e., the duration, or how long the contract remains in force), the renewal of the term, and how the agreement can be terminated, however, merit careful consideration.

        Under Québec law, contracts typically have terms that are either fixed (e.g., 5 years, 10 years etc.), or are for an indeterminate period of time (i.e., no specific term is provided for). Contracts with fixed terms may also contain automatic renewal clauses. In the case of an indeterminate term contract, a party to the contract can generally, absent specific terms or a notice provision to the contrary in the contract, terminate it, without cause, by providing reasonable notice of termination (what constitutes “reasonable notice” depends on a number of factors and is decided on the facts of each case). A third category of contracts are contracts with a potentially perpetual term. An example of a potentially perpetual contract is a contract that contains a renewal clause that is entirely under the control of only one of the parties who can, effectively, unilaterally decide whether the contract will go on indefinitely. In such a contract, the other contracting party does not have a right to terminate the contract by providing reasonable notice of termination. The validity of perpetual term contracts was precisely the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada in its July 28, 2017 decision in Uniprix inc. v. Gestion Gosselin et Bérubé inc. https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16746/index.do (“Uniprix“).

        In Uniprix, the pharmacy chain entered into an affiliation agreement with various members of a pharmacists’ group pursuant to which said members operated a pharmacy under the Uniprix banner. The term of the contract was for a fixed term of 5 years and the renewal clause allowed members to provide a notice within a certain period of time, failing which the contract would automatically be renewed for an additional 5 years:

        Regardless of any written or verbal provisions to the contrary, this agreement shall commence on the day of its signing and shall remain in effect for a period of sixty (60) months, or for a period equal to the term of the lease for the premises where the pharmacy is located. [The member pharmacist] shall, six (6) months before the expiration of the agreement, notify [Uniprix] of its intention to leave [Uniprix] or to renew the agreement; 

        Should [the member pharmacist] fail to send the prescribed notice by registered mail, the agreement shall be deemed to have been renewed in accordance with the terms and conditions then in effect, as prescribed by the board of directors, except with regard to the fee.[Translation]

        The Uniprix agreement did not provide any say to Uniprix in connection with its renewal and there were no limits on the number of times that the members could renew the agreement. As such, the contract could remain in force perpetually based entirely on the members’ decision. After the contract had been renewed twice, Uniprix sent the members a notice of non-renewal and purported to terminate the agreement. The members contested Uniprix’s decision based on the fact that under the affiliation agreement, the renewal clause could only be exercised by the members and, unless the members gave notice to the contrary, the contract was automatically renewed. Uniprix argued that the effect of the members’ position, which would bind the parties in perpetuity, was contrary to public order (i.e., it violated a fundamental societal value) and unlawful and, as such, the term of the agreement should be considered to be for an indeterminate period, which would allow either party to terminate it on reasonable notice.

        In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held (in upholding the decisions of the majority of the Québec Court of Appeal and of the Superior Court of Québec) that there was nothing under Québec law that prohibited a contract of affiliation from having a perpetual term and that this did not, in and of itself and in the context of corporate and commercial agreements, offend any fundamental societal values. The Court’s holding would equally apply to many other types of contracts such as, for example, franchise agreements and licensing agreements. The Court held, accordingly, that the affiliation agreement was not for an indeterminate term and, therefore, could be not be terminated by Uniprix by providing reasonable notice.

        With respect to the holding in Uniprix , the following points should be kept in mind:

        1. The Supreme Court of Canada expressly noted that in certain circumstances, such as where an individual’sperson and freedom are affected (e.g., a contract of employment), a perpetual obligation could offend public order.
        2. In certain specific cases set out in the Civil Code of Québec, the legislator has provided maximum terms for certain types of contracts (e.g., a commercial lease cannot exceed 100 years, the duration of payment of an annuity is 100 years).
        3. In the case of a contract of adhesion (which is generally defined as a contract where one of the parties was unable to negotiate its terms), the adhering or vulnerable party can argue that a perpetual term is abusive and, therefore, null.
        4. The Court’s decision in Uniprixapplied to Uniprix’s ability to terminate the contract without cause. A party always retains the right to terminate a contract for cause. What constitutes “cause” is decided on a case by case basis and may also be governed by the terms of the contract.

        When drafting contracts, parties are generally, subject to limitations imposed by the legislator or public order, permitted to structure their relationship as they see fit. Parties should carefully consider whether they truly intend the duration of their agreement to be entirely under the control of one of the parties to the agreement for an indefinite period of time because, as is made clear in Uniprix, perpetual commercial contracts are enforceable under Québec law.

        The author of this post is David Stolow.

        The EU Regulation 655/2014 on transnational seizures on bank accounts

        21 de Dezembro, 2016

        • Europa
        • Banca
        • Cobrança de créditos
        • Contencioso

        It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

        At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

        One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

        Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

        No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

        The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

        Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

        The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

        Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

        The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

        Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

        The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

        In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

        From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

        What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

        Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

        The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

        With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

        Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

        From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

        It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

        By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

        In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

        State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

        Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

        “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

        “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

        The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

        One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

        “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

        As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

        Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

        There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

        A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

        The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

        In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

        The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

        The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

        The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

        The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

        In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

        Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

        Conclusions

        If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

        If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

        And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

        With the recent sentence n° 16601/2017 the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di Cassazione”) – changing its jurisprudence – opened to the possibility of recognizing in Italy foreign judgments containing punitive damages. In this post we will see what these punitive damages are about, under which conditions they will be recognized and enforced in Italy and, above all, which countermeasures may be implemented to deal with these new risks.

        Punitive damages are a monetary compensation – typical of common law legal systems – awarded to an injured party that goes beyond what is necessary to compensate the individual for losses. Normally punitive damages are imposed when the person who caused the damage acted with wilful misconduct and gross negligence.

        With punitive damages, other than the compensatory function, the reimbursement of damages assumes also a sanctioning purpose, typical of criminal law, also acting like a deterrent towards other potential lawbreakers.

        In the legal systems that provide for punitive damages, the recognition and the quantification of the highest compensation, most of the time, are delegated to the Judge.

        In the United States of America punitive damages are a settled principle of common law, but ruled in different ways for each State. However, generally, they are applied when the conduct of person who caused the damage was intentionally directed to cause damage or is put in place without regard to the protection and safety standards. Usually they cannot be awarded for breach of contract, unless it also leads to an independent tort.

        Historically, in Italy, punitive damages generally were not recognized, because the sanctioning purpose is not consistent with the civil law principles, anchored to the concept that the reimbursement of the damage is a simple restoration of financial heritage of the damaged person.

        Therefore, the recognition of punitive damage established by a foreign judgment was normally denied due to a violation of the public policy (“ordre public”), so those judgments did not have access to the Italian legal system.

