How to set aside Arbitral Awards in Texas

The Texas Arbitration Act (“TAA”) governs an application to vacate an arbitral award, and provides authority to appeal court decisions to compel or stay arbitration, or to confirm, modify or correct, or to vacate an award (a “vacatur”). The TAA is in Chapter 171 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code (“CPRC”), sections 171.001 through 171.098. The specific grounds for vacating an award are found in section 171.088, the grounds for modifying or correcting an award are in section 171.091 and appeals from judgments on these applications are in section 171.098.

State District Courts. Applications to vacate or modify an arbitral award under the TAA are filed in Texas state district courts. An arbitration agreement that provides for or authorizes arbitration in Texas confers jurisdiction on the District Courts to enforce the agreement and to render judgment on an award (CPRC section 171.081 (jurisdiction)). Filing the application to set aside invokes the court’s jurisdiction, and the proceeding is treated as a civil action (CPRC section 171.082 (Application to Court)).

There are more than 450 District Courts in Texas, across 254 counties (the most counties of any state). If an arbitration agreement required hearing in a particular county, the application to set aside the award must be filed in that county. If there was no named county for hearing, then the application must be filed in the county where at least one of the counterparties resides or has a place of business.

1. Corruption, fraud, or other undue means. The party challenging the award must prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence (a middle, civil standard—more than a “preponderance” of the evidence, less than the criminal standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt”), show that the fraud was not discoverable by due diligence before or during the arbitration, and that it was materially related to an issue in the arbitration. 
2. Arbitrator partiality, corruption, or misconduct. The party challenging the award must show its rights were prejudiced by: (a) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator; (b) corruption in an arbitrator; or (c) misconduct or willful misbehavior of an arbitrator. A neutral arbitrator exhibits partiality if he or she fails to disclose facts that might create a reasonable impression of partiality to an objective observer, or, for example, where an arbitrator failed to disclose contacts with a party’s attorneys while having financial interests with them.
3. Procedural failures of the arbitrators. An arbitral award may be set aside if the arbitrators exceeded their powers; refused to postpone the hearing after a showing of sufficient cause; refused to hear evidence material to the controversy; or conducted the hearing contrary to the noticed time and place and other hearing mechanics in a way that substantially prejudiced the rights of a party.
4. No agreement to arbitrate. This ground is available if it was not determined in a proceeding to compel or stay arbitration, and the party participated in the arbitration hearing after raising the objection.

Interpretation is extraordinarily narrow. Vacatur grounds are interpreted very strictly. Texas law strongly favors the finality of arbitral awards, and judicial review is considered “extraordinarily narrow.”

CPRC section 171.088 (Vacating Award) contains the exclusive grounds for vacatur under the TAA (see Item 3, above). The Texas Supreme Court has ruled definitively that common-law grounds—including “manifest disregard of the law” and violation of public policy—are not viable as independent bases for vacatur because the TAA does not allow judicial expansion of the statutory grounds.

Courts also may not review the substantive merits of the arbitrator’s decision. A factual or legal error by the arbitrator is not, by itself, sufficient to warrant vacatur. Misinterpreting a contract or misapplying the law is not considered exceeding authority.

As a corollary to item 7, below, (waiving or limiting vacatur by agreement), under Texas law parties can agree to expand judicial review. The Texas Supreme Court has ruled parties may restrict the arbitrator’s authority in the arbitration agreement (e.g., to prohibit “reversible error” of law) and then seek judicial review for exceeding restricted authority under CPRC section 171.088(a)(3)(A). This effectively allows appellate-style review on the merits if the parties draft their arbitration clause accordingly.

Simply agreeing to allow expanded review does not preserve the right. That requires the parties:  (a) maintain a verbatim record of the arbitration proceedings; and (b) preserve errors for review under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, as if the award were a court judgment on appeal.

90 days but calculated differently depending on the basis for relief. Under CPRC section 171.088(b) (Vacating Award), a party must file an application to vacate not later than the 90th day after the date of delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant.

For vacatur based on corruption, fraud, or other undue means (CPRC section 171.088(a)(1)), the 90-day period runs from the date the grounds for the application are known or should have been known.

The same 90-day deadline applies to an application to modify or correct an award under CPRC section 171.091(b) (Modifying or Correcting Award).

No. Filing an application to vacate does not automatically suspend enforcement of the award under Texas law. The TAA does not contain a provision requiring or imposing an automatic stay of enforcement just because a vacatur application was filed.

CPRC section 171.084 (Stay of Certain Proceedings) authorizes the court to stay later-filed proceedings in another court relating to the same arbitration, but this limits competing court proceedings rather than enforcement of the award itself.

If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct the award is pending, CPRC section 171.088(c) (Vacating Award) the reviewing court “shall confirm” the award. Once confirmed, the award is entered as a judgment enforceable “in the same manner as any other judgment or decree” (CPRC section 171.092 (Judgment on Award). 

