Spain — The effects of COVID-19 on Lease Agreements of Premises and Offices

02.04.2020

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The arbitration procedure in Spain is characterized, and constitutes one of its great advantages, by the difficulty of judicially annulling or revoking the award; the parties know that the award that is issued is in most cases firm and final and ends the conflict.

The art. 41 of the Spanish Arbitration Law only allows the annulment of the award for formal reasons (nonexistence or invalidity of the arbitration agreement, failure to notify any of the parties of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings, improper appointment of the arbitrators or that the arbitrators have ruled on matters that were not or could not be arbitrated by rule of law). And additionally the award is also voidable when it is contrary to «public order«.

That «public order» is such as to give rise, in case of violation, to the annulment of the award, is a matter that has always been controversial and debated; already in the 1958 New York Convention, “public order” is alluded to as a cause of refusal to recognize foreign awards. As the Constitutional Court (“CC”) recalls in the judgment that we commented, citing its own jurisprudence, “the material public order is the set of public and private, political, moral and economic legal principles that are absolutely obligatory for the preservation of society in a town and in a certain time and the procedural public order is configured as the set of formalities and necessary principles of our procedural legal order and only arbitration that contradicts any or some of such principles may be considered null and void for violation of public order”.

As an example, during 2018, 38 requests for annulment of awards were filed before the Superior Courts of Justice (“SCJ”), of which 31 were based on violation of public order; 8 of the lawsuits (21%) were estimated, 5 for violation of public order, and 3 for invalidity of the arbitration agreement.

The Madrid SCJ has been maintaining in recent times a very «expansive» interpretation of public order, which has generated doubts and fears in the institutions and Arbitration Courts, due to the dissuasive effect that this position could have when choosing Madrid as the seat of arbitrations, national or international.

And in the interpretative line to which we refer, the Madrid SCJ has maintained the following and surprising criterion: once an award was made and a request for annulment was filed by one of the parties, the litigants reached an out-of-court agreement and jointly requested the filing of the cancellation request; that is to say, both gave the award as good and final; the SCJ rejected the petition and continued to issue a judgment annulling the award, arguing that since the application for annulment was based on the violation of public order, then the matter was no longer available to the parties and was not, in the opinion of the Court, subject to transaction or resignation.

This was not the first time that the SCJ of Madrid had adopted this position: impeded the annulment of an award as being contrary to «public order», the parties no longer had the possibility to compromise and renounce the demand for annulment.

For the first time the matter has reached the Constitutional Court (CC): in a recent ruling on June 15, 2020, the CC has been clear and resounding; recalls in its ruling that the civil process is based on the principle of «the parties’ willingness to regulate their private interests, that is, to initiate jurisdictional activity, determine the purpose of the process and end it when they deem appropriate». It is what we call «justice begged for»; and this principle applies not only to civil proceedings before ordinary courts but also to arbitration proceedings. The judgment also affirms that arbitration is configured by law as a heteronomous mechanism for conflict resolution, to which the minimal intervention of the judicial bodies in favor of the autonomy of the will is essential.

And it concludes by stating that the annulment action must be understood as a process of external control over the award that does not allow a decision on the merits of the arbitrators’ decision, since the causes are assessed, which justifies that “the control of the awards are limited and annulment of the award can only be obtained in exceptional cases”.

Summarizing, the CC understands and proclaims that it is contrary to the right to effective judicial protection protected by art. 24 of the Constitution, the Court’s refusal to recognize the validity of an agreement reached between the litigants based on the parties’ power to act without a prohibitive norm authorizing it, and imposing a decision that subverts the «justice» principle that inspires the civil process; reason why it grants the requested protection and orders to roll back the proceedings to the moment before the order that denied validity to the joint request for file, so that the SJC dictates another resolution accompanied by the CC’s criteria.

Therefore, the SCJ will no longer be able to prevent litigants from settling and ending a claim for annulment of the arbitration award (as it usually occurs peacefully and with appeals or cassation remedies) and it must also take into consideration the restrictive interpretation of the concept of public order that the CC has established in this important judgment. Indeed, Spanish arbitration is greatly reinforced by this judgment of the CC.

It is usually said that “conflict is not necessarily bad, abnormal, or dysfunctional; it is a fact of life[1]” I would perhaps add that quite often conflict is a suitable opportunity to evolve and to solve problems[2]. It is, in fact, a useful part of life[3] and particularly, should I add, of businesses. And conflicts not only arise at the end of the business relationship or to terminate it, but also during it and the parties remain willing to continue it.

The 2008 EU Directive on certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters states that «agreements resulting from mediation are more likely to be complied with voluntarily and are more likely to preserve an amicable and sustainable relationship between the parties.»

Can, therefore, mediation be used not only as an alternative to court or arbitration when terminating distribution agreements, but also to re-organize them or to change contract conditions? Would it be useful to solve these conflicts? What could be the advantages?

In distribution/agency/franchise agreements, particularly for those lasting several years, parties can have neglected their obligations (for instance minimum sales targets not attained).

Sometimes they could have tolerated the situation although they remain not very happy with the other party’s performance because they are still doing acceptable business.

It could also happen that one of the parties wishes to restructure the entire distribution network (Can we change the distribution structure to an agency one?), but does not want to face a complete termination because there are other benefits in the relationship.

There may be just some changes to be introduced, or changes in the legal structures (A mere reseller transformed in distributor?), legal frameworks, legal conditions (Which one is the applicable law?), limitation of the scope of contract, territory…

And now, we face the Covid-19 crisis where everything is still more uncertain.

In some cases, it could happen that there is no written contract and the parties wish to draft it; in other cases, agreements could have been defectively drafted with incomplete, contradictory or no regulation at all (Was it an exclusive agreement?).