        The sentence n° 16601/2017 of the 5 July 2017 of the Joint Sessions of Italian Supreme Court (“Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione”) however, changed the cards on the table. In this particular case, the plaintiff applied to the Venice Court of Appeal for the recognition (pursuant to art. 64, law 218/1995) of three judgments of District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida that, accepting a guarantee call submitted by an American retailer of helmets against the Italian company, condemned this latter to pay 1.436.136,87 USD (in addition to legal expenses and interests) for the damages caused by a defect in the helmet used in occasion of the accident.

        The Venice Court of Appeal recognized the foreign judgment, considering the abovementioned sum merely as compensation for damages and not as punitive damages. This decision was challenged by the unsuccessful Italian party before the Italian Supreme Court, arguing the violation of the Italian ordre public by the US judgment, on the basis of a consolidated juridical opinion until that day.

        The Supreme Court of Cassation confirmed the Venice Court assessment, considering the sum non-punitive and recognized the US judgment in Italy.

        The Supreme Court, though, took the opportunity to address the question of the admissibility of punitive damages in Italy, changing the previous orientation (see Cass. 1781/2012).

        According to the Court, the concept of civil liability as mere compensation of the damage suffered is to be considered obsolete, given the evolution of this institute through national and European legislation and case-law that introduced civil remedies intended to punish the wrongdoer. As a matter of fact, in our system, it’s possible to find several cases of damages with sanctioning function: in the matter of libel by press (art. 12 L. 47/48), copyright (art. 158 L. 633/41), industrial property (art. 125 D. Lgs. 30/2005), abuse of process (art. 96 comma 3 c.p.c. e art. 26 comma 2 c.p.a.), labour law (art. 18, comma 14), family law (art. 709-ter c.p.c.) and others.

        The Supreme Court has, therefore, stated the following principle: “Under Italian law, civil liability is aimed not only to compensate for losses incurred by the injured party, but also to reform the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar. Therefore, the US legal institute of punitive damages is not incompatible with the Italian legal system”.

        The important consequence is that this decision opens the door to possible recognition of foreign sentences that condemn a party to pay a sum higher than the amount sufficient to compensate the suffered injury as a result of the damage.

        To that end, however, the Supreme Court has set certain conditions so that foreign sentences have validity, that is to say that the decision is made in foreign law system on a normative basis that:

        1. Clearly establish the cases in which it is possible to convict a party to pay punitive damages; and
        2. The predictability of it; and
        3. Establish quantitative limits.

        It has to be clarified that the sentence has not modified the Italian system of civil liability. In other words, the sentence will not allow Italian Judges to establish punitive damages under Italian law.

        As for foreign court decisions, it will be now possible to obtain a compensation for punitive damages through the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, as long as they respect the above requirements.

        Extending our view beyond the Italian borders, we notice that punitive damages are alien to the legal tradition of most of  European States: there is the possibility, though, that other Courts of continental Europe might follow the decision of the Italian Supreme Court and recognize foreign judgments which grant punitive damages.

                         

        How to prevent this new risk

        There are several measures which businessmen can adopt to mitigate this new risk: firstly the adoption of contractual clauses that exclude this kind of damages or establish a cap on the amount of the contractual damages which can be claimed, for example by limiting the value of damages at the price of the products or services provided.

        Furthermore, it’s very important to have an overall knowledge of the legislation and case law of the markets in which the enterprise operates, even indirectly (for example: with the commercial distribution of products) in order to choose consciously the applicable law to the contract and the dispute resolution methods (for example: establishing the jurisdiction in a country that does not provide for punitive damages).

        Finally, this type of liability and risk may also be covered by a product liability insurance.

        How to make sure that your claim can be enforced in the long run? A creditor may freeze assets that a debtor holds in Switzerland if certain conditions are fulfilled. In practice, there are two situations in which one might consider an attachment of assets: the first is where a creditor has a claim against a debtor without domicile in Switzerland; the second is where a creditor holds an enforceable judgment or award.

        It is beyond doubt that the Swiss financial sector continues to play a dominant role in the financial world of today despite the regulatory pressure that it faces. The Swiss jurisdiction, therefore, is relevant for creditors who wish to enforce claims against a debtor who holds bank accounts or other assets in Switzerland. Even though practice shows that it is predominantly bank accounts that are being attached, other assets such as real estate, art works or claims against third parties are equally capable of being attached.

        Upon application, the Swiss court at the seat of the bank or at the place where the assets are located will grant an ex parte freezing order to a creditor against a debtor with assets in Switzerland, if the applying creditor demonstrates on a prima facie basis that the following three prerequisites of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) are met:

        • The creditor seeking a freezing order has a mature and unsecured claim;
        • The debtor’s assets are located in Switzerland;
        • A legal ground for a freezing order exists.

        As already pointed out, the most relevant grounds for a freezing order are:

        • The debtor is not resident in Switzerland and the claim itself has sufficient connection with Switzerland or is based on an acknowledgement of debt signed by the debtor (“attachment against a non-Swiss resident”);
        • The creditor has an enforceable court decision or arbitral award against the debtor (“enforceable title”).

        Attachment against a non-Swiss resident: The mere fact that the assets are located in Switzerland will not suffice to establish a “sufficient connection with Switzerland” in the sense of the DEBA. The requirement of “sufficient connection with Switzerland” very much depends on the specific facts of the case which the Swiss court will review on a case-by-case basis. Swiss courts have confirmed that there was a sufficient connection in cases where the underlying contract was signed or fulfilled in Switzerland, where the underlying contract is governed by Swiss law, where the creditor lives in Switzerland or where the creditor’s claim is linked to a commercial activity in Switzerland.

        Enforceable title: In order to rely on the second ground for a freezing order the creditor needs to have an enforceable title. The DEBA makes no distinction between domestic and foreign court decisions or arbitral awards. Provided that they are enforceable (either according to the Lugano Convention, the Swiss Private International Law Act or – in the case of a non-Swiss arbitral award – the New York Convention), all judgments and awards may serve as a ground for an attachment of Swiss assets.

        The Swiss court will request the creditor to provide prima facie evidence on the prerequisites of an attachment as outlined above. Because the attachment itself will be granted ex parte, it will, in many instances, take the debtor by surprise. Thanks to this surprise effect and the nature of the attachment, i.e. the fact that it will prevent the debtor from further disposing of the attached assets, the attachment has a great potential for helping the creditor to secure and ultimately satisfy its claim.

        [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

        It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

        In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

        This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

        Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

        Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

        Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

        The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of “sufficient justification” and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

        As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

        The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

        It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

        To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

        Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

        One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

        On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

        Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

        Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

        How much does it tell us?

        Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

        The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

        If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

        Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

        This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

        Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

        Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

        The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

        The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

        It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

        There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

        • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
        • a frustration or a force majeure.

        There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

        The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

        What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

        The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

        A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

        If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

        • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
        • the good faith of the parties;
        • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
        • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
        • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

        What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

        The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

        The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

        • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
        • sudden;
        • unpredictable.

