How to set aside Arbitral Awards in Florida

The Revised Florida Arbitration Code (“RFAC”) governs an application to vacate, modify, correct, confirm, or appeal an arbitral award under Florida law. The RFAC is codified in Chapter 682 of the Florida Statutes (“Fla. Stat.”).

The specific grounds for vacating an award are set forth in Fla. Stat. § 682.13, and discussed in detail below. Arbitral awards may also be modified or corrected upon grounds set forth in Fla. Stat. § 682.14. Judgments on an award, together with costs and attorney fees incurred in post-award court proceedings are addressed in Fla. Stat. § 682.15. Appeals are governed by Fla. Stat. § 682.20.

Other provisions of particular relevance include Fla. Stat. § 682.014 (nonwaivable provisions), § 682.10 (arbitrator correction or clarification of an award), § 682.181 (jurisdiction), and § 682.19 (venue).

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16, may also apply where the transaction involves interstate commerce. If the FAA governs, practitioners must separately assess FAA vacatur and modification standards and the basis for subject-matter jurisdiction in federal court. For an arbitral award governed by the New York Convention that is rendered in the United States (i.e., where the United States is the primary jurisdiction), a federal court may apply the domestic vacatur standards in FAA Chapter 1 when asked to vacate the award. See Corporación AIC, SA v. Hidroeléctrica Santa Rita S.A., 66 F.4th 876 (11th Cir. 2023).

Venue is expressly governed by Fla. Stat. § 682.19. The initial petition must be filed in the county specified in the arbitration agreement as the place where the hearing is to be held or, if the hearing has already occurred, in the county where it was held. If neither applies, the petition may be filed in a county where an adverse party resides or has a place of business. If no adverse party resides or has a place of business in Florida, it may be filed in any Florida county. All subsequent petitions must be filed in the court hearing the initial petition unless that court directs otherwise.

A. Corruption, fraud, or other undue means. The court must vacate an award if it was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means. A motion based on this ground must be filed within 90 days after the basis was known or, through reasonable care, should have been known. Fla. Stat. § 682.13(1)(a), (2).

B. Arbitrator partiality, corruption, or misconduct. Vacatur is required where there was: (a) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; (b) corruption by an arbitrator; or (c) arbitrator misconduct that prejudiced the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding. Fla. Stat. § 682.13(1)(b).

C. Procedural failures of the arbitrator. An award may be set aside if the arbitrator refused to postpone a hearing upon a showing of sufficient cause, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Fla. Stat. § 682.06 so as substantially to prejudice a party’s rights. Fla. Stat. § 682.13(1)(c).

D. Arbitrator exceeded powers. An award may be vacated if the arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s powers. This ground is narrow: it concerns an arbitrator deciding matters outside the authority given by the parties or the operative documents, or deciding issues not submitted to arbitration. It does not permit vacatur merely because the arbitrator made a legal or factual error. Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1989).

E. No agreement to arbitrate. This ground is available if no agreement to arbitrate existed, unless the challenging party participated in the arbitration without raising the objection no later than the beginning of the arbitration hearing. Fla. Stat. § 682.13(1)(e).

F. Defective notice initiating arbitration. Vacatur is available if the arbitration was conducted without the notice required by Fla. Stat. § 682.032 and that lack of notice substantially prejudiced a party’s rights. Fla. Stat. § 682.13(1)(f).

The Florida Supreme Court has held that an award in a statutory arbitration proceeding may not be set aside for mere errors of judgment on the law or facts. If the award is within the scope of the submission and the arbitrator has not engaged in the statutory misconduct, the award is final and conclusive. Schnurmacher Holding, Inc. v. Noriega, 542 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1989).

An alleged erroneous interpretation of the contract, misapplication of law, or incorrect factual finding is not itself a basis for vacatur. An arbitrator exceeds authority only by deciding issues outside the authority granted by the parties or the operative documents, not by making an alleged error while deciding an issue submitted to arbitration.

Parties cannot agree between or among themselves to vary or waive the statutory grounds for vacatur or modification.  Fla. Stat. § 682.014(3).

For an application based on corruption, fraud, or other undue means, the 90-day period runs from when the ground for vacatur was known or, through reasonable care, should have been known.

The same 90-day deadline applies to a motion to modify or correct an award under Fla. Stat. § 682.14(1). A modification or correction motion may be joined in the alternative with a motion to vacate. Fla. Stat. § 682.14(3).

A separate, limited application may be made to the arbitrator within 20 days after notice of the award to request correction or clarification under Fla. Stat. § 682.10. That procedure does not itself suspend or extend the judicial deadline; however, if the arbitrator issues a modified or corrected award, the 90-day period for a judicial vacatur motion runs from notice of that modified or corrected award.

If the court denies a motion to vacate and no motion to modify or correct the award is pending, the court must confirm the award. Fla. Stat. § 682.13(4). Upon granting an order confirming, modifying, or correcting an award, or vacating an award without directing a rehearing, the court must enter judgment in conformity with its order. That judgment may be recorded, docketed, and enforced as any other judgment in a civil action. Fla. Stat. § 682.15(1).

Accordingly, a party seeking to prevent confirmation or enforcement while a motion to vacate or an appeal is pending must seek relief under the applicable Florida trial-court or appellate rules governing stays and any required bond or other security. Chapter 682 itself does not provide for an automatic stay.

The RFAC permits parties to vary many other provisions of Chapter 682, subject to the statute’s express restrictions, but a Florida arbitration clause cannot eliminate, narrow, or expand the statutory grounds for judicial vacatur of an RFAC award.

