Italy – capital increases: a new rule complicates the position of minority shareholders

24 10 月 2020

  • 意大利
  • 公司法
  • 私募股权

Summary: Article 44 of Decree Law No. 76 of July 16, 2020 (the so-called “Simplifications Decree“) provides that, until June 30, 2021, capital increases by joint stock companies (società per azioni), limited partnerships by shares (società in accomandita per azioni) and limited liability companies (società a responsabilità limitata) may be approved with the favorable vote of the majority of the share capital represented at the shareholders’ meeting, provided that at least half of the share capital is present, even if the bylaws establish higher majorities.

The rule has a significant impact on the position of minority shareholders (and investors) of unlisted Italian companies, the protection of which is frequently entrusted (also) to bylaws clauses establishing qualified majorities for the approval of capital increases.

After describing the new rule, some considerations will be made on the consequences and possible safeguards for minority shareholders, limited to unlisted companies.


Simplifications Decree: the reduction of majorities for the approval of capital increases in Italian joint stock companies, limited partnerships by shares and limited liability companies

Article 44 of Decree Law No. 76 of July 16, 2020 (the so-called ‘Simplifications Decree‘)[1] temporarily reduced, until 30.6.2021, the majorities for the approval by the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting of certain resolutions to increase the share capital.

The rule applies to all companies, including listed ones. It applies to resolutions of the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting on the following subjects:

  • capital increases through contributions in cash, in kind or in receivables, pursuant to Articles 2439, 2440 and 2441 (regarding joint stock companies and limited partnerships by shares), and to Articles 2480, 2481 and 2481-bis of the Italian Civil Code (regarding limited liability companies);
  • the attribution to the directors of the power to increase the share capital, pursuant to Article 2443 (regarding joint stock companies and limited partnerships by shares) and to Article 2480 of the Italian Civil Code (regarding limited liability companies).

The ordinary rules provide the following mayorities:

(a)       for joint stock companies and limited partnerships by shares: (i) on first call a majority of more than half of the share capital (Art. 2368, second paragraph, Italian Civil Code); (ii) on second call a majority of two thirds of the share capital presented at the meeting (Art. 2369, third paragraph, Italian Civil Code);

(b)       for limited liability companies, a majority of more than half of the share capital (Art. 2479-bis, third paragraph, Italian Civil Code);

(c)       for listed companies, a majority of two thirds of the share capital represents-to in the shareholders’ meeting (Art. 2368, second paragraph and Art. 2369, third paragraph, Italian Civil Code).

Most importantly, the ordinary rules allow for qualified majorities (i.e., higher than those required by law) in the bylaws.

The temporary provisions of Article 44 of the Simplifications Decree provide that resolutions are approved with the favourable vote of the majority of the share capital represented at the shareholders’ meeting, provided that at least half of the share capital is present. This majority also applies if the bylaws provide for higher majorities.

Simplifications Decree: the impact of the decrease in majorities for the approval of capital increases on minority shareholders of unlisted Italian companies

The rule has a significant impact on the position of minority shareholders (and investors) in unlisted Italian companies. It can be strongly criticised, particularly because it allows derogations from the higher majorities established in the bylaws, thus affecting ongoing relationships and the governance agreed between shareholders and reflected in the bylaws.

Qualified majorities, higher than the legal ones, for the approval of capital increases are a fundamental protection for minority shareholders (and investors). They are frequently introduced in the bylaws: when the company is set up with several partners, in the context of aggregation transactions, in investment transactions, private equity and venture capital transactions.

Qualified majorities prevent majority shareholders from carrying out transactions without the consent of minority shareholders (or some of them), which have a significant impact on the company and the position of minority shareholders. In fact, capital increases through contributions of assets reduce the minority shareholder’s shareholding percentage and can significantly change the company’s business (e.g. through the contribution of a business). Capital increases in cash force the minority shareholder to choose between further investing in the company or reducing its shareholding.

The reduction in the percentage of participation may imply the loss of important protections, linked to the possession of a participation above a certain threshold. These are not only certain rights provided for by law in favour of minority shareholders[2], but – with even more serious effects – the protections deriving from the qualified majorities provided for in the bylaws to approve certain decisions. The most striking case is that of the qualified majority for resolutions amending the bylaws, so that the amendments cannot be approved without the consent of the minority shareholders (or some of them). This is a fundamental clause, in order to ensure stability for certain provisions of the bylaws, agreed between the shareholders, that protect the minority shareholders, such as: pre-emption and tag-along rights, list voting for the appointment of the board of directors, qualified majorities for the taking of decisions by the shareholders’ meeting or the board of directors, limits on the powers that can be delegated by the board of directors. Through the capital increase, the majority can obtain a percentage of the shareholding that allows it to amend the bylaws, unilaterally departing from the governance structure agreed with the other shareholders.

The legislator has disregarded all this and has introduced a rule that does not simplify. Rather, it fuels conflicts between the shareholders and undermines legal certainty, thus discouraging investments rather than encouraging them.

Simplifications Decree: checks and safeguards for minority shareholders with respect to the decrease in majorities for the approval of capital increases

In order to assess the situation and the protection of the minority shareholder it is necessary to examine any shareholders’ agreement in force between the shareholders. The existence of a shareholders’ agreement will be almost certain in private equity or venture capital transactions or by other professional investors. But outside of these cases there are many companies, especially among small and medium-sized enterprises, where the relationships between the shareholders are governed exclusively by the bylaws.

In the shareholders’ agreement it will have to be verified whether there are clauses binding the shareholders, as parties to the agreement, to approve capital increases by qualified majority, i.e. higher than those required by law. Or whether the agreement make reference to a text of the bylaws (attached or by specific reference) that provides for such a majority, so that compliance with the qualified majority can be considered as an obligation of the parties to the shareholders’ agreement.

In this case, the shareholders’ agreement will protect the minority shareholder(s), as Article 44 of the Simplifications Decree does not introduce an exception to the clauses of the shareholders’ agreement.

The protection offered by the shareholders’ agreement is strong, but lower than that of the bylaws. The clause in the bylaws requiring a qualified majority binds all shareholders and the company, so the capital increase cannot be validly approved in violation of the bylaws. The shareholders’ agreement, on the other hand, is only binding between the parties to the agreement, so it does not prevent the company from approving the capital increase, even if the shareholder’s vote violates the obligations of the shareholders’ agreement. In this case, the other shareholders will be entitled to compensation for the damage suffered as a result of the breach of the agreement.

In the absence of a shareholders’ agreement that binds the shareholders to respect a qualified majority for the approval of the capital increase, the minority shareholder has only the possibility of challenging the resolution to increase the capital, due to abuse of the majority, if the resolution is not justified in the interest of the company and the majority shareholder’s vote pursues a personal interest that is antithetical to the company’s interest, or if it is the instrument of fraudulent activity by the majority shareholders aimed at infringing the rights of minority shareholders[3]. A narrow escape, and a protection certainly insufficient.

[1] The Simplifications Decree was converted into law by Law no. 120 of September 11, 2020. The conversion law replaced art. 44 of the Simplifications Decree, extending the temporary discipline provided therein to capital increases in cash and to capital increases of limited liability companies.

[2] For example: the percentage of 10% (33% for limited liability companies) for the right of shareholders to obtain the call of the meeting (art. 2367; art. 2479 Italian Civil Code); the percentage of 20% (10% for limited liability companies) to prevent the waiver or settlement of the liability action against the directors (art. 2393, sixth paragraph; art. 2476, fifth paragraph, Italian Civil Code); the percentage of 20% for the exercise by the shareholder of the liability action against the directors (art. 2393-bis, Civil Code).

[3] Cass. Civ., 12 December 2005, no. 27387; Trib. Roma, 31 March 2017, no. 6452.