The contracts could be perfect for the situation imagined when signed several years ago but not anymore (What happen with online sales?) or circumstances, markets, services, products have changed and need to be reconsidered (mergers, change of directors…).

Sometimes, even more powerful parties have not the elements to oblige the weaker party to respect new terms, or they simply prefer not to impose their conditions, but to build up a more collaborative relationship for the future.

In all these cases, negotiation is the usual strategy parties follow: each one is focused in obtaining its own benefits with a clear idea of, for instance, which clause(s) should be modified or drafted.

Nevertheless, mediation could add some neutrality, and some space to a more efficient, structured and useful approach to the modification of the commercial relationship, particularly in distribution agreements where the collaboration (in the past, but also in the future if the parties wish so) is of paramount importance.

In most of these situations, personal emotional aspects could also be involved and make more difficult a neutral negotiation: a distributor that has been seen by the manufacturer as not performing very well and feels hurt, an agent that could consider a retirement, parties from different cultures that need to understand different ways of performing, franchisees that have been treated differently in the network and feel discriminated, etc.

In these circumstances and in other similar ones, where all persons involved, assisted by their respective lawyers, wish to continue the relationship although maybe in a different way, a sort of facilitative mediation can be a great help.

These are, in my opinion, the main reasons:

Mediation is a legal and organized procedure that could help the parties to increase their awareness of the necessity to redraft the agreement (or drafting for the first time if it was not already done).
Parties can be heard more easily, negotiation is eased in the interest of both of them, encourages them to act more reasonably vis-à-vis the other side, restores relationship if necessary, deadlock can be easily broken and, if the circumstances advice so, parties can be engaged separately with the help of the mediator.
Mediation can consider other elements different to the mere commercial or legal ones: emotions linked to performance, personal situations (retirement, succession, illness) or even differences in cultural approaches.
It helps to find the real (possibly new or not shown) interests in the commercial relationship of the parties, focusing in developments, strategies, new proposals… The mere negotiation between the parties and they attorneys could not make appear these new interests and therefore be limited only to the discussion on the change of concrete obligations, clauses or situations. Mediation helps to go beyond.
Mediation techniques can also help the parties to face their current situation, to take responsibility of their performance without focusing on blame or incompetence but on a constructive and future collaboration in new specific terms.[4]
It can also avoid the increasing of the conflict into a more severe one (breaching) and in case mediation does not end with a new/redrafted agreement, the basis for a mediated termination can be established, if the parties wish so, instead of litigation.
Mediation can conclude into a new agreement where the parties are more reassured, more comfortable with, and more willing to respect because they were involved in their construction with the assistance of their respective lawyers, and because all their interests (not only new drafted clauses) were considered.
And, in any case, mediation does not affect the party’s collaborative position and does not reduce their possibility to use other alternatives, including litigation or arbitration to terminate the agreement or to oblige the other party to respect its legal obligations.

The use of mediation does not need the parties to have foreseen it in the agreement (although it could be easier if they did so) but they can use it freely at any time.

This said, a lawyer proposing mediation as a contractual clause or, in case it was not included in the agreement, as a procedure to face this sort of conflicts in distribution agreements, will be certainly seen by his/her client as problem-solving attorney looking for the client’s interests rather than a litigator pushing them to a more uncertain situation, with unknown costs and unforeseeable timeframe.

Parties in distribution agreements should have this possibility in mind and lawyers have the opportunity to actively participate in mediation from the first steps by recommending it in the initial agreement, during the process helping the clients to express their concerns and interests, and in the drafting of the final (new) agreement, representing the clients’ and as co-author of their success.

If you would like to hear more on the topic of mediation and distribution agreements you can check out the recording of our webinar on Mediation in International Conflicts

[1] Moore, Christopher W. The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict. Jossey-Bass. Wiley, 2014.

[2] Mnookin, Robert H. Beyond Winning. Negotiating to create value in deals and disputes (p. 53). Harvard University Press, 2000.

[3] Fisher, R; Ury, W. Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in. Random House.

[4] «Talking about blame distracts us from exploring why things went wrong and how we might correct them going forward. Focusing instead on understanding the contribution system allows us to learn about the real causes of the problem, and to work on correcting them.» [Stone, Douglas. “Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most”. Penguin Publishing Group]

This is a summary of the approved measures, which unfortunately for both tenants and landlords do not include any public aid or tax relief and just refer to a postponement in the payment of the rent.

Premises to which they are applied

Leased premises dedicated to activities different than residential: commercial, professional, industrial, cultural, teaching, amusement, healthcare, etc. They also apply to the lease of a whole industry (i.e. hotels, restaurants, bars, etc., which are the most usual type of businesses object of this deal).

Types of tenants

Individual entrepreneurs or self-employed persons who were registered before Social Security before the declaration of the state of alarm on March 14^th, 2020
Small and medium companies, as defined by article 257.1 of the Capital Companies Act: those who fulfil during two consecutive fiscal years these figures: assets under € 4 million, turnover under € 8 million and average staff under 50 people

Types of landlords

In order to benefit from these measures, the landlord should be a housing public entity or company or a big owner, considering as such the individuals or companies who own more than 10 urban properties (excluding parking places and storage rooms) or a built surface over 1.500 sqm.

Measures approved

The payment of the rent is postponed without interest meanwhile the state of alarm is in force, but in any case, for a maximum period of four months. Once the state of alarm is overcome, and in any case in a maximum term of four months, the postponed rents should be paid along a maximum period of two years, or the duration of the lease agreement, should it be less than two years.