        To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

        • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
        • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
        • a constant increase in turnover;
        • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
        • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
        • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
        • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
        • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

        The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

        • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
        • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
        • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

        Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

        Compensation for a damage

        The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

        The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

        The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

        International law

        The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

        However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

        The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

        The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

        In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

        • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
        • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

        In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

        In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

        The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

        When negotiating contracts, parties typically focus on the key commercial terms of their agreement. The clauses that govern the term of the agreement (i.e., the duration, or how long the contract remains in force), the renewal of the term, and how the agreement can be terminated, however, merit careful consideration.

        Under Québec law, contracts typically have terms that are either fixed (e.g., 5 years, 10 years etc.), or are for an indeterminate period of time (i.e., no specific term is provided for). Contracts with fixed terms may also contain automatic renewal clauses. In the case of an indeterminate term contract, a party to the contract can generally, absent specific terms or a notice provision to the contrary in the contract, terminate it, without cause, by providing reasonable notice of termination (what constitutes “reasonable notice” depends on a number of factors and is decided on the facts of each case). A third category of contracts are contracts with a potentially perpetual term. An example of a potentially perpetual contract is a contract that contains a renewal clause that is entirely under the control of only one of the parties who can, effectively, unilaterally decide whether the contract will go on indefinitely. In such a contract, the other contracting party does not have a right to terminate the contract by providing reasonable notice of termination. The validity of perpetual term contracts was precisely the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada in its July 28, 2017 decision in Uniprix inc. v. Gestion Gosselin et Bérubé inc. https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16746/index.do (“Uniprix“).

        In Uniprix, the pharmacy chain entered into an affiliation agreement with various members of a pharmacists’ group pursuant to which said members operated a pharmacy under the Uniprix banner. The term of the contract was for a fixed term of 5 years and the renewal clause allowed members to provide a notice within a certain period of time, failing which the contract would automatically be renewed for an additional 5 years:

        Regardless of any written or verbal provisions to the contrary, this agreement shall commence on the day of its signing and shall remain in effect for a period of sixty (60) months, or for a period equal to the term of the lease for the premises where the pharmacy is located. [The member pharmacist] shall, six (6) months before the expiration of the agreement, notify [Uniprix] of its intention to leave [Uniprix] or to renew the agreement; 

        Should [the member pharmacist] fail to send the prescribed notice by registered mail, the agreement shall be deemed to have been renewed in accordance with the terms and conditions then in effect, as prescribed by the board of directors, except with regard to the fee.[Translation]

        The Uniprix agreement did not provide any say to Uniprix in connection with its renewal and there were no limits on the number of times that the members could renew the agreement. As such, the contract could remain in force perpetually based entirely on the members’ decision. After the contract had been renewed twice, Uniprix sent the members a notice of non-renewal and purported to terminate the agreement. The members contested Uniprix’s decision based on the fact that under the affiliation agreement, the renewal clause could only be exercised by the members and, unless the members gave notice to the contrary, the contract was automatically renewed. Uniprix argued that the effect of the members’ position, which would bind the parties in perpetuity, was contrary to public order (i.e., it violated a fundamental societal value) and unlawful and, as such, the term of the agreement should be considered to be for an indeterminate period, which would allow either party to terminate it on reasonable notice.

        In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held (in upholding the decisions of the majority of the Québec Court of Appeal and of the Superior Court of Québec) that there was nothing under Québec law that prohibited a contract of affiliation from having a perpetual term and that this did not, in and of itself and in the context of corporate and commercial agreements, offend any fundamental societal values. The Court’s holding would equally apply to many other types of contracts such as, for example, franchise agreements and licensing agreements. The Court held, accordingly, that the affiliation agreement was not for an indeterminate term and, therefore, could be not be terminated by Uniprix by providing reasonable notice.

        With respect to the holding in Uniprix , the following points should be kept in mind:

        1. The Supreme Court of Canada expressly noted that in certain circumstances, such as where an individual’sperson and freedom are affected (e.g., a contract of employment), a perpetual obligation could offend public order.
        2. In certain specific cases set out in the Civil Code of Québec, the legislator has provided maximum terms for certain types of contracts (e.g., a commercial lease cannot exceed 100 years, the duration of payment of an annuity is 100 years).
        3. In the case of a contract of adhesion (which is generally defined as a contract where one of the parties was unable to negotiate its terms), the adhering or vulnerable party can argue that a perpetual term is abusive and, therefore, null.
        4. The Court’s decision in Uniprixapplied to Uniprix’s ability to terminate the contract without cause. A party always retains the right to terminate a contract for cause. What constitutes “cause” is decided on a case by case basis and may also be governed by the terms of the contract.

        When drafting contracts, parties are generally, subject to limitations imposed by the legislator or public order, permitted to structure their relationship as they see fit. Parties should carefully consider whether they truly intend the duration of their agreement to be entirely under the control of one of the parties to the agreement for an indefinite period of time because, as is made clear in Uniprix, perpetual commercial contracts are enforceable under Québec law.

        The author of this post is David Stolow.

        Foreign investments in Italy: Dispute resolution

        15 de Dezembro, 2016

        • Itália
        • Arbitragem
        • Contencioso

        It is often the case – in practice – that an ongoing commercial relationship builds slowly over time through a series of sales agreements, without the parties ever signing an actual distribution agreement to set down their respective rights and responsibilities.

        At first blush this might appear to be a good thing: one can sidestep being bound, especially long-term, to the other party. But on closer scrutiny the solution becomes problematic, especially for anyone operating internationally.

        One of the key issues that arises when an international contractual arrangement is not in writing, is identifying the court with jurisdiction over any dispute arising therefrom. In the European Union, the issue is resolved by the provisions of Regulation 1215/2012 (“Brussels I recast”). Pursuant to Article 7 of the Regulation, as an alternative to the defendant’s courts, jurisdiction in a contractual dispute may lie with the court in the place of performance of the obligation in question. Next to this general rule are two criteria to identify the “place of performance”, differentiated according to the type of contract at issue. For a contract for goods, it is the place of delivery for the goods; in a contract for services, it is the place where the services are provided.   

        Thus, to identify the court with jurisdiction, it is crucial that a contract fall under one of these categories: goods or services.

        No doubt this distinction is quite simple in many circumstances. In the case of a distribution agreement, or of a commercial concession agreement, the issue may become thorny.

        The European Court of Justice has analysed this issue on a number of occasions, most recently in their judgement of 8 March 2018 (Case no. C-64/17) following the request for a preliminary ruling from a Portuguese Court of Appeal. The parties to the action were a Portuguese distributor, a company called Lusavouga, and a Belgian company called Saey Home & Garden, that produced articles for the home and garden, including a line of products branded “Barbecook”.