在意大利,收购交易(M&A)在大部分情况下通常是通过收购股权(“股票交易”)、公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”)进行的。主要由于税收原因,股票交易比资产交易更为频繁,尽管资产交易可以更好地限制买方的风险。股票交易与资产交易之间的主要区别在于风险和买方与卖方之间的关系。

在意大利市场上更倾向于通过收购股权(“股票交易”)而非收购公司或公司分支机构进行收购(M&A

在意大利,大多数情况下,收购交易(M&A)的执行是通过购买股份(“股票交易”)或购买公司与公司分支机构(“资产交易“)的方式进行的。其他的形式,如合并,则不那么常见。

通过购买被收购公司的股权或股份(“股票交易”),买方间接获得公司的全部资产(资产、负债、关系),从而承担与公司先前管理有关的所有风险。

通过收购公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”),买方获得一组为经营业务而组织起来的商品和关系(物业、工厂、员工、合同、信贷、债务等)。资产交易的好处在于,双方可以确定转让的范围,从而限制交易的法律风险。

尽管有这一优势,意大利的大多数收购业务都是通过收购股权进行的。2018年,被购买的股份(股权和股票)约为78400股,而被出售的股份约为35900股(资料来源::www.notariato.it/it/news/dati-statistici-notarili-anno-2018)。应当指出的是,业务转让的数字还包括个体企业家所经营的迷你或小型公司,对于这些公司而言,股权交易的替代方案(尽管可行,但可以通过将公司转让给新公司和出售来实现)由于成本原因,在实践中不可行。

意大利收购业务的经济成本(M&A)

与购买公司(“资产交易”)相比,购买股份(“股权交易”)的主要原因是运营的税收成本考虑,让我们看看它们通常是什么。

在购买股份时,卖方应缴的直接税款按下列百分比计算:

  • 如果卖方是一家资本公司(有限股份公司、有限责任公司、有限合伙股权责任公司),税率是资本收益的24%。但是,在某些条件下,c.d. PEX(参股豁免)章程仅对5%的资本收益适用24%的税率。
  • 如果卖方是合伙企业(简单公司、普通合伙公司、有限合伙公司),则应对资本收益全额征税,但是在某些情况下,应纳税额限制为资本收益额的60%。在这两种情况下,适用税率是指为透明性分配收入的每个股东的边际税率。
  • 如果卖方是自然人,则资本收益率为26%。

在收购股权时,通常向买方收取200欧元的注册税。

即使是在购买公司时,卖方应支付的直接税款也是根据资本收益计算的。如果卖方是资本公司,则税率是资本收益的24%。如果卖方是合伙企业(与自然人合伙人合伙)或个体企业家,则税率取决于卖方的收入。

在购买公司时,通常由买方支付的间接税款是根据分配给每一转让资产的价格份额计算的。价格是转让资产减去转让负债所得的金额。百分比因资产类型而异。总的来说:

  • 流动资产征收3%的注册税;
  • 商誉需缴纳3%的注册税;
  • 建筑物需缴纳9%的注册税 (以及每笔固定金额50欧元的抵押和地籍税);
  • 土地需缴纳9%至12%的注册税 (视买方而定),抵押和地籍税的税额均为50欧元。

如公司由不同税率的资产组成,且双方同意一次性付款,而不区分单个资产的可归属价值,则应将最高税率适用于一次性付款。

应当强调的是,税务机关可以对双方的不动产和商誉进行估价,从而产生增税的风险。

股票交易和资产交易:面向第三方的风险和责任

在购买股份或股权(“股票交易”)时,买方间接承担所有与公司先前管理有关的风险。

另一方面,在收购公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”)时,双方可以决定转让的范围(资产和关系),从而在相互关系中确定买方所承担的风险。

但是,在与第三方的关系方面,有一些规则是当事各方不能违背的,这些规则对买卖双方的风险有重大影响,从而对双方之间的谈判协定有重大影响。主要内容如下:

  • 雇员:与公司买家的雇佣关系继续存在。转让时,买卖双方应对雇员的所有索赔承担连带责任(条款2112 c.c.)。
  • 债务:卖方有义务偿还直至转让之日的所有债务。买方有义务承担会计账目上产生的债务(条款2560 c.c.)。
  • 债务和税务责任:卖方有义务支付转让之日之前的债务、税款和税务处罚。
  • 除了会计账簿产生的与应付税款有关的义务外 (条款2560 c.c.),买方还应承担税款和罚款,即使这些税款和罚款未出现在会计账簿中,也应遵守以下限制 (法令472 / 1997,条款14):
  • 卖方事先执行的利益;
  • 不超过所购买公司或公司分支机构的价值;
  • 对于尚未存在争议的税收和罚款,责任只适用于与公司被出售当年及之前两年有关的税收和处罚;在公司被出售前两年之前的税收和处罚,其责任仅适用于该期间内有争议的税收和罚款;
  • 在税务机关契约移转日期产生的债务范围内。税务局必须出具一份证明,证明存在争议和债务。申请后40天内未签发的否定证书可免除买方的合同责任:
  • 合同:双方可以选择转让哪些合同。就转让的合同而言,即使未经第三方同意,买方也会接管不属于个人性质的经营合同(即卖方提供客观或主观上不可互换的个人性质的给付))。此外,如果有正当理由 (例如,买方由于其财务状况或技术能力不能保证能够履行合同),第三方可以在3个月内退出合同(条款2558c.c.)。

一些应对风险的工具

为了应对由第三方责任引起的风险以及与收购相关的一般风险,可以使用各种谈判和合同工具。让我们来看一些例子。

在收购公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”)时:

雇员:可以与雇员就合同条件的变更达成一致,并免除买卖双方的连带责任(来自条款2112 c.c.)。为了使协议有效,必须在“受保护”的基础上(例如在工会的协助下)与雇员达成协议。

债务:

  • 通过相应降低价格将债务转移给买方;价格的降低还减少了运营的财政成本。如果发生债务转移,则可以根据债权人的要求获得卖方解除债务责任声明,以保护卖方 (来自条款2560 c.c.); 或者可以预计,买方将在公司转让(“关闭”)的同时偿还债务。
  • 对于未转让给买方的债务,请从债权人处获得使买方免于承担责任的声明(来自条款2560 c.c.)
  • 对于无法获得债权人解除声明的债务,应同意有利于卖方的担保形式(针对转让债务)或有利于买方的担保形式 (针对非转让债务),例如,推迟部分价格的付款 (对买方有利),部分价格的信托保证金 (“托管”),银行担保或由股东承担。

债务和税务责任:

  • 向税务局申请法令472/1997的条款14中关于未决债务和争议的证明;
  • 通过相应降低价格将债务转移给买方;
  • 商定有利于卖方的担保形式(针对转让债务)和有利于买方的担保形式(针对未转让债务或尚未解决的争议),例如上文所述的一般债务担保。

合同针对转让合同:

  • 检查卖方在转让之日之前所承担的给付义务是否已得到适当履行,以避免可能妨碍合同履行的第三方诉讼的风险;
  • 至少对于最重要的合同(除非出于保密原因),应寻求第三方对合同转让批准的确认。

在收购股份的交易(“股票交易”)中,买方间接承担与公司先前管理有关的所有风险,其中一些工具包括:

  • 尽职调查。 对公司进行深入的法律、税务和会计尽职调查,以便在谈判和合同中预先评估并管理风险。
  • 声明、担保(R&W)和赔偿。在收购合同(“股票购买协议”)中,预先就公司的情况向卖方提供一系列详细的声明和担保,以及在违约情况下的赔偿义务(“商业担保”:财务报表、参考资产负债表、合同、诉讼、环保法规、开展业务的授权、债务、信贷等)。声明和担保的谈判通常通过管理尽职调查的结果来实施(例如:尽职调查引起的争议不包括在声明、担保和赔偿中,各方在确定价格时须予以考虑)。在意大利的股票交易中,关于公司状况的声明和保证(“业务保证”)以及赔偿义务的规定是必要的,因为如果没有这些条款,如果公司的实际情况与购买时考虑的情况不同,买方则无法从卖方那里获得赔款或补偿(除非在极端情况下、极为罕见)。
  • 为买方提供担保。保证买方在对方不遵守声明和担保的情况下获得有效补偿(或部分补偿)的工具。 其中包括:(a)延长部分金额的支付;(b)在声明和担保期间,以及在发生争议到确定争议的阶段,以信托保证金(“托管”)的形式支付部分金额; (c)银行担保; (d)W&I保单,即涵盖在违反声明和担保的情况下买方所承担风险的最高赔偿额(特定风险除外)的保险合同。

其他影响股票交易和资产交易选择的因素

当然,通过股票交易或资产交易在意大利进行收购交易的选择,也取决于交易的税收成本以外的其他因素。以下是一些情况:

  • 购买部分业务。 当资产交易不涉及卖方整个公司的购买而仅涉及其一部分(公司分支机构)时,则选择资产交易。
  • 问题公司的状况。当目标公司的状况非常棘手,买方无法承担所有来自公司先前管理的风险时,就选择资产交易。
  • 保留卖方的角色。当你想让卖方在被收购的公司中占有一席之地时,你可以选择股票交易。在这种情况下,除了在管理中发挥作用外,卖方通常会持有少数股份,并在一定时间后拥有退出条款(出售权和认购权)。这些条款通常将价格与未来的结果联系起来,因此,从买方的利益出发,可以激励卖方发挥管理作用;从卖方的利益出发,可以增强购买时未实现的利润前景。

Cyprus is emerging as a new investment fund centre in Europe following the efforts for evolving and upgrading the regulatory and compliance framework which was initiated in the late 1990s. The enactment of the Alternative Investment Funds Law, No. 131(I)/2014 (AIF Law) is the latest development which aimed at the creation of an attractive and competitive environment for further enhancement and development of the alternative funds industry in Cyprus. The AIF Law replaced the previous regime under which Cyprus managed to develop into a regional domicile for investment funds and their managers.