For landlords different to those mentioned above

The tenant could apply before the landlord for the postponement in the payment of the rent (but the landlord is not obliged to accept it), and the parties can use the guarantee that the tenant should mandatorily have provided at the beginning of any lease agreement (usually equal to two month’s rent, but could be more if agreed by the parties), in full or in part, in order to use it to pay the rent. The tenant will have to provide again the guarantee within one year’s term, or less should the lease agreement have a shorter duration.

Activities to which it is applied

Activities which have been suspended according to the Royal Decree that declared the state of alarm, dated march, 14ht, 2020, or according to the orders issued by the authorities delegated by such Royal Decree. This should be proved through a certificated issued by the tax authorities.

If the activity has not been directly suspended by the Royal Decree, the turnover during the month prior to the postponement should be less than 75% of the average monthly turnover during the same quarter last year. This should be proved through a responsible declaration by the tenant, and the landlord is authorised check the bookkeeping records.

Term to apply and procedure

The tenant should apply for these measures before the landlord within one month’s term from the publication of the Royal Decree-law, that is, from April 22^nd, 2020, and the landlord (in case belongs to the groups mentioned in point c) is obliged to accept the tenant’s request, except if both parties have already agreed something different. The postponement would be applied to the following month.

As the state of alarm was declared more than one month ago (March 14^th), landlords and tenants have already been reaching some agreements, for example 50% rent reduction during the state of alarm, and 50% rent postponement during the following 6 months. Tenants who do not reach an agreement with the landlord could face an eviction procedure, however court procedures are suspended during the state of alarm. We have also seen some abusive non-payment of rent by tenants.

When is becomes impossible to reach an agreement with the landlord, tenants have the legal remedy of claiming in Court for the application of the “rebus sic stantibus” principle, which was highly demanded during the 2008 financial crisis but very seldom applied by the Courts. This principle is aimed to re-balance the parties’ obligations when their situation had deeply changed because of unforeseen circumstances beyond their control. This principle is not included in the Spanish Civil Code, but the Supreme Court has accepted its application, in a very restricted way, in some occasions.

Summary — What can we learn in the time of Covid-19 that can be used in mediation? And what can we learn from mediation to be used in this crisis?

As you know, mediation is a way to solve conflicts in which the parties keep in their hands the possible solution. They do not need to come to a third party (judge or arbitrator) to impose the answer to them. Parties can imagine more freely what they need, and how to solve their differences.

Some of the elements and techniques mediators use in a mediation can also be used in and learnt from the current Time of Covid-19. And the current crisis also helps us to understand why they are so important in mediation.

Cooperation to get the solution is better than unilateral and imposed decisions

We usually tend to think that cooperation is a sign of weakness and that we recur to it only if we cannot impose or view or win our case. However, as in the time of Covid-19 where countries, scientists and people should fight together, when facing a conflict cooperation and going beyond your positions brings you the possibility to explore solutions that otherwise remain hidden.

« Now it is increasingly recognized that there are cooperative ways of negotiating our differences and that even if a “win-win” solution cannot be found, a wise agreement can still often be reached that is better for both sides than the alternative. […]

Three points about shared interests are worth remembering. First, shared interests lie latent in every negotiation. They may not be immediately obvious. Second, shared interests are opportunities, not godsends. Third, stressing your shared interests can make the negotiation smoother and more amicable. » [Fisher, Richard; Ury, William. “Getting to Yes: Negotiating an agreement without giving in”].

Listening is highly effective

In the time of Covid-19 we tend to accept better information that confirms our beliefs and we accept better indications that are in accordance with our preferences and beliefs. Nevertheless, also in this time, listening is of essential importance to understand the causes and solutions.

A mediator will always listen to the parties and will help them to do the same. Listening the other’s side arguments, its explanation of the facts, interests and needs, the reasons for its decisions… is also of utmost importance to find a joint solution.

«Whether you are a neutral third party (professional facilitator, friend, or manager) or one of the participants, as you listen to all the stories, you begin to sense the best solution. » [Levine, Stewart. “Getting to Resolution: Turning Conflict Into Collaboration.”]

A solution for me can also be a solution for you

In the time of Covid-19 it seems clear to all of us that a common solution is the only possible one. A vaccine will save the entire world. In mediation, the main benefit is to understand that, unlike a court judgement or arbitral award, a joint (not imposed) solution is possible and a benefit for me does not imply a damage or a lost for my opponent.

«A mediator works to understand each disputant’s perspective and to look for the value in it. In this role, you refrain from judging whose side is right or wrong. Instead, you try to see the merit in each side’s perspective. » [Shapiro, Daniel. “Building Agreement”].

We master the solution and we create the agreement in a safe environment

The solution to the current crisis does not only depend on the authorities and on the health professionals. A great part of the solution relies on everybody’s participation, washing our hands, respecting the social distance, staying safe at home avoiding contagion and the collapse of hospitals.

In court we leave the decision of the conflict in the hands of a third party –the judge, the arbitrator–. In a mediation, on the contrary, the solution remains in our hands. We know what our interests are, we create our agreement. Our imagination is our ally in finding the solution together with the counterparty and the assistance and experience of the mediator who does not impose it but helps the parties to find it. Quite often, what parties could get in mediation goes far beyond what a judge would’ve been able to grant. And this in a confidential environment.

«The Sage is self-effacing and scanty of words. When his task is accomplished and things have been completed, all the people say, “We ourselves have achieved it!” » [Lao Tzu]

Emotions do matter

Good and bad emotions are inevitable. Particularly in periods of uncertainty, crisis and loose of control, we all face strong emotions. This is true in situations like this Covid-19 and in all conflicts, and not only in personal ones. Egos, envies, fears, anxieties… are also part of our day-to-day life, work and business, but they are rarely considered in courts when solving your conflicts. A mediator helps you to take them into account in a safe environment and as a part of the conflict itself.