In practice, a party seeking to stay enforcement pending a vacatur application would need to move separately for a discretionary stay from the court, and be prepared to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, potential irreparable harm, and a favorable balance of equities—the same standard applicable to stays pending appeal in civil litigation. Courts would likely be reluctant to grant a stay when the movant’s vacatur arguments appear weak.

The TAA does not address this issue directly, and there is no authoritative Texas Supreme Court ruling squarely on point. Texas law does not contain an express statutory provision permitting or prohibiting a pre-dispute waiver of the right to seek vacatur.

However, several related principles apply:

1. Participation without objection. Under CPRC section  171.088(a)(4) (Vacating Award), a party that participates in the arbitration hearing without objecting there was no agreement to arbitrate waives the right to vacate on that ground.
2. Timeliness objections. A party waives the objection that an award was untimely if it does not notify the arbitrators before the award is delivered (CPRC section 171.053(e) (Arbitrator’s Award)).
3. Contractual expansion and restriction. The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that parties’ contractual freedom extends to both expanding and restricting the scope of judicial review. This implies that parties may be able to contractually limit the grounds on which they may challenge an award.

The enforceability of a complete pre-dispute waiver of all statutory vacatur rights—particularly for grounds involving fraud, corruption, or due process violations—remains untested and is potentially vulnerable to unconscionability or public-policy challenges. Be cautious drafting waiver provisions and consider whether partial waivers (i.e., preserving fraud/corruption grounds) would be more defensible.

For international arbitrations, many institutional rules (e.g., ICC, LCIA) contain provisions deeming an award final and binding and waiving rights of appeal to the extent permitted by law. The enforceability of such waivers in Texas would likely depend on whether the grounds being waived are deemed non-waivable as a matter of public policy.

1. Filing and Docketing. The vacatur application is filed with the clerk of the appropriate Texas district court, who dockets it as a civil action upon payment of the required filing fees (CPRC section 171.082 (Application to Court; Fees). As of 2026 the baseline filing is about US$350. However, actual fees vary by county and may include additional local components.
2. Contents of the Application. There are typical requirements but there is some flexibility to match the application to the circumstances. CPRC section 171.085 (Contents of Application), the court may require the application to: (a) show the jurisdiction of the court; (b) attach a copy of the arbitration agreement; (c) define the issue subject to arbitration; (d) specify the status of the arbitration; and (e) show the need for the court order. The court may not find the application inadequate for lacking any of these elements unless it grants the applicant a 10-day period to amend.
3. Service of Process. For the initial application, the district clerk issues process for service on each adverse party named in the application, with a copy of the application attached. Service must conform to the form and substance required for service of process on a defendant in a civil action in a district court (CPRC section 171.094 (Service of Process for Initial Application).
   For subsequent applications where jurisdiction has already been established, notice may be given in the manner required for a motion in a pending civil action (CPRC section 171.095 (Service of Process for Subsequent Applications).
4. Hearing. The court hears the application “in the manner and with the notice required by law or court rule for making and hearing a motion filed in a pending civil action in a district court” (CPRC section 171.093 (Hearing; Notice).

1. Full Vacatur. If the court finds that one or more of the statutory grounds under CPRC section 171.088(a) (Vacating Award) are established, the court “shall” vacate the award in its entirety.
2. Denial and Confirmation. If the application to vacate is denied and no motion to modify or correct is pending, the court “shall confirm” the award (CPRC section 171.088(c) (Vacating Award)).
3. Modification or Correction. If the grounds fall within CPRC section 171.091(a) (Modifying or Correcting Award (miscalculation, matter not submitted, or imperfect form)), the court may modify or correct the award and confirm it as modified or corrected. A motion to modify or correct may be filed in the alternative alongside an application to vacate (CPRC section 171.091(d)).
4. Partial Vacatur. The TAA does not expressly allow partial vacatur. The statute appears to treat vacatur as an all-or-nothing remedy. However, modification under CPRC section 171.091 (Modifying or Correcting Award) may achieve a functionally similar result in certain cases (e.g., removing an award on a matter not submitted without affecting the merits). The absence of an express partial vacatur mechanism may complicate challenges to awards that are partially valid.
5. Rehearing (Remittal to the Tribunal). Under CPRC section 171.089 (Rehearing After Award Vacated), when an award is vacated on any ground other than the absence of an agreement to arbitrate (CPRC section 171.088(a)(4) (Vacating Award), the court may order a rehearing before new arbitrators. If the award is vacated specifically because the arbitrators exceeded their powers, refused to postpone a hearing, refused to hear material evidence, or conducted the hearing improperly (CPRC section 171.088(a)(3)), the court may alternatively order a rehearing before the same arbitrators (or their successors). The time period within which the agreement requires the award to be made applies to the rehearing and commences from the date of the court’s order.
6. Appeal. Under CPRC section 171.098 (Appeal), a party may appeal a judgment confirming, denying confirmation of, modifying, or vacating an award. An order vacating an award without directing a rehearing is also independently appealable. The appeal is taken “in the manner and to the same extent as an appeal from an order or judgment in a civil action.”