        Following Saey’s decision to break off the commercial relationship – notice of which was sent in an email dated 17 July 2014 – Lusavouga brought action in Portugal seeking compensation for the unexpected termination of the agreement, and goodwill indemnity. Saey raised a plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Portuguese court, citing their general conditions of sale (mentioned in their invoices) which required that a Court in Belgium be competent for dispute resolution.

        The facts thus presented two issues to be resolved in light of the Brussels I recast Regulation: deciding whether a jurisdiction clause in a vendor’s general terms and conditions pursuant to Art. 25 of the Regulation shall apply, and, if not, choosing the court with jurisdiction under Art. 7 of the Regulation.

        Shall a jurisdiction clause contained within a vendor’s general terms and conditions apply to a distribution relationship?

        The supplier company apparently considered their course of dealing with the Portuguese retailer nothing more than a concatenation of individual sales of goods, governed by their general terms and conditions. Consequently, they argued that any dispute arising from the relationship should be subject to the jurisdiction clause identifying Belgium as the court with jurisdiction under those terms and conditions.

        Thus, a determination was needed on whether, under these facts, there was a valid prorogation of jurisdiction under Article 25, paragraph 1 of Regulation 1215/2012.

        The Court of Justice has long opined that if the jurisdiction clause is included in the general contract conditions drafted by one of the parties, the contract signed by the other party must contain an express reference to those general conditions in order to ensure the real consent thereto by the parties (judgement of 14 December 1976, Estasis Salotti di Colzani, case no. 24/76; judgement of 16 March 1999, Castelletti, case no. C-159/97; judgement of 7 July 2016, Höszig, case no. C-225/15). Moreover, to be valid, the clause must involve a particular legal relationship (judgement of 20 April 2016, Profit Investment SIM, case no. C-366/13).

        In the instant case, the referring court found it self-evident that the legal relationship at bar was a commercial concession agreement entered into for the purpose of distributing Saey products in Spain, a contract that was not evidenced in writing.

        From this perspective, it is clear that the general conditions contained in the Saey invoices could have no bearing on the commercial concession agreement: assuming Lusavouga’s consent had been proven, the selection of Belgium as the forum would have applied if anything to the individual sales agreements, but not to those duties arising from the separate distribution agreement.

        What, then, would be the court with jurisdiction for the duties arising from the commercial concession agreement?

        Absent any jurisdiction clause, the issue would be decided under Art. 7, point 1 of Regulation 1215/2012, under which it becomes imperative to establish whether a contract is for goods or for services.

        The “provision of services” has been defined by the Court of Justice as an activity, not mere omissions, undertaken in return for remuneration (judgement of 23 April 2009, Falco, case no. C-533/07).

        With the judgements in Corman Collins of 19 December 2013 (case no. C-9/12), and Granarolo of 14 July 2016 (case no. C-196/15), the Court held that in a typical distribution agreement, the dealer renders a service, in that they are involved in increasing the distribution of supplier’s product, and receives in consideration therefor a competitive advantage, access to advertising platforms, know-how, or payment facilities. In light of such elements, the contract relationship should be deemed one for services. If on the other hand the commercial relationship is limited to a concatenation of agreements, each for the purpose of a delivery and pickup of merchandise, then what we have is not a typical distribution agreement, and the contractual relationship shall be construed as one for the sale of goods.

        Once the contract has been categorised as one for services, one must then determine “the place where, under the contract, the services are provided”. The Court specifies that such location shall be understood as the member state of the place of the main provision of services, as it follows from the provisions of the contract  or – as in the case at issue – the actual performance of the same. Only where it is impossible to identify such location shall the domicile of the party rendering the service be used.

        From the referring court’s description of the contractual relationship, and from the Court of Justice’s understanding of the distributor’s performance of services, it would be logical to find that the principal location for performance of services was Spain, where Lusavouga “was involved in increasing the distribution of products” of Saey.

        It is clear that neither the manufacturer nor the distributor would ever have intended such a result, and they might have avoided it being chosen for them by reducing their agreement in writing, including a jurisdiction clause therein.

        By the same token, viewed from the outside, the Portuguese judges’ apparent conviction that the situation was one of an actual dealership contract would leave ample room for debate. After all, a number of elements would lead to the opposite conclusion. However, even in terms of that aspect, the absence of a written contract left room for interpretation that might lead to unforeseen – and perhaps rather risky – consequences.

        In conclusion, the wisdom of setting down the terms and conditions of a sales distribution agreement in writing appears clear. This is not only because one can avoid those ambiguities we have described above, but also because it specifies other important clauses stipulated by the parties that should not be left to chance: exclusivity of area, if any, or with respect to specific sales channels, the contract period and termination notice, any duties to promote the product, control over end-user personal data, and the possibility of, and methods for, any online sales of products.

        State commercial court in Russia is named in the Russian language – Арбитражный суд. This name of the state commercial court is often translated into English as Arbitration court. Such translation in its turn often causes actual misunderstanding between the parties, since the Russian party will most probably consider the term “Arbitration court” as a state commercial court and the other (non-Russian) party might consider that it agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration rather than in a state court.

        Below are some examples of dispute resolution clauses specified by the parties in commercial contracts that caused actual misunderstanding:

        “…if there is no agreement, any disputes and claims between the parties relating to the contract will be resolved by arbitration under the Rules of International Chamber of Commerce in Moscow by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said rules. The Arbitration court shall use the Russian law.”

        “…if a dispute is not resolved within 30 days of written notification of the dispute by one party to the other, anyone of the parties may submit the dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Moscow City Arbitration Court”.

        The wording of such clauses and its translation, specifically translation of the term “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of claims by the state commercial courts in Russia, rather than by arbitration. In such situations failure of the non-Russian party to defend itself in the Russian state commercial courts might lead to serious negative consequences.

        One of the well-known arbitration institutions in Russia – the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation recommends the following arbitration clause:

        “Any dispute, controversy or claim which may arise out of or in connection with the present contract (agreement) [in case a separate arbitration agreement is concluded a particular contract (agreement) is to be indicated], or the entering into force, conclusion, alteration, execution, breach, termination or validity thereof, shall be settled by arbitration at the International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation in accordance with its applicable regulations and rules. An arbitral award shall be final for the parties. It shall not be allowed to submit a motion to a state court to make a decision on the lack of jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in connection with the issuance by the arbitral tribunal of a separate order on existence of jurisdiction as a matter of preliminary nature”. (http://mkas.tpprf.ru/en/documents/)

        As you can see the full name of the arbitration institution is “International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation” and using its short name “Arbitration court” might result in resolution of disputes by the state commercial court.

        Another situation is when the parties actually wish to resolve commercial disputes in a state commercial court in Russia but fail to specify the name of the state commercial court correctly. Believe it or not, but there are many lawyers who consider Russian state courts as an effective and less expensive judicial body to resolve commercial disputes as opposed to arbitration.