«Solving problems seems easier than talking about emotions. The problem is that when feelings are at the heart of what’s going on, they are the business at hand and ignoring them is nearly impossible. » [Stone, Douglas. “Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most”].

Royal Decree-Law 8/2020, of March 17, on extraordinary urgent measures to face the economic and social impact of COVID-19, even though it affects and produces effects in many different legal fields, does not include any reference to contracts for leases of real estate, or houses, premises or offices.

The purpose of this note is to analyze the effects of the situation of the State of Alarm regarding those leases of offices or premises that have been forced to close in application of the decree; those others that remain totally or partially open and in operation, although with a reduced or minimal activity, in principle are not subject to the conclusions reached below without prejudice to the fact that there are individualized cases to which, despite the fact that there is not a complete closure, reasonably and logically can be applied to them.

It is not excluded in any way that in the event of an extension of the validity of the State of Alarm, a regulation that affects the leasing contracts could be published, but for the moment this has not happened. If this were to happen, the content of said norm would apply.

Based on the principle of freedom of covenants enshrined in art. 1255 of the Spanish Civil Code, which allows the parties signing the contract to agree (i) what scenarios and situations should be considered as constituting cases of Force Majeure and Act of God and (ii) what the contractual consequences of such scenarios should be, the first exercise that must be done is to check if the contract includes a regulatory clause of Force Majeure and its effects; if so, such clause must be followed and its analysis is left out of this note.

In the absence of express regulation in the contract, the provisions of the Civil Code and specifically article 1105 would apply.

COVID-19 as Force Majeure

COVID-19 is an event that in principle meets the requirements of the Civil Code to be classified as an event of Force Majeure (art. 1105 Civil Code) since:

It is a foreign act and not attributable to the contractor who is the debtor of the benefit or obligation.
It is unpredictable, or if it were said to be «predictable», it is certainly inevitable.
The event in question, the pandemic, must be a cause and result in the breach of the obligation, that is, there must be a causal link.

Therefore, fulfilling the three requirements, the first conclusion that we reach is that very foreseeably, the Spanish Courts will classify as “Force Majeure” the situation caused by COVID 19 when a judicial dispute is raised in which such matter is discussed between litigants. We will now analyze the consequences of this status.

Consequences of considering COVID-19 as an event of Force Majeure

Most of the doctrine and jurisprudence understand that the effects of classifying a scenario as a case of Force Majeure in principle are:

Total and definitive impossibility of complying; releasing the debtor from the fulfillment of the obligation.
Partial inability to comply; the debtor is released only in the part that it is impossible to fulfill, but still bound by the part that can be carried out.
Temporary inability to comply; the debtor is released from the responsibility for default as long as the exceptional situation persists.

Now, let us analyze how it would affect to considerate the epidemic as Force Majeure in relation to lease agreements for uses other than housing.

Regarding the payment of rent

The question to answer is if the classification of the current pandemic situation as a case of Force Majeure frees the tenant (whose premises have been forced to close by order of the government authority) from the obligation to pay the rent while said closing obligation persists, including in the concept of «release» different alternatives: total or partial cancellation and / or total or partial postponement.

We are meeting these days with a frequent reaction among some tenants, who, unilaterally have informed their landlords that considering COVID 19 an event of force majeure and having been forced to close the premises / office, they suspend the payment of the rent while said situation remains. They do not terminate the contract, they do not hand over the possession, they remain in it (the premises remain closed and not operational) but they suspend the payment (it is not clear whether suspending in this case means liberating himself from the payment of the rent or postponing its payment for when the Force Majeure scenario ends).

Arguments against liberation

As much as this attitude can be considered “understandable” from the perspective of the lessee, not from the point of view of the lessor, said consideration runs into an obstacle: the interpretation of the Force Majeure made by the Supreme Court regarding pecuniary payment obligations, according to the Civil Sentence of May 19, 2015:

«Not being able to consider, in the case of pecuniary debts, the subjective impossibility — insolvency — nor the objective or formal imposition, the doctrine concludes that it is not possible to imagine that if the impossibility is due to a fortuitous event it could have as effect the extinction of the obligation.

The exoneration of the debtor by fortuitous event is not absolute, it has exceptions, as provided for in article 1105 CC, and one of them, by application of the «genus nunquam perit» principle, would be in cases of obligations to deliver generic things.

In such circumstances, the pecuniary debtor is obliged to fulfill the main obligation, without the economic adversities freeing him from it, since what is owed is not something individualized that has perished, but something generic such as money”.

In conclusion: it does not seem that this jurisprudential criterion allows to defend that the fulfillment of the pecuniary obligations is released, extinguished or that its breach is justified in cases of Force Majeure, therefore the pecuniary debtor, in this case the lessee, in application of this criterion and due to the generic condition of the money, would be obliged to fulfill his main obligation not being freed from it by the unforeseen economic adversities on the basis of Force Majeure.

Arguments in favor of liberation: art. 1575 of the Civil Code

Having said the foregoing, reference should be made to an article of the Civil Code that, with certainty, will be profusely cited in the upcoming judicial conflicts.

The art. 1575, dealing with the leasing of rustic estates, recognizes the lessee’s right to the reduction of rent in the event of loss of more than half of the fruits (unless otherwise agreed) in «fortuitous, extraordinary and unforeseen cases … such as fire, war, plague, unusual flood, locust, earthquake or another equally unusual that the contractors have not been able to rationally foresee ”.