The following possibilities for alternative investment funds (AIFs) were introduced by the AIF Law:

  • Umbrella funds with multiple investment compartments/sub-funds which may adopt different investment policies and manage different pools of assets
  • Transferability of shares
  • Public offerings of AIF’s shares or units
  • Listing of securities issued by AIFs

AIFs may be open-ended or closed-ended and may take one of the following legal forms:

  • Fixed Capital Company
  • Variable Capital Company
  • Limited Partnership
  • Common Fund (contractual)

The relevant rules applicable to the respective legal form are based on Anglo-Saxon common law principles which are incorporated in Cyprus law (company law, partnerships law and contract law etc.).

AIFs may have a limited or unlimited duration.

Investor Classification

AIFs may be established either to be marketed to retail investors or to professional and/or well informed investors (see below for the exception applicable to AIFs with limited number of persons). Investor classification is to be made on the following basis:

  • Professional Investor: For an investor to be considered as professional investor the requirements for professional clients under Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC (MIFID) must be satisfied. A basic characteristic of professional investors is the fact that they possess the experience, knowledge and expertise to make their own investment decisions and to properly assess the risks they incur.
  • Well-Informed Investor: A well-informed investor is not a professional investor within the above meaning but one who:
    • confirms in writing the well-informed investor status and awareness of the risks related with the proposed investment; and
    • makes an investment of at least €125.000 or has been assessed as having the expertise, experience and knowledge in evaluating the suitability of the investment opportunity in the AIF by a credit institution, investment firm or a management company for Undertakings for the collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS Management Company)
  • Retail Investor: A retail investor is an investor who does not fulfil the above requirements so as to be classified as a professional or well-informed investor.

Types of AIFs

The AIF Law allows for the establishment of AIFs to be addressed to an unlimited number of investors as well as for funds addressed to a limited number of persons (maximum 75) who may only be professional and/or well-informed investors.

AIFs to be addressed to an unlimited number of investors must to comply with minimum initial capital requirements i.e. €125.000 if externally managed and €300.000 if self-managed.

AIFs may be subject to investment restrictions depending on the investor type, the category of the assets to be held in their portfolio and the overall investment policy to be adopted. On the other hand, AIFs with limited number of investors are subject to a lighter legal and regulatory framework and are not subject to investment restrictions or investment limits.

Management of AIFs

AIFs may be managed externally by a manager appointed to perform the management of the portfolio of assets and related services. Different entities may undertake this role depending on the type of AIF:

  • For AIFs with unlimited number of investors the external manager may be:
    • An Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM) established under local law or under the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
    • A UCITS Management Company established under local law or under the Undertakings for the collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive
    • A MIFID Investment Firm established under local law
    • An AIFM established in a third country but complying with the relevant provisions of the local legislation
  • For AIFs with limited number of investors the external manager may be:
    • A MIFID Investment Firm established under local law or the MIFID
    • A UCITs Management Company established under local law
    • An entity established under local law solely for the purpose of managing a specific AIF with limited number of investors
    • An entity established in a third country and licensed to provide asset management services and subject to prudential supervision

In the case of AIFs which are companies, the AIF Law provides the option of self-management whereby the management of the portfolio of assets is performed by the board of directors subject to certain restrictions (cap on value of the assets under management, restrictions on leverage, lock-up periods).

Depositary

The depositary of an AIF may be a credit institution or a MIFID Investment Firm or other entity which is subject to prudential regulation and ongoing supervision and which is eligible to act as depositary under its home state legislation.

 The depositary must have its registered office in Cyprus or in another member state of the European Union or in a third country, provided that the Cyprus Securities Exchange Commission has signed with the competent authorities of the third country a Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation and Exchange of Information.

Under certain circumstances it is possible for small AIFs with limited number of persons not to appoint a depositary.

Utilisation of the AIFs

AIFs may be utilised for investments in a wide range of asset classes. Such funds have been established for investments in debt and equity securities as well as real estate and private equity. In a structure with multiple investment compartments/sub-funds, different compartments/sub-funds may invest in diverse asset classes.

Key benefits

  • Cost-efficient and simple set-up process with fees being significantly lower than in the more mature fund centres e.g. Ireland and Luxembourg
  • A single and accessible regulator for the alternative funds and their managers
  • Flexibility as to the asset classes that may be included in the AIF portfolio
  • Transparency, reporting and risk management aiming at investor protection
  • Regulated environment in line with the European Union regulatory framework for Alternative Investment Fund Managers, MIFID Investment Firms and UCITSs
  • Passporting of the marketing of funds in the European Union where the manager is an AIFM
  • Redomiciliation in and out of Cyprus is possible

Taxation

Cyprus’ growth in this sector has been driven by the country’s tax treaty network, originally rendering it a jurisdiction for launching investments funds with investments primarily into Russia, the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe but recently also in Asian countries.

Main aspects of tax treatment in Cyprus:

  • Subject to 12.5% flat corporation tax
  • Exemption from tax on dividends received by the AIF
  • Exemption from tax on profits from sale of securities or other instruments (except where the securities are in companies owning immovable property in Cyprus)
  • No subscription tax on assets of funds
  • Exemption on capital gains tax from the sale of immovable property located outside Cyprus
  • No capital gains tax on disposal of shares/units by the holders
  • Benefiting from an extensive network of more than 50 double tax treaties offering interesting tax planning opportunities

In a rapidly changing funds industry, the options and opportunities available for the setting up and operation of alternative investment funds under the Cyprus regulatory regime are worth exploring by fund managers, investors and their advisors.

Simone Rossi

Practice areas

  • 公司法
  • 契约
  • 并购
  • 破产
  • 私募股权

写信给 Italy – capital increases: a new rule complicates the position of minority shareholders





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    意大利的M&A收购交易:股票交易或资产交易

    15 1 月 2020

    • 意大利
    • 公司法
    • 并购
    • 私募股权

    Summary: Article 44 of Decree Law No. 76 of July 16, 2020 (the so-called “Simplifications Decree“) provides that, until June 30, 2021, capital increases by joint stock companies (società per azioni), limited partnerships by shares (società in accomandita per azioni) and limited liability companies (società a responsabilità limitata) may be approved with the favorable vote of the majority of the share capital represented at the shareholders’ meeting, provided that at least half of the share capital is present, even if the bylaws establish higher majorities.

    The rule has a significant impact on the position of minority shareholders (and investors) of unlisted Italian companies, the protection of which is frequently entrusted (also) to bylaws clauses establishing qualified majorities for the approval of capital increases.

    After describing the new rule, some considerations will be made on the consequences and possible safeguards for minority shareholders, limited to unlisted companies.


    Simplifications Decree: the reduction of majorities for the approval of capital increases in Italian joint stock companies, limited partnerships by shares and limited liability companies

    Article 44 of Decree Law No. 76 of July 16, 2020 (the so-called ‘Simplifications Decree‘)[1] temporarily reduced, until 30.6.2021, the majorities for the approval by the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting of certain resolutions to increase the share capital.

    The rule applies to all companies, including listed ones. It applies to resolutions of the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting on the following subjects:

    • capital increases through contributions in cash, in kind or in receivables, pursuant to Articles 2439, 2440 and 2441 (regarding joint stock companies and limited partnerships by shares), and to Articles 2480, 2481 and 2481-bis of the Italian Civil Code (regarding limited liability companies);
    • the attribution to the directors of the power to increase the share capital, pursuant to Article 2443 (regarding joint stock companies and limited partnerships by shares) and to Article 2480 of the Italian Civil Code (regarding limited liability companies).

    The ordinary rules provide the following mayorities:

    (a)       for joint stock companies and limited partnerships by shares: (i) on first call a majority of more than half of the share capital (Art. 2368, second paragraph, Italian Civil Code); (ii) on second call a majority of two thirds of the share capital presented at the meeting (Art. 2369, third paragraph, Italian Civil Code);

    (b)       for limited liability companies, a majority of more than half of the share capital (Art. 2479-bis, third paragraph, Italian Civil Code);

    (c)       for listed companies, a majority of two thirds of the share capital represents-to in the shareholders’ meeting (Art. 2368, second paragraph and Art. 2369, third paragraph, Italian Civil Code).

    Most importantly, the ordinary rules allow for qualified majorities (i.e., higher than those required by law) in the bylaws.

    The temporary provisions of Article 44 of the Simplifications Decree provide that resolutions are approved with the favourable vote of the majority of the share capital represented at the shareholders’ meeting, provided that at least half of the share capital is present. This majority also applies if the bylaws provide for higher majorities.

    Simplifications Decree: the impact of the decrease in majorities for the approval of capital increases on minority shareholders of unlisted Italian companies

    The rule has a significant impact on the position of minority shareholders (and investors) in unlisted Italian companies. It can be strongly criticised, particularly because it allows derogations from the higher majorities established in the bylaws, thus affecting ongoing relationships and the governance agreed between shareholders and reflected in the bylaws.