        There was one interesting case mentioned by the Supreme Court of Russia in this regard in its recent overview of court practice on resolving of disputes connected with protection of foreign investors in Russia.

        A foreign company filed a claim with the state commercial court in Russia against another foreign company. The court determined that the parties of the dispute concluded prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) in accordance with which all disputes arising from the specified contract and in connection with it shall be resolved in the courts of general competence of Russia.

        The state commercial court of first instance considered that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve this case, because the parties did not agree to resolve their disputes in the state commercial courts, with that the courts of general competence do not resolve commercial disputes between companies in Russia. As a result, the court of first instance returned the claim to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve this dispute.

        In the appeal claim the claimant argued that the prorogation agreement was unenforceable, since the court specified by the parties (the courts of general competence) do not consider commercial disputes of legal entities in Russia. The foreign company also argued that there was a close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation, and therefore the state commercial court had competence to consider this case.

        The appeal court dismissed the ruling of the court of first instance and the case was returned for re-consideration to the court of first instance based on the following grounds.

        The appeal court ruled that the enforceable prorogation agreement shall provide possibility to determine the actual intent (true intent) of the parties regarding competence of the state court to resolve disputes.

        The appeal court determined that the prorogation agreement agreed by the parties was unenforceable, since such agreement failed to determine the intent of the parties to resolve disputes in a specific court or a system of competent state courts where the specific state court shall be determined based on the rules of internal competence of courts.

        The appeal court further ruled that if prorogation agreement is unenforceable the competent court of the Russian Federation shall use general rules of competence of state commercial courts of the Russian Federation set forth in the Commercial procedural code of the Russian Federation.

        In this specific case the subject of the disputed transaction was a sale of share in the charter capital of the company registered at the territory of the Russian Federation. The appeal court in this case established close connection of the dispute with the territory of the Russian Federation and ruled that the state commercial court was competent to consider such dispute.

        Therefore, if the parties of the contract fail to correctly stipulate the specific state commercial court to consider their disputes in Russia, such prorogation agreement (choice of forum clause) might be considered by the state commercial court in Russia unenforceable and the claim might be returned to the claimant due to the lack of competence of the state commercial court to resolve such dispute.

        Conclusions

        If you wish to resolve disputes in the state commercial court in Russia, make sure that the full name of the state commercial court is specified correctly. 

        If you wish to resolve disputes by arbitration in Russia it would be reasonable to use a recommended arbitration clause of respective arbitration institution.

        And, of course, be sure to check translation of the English version of the contract into Russian.

        With the recent sentence n° 16601/2017 the Italian Supreme Court (“Corte di Cassazione”) – changing its jurisprudence – opened to the possibility of recognizing in Italy foreign judgments containing punitive damages. In this post we will see what these punitive damages are about, under which conditions they will be recognized and enforced in Italy and, above all, which countermeasures may be implemented to deal with these new risks.

        Punitive damages are a monetary compensation – typical of common law legal systems – awarded to an injured party that goes beyond what is necessary to compensate the individual for losses. Normally punitive damages are imposed when the person who caused the damage acted with wilful misconduct and gross negligence.

        With punitive damages, other than the compensatory function, the reimbursement of damages assumes also a sanctioning purpose, typical of criminal law, also acting like a deterrent towards other potential lawbreakers.

        In the legal systems that provide for punitive damages, the recognition and the quantification of the highest compensation, most of the time, are delegated to the Judge.

        In the United States of America punitive damages are a settled principle of common law, but ruled in different ways for each State. However, generally, they are applied when the conduct of person who caused the damage was intentionally directed to cause damage or is put in place without regard to the protection and safety standards. Usually they cannot be awarded for breach of contract, unless it also leads to an independent tort.

        Historically, in Italy, punitive damages generally were not recognized, because the sanctioning purpose is not consistent with the civil law principles, anchored to the concept that the reimbursement of the damage is a simple restoration of financial heritage of the damaged person.

        Therefore, the recognition of punitive damage established by a foreign judgment was normally denied due to a violation of the public policy (“ordre public”), so those judgments did not have access to the Italian legal system.

        The sentence n° 16601/2017 of the 5 July 2017 of the Joint Sessions of Italian Supreme Court (“Sezioni Unite della Corte di Cassazione”) however, changed the cards on the table. In this particular case, the plaintiff applied to the Venice Court of Appeal for the recognition (pursuant to art. 64, law 218/1995) of three judgments of District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida that, accepting a guarantee call submitted by an American retailer of helmets against the Italian company, condemned this latter to pay 1.436.136,87 USD (in addition to legal expenses and interests) for the damages caused by a defect in the helmet used in occasion of the accident.

        The Venice Court of Appeal recognized the foreign judgment, considering the abovementioned sum merely as compensation for damages and not as punitive damages. This decision was challenged by the unsuccessful Italian party before the Italian Supreme Court, arguing the violation of the Italian ordre public by the US judgment, on the basis of a consolidated juridical opinion until that day.

        The Supreme Court of Cassation confirmed the Venice Court assessment, considering the sum non-punitive and recognized the US judgment in Italy.

        The Supreme Court, though, took the opportunity to address the question of the admissibility of punitive damages in Italy, changing the previous orientation (see Cass. 1781/2012).

        According to the Court, the concept of civil liability as mere compensation of the damage suffered is to be considered obsolete, given the evolution of this institute through national and European legislation and case-law that introduced civil remedies intended to punish the wrongdoer. As a matter of fact, in our system, it’s possible to find several cases of damages with sanctioning function: in the matter of libel by press (art. 12 L. 47/48), copyright (art. 158 L. 633/41), industrial property (art. 125 D. Lgs. 30/2005), abuse of process (art. 96 comma 3 c.p.c. e art. 26 comma 2 c.p.a.), labour law (art. 18, comma 14), family law (art. 709-ter c.p.c.) and others.

        The Supreme Court has, therefore, stated the following principle: “Under Italian law, civil liability is aimed not only to compensate for losses incurred by the injured party, but also to reform the defendant and others from engaging in conduct similar. Therefore, the US legal institute of punitive damages is not incompatible with the Italian legal system”.

        The important consequence is that this decision opens the door to possible recognition of foreign sentences that condemn a party to pay a sum higher than the amount sufficient to compensate the suffered injury as a result of the damage.

        To that end, however, the Supreme Court has set certain conditions so that foreign sentences have validity, that is to say that the decision is made in foreign law system on a normative basis that:

        1. Clearly establish the cases in which it is possible to convict a party to pay punitive damages; and
        2. The predictability of it; and
        3. Establish quantitative limits.

        It has to be clarified that the sentence has not modified the Italian system of civil liability. In other words, the sentence will not allow Italian Judges to establish punitive damages under Italian law.

        As for foreign court decisions, it will be now possible to obtain a compensation for punitive damages through the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, as long as they respect the above requirements.