Is this article, foreseen for rustic leases, applicable to urban leases?

The art. 4.1 CC allows the analogical application of the rules when (i) they do not contemplate a specific assumption and (ii) they regulate a similar situation in which “identity of reason” may be appreciated.

The Sentence of the Supreme Court from January 15, 2019, that solved a conflict of a lease of a building used as hotel, in which the tenant had sought the reduction of the rent under the clause “rebus sic stantibus” by the crisis of 2008 and had alleged in his favor the application of art. 1575, established:

«The argumentation of the appealed judgment rejecting the claim to lower the agreed price is also not contrary to the legal criterion that follows from art. 1575 CC, which is the rule that allows the reduction of income in the leasing of productive assets that do not derive from risks of the business itself, it also requires that the loss of benefits originates from extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous cases, something that by its own rarity could not have been foreseen by the parties, and that the loss of fruits is more than half of the fruits. In this particular case, none of these circumstances concur. The decrease in rents comes from market developments, the parties anticipated the possibility that in some years the profitability of the hotel would not be positive for the lessee and the losses alleged by NH in the operation of the Almería hotel are less than fifty per hundred, without taking into account that the overall result of his activity as manager of a hotel chain is, as the Audience considers proven in view of the consolidated management report, positive”.

The Supreme Court does not admit the application of art. 1575, but not because it is considered not applicable to non-rustic leases, but because the Court concludes that the requirements are not fulfilled since the 2008 crisis was neither unpredictable and because the lessee’s losses do not exceed 50%.

But, that interpretation of the Supreme Court together with the wording of art. 4.1 CC would support the claim of the lessee who has no incomes during the State of Alarm to demand a reduction in rental fee that fits the principle of proportionality.

Regarding early termination at the request of the lessee

However, we may find situations in which the lessee considering the current situation, decides to terminate the lease in advance, delivering the premises to the lessor.

They are cases in which the early termination of the contract is intended, without respecting (i) or the mandatory term (ii) or the previous notice, in both cases under the hypothesis that they are thus regulated in the contract.

In these scenarios, we understand that it may be defendable that, due to the situation of force majeure caused by COVID 19 and in application of art. 1105 of the CC, the lessee is exempt from the obligation:

To respect the mandatory term of the lease
To give prior notice to the lessor in case of early termination of the contract

In both cases, the contract would be terminated with the delivery of possession of the premises, without prejudice to having to respect the other obligations set forth in the contract for termination and delivery, provided that they are not equally affected by the situation of Force Majeure.

Our opinion is that, also in application of Article 1,105 of the CC, the thesis that the lessee would be released from any obligation to compensate damages to the lessor for said advance resolution or breach of the obligatory duration of the contract could be defendable before the Courts.

Conclusion

In conclusion, when the Courts decide on the effects of the current pandemic (that they will surely classify as Force Majeure), and how this will affect the obligations of leaseholders who have been forced to close their business, our opinion is the following:

Regarding the obligation to pay the rent, despite the contrary criterion of the sentence from May 19, 2015, we find defendable the analogue application of art. 1575 of the CC, based as well on the Supreme Court Sentence from January 15, 2019, in order to demand a proportional and equitable reduction of the rent.
Regarding the power of the leaseholder to terminate the contract in advance, in case the leaseholder hands the possession of the property to the lessor, we find defendable to exonerate the leaseholder from complying with the advance notice or mandatory term in case provided in the contract, without the obligation to indemnify the lessor for this reason.

Application of the Rebus Sic Stantibus clause (“RSS” clause)

We will analyze below if the RSS clause can be applicable to the case that we are studying and with which consequences.

Requirements of the RSS clause (Latin aphorism that means “things thus standing”)

The principle RSS operates as an intrinsic clause (that is, implicit, without the need to expressly agree by the parties) in the contractual relationship, which means that the stipulations established in a contract are so in view of the concurrent circumstances at the time, that is, «things thus standing”, so that any substantial and unforeseen alteration of the same could lead to the modification of the contractual content.

The RSS clause is not regulated in any article in our laws; It is a doctrinal construction that the jurisprudence has traditionally admitted (examples among many other Supreme Court Sentences from June 30, 2014, February 24, 2015, January 15, 2019, July 18, 2019), with great caution, only in certain cases, and requiring the following requirements:

That there has been an extraordinary alteration in the circumstances of the contract, at the time that it must be fulfilled, in relation to those present at the time the parties entered the contract.
To analyze whether an incident can determine the extraordinary alteration of the circumstances that gave meaning to the contract, we must a) contrast the scope of said alteration regarding the meaning or purpose of the contract and the commutativity or performance balance thereof; and b) the «normal risk» inherent or derived from the contract must be excluded.

That there has been an exorbitant disproportion, out of all calculation, between the obligations of the contracting parties, causing an imbalance between them.
That the above occurs because of radically unpredictable circumstances.
That there is no other remedy to overcome the situation.

Historically, our courts have been very reluctant to apply RSS, although since the economic crisis of 2008-2012 there has been a certain change in criteria and greater jurisprudential receptivity.

Consequences of the application of RSS

The doctrine establishes that the application of the RSS does not have in principle terminating effects on the contract, but only modifying effects, aimed at compensating the imbalance of obligations between the parties; the doctrine establishes that this only applies to long-term contracts or successive contracts with deferred execution.

In application of the good faith principle, the reaction to an event of fortuitous event, force majeure or, in general, an event that generates a disproportion between the parties, such as that regulated by the RSS clause, should be the amendment of the contract to rebalance the obligations between the parties, and only in the event of material impossibility to comply with the obligations, the resolution of the obligation, in both cases without compensation for non-compliance.