    Qualified majorities, higher than the legal ones, for the approval of capital increases are a fundamental protection for minority shareholders (and investors). They are frequently introduced in the bylaws: when the company is set up with several partners, in the context of aggregation transactions, in investment transactions, private equity and venture capital transactions.

    Qualified majorities prevent majority shareholders from carrying out transactions without the consent of minority shareholders (or some of them), which have a significant impact on the company and the position of minority shareholders. In fact, capital increases through contributions of assets reduce the minority shareholder’s shareholding percentage and can significantly change the company’s business (e.g. through the contribution of a business). Capital increases in cash force the minority shareholder to choose between further investing in the company or reducing its shareholding.

    The reduction in the percentage of participation may imply the loss of important protections, linked to the possession of a participation above a certain threshold. These are not only certain rights provided for by law in favour of minority shareholders[2], but – with even more serious effects – the protections deriving from the qualified majorities provided for in the bylaws to approve certain decisions. The most striking case is that of the qualified majority for resolutions amending the bylaws, so that the amendments cannot be approved without the consent of the minority shareholders (or some of them). This is a fundamental clause, in order to ensure stability for certain provisions of the bylaws, agreed between the shareholders, that protect the minority shareholders, such as: pre-emption and tag-along rights, list voting for the appointment of the board of directors, qualified majorities for the taking of decisions by the shareholders’ meeting or the board of directors, limits on the powers that can be delegated by the board of directors. Through the capital increase, the majority can obtain a percentage of the shareholding that allows it to amend the bylaws, unilaterally departing from the governance structure agreed with the other shareholders.

    The legislator has disregarded all this and has introduced a rule that does not simplify. Rather, it fuels conflicts between the shareholders and undermines legal certainty, thus discouraging investments rather than encouraging them.

    Simplifications Decree: checks and safeguards for minority shareholders with respect to the decrease in majorities for the approval of capital increases

    In order to assess the situation and the protection of the minority shareholder it is necessary to examine any shareholders’ agreement in force between the shareholders. The existence of a shareholders’ agreement will be almost certain in private equity or venture capital transactions or by other professional investors. But outside of these cases there are many companies, especially among small and medium-sized enterprises, where the relationships between the shareholders are governed exclusively by the bylaws.

    In the shareholders’ agreement it will have to be verified whether there are clauses binding the shareholders, as parties to the agreement, to approve capital increases by qualified majority, i.e. higher than those required by law. Or whether the agreement make reference to a text of the bylaws (attached or by specific reference) that provides for such a majority, so that compliance with the qualified majority can be considered as an obligation of the parties to the shareholders’ agreement.

    In this case, the shareholders’ agreement will protect the minority shareholder(s), as Article 44 of the Simplifications Decree does not introduce an exception to the clauses of the shareholders’ agreement.

    The protection offered by the shareholders’ agreement is strong, but lower than that of the bylaws. The clause in the bylaws requiring a qualified majority binds all shareholders and the company, so the capital increase cannot be validly approved in violation of the bylaws. The shareholders’ agreement, on the other hand, is only binding between the parties to the agreement, so it does not prevent the company from approving the capital increase, even if the shareholder’s vote violates the obligations of the shareholders’ agreement. In this case, the other shareholders will be entitled to compensation for the damage suffered as a result of the breach of the agreement.

    In the absence of a shareholders’ agreement that binds the shareholders to respect a qualified majority for the approval of the capital increase, the minority shareholder has only the possibility of challenging the resolution to increase the capital, due to abuse of the majority, if the resolution is not justified in the interest of the company and the majority shareholder’s vote pursues a personal interest that is antithetical to the company’s interest, or if it is the instrument of fraudulent activity by the majority shareholders aimed at infringing the rights of minority shareholders[3]. A narrow escape, and a protection certainly insufficient.

    [1] The Simplifications Decree was converted into law by Law no. 120 of September 11, 2020. The conversion law replaced art. 44 of the Simplifications Decree, extending the temporary discipline provided therein to capital increases in cash and to capital increases of limited liability companies.

    [2] For example: the percentage of 10% (33% for limited liability companies) for the right of shareholders to obtain the call of the meeting (art. 2367; art. 2479 Italian Civil Code); the percentage of 20% (10% for limited liability companies) to prevent the waiver or settlement of the liability action against the directors (art. 2393, sixth paragraph; art. 2476, fifth paragraph, Italian Civil Code); the percentage of 20% for the exercise by the shareholder of the liability action against the directors (art. 2393-bis, Civil Code).

    [3] Cass. Civ., 12 December 2005, no. 27387; Trib. Roma, 31 March 2017, no. 6452.

    在意大利,收购交易(M&A)在大部分情况下通常是通过收购股权(“股票交易”)、公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”)进行的。主要由于税收原因,股票交易比资产交易更为频繁,尽管资产交易可以更好地限制买方的风险。股票交易与资产交易之间的主要区别在于风险和买方与卖方之间的关系。

    在意大利市场上更倾向于通过收购股权(“股票交易”)而非收购公司或公司分支机构进行收购(M&A

    在意大利,大多数情况下,收购交易(M&A)的执行是通过购买股份(“股票交易”)或购买公司与公司分支机构(“资产交易“)的方式进行的。其他的形式,如合并,则不那么常见。

    通过购买被收购公司的股权或股份(“股票交易”),买方间接获得公司的全部资产(资产、负债、关系),从而承担与公司先前管理有关的所有风险。

    通过收购公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”),买方获得一组为经营业务而组织起来的商品和关系(物业、工厂、员工、合同、信贷、债务等)。资产交易的好处在于,双方可以确定转让的范围,从而限制交易的法律风险。

    尽管有这一优势,意大利的大多数收购业务都是通过收购股权进行的。2018年,被购买的股份(股权和股票)约为78400股,而被出售的股份约为35900股(资料来源::www.notariato.it/it/news/dati-statistici-notarili-anno-2018)。应当指出的是,业务转让的数字还包括个体企业家所经营的迷你或小型公司,对于这些公司而言,股权交易的替代方案(尽管可行,但可以通过将公司转让给新公司和出售来实现)由于成本原因,在实践中不可行。

    意大利收购业务的经济成本(M&A)

    与购买公司(“资产交易”)相比,购买股份(“股权交易”)的主要原因是运营的税收成本考虑,让我们看看它们通常是什么。

    在购买股份时,卖方应缴的直接税款按下列百分比计算:

    • 如果卖方是一家资本公司(有限股份公司、有限责任公司、有限合伙股权责任公司),税率是资本收益的24%。但是,在某些条件下,c.d. PEX(参股豁免)章程仅对5%的资本收益适用24%的税率。
    • 如果卖方是合伙企业(简单公司、普通合伙公司、有限合伙公司),则应对资本收益全额征税,但是在某些情况下,应纳税额限制为资本收益额的60%。在这两种情况下,适用税率是指为透明性分配收入的每个股东的边际税率。
    • 如果卖方是自然人,则资本收益率为26%。

    在收购股权时,通常向买方收取200欧元的注册税。

    即使是在购买公司时,卖方应支付的直接税款也是根据资本收益计算的。如果卖方是资本公司,则税率是资本收益的24%。如果卖方是合伙企业(与自然人合伙人合伙)或个体企业家,则税率取决于卖方的收入。

    在购买公司时,通常由买方支付的间接税款是根据分配给每一转让资产的价格份额计算的。价格是转让资产减去转让负债所得的金额。百分比因资产类型而异。总的来说:

    • 流动资产征收3%的注册税;
    • 商誉需缴纳3%的注册税;
    • 建筑物需缴纳9%的注册税 (以及每笔固定金额50欧元的抵押和地籍税);
    • 土地需缴纳9%至12%的注册税 (视买方而定),抵押和地籍税的税额均为50欧元。

    如公司由不同税率的资产组成,且双方同意一次性付款,而不区分单个资产的可归属价值,则应将最高税率适用于一次性付款。

    应当强调的是,税务机关可以对双方的不动产和商誉进行估价,从而产生增税的风险。

    股票交易和资产交易:面向第三方的风险和责任

    在购买股份或股权(“股票交易”)时,买方间接承担所有与公司先前管理有关的风险。

    另一方面,在收购公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”)时,双方可以决定转让的范围(资产和关系),从而在相互关系中确定买方所承担的风险。

    但是,在与第三方的关系方面,有一些规则是当事各方不能违背的,这些规则对买卖双方的风险有重大影响,从而对双方之间的谈判协定有重大影响。主要内容如下:

    • 雇员:与公司买家的雇佣关系继续存在。转让时,买卖双方应对雇员的所有索赔承担连带责任(条款2112 c.c.)。
    • 债务:卖方有义务偿还直至转让之日的所有债务。买方有义务承担会计账目上产生的债务(条款2560 c.c.)。
    • 债务和税务责任:卖方有义务支付转让之日之前的债务、税款和税务处罚。
    • 除了会计账簿产生的与应付税款有关的义务外 (条款2560 c.c.),买方还应承担税款和罚款,即使这些税款和罚款未出现在会计账簿中,也应遵守以下限制 (法令472 / 1997,条款14):
    • 卖方事先执行的利益;
    • 不超过所购买公司或公司分支机构的价值;
    • 对于尚未存在争议的税收和罚款,责任只适用于与公司被出售当年及之前两年有关的税收和处罚;在公司被出售前两年之前的税收和处罚,其责任仅适用于该期间内有争议的税收和罚款;
    • 在税务机关契约移转日期产生的债务范围内。税务局必须出具一份证明,证明存在争议和债务。申请后40天内未签发的否定证书可免除买方的合同责任:
    • 合同:双方可以选择转让哪些合同。就转让的合同而言,即使未经第三方同意,买方也会接管不属于个人性质的经营合同(即卖方提供客观或主观上不可互换的个人性质的给付))。此外,如果有正当理由 (例如,买方由于其财务状况或技术能力不能保证能够履行合同),第三方可以在3个月内退出合同(条款2558c.c.)。

    一些应对风险的工具

    为了应对由第三方责任引起的风险以及与收购相关的一般风险,可以使用各种谈判和合同工具。让我们来看一些例子。

    在收购公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”)时:

    雇员:可以与雇员就合同条件的变更达成一致,并免除买卖双方的连带责任(来自条款2112 c.c.)。为了使协议有效,必须在“受保护”的基础上(例如在工会的协助下)与雇员达成协议。

    债务:

    • 通过相应降低价格将债务转移给买方;价格的降低还减少了运营的财政成本。如果发生债务转移,则可以根据债权人的要求获得卖方解除债务责任声明,以保护卖方 (来自条款2560 c.c.); 或者可以预计,买方将在公司转让(“关闭”)的同时偿还债务。
    • 对于未转让给买方的债务,请从债权人处获得使买方免于承担责任的声明(来自条款2560 c.c.)
    • 对于无法获得债权人解除声明的债务,应同意有利于卖方的担保形式(针对转让债务)或有利于买方的担保形式 (针对非转让债务),例如,推迟部分价格的付款 (对买方有利),部分价格的信托保证金 (“托管”),银行担保或由股东承担。

    债务和税务责任:

    • 向税务局申请法令472/1997的条款14中关于未决债务和争议的证明;
    • 通过相应降低价格将债务转移给买方;
    • 商定有利于卖方的担保形式(针对转让债务)和有利于买方的担保形式(针对未转让债务或尚未解决的争议),例如上文所述的一般债务担保。

    合同针对转让合同:

    • 检查卖方在转让之日之前所承担的给付义务是否已得到适当履行,以避免可能妨碍合同履行的第三方诉讼的风险;
    • 至少对于最重要的合同(除非出于保密原因),应寻求第三方对合同转让批准的确认。

    在收购股份的交易(“股票交易”)中,买方间接承担与公司先前管理有关的所有风险,其中一些工具包括:

    • 尽职调查。 对公司进行深入的法律、税务和会计尽职调查,以便在谈判和合同中预先评估并管理风险。
    • 声明、担保(R&W)和赔偿。在收购合同(“股票购买协议”)中,预先就公司的情况向卖方提供一系列详细的声明和担保,以及在违约情况下的赔偿义务(“商业担保”:财务报表、参考资产负债表、合同、诉讼、环保法规、开展业务的授权、债务、信贷等)。声明和担保的谈判通常通过管理尽职调查的结果来实施(例如:尽职调查引起的争议不包括在声明、担保和赔偿中,各方在确定价格时须予以考虑)。在意大利的股票交易中,关于公司状况的声明和保证(“业务保证”)以及赔偿义务的规定是必要的,因为如果没有这些条款,如果公司的实际情况与购买时考虑的情况不同,买方则无法从卖方那里获得赔款或补偿(除非在极端情况下、极为罕见)。
    • 为买方提供担保。保证买方在对方不遵守声明和担保的情况下获得有效补偿(或部分补偿)的工具。 其中包括:(a)延长部分金额的支付;(b)在声明和担保期间,以及在发生争议到确定争议的阶段,以信托保证金(“托管”)的形式支付部分金额; (c)银行担保; (d)W&I保单,即涵盖在违反声明和担保的情况下买方所承担风险的最高赔偿额(特定风险除外)的保险合同。

    其他影响股票交易和资产交易选择的因素

    当然,通过股票交易或资产交易在意大利进行收购交易的选择,也取决于交易的税收成本以外的其他因素。以下是一些情况:

    • 购买部分业务。 当资产交易不涉及卖方整个公司的购买而仅涉及其一部分(公司分支机构)时,则选择资产交易。
    • 问题公司的状况。当目标公司的状况非常棘手,买方无法承担所有来自公司先前管理的风险时,就选择资产交易。
    • 保留卖方的角色。当你想让卖方在被收购的公司中占有一席之地时,你可以选择股票交易。在这种情况下,除了在管理中发挥作用外,卖方通常会持有少数股份,并在一定时间后拥有退出条款(出售权和认购权)。这些条款通常将价格与未来的结果联系起来,因此,从买方的利益出发,可以激励卖方发挥管理作用;从卖方的利益出发,可以增强购买时未实现的利润前景。

    Cyprus is emerging as a new investment fund centre in Europe following the efforts for evolving and upgrading the regulatory and compliance framework which was initiated in the late 1990s. The enactment of the Alternative Investment Funds Law, No. 131(I)/2014 (AIF Law) is the latest development which aimed at the creation of an attractive and competitive environment for further enhancement and development of the alternative funds industry in Cyprus. The AIF Law replaced the previous regime under which Cyprus managed to develop into a regional domicile for investment funds and their managers.

    The following possibilities for alternative investment funds (AIFs) were introduced by the AIF Law:

    • Umbrella funds with multiple investment compartments/sub-funds which may adopt different investment policies and manage different pools of assets
    • Transferability of shares
    • Public offerings of AIF’s shares or units
    • Listing of securities issued by AIFs

    AIFs may be open-ended or closed-ended and may take one of the following legal forms:

    • Fixed Capital Company
    • Variable Capital Company
    • Limited Partnership
    • Common Fund (contractual)

    The relevant rules applicable to the respective legal form are based on Anglo-Saxon common law principles which are incorporated in Cyprus law (company law, partnerships law and contract law etc.).

    AIFs may have a limited or unlimited duration.

    Investor Classification

    AIFs may be established either to be marketed to retail investors or to professional and/or well informed investors (see below for the exception applicable to AIFs with limited number of persons). Investor classification is to be made on the following basis:

    • Professional Investor: For an investor to be considered as professional investor the requirements for professional clients under Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC (MIFID) must be satisfied. A basic characteristic of professional investors is the fact that they possess the experience, knowledge and expertise to make their own investment decisions and to properly assess the risks they incur.
    • Well-Informed Investor: A well-informed investor is not a professional investor within the above meaning but one who:
      • confirms in writing the well-informed investor status and awareness of the risks related with the proposed investment; and
      • makes an investment of at least €125.000 or has been assessed as having the expertise, experience and knowledge in evaluating the suitability of the investment opportunity in the AIF by a credit institution, investment firm or a management company for Undertakings for the collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS Management Company)
    • Retail Investor: A retail investor is an investor who does not fulfil the above requirements so as to be classified as a professional or well-informed investor.

    Types of AIFs

    The AIF Law allows for the establishment of AIFs to be addressed to an unlimited number of investors as well as for funds addressed to a limited number of persons (maximum 75) who may only be professional and/or well-informed investors.

    AIFs to be addressed to an unlimited number of investors must to comply with minimum initial capital requirements i.e. €125.000 if externally managed and €300.000 if self-managed.

    AIFs may be subject to investment restrictions depending on the investor type, the category of the assets to be held in their portfolio and the overall investment policy to be adopted. On the other hand, AIFs with limited number of investors are subject to a lighter legal and regulatory framework and are not subject to investment restrictions or investment limits.

    Management of AIFs

    AIFs may be managed externally by a manager appointed to perform the management of the portfolio of assets and related services. Different entities may undertake this role depending on the type of AIF:

    • For AIFs with unlimited number of investors the external manager may be:
      • An Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM) established under local law or under the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
      • A UCITS Management Company established under local law or under the Undertakings for the collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive
      • A MIFID Investment Firm established under local law
      • An AIFM established in a third country but complying with the relevant provisions of the local legislation
    • For AIFs with limited number of investors the external manager may be:
      • A MIFID Investment Firm established under local law or the MIFID
      • A UCITs Management Company established under local law
      • An entity established under local law solely for the purpose of managing a specific AIF with limited number of investors
      • An entity established in a third country and licensed to provide asset management services and subject to prudential supervision

    In the case of AIFs which are companies, the AIF Law provides the option of self-management whereby the management of the portfolio of assets is performed by the board of directors subject to certain restrictions (cap on value of the assets under management, restrictions on leverage, lock-up periods).