        Extending our view beyond the Italian borders, we notice that punitive damages are alien to the legal tradition of most of  European States: there is the possibility, though, that other Courts of continental Europe might follow the decision of the Italian Supreme Court and recognize foreign judgments which grant punitive damages.

                         

        How to prevent this new risk

        There are several measures which businessmen can adopt to mitigate this new risk: firstly the adoption of contractual clauses that exclude this kind of damages or establish a cap on the amount of the contractual damages which can be claimed, for example by limiting the value of damages at the price of the products or services provided.

        Furthermore, it’s very important to have an overall knowledge of the legislation and case law of the markets in which the enterprise operates, even indirectly (for example: with the commercial distribution of products) in order to choose consciously the applicable law to the contract and the dispute resolution methods (for example: establishing the jurisdiction in a country that does not provide for punitive damages).

        Finally, this type of liability and risk may also be covered by a product liability insurance.

        How to make sure that your claim can be enforced in the long run? A creditor may freeze assets that a debtor holds in Switzerland if certain conditions are fulfilled. In practice, there are two situations in which one might consider an attachment of assets: the first is where a creditor has a claim against a debtor without domicile in Switzerland; the second is where a creditor holds an enforceable judgment or award.

        It is beyond doubt that the Swiss financial sector continues to play a dominant role in the financial world of today despite the regulatory pressure that it faces. The Swiss jurisdiction, therefore, is relevant for creditors who wish to enforce claims against a debtor who holds bank accounts or other assets in Switzerland. Even though practice shows that it is predominantly bank accounts that are being attached, other assets such as real estate, art works or claims against third parties are equally capable of being attached.

        Upon application, the Swiss court at the seat of the bank or at the place where the assets are located will grant an ex parte freezing order to a creditor against a debtor with assets in Switzerland, if the applying creditor demonstrates on a prima facie basis that the following three prerequisites of the Swiss Debt Enforcement and Bankruptcy Act (“DEBA”) are met:

        • The creditor seeking a freezing order has a mature and unsecured claim;
        • The debtor’s assets are located in Switzerland;
        • A legal ground for a freezing order exists.

        As already pointed out, the most relevant grounds for a freezing order are:

        • The debtor is not resident in Switzerland and the claim itself has sufficient connection with Switzerland or is based on an acknowledgement of debt signed by the debtor (“attachment against a non-Swiss resident”);
        • The creditor has an enforceable court decision or arbitral award against the debtor (“enforceable title”).

        Attachment against a non-Swiss resident: The mere fact that the assets are located in Switzerland will not suffice to establish a “sufficient connection with Switzerland” in the sense of the DEBA. The requirement of “sufficient connection with Switzerland” very much depends on the specific facts of the case which the Swiss court will review on a case-by-case basis. Swiss courts have confirmed that there was a sufficient connection in cases where the underlying contract was signed or fulfilled in Switzerland, where the underlying contract is governed by Swiss law, where the creditor lives in Switzerland or where the creditor’s claim is linked to a commercial activity in Switzerland.

        Enforceable title: In order to rely on the second ground for a freezing order the creditor needs to have an enforceable title. The DEBA makes no distinction between domestic and foreign court decisions or arbitral awards. Provided that they are enforceable (either according to the Lugano Convention, the Swiss Private International Law Act or – in the case of a non-Swiss arbitral award – the New York Convention), all judgments and awards may serve as a ground for an attachment of Swiss assets.

        The Swiss court will request the creditor to provide prima facie evidence on the prerequisites of an attachment as outlined above. Because the attachment itself will be granted ex parte, it will, in many instances, take the debtor by surprise. Thanks to this surprise effect and the nature of the attachment, i.e. the fact that it will prevent the debtor from further disposing of the attached assets, the attachment has a great potential for helping the creditor to secure and ultimately satisfy its claim.

        [Initial note: This article is not aimed as a political article pro or con boycott movements or the Israeli government, but rather as a legal informative overview, in light of the actual and financial impact or exposure international business may have in the referred to matter.]

        It is perhaps not known to many international trading players, but under Israeli law, Bill for prevention of damage to the State of Israel through boycott – 2011, affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2015 (after a slight interpretive adjustment), boycotting Israeli origin products, or deliberate avoidance of economic or academic ties, may give rise to a lawsuit for actual damages under civil law.

        In light of the international BDS movement, attempting to place pressure upon the State of Israel by means of economic and cultural pressure, Israel has realized such activity, indeed, causes actual harm and damage to Israeli based business, manufacturers, importers/exporters, etc., as well as to academic students and professors, and so on, in cultural ties of many sorts – just because the origin is Israel.

        This boycott movement affects the people and businesses of Israel, as opposed to  Israeli leaders or politicians or  the State of Israel as a state, and conveys questionable (to say the least) economic and cultural negative effects upon the people facing unprecedented obstacles in trade in the international arena – for no wrongdoing on their part.

        Regardless of the political opinion one may have concerning the legitimacy, or rather the non-legitimacy, of the BDS movement or concerning the current political policy of the State of Israel – the relatively new law provides actual legal tools to deal with negative economic outcomes (damages, loss of profits, etc.) that businesses or private people encounter or suffer from boycott measures, solely because of their affiliation or relation to the State of Israel.

        Regardless of any opinion of the act itself or its enactment, at the end of the day the act exists and may be used and exploited by filing civil lawsuits against anyone who called for or participated in a boycott. In that sense it creates a new civil wrong as part of the Israeli tort laws.

        Moreover, even a deliberate avoidance of economic, cultural or academic ties can raise liability for the avoider towards the business or ties avoided, as well as liability for anyone who has called for the boycott or publicly expressed support of it.

        The law goes even further – and also excludes the defense argument of “sufficient justification” and thus provides that anyone who has caused or led to a breach of a contract, by calling for a boycott, may be liable for damages, as well.

        As for the damages that can be claimed, after the adjustment to the law according to the Supreme Court ruling of 2015 (ruling that compensation must be awarded in correspondence with the actual damages or loss of profit caused, and cancelled the clause for penal compensation) – the entity that may sue for torts is the entity that suffered the damage and what can be sued for is the actual damage according to the regular Israeli torts law.

        The law also prohibits a person who calls for a boycott from participating in any public tender, but this is a different focus from the side of the state.

        It is worth mentioning  that the rationale for this legislation was also reviewed by the widely respected Israeli Supreme Court, that has strongly elaborated that such legislation is constitutional and, inter alia, that international entities and individuals such as the BDS movement (as opposed perhaps to states) should not be able to harm or interfere with international or domestic economic affairs without at least being accountable for the outcome of such, and that freedom of speech cannot be unlimitedly protected when it in fact calls for action (or for refraining from action)  that has an actual impact on another and is not simply an expression of an opinion.