For this reason, in relation to leasing contracts and in case of closure of the premises by mandatory mandate, we understand that the RSS clause may be:

alleged by the leaseholder to request or urge the lessor to downsize or postpone payment.
estimated by the judges, when these assumptions are debated before the Courts, when accepting such contractual amendment as equitable and legitimate in order to compensate the imbalance generated by the effects of COVID 19.

To summarize, the RSS clause can be a tool for the leaseholder that has had to close its premises during the State of Alarm, when negotiating with the lessor an amendment of the contract, trying to postpone the rent while the State of Alarm or negotiating a discount.

We should bear in mind:

That the RSS clause is unavoidably applicable on a casuistic basis, there are no generalizations and it will be necessary to take into account the effect caused by COVID 19 in each specific contractual relationship (Supreme Court Sentence from June 30, 2014 and February 24, 2015) and the real imbalance of benefits produced, and
That, as we have said, the Courts are generally reluctant to apply this clause, that they only apply in the absence of any other legal tool and in situations in which the maintenance of the contractual status quo reveals a manifest “injustice ”and a evident and resounding imbalance between the performance of the parties.

Does this mean that the leaseholder may impose on the lessor a modification of the economic conditions of the contract under the RSS clause (postponement or total or partial cancellation of the payment)?

We cannot assure this, what we think is that the application of this RSS clause should:

Justify a reasonable request from the leaseholder to temporarily change the conditions of the contract (postponement or cancellation, total or partially) that the lessor must reasonably meet.
In case of unreasonable refusal of the lessor, we recommend to document as much as possible leaseholder´s request and the possible negotiations or refusal, in order to substantiate a suspension of the payment of the rent, total or partial, during the State of Alarm aimed, not to extinguish his obligation, but to postpone it.

We will have to wait for the reaction of the Courts when they judge these conflicts, but if we dare to anticipate that it is quite possible that the judicial tendency will be to grant protection to the leaseholder with support in the RSS clause and the principle of business preservation, when it comes to validating certain modifying effects regarding the payment obligations of the leaseholder (total or partial remission of the rent payment during the pandemic crisis, postponement, or partial postponement).

In any case, it will be essential to prove, that the behavior of the leaseholder seeking protection in the RSS clause to amend the contract, has been strictly adjusted to the principle of good faith (Supreme Court Sentence from April 30, 2015).

It will also be important to analyze case by case why the displacement of the risk derived from the “exceptional and unforeseen event” from one contractor to the other is justified (Supreme Court Sentence from January 15, 2015) and could well be defended (Supreme Court Sentence from July 18, 2019) that both contracting parties must divide and assume the consequences between the two of them. The judicial decisions will vary in each specific case.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In conclusion, it seems that the leaseholder would have two instruments in order to try to successfully suspend or postpone the payment of the rents, the RSS clause and the principle of Force Majeure.

In our view, the replacement of the contractual balance altered by the exceptional event, may consist of either an extension of the lease payment terms or the application of a total, or partial cancellation of the rental payment obligation while it lasts the State of Alarm, but we understand that it will be defendable that the delay in the payment may not give rise neither to the termination of the contract under art. 1124 Cc nor to the requirement of damages art. 1105 Cc, therefore, will not empower the lessor to urge eviction.

Therefore, the steps to be followed in each case would be:

Carry out an examination of the contract to check whether force majeure and acts of God are regulated and if the current situation is in accordance with the contract provisions.
Should nothing be set forth at the contract, and in case the leaseholder has had to close the premises or office, notify the other party of this circumstance and try to negotiate a novation of the lease requesting:
- Waiver of the payment obligation during the Alarm State.
- The application of a discount on the payment obligations with both parties sharing the effects of the pandemic, in a proportion to be agreed.
- Postponement of payment obligations until the premises or office can be reopened with a payment plan for the deferred debt.

If it is not possible to reach an agreement, it is advisable to try to maintain evidence that the parties have acted in good faith trying to reach a negotiated solution and at the extreme (from the leaseholder´s point of view) announce, without waiting to receive a communication or claim from the Lessor, the suspension of the rental fee payment until reopening of the premises/offices, justifying the same in the Alarm State.

Once the Agency agreement has terminated by the Principal, the Agent usually decides to claim for some indemnities or compensations. These include damages indemnities and goodwill (clientele) compensation.

In order to claim them it is very important to consider the limitation period in which both can be demanded. We have observed that agents usually take too long to decide whether or not claiming for such compensations, they start negotiations with their principals to find a solution to their conflict, sometimes they are re-negotiating their position for a new agreement, area or conditions; or sometimes they simply consider that there is no rush to proceed.

In similar terms as in the EC Directive on Agency Agreements (art. 17.5), the Spanish Agency Act (art. 31) expressly foresees a limitation period of one year from the termination of the agreement in order to claim both the damages indemnity and the goodwill compensation.

This means that after the expiration of such term, no claim will be admitted by our Courts. And in contracts ruled by Spanish law and submitted to arbitral procedures, the agent also risks finding his claim dismissed after that period. This duration cannot be modified by the parties in their agreement, but they can take some actions to extend it.