    Depositary

    The depositary of an AIF may be a credit institution or a MIFID Investment Firm or other entity which is subject to prudential regulation and ongoing supervision and which is eligible to act as depositary under its home state legislation.

     The depositary must have its registered office in Cyprus or in another member state of the European Union or in a third country, provided that the Cyprus Securities Exchange Commission has signed with the competent authorities of the third country a Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation and Exchange of Information.

    Under certain circumstances it is possible for small AIFs with limited number of persons not to appoint a depositary.

    Utilisation of the AIFs

    AIFs may be utilised for investments in a wide range of asset classes. Such funds have been established for investments in debt and equity securities as well as real estate and private equity. In a structure with multiple investment compartments/sub-funds, different compartments/sub-funds may invest in diverse asset classes.

    Key benefits

    • Cost-efficient and simple set-up process with fees being significantly lower than in the more mature fund centres e.g. Ireland and Luxembourg
    • A single and accessible regulator for the alternative funds and their managers
    • Flexibility as to the asset classes that may be included in the AIF portfolio
    • Transparency, reporting and risk management aiming at investor protection
    • Regulated environment in line with the European Union regulatory framework for Alternative Investment Fund Managers, MIFID Investment Firms and UCITSs
    • Passporting of the marketing of funds in the European Union where the manager is an AIFM
    • Redomiciliation in and out of Cyprus is possible

    Taxation

    Cyprus’ growth in this sector has been driven by the country’s tax treaty network, originally rendering it a jurisdiction for launching investments funds with investments primarily into Russia, the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe but recently also in Asian countries.

    Main aspects of tax treatment in Cyprus:

    • Subject to 12.5% flat corporation tax
    • Exemption from tax on dividends received by the AIF
    • Exemption from tax on profits from sale of securities or other instruments (except where the securities are in companies owning immovable property in Cyprus)
    • No subscription tax on assets of funds
    • Exemption on capital gains tax from the sale of immovable property located outside Cyprus
    • No capital gains tax on disposal of shares/units by the holders
    • Benefiting from an extensive network of more than 50 double tax treaties offering interesting tax planning opportunities

    In a rapidly changing funds industry, the options and opportunities available for the setting up and operation of alternative investment funds under the Cyprus regulatory regime are worth exploring by fund managers, investors and their advisors.

    Simone Rossi

    Practice areas

    • 公司法
    • 契约
    • 并购
    • 破产
    • 私募股权

    写信给 Italy – capital increases: a new rule complicates the position of minority shareholders





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      Cyprus – Establishing an alternative investment fund

      6 11 月 2016

      • 塞浦路斯
      • 投资
      • 私募股权

      Summary: Article 44 of Decree Law No. 76 of July 16, 2020 (the so-called “Simplifications Decree“) provides that, until June 30, 2021, capital increases by joint stock companies (società per azioni), limited partnerships by shares (società in accomandita per azioni) and limited liability companies (società a responsabilità limitata) may be approved with the favorable vote of the majority of the share capital represented at the shareholders’ meeting, provided that at least half of the share capital is present, even if the bylaws establish higher majorities.

      The rule has a significant impact on the position of minority shareholders (and investors) of unlisted Italian companies, the protection of which is frequently entrusted (also) to bylaws clauses establishing qualified majorities for the approval of capital increases.

      After describing the new rule, some considerations will be made on the consequences and possible safeguards for minority shareholders, limited to unlisted companies.


      Simplifications Decree: the reduction of majorities for the approval of capital increases in Italian joint stock companies, limited partnerships by shares and limited liability companies

      Article 44 of Decree Law No. 76 of July 16, 2020 (the so-called ‘Simplifications Decree‘)[1] temporarily reduced, until 30.6.2021, the majorities for the approval by the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting of certain resolutions to increase the share capital.

      The rule applies to all companies, including listed ones. It applies to resolutions of the extraordinary shareholders’ meeting on the following subjects:

      • capital increases through contributions in cash, in kind or in receivables, pursuant to Articles 2439, 2440 and 2441 (regarding joint stock companies and limited partnerships by shares), and to Articles 2480, 2481 and 2481-bis of the Italian Civil Code (regarding limited liability companies);
      • the attribution to the directors of the power to increase the share capital, pursuant to Article 2443 (regarding joint stock companies and limited partnerships by shares) and to Article 2480 of the Italian Civil Code (regarding limited liability companies).

      The ordinary rules provide the following mayorities:

      (a)       for joint stock companies and limited partnerships by shares: (i) on first call a majority of more than half of the share capital (Art. 2368, second paragraph, Italian Civil Code); (ii) on second call a majority of two thirds of the share capital presented at the meeting (Art. 2369, third paragraph, Italian Civil Code);

      (b)       for limited liability companies, a majority of more than half of the share capital (Art. 2479-bis, third paragraph, Italian Civil Code);

      (c)       for listed companies, a majority of two thirds of the share capital represents-to in the shareholders’ meeting (Art. 2368, second paragraph and Art. 2369, third paragraph, Italian Civil Code).

      Most importantly, the ordinary rules allow for qualified majorities (i.e., higher than those required by law) in the bylaws.

      The temporary provisions of Article 44 of the Simplifications Decree provide that resolutions are approved with the favourable vote of the majority of the share capital represented at the shareholders’ meeting, provided that at least half of the share capital is present. This majority also applies if the bylaws provide for higher majorities.

      Simplifications Decree: the impact of the decrease in majorities for the approval of capital increases on minority shareholders of unlisted Italian companies

      The rule has a significant impact on the position of minority shareholders (and investors) in unlisted Italian companies. It can be strongly criticised, particularly because it allows derogations from the higher majorities established in the bylaws, thus affecting ongoing relationships and the governance agreed between shareholders and reflected in the bylaws.

      Qualified majorities, higher than the legal ones, for the approval of capital increases are a fundamental protection for minority shareholders (and investors). They are frequently introduced in the bylaws: when the company is set up with several partners, in the context of aggregation transactions, in investment transactions, private equity and venture capital transactions.

      Qualified majorities prevent majority shareholders from carrying out transactions without the consent of minority shareholders (or some of them), which have a significant impact on the company and the position of minority shareholders. In fact, capital increases through contributions of assets reduce the minority shareholder’s shareholding percentage and can significantly change the company’s business (e.g. through the contribution of a business). Capital increases in cash force the minority shareholder to choose between further investing in the company or reducing its shareholding.

      The reduction in the percentage of participation may imply the loss of important protections, linked to the possession of a participation above a certain threshold. These are not only certain rights provided for by law in favour of minority shareholders[2], but – with even more serious effects – the protections deriving from the qualified majorities provided for in the bylaws to approve certain decisions. The most striking case is that of the qualified majority for resolutions amending the bylaws, so that the amendments cannot be approved without the consent of the minority shareholders (or some of them). This is a fundamental clause, in order to ensure stability for certain provisions of the bylaws, agreed between the shareholders, that protect the minority shareholders, such as: pre-emption and tag-along rights, list voting for the appointment of the board of directors, qualified majorities for the taking of decisions by the shareholders’ meeting or the board of directors, limits on the powers that can be delegated by the board of directors. Through the capital increase, the majority can obtain a percentage of the shareholding that allows it to amend the bylaws, unilaterally departing from the governance structure agreed with the other shareholders.

      The legislator has disregarded all this and has introduced a rule that does not simplify. Rather, it fuels conflicts between the shareholders and undermines legal certainty, thus discouraging investments rather than encouraging them.

      Simplifications Decree: checks and safeguards for minority shareholders with respect to the decrease in majorities for the approval of capital increases

      In order to assess the situation and the protection of the minority shareholder it is necessary to examine any shareholders’ agreement in force between the shareholders. The existence of a shareholders’ agreement will be almost certain in private equity or venture capital transactions or by other professional investors. But outside of these cases there are many companies, especially among small and medium-sized enterprises, where the relationships between the shareholders are governed exclusively by the bylaws.

      In the shareholders’ agreement it will have to be verified whether there are clauses binding the shareholders, as parties to the agreement, to approve capital increases by qualified majority, i.e. higher than those required by law. Or whether the agreement make reference to a text of the bylaws (attached or by specific reference) that provides for such a majority, so that compliance with the qualified majority can be considered as an obligation of the parties to the shareholders’ agreement.