No. Attorney’s fees are not automatically available in set-aside proceedings merely because a party prevails. They require a contractual or statutory basis.

CPRC section 171.048(c) (Representation by Attorneys; Fees) provides that arbitrators shall award attorney’s fees as additional sums required to be paid under the award only if: (a) the fees are provided for in the agreement to arbitrate; or (b) fees are authorized by law for a recovery in a civil action in the district court on a cause of action on which any part of the award is based.

For the court proceedings on an application to vacate, confirm, or modify, CPRC section 171.092(b) (Judgment on Award) authorizes the court to award “costs of the application and of the proceedings subsequent to the application” and “disbursements.” This covers court costs but does not expressly extend to attorney’s fees.

Texas follows the American Rule: each party bears its own attorney’s fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise. There is no standalone provision in the TAA granting attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a vacatur proceeding independent of the underlying contract or a fee-shifting statute.

If the underlying contract contains a prevailing-party fee clause covering disputes arising from the agreement, that clause may arguably extend to the confirmation/vacatur proceedings. Whether it does so is a question of contractual interpretation. Certain Texas statutes provide for attorney’s fees in breach-of-contract actions (e.g., CPRC section 38.001 (Recovery of Attorney’s Fees)), which may apply if the underlying award is on a claim for which fees are statutorily authorized ((1) rendered services; (2) performed labor; (3) furnished material; (4) freight or express overcharges; (5) lost or damaged freight or express; (6) killed or injured stock; (7) a sworn account; or (8) an oral or written contract.)

Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. 2016). The most significant modern decision. The Texas Supreme Court unanimously held that CPRC section 171.088 (Vacating Award) provides the exclusive grounds for vacatur under the TAA, eliminating all common-law bases for vacatur, including “manifest disregard of the law” and public-policy violations. This resolved a longstanding split among Texas appellate courts and significantly narrowed the avenues for challenging arbitral awards.

Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84 (Tex. 2011). The Texas Supreme Court held that the TAA permits parties to agree to expanded judicial review by contractually restricting the arbitrator’s authority (e.g., prohibiting reversible errors of law). This stands in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court’s Hall Street Associates holding under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and is a distinctive and commercially significant feature of Texas arbitration law. Sophisticated parties who want to preserve appellate-style review should draft their arbitration clauses accordingly. 

Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. TUCO, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1997). Established the standard for “evident partiality,” holding that a neutral arbitrator exhibits partiality if he or she fails to disclose facts that might create a reasonable impression of partiality to an objective observer.

Tenaska Energy, Inc. v. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2014). Further refined the evident-partiality standard, finding partiality where an arbitrator failed to disclose contacts with a party’s attorneys while having financial interests with them. 

Las Palmas Medical Center v. Moore, 349 S.W.3d 57 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.). Established that vacatur for fraud requires clear and convincing evidence, proof that the fraud was not discoverable by due diligence, and materiality to an issue in the arbitration. 

Badgerow v. Walters, 596 U.S. 1 (2022). Although a federal decision, this U.S. Supreme Court ruling directly affects Texas practitioners. The Court held that under the FAA, a federal court may not “look through” a petition to confirm or vacate an award to find federal subject matter jurisdiction. An independent basis (typically diversity) is required. This has shifted many post-award proceedings into Texas state courts.

Low success rate for vacatur applications. Empirical data across jurisdictions confirms that setting-aside applications globally succeed at a rate of only approximately 23% (19% in the nine largest jurisdictions surveyed), meaning approximately 75–77% of awards survive challenge. See Wolters Kluwer Arbitration Blog, Empirical Analysis of National Court Judgements in Commercial Arbitration (https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/empirical-analysis-of-national-court-judgements-in-commercial-arbitration-what-do-the-data-tell-us/). 

No Texas-specific data was identified, but given the strongly pro-arbitration jurisprudence reinforced by Hoskins, vacatur is likely at least as difficult in Texas as in other major jurisdictions.

Contractual drafting as the key lever. Given the narrow statutory grounds and the elimination of common-law bases for vacatur, the most important practical tool available to parties in Texas is the arbitration clause itself. Through careful drafting—including limiting the arbitrator’s powers, specifying that errors of law are outside the arbitrator’s authority, and requiring a complete record of proceedings—parties can preserve broader judicial review under the Nafta Traders framework. Without such drafting, review is limited to the narrow grounds of CPRC section 171.088 (Vacating Award).

FAA/TAA interplay requires attention. Practitioners must be attentive to whether the FAA or TAA (or both) governs, as this affects both the available grounds for vacatur and the ability to agree on expanded judicial review. Where the FAA applies and preempts, expanded-review arguments may be foreclosed entirely. Careful specification of the TAA in the arbitration clause is advisable when parties wish to preserve the expanded-review option.

Section 171.090 — type of relief not a ground for vacatur. CPRC section 171.090 (Type of Relief Not Factor) establishes that just because the relief granted by the arbitrators could not or would not be granted by a court is not a ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award. This is a significant provision that underscores the breadth of arbitral authority in Texas to award remedies.