This limitation has, therefore, important consequences. Of course, there could be an infinite number of situations and we do not intend to cover all of them, but in case the Agency agreement terminates, the following ideas can be useful:

The one-year period starts from the day the agreement was terminated. This date should also be considered carefully if there was not a formal termination letter.
One year, according to the Spanish Civil code, implies that the period terminates the exact day one calendar year after (from date to date, for example, May 1 to May 1 next year) or the following day if that day does not exist (for instance, February 29^th to March 1 next year).
In general terms, the starting of this one-year period is the termination day and not the date in which the letter was sent or received or when the Principal urges the Agent to fulfil his obligations. The previous notice period (if any) shall be respected if included in the termination notice.
In case the letter contains an immediate termination, that day will be the starting date, even if the procedure reveals that the Principal should have given a termination notice.
Generally, this applies to each agency agreement. This means that in case of successive and not connected agreements (for instance, the first one ends and the second one starts 10 months later), the termination period will be considered for each separate agreement. Nevertheless, linked agency agreements (agreements with a specific duration that work one immediately after the previous one) are usually considered as one agreement.
Some activities of the Agent can interrupt this one-year period, re-starting a new one. For instance (some have been accepted by the case-law, others are expressly mentioned in different pieces of legislation):
- An extra-judicial claim sent by the Agent or by someone in his behalf claiming for the goodwill indemnity, even if the compensation is incorrectly qualified as employment dismissal instead of commercial agency compensation.
- Claiming the goodwill compensation as a labour indemnity before the labour courts when it was not clear the sort of relationship between the parties.
- Starting a conciliation procedure before a First Instance Court
- Starting a mediation procedure (when done by both parties or by one of them enforcing the mediation clause in the contract) will also interrupt the term during the mediation procedure from the moment in which the request for mediation has been received by the mediator or deposited at the mediation institution.
- The acceptance by the Principal of the debt or the goodwill compensation when asking the clients list.
Other actions by the Agent could have different results depending on the circumstances and some have not been accepted as valid to interrupt this limitation period:
- A claim started by the Agent before a non-competent court, will depend on the circumstances.
- A criminal prosecution does not interrupt the one-year period
- The starting of the preliminary procedure (diligencias preliminaries) has neither been accepted to interrupt the one-year period.

Therefore, as a conclusion, in the drafting phase of the agreement it seems to be a good idea to consider a mediation clause. This will grant the parties an additional and useful tool to solve their conflicts and a possible way to obtain extra time in case the courts will be called to intervene.

And when an agency agreement terminates (with or without mediation clause), our recommendation for the Agent is immediately submitting the case to a legal local advisor. When the Agent has, for example, received a promise for a new agreement and he is still discussing on it, or he is still negotiating the termination, it is advisable to be careful and to take the necessary actions at least to interrupt the lapse of the one-year period and not to lose the possibility of a future claim. A simple letter carefully drafted could be very useful for the Agent’s interests.

A final remark for Distribution Agreements

Although for some aspects, particularly the goodwill compensation, Spanish Supreme Court has admitted the analogy with Agency agreements, this is not the case for the limitation period of one year to claim it. The distributor claiming for the goodwill indemnity will not be limited to one year after the contract terminated. In cases like these, it is convenient, however, to have precise advice on the type of contract we are facing, since the border between the agency and the distribution is not always clear.

According to the well-established jurisprudence of the Spanish Supreme Court, a distributor may be entitled to compensation for clientele if article 28 of the Agency Law is applied analogically (the «inspiring idea«). This compensation is calculated for the agent based on the remunerations received in the last five years.

In a distribution contract, however, there are no «remunerations» such as those received by the agent (commissions, fixed amounts or others), but «commercial margins» (differences between the purchase and resale price). The question is, then, what magnitude to consider for the clientele compensation in a distribution contract: either the «gross margin» (the aforementioned difference between the purchase price and the resale price), or the «net margin» (that same difference but deducing other expenses and taxes in which the distributor had incurred in).

The conclusion until now seemed to be to calculate the compensation of the distributor from his «gross margins» since this is a magnitude more comparable to the «remuneration» of the agent: other expenses and taxes of the distributor could not be deduced in the same way as in an agency contract neither expenses and taxes were deduced.

The Supreme Court (November 17, 1999) had pointed out that in order to calculate compensation for clients «it is more appropriate to consider it as a gross contribution, since with it the agent must cover all the disbursements of its commercial organization«. In addition, the «earnings obtained» «do not constitute remuneration in the same sense» (October 21, 2008), given that such «benefits«, «belong to the internal scope of the agent’s own organization» (March 12, 2012).

Recently, however, the judgment of the Supreme Court of March 1, 2017 (confirmed by another of May 19, 2017) considers that the determination of the amount of clientele compensation in a distribution contract cannot be based on the «gross margins» obtained by the distributor, but in the «net margin». To reach this conclusion, the Court refers to a judgment of the same court of 2016 and to others of 2010 and 2007.

Does this imply a change in the case-law? In my opinion, this reading that the Supreme makes is not correct. Let’s see why.

In the judgment of March 2017, the disjunctive between gross or net margin is mentioned in the Second Legal Argument and refers to the ruling of 2016.

In that judgment of 2016 it was said that although in another of 2010 it was not concluded whether the calculation had to be made on gross or net margins, in a previous one of 2007, it was admitted that what was similar to the remuneration of the agent was the net profit obtained by the distributor (profits once deduced expenses and taxes) and not the margin that is the difference between purchase and resale prices.

Now, in my opinion, in the judgment of March 2017 the Supreme Court is referring in last instance to the judgement 296/2007 for something that the latter did not say. In 2007, the Supreme Court did not quantify clientele compensation, but rather damages. More specifically, and after stating that «the compensation for customers must be requested clearly in the lawsuit, without confusion or ambiguity«, the Court concluded that the Chamber «must resolve what corresponds according to the terms in which the debate was raised…in the initial lawsuit. And since…an indemnity of damages was interested mainly based on the time that the relationship had lasted…the solution more adjusted to the jurisprudence of this Court…consists in fixing as indemnification of damages an amount equivalent to the net benefits that [were] obtained by the distribution of the products…during the year immediately prior to the termination of the contract«. Therefore, in that the judgment of 2007 the Court did not decide on clientele compensation, but on damages.