      In this case, the shareholders’ agreement will protect the minority shareholder(s), as Article 44 of the Simplifications Decree does not introduce an exception to the clauses of the shareholders’ agreement.

      The protection offered by the shareholders’ agreement is strong, but lower than that of the bylaws. The clause in the bylaws requiring a qualified majority binds all shareholders and the company, so the capital increase cannot be validly approved in violation of the bylaws. The shareholders’ agreement, on the other hand, is only binding between the parties to the agreement, so it does not prevent the company from approving the capital increase, even if the shareholder’s vote violates the obligations of the shareholders’ agreement. In this case, the other shareholders will be entitled to compensation for the damage suffered as a result of the breach of the agreement.

      In the absence of a shareholders’ agreement that binds the shareholders to respect a qualified majority for the approval of the capital increase, the minority shareholder has only the possibility of challenging the resolution to increase the capital, due to abuse of the majority, if the resolution is not justified in the interest of the company and the majority shareholder’s vote pursues a personal interest that is antithetical to the company’s interest, or if it is the instrument of fraudulent activity by the majority shareholders aimed at infringing the rights of minority shareholders[3]. A narrow escape, and a protection certainly insufficient.

      [1] The Simplifications Decree was converted into law by Law no. 120 of September 11, 2020. The conversion law replaced art. 44 of the Simplifications Decree, extending the temporary discipline provided therein to capital increases in cash and to capital increases of limited liability companies.

      [2] For example: the percentage of 10% (33% for limited liability companies) for the right of shareholders to obtain the call of the meeting (art. 2367; art. 2479 Italian Civil Code); the percentage of 20% (10% for limited liability companies) to prevent the waiver or settlement of the liability action against the directors (art. 2393, sixth paragraph; art. 2476, fifth paragraph, Italian Civil Code); the percentage of 20% for the exercise by the shareholder of the liability action against the directors (art. 2393-bis, Civil Code).

      [3] Cass. Civ., 12 December 2005, no. 27387; Trib. Roma, 31 March 2017, no. 6452.

      在意大利,收购交易(M&A)在大部分情况下通常是通过收购股权(“股票交易”)、公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”)进行的。主要由于税收原因,股票交易比资产交易更为频繁,尽管资产交易可以更好地限制买方的风险。股票交易与资产交易之间的主要区别在于风险和买方与卖方之间的关系。

      在意大利市场上更倾向于通过收购股权(“股票交易”)而非收购公司或公司分支机构进行收购(M&A

      在意大利,大多数情况下,收购交易(M&A)的执行是通过购买股份(“股票交易”)或购买公司与公司分支机构(“资产交易“)的方式进行的。其他的形式,如合并,则不那么常见。

      通过购买被收购公司的股权或股份(“股票交易”),买方间接获得公司的全部资产(资产、负债、关系),从而承担与公司先前管理有关的所有风险。

      通过收购公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”),买方获得一组为经营业务而组织起来的商品和关系(物业、工厂、员工、合同、信贷、债务等)。资产交易的好处在于,双方可以确定转让的范围,从而限制交易的法律风险。

      尽管有这一优势,意大利的大多数收购业务都是通过收购股权进行的。2018年,被购买的股份(股权和股票)约为78400股,而被出售的股份约为35900股(资料来源::www.notariato.it/it/news/dati-statistici-notarili-anno-2018)。应当指出的是,业务转让的数字还包括个体企业家所经营的迷你或小型公司,对于这些公司而言,股权交易的替代方案(尽管可行,但可以通过将公司转让给新公司和出售来实现)由于成本原因,在实践中不可行。

      意大利收购业务的经济成本(M&A)

      与购买公司(“资产交易”)相比,购买股份(“股权交易”)的主要原因是运营的税收成本考虑,让我们看看它们通常是什么。

      在购买股份时,卖方应缴的直接税款按下列百分比计算:

      • 如果卖方是一家资本公司(有限股份公司、有限责任公司、有限合伙股权责任公司),税率是资本收益的24%。但是,在某些条件下,c.d. PEX(参股豁免)章程仅对5%的资本收益适用24%的税率。
      • 如果卖方是合伙企业(简单公司、普通合伙公司、有限合伙公司),则应对资本收益全额征税,但是在某些情况下,应纳税额限制为资本收益额的60%。在这两种情况下,适用税率是指为透明性分配收入的每个股东的边际税率。
      • 如果卖方是自然人,则资本收益率为26%。

      在收购股权时,通常向买方收取200欧元的注册税。

      即使是在购买公司时,卖方应支付的直接税款也是根据资本收益计算的。如果卖方是资本公司,则税率是资本收益的24%。如果卖方是合伙企业(与自然人合伙人合伙)或个体企业家,则税率取决于卖方的收入。

      在购买公司时,通常由买方支付的间接税款是根据分配给每一转让资产的价格份额计算的。价格是转让资产减去转让负债所得的金额。百分比因资产类型而异。总的来说:

      • 流动资产征收3%的注册税;
      • 商誉需缴纳3%的注册税;
      • 建筑物需缴纳9%的注册税 (以及每笔固定金额50欧元的抵押和地籍税);
      • 土地需缴纳9%至12%的注册税 (视买方而定),抵押和地籍税的税额均为50欧元。

      如公司由不同税率的资产组成,且双方同意一次性付款,而不区分单个资产的可归属价值,则应将最高税率适用于一次性付款。

      应当强调的是,税务机关可以对双方的不动产和商誉进行估价,从而产生增税的风险。

      股票交易和资产交易:面向第三方的风险和责任

      在购买股份或股权(“股票交易”)时,买方间接承担所有与公司先前管理有关的风险。

      另一方面,在收购公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”)时,双方可以决定转让的范围(资产和关系),从而在相互关系中确定买方所承担的风险。

      但是,在与第三方的关系方面,有一些规则是当事各方不能违背的,这些规则对买卖双方的风险有重大影响,从而对双方之间的谈判协定有重大影响。主要内容如下:

      • 雇员:与公司买家的雇佣关系继续存在。转让时,买卖双方应对雇员的所有索赔承担连带责任(条款2112 c.c.)。
      • 债务:卖方有义务偿还直至转让之日的所有债务。买方有义务承担会计账目上产生的债务(条款2560 c.c.)。
      • 债务和税务责任:卖方有义务支付转让之日之前的债务、税款和税务处罚。
      • 除了会计账簿产生的与应付税款有关的义务外 (条款2560 c.c.),买方还应承担税款和罚款,即使这些税款和罚款未出现在会计账簿中,也应遵守以下限制 (法令472 / 1997,条款14):
      • 卖方事先执行的利益;
      • 不超过所购买公司或公司分支机构的价值;
      • 对于尚未存在争议的税收和罚款,责任只适用于与公司被出售当年及之前两年有关的税收和处罚;在公司被出售前两年之前的税收和处罚,其责任仅适用于该期间内有争议的税收和罚款;
      • 在税务机关契约移转日期产生的债务范围内。税务局必须出具一份证明,证明存在争议和债务。申请后40天内未签发的否定证书可免除买方的合同责任:
      • 合同:双方可以选择转让哪些合同。就转让的合同而言,即使未经第三方同意,买方也会接管不属于个人性质的经营合同(即卖方提供客观或主观上不可互换的个人性质的给付))。此外,如果有正当理由 (例如,买方由于其财务状况或技术能力不能保证能够履行合同),第三方可以在3个月内退出合同(条款2558c.c.)。

      一些应对风险的工具

      为了应对由第三方责任引起的风险以及与收购相关的一般风险,可以使用各种谈判和合同工具。让我们来看一些例子。

      在收购公司或公司分支机构(“资产交易”)时:

      雇员:可以与雇员就合同条件的变更达成一致,并免除买卖双方的连带责任(来自条款2112 c.c.)。为了使协议有效,必须在“受保护”的基础上(例如在工会的协助下)与雇员达成协议。

      债务:

      • 通过相应降低价格将债务转移给买方;价格的降低还减少了运营的财政成本。如果发生债务转移,则可以根据债权人的要求获得卖方解除债务责任声明,以保护卖方 (来自条款2560 c.c.); 或者可以预计,买方将在公司转让(“关闭”)的同时偿还债务。
      • 对于未转让给买方的债务,请从债权人处获得使买方免于承担责任的声明(来自条款2560 c.c.)
      • 对于无法获得债权人解除声明的债务,应同意有利于卖方的担保形式(针对转让债务)或有利于买方的担保形式 (针对非转让债务),例如,推迟部分价格的付款 (对买方有利),部分价格的信托保证金 (“托管”),银行担保或由股东承担。

      债务和税务责任:

      • 向税务局申请法令472/1997的条款14中关于未决债务和争议的证明;
      • 通过相应降低价格将债务转移给买方;
      • 商定有利于卖方的担保形式(针对转让债务)和有利于买方的担保形式(针对未转让债务或尚未解决的争议),例如上文所述的一般债务担保。