        To date, it seems that the Magistrates and District Courts of Israel have yet to render judgments in actual cases based on the boycott act, indicating that the implementation of the act is still inchoate. However, it seems that instances and measures of boycotting are on the rise and the methods of boycotting are becoming increasingly overt, in a manner that is bound to lead to considerable litigation in the near future.

        Needless to say, issues of jurisdiction, and other aspects of private international law, or imposing jurisdiction on foreign players, are also yet to be resolved in reference to the emergence of lawsuits under the boycott law, but these will surely find their creative legal solutions with the actual submission of lawsuits concerning real life cases.

        One of the commonly discussed advantages of international commercial arbitration over litigation in the cross-border context is the enforcement issue. For the purpose of swifter enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the vast majority of countries signed the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.

        On contrary, there is no relevant international treaty of such scale for the enforcement of foreign court judgements. Normally, the special legal basis, such as agreement on judicial cooperation between two or more countries, needs to be relied upon in order to get a court judgment recognized and enforced in another country. There are quite many countries that do not have such an agreement with China. This includes, among others, US, Germany or the Netherlands.

        Interestingly, however, recently the Chinese court in Wuhan enforced the US court judgement rendered by the Los Angeles Superior Court of California in the Liu Li v Tao Li and Tong Wu case.  It did so despite the fact that there is no agreement between China and US providing for mutual recognition and enforcement of such judgements. The court in Wuhan found, however, that the reciprocity in recognizing and enforcing the court judgments between China and US was established because of an earlier decision of the US District Court of the Central District of California recognizing and enforcing the Chinese judgement rendered by the Higher People’s Court of Hubei in the Hubei Gezhouba Sanlian Industrial Co., Ltd et. al. v Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. case.

        Interestingly, similar course of action was taken earlier in 2016 when the Chinese Nanjing Intermediate People’s Court enforced the Singaporean judgement relying on the reciprocity principle in the Kolma v SUTEX Group case.

        How much does it tell us?

        Should we now feel safe when opting for own courts in the dispute resolution clauses in the China-related deals? – despite the fact there are no relevant agreements between China and our country? The recent moves of the Chinese courts are, indeed, interesting developments changing the dispute resolution landscape in a desirable direction and increasing the chances for enforcing the foreign commercial court judgements. Yet, as of today, one should not see them as the universal door-openers for the foreign court judgements in similar situations. Accordingly, rather careful approach is recommended and the other dispute resolution methods securing the safer way of enforcement, like arbitration, should be kept in mind. The further changes remain to be seen.

        The author of this post is Monika Prusinowska.

        If your business is related to France or you wish to develop your business in this direction, you need to be aware of one very specific provision with regards to the termination of a business relationship.

        Article L. 442-6, I, 5° of the French Commercial Code protects a party to a contract who considers that the other party has terminated the existing business relationship in a sudden and abrupt way, thus causing her a damage.

        This is a ‘public policy’ provision and therefore any contractual provision to the contrary will be unenforceable.

        Initially, the lawmaker aimed to protect any business relationship between suppliers and major large-scale retailers delisting (ie, removing a supplier’s products that were referenced by a distributor) at the moment of contracts renegotiations or renewals.

        Eventually, the article has been drafted in order to extend its scope to any business relationship, regardless of the status of the professionals involved and the nature of the commercial relationship.

        The party who wishes to terminate the business relationship does not need to provide any justification for her actions but must send a sufficient prior notice to the other party.

        The purpose is to allow the parties, and in particular the abandoned party, to anticipate the discharge of the contract, in particular in cases of economic dependency.

        It is an accentuated obligation of loyalty.

        There are only two cases strictly interpreted by case law in which the partner is exempted from sending a prior notice:

        • an aggravated breach of a contractual obligation;
        • a frustration or a force majeure.

        There are two main requirements to be fulfilled in order to be able to invoke this provision in front of a judge – an established business relationship and an abrupt termination.

        The judge will assess whether the requirements have been fulfilled on a case by case basis.

        What does the term ‘established business relationship’ mean?

        The most important criterion is the duration, whether a written contract exists or not.

        A relationship may be considered as long-term whether there is a single contract or a few consecutive contracts.

        If there is no contract in place, the judge will take into account the following criteria:

        • the existence of a long-term established business relationship;
        • the good faith of the parties;
        • the frequency of the transactions and the importance and evolving of the turnover;
        • any agreement on the prices applied and/or the discounts granted to the other party;
        • any correspondence exchanged between the parties.

        What does the term ‘abrupt termination’ mean?

        The Courts consider the application of Article L442-6-I 5° if the termination is “unforeseeable, sudden and harsh”.

        The termination must comply with the following three conditions in order to be considered as abrupt:

        • with no prior notice or with insufficient prior notice;
        • sudden;
        • unpredictable.

        To consider whether a prior notice is sufficient, a judge may consider the following criteria:

        • the investments made by the victim of the termination;
        • the business involved (eg seasonal fashion collections);
        • a constant increase in turnover;
        • the market recognition of the products sold by the victim and the difficulty of finding replacement products;
        • the existence of a post-contractual non-compete undertaking ;
        • the existence of exclusivity between the parties;
        • the time period required for the victim to find other openings or refocus the business activity;
        • the existence of any economic dependency for the victim.

        The courts have decided that a partial termination may also be considered as abrupt in the following cases:

        • an organisational change in the distribution structure of the supplier;
        • a substantial decrease in trade flows;
        • a change in pricing terms or an increase in prices without any prior notice sent by a supplier granting special prices to the buyers, or in general any unilateral and substantial change in the contract terms.

        Whatever the justification for the termination, it is necessary to send a registered letter with an acknowledgment of receipt and ensure that the prior notice is sent sufficienlty in advance (some businesses have specific time periods applicable to them by law).

        Compensation for a damage

        The French Commercial Code provides for the award of damages in order to compensate a party for an abrupt termination of a business relationship.

        The damages are calculated by multiplying the notice period which should have been applied by the average profit achieved prior to the termination. Such profit is evaluated based on the pre-tax gross margin that would have been achieved during the required notice period, had sufficient notice been given.

        The courts may also award damages for incidental and consequential losses such as redundancy costs, losses of scheduled stocks, operational costs, certain unamortised investments and restructuring costs, indemnities paid to third parties or even image or reputational damage.

        International law

        The French supreme court competent in civil law (‘Cour de cassation’) considers that in cases where the decision to terminate the business relationship and the resulting damage take place in two different countries, it is a matter of torts and the applicable law will be the one of the country where the triggering event the most closely connected with the tort took place. Therefore the abrupt termination will be subject to French law if the business of the supplier is located in France.

        However, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a preliminary ruling dated 14 July 2016 answering two questions submitted by the Paris Court of Appeal in a judgment dated 17 April 2015. A French company had been distributing in France the food products of an Italian company for the last 25 years, with no framework agreement or any exclusivity provision in place. The Italian company had terminated the business relationship with no prior notice. The French company issued proceedings against the Italian company in front of the French courts and invoked the abrupt termination of an established business relationship.