In this way, the conclusion reached in 2007 to calculate compensation for damages on net margins, was transferred without further analysis to 2016 but for the calculation of clientele compensation. This criterion is now reiterated in the judgments of 2017 almost automatically.

In my opinion, however, and despite the jurisprudential change, the thesis that should prevail is that in order to apply analogically clientele compensation in distribution contracts, the magnitude equivalent to the «remuneration» of the agent is the «gross margin» obtained by the distributor and not its «net margin»: it does not make much sense that if the analogy is applied to recognize the clientele compensation to a distributor, it is deducted from its gross margins amounts to reach its margin or net profit. The agent also has his expenses and also pays his taxes starting from his «remunerations» and nothing in Directive 86/653/EEC nor in the Agency Contract Act allows to deduce such magnitudes to calculate his clientele compensation. In my opinion, therefore, and in line with this, distributors should be equal: the magnitudes that could be compared should be the (gross) retributions of the agent with the (gross) margins of the distributor (i. e. the difference between purchase and resale price).

In conclusion, judgments of March 1 and May 19, 2017 insist on what I consider a prior mistake and generate additional confusion to an issue that has already been discussed: the analogical application of clientele compensation to the distribution contracts and the calculation method.

Updating Notice (January 27, 2020)

In a recent Order (“Auto”) of the Supreme Court of November 20, 2019 (ATS 12255/2019 of inadmissibility of an appeal), the Court has had occasion to return to this matter and to confirm the criteria of the last jurisprudence: that in the distribution contracts, the magnitude to consider to apply the analogy and calculate the goodwill indemnity are the “net margins”.

In this procedure, a distributor appealed the decision of the Provincial Court of Barcelona that recognized compensation based on net margins and not gross margins. Said distributor requested the Supreme Court to annul said judgment on the grounds that it was taken following the latest jurisprudence, erroneous according to previous one in the appellant’s opinion.

The Supreme Court, however, seems to confirm that, contrary to the thesis that I defended above in this Post, « there is no alleged error in the most recent jurisprudence in the analogical interpretation of art. 28.3 of the Agency Law for the distribution contract, nor, therefore, the need to review the most recent jurisprudence on the subject ». Consequently, if the Supreme Court does not review its latest jurisprudence and considers that the judgment that applied the net margins was acceptable, we must consider that the magnitude to be considered in the compensation for clientele in distribution contracts is that of the net margins and not gross margins

With this decision it seems (or just «its seems»?), therefore, that the Court settles the discussion that, however and in my opinion, will nevertheless continue to rise to numerous discussions.

Franchise contracts almost always incorporate post-contractual non-competition clauses.

The Franchisor intends to prevent that, once the contract is over, the Franchisee takes advantage of the “goodwill” generated by the franchised activity becoming an obvious competitor.
The Franchisee, on the other hand, intends to have his hands as free as possible in order to devote to any activity, whether or not it competes with the business of its former Franchisor.

The natural vocation of the Franchisor is to build these covenants in the widest possible way, both territorially and temporarily, but that attitude easily collides with the non- competition EU regulations.

In 2013, the EU Court of Justice issued (case La Retoucherie / Manuel C) an order answering a question submitted by a Spanish Court that ruled that such restrictions on post-contractual free competition would only be valid if they were preached only with respect to the “premises” in which the terminated franchise contract had been developed, while the prohibition could not extend its effects to the locality (town or city) or to a larger geographical territory (region or country).

On the other hand, the Franchisor usually requires that the franchise agreement is subject to the legislation and the jurisdiction of the country where its headquarters are located, avoiding the legislation and jurisdiction of the courts of the franchisee’s country.

A few months ago the Superior Court of Justice of Madrid issued an interesting ruling on this issue declaring void an arbitration award by the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC.

The arbitration award ruled about the contractual relation between a Spanish franchisor and an Argentine franchisee and a post-contractual non-competition clause that prevented the franchisee from performing competitive activities at the end of the contract throughout the territory of Argentina and Uruguay; the contract was subject to Spanish legislation and jurisdiction and, as mentioned above, it was obviously contrary to EU law.
The arbitration award considered that the aforementioned post-franchise non-competition clause was valid and accordingly ordered the former franchisee to pay the contractually provided penalty.
The arbitrator’s argument was that the rules of the European treaty on competition are limited to competition in the EU internal market and to trade among the Member States while the conflict judged in the arbitration was a franchise agreement that prohibited post-contract competition on the Argentinian and Uruguayan markets, which are not part of the EU internal market.
The Superior Court of Justice of Madrid did not share this argument and declared the arbitration decision void; the Judgment argued that Spanish law “ineluctably” incorporates the EU regulations beyond its territorial scope; therefore, if a restrictive agreement is authorized by European law, it must be considered lawful in Spanish domestic law; and vice versa, if the agreement is considered illegal or not authorized by community law, it will not be lawful in our domestic law.
Consequently, since Spanish law was applicable to the franchise contract in question, the arbitrator should have applied European law, and should have analyzed the non-competition agreement in the light of the European rules no matter if its effects were deployed in non-EU territories.

The relevant conclusion is clear: if the franchise contract is subject to the legislation of an EU country, even if the territory where the franchise deploys its effects is outside the EU, it will be unavoidably subject to the regulations of the EU on competition restrictive agreements.

The European franchisor must then decide if he prefers to submit to the legislation of his country or to the regulations of the country where the franchise is located, perhaps more permissive and less restrictive with respect to these types of agreements.

Javier Gaspar Álvarez-Novoa

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