      合同针对转让合同:

      • 检查卖方在转让之日之前所承担的给付义务是否已得到适当履行,以避免可能妨碍合同履行的第三方诉讼的风险;
      • 至少对于最重要的合同(除非出于保密原因),应寻求第三方对合同转让批准的确认。

      在收购股份的交易(“股票交易”)中,买方间接承担与公司先前管理有关的所有风险,其中一些工具包括:

      • 尽职调查。 对公司进行深入的法律、税务和会计尽职调查,以便在谈判和合同中预先评估并管理风险。
      • 声明、担保(R&W)和赔偿。在收购合同(“股票购买协议”)中,预先就公司的情况向卖方提供一系列详细的声明和担保,以及在违约情况下的赔偿义务(“商业担保”:财务报表、参考资产负债表、合同、诉讼、环保法规、开展业务的授权、债务、信贷等)。声明和担保的谈判通常通过管理尽职调查的结果来实施(例如:尽职调查引起的争议不包括在声明、担保和赔偿中,各方在确定价格时须予以考虑)。在意大利的股票交易中,关于公司状况的声明和保证(“业务保证”)以及赔偿义务的规定是必要的,因为如果没有这些条款,如果公司的实际情况与购买时考虑的情况不同,买方则无法从卖方那里获得赔款或补偿(除非在极端情况下、极为罕见)。
      • 为买方提供担保。保证买方在对方不遵守声明和担保的情况下获得有效补偿(或部分补偿)的工具。 其中包括:(a)延长部分金额的支付;(b)在声明和担保期间,以及在发生争议到确定争议的阶段,以信托保证金(“托管”)的形式支付部分金额; (c)银行担保; (d)W&I保单,即涵盖在违反声明和担保的情况下买方所承担风险的最高赔偿额(特定风险除外)的保险合同。

      其他影响股票交易和资产交易选择的因素

      当然,通过股票交易或资产交易在意大利进行收购交易的选择,也取决于交易的税收成本以外的其他因素。以下是一些情况:

      • 购买部分业务。 当资产交易不涉及卖方整个公司的购买而仅涉及其一部分(公司分支机构)时,则选择资产交易。
      • 问题公司的状况。当目标公司的状况非常棘手,买方无法承担所有来自公司先前管理的风险时,就选择资产交易。
      • 保留卖方的角色。当你想让卖方在被收购的公司中占有一席之地时,你可以选择股票交易。在这种情况下,除了在管理中发挥作用外,卖方通常会持有少数股份,并在一定时间后拥有退出条款(出售权和认购权)。这些条款通常将价格与未来的结果联系起来,因此,从买方的利益出发,可以激励卖方发挥管理作用;从卖方的利益出发,可以增强购买时未实现的利润前景。

      Cyprus is emerging as a new investment fund centre in Europe following the efforts for evolving and upgrading the regulatory and compliance framework which was initiated in the late 1990s. The enactment of the Alternative Investment Funds Law, No. 131(I)/2014 (AIF Law) is the latest development which aimed at the creation of an attractive and competitive environment for further enhancement and development of the alternative funds industry in Cyprus. The AIF Law replaced the previous regime under which Cyprus managed to develop into a regional domicile for investment funds and their managers.

      The following possibilities for alternative investment funds (AIFs) were introduced by the AIF Law:

      • Umbrella funds with multiple investment compartments/sub-funds which may adopt different investment policies and manage different pools of assets
      • Transferability of shares
      • Public offerings of AIF’s shares or units
      • Listing of securities issued by AIFs

      AIFs may be open-ended or closed-ended and may take one of the following legal forms:

      • Fixed Capital Company
      • Variable Capital Company
      • Limited Partnership
      • Common Fund (contractual)

      The relevant rules applicable to the respective legal form are based on Anglo-Saxon common law principles which are incorporated in Cyprus law (company law, partnerships law and contract law etc.).

      AIFs may have a limited or unlimited duration.

      Investor Classification

      AIFs may be established either to be marketed to retail investors or to professional and/or well informed investors (see below for the exception applicable to AIFs with limited number of persons). Investor classification is to be made on the following basis:

      • Professional Investor: For an investor to be considered as professional investor the requirements for professional clients under Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC (MIFID) must be satisfied. A basic characteristic of professional investors is the fact that they possess the experience, knowledge and expertise to make their own investment decisions and to properly assess the risks they incur.
      • Well-Informed Investor: A well-informed investor is not a professional investor within the above meaning but one who:
        • confirms in writing the well-informed investor status and awareness of the risks related with the proposed investment; and
        • makes an investment of at least €125.000 or has been assessed as having the expertise, experience and knowledge in evaluating the suitability of the investment opportunity in the AIF by a credit institution, investment firm or a management company for Undertakings for the collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS Management Company)
      • Retail Investor: A retail investor is an investor who does not fulfil the above requirements so as to be classified as a professional or well-informed investor.

      Types of AIFs

      The AIF Law allows for the establishment of AIFs to be addressed to an unlimited number of investors as well as for funds addressed to a limited number of persons (maximum 75) who may only be professional and/or well-informed investors.

      AIFs to be addressed to an unlimited number of investors must to comply with minimum initial capital requirements i.e. €125.000 if externally managed and €300.000 if self-managed.

      AIFs may be subject to investment restrictions depending on the investor type, the category of the assets to be held in their portfolio and the overall investment policy to be adopted. On the other hand, AIFs with limited number of investors are subject to a lighter legal and regulatory framework and are not subject to investment restrictions or investment limits.

      Management of AIFs

      AIFs may be managed externally by a manager appointed to perform the management of the portfolio of assets and related services. Different entities may undertake this role depending on the type of AIF:

      • For AIFs with unlimited number of investors the external manager may be:
        • An Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM) established under local law or under the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
        • A UCITS Management Company established under local law or under the Undertakings for the collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive
        • A MIFID Investment Firm established under local law
        • An AIFM established in a third country but complying with the relevant provisions of the local legislation
      • For AIFs with limited number of investors the external manager may be:
        • A MIFID Investment Firm established under local law or the MIFID
        • A UCITs Management Company established under local law
        • An entity established under local law solely for the purpose of managing a specific AIF with limited number of investors
        • An entity established in a third country and licensed to provide asset management services and subject to prudential supervision

      In the case of AIFs which are companies, the AIF Law provides the option of self-management whereby the management of the portfolio of assets is performed by the board of directors subject to certain restrictions (cap on value of the assets under management, restrictions on leverage, lock-up periods).

      Depositary

      The depositary of an AIF may be a credit institution or a MIFID Investment Firm or other entity which is subject to prudential regulation and ongoing supervision and which is eligible to act as depositary under its home state legislation.

       The depositary must have its registered office in Cyprus or in another member state of the European Union or in a third country, provided that the Cyprus Securities Exchange Commission has signed with the competent authorities of the third country a Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation and Exchange of Information.

      Under certain circumstances it is possible for small AIFs with limited number of persons not to appoint a depositary.

      Utilisation of the AIFs

      AIFs may be utilised for investments in a wide range of asset classes. Such funds have been established for investments in debt and equity securities as well as real estate and private equity. In a structure with multiple investment compartments/sub-funds, different compartments/sub-funds may invest in diverse asset classes.

      Key benefits

      • Cost-efficient and simple set-up process with fees being significantly lower than in the more mature fund centres e.g. Ireland and Luxembourg
      • A single and accessible regulator for the alternative funds and their managers
      • Flexibility as to the asset classes that may be included in the AIF portfolio
      • Transparency, reporting and risk management aiming at investor protection
      • Regulated environment in line with the European Union regulatory framework for Alternative Investment Fund Managers, MIFID Investment Firms and UCITSs
      • Passporting of the marketing of funds in the European Union where the manager is an AIFM
      • Redomiciliation in and out of Cyprus is possible

      Taxation

      Cyprus’ growth in this sector has been driven by the country’s tax treaty network, originally rendering it a jurisdiction for launching investments funds with investments primarily into Russia, the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe but recently also in Asian countries.

      Main aspects of tax treatment in Cyprus:

      • Subject to 12.5% flat corporation tax
      • Exemption from tax on dividends received by the AIF
      • Exemption from tax on profits from sale of securities or other instruments (except where the securities are in companies owning immovable property in Cyprus)
      • No subscription tax on assets of funds
      • Exemption on capital gains tax from the sale of immovable property located outside Cyprus
      • No capital gains tax on disposal of shares/units by the holders
      • Benefiting from an extensive network of more than 50 double tax treaties offering interesting tax planning opportunities

      In a rapidly changing funds industry, the options and opportunities available for the setting up and operation of alternative investment funds under the Cyprus regulatory regime are worth exploring by fund managers, investors and their advisors.

      Christi Kythreotou

      Practice areas

      • 公司法
      • 税务
      • 私募股权

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