        The Italian company opposed both the jurisdiction of the French courts and the legal ground for the action arguing that the Italian courts had jurisdiction as the action involved contract law and was therefore subject to the laws of the country where the commodities had been or should have been delivered, in this case Incoterm Ex-works departing from the plant in Italy.

        The CJEU has considered that in case of a tacit contractual relationship and pursuant to European law, the liability will be based on contract law (in the same case, pursuant to French law, the liability will be based on torts). As a consequence, Article 5, 3° of the Regulation (EC) 44/2001, also known as Brussels I (which has been replaced by Regulation (EC) 1215/2012, also known as Brussels I bis) will not apply. Therefore, the competent judge will not be the one of the country where the damage occurred but the one of the country where the contractual obligation was being performed.

        In addition and answering the second question submitted to it, the CJEU has considered that the contract is:

        • a contract for the sale of goods if its purpose is the delivery of goods, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the goods have been or should have been delivered; and
        • a contract for services if its purpose is the provision of services, in which case the competent jurisdiction will be the one of the country where the services have been or should have been provided.

        In this case, the Paris Court of Appeal will have to recharacherise the contractual relationship either as consecutive contracts for the sale of goods and deduct the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, or as a contract for services implying the participation of the distributor in the development and the distribution of the supplier’s goods and business strategy and deduct the jurisdiction of the French courts.

        In summary, in case of an intra-Community dispute, the distributor who is the victim of an abrupt termination of an established business relationship cannot issue proceedings based on torts in front of a court in the country where the damage occurred if there is a tacit contractual relationship with the supplier. In order to determine the competent jurisdiction in such case, it is necessary to determine whether such tacit contractual relationship consists of a supply of goods or a provision of services.

        The next judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal and those of the Cour de cassation to come need to be followed very closely.

        When negotiating contracts, parties typically focus on the key commercial terms of their agreement. The clauses that govern the term of the agreement (i.e., the duration, or how long the contract remains in force), the renewal of the term, and how the agreement can be terminated, however, merit careful consideration.

        Under Québec law, contracts typically have terms that are either fixed (e.g., 5 years, 10 years etc.), or are for an indeterminate period of time (i.e., no specific term is provided for). Contracts with fixed terms may also contain automatic renewal clauses. In the case of an indeterminate term contract, a party to the contract can generally, absent specific terms or a notice provision to the contrary in the contract, terminate it, without cause, by providing reasonable notice of termination (what constitutes “reasonable notice” depends on a number of factors and is decided on the facts of each case). A third category of contracts are contracts with a potentially perpetual term. An example of a potentially perpetual contract is a contract that contains a renewal clause that is entirely under the control of only one of the parties who can, effectively, unilaterally decide whether the contract will go on indefinitely. In such a contract, the other contracting party does not have a right to terminate the contract by providing reasonable notice of termination. The validity of perpetual term contracts was precisely the issue before the Supreme Court of Canada in its July 28, 2017 decision in Uniprix inc. v. Gestion Gosselin et Bérubé inc. https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16746/index.do (“Uniprix“).

        In Uniprix, the pharmacy chain entered into an affiliation agreement with various members of a pharmacists’ group pursuant to which said members operated a pharmacy under the Uniprix banner. The term of the contract was for a fixed term of 5 years and the renewal clause allowed members to provide a notice within a certain period of time, failing which the contract would automatically be renewed for an additional 5 years:

        Regardless of any written or verbal provisions to the contrary, this agreement shall commence on the day of its signing and shall remain in effect for a period of sixty (60) months, or for a period equal to the term of the lease for the premises where the pharmacy is located. [The member pharmacist] shall, six (6) months before the expiration of the agreement, notify [Uniprix] of its intention to leave [Uniprix] or to renew the agreement; 

        Should [the member pharmacist] fail to send the prescribed notice by registered mail, the agreement shall be deemed to have been renewed in accordance with the terms and conditions then in effect, as prescribed by the board of directors, except with regard to the fee.[Translation]

        The Uniprix agreement did not provide any say to Uniprix in connection with its renewal and there were no limits on the number of times that the members could renew the agreement. As such, the contract could remain in force perpetually based entirely on the members’ decision. After the contract had been renewed twice, Uniprix sent the members a notice of non-renewal and purported to terminate the agreement. The members contested Uniprix’s decision based on the fact that under the affiliation agreement, the renewal clause could only be exercised by the members and, unless the members gave notice to the contrary, the contract was automatically renewed. Uniprix argued that the effect of the members’ position, which would bind the parties in perpetuity, was contrary to public order (i.e., it violated a fundamental societal value) and unlawful and, as such, the term of the agreement should be considered to be for an indeterminate period, which would allow either party to terminate it on reasonable notice.

        In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada held (in upholding the decisions of the majority of the Québec Court of Appeal and of the Superior Court of Québec) that there was nothing under Québec law that prohibited a contract of affiliation from having a perpetual term and that this did not, in and of itself and in the context of corporate and commercial agreements, offend any fundamental societal values. The Court’s holding would equally apply to many other types of contracts such as, for example, franchise agreements and licensing agreements. The Court held, accordingly, that the affiliation agreement was not for an indeterminate term and, therefore, could be not be terminated by Uniprix by providing reasonable notice.

        With respect to the holding in Uniprix , the following points should be kept in mind:

        1. The Supreme Court of Canada expressly noted that in certain circumstances, such as where an individual’sperson and freedom are affected (e.g., a contract of employment), a perpetual obligation could offend public order.
        2. In certain specific cases set out in the Civil Code of Québec, the legislator has provided maximum terms for certain types of contracts (e.g., a commercial lease cannot exceed 100 years, the duration of payment of an annuity is 100 years).
        3. In the case of a contract of adhesion (which is generally defined as a contract where one of the parties was unable to negotiate its terms), the adhering or vulnerable party can argue that a perpetual term is abusive and, therefore, null.
        4. The Court’s decision in Uniprixapplied to Uniprix’s ability to terminate the contract without cause. A party always retains the right to terminate a contract for cause. What constitutes “cause” is decided on a case by case basis and may also be governed by the terms of the contract.

        When drafting contracts, parties are generally, subject to limitations imposed by the legislator or public order, permitted to structure their relationship as they see fit. Parties should carefully consider whether they truly intend the duration of their agreement to be entirely under the control of one of the parties to the agreement for an indefinite period of time because, as is made clear in Uniprix, perpetual commercial contracts are enforceable under Québec law.

        The author of this post is David Stolow.

        Roberto Luzi Crivellini

        Áreas de prática

        • Arbitragem
        • Distribuição
        • Comércio internacional
        • Contencioso
        • Imobiliário
        Contato Roberto

        Scrivi a Roberto





          Read the privacy policy of Legalmondo.
          This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.