The FAA may add a separate federal-law issue when it governs. FAA vacatur standards are generally treated as exclusive in an FAA-governed proceeding. Parties therefore should not assume that an expanded-review provision included in a contract will be enforceable merely because Florida law is selected.

B.    Service of the initial petition. Unless a civil action involving the arbitration agreement is already pending, notice of the initial Chapter 682 petition must be served in the manner required for service of a summons in a civil action. If a related civil action is pending, notice must be served under the rules governing motions in pending cases. Fla. Stat. § 682.015(2).

C.    Contents of the application. The written motion must state its grounds with particularity. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100(b); Fisten v. Brown, 388 So. 3d 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). As a practical matter, the movant should identify the award and arbitration agreement, allege jurisdiction and venue, establish the date of notice and timeliness, state the specific ground or grounds under Fla. Stat. § 682.13, and provide supporting facts and record citations. The award, agreement, and relevant record materials should be attached where necessary to establish the statutory ground and any required prejudice.

D.   Service and notice. The petition and subsequent motion practice must comply with the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and applicable local rules. The court will set and hear the matter under the ordinary procedural requirements for motions.

E.    Consequences of insufficient pleading. A motion to vacate must do more than recite the statutory grounds in Fla. Stat. § 682.13(1). Because a written motion must state its grounds with particularity, conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts are legally insufficient. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100(b); Fisten v. Brown, 388 So. 3d 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). In Fisten, the court held that a timely motion that merely cited the statutory vacatur grounds and stated that supporting grounds would be supplied later was legally insufficient. After the trial court properly denied the motion and no motion to vacate, modify, or correct remained pending, the court had no discretion but to confirm the arbitration award under Fla. Stat. § 682.13(4).

B. Denial and confirmation. If the motion to vacate is denied and no modification or correction motion is pending, the court shall confirm the award. Fla. Stat. § 682.13(4).

C. Modification or correction. Under Fla. Stat. § 682.14(1), the court shall modify or correct an award if there is: (a) an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in a description; (b) an award on a matter not submitted that can be corrected without affecting the merits of the submitted issues; or (c) a non-merits defect in form. If granted, the court confirms the award as modified or corrected.

D. Partial relief. The RFAC does not use the term “partial vacatur.” However, modification or correction under § 682.14 may remove a separable, non-merits defect or decision on an unsubmitted matter where doing so does not affect the merits of the submitted issues.

E. Rehearing (remittal or remand to the tribunal). If the court vacates an award on any ground other than the absence of an arbitration agreement, it may order a rehearing. Fla. Stat. § 682.13(3). If vacatur rests on corruption, fraud, undue means, evident partiality, arbitrator corruption, or prejudicial arbitrator misconduct, a rehearing must be before a new arbitrator. If vacatur rests on procedural misconduct, exceeding authority, or prejudicial lack of notice, the rehearing may be before the same arbitrator or a successor.

A court may also remand a pending claim to the arbitrator for consideration of modification or correction under Fla. Stat. § 682.10. In the attorney-fee context, the Florida Supreme Court has recognized that a court may remand to an arbitration panel for clarification needed to determine fee entitlement. Moser v. Barron Chase Secs., Inc., 783 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2001).

F. Appeal. Under Fla. Stat. § 682.20, a party may appeal an order confirming an award, certain orders denying confirmation, an order modifying or correcting an award, an order vacating an award without directing rehearing, and a judgment or decree entered under Chapter 682. The appeal is taken in the manner and to the same extent as an appeal from an order or judgment in a civil action.

The provision is discretionary, not automatic. It is also independent of whether the agreement or the underlying claim authorized attorneys’ fees in arbitration. The court may additionally allow reasonable costs of the motion and subsequent judicial proceedings. Fla. Stat. § 682.15(2).

This post-award court-fee rule is distinct from whether an arbitrator may award fees incurred in the arbitration itself. That question depends on the arbitration agreement and applicable substantive law.

Fisten v. Brown, 388 So. 3d 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024). This is a significant recent procedural decision. The court affirmed confirmation where the challenger’s timely vacatur motion contained only conclusory assertions and did not plead supporting facts establishing a statutory vacatur ground. Once the trial court denied the motion and no modification/correction motion was pending, it had no discretion but to confirm the award.

Moser v. Barron Chase Securities, Inc., 783 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 2001). The Florida Supreme Court held that a court may remand to an arbitration panel for clarification if necessary to resolve entitlement to attorney fees. The decision illustrates the limited circumstances in which post-award remand may be appropriate.

Corporación AIC, SA v. Hidroeléctrica Santa Rita S.A., 66 F.4th 876 (11th Cir. 2023). This recent case is important for Florida federal practice and international arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit held that, for a Convention award made in the United States, the domestic FAA grounds for vacatur apply in federal court rather than Convention Article V as the exclusive vacatur standard.

Prompt and particularized filing is critical. The 90-day deadline runs from notice of the award (subject to the fraud/undue-means discovery rule), and a conclusory “placeholder” motion is risky. Fisten demonstrates that an insufficient motion may be denied and followed immediately by mandatory confirmation.

Contract drafting cannot expand review. Parties cannot preserve appellate-style merits review under Florida’s Revised Arbitration Code by restricting the arbitrator’s authority or otherwise varying the statutory vacatur grounds. Fla. Stat. § 682.014(3).

FAA/RFAC interplay requires attention. Practitioners should determine at the outset whether the FAA applies, particularly where interstate commerce, a federal forum, or an international award is involved. The FAA analysis may affect the available grounds, procedural rules, and forum, even if the contract selects Florida law.